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Islamization in Malaysia: Processes and dynamics

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Contemporary Politics
Vol. 16, No. 2, June 2010, 135–151

Islamization in Malaysia: processes and dynamics

Jason P. Abbotta∗ and Sophie Gregorios-Pippasb∗∗
a
Department of Politics, University of Surrey, Guildford, UK; bIndependent Researcher, London, UK

Over the past three decades Malaysian society has undergone radical change and
transformation. On one level this has been brought about by the country’s rapid economic
transformation, but equally significant has been the deepening Islamization of the country.
From banking to law, from dress to education policy, almost no sector of Malaysian
society has escaped the growing influence of Islam upon the socioeconomic and political
make-up of the country. The prevalent explanation for this dynamic has been the political
competition between the United Malay National Organization and the Islamic opposition
party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, since the early 1980s. Such explanations, however, clearly
marginalize the role of other societal factors and dynamics. Consequently, this article
contends Islamization in Malaysia has created a series of processes that have produced
results which are self-reinforcing. Ironically, the strategy for diverting the extremes of
Islamic revival by co-option has actually produced a far more dynamic penetration of state
and society by conservative Muslims who have become a powerful constituency supportive
of the further religious coloration of government bureaucracies and programmes.
Keywords: Islamization; Malaysia; electoral competition; co-option; penetration; UMNO;
PAS

Over the past three decades Malaysian society has undergone radical change and transform-
ation. On one level this has been brought about by the country’s rapid economic transform-
ation, however, equally significant has been the deepening Islamization of the country. From
banking to law, from dress to education policy, almost no sector of Malaysian society has
escaped the growing influence of Islam upon the socioeconomic and political make-up of
the country. The prevalent explanation for this dynamic has been the political competition
between the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) and the Islamic opposition party,
Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), since the early 1980s. Such explanations, however, clearly
marginalize the role of other societal factors and dynamics. Consequently, this article contends
that Islamization in Malaysia has created a series of processes that have produced results which
are self-reinforcing. Ironically, the strategy for diverting the extremes of Islamic revival by
co-option has actually produced a far more dynamic penetration of state and society by Islamist
culture in which the formal and informal influences of Islam on Malaysian society have
deepened.
Few would deny that over the past three decades in Malaysia the visible symbols of Islam
have become a much more prominent feature of socio-cultural, economic and political life.
The Malaysia of the 1950s and 1960s, depicted in the movies of the country’s most famous film-
maker P. Ramlee, is now a distant memory. In Ramlee’s much-loved comedies most of his

∗
Dr Jason P. Abbott is a Lecturer in International Politics in the Department of Politics at the University of
Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK. Email: j.abbott@surrey.ac.uk
∗∗
Sophie Gregorios-Pippas is a Graduate (MSc Globalization and Development, specializing in Southeast Asian
Politics) of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, UK. Email: sophie808@gmail.com

ISSN 1356-9775 print/ISSN 1469-3631 online

# 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13569771003783851
http://www.informaworld.com
136 Jason P. Abbott and Sophie Gregorios-Pippas

female characters have Western hairstyles (including beehives and bobs) and wear Western
clothing including sleeveless tops and skirts with hem lines above the knee. Today, among
Malay women, such sights are almost non-existent with the tudung veil now commonplace.
Indeed, as Stivens (2006, p. 358) remarks, this phenomenon ‘has been one of the most visible
markers and symbols of the Islamisation process’. While Nah (2003, p. 522) argues that this
has been part of a much more comprehensive cultural backlash that has also seen non-
Muslim elements of Malay culture marginalized and disavowed.
However, it is not just the external symbols of Islam that are more prominent today as
Islamization has permeated almost every aspect of society in a country in which over a third
of the population are non-Muslims. Islamic banking, first introduced in July 1983, has grown
very rapidly so that by 2002 Islamic banking deposits constituted 10.6% of total bank deposits
(indeed with the launch of an Islamic capital market Malaysia has arguably become the epicentre
of Islamic-style financial services).1 In education the privately funded International Islamic
University of Malaysia (IIUM), also opened in 1983, has grown from an initial 153 students
to over 20,000. In its first 25 years the IIUM has produced more than 38,000 graduates many
of whom have gone on to hold influential positions in government, including the Attorney
General’s Chambers, where they have become prominent supporters of greater compliance
with Shari’ah law (Haris 2008).
It is perhaps in the legal sector where the most controversial developments have occurred.
Although a dual judicial system was created under British colonialism the distinct barriers
between the civil/secular legal domain and the religious have become increasingly blurred
(Mohamed Adil 2007a). In 1988, for example, the Constitution was amended to clarify that
the High Courts were to have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction
of the Shari’ah courts.2 Since then Shari’ah courts have occupied a parallel, rather than a
subordinate place in the Malaysian judicial system (Horowitz, 1994). The net impact of this
is that arguably the Islamization of law has proceeded more methodically in Malaysia than
anywhere else in Asia (ibid.).
In order to account for, and determine the impact of, the Islamization of Malaysia, this article
reviews and aggregates the secondary literature on the subject. In addition, a small number of
interviews were carried out with civil society activists in Malaysia in August 2008, and via elec-
tronic mail thereafter.3 From these we conclude the following:
a) The process of Islamization in Malaysia is, as Liow (2003) has remarked elsewhere,
a dialectical process in which incremental government responses to demands made
by proponents of a greater social, economic and political role for Islam have only
served to galvanize the Islamic ‘constituency’ further, resulting in a continuing
dynamic in which the formal and informal influence of Islam on Malaysian society
has deepened.
b) While the prevalent explanation for this dynamic is the political competition between the
UMNO and the Islamic opposition party, PAS, such explanations exaggerate the elec-
toral challenge posed by PAS since the early 1980s. Furthermore, they do not elaborate
on how the social forces energized by Islamism were recruited into the state apparatus in
such a way that they themselves have become a principal agency for further religious
coloration of government bureaucracies and programmes.
Ironically, despite a clearly recognizable phenomenon across the Muslim world there is no
singular agreed definition of Islamization. Rather than engage with the disparate debates and
arguments over the term for the purposes of this article we define Islamization as ‘the intensifi-
cation of Islamic influence on social, cultural, economic and political relations’.
 Contemporary Politics 137

