7 Questions Combat Estimate

GHANA ARMED FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
THE 7 QUESTIONS
COMBAT ESTIMATE
MADE EASY
MAJOR GEORGE
NKANSAH
NAQOURA 2009
ARMY COMBAT TRAINING SCHOOL

PREFACE
The 7 Questions/Combat Estimate military decision making and planning process was
introduced in 2001 to address the problems that Battle Group (BG) and Brigade HQs
faced in getting to grips with planning. The failure of many BG and Brigade HQs in
British Army to plan successfully using the estimate was a consistent theme in
‘Observations From Training’ (OFT) during the late 1990s. Thus, the Estimate was
revised to make it more intuitive and easy to use. This revised process, originally
known as the 7 Questions, is now referred to as the “Combat Estimate” or the “7
Questions Combat Estimate”.
The Combat Estimate focuses on work carried out during planning and aims to ensure
that all such work has a purpose and leads to a timely, enemy focussed and effects
based plan. It is a thought process, not a rigid series of drills. Although it is presented in
conventional warfare standard, it can be adapted to peace support operations (PSO)
and counter insurgency. This book concentrates, however, on conventional warfare at
the Bde and BG levels. Its aim is take Bde/BG HQ staff through all the key steps of
planning indicating how the various processes (planning/decision making, CCIR, ISTAR
planning, Targeting and formation of the DSO) are inter-related and should be done as
part of a whole and not in isolation from one another. The intended audience is Bde and
BG staff officers and principal sub-unit commanders, but the process can be used at
lower levels, where many of the tools may not be appropriate, to brigade or divisional
level, where even more tools are likely to be employed. It is assumed that the
audience understands the underlying doctrine of mission command and the
manoeuvrist approach. The presentation will demonstrate what is required from each
question, how it links to, or drives other processes within the Combat Estimate and what
output is produced. It will be based round an example of a Bde in defence as part of a
Brigade defensive operation and will draw on examples of best practice throughout.
CONTENT
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………….1
FORMAT OF COMBAT ESTIMATE……………………………………………….5
CHAPTER 1- QUESTION 1 – WHAT IS THE ENEMY DOING AND WHY?..............1-1

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………….1-1
TIMELINE…………………………………………………………………………....1-3
THE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE……………………………………….1‐6
Step 1 ‐ Battlespace Area Evaluation………………………………………………………..1‐7

