CAT ARTICLE DOSE – 46

Ronald Dworkin, a renowned legal philosopher, argues that judges are in danger of uncritically embracing an
erroneous theory known as legal positivism because they think that the only alternative is a theory that they (and
Dworkin) see as clearly unacceptable—natural law. The latter theory, known for its roots in moral principles,
holds that judges ought to interpret the law by consulting their own moral convictions, even if this means ignoring
the letter of the law and the legal precedents for its interpretation. Dworkin regards this as an impermissible form
of judicial activism that arrogates to judges powers properly reserved for legislators. For him, this approach
overlooks the importance of statutes and written laws and gives too much sway to personal beliefs, leading to a
potential lack of uniformity in legal decisions.

Legal positivism, the more popular of the two theories, holds that law and morality are wholly distinct. The
meaning of the law rests on social convention in the same way as does the meaning of a word. Dworkin’s view is
that legal positivists regard disagreement among jurists as legitimate only if it arises over what the underlying
convention is, and it is to be resolved by registering a consensus, not by deciding what is morally right. In the
same way, disagreement about the meaning of a word is settled by determining how people actually use it, and
not by deciding what it ought to mean. Where there is no consensus, there is no legal fact of the matter. The
judge’s interpretive role is limited to discerning this consensus, or the absence thereof. This approach, according
to Dworkin, tends to downplay the potential nuances and underlying principles that may govern the interpretation
of the law, focusing instead on the surface-level agreement among the interpreting parties.

According to Dworkin, this account of legal positivism is incompatible with the actual practice of judges and
lawyers, who act as if there is a fact of the matter even in cases where there is no consensus. The theory he
proposes seeks to validate this practice without falling into what Dworkin correctly sees as the error of natural
law theory. It represents a kind of middle ground between the latter and legal positivism. Dworkin stresses the
fact that there is an internal logic to a society’s laws and the general principles they typically embody. An
interpretation that conforms to these principles may be correct even if it is not supported by a consensus. Since
these general principles may involve such moral concepts as justice and fairness, judges may be called upon to
consult their own moral intuitions in arriving at an interpretation. But this is not to say that judges are free to
impose their own morality at will, without regard to the internal logic of the laws. The positivist’s mistake, as
Dworkin points out, is assuming that the meaning of the law can only consist in what people think it means,
whether these people be the original authors of the law or a majority of the interpreter’s peers. Once we realize,
as Dworkin does, that the law has an internal logic of its own that constrains interpretation, we open up the
possibility of improving upon the interpretations not only of our contemporaries but of the original authors,
providing a balanced and thoughtful approach to legal philosophy.

Page 1 of 9
PASSAGE DETAILS
• Length of the Extract: 553 words
• Flesch Kincaid Grade Level: 15.0
• Genre: Legal Philosophy

MIND MAPS

After carefully reading the passage, evaluate your understanding through the following exercises:

1. Comprehension Check: This part is focused on identifying and summarising the main ideas in the passage.
Look for pivotal sentences or groups of sentences that encapsulate the core themes in each paragraph.
Summarise these main ideas using your own words. Your goal is to capture the essence of the passage
accurately.

2. Reasoning Check: In this part, you’ll engage with questions centred on inference and critical reasoning.
These questions will require you to analyse the logic and arguments presented in the passage and make
inferential deductions. Reflect on the strength of the reasoning, assess the evidence provided, and evaluate if
the conclusions drawn are well-supported.

Upon completing each exercise, review the provided answers to gauge your comprehension and reasoning
performance. This is a valuable opportunity to enhance your critical reading skills.”

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COMPREHENSION CHECK
“In this exercise, your task is to identify the key sentence or group of sentences in each paragraph that best encapsulates
its main idea. Once you’ve identified these, provide a concise summary of the principal theme or message conveyed in each
paragraph. Remember, your goal is to effectively distil the essence of the paragraph using the key sentences and your own
summarisation.”
KEY IDEA
[1] Ronald Dworkin, a renowned legal philosopher, argues that judges are in danger of uncritically
embracing an erroneous theory known as legal positivism because they think that the only
alternative is a theory that they (and Dworkin) see as clearly unacceptable—natural law. [2] The
latter theory, known for its roots in moral principles, holds that judges ought to interpret the law by
consulting their own moral convictions, even if this means ignoring the letter of the law and the legal
precedents for its interpretation. [3] Dworkin regards this as an impermissible form of judicial
activism that arrogates to judges powers properly reserved for legislators. [4] For him, this approach
overlooks the importance of statutes and written laws and gives too much sway to personal beliefs,
leading to a potential lack of uniformity in legal decisions.

