Religion and counter-state nationalism in Catalonia

Avi Astor, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Address: Department of Sociology

Avinguda Eix Central, Edifici B
08193, Bellaterra, SPAIN

Email: avi.astor@uab.cat

Telephone: +34 610 118 265

ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4720-1841

1
 Religion and counter-state nationalism in Catalonia

Abstract

Catalonia is simultaneously the most secular region in Spain and the region that places

the greatest priority on actively managing religious affairs. Moreover, parties

comprising the Catalan Left have been particularly assertive in pushing for legislative

proposals to reduce the privileges of the Catholic Church and the general presence of

religion in the public sphere. This article examines the sources of Catalonia’s

exceptionality in religious matters, with a focus on the entanglements between religion

and nationalism in the region. Drawing on survey data, legal documents, transcripts of

parliamentary debates, media reports, and historical studies, I argue that counter-state

understandings of nationhood have figured centrally in the rapid secularization of

Catalonia’s populace, the Catalan government’s proactive approach to religious

governance, and the Catalan Left’s insistence on church-state reform at both the

regional and national levels. My analysis speaks to broader questions regarding religion,

secularism, and nationalism in stateless nations.

Keywords: Nationalism; Religion; Secularism; Catalonia; Spain

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Introduction

Three principal features of Catalonia distinguish it as exceptional within Spain in regard

to religious matters. The first is that, by virtually all measures, Catalonia’s general

populace is the most secular in the country. With respect to religious identification and

practice, Catalonia resembles northern European nations more so than Spain, Portugal,

or Italy. Secondly, Catalonia’s government has prioritised religious affairs more than

any other regional government in Spain. Specifically, it has established its own

Directorate General of Religious Affairs, signed bilateral agreements with religious and

secularist organizations, and developed its own legislation for regulating places of

worship (Griera, 2016). No other regional government has been as involved as

Catalonia’s in documenting, regulating, and accommodating religious diversity.

Thirdly, parties comprising the Catalan Left have been particularly assertive in pushing

for legislative proposals to reform church-state relations at the national level. Drawing

on survey data, legal documents, transcripts of parliamentary debates, media reports,

and historical studies, this article explores the sources of Catalonia’s exceptionality with

respect to religious affairs. My analysis engages with broader questions regarding

religion, secularism, and nationalism in stateless nations.

Religion and counter-state nationalism

Bruce (1996: 96) has noted that religion tends to be undermined by processes associated

with modernity ‘except when it finds some major social role to play other than

mediating the natural and supernatural worlds’. One such role is that of defending

national identity and culture. The religious dynamics characteristic of contexts like

Poland, Greece, and Ireland attest to the power and influence religious actors may reap

through their involvement in defending national religious traditions against rival

3
ideologies viewed as foreign impositions (Halikiopoulou, 2011; Martin, 1978). The

fusion of religious and national belonging augments the valorisation of religious

identities and symbols by the observant and non-observant alike (Demerath, 2000), and

helps sustain religion’s persistence as a form of cultural identity and heritage in

secularizing contexts (Hervieu-Léger, 2000). By the same token, developments that

undermine the link between religion and nation where it once existed, such as

indignation at ecclesiastical abuses, may accelerate secularization by complementing

gradual religious erosion with active political rejection, and by depriving religious

institutions of a key pathway for extending their raison d’être beyond the religious

sphere (Requena and Stanek, 2013).

When analysing the relation between religion and nationalism, it is critical that

scholars be attentive to whether the form of nationalism in question is state-framed or

counter-state. Whereas state-framed understandings of nationhood conceive the nation

as congruent with the state, counter-state understandings such as those characteristic of

Catalonia and other stateless nations are ‘conceived in opposition to the territorial and

institutional frame of some existing state or states’ (Brubaker, 1998: 300). The degree to

which religion becomes fused with counter-state understandings of nationhood depends,

in large part, on whether religious difference serves as a marker of (sub)national

distinction. In Canada, for instance, the preponderance of Catholicism among the

majority in Quebec and Protestantism among the broader Canadian majority has

contributed to articulations of nationhood that foreground Quebec’s Catholic heritage

(Burchardt, 2017; Zubrzycki, 2016).

To be sure, the absence of clear denominational differences separating

populations with contrasting visions of the nation does not necessarily preclude religion

from serving as a marker of (sub)national distinction, as differences in religiosity (i.e.,

4
doctrinal interpretation or devoutness) may play an equally important role in this

respect. This is particularly evident in the case of Islamic radicals associated with ISIS,

al-Qaeda, and other groups that appeal to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam when

justifying their counter-state political projects and aggression against fellow Muslims

(Mahood and Rane, 2017). Under most circumstances, however, the absence of

denominational boundaries separating groups with distinct visions of the nation tends to

mitigate the significance of religion as a marker of (sub)national distinction.

