Territorial Violence

in Colombia:
Recommendations
for the New Government
I. Executive summary 3
II. Dynamics of the violence and internal armed conflict 5
a) Social control by non-State armed groups and criminal organizations 9
b) Stigmatization 12
III. Impact of the violence and armed conflict on human rights 13
a) Killings of human rights defenders and social leaders 13
b) Killings of indigenous and authorities of African descent and leaders 15
c) Death threats and other forms of aggression 16
d) Homicides of former FARC-EP combatants 16
e) Massacres 17
f) Disappearances 18
g) Forced displacements and confinements 19
h) Sexual and gender-based violence 21
i) Recruitment of children and adolescents 22
j) Use of explosive devices 23
k) Right to an adequate standard of living 24
l) Cultural and religious rights 24
m) Right to health 25
IV. State response to the violence 26
a) Defence and security policies 27
b) Dismantling 28
c) Rule of law in the territories 30
d) Early Warning System 32
e) Territorial Round Tables on Guarantees 33
f) Comprehensive Rural Reform and Development Programmes with a
Territorial Focus (PDET) 34
g) Use of force by law enforcement officers 36
h) Allegations of lack of timely action against non-State armed groups and
criminal organizations and of collusion by State security forces 38

V. Conclusions 39
VI. Recommendations 41
VII. ANNEX - Impact of Violence Index 46
I. Executive summary
1. This report analyses the impact of increased violence1 on the enjoyment of
human rights due to the expansion of different non-State armed groups and
criminal organizations in various parts of Colombia over the last two years. The
report also highlights the actions taken by the Colombian State, as guarantor of
the human rights of all persons in the territories affected by this violence.
2. The Office recognizes the central role of the State in addressing the situation of
violence, and unequivocally deplores and condemns violence by non-State
armed groups and criminal organizations, particularly when it is directed towards
the population. Therefore, the focus on State responsibility, within the
framework of international human rights law, does not seek to diminish or
minimize the direct responsibility of non-State armed groups and criminal
organizations for the acts they commit, which must be duly investigated and
sanctioned. On the contrary, the analysis and recommendations contained in this
report highlight the role of the State to address the violence generated by these
groups and establish public policies that respond effectively and adequately to
this violence, with an approach based on the international human rights
obligations of the Colombian State.
3. The analysis contained in this report is the result of direct observation by the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia
and documentation of the human rights situation in the most affected areas of
the country. This analysis is based on information gathered in meetings with
victims, State authorities, international organizations, and civil society
organizations at the local, regional and national levels.

1
In this report, the Office understands the term "violence" to mean all acts exercised by non-State armed actors and criminal
organizations against the civilian population, including in contexts where the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has
determined that six non-international armed conflicts exist, three between the Colombian State and various organized armed
groups, and three between different organized armed groups. When referring to "armed conflict", the Office refers to the armed
conflicts identified by the ICRC in the document "Humanitarian Challenges 2022", available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/
document/colombia-humanitarian-challenges-2022-ihl.

3
 4. Prior to the publication of this report, the Office has sent written communication
expressing the concerns contained herein to the relevant State entities.
5. The Office shared this report with the National Government and the document
with the comments submitted by the Government is published together with this
report.
6. After the signing of the Peace Agreement in November 2016, the country saw a
decline in the level of violence as noted by the United Nations Verification
Mission in Colombia2. According to the Institute for Development and Peace
Studies (INDEPAZ), conflict-related homicides decreased from 12,665 in 2012 to
1,238 in 20163. In the territories most affected by the armed conflict, this
situation generated hope among the population. However, over the last two
years, the Office has observed that various non-State armed groups and criminal
organizations have expanded their presence in several regions of the country,
particularly those where the FARC-EP have demobilized. The activities carried out
by these groups and organizations increasingly affect the population and their
rights.
7. Despite the State's efforts, the predominantly military response to combat these
groups has failed to curb their expansion and the violence they generate. In
addition, the weak rule of law and lack of alternatives for development in the
territories affected by the violence has exacerbated the situation.
8. The affected communities have denounced State abandonment and the absence or
limited presence of civilian State authorities to address this situation. In several
territories, distrust in the State is growing and, in some cases, there have been
reports of collusion between the authorities and non-State armed actors.
9. In this sense, the recommendations made are intended to contribute to the
implementation of urgent solutions to protect life and human rights through the
consolidation of the rule of law and peace in the territories affected by violence.
10. The report concludes that it is necessary to review the State's strategy to
confront these groups and organizations and to protect the affected populations
and guarantee the enjoyment and exercise of their rights. To protect human
rights and combat the violent expansion of the groups, the Office recommends
three main lines of action to the Government.
11. First, significantly reduce and eventually eliminate the presence of non-State
armed groups and criminal organizations in the territories affected by violence,
through a combined effort in four areas: (i) the implementation of an effective
State policy to dismantle these armed groups, agreed by civil society, within the
framework of the National Commission on Security Guarantees; (ii) the adoption

2
https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/informe_sp_n2139927.pdf
3
https://indepaz.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/5-an%CC%83os-del-acuerdo-de-paz-1.pdf

4
 of a legal framework and a strategy for the collective subjugation of these groups
as provided for in the Peace Agreement; (iii) the implementation of a State
strategy for the protection of civilians; and (iv) to genuinely consider the call
made by populations affected by the violence for the adoption of humanitarian
or peace agreements with the groups.
12. Second, prioritize the territorial implementation of the Peace Agreement,
particularly the Comprehensive Rural Reform, consolidate the implementation of
the Development Programmes with a Territorial Focus (PDETs), with the
participation of the affected communities, and relaunch the National Program
for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS).
13. Third, it is recommended that the rule of law be consolidated in the areas most
affected by violence and the internal armed conflict, strengthening the presence
and capacity of the justice system and control agency institutions in the
territories. Thus, strengthening the capacities of local governments and people
of African descent and indigenous peoples’ governments in these territories. This
should be accompanied by a campaign aimed at restoring confidence in State
institutions, opening spaces for dialogue and participation with the affected
communities and civil society.

II. Dynamics of the violence and internal armed conflict

14. In its latest annual report on Colombia presented to the Human Rights Council in
March 2021, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights noted an
increase in violence by different armed actors in rural areas and in some urban
centres, severely affecting community life and leadership for indigenous peoples,
peasant and people of African descent, as well as women in rural areas.4 This
trend has continued and become more pronounced in certain areas of the
country since the beginning of 2022.
15. The Office has developed an index to identify some of the municipalities most
affected by the violence in 2021, using five violence-related variables of concern:
(1) killings of human rights defenders verified by the Office; (2) massacres
verified by the Office5; (3) displacement rate reported by the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) per 100,000 inhabitants; (4)
confinement rate reported by OCHA per 100,000 inhabitants; and (5) homicides of
former FARC-EP combatants reported by the United Nations Verification Mission in
Colombia (see Map 1).

4
https://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/03-03-
2022A_HRC_49_19_AdvanceUneditedVersion.pdf
5
For the definition of massacres, see E/CN.4/2000/11, para. 27.

5
16. The Office has also received reports from the affected communities of an
increase in sexual violence and recruitment of children and adolescents by non-
State armed groups and criminal organizations. However, there is no rigorous
and systematic documentation of these claims that would allow them to be
included as variables in the index. On the contrary, there is significant
underreporting of these violations, among others, mentioned in the next chapter
of this report, which must be addressed.

6
7
 17. The index identifies municipalities where the impact of violence on human rights
is high, very high or critical. This impact is observed in the Pacific corridor, in
several border municipalities, and in strips or corridors in which illicit economies
operate. Violence mostly affects people in peripheral territories where there is
also a limited State presence and where the rate of multidimensional poverty is
usually higher. Indigenous peoples, people of African descent and peasant
populations make up the majority of those who live in these territories (see maps
2 and 3).
18. Violence and its impacts are also present in urban areas such as Buenaventura,
Cali and Quibdó or in municipal capitals such as Santander de Quilichao in the
department of Cauca.
19. One of the contexts that generates the greatest vulnerability for the civilian
population is the violent territorial dispute between armed groups. It is in this
context that the peaks of violence and displacement are concentrated.
Populations are caught between two or more groups and suffer the
consequences of their armed actions. The stigmatization of leaders and other
community members exposes them to the violence of armed groups seeking to
take control of an area by inflicting casualties on the rival group. The level of
violence is exacerbated when armed groups appear vulnerable to rival groups.
20. In places where non-State armed groups or criminal organizations have exclusive
control, human rights violations tend to be less visible and related to the group's
own interaction with the civilian population.
21. In its latest report on humanitarian challenges published in March 2022, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that "according to the
figures, in 2021 most of the effects derived from armed conflicts and violence
reached the highest level of the last five years".6 The ICRC currently identifies six
non-international armed conflicts in Colombia.7 According to the ICRC, "the
reconfiguration of non-State armed groups, the rise in armed clashes, social
control and territorial disputes intensified pressures on the civilian population
and presented new challenges for humanitarian assistance".8
22. According to the National Police, the national homicide rate per 100,000
inhabitants also increased to 26.85 in 2021, compared to 23.7 in 2020. In 2021,
the highest homicide rates were in the departments of Valle del Cauca (57.63%),

6
https://www.icrc.org//en/document/colombia-humanitarian-challenges-2022-ihl
7
The six conflicts identified by the ICRC are: 1. The Colombian State against the National Liberation Army (ELN); 2. The Colombian
State against the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC); 3. The Colombian State against the former FARC-EP not currently
under the Peace Agreement; 4. The ELN vs. AGC; 5. Former FARC currently not under the Peace Agreement against the Segunda
Marquetalia; 6. Former FARC currently not under the Peace Agreement against Comandos de la Frontera.
8
https://www.icrc.org//en/document/colombia-humanitarian-challenges-2022-ihl

8
 Cauca (54.43%), Putumayo (52.63%), Chocó (53.23%), and Antioquia
(31.96%).9
a) Social control10 by non-State armed groups and criminal organizations

Testimony
"It is sad to have to say it, the word "weapon" destroys any chance
of dialogue, and in the face of an armed actor that comes,
intimidates, violates, obviously our authorities and our
communities are not going to have a defence. When the weapon
is in control, despite the desire to have full autonomy within the
territory, governance within the territory is not possible,
because obviously the armed actor is the one who comes and
sets the conditions."

Indigenous leader, Chocó department

23. Non-State armed groups and criminal organizations use various mechanisms to
control the population in the territories in which they maintain an active presence.
These mechanisms of social control include various forms of violence, coercive
measures, or direct threats to the population in order to control it and prevent it
from jeopardizing the development of its activities.
24. The Office has observed the excessive pressure exerted by non-State armed
groups for social control in municipalities in departments such as Arauca, Bolívar,
Cauca, Cesar, Chocó, Córdoba, La Guajira, Nariño, Norte de Santander,
Magdalena, Putumayo, and Sucre, with notable control of corridors for illegal
trafficking, such as in the Pacific region between Ecuador and Panama.

Testimony
"I am afraid because we have been in the presence of the dissidents
imposing their rules and conditions for so long that, even if we
don't want to participate, we have to obey what they say (...) there
are checkpoints on the road where men with big assault rifles stop
us and tell us that we have to ask for permission to leave and
look through our mobile phones.”

Human Rights Defender, Department of Arauca

9
https://www.policia.gov.co/grupo-informacion-criminalidad/estadistica-delictiva
10
Social control is understood as strategies of intimidation, harassment, pressure, extortion, and other actions aimed at controlling
the population and territories by non-State armed groups and criminal organizations.