STEP 2 ‐ THREAT EVALUATION…………………………………………………………………………..1‐15
Step 3 ‐ THREAT INTEGRATION…………………………………………………………………………1‐18
QUESTION ONE BRIEF………………………………………………………………………………………..1‐26
COMPLETION OF 7 QUESTIONS ESTIMATE FORMS‐ QUESTION 1…………………………1‐27
CHAPTER 2‐ QUESTION 2 – WHAT HAVE I BEEN TOLD TO DO AND WHY?...........................2‐1
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………2‐1
Q 1. — WHAT IS MY SUPERIOR COMDS INTENT AND MY PART IN HIS PLAN?.........2‐3
Q 2. — WHAT ARE MY SPECIFIED AND IMPLIED TASKS?.........................................2‐4
Q 3. — WHAT CONSTRAINTS ARE IMPOSED ON MY FREEDOM OF ACTION?............2‐6
Q 4. — HAS TAC SIT CHANGED AND DO I NEED TO TAKE ANOTHER DECISION?.....2‐6
IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS…………………………………..2‐7
EXAMPLES……………………………………………………………………………………………………2‐10
CHAPTER 3 COMDS EFFECT SCHEMATICS…………………………………………………………………..3‐1
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………………………..3‐1
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PREPARATION OF COMMANDER’S EFFECTS SCHEMATIC……………………………….3‐2
COMMANDER’S DIRECTION…………………………………………………………………………3‐5
COMMANDER'S DIRECTION BY FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT……………3-6
EXAMPLES..……………………………………………………………………3-8
CHAPTER 4‐DECISION SUPPORT OVERLAY…………………………………………………………………4‐1
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………………………..4‐1
CONSTITUENTS OF DECISION SUPPORT OVERLAY…………………..4-2
ILLUSTRATED PROCESS OF PRODUCING DSO…………………………………………………….4‐4
EXAMPLE…………………………………………………………………………………………………………4‐6
CHAPTER 5‐ DSO MATRIX……………………………………………………………………………………………5‐1
COA BRIEF………………………………………………………………………………………………………5‐6
CHAPTER 6‐SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX……………………………………………………………………..6‐1
PREPARATION OF SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX…………………………6-2
GAFCSC Synchronisation Matrix……………………………………………….6-3
EXAMPLES OF SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX ………………………………………6‐5
CHAPTER 7‐ CONTROL MEASURES……………………………………………………………….7‐1
MANEUVER…………………………………………………………………………………….7‐2
DECEPTION……………………………………………………………………………………….7‐4
DEFENCE……………………………………………………………………………………………7‐5
OFFENSIVE…………………………………………………………………………………………7‐9
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SPECIAL………………………………………………………………………………………..7‐13
FIRE……………………………………………………………………………………………….7‐16
COMMAND AND CONTROL…………………………………………………………….7‐20
MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY…………………………………………………………7‐22
NBC……………………………………………………………………………………………………7‐29
CSS…………………………………………………………………………………………………..7‐32
CHAPTER 8‐ DEDUCTIONS AND COMPLETE COMBAT ESTIMATES
TACTICAL DEDUCTIONS………………………………………………………………8‐2
ADMIN DEDUCTIONS…………………………………………………………………….8‐6
COMBAT ESTIMATE FOR MECH BDE‐DEFENCE ………………………………………………..8‐8
COMBAT ESTIMATE- ATTACK……………………………………………….8-46
COMBAT ESTIMATE-DEFENCE AT BG LEVEL………………………………….8-52
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INTRODUCTION
The 7 Questions Combat Estimate represent the fundamental issues that need to
be addressed in order to produce a plan. At the tactical level the focus for planning
is the 7 Questions. If each question is addressed fully, planning is more likely to
be thorough. The tools and techniques are used selectively to help address the
questions depending on the situation and time available. As the 7 questions grew
out of the Estimate, the tools and techniques remain largely the same. The
planning starts with focusing on the enemy. The BG Comd then states effects he
wants to have on him. These effects form the focus for the rest of the planning
process. The use of graphical techniques and schematics is to be encouraged.
They are an efficient way to record deductions from the analysis of the questions
and with which to communicate the plan. Products lead directly to the production
of orders. If time is short, selective use of the tools and techniques is acceptable,
so long as each of the 7 Questions is addressed.
The purpose of the Estimate is to make a decision for a course of action,

appropriate to the level of command, from a body of information or picture of a
campaign, major operation, battle or engagement. As the situation changes, the
mission and relevant factors are re-evaluated in a logical manner. In this sense,
the Estimate can be looked on as a continuous cycle which can be returned to
when needed. Estimate can best be described as decision making process at all
levels of Command. As the decision-making process involves activity by both the
commander and the staff, it could be described more accurately as a Command
and Staff Estimate, but, for reasons of brevity, it is termed the Estimate.
Consistent with the prerequisites of Mission Command, a subordinate commander

is directed by his superior as to what effect he is to achieve. At the operational
level, the superior commander’s intentions are expressed in a Statement of the
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Commander’s Intent (what needs to be achieved in terms of the desired end-state

for a campaign or major operation), which is normally refined in a Concept of
Operations (how the level of command will achieve the desired end-state). At the
tactical level, the superior commander’s concept of operations should include both
his intent and his design for operations. At all levels, stating the commander's
intent allows subordinates to exercise initiative, but in a way which will be in
accordance with the commander's aim. The Estimate process, of which mission
analysis is only a part, helps the subordinate commander at any level then decide
how he will achieve the desired effect.
The Combat Estimate or 7 Questions Estimate is used at all tactical levels of