In Spain, the overwhelming preponderance of Catholicism as the religion of the

majority in territories with longstanding counter-state understandings of nationhood,

such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, has impeded religion from becoming a core

part of (sub)national identity, symbology, and discourse (Burchardt, 2017). Instead,

other cultural markers, most notably language but also folk traditions, have taken on

greater prominence as markers of (sub)national distinction. Dynamics of ‘cultural

defence’ (Martin, 1978; Bruce, 1996) have consequently played little role in stemming

the tide of secularization in these regions, as such dynamics centre mainly on language

and other aspects of culture. Indeed, the traditional centrality of Catholicism to Spanish

identity and the historical proximity of the Church to repressive political regimes have

damaged the image of Catholic institutions and accelerated secularization, especially in

minority nations. As explained below, this is critical for understanding the relatively

high levels of atheism and agnosticism in Catalonia, as well as the virtual absence of

references to religion in current nationalist discourse.

Atheism, agnosticism, and other forms of secular identification are not the only

responses to religion that may be buttressed by counter-state nationalism in contexts

where the state has historically had strong ties to a particular faith. Counter-state

understandings of nationhood may also motivate conversion to rival traditions or

5
experimentation with ‘new-age’ spiritualities.1 During the 1970s and 1980s, for

example, a number of activists involved in Andalusia’s struggle for (sub)national

autonomy gravitated toward Islam, as the region’s Islamic heritage facilitated claims to

cultural distinctiveness and special political rights amid Spain’s democratic transition.

Idealized representations of interreligious coexistence (convivencia) during the period

of al-Andalus also provided a historical basis for challenging exclusionary

understandings of the nation advanced as part of Franco’s ‘National Catholicism’. This

is key for understanding the expansion of the Islamic Morabitun movement, a Sufi-

inspired movement of converts, in southern Spain (Dietz, 2004; Verkaaik, 2013).

In addition to influencing religiosity in stateless nations, counter-state

understandings of nationhood may impact political and institutional approaches to

governing religious affairs. Although such understandings have accelerated

secularization and the decline of religion as an element of personal and collective

culture in Catalonia, they have simultaneously contributed to the emergence of a

relatively active and interventionist political approach to regulating religious issues. As

argued below, the entwinement of religious governance with the politics of counter-

state nation building has played a crucial role in generating impetus for the

establishment of Catalonia’s legal and institutional architecture for managing religious

affairs (cf. Griera, 2016).

Religious indicators in Catalonia

Catalonia’s high degree of secularity vis-à-vis other Spanish regions is evidenced by a

multiplicity of indicators. Just 51% of Catalans currently identify as Catholic, a

proportion substantially lower than the national average of 67%. Of those who identify

as Catholic in Catalonia, 73% report ‘almost never’ attending church, compared with

6
63% of Catholics in Spain. 42% of Catalans identify as atheists or non-believers,

compared with 27% of Spaniards as a whole (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Religious identity in Spain and Catalonia

45%
42%

40%
37%

35%

30%

25%
25% 24%

20% 18%
16%
15% 14%
11%
10%

5%
5% 3%

0%
Practising Catholics Non-Practising Atheists Non-Believers Other Religions
Catholics

Spain Catalonia

Note: These data combine two different survey items on religious identity and
practice. ‘Non-Practising Catholics’ are defined here as those who identify as Catholic
but ‘almost never attend religious functions’.
Source: Centre for Sociological Research (CIS), January and February 2019 barometers
(aggregate data).

As illustrated by the logistic regression model presented in Table 1, the negative

relation between residence in Catalonia and Catholic identification remains significant,

even when controlling for size of municipality, age, education, and socioeconomic

status. Hence, secularism in Catalonia is not a simple story about Catalans being more

urban, younger, more educated, and of higher class standing than other Spaniards.

7
Table 1. Logistic regression model for Catholic identification in Spain (N = 27,009)

B S.E. Sig. Exp(B)

Residence in Catalonia -1.02 0.04 .000 0.36

Size of municipality -0.07 0.01 .000 0.93

Age 0.04 0.00 .000 1.04

Education -0.24 0.01 .000 .79

SES -0.06 0.01 .000 0.94

Constant 0.41 0.06 .000 1.50

Pseudo R2 0.14

Note: Size of municipality, education, and SES are based on the CIS’ recoding of survey
responses.
Source: CIS 2018 monthly barometers (aggregate data).