Islamization in Malaysia
Islam has played a part in Malay society and culture since the fifteenth century when traders from
the Indian sub-continent and the Middle East brought the region into contact with their religion
(Andaya and Andaya 2001). However, since the 1970s the form and prevalence of Islam in
Malaysia has slowly and steadily changed, moving away from its syncretic Hindu and animist
roots towards an ever-more conservative and Arabic form (Fealy 2005). Although some of
the early literature on this phenomenon sought to explain this by examining societal and cultural
factors (Nagata 1980, Zainah 1987) much of the literature in more recent years has turned its
attention to the role of the Malaysian state in pursuing an overt and explicit Islamization
process due to the growing Islamic political challenge from PAS (Liow 2004a,b, Neo 2006).
While clearly, as we demonstrate below, the two are inextricably linked, it is our contention
that the debate has shifted to such an extent that the societal dimension has largely been margin-
alized. The consequence of this is that a crucial explanatory factor for why the Islamization
process has continued is neglected.
The revival of Muslim religiosity in Malaysia, a trend it shares with other Muslim-dominated
countries, can be traced to both global and local factors (Jomo and Cheek 1988). The global
backdrop to Malaysia’s Islamic resurgence began in the 1970s with the Arab –Israeli war
which triggered the global Oil Crisis in 1973. Events in the Middle East caused Muslims
throughout the world to identify with the various plights of their co-religionists. Additionally,
while some Muslim countries were awash with petrodollars following the Oil Crisis, there
was, simultaneously, a growing disenchantment in many of these countries over the perceived
failures of secular nationalism (Chong 2006, Neo 2006). Significantly, the Iranian Revolution
of 1979 is identified as a major turning point resonating at an ideological level with many
Muslims living under corrupt and repressive secular dictators (Noor 2003, Chong 2006).
Combined, these events served not only to underscore the perception of a Western domination
of Muslim societies, and the relative underdevelopment of these societies, but also promoted the
possibilities of a better life under the auspices of an Islamic state (Zainah 1987, Mutalib 1993).
Consequently, these events left an indelible impression on the Muslim world that translated into
a global Islamic resurgence (Muzaffar 1987, Roy 2004).
Conversely, the impact of Malaysia’s rapid economic development, coupled with the redis-
tribution of wealth under the New Economic Policy (NEP), meant that Malays were not in the
same economic position as their Muslim brethren in the Middle East (Thirkell-White 2005).
Consequently, as Jomo and Cheek (1988, p. 844) suggest, there are ‘unique aspects to the resur-
gence of Islam in Malaysia that cannot be traced to the wider global dynamics’. Nevertheless, the
global Islamic resurgence did serve to affect the religious conscience of the Malays, combining
with the specific factors explored below to catalyse an increase in religiosity.

Dakwah: origins, influences and significance

Many writers (Nagata 1980, Zainah, 1987, Abu Bakar 1991, Mutalib 1993, 1996) argue that the
principal dynamic which explains the growing religiosity of Malaysia during the 1970s and
1980s was the so-called Dakwah movement. In some ways it is misleading to speak of
Dakwah as a movement since it lacked an overall organization with clearly defined goals.
Dakwah was not therefore, monolithic or unitary, but instead largely a generic term for mission-
ary activity (Nagata 1980). Indeed, since at the core of Dakwah was the basic and continuing
obligation for all Muslims to propagate their faith, Dakwah can be regarded as being as old
as Islam itself.
This notwithstanding, the term is used to depict and describe the growth in support, particu-
larly among the urban, higher-educated, middle-class youth, for Islam as a way of life (a-din)
138 Jason P. Abbott and Sophie Gregorios-Pippas

and as a striving for religious truth (ibid., p. 414). The most visible signs of these commitments
were the adoption of more conservative dress codes and work habits and the participation in
formal Dakwah groups. However, since prior to the 1970s strict Islamic dress was far less
common, it was perhaps the visual impact of Dakwah that became its hallmark.
Abu Bakar (1991, p. 1040) argues that the Dakwah revival was principally about the ‘the
re-education in Islam’ of increasing numbers of Malays, a return to a more orthodox version
of the faith led by an Arabic and religious educated group who espoused the teachings of the
Quran and Hadith and organized early morning lectures, kuliah and subuh in mosques and
prayer rooms. This group he argues was also prevalent in colleges and universities and included
many who were also involved in the Al-Arqam4 and Tabligh5 missionary movements.
Initially, the Dakwah movement focused on personal religiosity, but the Islamic revival
evolved and took on a new form (Mutalib 1993). Young, middle-class and educated Malay
students began to study at universities such as Al-Azhar in Egypt in an attempt to return to
their ‘Islamic roots, devoid of the alleged deviations of localised folk Islam’ (Stark 2005,
p. 309). Students at Al-Azhar became influenced by more conservative and extreme versions
of Islam as well as Islamist ideologies drawn from groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt. Prominent in such ideologies was the view that Muslim societies were failing because
they had departed from following the path of ‘true Islam’ – ‘true Islam being that which is inte-
grated into politics, state, law and society’ (Noor 2003). To these were joined the ‘core cadres’ of
the Iranian revolution who while young, Western or secularly educated, would ‘blend Marxist
concerns for social justice with Islamic authenticity’ (Robinson 2004, p. 118).
Of equal importance was the return of Malay students from their studies in England. Indeed,
as Zainah notes, it was in England that Malaysian students ‘first began to denounce the govern-
ment as unIslamic’ (Zainah 1987, p. 29). In 1975, for example, Suara Islam was formed in
Brighton, a movement which had been exposed to the more militant teachings of Islam and
which believed that to realize the goal of an Islamic state it was necessary for a core group of
true Islamic radicals to seize political power (Zainah 1987, p. 28). This group denounced
UMNO for being a secular nationalist party, and thus unIslamic, and instead called for the
re-establishment of Shari’ah. Others, more extreme still, went a step further demanding the
implementation of the controversial ‘hudud’ (criminal) laws (ibid.).
Nagata argues that an additional factor explaining the growth of the Dakwah among the
students was the fact that the arena of political debate and contestation had been limited by
the Malaysian government following the ethnic riots of 1969. Since the issue of Malay rights
and the Malay language were now considered too ‘sensitive’ as subjects for political debate,
new modes of expression had to be found and, these were ‘increasingly in the domain of
religion’ (ibid., p. 410).
Shamsul (1997) shares these sentiments arguing that the starting point for the Islamic resur-
gence was precisely in the aftermath of the ethnic riots between the Malays and the Chinese in
1969. After the riots, Malays were encouraged into tertiary education. Educated in Malay, and
with poor academic qualifications, many would not have qualified for the University had it not
been for the NEP which positively discriminated in their favour.6
Furthermore, according to Zainah (1987, p. 21), ‘these students felt inferior to the urban and
largely better qualified non-Malay students who spoke fluent English’. As a result of this
alienation (English was the medium of instruction until the mid-1970s) they became ‘more
susceptible to influences and ideas emerging from a heritage that they were familiar with and
joined the Dakwah groups’ (ibid., p. 22). This was compounded, Zainah continues, by the
culture shock of studying in the West. This unfamiliar environment meant that many Malay
students were ‘alienated, insecure and felt powerless’ (ibid., p. 25), anxieties eased by Islam,
which represented the familiar and provided the ‘sense of identity, stability and coherence that
 Contemporary Politics 139