9
25. The exercise of power through violence against community members destroys
organizational processes and the social fabric of communities, including
indigenous peoples and people of African descent. Communities and their
leaders resist pressure and violence from groups to protect their territory, their
lives, their environment, and their culture. However, non-State armed groups
and criminal organizations are responsible for massacres, killings,
disappearances, sexual violence, recruitment of children and adolescents, and
extortion of the population, impacting the community's ability to fully exercise
and enjoy their rights.
26. In some territories, the groups extort the population or control their movement.
In other places, these groups seem to supplant some of the State's own functions
and regulate many aspects of community life, including making decisions on
family matters or local justice.
27. Control tactics also include the obligation to abandon traditional crops, fishing,
and hunting; to participate in illicit activities, resulting in forced labour; the
control of community timetables, and the imposition of rules that regulate
community life (in some cases restricting the expression of non-hegemonic
sexual orientations and gender identities); limitation and control of the entry and
trade of food and other basic necessities; imposition of identification
documents; restriction of exchanges and communication with other
communities; and co-opting community structures; among others.
28. There is underreporting of these incidents due to the risks involved for
communities in reporting violence, the absence of State institutions in these areas,
or a lack of confidence in the institutions to report, and, in some cases, the difficult
access to some confined territories for State entities.

Testimony
"To this day, we continue to see targeted killings. In the
countryside, people do not speak out of fear. They just say a few words
to the people they trust. They don't want to testify for fear of
drawing attention to themselves."

Human Rights Defender , Department of Arauca

29. In the case of ethnic communities, indigenous peoples, and people of African
descent, violence, disregard for their authorities, displacement, and territorial
dispossession affect their physical and cultural survival. In addition, non-State
armed groups and criminal organizations force them into illicit economies and
impose restrictions on their traditions, forcing them to abandon their ancestral
practices that form the basis of their well-being, cultural identity and autonomy.
These societies have ancestral and collective land use

10
 practices that are supplanted by activities related to illicit economies and
monetization.

Case
The Jiw, made up of approximately 2,261 people, reside along the Guaviare
River banks, their livelihoods include fruit gathering, hunting, fishing, and
artisan work, are in danger of physical and cultural disappearance, as noted
by the Constitutional Court in 2012.11 Since the 1990s, the Jiw people have
suffered stigmatization, killings, forced disappearances of indigenous
authorities, forced recruitment, and forced displacement. In 2021, the Jiw
people of Karnüm "Barranco Colorado" were victims of a new forced
displacement. The increase in violence, the social and economic situation
they suffer, including frequent cases of malnutrition, put this group at greater
risk. The current situation could lead to an accelerated process of
disappearance of the Jiw people, since there are no guarantees for essential
parts of their lives, such as territory, self-government, housing, food
sovereignty, safe drinking water, ethno-education, health, life and freedom,
among others.

Case
Since 2020, a FARC-EP dissident group has been expanding its presence in
the Nariño Mountain range sub-region. It has been observed that human
rights abuses have increased, particularly in the municipalities of Cumbitara,
Leiva, Policarpa, and El Rosario. The Office has received information about
rules on coexistence imposed by the group, including restriction of
movement conditioned by identification measures and negative test results
for sexually transmitted diseases for persons between the ages of 13 and 70.
The situation generates fear among the population because of the possible
sanctions and serious consequences associated with non-compliance of the
measures. In April, a 15-year-old girl and an 18- year-old woman were
murdered, and a sign was found next to them stating that they did not have a
local mobility permit.

11
https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/Relatoria/autos/2012/A173-12.htm.

11
 Case
During 2021, in the municipality of Tibú (Norte de Santander department),
non-State armed groups established control, enabling them to manage illegal
revenues and strategic corridors, while carrying out constant attacks on State
security forces. Since 2021, the Office has observed cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment of people accused of being common criminals (youth
and migrants) by a non-State armed group. These young people are subjected
to forced labour, detention, videotaping in which they are forced to
incriminate themselves for common crimes, and actions of public scorn, such
as walking around urban areas with signs declaring they are criminals, as part
of a social cleansing strategy. The Barí indigenous people situated in the area
are under armed pressure to allow coca leaf cultivation in their territories.

Case
In the municipalities of Remedios and Segovia, northeastern Antioquia, non-
State armed groups and criminal organizations commit selective homicides
or massacres of those who confront or dispute their control over illicit
economies. According to official sources, between 2021 and 2022 there was
a 200 per cent increase in homicides in Remedios, while in Segovia the
increase was 100 per cent during the same period. This violence seeds fear
among the community, affects the development of communities’ dignified
living conditions, and leads to the forced displacement of people who do not
comply with rules imposed by these groups and organizations.

b) Stigmatization

30. The Office is concerned that individuals or communities living in areas under the
influence of non-State armed groups and criminal organizations have been
subject to stigmatization. Rival groups or, in some cases, authorities, accuse
them of being sympathizers or accomplices of the armed group or criminal
organizations whose influence they live under. On 10 March 2021, in a radio
interview regarding a military operation in which several minors were allegedly
killed, the Minister of Defense referred to the child victims as "war machines ".12
This description risks stigmatizing those who may in fact be victims of forced
recruitment and require State protection.

12
https://www.bluradio.com/nacion/maquinas-de-guerra-la-frase-del-ministro-de-defensa-en-blu-radio-que-genero-polemica

12
 31. Human rights organizations also suffer stigmatization when their activities or
demands are associated with the agenda of one or another armed group,
exposing them to risks from other armed actors.
32. Some community councils in the Atrato river basin (Chocó) for example, have
reported that they are threatened by members of different non-State armed
groups because they are considered suspected collaborators of an enemy group.
The Office has also documented a high level of stigmatization of the inhabitants
of the highlands of the Serranía del Perijá as alleged ELN members.

III. Impact of the violence and armed conflict on human rights

33. The Office has documented various human rights violations and abuses in the
context of armed conflict and violence in the territories. These particularly affect
indigenous peoples and people of African descent, and peasant communities and
include:

a) Killings of human rights defenders and social leaders

34. The main perpetrators of the killings of human rights defenders and social
leaders verified13 by the Office in the last two years were members of non-State
armed groups and criminal organizations. Most of the victims were defenders of
land, territory, the environment, the rights of indigenous peoples and people
African descent , the rights of peasant communities, as well as those who defend
programs created by the Peace Agreement, such as Development Programmes
with a Territorial Focus (PDETs) and the Program for the Substitution of Illicit
Crops (PNIS).
35. The Office has observed that one of the most significant patterns among killings
of human rights defenders in rural areas is the murder of community leaders by
non-State actors seeking control of the territory for illicit economies, for the
illegal appropriation of the most profitable economic activities, and for the
control of corridors for drug trafficking and extractive projects.
36. These killings weaken the affected communities’ organizational structures
and their capacity to resist violence, exploitation and dispossession of their

13
In order to monitor these cases of killings of human rights defenders, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Colombia has developed the following procedure: 1) Reception of allegations or complaints: referred to as Allegations; 2) Follow-
up on these allegations or complaints in the field: referred to as cases under verification; 3) Documentation of the allegations or
complaints. These allegations or complaints that meet the parameters of analysis are referred to as verified cases; and 4) Allegations
or complaints that the Office fails to verify are referred to as inconclusive cases for the Office to reach a determination. See:
https://www.hchr.org.co/micrositios/ homicidios-de-defensoras-y-defensores/

13
 territory by armed actors. These killings weaken the organizational structures
and social fabric of the affected communities. In many cases, they also slow
down social processes for the reivindication of rights by instilling fear, silencing
those who speak out and preventing renewed leadership. In rural areas of the
country, the homicide of leaders can result in the displacement of their
communities and the exploitation and dispossession of their territory by armed
actors. In some regions, such as in the Cañón del Micay in the department of
Cauca, grass-roots organizational structures have practically disappeared due to
the violence exercised against them, and the murder and displacement of their
leaders.

Between 2016 and 2021, the Office verified 562 killings of human rights
defenders (including 64 women). Of these cases, at least 61 victims were indigenous (13
women), 21 people of African descent (two women), and seven people were members
of the LGBTI community. From 2016 to date, there has been a progressive increase in
killings.
In 2021, the Office received 202 allegations of killings of human rights defenders, of
which it verified that in 100 cases there was a link between their death and their work
in defense of human rights and in 102 cases the information was inconclusive for the
Office to reach a determination. Twelve of the victims of the verified cases were women,
including seven indigenous people, and 88 were men, including nine people of African
descent and nine indigenous people. The main perpetrators were members of non-State
armed groups and criminal organizations. The departments with the highest number of
killings are Antioquia, Cauca, Chocó and Valle del Cauca.
Between 1 January and 30 June 2022, the Office received 114 allegations of killings of
human rights defenders, of which it has verified 22 cases, 67 cases are in the process of
verification and 25 cases were deemed inconclusive.

Case
In 2022, in the department of Arauca, the Office recorded an increase in the
number of killings of human rights defenders, social leaders, and journalists.
In 2021, the Office verified the killing of one human rights defender, while
in the first six months of 2022 it verified the homicide of six people.
According to official sources, 202 civilian killings have been recorded in the
department so far in 2022. One of the most significant events occurred on
19 January 2022, when a car bomb exploded in the municipality of Saravena,
near the Héctor Alirio Martínez building, where 60 human rights defenders
were gathered.

14
 Subsequently, FARC-EP groups that did not sign the Peace Agreement
assumed responsibility for the event.

b) Killings of indigenous and African descendant authorities and leaders

37. The killings of indigenous and African descent authorities or leaders has a
profound impact on the community and organizational processes. These killings
seem to be part of a strategy to impact indigenous peoples and people of African
descent’ capacity to assert their rights regarding dispossession of their territories
and violence, putting the survival of the communities at risk.
38. Between January 2020 and December 2021, the Office has documented the
homicide of at least 19 indigenous authorities, nine of whom were women, and
six African descent leaders, who were all male. During the first half of 2022, the
Office has received allegations of killings of eight indigenous leaders and three
African descent leaders.

Case
Historically, the municipalities in Northern Cauca have been one of the main
scenarios of the armed conflict in Colombia, with serious effects on the
communities within the region, particularly the Nasa people united by the
Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (ACIN). According
to ACIN, homicides in the Nasa territory have increased from 16 people in
2016 to 94 in 2020. Between 2017 and March 2022, seven incumbent
authorities of the Nasa people have been killed, three of them women.14
There have been also 30 homicides of people who hold some degree of
leadership in the ACIN, including four traditional doctors. In the first months
of 2022, four leaders of the Nasa people were killed, including an incumbent
Thuthenas (regional authority). This violence, affecting individual and
collective rights, has impacted the ACIN and the effective exercise of their
autonomous government, weakening governance and the social fabric of the
Nasa people. The disproportionate impact on women, children and
adolescents, the gradual and violent modification of the Nasa people’s way
of life due to pressures from drug trafficking and extractive economies,
reveal the risk to their physical and cultural survival.

14
https://nasaacin.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/WhatsApp-Image-2022-03-18-at-3.44.17-PM.jpeg

15
 c) Death threats and other forms of aggression
39. The Office continues to record a high number of threats, attacks, and other forms
of aggression towards human rights defenders. Threats are generally made
through pamphlets, phone calls, text messages, social networks, or through
intermediaries. In the case of women defenders, they may involve sexual
violence and/or be directed against their family members. Attacks may even take
the form of attempted murder and generate permanent anxiety and fear among
defenders, their families and their community. A phenomenon of particular
concern to the Office was the increase in pamphlets circulated by a group named
“Águilas Negras” during the electoral period, with death threats made against
social leaders, indigenous and African descent authorities, political leaders of the
opposition, members of civil organizations and even, in February 2022, members
of the Constitutional Court. Some of the threats contained in the pamphlets have
resulted in attacks. Consequently, these pamphlets severely affect defenders and
social leaders and their work. The competent authorities have initiated
investigations to identify possible perpetrators of the threats and acts of violence
which have arisen from the pamphlets, they have also implemented procedures
to protect some of the threatened leaders.
40. In many cases documented by the Office, threats and attacks have led defenders
to lower their profile, end their activism, leave their communities, give up their
positions and responsibilities as cultural or self-governing authorities, or even
leave the country. Between 2020 and 2021 alone, the Office documented 1,911
threats and attacks against human rights defenders.