[5] Legal positivism, the more popular of the two theories, holds that law and morality are wholly
distinct. [6] The meaning of the law rests on social convention in the same way as does the meaning
of a word. [7] Dworkin’s view is that legal positivists regard disagreement among jurists as legitimate
only if it arises over what the underlying convention is, and it is to be resolved by registering a
consensus, not by deciding what is morally right. [8] In the same way, disagreement about the
meaning of a word is settled by determining how people actually use it, and not by deciding what it
ought to mean. [9] Where there is no consensus, there is no legal fact of the matter. [10] The
judge’s interpretive role is limited to discerning this consensus, or the absence thereof. [11] This
approach, according to Dworkin, tends to downplay the potential nuances and underlying principles
that may govern the interpretation of the law, focusing instead on the surface-level agreement
among the interpreting parties.

[12] According to Dworkin, this account of legal positivism is incompatible with the actual practice of
judges and lawyers, who act as if there is a fact of the matter even in cases where there is no
consensus. [13] The theory he proposes seeks to validate this practice without falling into what
Dworkin correctly sees as the error of natural law theory. [14] It represents a kind of middle ground
between the latter and legal positivism. [15] Dworkin stresses the fact that there is an internal logic
to a society’s laws and the general principles they typically embody. [16] An interpretation that
conforms to these principles may be correct even if it is not supported by a consensus. [17] Since
these general principles may involve such moral concepts as justice and fairness, judges may be
called upon to consult their own moral intuitions in arriving at an interpretation. [18] But this is not to
say that judges are free to impose their own morality at will, without regard to the internal logic of
the laws. [19] The positivist’s mistake, as Dworkin points out, is assuming that the meaning of the
law can only consist in what people think it means, whether these people be the original authors of
the law or a majority of the interpreter’s peers. [20] Once we realize, as Dworkin does, that the law
has an internal logic of its own that constrains interpretation, we open up the possibility of improving
upon the interpretations not only of our contemporaries but of the original authors, providing a
balanced and thoughtful approach to legal philosophy.

[Analysis on the next page]

Page 3 of 9
 KEY IDEA
[1] Ronald Dworkin, a renowned legal philosopher, argues that judges are in danger of uncritically Introduction of Dworkin's
embracing an erroneous theory known as legal positivism because they think that the only argument against uncritical
alternative is a theory that they (and Dworkin) see as clearly unacceptable—natural law. [2] The acceptance of legal
latter theory, known for its roots in moral principles, holds that judges ought to interpret the law by positivism, contrasting it with
consulting their own moral convictions, even if this means ignoring the letter of the law and the legal natural law, which he sees
precedents for its interpretation. [3] Dworkin regards this as an impermissible form of judicial as equally flawed.
activism that arrogates to judges powers properly reserved for legislators. [4] For him, this approach
overlooks the importance of statutes and written laws and gives too much sway to personal beliefs,
leading to a potential lack of uniformity in legal decisions.

[5] Legal positivism, the more popular of the two theories, holds that law and morality are wholly Explanation of legal
distinct. [6] The meaning of the law rests on social convention in the same way as does the meaning positivism and how it
of a word. [7] Dworkin’s view is that legal positivists regard disagreement among jurists as legitimate focuses on consensus and
only if it arises over what the underlying convention is, and it is to be resolved by registering a convention, excluding moral
consensus, not by deciding what is morally right. [8] In the same way, disagreement about the considerations.
meaning of a word is settled by determining how people actually use it, and not by deciding what it
ought to mean. [9] Where there is no consensus, there is no legal fact of the matter. [10] The
judge’s interpretive role is limited to discerning this consensus, or the absence thereof. [11] This
approach, according to Dworkin, tends to downplay the potential nuances and underlying principles
that may govern the interpretation of the law, focusing instead on the surface-level agreement
among the interpreting parties.

