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OPOSA v. FACTORAN, GR No.

101083, 1993-07-30
Facts:
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21
of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in
Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation
embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation, per
Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful... environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated
by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations... concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae."
Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the
theory that... the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government.
They therefore assert that the petitioners' recourse is not to file an action in court, but to... lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
Issues:
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment"
of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
Ruling:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We
find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding... generations, file class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,... considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and... conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future... generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of... their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of
the petition.
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on... unverified data. A reading
of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution... explicitly provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a... right belongs to a different category
of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation -- aptly
and fittingly stressed by the petitioners -- the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a... matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers
that unless the... rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day...
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those
to come -- generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."[27]... cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be... invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot
still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and
purpose, such a law could have only been... passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for
the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their
health and enhancing the general welfare.
Oposa v. Factoran (296 Phil. 694, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993) is a
case filed by minors against the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Secretary Factoran, to
mandate the latter to cancel all existing timber license agreements and to
stop their further issuance.

The first question is whether or not these minors have legal standing to
sue by representing their generation and the generation yet unborn. The
Supreme Court (SC) said yes because this is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility in environmental law.
A subset of the first question is whether or not there is a valid class suit.
Again, the SC said yes because the petitioners are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all parties in the case. Also, the petitioners have
a common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of
the Philippines. Finally, the number of parties present is representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
The second question is whether there is cause of action. Was there a right
violated? Secretary Factoran argued that there is none because the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology under the 1987 Constitution is under
Article II and, therefore, it is not a self-executing provision. It was argued
that there is a need to wait for an enabling law. According to the SC,
there is a right violated; provisions on the right to health and the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology are self-executing and they can be the
basis of an action in court.

The third question is whether judicial review can be invoked. It was


argued by Secretary Factoran that this is a matter of policy and, thus, it
should be left to Congress to enact a law that stops timber license
agreements. He said that the question is not ripe for the SC's
intervention. The SC said no; it is ripe for judicial review. The Court
invoked the expanded power of judicial review under Article VIII of the
Constitution in which the Judicial Branch can correct grave abuses of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The last question that was whether stopping timber license agreements
would impair the obligation of contracts and, hence, violate the
Constitution. Said the SC, no, because such are not contracts but licenses
which give mere privileges that are subject to the State's power of
regulation. Assuming without conceding that they are contracts, they
must still yield to the State's police power.

https://thelowlylawstudent.wordpress.com/2017/11/18/manila-prince-
hotel-v-gsis-diges/
Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS (DIGEST)

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the
MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.\

https://oganiza.com/magallona-vs-ermita-case-digest/

Facts

Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522 in March 2009 demarcating the maritime
baseline of the Philippine archipelago. The former is a rectangular baseline based on the
Treaty of Paris and UNCLOS I while the latter followed a straight baseline method
prescribed by UNCLOS III. Measurement of maritime zones will begin from these baselines.
Issue

Whether RA 9522 violated Article 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Ruling

No.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is just a codified
norm that regulates the .conduct of states.

The RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic
starting points. Also, RA 9522 includes provisions that enforce our claims to the KIG, SS,
and Sabbah.

RA 9522 is not unconstitutional, the Petition was dismissed.

RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was
not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and
we find petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option
belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes
at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State
like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where
the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-
fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and
exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago;
and second, it weakens the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine
maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and
adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation
of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore
a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent
with the Constitution and our national interest.

Magallona Vs Ermita Case Digest

Magallona v. Ermita
2021-03-04administrator

G.R No. 187167


August 16, 2011
CARPIO, J.:

Facts:
Congress passed RA 3046 in 1961 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State, This is pursuant to the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone in 1958 UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II.

RA 5446 was passed to correct the typo errors under RA 3046 and included reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo. In March 2009, Congress amended RA
3046 by enacting RA 9522, to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the UNCLOS III,
which the Philippines ratified.

The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some
basepoints and classify the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of
islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;


2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our
sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those
territories, thus may not only result in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen

Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional as it reduces the Philippine Maritime
Territory

Held:
Yes. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines
will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its
maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first,
it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the
waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in
any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress
wisely avoided.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from
the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.

UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members
to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters
and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to
mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or
contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones
and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be
any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to
delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this
gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf
(Article 77).

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and
adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most
vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN, GR No. 183591, 2008-10-14
Facts:
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.
something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch... existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as... a result of the challenged action
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in
the present petitions, reasoning tha... the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does... not
automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts required
have been duly complied with.
Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act... which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled.
Mandamus
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the
MOA-AD without consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing
them of the proceedings.
the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution.
stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution.
a citizen... citizen... he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled... he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained... of.
a taxpayer... taxpayer... assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal
purpose... wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
a legislator... legislator... act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury... a local government unit... local government unit...
relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.
the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in
resolving a case... a
(a)... grave violation of the Constitution... b
(b)... situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved;
(c)... constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to... guide the bench,
the bar, and the public... d
(d)... case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern... right of
access to public documents... has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.
right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand... information
Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privileg
Issues:
Ripeness
Locus Standi
Mootness
Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD
Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws
Ruling:
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it.
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe
B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authorit
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority,... the
petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari,... Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists.
the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot
the present petitions.
Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus
points," especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed
The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments... including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating
entity.
the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at... large.
T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction
Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not
effecting such... policy.
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people.
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing"
consultations, contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation."
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to
the constitutional right to information and disclosure.
The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation.
The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess
of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,... capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereof.
respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified
disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD
The MOA-AD is one peculiar... program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a
vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,[146] which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total... environment.
The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with
the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act,[148] which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate
and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
n proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the
IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended... the
boundaries of their authority.
Principles:
Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate... remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.
the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality... where technicalities of procedure were
brushed... aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty
and weight as precedents.

