Outer Space Disasters

1970: Apollo 13
1986: Challenger; 2003: Columbia
2004: Solar Capsule Crash …
Designing for Safety ???

Dr. S. S. Gokhale
Former Professor – Aerospace Engineering, IIT Madras

* S S Gokhale 1
 Professionalism
• Professionalism is the expertise that a professional has of a
certain chosen field.
• In the workplace, professionalism refers to an individual doing
their job, with sincerity, to the best ability & genuineness.
• Professionalism leads to logical and unbiased decision. In the
absence of professionalism, the concepts of "politics" and
"mind games" find room to breed.
• M S Dhoni – Sharp, Alert, Reads situation well, Open to
Consultations, Sharing Ideas, Calm & Does not Show
Frustration, Takes onus for his actions
• Gary Kirsten – Fulfilled contractual obligation, Works as hard
as players, Allowed elbowroom to top players, No nonsense
attitude, Father figure, Committed to family

* S S Gokhale 2
 Responsibility in Engineering
• Responsibility ↔ Accountability (past, present, future)
• Obligatory Responsibility – Adhering to regulatory norms &
standard practices + standards of reasonable care
• Responsible Engineering practice requires good judgment &
not simply following the handbooks
• Good Test: What does one do when no one is looking?
• Impediments to Responsible Practice – Ignorance,
Incompetence, Fear, Vested interest, Egocentric tendencies,
Lack of focus / vision, Rebellious Attitude towards authority,
Trade-Union
• Intentional, Negligent, Reckless behavior causing Harm (Legal
Liability, Culpability, Criminal Conspiracy, Accountability)

* S S Gokhale 3
Relative weight comparison of Transportation Devices in %

Vehicle Fuel Engine Payload Structure

SLV 88 4 2 6

Jet a/c 43 7 10 40

Ship 15 10 25 50

Car 3 22 25 50

Goods 1 3 77 19
Train
* S S Gokhale 4
 Aerospace
Engineering Disciplines
• Fluid and Energy Transport, Systems & Devices
• Materials and Manufacturing, Integration
• Information and Communication Technology
Non Engineering Disciplines
• Ergonomics, Interior Spaces
• Physiology, Psychology, Space Medicines
• Long term effects on health of microgravity
• Space colonization
• Space law
• Space Cooperation
* S S Gokhale 5
 Aircraft Vulnerability

* S S Gokhale 6
 Aircraft Accident History
Frequency
• 1945 – Propeller 1 in 5,000
• 1950 – Jets 1 in 10,000
• 21st century – 1 in 1 million Take-offs
• During 2001-10, there were 7,025 fatalities
• In 2010, 817 passengers perished & about 4.8
million passengers took to air
• In India > 1,35,000 people died in Road Accidents
in 2010 (Trucks & Two-wheelers accounting for
40%)

* S S Gokhale 7
 Aircraft Accident Causes
• Human (Training, Ergonomics, Psychology,
Medical condition, Communication &
Interaction amongst crew & with Ground
Control)
Crew Resource Management – Stress & Conflict
resolution
Behavioral Psychology – Assertiveness of Captain,
What is right rather than who is right
Challenge is to ensure safety which is not optional

* S S Gokhale 8
 Aircraft Accident Causes +
• Machine failure (Wear & Tear, Maintenance,
Electric short-circuit, Electronic malfunction,
Hydraulic system failure, Tyre-burst)
Redundant / Duplicate system
Periodic, Preventive, Spot – Technical snag
Recertification by DGCA

* S S Gokhale 9
 Aircraft Accident Causes ++
• Design Deficiencies rare as prototype testing
is extensive but can not be ruled out entirely
• Unforeseen / Unknown situation (weather,
terrorists, emergencies)
Pilots skills & presence of mind

* S S Gokhale 10
 Swiss Cheese Model – Aircraft
1. Aircraft Manufacturers
2. Design Regulatory Authority
3. Airlines (Values & Culture)
4. Pilots (Global)
5. ATC (Regional)
6. Maintenance (Routine, MRO)
7. Civil Aviation Authority
8. Ageing of Aircraft (25-30yrs)

Series of multiple failures leads to

catastrophic / maj accidents

* S S Gokhale 11
 Air India – Severe Turbulence
Reports say sustained ~15 minute severe
turbulence level on AI 462 — a Boeing 787
Dreamliner (VTANI), was so high that a
passenger hit the overhead cabin. The
passenger possible had not fastened his
seatbelt. In total, three persons suffered
injuries. The inside window panel near seat
number 18A came off. It said that the outside
window did not break. Also there was no de-
pressurization.