they needed to adjust to a new environment’ (ibid.). Nagata (1980) concurs, arguing that higher
education led many Malay youths to question western values creating cultural and personal
conflicts. Furthermore, while exposed to Western culture in Britain and elsewhere many of
these students were also ‘introduced to an alternative life-style actively propagated by fellow
students from other Muslim countries, notably Pakistan, Libya and Saudi Arabia’ (ibid., p. 438).
On returning home from abroad many of these Malay students would then join the growing
Dakwah movements at home, ‘in search of a better, more Islamic ideal’ (Fealy 2005, p. 160).
The most prominent of the Dakwah groups in Malaysia was the Malaysian Islamic Youth
Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia – ABIM). Founded in 1971 by the alumni of
local and foreign universities, the National Association of Islamic Students claimed an ideologi-
cal and organizational affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Jomo and Cheek 1988).
ABIM was a moderate Dakwah movement, but argued that Islam’s status as the ‘official’ religion
of Malaysia did not go far enough and that instead Malays should strive ‘toward[s] building a
society that is based on the principles of Islam’ (Shamsul 1997, p. 213, our emphasis). After a
slow start, ABIM gained significant momentum when it organized a mass protest against
peasant suffering in Baling, which culminated in over 1200 students being arrested. Estimates
suggest that ABIM was able to mobilize almost 90% of students at the Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia and over 60% of students at the University of Malaya. While its leadership was
detained under the Internal Security Act7 following the demonstration, the event gave ABIM
the political credibility it had been lacking and enabled the movement to display its commitment
to Islamic values. Furthermore, its cause struck a chord with the wider Malay community,
thereby directly challenging UMNO’s historic role as the sole protector of Malay interests.
Arguably ABIM’s spectacular growth among the student body was another consequence of
the restrictions placed upon Malaysian society in the aftermath of May 1969. The Universities
and Colleges Act (1971), for example, effectively prohibits university students, or any of their
organizations, from joining, affiliating themselves or expressing support for any political party
or trade union.8 Consequently with such curbs in place Islam ‘became the only safe avenue
through which students could air their grievances, channel their energies, fulfil a need to
serve society and find a relief from the pressures of university life and urban living’ (Zainah
1987, p. 22).
Such political repression reveals similarities between the growth of ABIM and the growth in
support for other Islamic movements elsewhere in the Muslim world. Robinson (2004, p. 126),
writing on Hamas in the Palestinian territories, notes that once, ‘opposition is not allowed to
develop in the public sphere [it is then] pushed into the private and semi-private realms [and]
in most cases, this means the mosque, since it is the one institution that the state dare not chal-
lenge directly’.
Furthermore, as well as using Islam as a vehicle for dissent, the Palestinian Islamist move-
ments also set up ‘numerous social service institutions, primarily in the medical and educational
realm’ (ibid., p. 127), a pattern replicated by the Dakwah groups in Malaysia. For example, in the
same year that ABIM was founded, Anwar Ibrahim (its then leader) set up a private secondary
school ‘to provide continuing education to the mainly Malay drop-outs from the government
education system’ (Zainah 1987, p. 17). Likewise the Al-Arqam movement, which would even-
tually be banned in 1994, created not just schools and clinics, but an entire business empire that
included mini-markets, bus services and food plants (Shennon 1994).

The rise of political Islamization: UMNO versus PAS competition

The period between 1979 and 1981, when ABIM was under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim,
marked the height of ABIM’s influence. In rural areas ABIM emerged as the champion of
140 Jason P. Abbott and Sophie Gregorios-Pippas

the community of believers, while in urban areas ABIM had a strong student base which
was buoyed by perceived successes, such as the Iranian revolution. As Yusri Mohamad, the
current President of ABIM, notes, ‘[t]he Iranian Revolution captured the imagination of
the dakwah leaders. Indeed Anwar was one of the first to visit Tehran post-1979’ (Yusri
2008). Consequently, as in many countries Islam became seen in Malaysia as ‘the major
ideology of dissent’ with Western ideals ‘no longer sought for solutions to the ills of society’
(Zainah 1987, p. 1).
As noted earlier, ABIM’s rise to prominence in the national politics of Malaysia arguably
first occurred in the aftermath of the Baling protests of 1974. These protests, in which Anwar
Ibrahim played a prominent role, represented an attempt by ABIM and other student youth
movements to highlight the issue of rural Malay poverty. As well as possessing a charismatic
leader, and orchestrating campaigns, ABIM also benefitted enormously from the fact that the
Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) under the leadership of Asri Muda had joined the ruling
UMNO-led Barisan Nasional coalition. As a result, disaffected Muslims turned to ABIM for
support rather than to PAS. All these factors combined resulted in the rapid growth of
ABIM’s membership from about 9000 in 1972 to 35,000 by 1980 (Yusri 2008).
In 1977, following the expulsion of PAS from the governing coalition, many within ABIM
saw a unique opportunity to forge a creative alliance with PAS with a view to exploiting the
Dakwah movement as an electoral force. On its part, PAS also saw an opportunity to take
advantage of the ‘wave of the future’ to appeal beyond its traditional base. In the subsequent
elections of 1978 three ABIM officials openly contested on the PAS ticket in Kedah while
across the country as a whole ABIM campaigned openly for the Islamic party. The result
was that, as Esposito and Voll (1996, p. 134) remark, ‘PAS and ABIM strengthened and
reinforced each other’ in order to ‘safeguard the dignity of Islam from being undermined by
UMNO’ (Jomo and Cheek 1988, p. 848). Prominent among those ABIM leaders who actively
‘crossed organizational lines’ (ibid.) were Deputy Leader Fadzil Noor and the Head of Tereng-
ganu Section, Hadi Awang, who was also one of the ABIM members who ran on a PAS ticket.
Although the elections saw the National Front secure a comfortable two-thirds majority, PAS
support in the four northern states of Kedak, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu exceeded
40%, and in many seats in these states UMNO’s margin of victory narrowed considerably.
Many, both in ABIM and PAS, also saw the necessity of combining forces following
UMNO’s success in wresting control of the state of Kelantan from PAS in the state elections
in 1978.
Faced with growing Islamic resurgence, and in order to counter the combined threat of
ABIM and PAS, UMNO responded with the Societies Act Amendment Bill of 1981 which
sought to curtail the growth of ABIM by forcing it to end its international and domestic political
links. As Nair (1997, p. 32) notes, ‘UMNO was increasingly alarmed by the narrower margin
obtained between BN victors and PAS candidates and by record increases in votes polled for
PAS in a series of by-elections’.
Prior to Mahathir’s accession to the premiership in 1982, UMNO had done little to co-opt
Islam and Islamists into the umbrella of the Barisan Nasional. According to Shamsul (1997),
the Barisan at the time was too busy dealing with internal political squabbles for such efforts
to take precedence. Furthermore, initially the BN also mistakenly believed that the protests
organized by ABIM in support of the poor were political protests rather than protests motivated
by ‘Islamic objectives’ (ibid., p. 214). Gradually, the government’s views changed, but one see-
mingly trivial event in particular served to awaken the government to the changing reality. This
was when the daughter of the then Prime Minister Hussein Onn returned from studying in
England wearing a hijab in the late 1970s (Zainah 1987). According to Zainah this act made
the government realize that the Dakwah movement not only infected a displaced rural contingent
 Contemporary Politics 141