Case
On 13 March 2022, Miller Correa, a Thuthenas (regional authority) of ACIN
and human rights defender of the Nasa people in Northern Cauca, was killed
in Popayán, after being named and threatened in a pamphlet signed by the
"Aguilas Negras" which circulated on 7 March of that year. In a pamphlet
dated 16 March, the "Aguilas Negras" claimed responsibility for the murder
of Miller Correa and threatened other indigenous leaders in Northern Cauca.
Miller Correa served as Thuthenas and representative of the Nasa Project’s
Life Plan at ACIN.

d) Homicides of former FARC-EP combatants

41. On 27 January 2022, the Constitutional Court declared an unconstitutional State
of affairs15 due to the low level of compliance with the implementation of the

15
https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/comunicados/Comunicado%20No.%2001%20Enero%2027%20de%202022.pdf

16
 Final Peace Agreement component on security guarantees for signatories in the
process of reincorporation into civilian life, their families, and members of the
new political party Comunes.
42. The United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (UNVMC) has verified the
homicides of 327 former FARC-EP members since the signing of the Peace
Agreement in November 2016, 22 of them in 2022.16

e) Massacres
43. Since the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2016, the Office has continued to
document massacres, including in African descent and indigenous communities.
Not only do massacres end people's lives, but they are also a form of
intimidation, coercion and control over communities, specifically as a result of
the extreme violence used. Although men make up most of the direct victims of
massacres, women, children and adolescents are strongly affected by the
psychological and economic impact of this form of violence. In many cases, it is
the women who seek justice, facing risks of retaliation by the groups responsible
for this violence.
44. The Office notes with concern an increase of approximately 200 per cent in the
number of massacres occurring between 2016 and 2021, with the departments
of Antioquia, Cauca, Nariño, Norte de Santander and Valle de Cauca being
particularly affected. So far in 2022, there has been a particularly marked
increase in the number of cases of massacres registered in the department of
Putumayo compared to 2021.

In 2021, the Office received information about 100 cases of possible massacres,
of which 78 were verified, 2 are still in the process of verification and 20 were considered
inconclusive by the Office. The Office notes with concern that, of the 78 cases of
massacres verified in 2021, there were a total of 305 victims (35 women, 15 boys, 5 girls
and 13 persons belonging to ethnic peoples: 7 indigenous and 6 people of African
descent).

Between 1 January and 30 June 2022, the Office has verified 33 massacres, 13 more
are in the process of verification and eight were deemed inconclusive.

In the cases verified so far, there are a total of 68 victims.

16
https://colombianismo/sites/default/files/n2238679.pdf

17
 Case
On 25 December 2021, a massacre occurred in the sector of Bellavista and
Puerto Nariño, in the municipality of Puerto Leguízamo, Putumayo, in which
at least seven people were murdered: six civilians and one member of a non-
State armed group. The information received by the Office indicates that the
Carolina Ramírez Front attacked alleged members of the group Comandos
de la Frontera and civilians who were alleged to be collaborators. The bodies
were recovered by State security forces and, according to community reports,
the victims were not from the region. Days later, members of the group
Comandos de la Frontera acknowledged that a member of their organization
was killed in the incident.
Following the events, 50 people from the community of Bellavista (Murui
people) and 58 people from Puerto Nariño (Kichwa people) displaced to the
urban centre of the municipality of Puerto Leguízamo due to fear of the
serious insecurity in the region.

f) Disappearances
45. The Office is particularly concerned about the persistence of disappearances in
the areas most affected by armed conflict and violence. The allegations received
indicate the use of disappearances as a way to generate anxiety and control over
the communities. These communities also note that the upsurge in violence has
introduced practices that are reminiscent of those that were used in the past. In
the departments bordering other countries, the permeability of borders, coupled
with disputes over control by armed groups, aggravate the risk of
disappearances. In 2021, the ICRC documented “every two days, on average, a
new case of disappearance related to armed conflicts and violence” ".17

46. The State has a robust legal framework and institutional mechanisms for
protecting people against disappearances. However, there are still significant
challenges that limit the potential and effectiveness of such mechanisms, in
particular barriers to access justice and delays in the implementation of search
regulations. Consequently, the State must, as a matter of priority, redouble its
efforts to review and implement a comprehensive public policy against
disappearances, including forced disappearances.18

17
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/colombia-humanitarian-challenges-2022-ihl
CED/C/COL/OAI/1. Paras.14 and 15. Concluding observations on the additional information submitted by Colombia under article
18

29 (4) of the Convention, Committee on Enforced Disappearances

18
 Case
On 28 November 2021, three community leaders from the Yurumangui
Community Council (Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca) met in the San José
Community to comply with a meeting ordered by the Columna Jaime
Martínez - Western Coordinating Command. At approximately 5:00 a.m.
they were reported to have boarded a boat crewed by members of the armed
group and the community presumes that they were heading towards El
Micay. The community generated alerts regarding the safety of these leaders
on 29 November when they did not return to their communities. Since 1
December, the authorities and the community have declared a permanent
assembly and delegated search commissions made up of more than 200
women from the community. However, they have been unable to make any
progress due to harassment by the armed group. One of the leaders has
returned to the territory while the other two remain missing.

The disappearance of these leaders and ethnic-territorial authorities has had

a disproportionate impact on African descent communities, the Black
Communities’ Process in the municipality, and the defence of ethnic-
territorial rights. It has also led to the departure of other authorities from the
Community Council and the loss of autonomy and self-government in
several of the communities along the upper Yurumangui River, which have
traditionally resisted the introduction of illicit crops and mining activities.

g) Forced displacements and confinements

47. In 2021, OCHA reported an increase in displacement caused by violence and in
the number of confinements or movement restrictions inflicted on the
community by non-State armed groups and criminal organizations.19 OCHA
indicates that, in 2021, 73,974 people (13,000 children and 5,256 women) were
displaced, while in 2020, 26,291 people were displaced. In addition, 65,685
people were victims of confinement.20 OCHA notes that 57 per cent of the
displaced population and 85.5 per cent of the population whose movement has
been illegally restricted are indigenous peoples and people of African descent.

19
The departments most affected by displacement are Antioquia, Cauca, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca. The departments most
affected by confinements or mobility restrictions are Antioquia, Chocó, Nariño and Valle del Cauca.
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20220120_infografia_impacto_y_tendencias_humanitaria_diciembre_
20

2021vfff_at.pdf

19
48. In several cases of sexual violence documented by the Office, the violence results
in the forced displacement of the victim and their family. Forced displacement
and confinements also make women and girls more vulnerable to sexual violence
and other forms of gender-based violence.
49. OCHA reported that, since December 2021, restrictions by non-State armed groups
have been recorded in the Chocó department, preventing the population from
accessing crops, hunting and fishing activities, gathering traditional medicinal plants
and participating in cultural spaces. According to OCHA, as of June 2022, at least
54,000 people from 197 African descent and indigenous communities are confined
in the department of Chocó, which corresponds to 85 per cent of the total number
of people confined (63,400) in the country in the first half of 2022.

Case
In the central part of the department of Cesar, in the upper part of the Serranía
del Perijá mountain range, 43 villages in four municipalities (Curumani,
Chimichagua, Pailitas and Pelaya) are under territorial and social control by a
non-State armed group. These villages, made up of predominantly peasant
communities, are on the border with Norte de Santander and Venezuela.
Although the non-State armed group’s military actions target State security
forces and there has been no fighting since 2018, it imposes restrictions on the
population's movement, including confinements, as well as threats to the life
and integrity of people, including human rights defenders. The weak
institutional presence and the difficult access to it affects the peasant population
and their enjoyment of rights and enables the group to control movement,
resolve local disputes and land conflicts, thus threatening the life and integrity
of the population.

Case
In 2021, the Office observed a gradual increase in rates of violence,
specifically homicides, in some municipalities in the department of
Magdalena such as Santa Marta, Ciénaga, and Fundación. This is associated
with disputes between the Pachencas and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de
Colombia - Clan del Golfo over territorial disputes and control of illicit
economies.
In 2022, clashes between the two groups have been recorded in rural areas.
On 15 April, in La Siberia, there were confrontations between the groups
from the early morning until mid-afternoon. The event directly affected the
population of La Secreta, who were caught in the crossfire. This situation
led to the displacement of 900 people (including 457 women and 327

20
 children) to the municipality of Ciénaga, making it the largest mass
displacement since the demobilization of the extinct Autodefensas Unidas
de Colombia in 2006.

50. Some leaders have informed the Office of their fears that the armed groups'
objective is to permanently dispossess them of their lands and that they would
rather die in their territories than be displaced and lose their ancestral lands.

h) Sexual and gender-based violence

51. The Office has documented different forms of sexual violence used against
women and girls, including rape, sexual slavery, forced early unions, and forced
pregnancies of minors. It has also learned that women in territories with the
presence of non-State armed groups are frequently forced to perform domestic
chores for them, sometimes suffering reprisals for doing so from other groups.
In some areas, such as Tibú (Norte de Santander), the Office was alerted to cases
of femicide in 2021.
52. Sexual and gender-based violence has been used by non-State armed groups to
control the population, extract information from victims, as a form of
punishment for their family members, and as part of forced recruitment of girls
and adolescents. Early warning 002 of 2022 of the Ombudsman's Office for the
municipality of Puerto Leguízamo (Putumayo), for example, states that "for girls,
adolescents and women, there are gender-related risk factors due to networks of
human trafficking for sexual and labour exploitation, and various expressions of
gender-based violence, exercised by threatening actors present in this
territory".21
53. In addition, in places where non-State armed groups are present, there are
greater barriers affecting women and girls’ access to institutional care pathways
for victims, due to fear of retaliation or stigmatization, distrust of institutions, re-
victimization, lack of confidentiality and negligence in the activation of these
pathways due to racial, social, gender, and age prejudices, among other reasons.
As a consequence, these cases are highly underreported. Trans women, especially
those in prostitution, are highly vulnerable to violence from these groups
because of their gender identity and the social stigma attached to prostitution.

21
https://alertasstg.blob.core.windows.net/alertas/001-22.pdf

21
 Testimony
"Women have been the most affected. We have been violated
physically, sexually, psychologically".

Social leader and human rights defender,

Department of Chocó

i) Recruitment of children and adolescents

54. Children and adolescents disproportionately suffer the consequences of violence
generated by non-State armed groups since they are direct victims of their
attacks and recruitment. A lack of education services, school meals, job
prospects, and limited opportunities to fulfil their life goals, mean children and
adolescents are more vulnerable to recruitment by non-State armed groups.
These groups expose children to exploitative dynamics that include some of the
worst forms of child labour22, trafficking, smuggling, sexual exploitation and
slavery, which primarily affect girls.
55. Some of the methods used by groups to recruit children and adolescents include
organizing concerts, offering goods such as mobile phones, handing over sums
of money to bring them closer to the group, intimidation, and threats. Members
of the groups seek out girls as partners, violating their rights and exposing them
to sexual and gender-based violence.
56. In 2021, the Office received allegations of 51 cases of recruitment and use of
children and adolescents. In addition, eight murders and three cases of sexual
violence against children and adolescents (two of them recruited girls) were
documented. These cases occurred in the departments of Amazonas, Antioquia,
Arauca, Caquetá, Chocó, Córdoba, Guaviare, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and
Tolima. According to the National Government,23 in 2021, the Unit for Attention
and Reparation of Victims recorded 98 cases of children and adolescents
involved in activities related to armed groups; and the Colombian Institute for
Family Welfare recorded 94 cases of children and adolescents who stated they
had been recruited by organized illegal armed groups.