command for quick decision making and effective mission command. The
Combat Estimate, like the Formal Estimate at the operational level or any other
forms of the decision making process, seeks to answer a number of simple
questions which are applicable to that level of command. As the level of command
gets higher and operations become more complex, so the need increases to apply
tools and techniques for decision making to ensure that plans for the application of
combat power are both integrated and synchronised.
In the Ghana Army, like British Army, the command and staff estimate process has
been traditionally 'command-led', rather than 'staff-driven'. In joint or combined
headquarters at the higher tactical or operational levels within NATO, a greater
degree of responsibility has been accorded to the staff. As the commander is
responsible for the direction of the decision-making cycle, it follows that he has to
be fully involved in the estimate at its initial stage, and as he makes the decision,
he has to be involved in its latter stage.
The staff is responsible for completing the bulk of the estimate under the direction
of the commander, or his principal general staff officer. The staff at lower tactical
levels is concerned with detailed evaluation of information and the conduct of staff
checks on behalf of the commander. At the higher tactical levels and at the
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operational level (particularly in joint and combined operations), the staff will often
be required to develop options, or possible courses of action, for the commander
to compare and decide on. However, while members of the staff may present the
commander with courses of action, they do not make the decision. The Estimate
process requires open access to the commander for the staff to obtain clarification
and advice as necessary.
To exercise command, the Comd must make timely decisions and take the
appropriate action. The Comd should continually strive to decide and act faster
than the enemy. The estimate and planning processes must support this. It is more
important to have a 70% worked up plan in time than a 100% plan too late. The
plan must be flexible enough to be adaptable when the enemy does something
unexpected, which he will. Time for proper battle procedure especially at the lower
level of command is frequently overlooked during planning at BG HQ. Thus the
Combat Estimate is presently the fastest decision making process that meet these
requirements at the tactical level.
There are 7 questions which should be addressed. These are:
a. Question 1. What is the enemy doing and why?
b. Question 2. What have I been told to do and why?
c. Question 3. What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what
direction must I give to develop a plan?
d. Question 4. Where best can I accomplish each action/effect?
e. Question 5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?
f. Question 6. When and where do the actions take place in relation to each
other?
g. Question 7. What control measures do I need to impose?
This is further illustrated below. Each question gives a number of products/outputs
which may be completed in Forms or Overlays. These questions would be
considered into details in the subsequent chapters. The Format for the 7 Questions
Combat Estimate is also given below.
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Questions 1-3 Input

Q 1 – What are the Start Point - Prep for Planning
enemy doing and why? IPB
Q 2 – What have I
been told to do and Mission
why? Analysis
Q 3 – What effects do I want

to have on the enemy and Effects
what direction must I give to
develop a plan?
Schematic
COMMANDER Direction
To Staff
Direction Questions 4-7

To Staff
From DSO/DSOM Development
Comd
COA Selection
Q 4 – Where can I
Plan Refinement
best accomplish
each effect? DSO
Q 5 – What resources
do I need to achieve DSOM
each effect?
Q 6 – When and where do

the actions take place in Synch
relation to each other? Matrix
Q 7 – What control
Control
The Plan WARGAME measures do I need
to impose? Measures
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FORMAT OF COMBAT ESTIMATE
MISSION:
In order to
2. Establish Time Available: (1/3:2/3)

Battle Procedure Time Avail
2/3 Subords time Prelim

Time Now 1/3 My time moves and
final prep H HR (if Obj Secure
given) (if given)
The time now is …………H hr is at ………. I have worked out that movement
would take ………..which means that I must be ready to move not later
than(NLT)……….. Therefore the time available for battle procedure is …….. …. I
can use 1/3 of that time (………) to conduct my estimate and give orders, leave
2/3 ………..
Wng O
Sit
Probable Msn.
Own ME
Timings.
O Gp RV & Time .
CSS.
Acknowledge (incl Atts as required)
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Question Answer/Deduction Product for Orders

(Effect / Task / Constraints /
Clarification Up)
MISSION ANALYSIS / SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
(Build effects schematic throughout)
Q1. What is the en doing & why?
(Feeds SITUATION ENEMY FORCES Paragraph of Orders- include key deductions. Tasks/
effects identified contribute to intent schematic and CONCEPT OF OPS)
1. How does the ground
affect en ops?
a. Objectives.
b. Routes / Axes.
c. Vital Ground.
d. Dominating Ground.
e. Key Terrain.
f. KAs.
g. Vis.
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2. What are the en

capabilities?
a. Tac/ Doctrine.
b. Dispositions.
c. Eqpt.
e. Obs.
f. Morale.
g. Air.
h. Indirect Fire
i. Strengths.
j. Weaknesses.
What are the enemy’s

intentions in my area?
Most Likely COA.
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Most Dangerous COA
4. QUESTION 1 BRIEF
Q2. What have I been told to do and why?