The duration of Amristar-Delhi flight is about

35 minutes and on April 19, 2018 the flight was
full with over 240 passengers. Officials said the
flight experienced turbulence soon after take-
off when the altitude was around 15,000 feet
due to bad weather.
* S S Gokhale 12
 Southwest Airline - 1st Fatal Accident in 47 years

One of the fan blades on the Boeing 737-700's engines broke off shortly into Flight
1380, when the plane was above 30,000 feet. Debris flew, puncturing the fuselage
and blowing out a window. A passenger was partly sucked through the opening
and died. April 2018

* S S Gokhale 13
 Military Aircrafts
• Accidents leading to hull loss are more (high g
maneuvers, unknown / unfamiliar territory..)
• Human error could be due to physiological limits, red
out/ black out, space disorientation..
• Commercial civil aircrafts use ILS devises to assist
landings, military aircrafts don’t have such a facility
• Ejection seat + parachutes ensure pilot safety
• High speed, high impact landing, drag parachute brakes
• War time / Peace time > Safety improvement protocals
• Military aircrafts: USA ~ 13000, Russia & China ~2000 –
3000, India ~1700
* S S Gokhale 14
 Space Launch Vehicles

* S S Gokhale 15
 Space Statistics
• Outer Space maintained by the United Nations
Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), in 2016
there are 4 635 satellites currently orbiting in the
planet; an increase of 8.91% compared to last year.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) keeps a
record of the operational satellites and you may be
surprised to know that only 37.5% of the orbiting
satellites are active, just 1 738 according to the
August 2017 update.

* S S Gokhale 16
 Space Statistics +
According the UCS the main purposes for the operational
satellites are:
1. Communications: 742 satellites
2. Earth observation: 596 satellites
3. Technology development/demonstration: 193 satellites
4. Navigation/Positioning: 108 satellites
5. Space science: 66 satellites
6. Earth science: 24 satellites ~ 300
7. Space observation: 9 satellites

* S S Gokhale 17
 Key Characteristics of Space Missions

• Cost Intensive, Space, Size, Weight constraints

• Low margins of safety
• Irreversible processes – limited midcourse
corrections possible
• Hostile and ever changing environment
• Massive system integration – more components
greater chances of failure
• Extremely multidisciplinary in nature
• Earth based designs to perform in entirely
different environment
• Failures are invariably catastrophic
* S S Gokhale 18
Manned Missions complex to design hence answer
why !
Safety (g forces, vibration, noise)

Human requirements (food, oxygen, water)

Operational Space constraints & environment (small

inner spaces, thin shell structure, tubular slender
shape, p, T, variations, microgravity)

Limited Redundancy in space system design except

critical components difficult to achieve.
If one can achieve same goals with unmanned
mission, the launch cost will be substantially
*
reduced. Additionally risks involved would be very
S S Gokhale 19
 Escape alternatives must be provided for
addressing emergencies.
Apollo mission had space launch propulsion system,
command, service and lunar module each designed
for a specific purpose.
Earlier Designs were conservative as the details &
safety of system was untested. Subsequently
during Shuttle design these features were omitted.

* S S Gokhale 20
 Raw Stats: Accidents & Reliability
• In-flight Accidents have killed 18 astronauts
• Training Accidents have taken 11 lives
• Launch-Pad accidents have claimed 71 personnel
Causes

Subsystem Failure Rate (%)

Propulsion 69.7
Avionics 16.3
Staging 7.0
Environmental 4.7
Structural 2.3
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_accidents_and_incidents
* S S Gokhale 21
 Freak Accident
• NASA lost a $125 million Mars orbiter in September
1999 because a Lockheed Martin engineering team used
English units of measurement while the agency's team
used the more conventional metric system for a key
spacecraft operation
• Spacecraft came within 60 km (36 miles) of the planet --
about 100 km closer than planned and about 25 km (15
miles) beneath the level at which the it could function
properly
• Recommendation: In this day and age when the metric
system is the measurement language of all sophisticated
science, two measurements systems should not be used
http://edition.cnn.com/TECH/space/9909/30/mars.metric.02/
* S S Gokhale 22
 All Not in Space & But Alas!

• Lunar landing training in Helicopter and

Trainer aircrafts
• Bird Strike shatters T-38 Trainer canopy
causing engine flame-out
• Failure of Lunar Landing Training Vehicle
• Fire on board in oxygen-rich environment

* S S Gokhale 23
 All is Not that Well & Still Survived!
• Sensor Failure: Soyuz TM5 horizontal sensor
could not confirm proper altitude to start de-
orbit burn – manual override
• Separation Failure: Mostly on Soviet missions
when service module refused to separate
• Landing Capsule sinking in Water US in 1961,
Soviet Union Soyuz 23 in 1976
• Gas Poisoning Apollo-Soyuz test project (Space
Cooperation) Accidental fuel leak in cabin
• Misbehaved Engine – refusing to or premature
shutoff
* S S Gokhale 24
 Global Launch Sites