22
International Labour Organization Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor (1999), Article 3.
23
Comments document: "Territorial violence in Colombia: Recommendations for the new government".

22
 Case
Thirteen years after the Constitutional Court warned in Decree 004 of 2009
that members of the Awá Indigenous People "are in danger of being
culturally or physically exterminated by the internal armed conflict," the
violence caused by disputes between non-State armed groups over control
of territory continues to impact this community’s individual and collective
rights. The Awá people are located in the department of Nariño, in the
municipalities of Barbacoas, Ricaurte, Tumaco, Samaniego and Roberto
Payán, and have a population of 25,813 people.
The Office has observed an increase in the recruitment of Awa children and
adolescents. Due to the pressure exerted by non-State armed actors,
traditional authorities are limited in exercising their right to autonomy and
self-government to protect Awá minors and prevent recruitment.

57. According to information shared by ACIN, as part of monitoring the situation of

the Nasa people by the Office, between 2019 and 2021, more than 270
indigenous children belonging to the Nasa people in Northern Cauca have been
victims of recruitment by non-State armed actors. A high percentage of whom
are thought to be girls.

j) Use of explosive devices

58. Explosive devices are used by non-State armed groups to control territory, to
limit the population’s movement and incursion by other groups, and to protect
illicit economies. The use of these devices seriously endangers the lives and
integrity of the affected population and their livelihoods, such as fishing, hunting,
and agriculture. It also puts communities’ food security and health at risk. In
2021, the ICRC recorded 486 victims of explosive hazards, the highest number in
the last five years according to the organization.24 The ICRC points out that "the
level of explosive hazard contamination in Colombia is not known for sure." and
that in the last four years it has "documented victims in 131 municipalities,
spanning 21 departments of the country".
59. Restrictions on movement also affect a multiplicity of related rights and the
control of armed groups to prevent the free movement of people generate
situations of acute vulnerability.

24
https://www.icrc.org//en/document/colombia-humanitarian-challenges-2022-ihl

23
 Case
In 2021, in the department of Norte de Santander, the Office documented at
least 13 incidents of violence and fear related to the installation of explosive
hazards. On 15 June 2021, a car bomb exploded at the 30th Army Brigade’s
military base in the city of Cúcuta, leaving 36 people injured. On 14
December 2021, two explosive devices were activated at the Camilo Daza
airport in Cúcuta, resulting in the death of three people, one civilian and two
police officers.

k) Right to an adequate standard of living

60. Violence by non-State armed groups with the objective of controlling
communities, particularly peasant, African descent and indigenous communities,
as well as other activities carried out by these groups, negatively affects the
enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of living, such as the right to
food, water, and territory, among others. Confinement and measures to restrict
families’ movement constitute obstacles for accessing food and their own
production systems. Many families in the communities are also forced to
introduce illicit crops. Forced displacement of the population, particularly
women, children and adolescents, also affects the right to an adequate
standard of living, since families are forced to leave their homes, their land, their
own forms of food production, and their own economies and live, for the most
part, on the poverty threshold in large cities in more precarious situations.25
61. The constant clashes between armed actors and the control imposed by them
on extensive land and river transport corridors limit the access of humanitarian
aid to confined or displaced populations. One of the areas that has been most
affected by these measures is the Pacific region.

l) Cultural and religious rights

62. Traditional practices of self-care, harmonizing and healing of the territory and
physical and spiritual illnesses have been threatened by violence and armed
conflict. The presence of non-State armed groups and State security forces in the
territories has limited access to sacred sites and traditional plants, preventing
the transmission of ancestral knowledge, preparation of medicines and the
spiritual harmonization of the territory.
63. The killings of leaders, including indigenous and African descent leaders, and
people with ancestral knowledge, accentuates the fear of exercising traditional

25
https://fiancolombia.org/wp-content/uploads/Cuarto-Informe-Alimentacio%CC%81n-2021.-Un-pai%CC%81s-que-se-hunde-en-
el-hambre.pdf

24
 authority, putting spiritual leaders and women who are traditional midwives or
caregivers in a situation of vulnerability. In rural communities, non-State armed
groups have prohibited religious rites, traditional exchange festivities and
community meetings.
64. The recruitment of children and adolescents by non-State armed groups and the
contamination of the territory with anti-personnel mines and remnants of war,
chemical inputs for mining, coca leaf processing and deforestation seriously
affect learning spaces and the transmission of culture, traditional knowledge,
and trades from one generation to the next. The physical and mental health of
members of the communities in the territories are also affected, as well their
worldview and spiritual and religious characteristics that uphold their lives,
identity, and the very survival of ethnic peoples and communities as collective
subjects.

m) Right to health
65. As noted in previous sections, movement restrictions prevent community
members from planting and harvesting their medicinal plants as well as health-
care centres. According to the ICRC, in 2021 the national health-care board
recorded 553 attacks against health-care workers, indicating an increase of 70
per cent compared to 2020.26 The Office has recorded restrictions to the medical
mission, due to the presence and actions of non-State armed actors, in the
department of Chocó in the San Juan and Atrato river basins in 2021 and 2022.
66. In addition to the deterioration of physical health among the population affected
by armed conflict and violence, the loss of freedom, fear, and anxiety have
caused mental health problems and even led to suicides, including those of
minors, especially among indigenous peoples. In the department of Chocó,
between January and April 2022, at least 20 minors committed suicide because
of fear of recruitment by non-State armed groups, among other reasons27.
According to the Federation of Indigenous Council Associations (FEDEOREWA),
this situation has been caused by "the presence of armed groups, confinement,
recruitment, mass displacement, and human rights violations. The combination
of these factors leads young people to feel that there is no future".28

26
https://www.icrc.org//en/document/colombia-humanitarian-challenges-2022-ihl
27
https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/conflicto/suicidios-en-choco-van-mas-de-20-jovenes-indigenas-en-2022-ante-el
-temor-a-violencia-y-reclutamiento/
28
https://cerosetenta.uniandes.edu.co/los-suicidios-que-nadie-atiende/

25
IV State response to the violence
66. The State's international obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights
include the duty to ensure the enjoyment of these rights by all individuals under
its jurisdiction. Such obligations are included in the Peace Agreement, meaning
its full implementation can positively change the population’s living conditions,
particularly in rural areas, and therefore contributes significantly to improving
the security situation in the country.
67. According to international human rights law, the positive obligations to
guarantee rights, such as those recognized in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, can only be fully complied with if the State protects
individuals not only against violations of the rights recognized in the Covenant
committed by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or
entities that impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights. The Human Rights
Committee has noted that there may be circumstances which, due to the failure
to guarantee the rights recognized in the Covenant, “give rise to violations by
States Parties of those rights, as a result of States Parties’ permitting or failing
to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish,
investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or
entities.”29 Similarly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
emphasized that the obligation to protect under the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights means that States must prevent effectively
infringements of economic, social and cultural rights in the context of business
activities.30

68. Thus, States have an obligation to exercise due diligence to take reasonable
positive measures that do not impose a disproportionate burden in the face of
reasonably foreseeable threats to life emanating from private persons and
entities whose conduct is not attributable to the State. States are therefore
obliged to take appropriate preventive measures to protect persons
under reasonably foreseeable threat of murder or manslaughter by criminals,
organized crime, or armed groups. States parties should also disband
irregular armed groups, such as private armies and vigilante groups, which are
responsible for deprivations of life and reduce the proliferation of potentially
lethal weapons to unauthorized individuals.31 The duty to protect the right
to life requires States parties to take special protection measures towards

29
Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 8.
30
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/GC/24, para. 14.
31
Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 21.

26
 people in situations of vulnerability whose lives are at particular risk because of
specific threats or pre-existing patterns of violence. These include human rights
defenders, humanitarian workers, children in situations of armed conflict,
members of ethnic and religious minorities, indigenous peoples, lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, and displaced persons.32

a) Defence and security policies

69. In 2018, the Colombian Government formulated two main policies to address
territorial violence: i) the defence and security policy for legality,
entrepreneurship, and equity33, which is designed to confront organized armed
groups and illicit economies, while consolidating the rule of law; and ii) the
“Peace with Legality” policy34 as the government strategy aimed at stabilizing and
consolidating the territorial State and strengthening security. The two policies
converge in their common objective to strengthen the presence and legitimacy
of the State across Colombian territory.
70. In the defence and security policy, five axes were identified, among which three
stand out as being the most directly focused on confronting territorial violence:
(i) water, biodiversity and the environment, which are seen as strategic assets
for the nation and therefore become a national security priority; (ii) the
disruption of crime, based on a policy of dismantling illicit economies, which
seeks to go beyond capturing heads of criminal apparatuses, developing a
structural attack on such illicit businesses; and iii) the shift from military control
to institutional control of the territory, under the premise that the main threat
to security and stability in Colombia is the precariousness and/or absence of
institutions in specific areas across the territory.
71. In this last axis, the most explicit in confronting territorial violence, the
government has proposed an order of action: phase 1, the creation of future
zones (Zonas Futuro); phase 2, the transition to zones for the construction of
legality; and phase 3, the transition to legality, entrepreneurship and equity
zones.
72. According to the government’s indications, the implementation of future zones
will constitute comprehensive intervention in the most critical areas in terms of
violence, illicit economies and institutional weakness, through the deployment
of military and police forces, along with articulated action from the State. In

32
Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 23.
33
Defense and Security Policy (PDS) for Legality, entrepreneurship, and equity (Política de Defensa y Seguridad (PDS) para la
Legalidad el emprendimiento y la equidad), Minstry of Defense of Colombia, Bogotá, 2019
34
See https://www.portalparalapaz.gov.co/publications/1579/implementacion/

27
 practice, these policies culminated in robust legal, administrative, and
programmatic support, with an increased presence of military forces in many
areas affected by violence but lacked clear coordinated actions with other State
institutions and achieved limited impact in terms of reducing violence. As a
result, a progressive increase in insecurity across the territory was observed, as
well as a lack of guarantees for the exercise and enjoyment of human rights in
these areas.
73. The State's response which focuses on the use of force and whose success is
measured in the number of casualties or captures inflicted on non-State armed
groups and criminal organizations, particularly with respect to those considered
heads, has not had the intended impact. In effect, the heads who are killed or
captured are quickly replaced, and no sustainable reduction in violence is
achieved.
74. The demobilization and reintegration of the FARC-EP was successfully
implemented but growing insecurity has exposed these people to the risk of
violence and, in some cases, even their lives are under threat. This is reflected in
the number of former combatants killed since the signing of the Peace
Agreement, which to date, amounts to 327.35 Since then, and with the exception
of the Ombudsman's Office which instated a broad territorial presence and
gained the proximity and trust of the communities, the presence of the State's
civil institutions in many territories continues to be weak.

b) Dismantling
75. The State's duty to prevent implies the adoption of all actions to avoid or mitigate
situations of risk to the population. The Peace Agreement established that it was
necessary to "safeguard the legitimate monopoly of force and of the use of arms
by the State across the territory"36 and proposed the design and implementation
of a public and criminal policy for the dismantling of any organization or conduct
referred to in the Agreement that threatens peace building. To this end, the
National Commission on Security Guarantees was established, responsible
for formulating and evaluating the Permanent Action Plan to combat and
dismantle the organizations and behaviour that are the object of the agreement,
chaired by the President of the Republic, and made up of the Minister of
the Interior, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General
of the Nation, the Ombudsman, the Director of the Special Investigation Unit
of the Office of the Attorney General, the Commanding General of the Military
Forces, the Director General of the National Police, as well as three recognized
experts in the field chosen by the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting
and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI in spanish),

35
https://colombianismo/sites/default/files/n2238679.pdf
36
Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, point 3.4.1.