REAGAN VS. CIR, digested


GR # L-26379, December 27, 1969 (Constitutional Law – Power to Tax)
FACTS: Petitioner questioned the payment of an income tax assessed on him by public respondent on an amount
realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place
at the Clark Field Air Base. Petitioner contends that the base is outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond the
jurisdictional power to tax.

ISSUE: Whether or not a sale made on a foreign military base is excluded from tax.

HELD: No. The said foreign military bases is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax legislation.
Philippine jurisdictional rights including the power to tax are preserved.

FACTS:

Petitioner William C. Reagan dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale of his
automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at
the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga.

Petitioner contends that the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our
jurisdictional power to tax, and that the trading firm as purchaser of army goods must respond
for the sales taxes due from an importer, as the American armed forces being exempt could not
be taxed as such under the National Internal Revenue Code.

ISSUE:

1.

Whether or not the Clark Air Force is foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax
legislation.

2.

What is the concept of auto-limitation?

RULING:

The sale having taken place on what indisputably is Philippine territory, petitioner’s liability for
the income tax due as a result thereof was unavoidable. As the Court of Tax Appeals reached a
similar conclusion, we sustain its decision now before us on appeal.
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority
may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power.
Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount.

Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the
extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be
exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.

There is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to such an assertion. It has
not become foreign soil or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not
excluding the power to tax, have been preserved. As to certain tax matters, an appropriate
exemption was provided for.

2.

It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction
of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in
character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language
of Jellinek, “is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal
self-determination and self-restriction.” A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the
exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.

Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter
end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that
such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They
are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it
is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant.
53 SCRA 476
OCTOBER 26, 1973
FACTS:
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olangapo City. She demolished the house and built
another one in its place without securing a building permit from the City Mayor of
Olangapo City. The City Court of Olangapo found her guilty of violating a municipal
ordinance that requires permit from the municipal mayor for construction of
building as well as any modification, repairs or demolition thereof.

On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Gozo put in issue the validity of such
ordinance by invoking due process. She likewise questioned the applicability of the
ordinance to her in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base leased
to the American Armed Forces; she contended that the municipal government
could not exercise therein-administrative jurisdiction.

ISSUES:
1. Whether municipal ordinance is valid?
2. Whether the municipal corporation retains its administrative jurisdiction over the area
where Gozo‘s house was located?

HELD:

1. YES, the municipal ordinance is valid. The authority to require building permits is
predicated upon the general welfare clause. Its scope is wide, well nigh all embracing,
covering every aspect of public health, public morals, public safety, and the well-being
and good order of the community.

2. YES, the municipal corporation retains its administrative jurisdiction over the said area.
By the agreement, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. This consent was given purely as a matter of
comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its
sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely
of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United
States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such
offenses. The Philippine jurisdiction retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but
also such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own
decline to make use of.

Moreover, the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation is the property of a state force


due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.
x x x A state is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise
of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means
follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status
as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be dismissed, but
it does not disappear. Therefore, it is with the bases under lease to the American armed
forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be
foreign territory.

_________________________________________________

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,


vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.
75 PHIL 113
SEPTEMBER 17, 1945

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus praying that the respondent judge be
ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case no. 3012, which was initiated
under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the
Japanese military occupation of the islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings
on the following grounds: (1) the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen.
Mac Arthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the courts of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic established during the Japanese occupation;(2) the
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic in the absence of
enabling law granting such authority; (3) the government established in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation was not a de facto government.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the government established during the Japanese occupation was a de facto
government.
2. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under
the Phil. Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid
and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US
and Filipino forces.
3. Whether the proclamation issued by Gen. Mac Arthur declaring ―all laws, regulations
and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth
are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control has invalidated al judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of
the said courts.
4. Whether the courts of Commonwealth, which were the same courts existing prior to and
continue during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines may continue those
proceedings in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by
the US and Filipino forces and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished.

HELD:
1. YES. The government established under the names of Philippine Executive Commission
and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was a civil government
and a de facto government of the second kind: that which is established and maintained
by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war.
The distinguishing characteristics of this kind of de facto government are; (1) that its
existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the
rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while it exists it
must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience
rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for
those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.

2. YES. Being a de facto government, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of
postliminy in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

3. NO. The phrase ―processes of any other government is broad and may refer not only to
judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional
processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established
in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that,
according to the well-known principles of international law, all judgments and judicial
proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto government during
the Japanese occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied
territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed
that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of the Gen. Mac Arthur, in using
the phrase ―processes of any government to refer to judicial processes, in violation of
said principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is
that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes, or court
proceedings, for according to a well-known statutory construction, statute ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.

4. YES. Although in theory, the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is
suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice,
the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country to which
he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented. If the proceedings pending in the different
courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during
the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission and the so-
called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason the same courts, which become
reestablished and conceived of as having been in continued existence upon the
reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy,
may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of
enacting laws conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings.

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