Introduction to Law Final Exam

Q2). What are the main institutions of the European Union and how do they differ in
terms of their powers and responsibilities?
Since the foundation of the European Coal and Steel community there have been many
institutions, with differing roles and powers. Today the main institutions are The European
Parliament, The Court of Justice of the EU, The Council of the European Union, The
European Commission and the European Council. This essay will discuss their individual
powers and responsibilities, it will then analyse these.
The European parliament is the most recognisable face of the European Union, since its
establishment as the common assembly of the European coal and steel community in 1952. It
officially became the European Parliament in 1962 and has been publicly elected since 1979.
This makes it the publicly accountable face of the EU as its members must be elected and
thus must act on their constituents’ behalf. The European Parliament has three main
responsibilities.
The European Parliament’s first power is to debate and approve any proposed European laws.
The parliament debates any proposed legislation and under “ordinary legislative procedure”
must approve jointly agree with the Council of the EU for a proposal to become law. Thus,
the European Parliament can block proposals from becoming law if it rejects them three
times. The Second power of the European Parliament is to approve the EU budget. After the
Commission draws up the budget the European Parliament has the power along with the
Council of the EU to approve or reject the budget. Thus, parliament has power to ensure EU
money is spent in such a way to benefit EU citizens. Parliament also has a committee which
monitors how the budget is spent and annually passes judgement on the Commission’s
spending of the budget. Parliament’s third and greatest responsibility is to supervise the EU.
The Parliament holds the Council of the EU accountable by calling in the president to answer
questions. It expresses its views to the European Council through its president who is present
at all European Council meetings. Most importantly Parliament appoints all Commissioners
and holds it politically answerable with the ability to pass a “motion of censure”. Although as
Franchino and Hoyland say in their article “Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary
Systems: Opportunities, Conflict, and Institutional Constraints” that quality of parliamentary
democracy depends on the accountability of executive and it is up to parliament to hold them
accountable. It is often criticised that the only publicly elected face of the EU has only the
responsibility of a watchdog with no real power.

The Court of Justice of the EU has many powers and responsibilities. The Direct effect of EU
law means that CJEU has an important responsibility in advising national courts. The national
courts of each country are responsible for ensuring EU law is correctly applied, however, if
they feel there is a risk it could be interpreted incorrectly then they can refer it to the EU in a
“preliminary ruling procedure” to ask for advice in interpreting EU law. Unfortunately, many
people feel that this is a hugely flawed system. As Richard Rawlings says in Law and
administration, the judgements are often curt, unhelpful and Delphic in character. It also takes
on average up to eighteen months to get a preliminary ruling.
The CJEU also has a significant power in that it ensures EU law is obeyed. If a country is
failing to fulfil its obligations under the EU treaties, European Charter of Fundamental
Human rights, Regulations, Directives or Decisions this country can be taken to the CJEU.
The CJEU will investigate and gives a judgement. If guilty the country in question must fix
the problem at once, if it does not the CJEU can issue a fine. The CJEU has the final say in
interpreting all treaty provisions, and other EU laws, thus there is extensive case law in this
area. A further power from this responsibility is that if any country or person believes that a
particular EU law is illegal, they can ask the court to annul it. If the CJEU finds the law is in
breach of any of the treaties it can annul it. This power granted to the CJEU extends to every
citizen of the EU given primacy of EU law, gives the CJEU huge powers. The CJEU justifies
this with its own ruling in Van Gend en Loos (1963), giving itself autonomy that can not be
undermined by national law. CJEU also argues that states unilaterally breaking EU law would
undermine the whole Union. It takes this stance directly from the treaties stating that, Article
288 TFEU, providing that regulations are ‘binding’ and ‘directly applicable in all Member
States. Although this is a valid argument many who fear supernationalism criticising this
approach.