In the Spanish public-school system, parents have the option of signing their

children up for classes on Catholicism or a secular alternative. The proportion of parents

who choose the Catholic option is lowest in Catalonia. For the 2016-2017 school year,

18% of public primary school students in Catalonia were registered for courses on

Catholicism, compared with 57% in Spain as a whole. Just 10% of Catalan secondary

school students were registered for courses on Catholicism, compared with 45% of

Spanish students (Ministerio de Educación y Formación Profesional, 2018).2

Inhabitants of Catalonia are also the least likely in Spain to direct a portion of

their taxes to the Church. When paying taxes, Spaniards have the option of allocating

0.7% of their taxes to the Church, other social purposes, both the Church and other

social purposes, or the general budget.3 In 2017, just 19% of Catalan taxpayers allocated

a percentage of their taxes to the Church, compared with the national average of 34%

(Agencia Tributaria, 2018). It is important to note, however, that although a relatively

8
low proportion of Catalan taxpayers allocate taxes to the Church, the region as a whole

is one of the largest contributors to the Church via tax assignments due to the relatively

high earnings of its populace, especially in the Barcelona metropolitan area.

Perhaps the most striking indicator of the depth of secularism in Catalonia is the

high proportion of civil weddings among marrying couples. In 2018, fully 91% of

weddings in Catalonia were civil, while just 8% were Catholic. The Spanish averages,

by contrast, were 79% civil and 19% Catholic.4 The low proportion of Catholic

weddings in regions across the country is indicative of the strong secularizing trends

among Spanish youth and the decline of Catholic familial tradition.

Secularization in Catalonia

Secularization in Catalonia is rooted, in part, in the specificities of its industrial

development. Like the Basque Country, Catalonia industrialized prior to other Spanish

regions, setting in motion various developments associated with modernization and

secularization, including social and structural differentiation, migration and

urbanization, and rising individualism. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries, the emergence of an urban elite critical of the monarchy and its ties to the

Church, as well as the large concentration of workers in Barcelona and its surrounding

metropolitan area, contributed to the rise of powerful anarchist, communist, and

socialist movements that promulgated staunchly anti-clerical ideologies (Balcells, 1996;

Dowling, 2013; Pérez-Agote, 2012). Early incarnations of anti-clericalism in Catalonia

thus had a significant working-class dimension and were basically divorced from

questions of (sub)national autonomy.

The ascension of Franco to power following the Civil War (1936-1939) and his

regime’s forceful inculcation of Catholic identity, traditions, and values via ideological

9
state apparatuses had a ‘levelling’ effect of sorts. While clandestine anti-clerical

organizations persisted, they were severely weakened, and levels of religiosity in

Catalonia became increasingly similar to those in the rest of Spain. According to a

survey conducted in 1978 – three years after Franco’s death – 91% of inhabitants of

Catalonia and the Balearic Islands identified as Catholic, a percentage roughly

equivalent to the national average at the time. The proportion of the populace that

identified as non-practising Catholics in the two regions (34%) was only slightly above

the national average (31%).5

Figure 2. Proportion of Catalan and Spanish populations identifying as Catholic

100%

89%
90%
84%

80% 86%

70% 67%
76%

60%

50%
51%
40%

30%
85 995 000 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019
19 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Spain Catalonia

Sources: CIS 1985 November barometer (Study #1492); CIS 1995 ‘Attitudes toward
immigration’ survey (Study #2131); CIS 2000-2019 monthly barometers (aggregate
data).

As illustrated by Figure 2, the proportion of both Catalans and Spaniards

identifying as Catholic has declined significantly since Spain’s democratic transition in

the late 1970s. This decline, however, has been more rapid in Catalonia, especially since

the 1990s. Both national- and regional-level factors account for these trends. At the

national level, scholars have signalled strong cohort effects as crucial for explaining the

10
decline of Catholic identification and practice throughout Spain. Generations born from

the 1950s (and especially the 1960s) onward tend to be significantly less religious than

earlier generations, as they came of age during or after the transition. They were thus

exposed at an early age to narratives condemning the Church for its support of the

dictatorship (Requena and Stanek, 2013). They also had greater contact with alternative

worldviews and values as a result of maturing during a period in which Spain was more

open to the outside world (Pérez-Agote, 2012).