28
 and two delegates from civil society as representatives of the "Human Rights
Platforms".
76. Despite the deterioration of the security situation in the territories and the
increase in violence by armed actors, there has been no progress in the
formulation of a public policy to dismantle armed groups nor its implementation
within the framework of the National Commission on Security Guarantees.
77. The Absence of Recognition section of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP),
during the hearing on monitoring the functioning of the National Commission for
Security Guarantees on 28 February 2022, verified the absence of an institutional
strategy to prevent violence from criminal groups.37 The JEP considered that the
National Commission on Security Guarantees had so far failed to function
effectively at the highest level of government as stipulated in the Peace
Agreement (point 3.4.3) and ordered the National Commission on Security
Guarantees to adopt a plan of action to combat and dismantle illegal armed
organizations.38
78. The Peace Agreement stipulates that the National Commission on Security
Guarantees, led by the President of the Republic, should meet once a month.
Between the signing of the Peace Agreement in November 2016 and 30 May 2022,
the Commission has only met 22 times, which could be indicative of a lack of
prioritization regarding its mandate.

Testimony
"Violence spreads in our communities as state abandonment grows.
Armed actors are gaining more and more strength, with the silence
of a government that does not comply the Peace Agreement".

Human Rights Defender, North-eastern Antioquia

79. The Office highlights the actions of the Office of the Attorney General, through the
Special Investigation Unit, regarding the criminal prosecution and capture of a
significant number of members of non-State armed groups and criminal
organizations, such as the case of 570 members of the so-called Clan del Golfo or
Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia in 2021. However, the arrests of members,
including some heads,39 of these groups and organizations have not prevented or
reduced the violence.

37
Special Jurisdiction for Peace," Security Guarantees and adopt plan to dismantle criminal organizations," 1 March 2022.
See:https://www.jep.gov.co/Sala-de-Prensa/Paginas/JEP-ordena-al-gobierno-adoptar-el-plan-para-desmantelar- organizaciones-
criminales.aspx.
38 Idem.
39
According to information provided by the National Government in its Comment document, in 2021, 300 operations were carried
out to weaken the structure of the Clan del Golfo (96 per cent more than in 2020), and 570 members of this organization were
captured.

29
 80. Actions taken to date have not altered structural conditions that facilitate the
expansion of these armed groups and organizations and their actions, such as:
sources of financing and money laundering schemes; corruption; trafficking of
arms; recruitment or exploitation of children and adolescents; or the lack of
human development alternatives to prevent young people from joining the
groups, among others. All these factors could be included in a national
dismantling plan as provided for in the Peace Agreement.
81. On 5 May 2022, at a hearing of the JEP Section of Cases of Absence of
Acknowledgement of Truth to evaluate actions taken by the Special Investigation
Unit of the Office of the Attorney General to dismantle criminal organizations
and guarantee the lives of the Peace Agreement signatories, the JEP gave the
director of the Special Investigation Unit 45 days to present an action plan that
takes into account the increase in the number of prosecutors and teams, a
regional prioritization (taking into account differentiated approaches),
victimizing acts against individuals and family members, explanations given by
the accused and potential risks for the victims, and a macro-criminal logic that
goes beyond a case by case basis.
82. The lack of a dismantling policy to complement the State's security policies and
guides the actions of the Office of the Attorney General and other State
institutions, has had repercussions in terms of the expansion of the armed and
violent presence of groups in the territory.

c) Rule of law in the territories

83. To a large extent, the current areas of violence coincide not only with
municipalities historically affected by armed conflict and violence, but also with
municipalities with a low index of democratic governance. This index created by
the UNDP in 2020, corresponds to the measurement of variables such as public
administration, effectiveness in social response, democratic participation and
security in Colombian municipalities. 38 per cent of the country's municipalities
with the lowest indices of democratic governance are in areas with the highest
levels of territorial violence, demonstrating the weakness of local State
institutions in these municipalities.40
84. Local state institutions hold the responsibility of addressing humanitarian crises,
preventing human rights violations and insecurity that seriously affect
their population without the sufficient economic, logistical or human resources
to effectively meet the population’s needs. These entities are overwhelmed
and are unable to meet their preventive and protection duties to the population.

40
Democratic Governance Index, UNDP, April 2022.

30
 The institutional framework scarcely manages to ensure comprehensive State
presence in the villages and towns most affected by violence.
85. In this context, actions planned at the national level do not consider the
sustainability or local conditions needed for their implementation. In turn, some
local authorities in these most affected areas have expressed the need for the
National Government to enforce the principle of complementarity and
subsidiarity to develop social policies and programs as a preventive response to
violence. The Office has observed cases of weak coordination between
municipal, departmental and national entities.41
86. The Office has observed that in some rural areas in Arauca, Catatumbo, Bajo
Cauca, Sur de Córdoba and in the Pacific region, the regular presence of the State
falls on local ombudsmen, who demand greater support from the State. The role
of the municipal ombudsman's offices has been key to prevent and provide
protection against violence suffered by communities in the territories.
Nonetheless, their work on human rights protection at the local level has been
affected by a series of factors, such as the scarce resources with which they work;
the high level of functions and responsibilities assigned to them; and the
situation of risk in which officials are in. According to information received by the
Office, at least 25 per cent of the country's ombudsmen have received threats
while exercising their duties, as illustrated by the recent situation regarding
public officials in Arauca, Chocó, Cubará and the Pacific municipalities of Nariño.
Community Action Boards (Juntas de Acción Comunal - JACs) are also key local
institutions.42 However, they also face serious security risks concerning their community
work, including killings of their members and presidents.43

87. Demands from communities that face daily pressures and threats from groups
falls on the Office of the Ombudsman. This entity has gained the proximity and
trust of the communities. Its territorial deployment and operation serve as a
model for the territorial consolidation of other State institutions that form
part of the justice system and the Public Ministry.

88. The weak institutional presence and response further impacts the creation of
conditions to safeguard the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights

41
Information obtained by the Office in meetings with Territorial Transitional Justice Councils, municipal and departmental security
councils and in interviews with State officials and victims.
According to the UNDP survey, in Arauca, Catatumbo and Chibiriquete, six out of ten people surveyed trust the Community
42

Action Boards to some degree or a lot.

In 2020, the Office verified the homicide of 27 individuals belonging to Community Action Boards (JACs) (including 12
43

presidents); and in 2021 the Office verified the homicide of 10 JAC presidents.

31
 and their protection, particularly for female victims of gender-based violence in
the context of conflict and forced displacement. Likewise, State institutions lack
the sufficient resources and capacity to integrate a gender approach. The
situation regarding ethnic peoples is not improving, since the institutional
response does not seem to have ensured ethnic authorities’ participation,
strengthening of self-government, and recognition as a condition of institutional
presence and response.
89. A territorial strategy to re-enforce the rule of law and the implementation of the
peace agreements can and must strengthen the capacities of indigenous peoples
and people of African descent for self-government and create alliances with
territorial organizational structures to advance this agenda.

d) The Early Warning System

90. Two of the instruments provided for in the Peace Agreement to prevent violence
are the Early Warning System (EWS) of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Intersectoral Commission for Rapid Response to Early Warnings (CIPRAT). This
prevention strategy requires the Office of the Ombudsman to warn of risks and
to articulate comprehensive action by the State, both nationally and locally, to
prevent the alerted risks from materializing. From 2017 to date, the Early Warning
System has issued 234 early warnings, of which 53 per cent have been considered
imminent due to the severity and high probability of the risk materializing.
91. The Office recognizes the preventive work carried out by the Office of the
Ombudsman through the Early Warning System. However, it considers that the
implementation phase of recommendations to mitigate the warned risks has not
had the intended results. On one side, it is necessary to further refine the
recommendations for the alerts themselves so that they can be translated into
concrete and operational state actions. On the other side, it is necessary to
review the CIPRAT methodology to prevent institutions from recounting their
actions, failing to articulate a comprehensive institutional response to eliminate
risk factors.
92. Civil society participation in CIPRAT has also been limited and irregular. In
addition, the legal reserve imposed on the information derived from CIPRAT has
prevented transparent monitoring of its commitments and conclusions. The Early
Warning follow-up reports issued by the Office of the Ombudsman show CIPRAT’s
practical limitations in implementing recommendations for the warnings. Of the
145 follow-up reports created from 2018 to date, which analyse the evolution of
the risk and the monitoring of the State response in terms of prevention and
protection, the Office of the Ombudsman found that risk mitigation has only
been achieved in two of the alerts, while the risk in alerted territories remained

32
 in 99 cases and became more acute in 42 cases.44 The Office of the General
Procutaror of the Nation can re-enforce control in relation to the
implementation of recommendations contained in the Early Warnings and in
monitoring the responses within the framework of the CIPRAT.

e) Territorial Round Tables on Guarantees

93. Since 2009, and in view of the high levels of violence against human rights
defenders, civil society organizations have backed a "National Process of
Guarantees". This initiative was coordinated as a process of political dialogue at
the highest level between civil society and the State, with support from the
international community. The objective of this process is to define actions, policy
guidelines, and other concrete measures to address the persistent violence
against defenders in Colombia. At the national level, the National Process of
Guarantees is embodied in the "National Round Table on Guarantees", as well as
in sub-groups focused on research, prevention- protection and women human
rights defenders. The National Process opened spaces for dialogue at the
territorial level through the "Territorial Round Tables on Guarantees" in 20
prioritized regions due to high levels of violence45.
94. In recent years, the National Process of Guarantees faced a crisis due to, among
other factors, the lack of compliance with the agreements made and the
Government favouring other spaces to address the situation of human rights
defenders. These spaces had a lower level of participation from civil society. This
resulted in the suspension of the process in practice, both at the national and
territorial levels. In response to a claim filed in 2019 and in view of the new
increase in violence against human rights defenders, in May 2020, the Superior
Court of Bogota ordered the National Government to reactivate the National
Round Table on Guarantees and the Territorial Round Tables on Guarantees to
define concrete solutions to the violence against human rights defenders,
through dialogue with the communities.46 Despite this decision, the National
Round Table and the sub-groups have not resumed activities. Nine territorial
round tables are in operation, although seven of them have ceased to hold
regular meetings and no longer have adequate institutional representation.47 The
Territorial Round Tables of Putumayo and the Andean Zone of Nariño have not

44
Ombudsman's Office, https://alertastempranas.defensoria.gov.co/Informe?OrdenInformes=consec_
asc&FiltroIdAlerta=&FiltroIdTypeReport=&FiltroIdTypeManagement=&FiltroIdTypeEvolution=.
United Nations Development Programme, National Guarantees Process, 2019. See: UNDP_Co_PAZ_Publicaciones_
45

ResumenGarantias_Dec1_2019_ISintesis (1).pdf
Superior Court of Bogotá, First Civil Decision Chamber, 11 May 2020. See: Sentencia_2ndInstancia_
46

TutelaECILiderazgosSociales_11may2020.pdf (coljuristas.org)
47
The Territorial Round Tables of Atlántico, Sucre, Norte de Santander, Arauca, Chocó, Valle de Cauca and the Pacific Coast of Nariño
have had irregular operation, while the Antioquia and Cauca round tables have functioned regularly, but with problems in terms of
institutional representation.