The Council of the European Union is composed of national ministers of each EU country. It
is a very important decision-making body within the EU. Meetings are attended by one
minister of each member state’s national government. The minister sent depend on the issue
being discussed. Decisions in the Council are taken by qualified majority voting, at least 55%
of member states must agree & the member states in agreement must represent at least 65%
of the EU population. The main responsibility of the Council of the EU is to ensure that
member states domestic policies are co-ordinated in fields such as economic and fiscal
policies. This is done through monitoring budgets and issuing recommendations for
improvement. Another area the council ensures co-operation is on foreign and defence
policies. The council defines and implements EU policy in these areas based on guidelines set
by the European Council. The Council works with the High Representative of the Union for
foreign affairs and security policy to ensure consistency. Unity and an effective EU
international policy.
The Council of the EU also work closely with the European parliament. Much like the
parliament the Council of the EU under the “ordinary legislative procedure” get to have a
final say on proposals for EU laws. If 4 member states consisting of 35% of the population of
the EU, the council can block the proposed law. Much like the parliament this power to block
proposed laws also extends to the EU budget, drawn up by the commissioners, which would
force the commission to go back and draw up a new budget if finance ministers are unhappy,
with how the budget will influence their nations in the coming year. As Hix et al. say in
“Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament” since the council has more power
domestically the commission rarely proposes a law or budget, they do not think the council
will accept. This gives the council a large responsibility to keep the commission in check.
The most powerful institution of the EU is the European Commission. It was originally
founded as the High Authority, changed in the Merger Treaty, and consists of 27
commissioners, one from each Member State. They are meant to be independent and
represent the best interests of the EU. They are the executive arm and manage the daily
implementation of EU policies and spending EU funds. The commission is often seen as the
most powerful institution in the EU as it is the only one with the power to propose legislation.
It does this through consultation with experts and public consultations, before passing the law
to parliament and the council to be passed. It also does this with the EU budget, controlling
how the EU spends its money is a huge power and one that is heavily checked by parliament
and the council. The commission also has the responsibility of enforcing EU law. If a nation
is failing to apply EU law then the commission sends a first official letter warning of
reprimand before referring the nation to the CJEU. The commission also represents the EU
internationally, speaking on its behalf on international matters such as trade policies and in
international bodies such as the World Trade Organisation. Here the Commission acts as a
spokesperson for the EU, giving one unified voice.
The European commission is very powerful and as such is subject to strict checks and
balances from the parliament and from the Council of the EU. However, many people think
that it is too powerful given according to Art 17(7) TEU the commissioners are elected not by
the public but by the European heads of state at the European Council.
The European Council is a meeting of the heads of state of every EU country, four times a
year in Brussels. Art 15(1) TEU gives the European council the ability to set the political
direction the Union will take and advise the commission, as well as the Council of the EU.
However, The European council has no legislative function. This is an important distinction
as it keeps European policies away from Domestic heads of state attempting to influence it.
In summary all institutions, have their own differing powers and responsibilities, but the
checks and balances and separation of powers ensure they all work together in harmony.

Q3) Please discuss and analyse the aims, achievements and failures of the following
treaties: • The Nice Treaty • The Lisbon Treaty
The Nice Treaty was a follow on from the Treaty of Amsterdam and amended the TEU and
the Treaty of Rome. In order to address the shortcomings of the treaty of Amsterdam, which
had meant to lead to sweeping reform but instead was essentially a consolidated TEU. This
led to Nice aiming to resolve the leftover issues from Amsterdam: weighting of member
states’ votes in the council of the EU, the number of commissioners and a rotation system of
commissioners, the extension of qualified majority voting to greater areas, as well as address
the institutional issues in order to facilitate the union to expand eastwards. On the surface
these aims seem simple and justified, addressing the weighting of votes and changing the
number of commissioners seem very fair policies, as does expansion of the union, which
would increase its international influence and thus international influence of its members.
However, many felt that this was dishonest, and the European parliament still officially
claims that the treaty aimed only to reform the institutional structure of the EU to allow
enlargement.
Nice had many notable achievements such as extending qualified majority voting to 90% of
legislative areas within the EU, leaving only taxation, asylum and immigration to unanimity.
It also introduced a new voting system to the council of ministers. The creation of specialised
judicial panels to hear specific cases and attempt to speed up and improve the workings of the
ECJ. Eurojust was also created to increase collaboration between police forces within the EU.
According to Bowie in A New Inventory of 30 Terrorism Databases and Data Sets, this has
been a huge success in cutting down on transnational crime in the EU. These achievements
of Nice all allowed for further co-operation within the EU and helped to clear the way for
further expansion as intended since the Treaty of Amsterdam.
However, Nice had many notable shortcomings. As De Burca says “The entire system of
governance in Europe at present still lacks the broad trust, solid democratic foundations,
cultural acceptance and overall legitimacy that most states possess”. The EU was still seen as
an economic community and it was not felt by the public within their own nations that there
was democratic involvement in the EU. The treaty also led to the EU establishing its own
European Defence and Security Policy in Art 7. Many feared that this would lead to the
militarisation of the EU and the beginning of a supernational takeover in the EU and the
erosion of sovereignty, many thought as Wessel says in “the state of affairs in eu security and
defence policy: the breakthrough in the treaty of nice,” the Nice Treaty has turned the
European Union into a fully-fledged security and defence. This fear of militarisation was a
key contributing factor to Ireland’s rejection of the treaty. Many smaller nations such as
Ireland also felt that losing their commissioner for 5 years at a time as proposed, as well as
expansion would diminish their own hold on power within the EU. This handing over of
power was also seen to be a gateway for EU interference in Ireland’s conservative laws on
issues such as divorce and abortion. The Treaty of Nice failed to see that public opinion
mattered, as Hayward says in Not a Nice Surprise: An Analysis of the Debate Surrounding
the 2001 Referendum on the Treaty of Nice in the Republic of Ireland “In 1987 the Supreme
Court ruled that the Irish state could not ratify a treaty of the European Union without
amending the Irish constitution; subsequently, all EU treaties have had to be approved by the
Irish population”. The treaty promoted integration but failed to express to the public why and
how integration would benefit them, leaving the populace small states to wonder what
benefits they would get from being given a smaller, rotary seat at the European table.
Although Nice failed at some of its objectives to clarify the structure of the EU and improve
its efficiency the failure of it to pass with these reforms was a positive step for smaller
nations, towards the increase in democratic involvement and reassurance that their voices
shall be heard.
The Lisbon Treaty aimed to clear up some of the mess left by the Treaties of Nice and
Amsterdam with a view to enhancing efficiency and legitimacy of the EU, as well as to make
the EU more democratic, efficient and better able to address global problems on the
international stage, such as climate change, with one voice. A key aim was also to clarify
which powers belong to the EU, which to member states and which are to be shared. The
proposed increased powers of parliament were also a welcome change to the public who
wanted to vote for a meaningful parliament. These aims all sought to make the Eu itself more
powerful and as thus many people felt that without the legitimacy, they had failed to conjure
from the Treaty of Nice it was simply a power grab.