It might be argued that bitterness toward the Church is particularly potent in

regions like Catalonia and the Basque Country due to Franco’s severe repression of

(sub)national identity in the two territories and the perceived complicity of the Church

in this process. Although there may be a kernel of truth to this argument, it is important

to note that a number of Catholics in Catalonia played an important role in defending

and preserving Catalan culture during the dictatorship. The Abbey of Montserrat and

Catholic publishing houses such as Nova Terra and Estela supported the publication of

both religious and non-religious texts in Catalan. Catholic actors also promoted pro-

Catalan religious associations and gave refuge to political dissidents (Guibernau, 2004).

Toward the end of the dictatorship, Catalan Catholic leaders were among the most vocal

proponents of democratic transition, and several prominent Catalan politicians during

the post-transition period had strong ties to Catholic movements and orders (Costa,

1993). The presence of progressive elements within Catalan Catholicism mitigated anti-

clerical sentiment and facilitated the emergence of an influential Christian democratic

party whose political offshoots remain a significant part of the political landscape.

For these reasons, the strong secularizing trends characteristic of Catalonia

likely have less to do with vehement anti-clericalism and rejection of ecclesiastical

institutions per se, and more to do with general perceptions of Catholicism as

11
conservative, outmoded, and quintessentially Spanish. Spain’s democratic transition

afforded greater space for the expression of Catalan (sub)national identity, facilitated

claims for political autonomy, and generated enthusiasm for the development of a more

modern and plural nation. Counter-state nationalist mobilization and the rejuvenation of

Catalan identity have subsequently buttressed the general distancing of the Catalan

populace from Catholicism, as well as other traditions viewed as prototypically Spanish,

such as bullfighting.6

The connection between national and religious identification in Catalonia is

evidenced by survey data showing that just 45% of inhabitants in the region who

describe themselves as ‘only Catalan’ or ‘more Catalan than Spanish’ identify as

Catholic, compared with 68% of those who describe themselves as ‘only Spanish’ or

‘more Spanish than Catalan’. Inhabitants of Catalonia who feel equally Spanish and

Catalan fall somewhere in the middle, with 55% self-identifying as Catholic (Table 2).

Similar patterns may be found in the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, in Galicia.

Table 2. National identity and religious identification in Catalonia

Catholic Non-Believer Atheist

Only Spanish (N=285) 67% 17% 7%

More Spanish than Catalan (N=193) 69% 18% 8%

As Spanish as Catalan (N=1621) 55% 23% 16%

More Catalan than Spanish (N=852) 48% 29% 19%

Only Catalan (N=923) 41% 30% 25%

Note: Religious minorities and those who did not respond to the relevant questions
are not included in this table.
Source: CIS 2018 monthly barometers (aggregate data).

12
 The relation between (sub)national and religious identification in Catalonia is

complicated somewhat by the fact that Catalans lean more to the Left than most

Spaniards (Figure 3). Moreover, those who feel more Catalan than Spanish tend to be

more affluent and less ideologically conservative (Miley, 2006).

Figure 3. Ideological self-positioning in Catalonia and Spain

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
(Left) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Right)

Spain Catalonia

Source: CIS 2018 monthly barometers (aggregate data).

Throughout Spain, there is a strong association between ideological self-

positioning and religious identification, and Catalonia is no exception in this regard

(Figure 4). The precise nature and direction of this association is somewhat ambiguous

insofar as Catholic identity could plausibly be understood as either a cause or

consequence (or both) of ideological conservatism.

13
Figure 4. Ideological self-positioning and religious identity in Spain

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
(Left) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (Right)

Catholic Non-Believer Atheist

Note: Religious minorities and those who did not respond to the relevant questions
are not included in this figure.
Source: CIS 2018 monthly barometers (aggregate data).

Although Catalans’ general ideological leanings have likely contributed to their

secularity, the regression model presented in Table 3 demonstrates how, even if we

control for ideological self-positioning and a host of other variables, including age, sex,

education, and socioeconomic status, the relation between (sub)national and religious

self-identification remains significant. The model presented in Table 3 provides rough

insight into the general profile of Catholics in Catalonia. Specifically, they tend to feel

more Spanish than Catalan, and to be more ideologically conservative, older, female,

less educated, and of lower socioeconomic status.

14
Table 3. Logistic regression model for Catholic identification in Catalonia (N = 3004)

B S.E. Sig. Exp(B)

Catalan identity -0.18 0.04 .000 0.84

Ideological positioning 0.30 0.03 .000 1.36

Age 0.05 0.00 .000 1.05

Sex 0.43 0.09 .000 1.54

Education -0.13 0.04 .002 0.88

SES -0.12 0.05 .024 0.89

Constant -2.34 0.29 .000 0.10

Pseudo R2 0.20

Note: Omitted category for sex is male, and education and SES are based on the CIS’
recoding of survey responses.
Source: CIS 2018 monthly barometers (aggregate data).