but was powerful enough to influence young Malays from middle and upper class backgrounds
who had grown up in an urban, secular and Westernized environment and thus the dakwah
movements’ political potency was finally recognized (1987, p. 30).
Under Mahathir, a strategy to deal with this new opposition emerged. Mahathir feared that
PAS posed a challenge to UMNO’s political hegemony as PAS’s ideological re-orientation,
combined with the growing Islamic resurgence, ‘provided a wider audience for PAS’s criticism
of UMNO policy and meant it presented more of a threat to the government’ (Thirkell-White
2006, p. 431). Since 1969, UMNO has been particularly concerned about the prospect of PAS
capturing the majority of the Malay vote and the risk that this could unseat UMNO from its pos-
ition as the dominant party within the Barisan Nasional. Since UMNO’s raison d’être has always
been to champion Malay rights, losing the majority support of the Malay population would
undermine its primary basis for legitimacy. Thus to counter a reinvigorated PAS, and capture
the increasingly religious Malay voter, UMNO was driven to incorporate Islam into its political
agenda (Malhi 2003), despite the fact that originally it was guided by a secular-nationalist
ideology with developmental – capitalist aspirations (Noor 2003).
Mahathir’s prescription to meet the challenge of ABIM and PAS was to effectively redefine
the debate between the two parties by embarking on a state-led, UMNO-led programme of Isla-
mization. To give credence to this, 9 months later Mahathir spectacularly brought Anwar into
UMNO’s fold and ‘with Anwar’s help, Mahathir was able to quickly formulate new Islamic
policies that were received with wide approval from the country’s ulamas’ (Shome 2006,
p. 61). Anwar’s co-option was all the more spectacular since many within PAS had anticipated
that Anwar would become its leader in the future (Esposito and Voll 1996).
In addition, Anwar’s ‘defection’ was also important because it crippled and demoralized
ABIM, thereby effectively silencing it. Indeed his decision to join UMNO resulted in a
schism within ABIM itself, with some ABIM members happily following Anwar into the
embrace of the ruling party while others subsequently chose to openly side with PAS. As a
result ABIM ceased to be the critical voice of Islamic youth and instead effectively became
an officially sanctioned pressure group. In the words of Yusri, ABIM’s strategy from this
point shifted from being, ‘the critical voice against the establishment at the time, especially
when PAS was in coalition with UMNO to one of corrective participation’ (Yusri 2008).
Despite this, ABIM lost much support both from rural villages, as ordinary members deserted
ABIM for PAS (Jomo and Cheek 1988, p. 858), and from high-level defections to PAS from
the ABIM leadership both nationally and at state level. The most prominent of these defectors
were Fadzil Noor and Hadi Awang who would go on to mount an effective challenge to the
traditionalist leadership of Asri Muda, forcing his resignation as the President of PAS
towards the end of 1982, followed by a purge of his supporters the following year.
At this historical juncture the dominant narrative and subsequent discourse on the Islamiza-
tion of Malaysia largely turns to an analysis of the continued competition between PAS and
UMNO for the Islamic vote, maintaining that piecemeal and incremental Islamic policies by
the government continued apace principally as a political tactic to dent popular support for
PAS (Nair 1997, Liow 2004a, Weiss 2004, Stark 2005, Thirkell-White 2006). The same narra-
tive depicts UMNO as predominantly concerned with the political challenge posed by PAS. This
article contends that such accounts of the dynamics of Islamization present an exaggerated
picture of the political, and in particular the electoral challenge, presented by PAS. Here we
agree with Stivens (2006, p. 356) who argues that
[r]epresenting these struggles as an opposition between an undifferentiated bloc of neo-traditional,
theocratic conservative Islamic/Islamist forces and a more ‘moderate’ modernising governmental
forces can overlook many of the complexities of the support for Islamism in Malaysia.
142 Jason P. Abbott and Sophie Gregorios-Pippas