Lisbon had many notable achievements, perhaps the most notable and consequential was the
merging of the three pillars of the three communities and the two forms of co-operation,
European Communities, EC Treaty and ECSC Treaty, Common Foreign and Security Policy,
and Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs. This laid the basis for the more politicised EU
seen today instead of just an economic community. The Charter of Fundamental Rights being
made legally binding was also a huge success, enabling any person to come to the CJEU with
fundamental rights violations. As Ewing says in The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights this
also laid the groundwork for much broader social rights. The citizens’ initiative was also a
ground-breaking achievement, ensuring that the commission is obliged to review any
proposal signed by at least one million EU citizens from several member states. All proposed
EU legislation being sent to national parliaments for review and offer reasoned opinion was
also a step in addressing the concerns of small member states that they would not be heard
after the Nice Treaty. The establishment of supporting competence in several fields as well as
joint competence in space and energy also helped show smaller member states that they were
being supported not dictated to. The reforms to the offices of both the commission and the
European Council presidencies has also helped to increase continuity and legitimacy of these
offices.
Unfortunately, just like Nice the Lisbon Treaty had many failures. Although none were
adopted, the creation of competencies belonging solely to the EU scared many people of a
future supernationalist power grab. As De Burca says in “The Lisbon Treaty No-Vote: An
Irish Problem or a European Problem?” The move away from a technocratic union, to an
increasingly politicised one is giving the EU a serious legitimacy problem, with many people
unsure where it stands. The failure of the EU to justify its increase in powers led in large part
to the Irish no vote as did the new common security and defence policy. This failing of the
treaty led to further failings due to the further discourse of distrust it sowed within the EU
surrounding the powers of the EU and their military intentions. When the Lisbon Treaty
again pushed for a downsizing of parliament and the reduction of commissioners the small
nations once again feared for their seemingly ever smaller seat at the table. The failure of the
EU to justify this change in the balance of power also led to several forced concessions to
smaller nations and Ireland in the redraft. As De Burca says in “The Lisbon Treaty No-Vote:
An Irish Problem or a European Problem?” if the EU wants to continue down this road of
ever increasing politization there must be communication with both smaller member states
and their populations. Increased democracy is the key to increased legitimacy and thus
increased politization.
In conclusion both the treaty of Nice and the treaty of Amsterdam failed to set out all their
established aims, however this may be a positive as it has shown that increased democracy is
needed within the EU. The successes of Nice and Amsterdam are also not to be overlooked as
the legality of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the citizen’s initiative the extension of
qualified majority voting within the EU and Eurojust all have increased the legitimacy of the
EU and improved its citizens lives. Although there is much still left to work on if the EU
wishes to fully move from an economic community to a political one, these two treaties have
succeeded in legitimising this move and illustrating how it can benefit citizens throughout the
EU.