15
Figure 5. Change in the predicted probabilities of identifying as Catholic among
Catalans with different national identifications

.8
Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs
Catholic Identity
.7
.6
.5
.4
sh

an

an

an
is
ni

al

al

al
an
a

at

at

at
Sp

Sp
C

C
n

as

y
y

nl
a
nl

a
th

th

O
h
O

is
h

an
an
is
an

al
Sp

at
Sp

C
As
e

e
or

or
M

National Identity

Note: Odds ratios adjusted by ideological positioning, age, sex, education, and SES.

Despite strong trends toward secularization, Catholicism’s deep historical

enculturation in Catalonia has facilitated its persistence as a ‘diffused’ or ‘ambient’ faith

embedded in the sensory environment and present as a cultural backdrop for public

engagement (Cipriani, 2017; Engelke, 2013). The official calendar remains structured

around Catholic holidays and commemorations of local patron saints. Public

celebrations tied to Catholic tradition still attract a multitude of participants, old and

young. Cathedrals and other religious structures remain the centrepiece of the built

landscape of Catalan cities and towns. Religious symbols, such as the nativity scene, are

displayed in emblematic public squares and thoroughfares, typically without major

objection. An important question looking ahead is whether Catholic symbols and

traditions present in the public sphere have become sufficiently ‘culturalized’, or

16
divorced from their confessional moorings, to remain acceptable in the eyes of a

populace whose ties to Catholicism and the Church continue to dissipate (cf., Astor et

al., 2017; Joppke, 2018).

Counter-state nationalism and religious governance

Although religion has declined as an element of personal culture in Catalonia, the

Generalitat (Catalonia’s government) has prioritized the governance of religious affairs

more than any other regional government in Spain. Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of

Autonomy, which establishes its self-government rights, includes an entire article

(#161) on ‘relations with religious entities’. The article, the likes of which are not

present in other such statutes in Spain, entitles the Generalitat to ‘exclusive competency

over matters of religious entities that carry out their activities in Catalonia’, as well as

‘executive competency in matters related to religious freedom’ (Boletín Oficial del

Estado, 2006: 27298). Authority over religious affairs is thus seen as integral to the

right to self-govern.

As mentioned above, Catalonia is the only region with its own Directorate

General of Religious Affairs (DGAR). The DGAR, a sub-section of the Department of

Justice, was initially established in 2000 as the Secretariat for Relations with Religious

Confessions. Its creation responded to a popular campaign aimed at securing the

Vatican’s nomination of bishops of Catalan origin to fill new vacancies in Catalonia, as

well as pressure from Protestant organizations to for a regional interlocutor to mediate

questions of religious accommodation (Griera, 2016). More generally, establishing the

DGAR has served to enhance Catalonia’s self-governing capacity by bolstering its

ability to regulate religious affairs and to chart its own approach to religious governance

17
(Astor, 2014). It has also facilitated efforts to incorporate religious minorities into the

(sub)nationalist fold (Burchardt, 2017).

The DGAR’s first major initiative was to commission a database and map of

religious minority communities. Motivation for the project, which was initially

launched in 2001 and continues to be updated, derived from deepening processes of

religious diversification generated by rising levels of immigration beginning in the

1990s, as well as concerns about national security sparked by 9/11 in the US. According

to Griera (2018: 49), the initiative was also connected to (sub)nationalist aspirations and

the desire to construct ‘a specific and singular imaginary of Catalonia’.

The DGAR offers subsidies to support religious activities and defray the

operational expenses of religious associations. Moreover, it has administered and

established a series of bilateral conventions with the Church, entities representing

religious minorities, and secularist organizations. These agreements have addressed a

variety of issues, including religious accommodation in public institutions, the

promotion of Catalan language instruction and cultural orientation for foreign clergy,

and the designation of religious interlocutors and regular forms of consultation. At a

ceremony in 2009 celebrating the signing of several multi-year conventions with

various religious entities, the Vice President of the Generalitat and head of the DGAR,

Josep Lluís Carod-Rovira, cited the agreements as reflective of a model of ‘positive

secularism (laïcitat positiva) a la catalana’ (Agencia EFE, 2009).

What though does ‘positive secularism a la catalana’ entail exactly? How does

it depart from the broader Spanish approach to religious governance established in the

Constitution and subsequent legislation pertaining to religion? The policy of

establishing cooperative agreements with religious federations is, after all, part and

parcel of Spain’s ‘cooperative model’ (Astor 2014). Is the act of giving the Catalan

18
approach a special name then simply symbolic politics devoid of substantive content?