1 – Vandenberg1 – Vandenberg 2 – Edwards1 – Vandenberg 2 –

Edwards 3 - Wallops Island1 – Vandenberg 2 – Edwards 3 - Wallops
Island 4 - Cape Canaveral
5 – Kourou5 – Kourou 6 – Alcantara5 – Kourou 6 – Alcantara 7 –
Hammaguir5 – Kourou 6 – Alcantara 7 – Hammaguir 8 – Torrejon5 –
Kourou 6 – Alcantara 7 – Hammaguir 8 – Torrejon 9 - Andoya
* S S Gokhale 25
10 – Plesetsk10 – Plesetsk 11 - Kapustin Yar10 – Plesetsk 11 -
 The Saturn V 3 stage launch vehicle consis
First stage included the five F-1 engines:
These engines, whose thrust would total 6.7
million N, were mounted on a structure
consisting of eight 178-cm-diameter tanks
clustered around a single 267-cm Jupiter tank.
Second stage contained five J-2 engines
producing 5 million N of thrust that took the
vehicle and payload to 185 km altitude.
Third stage contained one J-2 engine
producing 1 million N of thrust.
This engine boosted the spacecraft to orbital
velocity and remained attached to the
spacecraft in Earth orbit. The engine was re-
ignited to propel the spacecraft into its lunar
trajectory before finally being discarded.
* S S Gokhale 26
 The key features of
Apollo Program were
streamlined,
axisymmetric
structure. Also the
astronauts were
nearly 100 m away
at the time of launch
from the hot zones.
Command module
was cramped one.
However it provided
with Launch
Escape System
that could be used
in case of
emergency.
* S S Gokhale 27
 WEIGHT: Empty: 3920 kg
Crew & Prop.: 14,700 kg
H:7.0 m, W: 9.4 m
THRUST:
Descent: 44.3 kN (max),
4.7 kN (min)
Ascent Engine:15.7 kN
FUEL:50-50 mix of UDMH
& Hydrazine
OXYDIZER:N2O4

Apollo Lunar Module: Because lunar modules were

designed to fly only in the vacuum of space, they did
not have to be streamlined like an aircraft or carry a
heat shield for protection during reentry. Once a lunar
module was launched into space, it could not return to
Earth.
* S S Gokhale 28
1.Docking mechanism-dock with LM
2.Command Module, the crew
compartment
3.CM-RCS, CM Reaction Control
System, the small "rockets" to control
the CM during re-entry
4.CSM-RCS, CSM Reaction Control
System, small "rockets" to control the
spacecraft in space
5.Service Module, the compartment with
life support systems & fuel, fuel cells (for
electricity), oxygen + water
6.High gain (deep space) antenna, the
antenna to keep contact with ground
control
7.SPS engine, the only engine of the
CSM, used for course corrections and
the* boost back to Earth S S Gokhale 29
 Apollo project
astronauts being
picked up following
splashdown of the
command module. On
return to Earth the
spacecraft re-entered
the atmosphere and
part of the command
module parachuted
down into the sea,
where the astronauts
were picked up by a
waiting ship.

* S S Gokhale 30
 Launch Escape Subsystem-
H: 10.06 m, D (body): 67cm
Weight : 3.632 ton
First Launch Escape Motor, 4
nozzles to carry CM away from
the booster during an
emergency, providing about 67 T
of thrust in 3.2 seconds of
burning. Second solid Tower
Jettison Motor, 2 nozzles to
jettison the LES and BPC from
the CM providing about 14.4 T of
thrust for one second. Third
solid rocket motor is the Pitch
Control Motor, stored in the top
of the body. It is used for
changing the flight course
* S S Gokhale 31
during an emergency, providing
* S S Gokhale 32
 The Apollo 13 malfunction was
caused by an explosion &
rupture of oxygen tank no. 2 in
the service module. The
explosion ruptured a line &
damaged a valve in the no. 1
oxygen tank, causing it to lose
oxygen rapidly. The service
module bay no.4 cover was
blown off. All oxygen stores
were lost within about 3 hours,
Apollo 13: Successful Failure along with loss of water,
Apparently the start of the fanselectrical
in oxygenpower,
tank 2 use of the
caused an
propulsion
electrical short circuit. Damaged system. around the
Teflon insulation
fan motor wires caught fire. Although the Teflon burned
slowly, increasing heat and pressure soon ruptured the tank.
The escaping oxygen either ignited with combustibles in the
oxygen shelf compartment or blew an access panel off by itself.
* S S Gokhale 33
The Apollo 13 CSM mass of 28,881 kg was the launch mass
including propellants and expendables, of this the
Command Module (CM 109) had a mass of 5703 kg and the
Service Module (SM 109) 23,178 kg.
Apollo 13 mission was launched on April 11, 1970. Two
days into the mission and disaster struck in the form of
tank explosion. Two major activities dominated the
remainder of the mission: (1) planning and conducting the
propulsion maneuvers with the lunar module so as to
bring the spacecraft back to earth, and (2) managing the
vital resources - oxygen, water, electricity, and the
canisters of lithium hydroxide used to remove carbon
dioxide from the cabin atmosphere. Apollo 13 looped
around the moon on 14 April 1970. While the lunar module
barely provided room to turn around, the crew preferred
its narrow confines to the chilly 11 degrees C of the
powerless
* command module. Respect for Aquarius
S S Gokhale 34
Cutting back on the use of consumables was the first order
of business. CM was shut down completely after Lovell and
Haise powered up the LM and made sure it was functioning
properly. Except for the final phase of the flight, the CM was
only used as a bedroom. Later all the LM's systems except
those relating to life support, communications,
environmental control were turned off, drastically reducing
Aquarius' power consumption. The LM was designed to
support two men for 49.5 hours, but these actions stretched
its resources to provide life support for three men for 84
hours. To improve this too-close-for-comfort margin, it was
necessary to step up the spacecraft's velocity. Several
velocity changes were possible. The one which would save
the most time would bring the crew down in the Indian Ocean;
a possibility, but recovery would be awkward. A second
option would reduce the return time from 153 hours to 143
hours and bring the spacecraft in to the Pacific as planned.
However, this option required velocity increase of 860 fps.
Numerous simulations on the ground evolved optimal option.
* S S Gokhale 35
Concept of Reusability - The Space Shuttle:
One must use high strength, light weight material for space
applications. These materials are obviously expensive. Unit
cost per launch would reduce significantly if bulk of the
components could be reused. The flight path of space vehicle
is quite torturous as the mechanical, flight, thermal and
inertial loads continuously vary. Many such repeated
applications would weaken the structure and certain degree of
uncertainty would creep in future operations. Safety,
reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance becomes of
paramount importance.
Expendable systems are fire and forget requiring less robust
systems. Manned missions further complicate the design as
lot more life saving features need to be provided. However
the manned missions allow building space station or repairing
satellites, rescuing astronauts etc.