For example, if one examines election results since the 1980s, at both the state and federal levels,
there is little evidence to support the notion that the challenge from PAS either grew or was
consistent. During the election of 1986, for example, PAS contested the election on the ‘basis
of a radical Islamic appeal and the promise to implement hudud laws if it came to power’
(Thirkell-White 2006, p. 430). The fiery rhetoric used by PAS leaders in their campaign, and
the strict religious and moral policies they endorsed, managed to produce the party’s worst
election results (Thirkell-White 2006).
Indeed, the only real gains that PAS did make during the 1980s and 1990s were less the result
of growing popular electoral support for Islam and more the result of the political divisions and
elite splits within UMNO that culminated in the creation of broadly based opposition coalitions.
The first of these was the split between UMNO Team A and Team B that gave rise to the splinter
party, Semangat ’46 (The Spirit of ’46). Although the twin coalition that Semangat ’46 formed
with PAS on the one hand, and the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party on the other,
failed to make any significant federal-level impact either in 1990 or in 1995 the coalition did
manage to recapture the state of Kelantan for PAS in 1990.
PAS’s next breakthrough came in the 1999 elections when it emerged as the largest single
opposition party and captured control of a second state, Terengganu. Again, our contention is
that this gain was also the result of a major schism within UMNO rather than in response to
popular support for an overtly Islamic agenda. In 1998 Anwar Ibrahim, who had risen to the
post of Deputy Prime Minister, was sacked by Mahathir ostensibly over differences of opinion
in how to respond to the Asian financial crisis. In reality the decision to fire Anwar was the
result of power struggles within UMNO between Anwar’s supporters and their opponents
(Case 1999, Abbott 2001). The dismissal however energized the political opposition giving
birth to an NGO-led reform movement that would coalesce into a political party – Keadilan
(the National Justice Party). While Anwar would be arrested and imprisoned for corruption,
the party, led by his wife, Wan Azzizah, would forge a new opposition coalition bridging the
political gap between PAS on the one side and the secular DAP on the other. PAS, along with
the other parties in the Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front) coalition adopted a common
platform that campaigned against ‘corruption, collusion and nepotism’ (Abbott 2001, p. 286).
The result, as in 1990, was that PAS emerged from the 1999 elections as the chief beneficiary
of the alliance securing over half of all Malay votes and thereby seriously challenging UMNO’s
credibility as the legitimate voice of Malays (Abbott 2001). Importantly however, PAS secured
the majority of Malay votes in 1999 despite the fact that it did not campaign for an Islamic state.
Five years later, under the leadership of Hadi Awang and the traditionalist wing of the party,
PAS would reverse this policy and openly adopt a stridently Islamist agenda, culminating in
the controversial Islamic State document. This resulted in a comprehensive defeat in which
the party lost 20 of the 27 seats it held in parliament, and 62 of the 98 state assembly seats it
had won in 1999 including the state of Terengganu.
What these results do suggest is that through PAS, Islam has been reconstructed as a political
tool, to act ‘as a . . . discourse against the stratification, social dislocation and alienation of
Malaysian society . . . not to mention the corruption and money politics that has long plagued
UMNO’ (Liow 2004a, p. 187). This has both allowed PAS to call UMNO to account, and
ensure that it has become a credible and legitimate opposition party (ibid.). What it does not
demonstrate is that there is a greater desire by Malays to live in an overtly Islamic state (at
least not in the version espoused to date by PAS).
Indeed such conclusions are corroborated by the most recent general and state elections of
March 2008. Once again the leadership of PAS moved away from a more conservative
Islamic agenda to one that stressed the need to combat social and economic inequalities,
and as in 1990 and 1999 entered into a formal coalition with non-Islamic opposition parties.
 Contemporary Politics 143

The result for PAS was a recovery of most of the seats they had lost both in parliament and the
state assemblies in 2004.9 In addition, with their coalition partners they were able to form
the state governments in a record five states. Our opinion then is that the electoral evidence
suggests that ‘opposition pressure from PAS is insufficient to account for the Islamization of
the Malaysian State’ (Hamayotsu 2004, p. 247).
Consequently, if the electoral challenge from Islam is then largely a chimera, this begs the
question as to where the justification, support and dynamic for greater Islamization comes from?
It is our contention that this dynamic largely emerges from societal pressures, and principally
from the key constituents and beneficiaries of previous Islamic policies.

Top down versus ‘societal’ Islamization

It is clear that Anwar’s co-option signalled the beginning of the institutionalization of Islamiza-
tion within the bureaucracy. The first initiative was the introduction of ‘Penerapan Nilai-nilai
Islam’ which was ‘a policy guideline for the incorporation of Islamic ethics in governance’
(Chong 2006, p. 31). This policy led to the establishment of an Islamic Consultative Body,
the Institute for Islamic Understanding, the IIUM in 1983, an Islamic Development Foundation
in 1985, as well as an Islamic insurance company and an Islamic bank (Bank Islam Malaysia
Berhad) in 1984 (Chong 2006). Another important development was the introduction of
Pusat Islam which in effect was a ‘government sponsored Dakwah group, intended to
compete with other Dakwah movements and to report on their activities’ (Milne cited Chong
2006, p. 31). Over time Pusat Islam would grow into a fully fledged department of government
known by the acronym JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Agama Islam Malaysia – Department of
Islamic Advancement of Malaysia). Additionally, to ensure Malays were educated about
UMNO’s ‘progressive’ approach to Islam (as opposed to PAS’s version of Islam), the
government sanctioned policies that saw an increase in Islamic programmes over the radio
and television (Liow 2004a).
Without questioning Mahathir’s own religious convictions his decision to bring in Anwar
was clearly a calculated and strategic decision. As Zainah (2008) comments, ‘Anwar was

Table 1. Share of vote for the Islamic party (PAS) in general elections and the
number of seats won by PAS.
Year Share of vote (%) Number of seats
a
1955 4.1 1
1959 21.3 13
1964 14.4 9
1969 23.7 12
1974 n/ab 14
1978 17.4 5
1982 16.1 5
1986 6.6 1
1990 6.6 7
1995 7.3 7
1999 15.0 27
2004 15.2 7
2008 14.1 23
Note: Figures in italics are for peninsular Malaysia only.
a
The 1955 election took place before Malaysia won its independence.
b
In 1974, PAS was part of the BN.
144 Jason P. Abbott and Sophie Gregorios-Pippas