The controversial 2009 Catalan Law on Centres of Worship, which I analyse in the

following section, is perhaps the Catalan initiative that has challenged the prevailing

institutional and practical modus operandi most.

The 2009 Catalan Law on Centres of Worship (LCW)

The LCW was conceived toward the end of the 2000s as a response to the proliferation

of anti-mosque campaigns in Catalonia and the demands of municipal authorities for

clearer regulations regarding the establishment of mosques and other temples serving

religious minorities.7 Municipal authorities commonly found themselves at a loss

regarding how to act in the face of anti-mosque mobilizations, fearing that failure to

concede to popular pressure would result in electoral losses. The ambiguity of

regulations pertaining to licensure left a number of municipal governments with an

excess of discretion for deciding whether to authorize proposals to establish new

mosques or to enlarge existing ones. A principal objective of the LCW was to shield

municipal authorities from popular pressures by giving them recourse to regional-level

legislation that provided straightforward and unambiguous guidelines. Local officials

would thus be better positioned to claim that decisions regarding authorization were out

of their hands (Astor, 2017).

Had their objectives been purely pragmatic, Catalan legislators might have

sought a more minimalist solution, such as adding stipulations regarding places of

worship to existing regulations pertaining to urban planning, as has more typically been

the case in Europe. Such stipulations would have been less conspicuous and perhaps

less controversial. The impetus for enacting an entirely new law, however, was linked to

the symbolic politics of counter-state nationalism.

19
 Catalan nationalism was on the rise when the LCW was conceived due to

outrage generated by efforts among conservative elites to challenge the constitutionality

of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy. By developing a law on places of worship specific to

Catalonia, the DGAR – then headed by the Catalan Republican Left Party (ERC) –

sought to amplify Catalonia’s distinctiveness and consolidate its autonomy with respect

to religion, culture, and urban planning. The LCW’s preamble thus referenced the

Catalan Statute of Autonomy and emphasized the Generalitat’s exclusive competency

over Catalan religious affairs. The law established a new ‘activity license’ pertaining

solely to places of religious worship.8 It was the first (and remains the only) regional

law in Spain that directly regulates the establishment of religious temples.

The entanglement of counter-state nationalism and religious governance was on

full display in the presentation of the LCW to the Catalan Parliament in 2008. The

ERC’s Carod-Rovira described the law as a ‘pioneering project, the first [law] in

Europe that specifically regulates the conditions of centres of worship’. He added that

the LCW demonstrated Catalonia’s status as ‘an advanced country’, and that like

previous Catalan laws it would serve as an example for other regional parliaments to

follow (Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, 2008: 4). The proposed law, he

contended, embodied the values of solidarity, justice, and social cohesion, and protected

religious freedom. He concluded by praising the inclusive, plural, and democratic

process by which the law was drafted, mentioning input received from diverse civic and

religious organizations.

The most vehement pushback came from Church leaders and conservatives, who

deemed the LCW militantly secularist and an affront against Catalonia’s Catholic

heritage. The spokesman for Catalan bishops criticized the law for failing to

acknowledge the ‘very diverse realities of churches, synagogues, mosques and other

20
centres’ (Astor, 2017: 131). The mantra of Catholic organizations in Catalonia and

elsewhere in Spain has been that ‘equity is not synonymous with equality or

uniformity’, given the importance of Catholicism to Spanish identity, history, and

culture.9

The drafters of the LCW did include an exemption for religious buildings listed

in Catalonia’s ‘Registry of Catalan Cultural Patrimony’ so as to ensure against the

closure of old churches unable to comply with the law’s technical requirements. This,

however, did not satisfy conservatives, who viewed the LCW as an aggressive attempt

to undercut the privileged status of Catholic institutions and a dangerous precedent for

future legislation. To contextualize their disgruntlement, Catholic churches had

historically been exempted from most ordinary municipal licensing and regulatory

requirements. This is precisely why there was no clear precedent for regulating places

of worship catering to religious minorities. Forcing Catholic churches to comply with

the LCW thus represented a major break from tradition. From the perspective of the

ERC and other parties on the Left, however, the law was a step toward a more secular,

neutral, and just framework for regulating religious affairs.

Aside from the LCW, there have not been any other major regional legislative

initiatives that aim to reduce the privileges of the Church or to push church-state

relations in a more secularist direction. As will be explained below, the ERC and other

parties associated with the Catalan Left have been more active in promoting church-

state reform at the national level. A key development that has mitigated secularist

militancy among the Catalan Left has been the formation of independentist coalitions

that transcend traditional Left/Right ideological lines. Since 2015, the exigencies of

forming a viable independentist bloc have led the ERC to develop strategic pacts with

conservative independentist parties descended from the Democratic Convergence of

21
Catalonia, a conservative party that historically has had strong ties to the Church and

Catalan Christian democrats. Militating for secularist church-state reforms would

jeopardize the viability of the independentist bloc in the region.