* S S Gokhale 36
* S S Gokhale 37
 • Piggy-back ride

• Attachment & Detachment vis-à-

vis explosive stage seperation
• Precise operations and Proper
sequencing
• Extremely large quantum of
energy
• Sitting on a time bomb?

• Escape from hell and fury?

• What is it - Airplane or Space

Rocket?
• Orbiter L=37 m, H=17m, W=24 m
* OrbitalS speed
S Gokhale ~28000 kmph and38
Columbia : 1981 – 28 missions – Perished 2003
Challenger: 1983 – 10 missions – Perished 1986
Discovery: 1983 – 30+ missions, Retired 03/’11
Atlantis: 1985 – 26 missions, Retired 07/’11
Endeavor: 1991 – 19 missions, Retired 05/’11
Atlantis flight was the last flight from July 8 to
21 in 2011
Each Space Shuttle system is designed for 100
missions with proper maintenance. Endeavor
which replaced Challenger cost nearly $ 2.1
billion.

* S S Gokhale 39
 Design Criteria: Qmax, g, vibration, ..

* S S Gokhale 40
 Space Shuttle Take Off
• In two minutes total of 1000 Ton of solid
propellant is consumed
• The altitude reached is ~ 45+ km and the
speed achieved is ~ 8 km/s
• Total energy = Chemical energy + Potential
energy + Kinetic energy
• Total energy is really huge considering
massive weight of the space shuttle ~ 2
million tons at take off

* S S Gokhale 41
 The Space Shuttle external
tank (ET) is the largest single
element & the only major non-
reusable component of the
Shuttle system. ET: 47 m long,
8.4 m dia, carries ~ 2 ml of
cryogenic propellants for
orbiter's 3 main engines during
powered flight.
ET has 3 : a liquid oxygen tank located in the forward
position; a liquid hydrogen tank located aft & an inter-tank
assembly that connects 2 propellant tanks & houses forward
solid rocket booster attachment points. ET weighs approx
751 T filled & 29.9 T empty. ET is covered with a multi-
layered thermal protective coating approximately 2.5 cm
thick that allows tank to withstand the extreme internal +
external temperatures generated during pre-launch, launch, &
flight. Materials, thickness, methods of application vary at
different
* locations on the tank.
S S Gokhale 42
 2 solid rocket boosters are 45.4 m
high & 3.7 m in dia weighing 590 T.
Solid propellant consists of a
mixture of Aluminum powder,
Ammonium Perchlorate powder, +
Iron Oxide catalyst, held together
with a polymer binder producing
about 13.8 MN thrust each for
the first few seconds after ignition,
before gradually declining for the
remainder of 2 minute burn.

With 3 main engines on the orbiter, total thrust is 32.5

MN at liftoff. After recovery, the booster is disassembled
and refurbished. The motor segments are shipped to the
manufacturer for reload for another Shuttle flight. The
other systems are refurbished either at the launch site or
at the respective manufactures' locations .
* S S Gokhale 43

Each engine develops 2.2
MN of thrust, 1.7MN at
SL. Staged combustion
ensures ~ 99% combustion
efficiency.
* S S Gokhale
Space Shuttle Main Engine is
most advanced liquid-fueled
rocket engine with features
such as variable thrust, high
performance, reusability, total
redundancy, & fully integrated
controller. Fuel for the engines,
liquid hydrogen and liquid
oxygen, is contained in the ET
the largest element of the
Shuttle. Fuel is supplied from
the tank at a rate of about
178,000 liters per minute of
hydrogen and 64,000 liters per
minute of oxygen. It uses
staged combustion: high p, low
T + high p, high T.
44
At launch, booster carries 1.8 kT of LOx and LH2 with total
energy equivalent of 4 kT of TNT. This is about 20% of the
Hiroshima atom bomb explosion. The launch itself is through
a series of explosions – massive energy release in relatively
short time duration. During the launch phase, Astronauts are
exposed to sound, heat, vibration, radiation and g forces.
Without any escape mechanism, this phase of flight is highly
dangerous & vulnerable.
Similarly at reentry the flight speed is about M~18. If
energy of air pushed out of the way is converted into
thermal energy, for an ambient temperature of 250 K the
temperature rise will be 182 times or ~80000 K. However all
of it is not converted to heat and the temperature rise is
restricted to ~2000 K (still 1/3 surface temperature of the
Sun). Reentering shuttle leaves behind a white trail of
ionized gases.