brought in to deliver the Islamic votes to UMNO’. However, Mahathir was not only motivated
by the desire to blunt the appeal of ABIM and the influence of the Dakwah educated students.
Analysing his key policy pronouncements it is clear that Mahathir hoped to utilize Islam as a
vehicle to facilitate his broad economic developmental goals, which would further add to
UMNO’s popularity and electoral legitimacy. Mahathir’s particular vision of Islam was one
that he believed could be harnessed to UMNO’s original goals of nationalism and capitalism.
As he articulated during a speech in 1984, Mahathir (1993, cited in Mutalib 1993, p. 30)
remarked that ‘what we mean by Islamisation is the inculcation of Islamic values in
government’. Mahathir had in mind a set of values that stressed integrity, honesty, hard
work, a kind of Islamic equivalent of Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic (Mahathir and
Ishihara 1995, Esposito and Voll 1996, Khoo 1996). It was a vision of Islam that would be
compatible with his ‘Look East Policy’ and with his vision of Malaysia achieving developed
world status by 2020. However, once set in action it is our contention that the Islamization
programme created a series of unforeseen dynamics that would propel it further, not least
of which was that it co-opted a theologically trained cadre of officials into the civil service
from where they would utilize their political influence to propel the further institutionalization
of Islamic values.
Anwar’s co-option, for example, had far greater ramifications than Mahathir could have
possibly realized, since it crucially provided the Dakwah students, who had flocked to ABIM
in the 1970s, access to the levers of government. As Zainah (2008) remarks,
Anwar really was the trojan horse that came in and poured out all these Islamic activists into UMNO,
into UMNO politics, into the universities, he was Minister of Education and through him all these
people, all these ABIM colleagues were everywhere.
Whether Mahathir was unable or unwilling to rein in this new Islamic constituency within the
administration is open to question, nevertheless the impact it was to have was that the Islamiza-
tion programme was arguably somewhat removed from what Mahathir had originally had in
mind. Rather than neutralize the challenge from ABIM and the Dakwah movement, UMNO
and the Mahathir administration became the vehicle for transforming Malaysia. To quote
from Zainah again (2008),
Mahathir underestimated the implications of having such a policy . . . it took on a life of its own . . .
and just went completely out of control. It was not about the values of honesty, hard work and control
that he wanted; it was instead about God, regulations, the dress, all these things . . .
This pattern whereby Dakwah students were able to permeate key institutions was repeated
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. One prominent example came with the establishment of the
IIUM. Whereas the Dakwah movement had been prominent across University campuses in
Malaysia during the 1970s, the crucial difference at IIUM was that the Dakwah movement
was not just influential at the ‘bottom’ – from the student body. At IIUM activists were promi-
nent instead, ‘from the top and bottom . . . [with] the teaching staff having been recruited for their
position on Islam’ (ibid.). Zainah goes further arguing controversially that the IIUM became an
‘ideological factory’ where everything was defined by Islam, a policy where Islam was not just
‘a flag’ but where the goal was the very ‘Islamization of knowledge’ (ibid.).
In addition, the Mahathir administration did not just adopt some of the demands of the
Islamic opposition but often arguably anticipated them, further driving the process of Islamiza-
tion forward. Alongside the creation of the IIUM, Islamic studies faculties were established at
other universities (culminating in the establishment of a second Islamic University in 1998 –
the Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia), and funding was increased for mosque building and the
propagation of Islam (Esposito and Voll 1996, p. 138). Indeed critics would question whether
Mahathir had co-opted Anwar or whether ABIM had co-opted UMNO leading to the
 Contemporary Politics 145

ABIMization of the government (ibid., p. 139). Nair (1997), for example, argues that one of the
factors behind the UMNO Team A/Team B split, which would result in the emergence of the
breakaway Semagat ’46 party in 1988, was that the Razaleigh– Musa faction was uneasy
about the entry of the Islamists into the party. Such trends continued most notably with the
defection from PAS of its former secretary general Mohammad Nakhaie Ahmad.
Another area where we have witnessed the ‘unintended’ consequences (sic) of the Islamiza-
tion programme has been in the legal arena. Here critics argue the influence of Dakwah graduates
has been particularly felt, especially, it is claimed, in the offices of the Attorney General (Haris
2008). Since the Islamization programme began, the AG’s Chambers has set up two Shari’ah
divisions, civil and criminal (Mohamed Adil 2010), and created three specialized units designed
to strategize the development of Islamic Law in Malaysia. These are respectively an Islamic
Family Law and Shari’ah Judicial System Development unit, an Islamic Banking and Finance
unit and the Interaction and Harmonization units (Muhammad 2008, p. 2). In addition, the
former director of the Federal Shari’ah Judiciary Department has been appointed as a consultant
both to assist in matters which relate to Islamic law at the Civil Court as well as where there are
conflicts between Shari’ah and Civil law (Mohamed Adil 2010).10
One specific example cited as illustrating the growing influence of Islamists is the amend-
ments that were made to Islamic Family Law in 1994 and more recently in 2005. The amend-
ments passed in 2005 have made it easier for men to enter into polygamous marriages, to
divorce, to prevent the disposition of property by a wife and to remove the responsibility of
maintenance following divorces (Kent 2005, WLUML 2006). While critics argue that these
amendments now mean that Islamic family law in Malaysia contravenes provisions in the
Federal Constitution, supporters argue that matters pertaining to Islam come under the jurisdic-
tion of both (a) individual states and (b) the Shari’ah courts. Nonetheless, the example illustrates
the increased use of the legal system to make laws more and more Shari’ah compliant. More
recently in 2007, during celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of independence, the chief
justice, Ahmad Fairuz told an Islamic conference in Kuala Lumpur that Common Law should
be abolished and Shari’ah law ‘infused’ into the legal system instead (Bell 2007).
The impact of Islamization has arguably been felt most acutely in education. Until the 1970s,
Islamic religious education had been in decline in Malaysia as the introduction of religious edu-
cation in National Schools, coupled with the opportunities that the NEP presented, led many
Malay parents ‘to see the advantages of sending their children to national schools rather than
religious schools’ (Guan 2006, p. 251). However, the Islamic resurgence of the late 1970s
and 1980s meant that Dakwah groups such as ABIM sought to ‘bring back the Malays to the
“purer” form of Islam’ (ibid.). Indeed, given that ABIM’s goal was to advocate for the formation
of an Islamic state, it specifically ‘emphasized the Islamisation of the ummah first’, and
Islamizing the education system was therefore a priority (Zainah 1987, p. 2).
As noted earlier, ABIM sought to achieve this by establishing their own religious schools or
‘sekolah agama’. Subsequently, by the mid-1980s the decline of religious schools was in reverse
as a sizeable number of Malay parents sought to send their children to these schools (Guan
2006). From a political point of view, Guan (2006, p. 251) argues that the realization of the
potential of ‘influencing the Muslim public through sekolah agama/religious schools, also led
PAS to fund and establish a number of schools throughout the peninsula’. In response to this,
the State also established ‘agama’ schools as it attempted to both respond to parental
demands for this kind of education and partly to ‘contain’ the rising influence of Islamic move-
ments and PAS (ibid.). By 2000 there were 24,000 children attending government-backed
Islamic schools and a further 53,000 children attending private religious schools. By 2003 the
combined figure had risen to 125,000 whereupon the government ended state funding accusing
the schools of breeding hatred (Kent 2003).
146 Jason P. Abbott and Sophie Gregorios-Pippas