[12] According to Dworkin, this account of legal positivism is incompatible with the actual practice of Critique of legal positivism,
judges and lawyers, who act as if there is a fact of the matter even in cases where there is no presenting Dworkin’s
consensus. [13] The theory he proposes seeks to validate this practice without falling into what alternative view that
Dworkin correctly sees as the error of natural law theory. [14] It represents a kind of middle ground balances legal positivism
between the latter and legal positivism. [15] Dworkin stresses the fact that there is an internal logic with elements of natural law,
to a society’s laws and the general principles they typically embody. [16] An interpretation that emphasizing the internal
conforms to these principles may be correct even if it is not supported by a consensus. [17] Since logic of laws.
these general principles may involve such moral concepts as justice and fairness, judges may be
called upon to consult their own moral intuitions in arriving at an interpretation. [18] But this is not to
say that judges are free to impose their own morality at will, without regard to the internal logic of
the laws. [19] The positivist’s mistake, as Dworkin points out, is assuming that the meaning of the
law can only consist in what people think it means, whether these people be the original authors of
the law or a majority of the interpreter’s peers. [20] Once we realize, as Dworkin does, that the law
has an internal logic of its own that constrains interpretation, we open up the possibility of improving
upon the interpretations not only of our contemporaries but of the original authors, providing a
balanced and thoughtful approach to legal philosophy.

Page 4 of 9
Central Theme: The central theme of this passage is Ronald Dworkin's critique of legal positivism and natural law theories,
and his proposition of a middle ground that seeks to balance both approaches. The passage elucidates the underlying
philosophies, contrasting them, and putting forward Dworkin's own perspective that integrates elements of both.

Tone: The tone of the passage is analytical and expository. It presents a complex legal debate with clarity, offering Dworkin's
argument without overt bias.

Structure of the Passage: The structure of the passage is methodically arranged to unfold the argument in logical
progression. Paragraph 1 introduces the opposing views of legal positivism and natural law. Paragraph 2 explores legal
positivism in more detail, emphasizing its reliance on consensus. Paragraph 3 presents Dworkin's critique and his own theory
that seeks to synthesize the aspects of legal positivism with an understanding of the moral concepts inherent in the law's
internal logic.
[Check your Reasoning on the next page]

Page 5 of 9
REASONING CHECK
Question 1
Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?
(A) Dworkin holds that judicial interpretations should not be based solely on identifying a consensus or solely on moral
intuition, but should be consistent with the reasoning that underlies the law.
(B) Dworkin argues that the internal logic of the law should generally guide judges except in instances where
consensus is registered or judges have strong moral intuitions.
(C) Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation is based on borrowing equally from natural law theory and legal positivism.
(D) Dworkin validates judges’ dependence on moral intuition, reason, and the intent of the authors of a law, but only in
cases where a social consensus is not present.

Question 2
What is the main purpose of the second paragraph?
(A) to explain why legal positivism is so popular
(B) to evaluate the theory of legal positivism
(C) to discuss how judicial consensus is determined
(D) to identify the basic tenets of legal positivism

Question 3
Which one of the following most accurately characterizes the author’s attitude toward Dworkin’s theory?
(A) confident endorsement of its central assertions
(B) caution about its potential for justifying some forms of judicial activism
(C) modest expectation that some of its claims will be found to be unwarranted
(D) quiet conviction that its importance derives only from its originality

Question 4
According to the passage, which one of the following is a goal of Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation?
(A) to dispute the notion that social consensus plays any role in legal interpretation
(B) to provide a theoretical argument against the use of moral intuition in legal interpretation
(C) to argue that legal decisions must be based on the principles of the original authors of the laws
(D) to validate theoretically the method commonly used by judges in practice

Question 5
The passage suggests that Dworkin would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements?
(A) Judges and lawyers too often act as though there is a fact of the matter in legal cases.
(B) Judges should not use their moral intuition when it conflicts with the intentions of those legislators who authored
the law being interpreted.
(C) Legal positivism is a more popular theory than natural law theory because legal positivism simplifies the judge’s
role.
(D) Legal positivists misunderstand the role of moral intuition in legal interpretation.

Question 6
It can be inferred that legal positivists, as described in the passage, agree with which one of the following statements?
(A) Judges sometimes ought to be allowed to use personal moral convictions as a basis for a legal interpretation.
(B) The ultimate standard of interpretation is the logic of the law itself, not moral intuition.
(C) The meaning of a law derives from jurists’ interpretations of that law.
(D) There is no legal fact of the matter when jurists have differing moral convictions about an issue.