33
 reactivated and seven round tables have yet to be established48. This situation
has undermined the dialogue between civil society and authorities in the
territories most affected by violence and, therefore, the possibility of finding
common solutions to the factors that give rise to violence.

f) Comprehensive Rural Reform and Development Programs with a Territorial

Approach (PDET)
95. It is important to continue strengthening the implementation of the PDETs49
provided for in the Peace Agreement, due to their capacity to transform the
territories by addressing structural causes of violence. The initial results of the
PDETs were positively valued by the communities, particularly the diagnostic and
proposal stage, which had extensive participation from affected communities.
The Office recognizes the progress of the PDETs in the territories, including the
improvement of tertiary roads, social and community projects, and public
services.50 Similarly, where progress has been made in land titling, the
communities have valued these institutional efforts.
96. However, the different platforms of civil society organizations, grouped under
the "Mesa Nacional PDET”, have expressed their concern regarding the lack of
comprehensive implementation of the PDET and other components of the
Comprehensive Rural Reform contemplated in point 1 of the Peace Agreement,
aimed at structurally transforming rural Colombia: access to and use of land, and
the National Sectorial Plans.
97. As stated by the Office in its annual report on the human rights situation in
Colombia in 2021 and noted by the Office of the General Procurator l of the
Nation,51 progress must also be made in the implementation of the
comprehensive measures set out in the Action Plans for Regional
Transformation52 that seek solutions to territorial needs and promote the
implementation of life and ethno-development plans for rural communities.

48
These Territorial round tables are those of Magdalena Medio, Bogotá, Risaralda, Meta, Córdoba, Montes de María and Cesar.
49
The Development Programs with a Territorial Approach (PDET) "are a special 15-year planning and management instrument,
whose objective is to urgently implement instruments to stabilize and transform the territories most affected by violence, poverty,
illicit economies and institutional weakness". See https://www.renovacionterritorio.gov.co/specials/special_pdet/
50
According to the report “Estabilización en los municipios PDET", 1,799 projects have been approved in 170 PDET municipalities in
the 16 Sub regions with an investment of $356,441 million. Of the 1,799 approved projects, 76.15 per cent have already been
completed and/or delivered, 17.73 per cent are under implementation, 2.78 per cent are in the structuring phase and 3.34 per cent
have been structured.https://www.portalparalapaz.gov.co/publicaciones/990/informes-de-seguimiento/
51
https://www.procuraduria.gov.co/portal/media/file/TercerInfomealCongreso_2021_25_Conlinks.pdf
52
The Action Plans for Regional Transformation (PATR) are the instrument through which the PDETs are implemented in the
territories. These contain strategic guidelines for territorial development based on community diagnoses that identify local needs;
objectives in relation to the points defined in the Peace Agreement; and initiatives that have been built collectively between
communities and institutions, and which, in turn, constitute the series of concrete actions for territorial transformation. The PATRs
also establish the necessary budgets for implementing the initiatives.

34
 Furthermore, active participation of the communities must be ensured, their
needs identified in the participatory forums must be considered, and ethnic and
gender approaches must be established in the implementation of the program.
98. Regarding land issues, the Office has found that the security conditions in several
PDET zones have impacted the development of land restitution processes. In 38
of the 170 PDET municipalities, restitution processes have been suspended due
to deteriorating security conditions. 88 of these municipalities do not have
security conditions and therefore the restitution policy’s initiation has been
prevented or has been done partially, and in these same municipalities there
have been 807 withdrawals from accessing or continuing with restitution
processes.53
99. In relation to the land use and access component, the Office is concerned that,
since the beginning of the implementation of the Victims and Land Restitution
Law (Law 1448 of 2011), and according to information from the Land Restitution
Unit (URT),54 3,022 incidents of threats have been filed against 2,639 land
claimants, of which 156 occurred in 2021. There have also been 51 cases of
killings of land claimants, of which seven occurred in 2021.
100. In 2021, in the department of Meta, three women and one man who were
members of a land restitution commission disappeared and were subsequently
murdered. Two of the victims were relatives of a land claimant in Mesetas
(Meta). As a result of this event, land restitution processes in the area were
suspended for security reasons.
101. Since the beginning of 2022, there have also been multiple acts of violence
against peasant leaders carrying out restitution processes in their communities
and organizations, with the defence, promotion and reclamation of access to
land and territorial rights being the most visible. The Office has documented two
emblematic cases that illustrate this violence. The first is the death of Luz Marina
Arteaga, leader of El Porvenir community in the municipality of Puerto Gaitán,
department of Meta, who was the spokesperson and interlocutor with
authorities for land titling to the community which is recognized by the
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Justice as a historical community
and holder of the right.55 The other case is the homicide of Teófilo Acuña and

53
Ibid. Land Restitution Unit (URT) report to UN Human Rights, 30 September 2021.
54
Ibid. Land Restitution Unit (URT) report to UN Human Rights, 30 September 2021.
55
Rulings STP 16298 of 2015 https://corporacionclaretiana.org/2021/06/15/denuncia-publica-no-42/ and SU 426 of 2016, available
at:https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2016/SU426-16.htm

35
 Jorge Tafur in February, peasant leaders from Magdalena Medio region who
were part of the People’s Congress (Congreso de los Pueblos) and the
Interlocution Commission of Southern Bolívar, Central and Southern Cesar,
Southern Magdalena, and Santanderes processes (CISBCSC), who also led the
defence of peasant community land rights in the region.56

g) Use of force by law enforcement officers

102. During 2021, the Office received 49 allegations of alleged arbitrary deprivations
of life by State security forces in territories where non-state armed actors and
criminal organizations operate, of which it verified 27. In at least six of the 27
cases verified, the Office observed that the deaths occurred during operations
by State security forces against these groups. In three of the six cases, the Office
found that the victims did not belong to non-State armed groups or criminal
organizations.
103. So far in 2022, the Office has received 45 allegations of possible arbitrary
deprivations of life by State security forces in the context of conflicts and
territorial violence. These cases are in the process of analysis and verification.
This figure includes the case of the Alto Remanso village (Putumayo), where at
least 11 people were killed and four wounded during an operation carried out by
several military units on 28 March 2022, most of them were civilians.
104. The operation took place while some 30-50 people, including children, were
participating in a fundraising bazaar in the village. According to the government,
the objective of the operation was to capture a commander of the armed group
Comandos de la Frontera. According to information gathered by the Office,
members of the National Army used firearms against people who were in the
bazaar. Among the fatalities was a 16-year-old boy and a pregnant woman.
According to international human rights law, the use of potentially lethal force is
an extreme measure that should be resorted to only when strictly necessary to
protect life or prevent serious injury from an imminent threat.57
105. The Office also received allegations of human rights violations during raids
carried out by State security forces in which minors were reportedly killed. This
is the case of San Vicente del Caguán (Caquetá), 29 August 2019; the case of

56
See https://twitter.com/ONUHumanRights/status/1496335613049638916?s=20&t=RTvkYmv1G95BTK5GZyjuBw and
https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/lideres-sociales-teofilo-acuna-y-jorge-tafur-fueron-asesinados-653662.
57
Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 12. See also United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by
Law Enforcement Officials. Principle 9.

36
 Calamar (Guaviare) on 2 March 2021, and the case of Litoral del San Juan (Chocó)
on 16 September 2021. The Office learned that the investigations of the Office
of the Attorney General related to the San Vicente del Caguán raid indicate that
intelligence reports that sustained the operation were insufficient and contained
flaws, leading to unnecessary deaths, including of minors.58 The State has the
obligation to carry out effective intelligence work that contributes to the
planning and execution of military operations, including air raid operations, in
compliance with applicable international law. For greater trust in the
institutional framework and the protection of the rights of the affected persons,
it is important to investigate these allegations with transparency. In this regard,
the Office urges the State, in accordance with Articles 4 and 33 paragraph 1 of
Statutory Law 1621 of April 2013, to declassify intelligence reports when
allegations of human rights violations are presented in the development of
military operations, to ensure accountability and facilitate an eventual criminal
investigation.
106. Authorities must take all necessary measures to ensure that operations to
restore public order, including those involving the Armed Forces, are not planned
and executed under war or military logic and are in full compliance with
international human rights law.
107. Regarding anti-drug policy, the Peace Agreement established that the main
mechanism to combat illicit crops should be the voluntary substitution of these
crops by peasants and that forced eradication could only be resorted to in the
event that voluntary substitution did not work.59 According to statistics from the
Army reported in the press, from January to October 2021 there were
approximately 1,017 blockages and/or confrontations between State security
forces and communities opposed to manual forced eradication, demanding the
expansion and implementation of the National Program for the Integral
Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS) created by the Peace Agreement.60 Some
communities claim to be pressured by armed actors to participate in these
blockages.
108. These clashes reportedly left a significant number of people injured among
peasants and security forces in 2021. During an operation in Puerto Asís
(Putumayo) on 29 September 2021, five people from the community
were reportedly injured. In October 2021, in Anorí (Antioquia), the municipality

58
https://cuestionpublica.com/exclusivocuestionpublicaydejusticia-liberacion-informes-de-inteligencia-operacion-atai/
See point 4.1.3.2 Agreements with the communities, Final Agreement to End the Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. See
59

https://www.jep.gov.co/Marco%20Normativa/Normativa_v2/01%20ACUERDOS/Texto-Nuevo-Acuerdo- Final.pdf?csf=1&e=0fpYA0
60
https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/erradicacion-en-promedio-cada-dia-de-2021-se-han-registrado-tres-
blocks-629047

37
 with the highest rate of voluntary coca substitution through the PNIS program,
more than 700 farmers organized a "humanitarian refuge", demanding
compliance with this program. It was alleged that shots were fired by State
security forces and that at least three peasant farmers were injured. In October
2021, in Santa Bárbara de Iscuandé (Nariño), there were clashes between
peasant and Afrodescendant groups who demanded compliance with the PNIS,
and State security forces who were implementing forced eradication. These
confrontations left one person seriously injured after being shot by a military
officer.

h) Allegations of lack of timely action against non-State armed groups and

criminal organizations and of collusion by State security forces.
109. The State has carried out numerous actions with significant results against all
non-State armed groups and criminal organizations. However, communities
have expressed their concerns to the Office regarding actions taken by State
security forces.
110. Some communities question the lack of timely action taken by security forces in
response to the entry and deployment of non-State armed groups and criminal
organizations in the territory and their transit through roads and rivers where
there are checkpoints and roadblocks managed by State security forces. Some
communities believe that the lack of timely action by the security forces makes
it easier for non-State armed groups and criminal organizations to maintain their
presence and eventually exert control over parts of the territory.
111. Similarly, some communities expressed concern about the alleged lack of action
taken by State authorities regarding machinery for illegal mining entering the
territory, as well as materials used for processing illicit crops.
112. On 18 November 2021, a group of ethnic-territorial and civil society
organizations, together with several bishops from the dioceses of Chocó,
presented a report based on six humanitarian missions they carried out in 2021
in 11 municipalities of Chocó and in some municipalities of western Antioquia.
The Office accompanied some of these missions as an observer. One of the
observations noted by the report was the "ineffectiveness of the presence of
State security forces for adequate control of the territory, which in some cases
is marked by clear examples of collusion with the Clan del Golfo”.61

https://www.cec.org.co/sites/default/files/MISIONES%20HUMANITARIAS%20EN%20EL%20CHOC%C3%93%20Y%20OCCIDENTE%
61

20DE%20ANTIOQUIA.%20ok1.pdf

38
 113. In 2022, several cases of alleged collusion between law enforcement agents and
non-State armed actors and criminal organizations came to light.
114. In February 2022, a recording was made public in which the Brigadier General,
Commander of the Sixth Division, spoke at a meeting about his interactions with
the criminal organization known as Los Pocillos to combat FARC-EP dissident
groups in the department of Cauca. In a public statement on the same day, 13
February, the Army announced that it would send the relevant information to the
Office of the Attorney General, remove the Brigadier General from his post and
open relevant internal investigations.62
115. In the same month, it was announced that an investigation had been opened by
the Office of the Attorney General against several army officers accused of being
part of the "La Cordillera" substructure of the Clan del Golfo. Among others, the
Office of the Attorney General opened an investigation against a retired general,
who, in 2019, was the director of the Plan of Timely Action for the Prevention
and Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Social Leaders and Journalists (PAO).
The Office of the Procurator General also opened a preliminary investigation into
the case.
116. Advances made by the Office of the Attorney General in ongoing investigations
into allegations of omission, complicity or collusion between members of State
security forces and members of non-State armed groups and/or criminal
organizations are fundamental for strengthening trust between State authorities
and populations affected by violence.