Feeds situation, FRIENDLY FORCES (2UP,1UP) and MISSION Paragraphs of Orders. Also,
tasks/effects identified contribute to Comd’s Effects Schematic (Q 3) and the CONOPS para in
Orders.
1. What is my superior
Comds intent and my
part in his plan.
a. 2Up
b. 1 Up
c. My Role
2. What are my specified

and implied tasks?
1. Specified Tasks.
(fm Msn / 1 up SOM / Coord
Instr)
2. Implied Tasks.
3. What Constraints are

imposed on me?
5. Has the situation

changed?
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6. Clarification Required.
DIRECTION
Q3. What effects do I want

to have on the en & what SEE GAFCSC EFFECTS
direction must I give to SCEMATIC SHEET
develop a plan? ( Feeds CONOPS para in
orders and is used with Qs 5
Use functions in Combat or and 6 to complete Subordinate
principles of the operation of Unit Msn Statements)
war.
ISSUE WARNING ORDER

(Outline SPOTOCA and give CSS update)
Sit
Probable Msn.
Own ME
Timings.
O Gp RV & Time .
CSS.
Q4. Where can I best

accomplish each action/ DO THIS GRAPHICALLY AS A DRAFT DSO
effect?
( Feeds SoM COORD
INSTR para in orders)
Q5. What resources are

required to accomplish UNTIL HAVE SELECTED A
each action/ effect? COA CONSIDER EITHER:
Allocates resources to a. FILL IN RESOURCES TO

Effects, to form mission EFFECTS ON THE DRAFT
statements DSO- different colours
b. FILL IN RESOURCE
VARIATIONS DIRECTLY
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ONTO COA DELOPMENT

SHEETS FOR COMD’S
DECISION BRIEF.
c. FILL IN A DSOM FOR

EACH COA- SEE GAFCSC
DSOM PROFORMA
Comd’s COA and Decision Brief- FILL IN GAFCSC COA DEVELOPMENT AND COMD’S
DECISION BRIEF PROFORMA FOR EACH COA
Q6. When & where do the actions/effects take place in relation to each other?
Create effects sync matrix – TIMELINE based on the effects/co-ord ident in Q5. Ensure
subordinates are not allocated more than one effect at the same time .
FILL IN GAFCSC SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX
Q7. What control Timings

measures do I need to Locations
impose?
FSCM-
( Feeds COORDINATING Anti-fratricide
INSTRUCTIONS para in measures
Orders ) FSCL
NFL
NFA
RFL
Bdrys,
Report Lines
LOE
LDs
Nicknames
Codewords
MSRs
NAIs
TAIs
AMAs
ARA
Handover lines
Break Clean Lines
No pen Line( NPL)
FPL
RPL
Contact and Coord pts
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COMPLETION OF THE PLAN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ORDERS
Mission
Concept of Ops.
1. Intent
2. Scheme of Manoeuvre
3. Main Effort
4. Subordinate Missions & Tasks
5. Coord Instrs
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CHAPTER 1
QUESTION 1 – WHAT IS THE ENEMY DOING AND WHY?
INTRODUCTION
The Question 1- “What is the Enemy doing and why?” is basically the intelligence
Preparation of the Battlespace ( IPB). This is a tool to assist the commander and
his staff in planning, decision making and the execution of a plan. The products of
IPB record graphically the results of the analysis of the ground, the enemy
likely/worst case courses of action from the analysis of their doctrine, their
objectives and their capabilities applied to the ground on which they are operating.
These products are then used to develop courses of action indicating where the
enemy will be targeted by direct fire, indirect fire and engineers to deny him his
purpose and, ultimately, to defeat him. The IPB process is a dynamic and
continuous process and the products will be adjusted as enemy actions are either
confirmed or identified, and as the plan is adjusted to meet the changing situation.
The first 3 Questions of the Combat Estimate are those in which the tactical Comd
must be most involved. On the basis of the briefing he receives in Question 1, he
should be in a position to articulate the effects he seeks to achieve to complete the
mission given to him by his superior commander.
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Questions 1-3 Input