* S S Gokhale 45
 Challenger Tragedy: Structural Failure at
Take-Off

* S S Gokhale 46
Chronology of events: Originally mission was scheduled for
January 22, 1986. Due to delayed SS mission 61 C, bad
weather, problems with ground service equipment (hatch
closing), excessive cross winds (impact of empty rocket
booster), failure of hardware to detect fire – the actual
launch takes place on January 28, 1986. At the time of
launch the outside temperature is 32 F. Safe ambient
temperature at launch is 53 F. The mission included Sharon
Christa McAuliffe – in TISP (Teacher in Space Program) as
high visibility aspect of STS 51-L mission. MTI (Morton
Thiokol of Utah were responsible for SRB and advised NASA
against the launch. Subsequently changed opinion due to
management pressure.
After 45 seconds puff of gas starts sequence of events and
Challenger exploded in 73 seconds. Astronauts inside the
shuttle tried to maneuver but crashed in the sea from a
height of about 9 km. All the bodies were recovered from
sea bed.
* S S Gokhale 47
Large number of seals are required to integrate
large size solid rocket motor. The Solid Propellant is
not cast as a single piece and hence these
connections are necessary. As the L/D ratio is
about 12.4, the pencil like structure is vulnerable
from gust & cross wind loads apart from usual
inertial-acceleration loads. The failed O-seal is
shown in this figure that triggered leakage of
combustion gases, deposited aluminum and final
escape of naked flame through the gap at full
throttle.
* S S Gokhale 48
The main mechanical failure that occurred in flight was
the improper sealing of the O-rings around main boosters.
O-rings seal the 4 main sections of the rocket together
preventing fuel leakage. Cooler conditions cause o-ring
material to expand and contract at a different rate.
NASA knew the o-rings eroded somewhat throughout their
missions. They looked for, but didn't find the
information explaining how the O-rings would be influenced
by* the cold. S S Gokhale 49
 The escaped hot gases through the failed seal created
a hole that became big enough such that the flame
passed through it. This flame burned through external
fuel tank and one support that attaches booster to one
side of tank. Booster broke loose and collided with the
tank piercing the external tank from side. LH2 and LOx
from tank mixed and ignited resulting the orbiter to
tear apart. Even though the events were occurring
inside the atmosphere (< 10 km) the orbiter was out of
control. Vertical takeoff makes the aerodynamic
surfaces ineffective as the lift is provided only by the
thrust of the SRB and SSME. In less than 20 seconds,
the orbiter crashed in the sea. The falling, burning
debris and unscheduled impact points rules out any
possibility of recovering struggling astronauts.

* S S Gokhale 50
Previous records of the # of O-seal damages against the
ambient temperature are shown in this figure. Dashed line
is extrapolation for the actual frigid conditions at the time
of Challenger launch on 28 Jan 86.
* S S Gokhale 51
The SRM Program at MTI was suffering from the lack of
proper original development work and some may argue that
sufficient funds or schedule were not available and that
may be so, but MTI contracted for that condition. The
Shuttle program was declared operational by NASA after
the fourth flight, but the technical problems in producing
and maintaining the reusable boosters were escalating
rapidly as the program matured, instead of decreasing as
one would normally expect. Many opportunities were
available to structure the work force for corrective action,
but the MTI Management style would not let anything
compete or interfere with the production and shipping of
boosters. The result was a program which gave the
appearance of being controlled while actually collapsing
from within due to excessive technical and manufacturing
problems as time increased.
* S S Gokhale 52
What is everyone's professional responsibility and ethical
conduct code which should be practiced in the work place?
The following advice was given by Mr. Adolph J. Ackerman
in June, 1967, in an article published by the IEEE. His
advice is timeless and applies to all generations in
engineering. Mr. Ackerman said, 'Engineers have a
responsibility that goes far beyond the building of machines
and systems. We cannot leave it to the technical illiterates,
or even to literate and overloaded technical administrators
to decide what is safe and for the public good. ….’

* S S Gokhale 53
 Challenger failure is attributed to:
1. poor design of O- seal
2. inadequate validation and subsequent modifications
3. hostile weather & inordinate delays
4. improper decision making process
5. politically incorrect pressures for frequent launches
6. management buckling under the pressure, operations ...
It is series and sequence of events that caused the failure. Even
though the Astronauts knew the risks and willing to take the same, it
was difficult to accept these for the common public.
The cost escalation of Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Technology is
much higher compared to the expendable ones. Expendable launches
are much better, less risky and more economical. In older Apollo
programs the manned missions were executed without too much of
flaw considering the level of technology prevalent during early to
mid sixties.

* S S Gokhale 54
 R
C E
O E
L N
U T
M
B I
I R
A Y
F
A
This twin picture shows Columbia’s first flight in
1981 and the 28th and last one in 2003. The similarity
in both the launches is uncanny. Columbia was the I
heaviest of all the Space Shuttles as well as most L
sophisticated.
* S S Gokhale U55
The atmospheric descent starts with series of complex
maneuvers. Originally the Orbiter is upside down as well
as traveling with rear end in the front. Subsequently it
flips and rotates around the vertical axis.
Simultaneously the angle of attack is also increased to
ensure slowing down the orbiter.Orbiter reentry is
ballistic entry outside the atmosphere. There is no
thrust power for maneuvers. Also the aerodynamic
control surfaces play an important role during the last
few
*
minutes only for the landing
S S Gokhale
that is controlled by 56
the commander.
Reentry Sequence
* S S Gokhale 57
This wire-frame image of the shuttle shows the left
bank. Usually the maneuvers of these types expend
more energy. Since the orbiter flying at 100 km
altitude at 18000 kmph possesses enough potential
as well as kinetic energy, lowering the energy
content in stipulated time is the basic objective of
these maneuvers. This combined energy is
converted into the thermal energy.