V. Conclusions
Over the last two years, the Office has observed an increase in the levels of violence in
several territories of the country.
This violence, generated mainly by non-State armed actors and expressed through acts
of intimidation, harassment, extortion, among others, with the aim of controlling the
population and their territories in certain areas, has resulted in a high number of
massacres of civilians, killings, and threats to leaders and human rights defenders, and
former FARC- EP combatants. Since 2021, there has also been a significant increase in
forced displacement and confinement, as well as the recruitment and use of children,
and cases of gender-based violence. It is worth noting the disproportionate impact of
this violence on indigenous peoples and people of African descent and peasant
communities.
The report provides figures that help measure the levels of this violence. However,
beyond the figures, it shows the impact it is having on a wide range of human rights

62
https://www.ejercito.mil.co/comu/

39
and on the daily life of communities, including ethnic and peasant populations,
particularly regarding women and children.
The Office recognizes the central role of the State as guarantor of rights and
unequivocally deplores and condemns violence by non-State armed groups and criminal
organizations against the population. The focus on State responsibility, within the
framework of international human rights law, does not seek to diminish or minimize the
direct responsibility of non-State armed groups and criminal organizations for the acts
they commit, which must be duly investigated and punished. On the contrary, through
the analysis and recommendations contained in this report, the important role of the
State to prevent and address the violence generated by non- state armed groups, with
a human rights approach, is highlighted.
In view of the considerations set forth in this report, it is concluded that the State's
response has been insufficient in reducing levels of violence, preventing abuses
committed by non-State armed groups and criminal organizations, and adequately
protecting communities in the territories. The State's approach, which effectively
handed over responsibility to State security forces to find a solution to the violence, has
shown its limitations. The lack of implementation of key aspects of the Peace
Agreement, in particular the lack of implementation of a public policy for dismantlement
by the National Commission on Security Guarantees and the precarious expansion of
civilian State authorities in these zones has contributed to the outbreak of violence.
State success must be measured by a substantive reduction of human rights violations
affecting these communities in order to achieve the full enjoyment and exercise of their
rights. In this sense, the State's security strategy should focus on the protection of the
civilian population and prevention by addressing the structural causes of the violence
included in the Peace Agreement.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has noted that the fulfilment of the
positive obligations of States to guarantee rights recognized in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights implies protection not only against violations that
may be committed by their agents, but also against acts that may be committed by
private persons or entities.63 States parties are therefore under an obligation to exercise
due diligence to take reasonable positive measures that do not impose a
disproportionate burden on them in the face of reasonably foreseeable threats to life
emanating from private persons and entities whose conduct is not attributable to the
State.

63
United Nations. Human Rights Committee. General Comment No. 31. 26 May 2004 Para. 8. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ Add.13. Available
at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/419/59/PDF/G0441959.pdf?OpenElement

40
In its concluding observations on the ninth periodic report of Colombia, the Committee
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
recommended that the Colombian State facilitate access to justice for women, especially
indigenous peoples and migrant women, Colombian women of African descent and
women with disabilities, by strengthening the presence of the Attorney General's Office
in rural areas and increasing the number of judges and prosecutors specialized in sexual
violence matters. The Committee also insisted on the need to accelerate the
implementation of the gender-related provisions of the Peace Agreement, with
sufficient human and financial resources.64
In relation to non-repetition measures, ongoing actions of recognition of responsibility
for crimes committed by different actors in the armed conflict before the
Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition (created by the
Peace Agreement) have demonstrated the importance of this process on victims’ rights
in Colombia. Important lessons learned from the recent hearings before the Special
Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) should guide the State's actions in the present. Greater
openness and transparency of State institutions with regard to State responsibility
would help to consolidate the rule of law and strengthen trust in the institutional
framework.
The Office reiterates its call to all non-State armed groups to respect human rights and,
where applicable, international humanitarian law, and to listen without delay to the
population's call for peace and respect for life and territory.

VI. Recommendations
The communities most affected by violence are calling for lasting peace for their
territories. Based on the analysis presented in this report, the Office recommends
decisive and concerted action by the State in the following three areas:
1) Significantly reduce and eventually eliminate the presence of non-State armed
groups from territories affected by violence, through a combined effort in four
areas: (i) the adoption and implementation of an effective policy for the
dismantling of armed groups, in collaboration with civil society in the framework
of the National Commission on Security Guarantees; (ii) the development of a
legal framework and strategy for the collective subjugation of the groups as
provided for in the Peace Agreement; (iii) the development and implementation
of a State strategy for the protection of civilians; and (iv) genuinely consider the
call of populations affected by violence who are asking for the adoption of
humanitarian or peace agreements with non-State armed groups.

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2019). "Concluding observations on the ninth periodic report of
64

Colombia". CEDAW/C/COL/CO/9.

41
Regarding the demand for the negotiation of humanitarian agreements, the National
Humanitarian Coordinator, who works with communities affected by violence65 has
requested negotiation processes for the humanitarian de-escalation of the armed
conflict and the de-escalation of hostilities affecting peoples and territories.
Furthermore, although State security forces must continue to act against the groups that
generate violence, protection of the civilian population against violence from these
groups must be established as the central objective of their actions, both in the
development of operations and in the implementation of intelligence, counter-
intelligence and information gathering.

2) Prioritize the territorial implementation of the Peace Agreement, particularly

the Comprehensive Rural Reform, consolidate the implementation of the
Development Programs with a Territorial Approach (PDET), reactivate the
National Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS) with the
participation of the affected communities.
Although the Peace Agreement was signed between the National Government and the
FARC-EP, its relevance transcends these two actors by proposing adjustments to State
policies to address the deep-rooted causes and effects of the conflict. Therefore, the
Peace Agreement is not only useful in relation to former FARC-EP combatants, but it also
offers structural responses to the situation suffered by the population in territories
where there is presence of other non-State armed groups.
In relation to the comprehensive rural reform: it is necessary to resume actions to
guarantee access, use and tenure of lands and territories, including land restitution for
victims of dispossession. This implies ensuring adequate human, financial and technical
resources to accelerate the implementation of specific measures contemplated in point
one of the Peace Agreement on comprehensive rural reform. Affirmative actions must
also be developed regarding access to land for indigenous peoples, people of African
descent, and peasant women, in order to reverse inequality with regards to accessing
land.
In relation to the PNIS: it is important that the PNIS program (point four of the Peace
Agreement) constitutes an alternative for peasants, ethnic groups and territories that
have been affected by illicit crops and linked to drug trafficking economies.
International guidelines on human rights and drug policy should be incorporated,
as well as guidelines on alternative development to address the drug problem in
Colombia. 66 Similarly, it is important to promote localized social dialogue aimed at

Includes the Catatumbo Humanitarian round table; the Nariño Humanitarian round table; the humanitarian process of Southern
65

Córdoba; the Chocó Humanitarian round table; Magdalena Medio Humanitarian round table, the Interethnic and Intercultural
Territorial Council of Northern Cauca, the National Afro-Colombian Peace Council, the social and ethnic territorial organizations of
Arauca, Buenaventura and the Colombian Caribbean, as well as other regional platforms and organizations in the country.
66
https://www.undp.org/publications/international-guidelines-human-rights-and-drug-policy

42
resolving occupations of collective territories, illegal land sales, occupation of sacred
sites managed by traditional authorities.
It is essential that the implementation of the Peace Agreement applies the territorial
peace model, which includes the design, execution, and local and regional participation
in ongoing and new policies and projects. A decentralized plan to implement the
Agreement must be developed as a condition for sustainability and territorial
transformation towards an effective enjoyment of human rights.

3) Consolidate the rule of law in the areas most affected by violence and internal
armed conflict, strengthening the presence and capacity of the institutions of
the justice system and control agencies in the territories. Strengthen capacities
of local governments and the governments of people of African descent and
indigenous peoples in these territories and implement the ethnic chapter of the
Peace Agreement. These measures should be accompanied by a campaign aimed
at restoring confidence in the State’s institutional framework, opening spaces for
dialogue and participation for the affected communities. It is also important to
take all necessary measures to ensure that there is no collusion between State
officials and certain non-State armed groups and/or criminal organizations and
combat impunity. Likewise, spaces for dialogue and participation should be
established. The State can and should work with grass-roots organizations and
join forces to fight against the violence.

In this context, it is recommended to expand the deployment and territorial capacity of

the Office of the Attorney General and the Public Ministry (Ombudsman's Office, legal
representatives, and the Office of the Procurator General of the Nation) and take
exceptional measures to re-enforce their capacity in terms of both human and financial
resources. Institutional presence of the justice and security sector must be strengthened
through: (i) the appointment of peace judges; (ii) the strengthening of the National
Police, in such a way that its central role in citizen security is more clearly defined; and
(iii) an improvement in conditions for local and independent action by the State control
entities in their preventive and disciplinary tasks.
The Office highlights that strengthening the independence of State Control entities is
essential in confronting the great challenges facing Colombia. Separation of powers is a
key factor in the country’s democratic consolidation. It is recommended that the
Colombian State review procedures for the selection of those who will lead the control
agency in order to guarantee the full participation of social organizations, leaders, and
human rights defenders. Candidates' knowledge and experience in human rights
matters should be one of the essential elements, as well as their understanding of the
territorial situation.

43
Other recommendations:
The Peace Agreement did not propose a reform of the security sector. However,
international experiences coincide in suggesting that in order to avoid repetition, it is
important to strengthen democratic oversight by civil society and the three branches of
public power; modernize defence and public security doctrines; strengthen political-
administrative authorities with regards to citizen security; robust civilian control of
private security and arms companies; incorporate a gender and human rights approach;
and remove officers from State security forces who are linked to human rights violations,
corruption, or illegal groups.
Among the changes needed to achieve lasting peace is the abandonment of the notion
of an internal enemy and the stigmatization of communities and peoples living under
the presence of non-State armed groups. There is still a tendency to hold the inhabitants
of these communities responsible for the actions of these groups, despite the coercion
to which they are subjected. Groups take advantage of the vulnerability of these
communities to divide them and coerce them into illicit activities through violence or
pressure.
Improving the adoption and articulation of prevention measures and rapid response
to early warnings from the Office of the Ombudsmanis urgent in order to address
territorial violence in the country. This requires, among others: (i) guaranteeing a
preventive, participatory, collective (community, organizational, ethnic) and territorial
approach to the response; (ii) generating monitoring mechanisms for the commitments
acquired by the institutions based on impact indicators of state action; and (iii) changing
the CIPRAT methodology to focus on institutional coordination of concrete solutions for
prevention and protection against violence, and adequate coordination with other inter-
institutional spaces such as the territorial round tables for guarantees or with social
investment and development programs that generate structural responses to
accompany emergency measures.
It is important to combat sexual and gender-based violence and investigate it based on
international standards, both in the framework of transitional justice and in the ordinary
jurisdiction, based on a victim/survivor-centred approach that responds to the
seriousness, representation, prevalence, and profound impact that these forms of
violence have on the lives of victims, their families and communities. At the same time,
victims/survivors should be guaranteed access to health services (including mental
health), reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition. State programs which respond
to forced displacement and forced recruitment of children should integrate a gender
approach that comprehensively addresses the different types of gender-based violence
to which the victims of these violations are exposed before, during and after suffering
them.
To guarantee lasting peace and non-repetition, it is necessary that the Comprehensive
System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Repetition continues to

44
implement its mandate with the full guarantee of its independence and autonomy.
The Integral System’s decisions will contribute to fight against impunity and non-
repetition, particularly in the areas that have fallen back into violence over the past few
years since the signing of the Peace Agreement. The implementation of the Unified Risk
Monitoring Mechanism for the Comprehensive System for Peace is recommended. The
protection of victims, participants and signatories of the Peace Agreement within the
framework of this process is an essential requirement for strengthening confidence in
the State.
This is a pivotal moment for the recognition of truth in Colombia. The implementation
of the Truth Commission’s recommendations, particularly those related to the need to
strengthen the independence and impartiality of the Attorney General's Office, and
methodologies for investigating human rights violations, are essential for the
transformation towards peace.