[Answers & Explanations on the next page]

Page 6 of 9
Question 1
Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?
(A) Dworkin holds that judicial interpretations should not be based solely on identifying a consensus or solely on moral
intuition, but should be consistent with the reasoning that underlies the law.
(B) Dworkin argues that the internal logic of the law should generally guide judges except in instances where
consensus is registered or judges have strong moral intuitions.
(C) Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation is based on borrowing equally from natural law theory and legal positivism.
(D) Dworkin validates judges’ dependence on moral intuition, reason, and the intent of the authors of a law, but only in
cases where a social consensus is not present.

The correct answer (A) succinctly captures the main point of the passage. Dworkin's argument is centered on the idea
that judicial interpretation should not be confined merely to the consensus (as in legal positivism) or to moral intuition
(as in natural law). Rather, he advocates a balanced approach that takes into account the internal logic or the
reasoning that underlies the laws. This answer reflects the central theme of Dworkin's critique of both legal positivism
and natural law and his proposition for a middle ground.

Incorrect Answers:
(B) This option is incorrect because it misrepresents Dworkin's view by suggesting that he allows exceptions based on
consensus or moral intuitions. The passage does not indicate that Dworkin makes these exceptions; instead, he
emphasizes the internal logic of the laws.

(C) This option is incorrect as it oversimplifies Dworkin's theory. While he does seek a middle ground between natural
law and legal positivism, he does not borrow "equally" from both. He criticizes both theories and seeks to find an
approach that is consistent with the principles they typically embody, without strictly adhering to either of them.

(D) This option is incorrect because it misstates Dworkin's position by limiting it to cases where social consensus is
absent. Dworkin's argument is more comprehensive, emphasizing the importance of the internal logic of laws, not
merely relying on the absence of consensus.

Question 2
What is the main purpose of the second paragraph?
(A) to explain why legal positivism is so popular
(B) to evaluate the theory of legal positivism
(C) to discuss how judicial consensus is determined
(D) to identify the basic tenets of legal positivism

The correct answer (D) accurately summarizes the main purpose of the second paragraph, which is to identify and
outline what legal positivism stands for. In this paragraph, the author explains that legal positivism believes law and
morality are distinct and that the meaning of the law rests on social convention. It focuses on the foundational
principles of legal positivism, defining its key features, and thus encapsulating the basic tenets of this theory.

Incorrect Answers:
(A) This option is incorrect because the paragraph doesn't delve into the reasons for the popularity of legal positivism.
It explains what legal positivism is but does not specifically address why it is popular.

(B) This option is incorrect because the second paragraph does not evaluate or critique legal positivism. It simply
presents its main principles without passing judgment or providing an assessment of its value or merit.

(C) This option is incorrect as the paragraph doesn’t focus on how judicial consensus is determined. While it does
mention the idea of consensus in legal positivism, it is in the context of explaining what legal positivism is rather than
providing a detailed discussion on how consensus is reached.

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Question 3
Which one of the following most accurately characterizes the author’s attitude toward Dworkin’s theory?
(A) confident endorsement of its central assertions
(B) caution about its potential for justifying some forms of judicial activism
(C) modest expectation that some of its claims will be found to be unwarranted
(D) quiet conviction that its importance derives only from its originality

The correct answer (A) reflects the author's attitude toward Dworkin's theory as presented in the passage. The author
explains Dworkin's arguments in a clear and methodical manner without offering any criticisms or reservations. By
focusing on Dworkin's critique of existing theories and his proposed synthesis, the author gives a detailed exposition
that can be seen as a confident endorsement of Dworkin's central assertions. There's no indication in the passage that
the author disagrees or holds reservations about the claims made by Dworkin.

Incorrect Answers:
(B) This option is incorrect because the author does not express any caution or concern about Dworkin's theory
justifying judicial activism. The caution against judicial activism is presented as Dworkin's view rather than the author's.

(C) This option is incorrect as the author does not suggest or imply any doubt about the validity of Dworkin's claims.
The passage does not include any hints of skepticism or modest expectations regarding the soundness of Dworkin's
theory.

(D) This option is incorrect because the author does not characterize Dworkin's theory as important solely due to its
originality. Rather, the author explains the theory's substance without reducing its importance to mere originality.