* S S Gokhale 58
 The sequence of
events shown here
illustrates the
highlights of near
blunt entry where
underside of the
shuttle is exposed to
the massive thermal
load. With the help of
heat shield tiles the
aluminum structure
under the tiles is
protected. The bright
glow is easily visible
on dark nights.

* S S Gokhale 59
 The amount of
foam that came
off the tank had a
mass of just 2.5
pounds, and it
grazed bottom of
Columbia's wing
at a shallow
angle of no more
than 16°.

* S S Gokhale 60
 It would be of
invaluable help to
find the tiles
Columbia initially
shed--apparently
as it was flying
over San Jose,
Calif. Calculations
are being made
to determine their
possible impact
points on the
ground, in
California and
Arizona.

* S S Gokhale 61
The sensors shown as red dots on the left side wing
of the orbiter started failing sequentially, indicating
that something was wrong. Wheel well temperature
on the left side registered high temperature that is
believed to have resulted in damaging these sensors.
As per the latest evidence obtained on video,
astronauts did not have any idea as to something
was terribly wrong.
* S S Gokhale 62
"It's like a domino effect," Drela of MIT says. "If one
piece of tile falls off in a vulnerable spot during reentry,
heat melts the underlying aluminum skin like a
blowtorch and then adjacent pieces of tile fall off as
heat penetrates from inside the structure."
In congressional testimony in 2002, Richard D.
Blomberg, former chairman of the Aerospace Safety
and Advisory Panel, which NASA created after the
1986 Challenger accident, said: "As [shuttle]
components and subsystems age beyond their design
lives, they may fail more often and with new and
unanticipated failure modes."
In 2001, NASA rejected a plan for a detachable shuttle
cockpit that would be an emergency-escape vehicle, in
part because it would be too costly.

* S S Gokhale 63
As the '94 STS-62 science research mission was
coming to an end, a NASA infrared video showed
pieces of debris falling from the vicinity of the nose
wheel as the orbiter's landing gear deployed,
seconds before touchdown on the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) runway in Florida.
* S S Gokhale 64
"Just as the main landing gear dropped and locked,
infrared cameras at KSC saw several objects drop
from the vicinity of Columbia's wheel well. Post flight
inspection detected a 4 in. square heat protection tile,
and six strips of thermal barrier were missing from
the orbiter around the area of the wheel well.“ The
report does not specify how the pieces of thermal
barrier were dislodged. Possibilities include thermal
damage that could have been caused by a missing or
damaged insulating tile. Alternatively, the damage
could have been caused by a mechanical shock, such
as impact with ice or insulation on liftoff, or a piece of
space debris while on orbit.
What happened in 1994, could it have repeated in
2003 but this time around much earlier at the time of
re entry?
* S S Gokhale 65
 Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)
reported that preliminary analysis shows "the
temperature indications seen in the orbiter's left
wheel well during entry would require the
presence of plasma." Sensor readings indicate
that the landing gear was properly stowed, ruling
out the possibility of a premature gear
deployment. This focuses further attention on the
possibility that a small amount of tile damage
began the fatal chain reaction that caused
thousands of pieces of orbiter debris to rain down
over the Southwest minutes before the shuttle's
scheduled landing.

* S S Gokhale 66
"It does look like things were beginning to come off
the shuttle as it approached, right about California,"
Hallock says."Obviously, it would be very important
to understand what those pieces are, particularly
those that started falling off at the very beginning,"
he says. But given their altitude and speed, it will be
difficult if not impossible to find those first fragments-
-as they probably vaporized, unless they were fairly
large, says Hallock.
Following three pictures are taken by an Israeli
Satellite that show the final moments of SS Columbia.

* S S Gokhale 67
* S S Gokhale 68
* S S Gokhale 69
* S S Gokhale 70
 Conclusions & Main Design Flaws(?):

• Space craft is positioned laterally, alongside main

LOx, LH2 tanks. 2 SRBs and 3 SSMEs provide 2
million kg thrust in two different planes. This causes
enormous vibrations, material fatigue, structural
deformations and possible de-bonding of heat shield
tiles.

• SSME engines are on the orbiter whereas the fuel

storage is farther away and the loads must be
transferred though couple of links. High energy fuel
poses threat from safety considerations due to the
proximity- emergency escape becomes impossible.

• Lateral position makes Orbiter vulnerable as the

debris from external storage tank or ice impact may
impact critical parts of the orbiter.
* S S Gokhale 71
• Thermal gradients and thus thermal stresses are
enormous in cryogenic system. Also once the
SRBs are ignited, it is impossible to stop the
combustion unless completely expended.