The Catalan Left and national church-state reform

At the national level, the Catalan Left has been less restrained in asserting its vision for

an alternative model of religious governance. Until very recently, the ERC and other

parties comprising the Catalan Left were at the fore of essentially all proposals to

reform national legislation pertaining to church-state relations during the post-transition

period. These proposals centred primarily on reducing the privileges of the Catholic

Church and the general presence of religion in the public sphere.

In 2006, the ERC presented a law to replace the 1980 Organic Law on Religious

Liberty (LOLR) in the Lower Chamber of Parliament (Congreso de los Diputados). The

law’s main objectives were to promote greater equality between different religions –

especially the Catholic Church and minority confessions – and to ensure a stricter

separation between church and state. For example, a provision was included stating

there should not be ‘any type of confusion between religious and state functions’, and

that ‘the principle of secularity must be respected’ in state ceremonies (Article 5.2)

(Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, 2006b). That same year, the United Left Party

(IU) and the Catalan Greens (ICV) proposed an ‘Organic Law on the Liberty of

Thought, Conscience, and Religion’, which included a provision prohibiting the state

from subsidizing any type of ideological or religious group, a measure that indirectly

challenged Spain’s Concordats with the Vatican (Boletín Oficial de las Cortes

Generales, 2006a). Both proposals expired without a vote.

22
 In 2008 the ERC, together with the IU and ICV, proposed another law to replace

the LOLR, this time with the title ‘Organic Law on Liberty of Ideology, Religion and

Worship’. While the proposal did not entail any provision expressly prohibiting state

subsidies for religious groups, it did include a measure requiring such subsidies to

comply with various national, regional, and local regulations (Article 5.2). It also

entailed an article prohibiting politicians and civil servants from attending religious

ceremonies in their capacity as public officials (Article 4.2), among other measures

aimed at enforcing a stricter separation between church and state (Boletín Oficial de las

Cortes Generales, 2008). The proposal was roundly rejected by a vote of 330 to 7 with

13 abstentions.

In drafting these laws, the ERC, IU, and ICV were of course aware their

proposals had no real chance of approval. Their aim, however, was to open up dialogue

on a topic that had largely been left unaddressed since Spain’s democratic transition.

Their efforts were not entirely futile. Shortly after the rejection of their 2008 proposal,

President José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero and the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) took up

the issue in earnest and appeared to be making strides toward a reform of the LOLR.

Nevertheless, Zapatero elected to drop the proposal in 2010 after determining he lacked

sufficient backing. Upon learning of Zapatero’s decision, the ERC’s Joan Ridao

remarked:

We are going to continue being a supposedly non-confessional state in which

everyone knows that, apart from the privileges authorized by the essentially pre-

constitutional Concordat (with the Vatican), there is a species of freeloader – a

luxurious tic – that is the Catholic Church, which costs us nearly six billion

Euros a year (Garea and Galarraga, 2010).

23
 Despite its various failures at reforming the LOLR, the Catalan Left has not

abandoned its efforts. In 2013, a parliamentary group called Agreement for the Progress

of Catalonia (Entesa), which included the Catalan Socialist Party, the ICV, and the

Catalan United and Alternative Left Party, re-introduced a revised version of the Law

on Liberty of Ideology, Religion, and Worship, this time to the Upper Chamber of

Parliament (Senado). In defending the proposal, Joan Saura Laporta of the ICV

emphasized the importance of a clearer separation of church and state, going so far as to

quote Pope Francis as defending the principle of secularism. He added:

We could say as well that the principle of secularism means, evidently, the

independence of politics and religious teaching, and I want to manifest in this

chamber that in Spain I believe there are some words that certain social sectors

and politicians still do not understand. ‘Federalism’ is one of them. For

determinate sectors of Spanish society, federalism is a rupture when [in

actuality] federalism is unity. And the other is secularism. Many people think

that secularism is anticlericalism, but secularism has nothing to do with

anticlericalism (Diario de Sesiones del Senado, 2013: 6955).

In juxtaposing the issue of federalism and regional autonomy with that of

secularism and the separation of church and state, Saura Laporta rendered explicit the

connection between counter-state nationalism and secularism. Although the secularist

orientation of the ERC and ICV cannot be reduced to their counter-state nationalism,

the former has been reinforced by the latter. Following the debate, it was decided not to

consider the proposal further.