Question 4
According to the passage, which one of the following is a goal of Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation?
(A) to dispute the notion that social consensus plays any role in legal interpretation
(B) to provide a theoretical argument against the use of moral intuition in legal interpretation
(C) to argue that legal decisions must be based on the principles of the original authors of the laws
(D) to validate theoretically the method commonly used by judges in practice

The correct answer (D) is in line with the passage's description of Dworkin's theory of legal interpretation. Dworkin's
theory aims to find a middle ground that accounts for the actual practice of judges and lawyers, validating the way they
act as if there is a fact of the matter even in cases where there is no consensus. He seeks to justify this practice
without falling into the extremes of natural law theory or legal positivism.

Incorrect Answers:
(A) This option is incorrect because Dworkin does not completely reject the idea of social consensus in legal
interpretation. Rather, he argues against it being the sole basis for legal interpretation, advocating for a more nuanced
approach.

(B) This option is incorrect because Dworkin does not completely argue against the use of moral intuition. He criticizes
natural law theory, which relies solely on moral convictions, but he does not dismiss the role of moral concepts such
as justice and fairness in legal interpretation.

(C) This option is incorrect because the passage does not indicate that Dworkin’s theory requires legal decisions to be
based solely on the principles of the original authors. Instead, he emphasizes an interpretation that conforms to the
internal logic and general principles of the society's laws.

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Question 5
The passage suggests that Dworkin would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements?
(A) Judges and lawyers too often act as though there is a fact of the matter in legal cases.
(B) Judges should not use their moral intuition when it conflicts with the intentions of those legislators who authored
the law being interpreted.
(C) Legal positivism is a more popular theory than natural law theory because legal positivism simplifies the judge’s
role.
(D) Legal positivists misunderstand the role of moral intuition in legal interpretation.

The correct answer (D) aligns with Dworkin's argument as portrayed in the passage. Dworkin criticizes legal positivism
for its distinct separation of law and morality. He believes that there is a middle ground where judges may consult their
moral intuitions, considering the internal logic of the laws and the general principles they embody. Dworkin's theory
challenges the legal positivist's view, suggesting that they misunderstand the role that moral concepts such as justice
and fairness may play in legal interpretation.

Incorrect Answers:
(A) This option is incorrect because the passage states that judges and lawyers act as though there is a fact of the
matter, but it does not imply that Dworkin believes they do this "too often." Rather, Dworkin's theory aims to validate
this practice.

(B) This option is incorrect because Dworkin's theory does not specifically call for judges to ignore their moral intuition
when it conflicts with the original authors' intentions. Instead, he emphasizes the role of internal logic and general
principles, which may involve moral concepts.

(C) This option is incorrect because the passage does not offer a reason for why legal positivism is more popular. It
does describe legal positivism but does not attribute its popularity to the simplification of the judge's role.

Question 6
It can be inferred that legal positivists, as described in the passage, agree with which one of the following statements?
(A) Judges sometimes ought to be allowed to use personal moral convictions as a basis for a legal interpretation.
(B) The ultimate standard of interpretation is the logic of the law itself, not moral intuition.
(C) The meaning of a law derives from jurists’ interpretations of that law.
(D) There is no legal fact of the matter when jurists have differing moral convictions about an issue.

The correct answer (C) is supported by the passage's description of legal positivism. Legal positivists believe that the
meaning of the law rests on social convention and that disagreements among jurists are legitimate only if they arise
over the underlying convention. If there is no consensus, legal positivists would argue that there is no legal fact of the
matter, and the judge's role is limited to discerning this consensus. This aligns with the idea that the meaning of the
law derives from jurists' interpretations of it.

Incorrect Answers:
(A) This option is incorrect because legal positivism, as described in the passage, holds that law and morality are
wholly distinct. It does not support the idea of judges using personal moral convictions for legal interpretation.

(B) This option is incorrect because legal positivists believe the meaning of the law rests on social convention, not the
internal logic of the law. Dworkin's theory is the one that stresses the internal logic of the laws, not legal positivism.

(D) This option is incorrect because legal positivism distinguishes law and morality. Disagreements among jurists
would be considered legitimate if they arise over the underlying convention, not differing moral convictions. Therefore,
legal positivists would not make decisions based on moral convictions.

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