Q 1 – What are the Start Point - Prep for Planning
enemy doing and why? IPB
Q 2 – What have I
been told to do and Mission
why? Analysis
Q 3 – What effects do I want

to have on the enemy and Effects
what direction must I give to
develop a plan?
Schematic
COMMANDER Direction
To Staff
Terminolgy. The following are important terminologies that are relevant to this
chapter:
a. Mobility Corridors. An MC is an open area through which a unit, deployed
in accordance with its tactical doctrine, can manoeuvre. MCs should lie, where
possible, through areas of good going. They should bypass severely restricted
terrain and may occasionally need to use restricted terrain.
b. Avenues of Approach. A viable AA for a formation contains 2 or more

adjacent MCs, running in the same direction and suitable for a formation or unit at
the next lower level of command.
c. Decision Points (DP)/Decision Lines (DL). An event, area, line, or point

on the battlefield where tactical decisions are required. Decision points only
indicate that a decision is required, and they indicate when/where the decision
should be made to have the maximum effect on friendly or enemy courses of
action.
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d. Named Areas of Interest (NAIs). NAI is a point or an area along a

particular avenue of approach through which enemy activity is expected to occur.
Activity or lack of activity within an NAI will help to confirm or deny a particular
enemy course
of action
e. Target Areas of Interest (TAI). The geographical area or point along a

mobility corridor the successful interdiction of which will cause an enemy to either
abandon a particular course of action or require him to use specialized engineer
support to continue and where he can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces.
f. High Value Target( HVT) A is an asset or capability which the enemy

requires for the success of his mission HVTs are usually the ‘enablers’ and should
be ranked according to their relative worth to the enemy’s operation A HVT’s value
will vary during an operation; i.e. bridging eqpt is crucial for a river crossing but of
no use once the last river has been crossed.
g. High Pay Off Target (HPOT). Those HVTs, the loss of which would
contribute most to the defeat of the enemy. HPTL normally coordinated by the BC.
The Comd must have the means to identify and engage them.
TIMELINE
Before the Commander and his staff start the Combat Estimate, they must draw
their planning timeline to guide them in their time management. Time is always
short but must be apportioned as a minimum according to the one third/two thirds
rule. This means that:
a. One third of the potential planning time available from receipt of superior
orders should be used by the HQ to conduct the decision making process and
issue orders to subordinates.
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b. The balance of two thirds of the potential planning time available should be
used by subordinates to conduct their own decision making process, issue orders
and conduct battle procedure. The time analysis can be detailed and recorded on
a planning timeline matrix, showing how the one third is to be used. It should be
maintained and displayed where the staff can view deadlines. The over-riding aim
is to ensure that subordinate commanders are given sufficient time to plan and
execute their part. Examples of a BG timeline matrix are shown below. The first
timeline is base on what the Commander and his staff would be doing within the
allotted time for the Combat Estimate. This emphasizes on the whole battle
procedure that the comd and his staff go through within the period. It does not
place much emphasis on the actual timings for the Combat Estimate. The second
timeline shows the various stages and timing bench marks that the comd and his
staff have to meet in order to complete their Combat Estimate at the specified time.
Thus the seconds ample is most appropriate for the 7 Questions Combat Estimate.
Note that Planning Timeline is different from Operational Timeline which starts
from the time of receipt of wng order to the time mission is accomplish.
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Timeline
Prelim
Time D -1 Op D@ Time Moves Planning 1/3 : 2/3: Orders D-1
etc:
Now: 0800 Starts: 1700 Avail: 33 Hrs Time 30 Hrs 10Hrs : Complete: 1800
(3 hrs) aval: 20Hrs
Activity: Prep Q 1-3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Decision War- Op O Os BG O