• Energy of the complete system and the

proximity of the Astronauts to the hot zones
increases the vulnerability and risks to the
Astronauts.

• Cause of an accident (technical, managerial,

administrative, software bug etc) might be
varied, however the catastrophic result is
invariably due to the material failure.

• Minor or inconsequential events may occur at

different spatial or temporal sense and the
* consequences may be Sat different instance.
S Gokhale 72
 Modifications made in Discovery
• SRB: Cameras will take digital photographs for
instantaneous access to the flight history
rather than on film which was used for post
flight analysis
• Bolt catch redesigned to prevent possible
debris
• Ext Fuel Tank: Bipod attaching front of orbiter
to external tank redesigned
• Ice formation prevented by use of electric
heaters instead of insulating foam

* S S Gokhale 73
Thursday, July 14, 2005 (Cape
Canaveral):
A faulty fuel tank has forced NASA to call
off the launch of Discovery shuttle. The
space agency has not immediately set a
new launch date, but launch control has
said it will take some time to figure out the
technical hitch. The problem was with one
of the four engine cut-off sensors, which
are responsible for making sure the
spacecraft's engines shut down at the
proper point during the ascent. NASA said
it appeared that the sensor was showing a
low fuel level, even though the tank was full.

Worldwide interest
Discovery's astronauts had all been
strapped into the shuttle and were
preparing for blast-off when the order came
through to stand down. The decision came
with less than two and a half hours left in
*the countdown. S S Gokhale 74
 What's your reaction to the
shuttle being delayed due to a
faulty sensor?

▪ Indifferent, it will fly sometime

▪ Angry, NASA can’t get it right

▪ Relieved the space agency is

playing it safe

▪ Gives me urge to offer astronauts

snickers bars

* S S Gokhale 75
 Next Generation Air-Breathing Engine
• Scramjet Engine: Supersonic Combusting Ram-
Rocket Engines use atmospheric Oxygen
during Ram phase reducing oxidizer
requirement
• Payload capabilities enhances by nearly 100%
• India conducted first test in March 2020
where 46 km altitude was achieved in 120
seconds at the speed of M 6+0.5 and dynamic
pressure of 80+35 kPa
• Lift Off weight 3 ton is expected to reduce
launch cost per payload
• Increased complexities would require
*
different design philosophy and risk evaluation
S S Gokhale 76
* S S Gokhale 77
 Satellites and Probes

* S S Gokhale 78
• The $264m Genesis mission spent Solar
more than two years gathering the capsule crashes into
solar material to help scientists Earth
understand the origin of the Sun
and the planets. The capsule hit the
ground at about 193mph (310km/
h) The Genesis spacecraft ejected
the sample container on time at
1153GMT (1253BST) at a distance
of more than 60,000km from Earth.
It was on a perfect trajectory and it
entered the atmosphere as
planned at 1554GMT (1654BST).
• Controllers clapped and cheered
when their long-range cameras
spotted the 190kg (420lbs) capsule
in the high atmosphere.
* S S Gokhale 79
 Genesis Flight Trajectory – September 10, 2004.
* S S Gokhale 80
• The Genesis probe was supposed to mark the first return of
extraterrestrial matter without human means since the 1970s,
when Moon rocks were carried back to Earth by manned US
Apollo and unmanned Soviet Luna missions.
• Genesis was launched in 2001. It carried delicate hexagonal
wafers of pure silicon, gold, sapphire, diamond and other
materials. These were hung outside the probe for more than 800
days, sifting space for 10-20 micrograms of atoms - a billion,
billion of them - that had been blown off the Sun.
• The precise nature of these atoms were to have told scientists
how the Sun and the nine major planets grew out of a huge
cloud of gas and dust 4.5 billion years ago.
• The outer part of the spacecraft is carbon-fiber and that is very
resilient - it is basically in one piece.
• There could be fragments inside there that still contained some
kind of scientific information. But the contamination from the
desert is going to be a killer at the end of the day for the
scientists.

* S S Gokhale 81
Although the panels have been exposed to air and
mud, scientists believe they can salvage
embedded atoms from the tiles.
"Certain elements of the design should help piece
the science together," said Andrew Dantzler,
NASA's solar system division director. "We don't
know the condition of the collectors that hold the
science. We'll be learning that in the hours, days,
weeks to come.
"Shards of the delicate ultra-pure tiles were being
picked up with tweezers at the crash site on
Thursday. Scientists believe that some of the
hexagonal-collectors survived the impact. A six-
inch gap in the sample container allowed
investigators to peer inside the capsule. Only a
* S S Gokhale 82
few square millimeters of the tiles are needed for
Scientists said the material, if recovered, would not
only reveal the composition of the sun but also
illuminate how our planet formed from clouds of
stellar dust. "Four and a half billion years ago, all of
the matter of the solar system, including us, was part
of a giant molecular cloud," said Don Burnett,
principal investigator for the Genesis mission.
"Genesis is providing the chemical composition of that
solar nebula. ...The material is still stored for us in the
surface of the sun."
In all, Genesis collected the equivalent of a few grains
of the material. Before Wednesday's mishap, scientists
said that would be enough to keep researchers busy
for decades. "We'll have a reservoir of solar matter,"
said Burnett "We can meet the requirements for
[studying]
*
the solar composition
S S Gokhale
through the 21st 83
ISRO’s Chandrayaan – 1 mission to map the Moon’s
entire topography with 3-D terrain Mapping to provide
accurate base map. The main objectives during
exploration at 100 km orbital height are:
Study Origin, Evolution and Mass Concentration of
Moon
Chemical and Mineral Composition of Moon
Search for Helium -3 for Energy Source
Probe for Trapped Frozen Water
The project is expected to materialize during 2007-08 at
the cost of Rs. 3840 million. Additionally a 25 kg Impactor
at 1.5-2 km/s will hit the lunar surface to identify the
suitable landing sites for future mission.
December 20,
2004
* S S Gokhale 84
 Brief Update
• Launched from SHAR Centre on 22 October 2008
with original mission for 2 years and carrying
about 11 different experiments
• At 100 km orbit assumption of 75 C temperature
from Lunar surface due to radiation which was
miscalculated – orbit raised to 200 km but had
little effect
• Instruments started shutting down and mission
was called off on August 29, 2009
• Excellent close range images of lunar surface and
evidence of water were gains