It was the arrival of Anwar as Education Minister in 1986 that cemented educational reform
in Malaysia. Prior to his arrival, Dakwah groups such as ABIM and PAS had been extremely
critical of the state of the nation’s education system, in particular for ‘neglecting Islamic
religious schools’ (Hashim 2004, p. 82). According to such groups, ‘the government mainly
provided secular education and put too much emphasis on material development to the
neglect of Islamic values’ (ibid., p. 81). They argued that a consequence of this was a decline
in religious commitment and a rise in discipline problems among Muslim youths such as
smoking and vandalism (ibid., Mahathir and Ishihara 1995). Anwar’s arrival ensured that
such concerns were addressed with the unwritten secular and utilitarian philosophy of education
replaced in 1988 with a National Educational Philosophy (NPE). This placed a firm belief in, and
devotion to, God at its core. This philosophy directly led to the introduction of the moral edu-
cation syllabus (Sukatan pelajaran Pendidikan moral 1988) into both primary school (KBSR)
and secondary school (KBSM) curricula. The result was that both formal Islamic education
for Muslims, and moral education classes (Pendidikan Moral) for non-Malays (more often
than not taught by Muslims), became core subjects at public and private schools. The net
result of these reforms is that they have resulted in a national school system which ‘is no
longer secular based’ but instead one ‘more inclined towards moral values . . . [which] suits
the Islamic system well’ (Hashim 2004, p. 185).
Although limited, there is anecdotal and some empirical data that suggest that the impact of
such changes to the curriculum created a self-reinforcing process whereby graduates schooled in
the new curriculum have boosted applicants for Islamic Studies programmes at Malaysian
Universities which in turn has created growing numbers of Islamic Studies graduates who
themselves become both the chief beneficiaries as well as the agents of the Islamization
process. For example, while the data are now quite dated, a study of graduate destinations by
Aziz et al. (1987) demonstrated that from a sample of 1600 Malaysian graduates, 28% of bumi-
putra went on to become teachers and almost 20% Government administrators. In contrast the
figures for the Chinese minority were 15% and 1.5%, respectively (ibid.).
Given that the government itself has expressed concern at the sheer numbers of Islamic
Studies graduates, it is evident that one of the consequences of the Islamization of education
has been that is has subsequently contributed to the Islamization of the bureaucracy both at
state and federal levels (Liow 2003). Indeed as Liow (2004a, p. 195) comments, the impact
of such graduates has been further compounded by the fact that ‘for some time now Federal
and state bureaucracies have followed a policy of preference for applicants with a strong
religious background’. The repercussions of such preferences have not only engendered and
exacerbated the institutionalization of Islam by government officials but the actual implemen-
tation of these policies has ended up ‘echo[ing] the very agendas favoured by the “fundamental-
ist” Islamic opposition that UMNO set out to undermine early on in the Islamization race with
PAS’ (Liow 2004a, p. 200). Indeed Haniff bin Hassan (2007, p. 307) goes a step further, arguing
that the Islamization programme itself has actually attracted devout Muslim professionals into
the bureaucracy and into UMNO in order to ‘help effectuate Islamic changes from within’.
Some of these professionals were ABIM members who followed Anwar into the fold in 1982,
some came from ‘other Islamic organizations’, while others were simply professionals who
‘saw the potential benefit of the . . . Islamziation impetus’ (ibid.).
Indeed we contend that such actors can effectively be seen as ‘norm entrepreneurs’. While
the concept and the majority of the literature on norm entrepreneurs developed to explain how
norms are adopted at the level of the international system the processes we argue can equally be
applied at the level of domestic politics. Thus for Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) the adoption of
norms follows a specific life-cycle. Firstly norms emerge, secondly they are accepted and then
finally they become internalized. However norms do not ‘emerge out of thin air’ (ibid., p. 896)
 Contemporary Politics 147

instead ‘they are actively built up by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable
behavior in their community’ (ibid.). Pivotal in the emergence of norms for Finnemore and
Sikkink are specific agents that acts as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ mobilizing support for those
norms, in this case for stricter adherence to Islamic principles and Law. These agents are
crucial in the processes through which norms are then internalized within the state.
However it is not just within UMNO and the government where such graduates have begun
to exercise influence and mobilize support for further Islamization. Graduates from the IIUM are
also becoming increasingly prominent within the country’s opposition political parties. Thus
besides UMNO we find IIUM graduates not only, as we perhaps would expect, in PAS (e.g.
Youth vice-chief Ahmad Sabki Yusof; Balik Pulau, MP, Yusmadi Yusuf) but also in the avow-
edly non-ethnic Parti Keadilan Rakyat (e.g. Youth Chief Syamsul Iskander Mat Akin, and
former Deputy Chief Minister of Penang Mohamad Fairus Khairuddin).
While the policies, reforms and processes discussed above have made Malaysia more overtly
Islamic, they have also served to increasingly alienate non-Muslims. Although ethnic and
religious tensions have long plagued Malaysian politics, in recent years there have been a
spate of controversies involving religion.11 These include a range of issues from the Wanton
destruction of Hindu temples (AFP 2006) to prominent individual cases of apostasy and
alleged forced/fictitious conversion to Islam (BBC 2007).12
The argument advanced in this section is that the unintended consequences of both decisions
and non-decisions (Bachrach and Barantz 1963)13 concerning the challenge posed by the
Dakwah movement, the rise to prominence of Anwar Ibrahim, Anwar’s co-option into
UMNO, Mahathir’s UMNO-led Islamization programme and the perceived political challenge
from PAS, collectively set in motion a ‘dialectical process’ (Liow 2003) that has led to deepen-
ing religiosity, moral conservatism and a growing societal constituency that has acted as ‘norm
entrepreneurs’, supportive of deepening Islamization.

Conclusion
Muhamad Haniff has referred to the above processes as a ‘vicious cycle’. We, however, reject
the use of the term since whether the process is either vicious or virtuous clearly depends on who
is interpreting the phenomenon and how it is interpreted. Indeed Zainah (2000, p. 3) notes that
from a progressive perspective, the problem is not Islamization per se, but when Islamization is
distorted by political forces so it is, ‘marked not by the universal message of the religion – that is
of justice, tolerance, equality and freedom – but rather by growing intolerance, repressive teach-
ings and practices, and the shrinking of democratic space’.
The normative aspect of Islamization aside, what we have attempted to demonstrate in this
article is that the Islamziation ‘programme’ in Malaysia has created processes that have
produced results which are self-reinforcing. The strategy for diverting the extremes of Islamic
revival by co-option has instead produced far greater penetration of the state and society by
new cohorts of bureaucrats and norm entrepreneurs who have become both the implementers
of the existing state-led Islamism, and a powerful constituency still seeking conformity to
Shari’ah institutions. These results have created socio-political and socio-cultural feedback
loops that have created further momentum for more change. Consequently repeated iteration,
we tentatively suggest, will ensure that there will be no tendency towards equilibrium in the
Islamziation process, at least in the foreseeable future, unless a concerted political decision is
taken to halt it and to resist those societal groups and forces that would continue it.
However, in making such conclusions we note the relative paucity of extensive in-depth
social research on the impact that Islamization has had both on policy formation within govern-
ment departments and the civil service and we note that such studies would be a welcome
148 Jason P. Abbott and Sophie Gregorios-Pippas

addition to the literature. Furthermore, additional research is also required into bottom-up
societal pressures for reform such as Islamic engagements in mosques, Islamic schools and com-
munity sites. Equally besides the influence of IIUM, research is also needed into the role played
by private Islamic colleges and Islamic University Colleges run by state governments.
Ultimately, what is required for a complete understanding of the process of Islamization in
Malaysia is not just analysis of top-down state-directed initiatives, or conversely of bottom-
up societal pressures, but instead, of the continued and continuous dynamic interaction of both.