45
VII. ANNEX - Impact of violence Index

MUNICIPALITY DEPARTMENT UN
HUMAN
RIGHTS
INDEX
1 SAN ANDRES DE TUMACO NARIÑO CRITICAL
2 ARGELIA CAUCA CRITICAL
3 ROBERTO PAYÁN NARIÑO CRITICAL
4 BUENAVENTURA VALLE DEL CAUCA VERY HIGH
5 SANTANDER DE QUILICHAO CAUCA VERY HIGH
6 TULUA VALLE DEL CAUCA VERY HIGH
7 PUERTO LEGUÍZAMO PUTUMAYO VERY HIGH
8 MURINDÓ ANTIOQUIA VERY HIGH
9 BAJO BAUDÓ CHOCÓ VERY HIGH
10 MEDIO SAN JUAN CHOCÓ VERY HIGH
11 BUENOS AIRES CAUCA VERY HIGH
12 CALI VALLE DEL CAUCA VERY HIGH
13 EL CHARCO NARIÑO VERY HIGH
14 DABEIBA ANTIOQUIA VERY HIGH
15 ITUANGO ANTIOQUIA VERY HIGH
16 QUIBDÓ CHOCÓ VERY HIGH
17 BAGADÓ CHOCÓ VERY HIGH
18 BOJAYÁ CHOCÓ VERY HIGH
19 NUQUÍ CHOCÓ VERY HIGH
20 CARTAGENA DEL CHAIRÁ CAQUETÁ VERY HIGH
21 POPAYAN CAUCA VERY HIGH
22 JAMBALÓ CAUCA VERY HIGH
23 EL TAMBO CAUCA VERY HIGH
24 ORITO PUTUMAYO VERY HIGH
25 LEIVA NARIÑO VERY HIGH
26 MAGÜÍ NARIÑO VERY HIGH
27 MOSQUERA NARIÑO VERY HIGH
46
 MUNICIPALITY DEPARTMENT UN
HUMAN
RIGHTS
INDEX
28 OLAYA HERRERA NARIÑO VERY HIGH
29 SAN JOSÉ DEL GUAVIARE GUAVIARE VERY HIGH
30 CÁCERES ANTIOQUIA VERY HIGH
31 ANDES ANTIOQUIA VERY HIGH
32 ALTO BAUDÓ CHOCÓ VERY HIGH
33 EL LITORAL DEL SAN JUAN CHOCÓ VERY HIGH
34 NÓVITA CHOCÓ VERY HIGH
35 SAN JOSÉ DE CÚCUTA NORTE DE SANTANDER VERY HIGH
36 TIBÚ NORTE DE SANTANDER VERY HIGH
37 LA MONTAÑITA CAQUETÁ HIGH
38 SAN JOSÉ DEL FRAGUA CAQUETÁ HIGH
39 SAN VICENTE DEL CAGUÁN CAQUETÁ HIGH
40 BALBOA CAUCA HIGH
41 CAJIBÍO CAUCA HIGH
42 CALDONO CAUCA HIGH
43 CORINTO CAUCA HIGH
44 MIRANDA CAUCA HIGH
45 GUAPI CAUCA HIGH
46 GUADALAJARA DE BUGA VALLE DEL CAUCA HIGH
47 JAMUNDÍ VALLE DEL CAUCA HIGH
48 RICAURTE NARIÑO HIGH
49 BARBACOAS NARIÑO HIGH
50 LA TOLA NARIÑO HIGH
51 PUEBLO RICO RISARALDA HIGH
52 MEDELLÍN ANTIOQUIA HIGH
53 BETANIA ANTIOQUIA HIGH
54 AMALFI ANTIOQUIA HIGH
55 TARAZÁ ANTIOQUIA HIGH
56 SAN ANDRÉS DE CUERQUÍA ANTIOQUIA HIGH

47
 MUNICIPALITY DEPARTMENT UN
HUMAN
RIGHTS
INDEX
57 FRONTINO ANTIOQUIA HIGH
58 ACANDÍ CHOCÓ HIGH
59 EL CARMEN DE ATRATO CHOCÓ HIGH
60 ISTMINA CHOCÓ HIGH
61 LLORÓ CHOCÓ HIGH
62 MEDIO ATRATO CHOCÓ HIGH
63 TIERRALTA CÓRDOBA HIGH
64 MONTECRISTO BOLIVAR HIGH
65 MAICAO LA GUAJIRA HIGH
66 SANTA MARTA MAGDALENA HIGH
67 SARAVENA ARAUCA HIGH
68 OCAÑA NORTE DE SANTANDER HIGH
69 LA MACARENA META HIGH
70 FLORENCIA CAQUETÁ HIGH
71 EL PAUJÍL CAQUETÁ HIGH
72 MORELIA CAQUETÁ HIGH
73 CALOTO CAUCA HIGH
74 FLORENCIA CAUCA HIGH
75 INZÁ CAUCA HIGH
76 LA VEGA CAUCA HIGH
77 MORALES CAUCA HIGH
78 PIAMONTE CAUCA HIGH
79 SUÁREZ CAUCA HIGH
80 TIMBIQUÍ CAUCA HIGH
81 CARTAGO VALLE DEL CAUCA HIGH
82 FLORIDA VALLE DEL CAUCA HIGH
83 ALCALÁ VALLE DEL CAUCA HIGH
84 RESTREPO VALLE DEL CAUCA HIGH
85 SAN PEDRO VALLE DEL CAUCA HIGH
48
 MUNICIPALITY DEPARTMENT UN
HUMAN
RIGHTS
INDEX
86 SAN MIGUEL PUTUMAYO HIGH
87 PUERTO ASÍS PUTUMAYO HIGH
88 SAMANIEGO NARIÑO HIGH
89 MALLAMA NARIÑO HIGH
90 LA FLORIDA NARIÑO HIGH
91 CUMBITARA NARIÑO HIGH
92 LOS ANDES NARIÑO HIGH
93 POLICARPA NARIÑO HIGH
94 SANTA BÁRBARA NARIÑO HIGH
95 SÁCAMA CASANARE HIGH
96 CALAMAR GUAVIARE HIGH
97 AGUADAS CALDAS HIGH
98 ARMENIA QUINDIO HIGH
99 CIRCASIA QUINDIO HIGH
100 PEREIRA RISARALDA HIGH
101 CIUDAD BOLÍVAR ANTIOQUIA HIGH
102 BRICEÑO ANTIOQUIA HIGH
103 BELLO ANTIOQUIA HIGH
104 ANORÍ ANTIOQUIA HIGH
105 ZARAGOZA ANTIOQUIA HIGH
106 YOLOMBÓ ANTIOQUIA HIGH
107 TURBO ANTIOQUIA HIGH
108 SONSÓN ANTIOQUIA HIGH
109 SEGOVIA ANTIOQUIA HIGH
110 CAUCASIA ANTIOQUIA HIGH
111 CAÑASGORDAS ANTIOQUIA HIGH
112 SAN RAFAEL ANTIOQUIA HIGH
113 PEQUE ANTIOQUIA HIGH
114 VIGÍA DEL FUERTE ANTIOQUIA HIGH
49
 MUNICIPALITY DEPARTMENT UN
HUMAN
RIGHTS
INDEX
115 APARTADÓ ANTIOQUIA HIGH
116 CARMEN DEL DARIÉN CHOCÓ HIGH
117 TADÓ CHOCÓ HIGH
118 LA APARTADA CÓRDOBA HIGH
119 SAN JOSÉ DE URÉ CÓRDOBA HIGH
120 PUERTO LIBERTADOR CÓRDOBA HIGH
121 BARRANQUILLA ATLÁNTICO HIGH
122 SABANALARGA ATLÁNTICO HIGH
123 MORALES BOLIVAR HIGH
124 RIO VIEJO BOLIVAR HIGH
125 PAILITAS CESAR HIGH
126 URIBIA LA GUAJIRA HIGH
127 PIJIÑO DEL CARMEN MAGDALENA HIGH
128 ARACATACA MAGDALENA HIGH
129 ARAUCA ARAUCA HIGH
130 PUERTO RONDON ARAUCA HIGH
131 CRAVO NORTE ARAUCA HIGH
132 FORTUL ARAUCA HIGH
133 TAME ARAUCA HIGH
134 ÁBREGO NORTE DE SANTANDER HIGH
135 HACARI NORTE DE SANTANDER HIGH
136 SAN CALIXTO NORTE DE SANTANDER HIGH
137 SARDINATA NORTE DE SANTANDER HIGH
138 CONVENCIÓN NORTE DE SANTANDER HIGH
139 EL CARMEN NORTE DE SANTANDER HIGH
140 TEORAMA NORTE DE SANTANDER HIGH
141 VILLAVICENCIO META HIGH
142 MESETAS META HIGH
143 PUERTO CONCORDIA META HIGH
50
 MUNICIPALITY DEPARTMENT UN
HUMAN
RIGHTS
INDEX
144 NEIVA HUILA HIGH
145 ISNOS HUILA HIGH
146 LA PLATA HUILA HIGH
147 PITALITO HUILA HIGH
148 CAMPOALEGRE HUILA HIGH
149 ALGECIRAS HUILA HIGH
150 PUERTO WILCHES SANTANDER HIGH
151 BOLIVAR SANTANDER HIGH
152 BUCARAMANGA SANTANDER HIGH
153 AMBALEMA TOLIMA HIGH
154 DOLORES TOLIMA HIGH
155 ESPINAL TOLIMA HIGH
156 SOACHA CUNDINAMARCA HIGH

The Index identifies some of the municipalities most affected by violence in 2021, using
five violence-related variables of concern: 1) killings of human rights defenders verified
by the Office; 2) massacres verified by the Office; 3) displacement rate reported by the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) per 100,000 inhabitants; 4)
confinement rate reported by OCHA per 100,000 inhabitants; and 5) homicides of
former FARC-EP combatants reported by the United Nations Verification Mission in
Colombia. The results of the Index calculation are shown in Map 1 and the list below.
In addition to the municipalities identified by the Index, there are municipalities where
violence is expressed through disappearances, selective killings of civilians and social
control measures; and municipalities where the violence has increased since the
beginning of 2022. In all cases, decisive and concerted action by the State is required to
address the situation of violence in the territories in line with the conclusions and
recommendations of the report.

51
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