* S S Gokhale 85
NASA is on a collision course
with a comet, and scientists say
they can't wait to see what
happens. The collision, which is
to take place between a
projectile fired from the space
agency's Deep Impact spacecraft
and a 4-mile-wide comet known
as Tempel 1, is scheduled for
July 4, 2005. That's when Tempel
1 will be close enough to Earth
for astronomers to monitor the Scientists are especially
debris that the impact kicks up. interested in comets because
If the mission is successful, it they are believed to be
will help the scientists see for leftovers from the formation
the first time just what comets of the solar system.
are made of. Once in orbit, the Understanding comets'
spacecraft will travel to a ingredients could help prove --
rendezvous point 83 million or disprove -- theories about
miles away from Earth and howDecember
the planets formed.
21, 2004
release the 820-pound copper
*
impactor into the comet's path. S S Gokhale 86
 2 a.m. ET Monday- July 4, 2005
• A picture taken by the Deep-
Impact probe just before its
crash shows surface features
on Comet Tempel-1.
• Comet composition could
conceivably help researchers
draw up strategies for
diverting celestial objects that
might threaten Earth.

http://solarsystem.nasa.gov/deepimpact
* S S Gokhale 87
 GSAT 6 A – Near Disaster or Failure?
Dimension:
1.53 x 1.65 x 2.4
Mission Life:
10 years
Power:
3119 W
Launch Vehicle:
GSLV-F08/GSAT-6A Mission
Type of Satellite:
Communication
Manufacturer and Owner:
ISRO
Orbit Type:
Application: To support military GSO
communications in hostile regions using
handy ground terminals

* S S Gokhale 88
 GSAT 6A - Latest
• The second orbit raising operation of GSAT-6A satellite has
been successfully carried out by LAM Engine firing for about
53 minutes on March 31, 2018 in the morning.
• After the successful long duration firings, when the satellite
was on course to normal operating configuration for the
third and the final firing, scheduled for April 1, 2018,
communication from the satellite was lost.
• Efforts are underway to establish the link with the satellite.
• It had then reached an orbit of around 36,000 km x 20,000
km and would be circling Earth every 18-20 hours.
April 15, 2018

* S S Gokhale 89
Release of huge plume of primordial materials from the
comet’s nucleus. Some of the first images from the
collision showed a small fireball followed by a much
larger, incandescent flash that engulfed one end of the
comet Tempel 1 as the impactor smashed into its surface.

NASA photo shows material ejecting from the

*
surface of the Tempel IS comet
S Gokhale
as Deep Impact's 90
impactor module strikes it.
 Potential collision energy, in
the center of mass frame, is
60 plus or minus 5
gigajoules, or about 14 tons
of TNT equivalent.

According to space debris tracking service LeoLabs, an

old, discarded Chinese rocket stage and a defunct
Russian military satellite are due to pass within 12 m of
each other on 16 October 2020 at 00:56 UTC.
There is, LeoLabs says, a greater than 10 percent chance
that the two objects will collide at an altitude of 991 km
over the Weddell Sea just off the Antarctic Peninsula.
* S S Gokhale 91
Combined mass is ~2800 kg
 If these two satellites collide high speed ~14.7 km/s,
will probably cause the smaller satellite to break up
completely into smaller fragments. And each of those
fragments becomes a piece of space debris in its own
right
Since satellites are defunct no communication or
* corrective action is possible
S S Gokhale 92
 Space Debris: ESA
• A four-armed robotic
collector will be
launched by
the European Space
Agency in 2025.
• ClearSpace-1 will cost
€120m and will be the
first space mission to
remove debris from
orbit.
• https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/50717021#:~:
Earlier Japanese
text=A%20four%2Darmed%20robotic%20collector,
efforts were
a%20bigger%20clear%20up%20operation.
* S S Gokhale 93
unsuccessful.
 Conclusions

• Even though it is considered to be the safest

means of transportation in terms of fatalities,
the costs are enormous
• The direct benefits are not always evident
and hence it is risky research / investment
• Human resources, energy and involvement is
in gigantic proportion
• Failure make headlines than the successes
and is treated as disaster
* S S Gokhale 94