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge and thank the Department of Politics of the University of
Surrey for their financial support in making a research trip by Dr Abbott to Kuala Lumpur poss-
ible in September 2008. In addition, thanks go to two anonymous referees for their constructive
suggestions, and to James Nye for his assistance in proofing and preparing the final article.

Notes
1. Today Malaysia is home to the world’s largest Islamic bond market, worth over $47 billion, and
accounts for about two-thirds of all Islamic bonds. In addition, 86% of stocks on the Malaysia
Bursa are Shari’ah compliant (Sy 2007).
2. Article 121(a) states that civil courts have no jurisdiction on any matter within the jurisdiction of the
Syariah courts. Critics argue that this creates tensions with Article 11 (freedom of religion) and that the
Constitution is not explicit in the exact scope of the Jurisdiction of the Shari’ah Court (Fernando 2006,
ILBS 2008).
3. These included interviews with Zainah Anwar, head of the Islamic Womens’ group Sisters in Islam; the
President of ABIM Yusri Mohamad; Dr Dzulkefly Ahmad, PAS MP for Kuala Selangor; Khalid Jaafar,
Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and the blogger, lawyer and opposition activist
Haris Ibrahim; as well as a number of other interviewees who wished to remain anonymous.
4. Founded by Ashaari Muhammad, Al-Arqam grew very rapidly between 1972 and 1978. Arqam’s goal
was to create an Islamic society as a precursor to an Islamic state. Because it was seen as anti-establish-
ment it attracted many young and educated followers with its supporters including lecturers, highly
placed civil servants, school teachers, doctors and nurses. The movement was eventually banned by
the Malaysian government in 1994 and several of its prominent leaders detained under the ISA.
When it was finally banned it was estimated that Al-Arqam had between 10,000 and 100,000
supporters.
5. Tabligh was a missionary movement that first originated in India. While it initially emerged in Malay-
sia among Indian Muslims it quickly spread to rural Malay villages. Like Al-Arqam it was revivalist
seeking to revive and clarify the basic teachings of Islam in the Quran via a series of retreats. Seen as
largely apolitical, Jomo and Cheek (1988) claim that Tabligh had a limited impact.
6. The NEP was launched in 1970 with the aim of raising the Malay/bumiputra share of GDP from 3% to
30% by 1990.
7. Originally passed in 1960 the Act allows police to arrest any person suspected of acting in ‘any manner
prejudicial to the security of Malaysia . . . or the economic life thereof and to detain them indefinitely
without trial’.
8. The UUCA imposes severe restrictions on the formation of political organizations since it requires
every club, organization, society or political party to secure a licence from the government, thereby
providing a means to block or impede the formation of any organization considered undesirable.
9. In the 2008 elections PAS won 23 seats in parliament and 83 seats in the state assemblies. Besides
Kelantan PAS was the largest party in Kedah (16 seats).
10. Nevertheless, the relationship between the AG’s Chambers and the Cabinet is more complex. For
example, following a spate of conversions to Islam (and R Subashini versus Saravanan in particular),
in which the children of a non-Muslim spouse were also converted, the Cabinet unilaterally declared in
April 2009 that in that in the event of any dispute, a child must be raised in the faith professed by both
parents at the time of marriage. In other words conversion cannot be used to automatically get custody
of children. The Cabinet subsequently ordered the AG’s chambers to look into all relevant laws that
 Contemporary Politics 149

needed to be amended to ensure this. This decision has subsequently been rejected by Islamic councils
and Islamic NGOs (Soon 2007, Ting 2009).
11. The most recent of which has concerned the use of ‘Allah’ by non-Muslims to describe God. In 2007,
the Home Ministry banned the use of the word by the Catholic newspaper the Herald, and in November
2009 confiscated 15,000 copies of Malay language in which the word for God is translated as ‘Allah’.
The government claimed that the word Allah is Islamic and that the distribution of the bibles might
convince Muslims that Christian groups were deliberately seeking to proselytize which could
inflame ethnic and religious tensions. However on 31 December 2009 a ruling by the Kuala Lumpur
High Court overruled the earlier ban, asserting constitutional guarantees regarding the freedom of
religion. Since then there have been demonstrations and arson attacks on over 10 churches (Piggott
2009, Anwar 2010, Kuppusamy 2010).
12. Among the most famous of these is the case concerned Lina Joy (WLUML 2007). Born to Muslim
parents, Lina converted to Christianity in 1990 and changed her name. While her name change was
recognized on her identity card her change of religion was not since she did not have confirmation
from the Shari’ah Court. Her campaign to have her religion changed on her identity card eventually
went to the highest court in Malaysia and became a cause célèbre for human rights campaigners.
On 30 May 2007 the court ruled against her appeal arguing that the Shari’ah Court alone has the
power to deal with Islamic issues. In the original case (2005) the Judge argued that while Article
11(1) of the Federal Constitution provides for freedom of religion, the article must be understood in
conjunction with Article 3(1) of the constitution which assigns a special position to Islam in the
Federation. Thus because Lina was still a Muslim when she requested that her religion be changed
on her identity card ‘by virtue of Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution she cannot leave the
Islamic Religion at all’ (Mohamed Adil 2007b, p. 115).
13. Bachrach and Barantz (1963, p. 641) argue that a crucial, but oft overlooked, element of decision-
making is ‘the conscious or unconscious decision to exclude certain issues from formal locations of
decision and from relevant decision makers’. This they refer to as non-decisions. In the case of the
Islamization process in Malaysia it is our contention that much of that process can be characterized
as the result of non-decisions rather than an explicit ‘plan’.

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