24
 The most recent effort at reform came in 2017, when the ERC submitted a

motion to the Lower Chamber of Parliament urging the government to consider

replacing the LOLR with a new law guaranteeing liberty of ideology, religion and

worship. The initiative’s ‘Statement of Motives’ cited the importance of becoming a

secular society for the purposes of freedom, equality, and state neutrality (Boletín

Oficial de las Cortes Generales, 2017). The motion was approved by a single vote after

an initial tie but has not been discussed since.

Aside from introducing proposals to replace the LOLR, the Catalan Left has

advanced several other motions aimed at promoting a stronger separation between

church and state, and at curtailing the privileges of the Church. In 2009, the ERC, IU

and ICV presented a non-legislative motion calling for the removal of religious symbols

from public schools. In 2012, Entesa called for the abolition of a controversial legal

procedure called ‘immatriculation’, which the Church had been leveraging to claim

ownership over properties that many considered public patrimony (e.g., Cordoba’s

iconic Mosque-Cathedral) (Astor et al., 2019). Efforts to secularize and reclaim Catalan

and Spanish cultural heritage represent a new strategy for severing the link between

nation and religion.

Parties comprising the Spanish Left (e.g., PSOE and Podemos) have recently

become more vocal in calling for church-state reforms, particularly with respect to

reconsidering Spain’s Concordats with the Vatican and the inclusion of religious

courses as part of the public-school curriculum. The positioning of the Catalan Left on

church-state relations thus appears to be gaining steam among parties with a larger

national following.

Conclusion

25
In this article, I have argued that counter-state nationalism may serve as a powerful

force contributing to secularization in contexts where the majoritarian religion bears

strong historical ties to a central state viewed as oppressive or unresponsive to

(sub)national claims. The general distancing of a large proportion of the Catalan

populace from traditions understood as quintessentially Spanish is critical for

comprehending the widening gap between Catalonia and Spain with regard to Catholic

identity and practice. Counter-state understandings of nationhood have also been central

to the priority political elites have placed on developing a legal and institutional

architecture for managing religious affairs specific to Catalonia. At the national level,

the Catalan Left will likely continue to push for reforms that call for a reduction in the

privileges of the Church, a stricter separation of church and state, and greater limitations

on the role of religion in public life. The extent to which parties like the ERC militate

for church-state reform at the regional level, however, will depend critically on

coalitional strategies surrounding the issues of political autonomy and independence.

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Biographical Note

Avi Astor is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the Universitat

Autònoma de Barcelona and a member of the Research Centre on the Sociology of

Religion (ISOR).

1
It is noteworthy that new-age spiritualities like Buddhist modernism and mindfulness

are especially popular in Catalonia (Díez de Velasco, 2013).

2
The discrepancy between primary and secondary school rates may be due to various

factors, such as secondary school students having more input in selecting their courses,

the availability of more appealing alternatives, or the influence of peer groups.

3
Prior to 2007, the default amount was .52%. The option of allocating taxes to both the

Church and other social purposes was instituted in 2000 (Montero, 2011).
4
Data on weddings in Spain may be found on the National Institute of Statistics’

website (https://www.ine.es/).
5
Catalonia and the Balearic Islands were grouped together in the 1978 CIS survey

(Study #1152) referenced here.

6
In 2010, the Catalan Parliament voted to ban bullfighting in Catalonia. The Spanish

Parliament later passed a motion declaring bullfighting ‘cultural patrimony’. In 2016,

the Constitutional Court ruled the Catalan ban illegal for its encroachment on the state’s

competency over matters of cultural patrimony.

30
7
The sources of anti-mosque campaigns in Catalonia are complex and irreducible to

counter-state nationalism. For a detailed analysis, see Astor’s (2016, 2017) previous

research on the topic.

8
Activity licenses relate to the activities permitted in a given building. They are distinct

from urban licenses, which relate to the construction or modification of buildings.

9
This slogan was foregrounded in a document entitled ‘Religion in the Catalonia of the

future’, which was presented to the Catalan Parliament in 2017 by the Catalan Union of

the Religious, a Barcelona-based ecclesiastical entity. In explaining the slogan’s

meaning, the authors wrote, ‘Diverse religions have different religious and cultural

characteristics and needs; they have diverse histories, implantation, rootedness and

representativeness’. The document may be viewed at: http://bisbatsolsona.cat/wp-

content/uploads/2017/03/El-fet-religi%C3%B3s-en-la-Catalunya-del-futur.pdf

(accessed 21 July 2019).

31