game Compilation Rehearsal Gp
Brief
% of
Time 5% 25% 10% 10% 5% 5% 5% 10% 10% 5% 10%
Allotted:
Time
in 30 150 60 60 30 30 30 60 60 30 60
Minutes:
Real 0800 - 0830 - 1100 - 1200 - 1300 - 1330 - 1400 - 1430 - 1530 – 1630 – 1700 –
Time: 0830 1100 1200 1300 1330 1400 1430 1530 1630 1700 1800
To manage time efficiently, the timeline should include all activity undertaken by
the BG not just time for planning. This is an initial operational timeline which could
be refined later to operational timeline. The staff can then see time in the context
of the whole operation. BG HQ should have a pre-prepared timeline board with
day/night lines, sub-unit activity, key CSS events, right up to H Hr, road moves,
defensive position preparation, backbriefs, mission rehearsals etc. The example
below shows a timeline covering both planning and the overall operation. It is not
exhaustive but covers the principal areas. It also has a natural link to the
synchronization matrix, which we will see in Question 6. The timings for Questions
4 – 7 could be merged as these questions are rarely conducted in discrete blocks.
Indeed Questions 4 – 7 are likely to be conducted once in outline to establish the
differing COA(s) and then again in more detail after the Comd has selected his
COA. The Comd’s Decision Brief can be given at any stage after Question 5
depending on the time available to fully develop a chosen COA.
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Example Timeline
H Hour in 24 Hrs, 3 hrs reqd for moves, 7 hrs for BG Staff to plan and give orders
Time
Event/Actions 2359 0200 0400 0600 0800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2359
Weather / Environment
MS 0215hrs MR 1630hrs
SR-0615hrs SS-1830hrs
Enemy Events Corps Recce In AO Bde Recce In AO
Friendly Actions Move to Def Posn
Bde Bde Conf Call l Bde Conf Call
BG PLANNING 1/3 Bde Cfm O's

BG Plans
1/3 - 2/3s BG Battle Procedure
BG Ops Recce Deploy Recce set BG Rxl MDA Complete

A Coy Pre Battle Checks
B Coy Pre Battle Checks
C Coy Pre Battle
Main Jumps Checks
Shift / Manning Ni 0700 Day 1900 Ni
COA DEVELOPMENT
Activity Prep Questio Question Question Question Question Decision Wargame OpO Orders Orders
n 1-3 4 5 6 7 Brief Compilation Rehearsal
% of Time 5% 25% 10% 10% 5% 5% 5% 10% 10% 5% 10%

Allotted:
Time in 30 150 60 60 30 30 30 60 60 30 60
Minutes:
Real Time 0800 - 0830 - 1100 - 1200 - 1300 - 1330 - 1400 - 1430 – 1530 – 1630 – 1700 –
Start / finish: 0830 1100 1200 1300 1330 1400 1430 1530 1630 1700 1800
Time Now: D-1 Op D@ Time 33 Hrs Prelim Plannin 30 Hrs 1/3:2/3 Orders D–1
0800 Starts 1700 Avail Moves: g Time 10:20 hrs Complete 1800
(3 hrs) avai
THE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE (IPB)
IPB is the analytical process to produce graphical intelligence products to support

the BG Comd’s Decision Making. It should enable him to visualize the likely effects
of the battlespace on his and the enemy’s forces and the likely effects of the
assessed enemy COA. The process normally involves defining the
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Battlespace/AO, describing the Battlespace’s/AO’s effects, evaluating the enemy

and describing the enemy COA(s). The Comd must be able to see the potential of
the environment and understand the capability of his opponent and how he is likely
to use his strengths and the ground to his advantage. The IPB must answer the
following questions which are further illustrated below:
a. How does the environment affect operations?
BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION (BAE)
b. What are the enemy’s capabilities and what are his tactics?
THREAT EVALUATION
c. How might the enemy achieve his objective in my area?

THREAT INTEGRATION
IPB: System and Products

How does the environment What are the enemy’s
affect operations? capabilities and what are his
tactics?
BATTLEFIELD AREA
EVALUATION (BAE) THREAT EVALUATION
Output - Terrain Analysis / Output - Doctrinal Overlays
MCs and AA /
HVT/ Vulnerabilities
Weather Analysis
How might the enemy achieve his objective in my

area?
THREAT INTEGRATION
Output - Situation Overlay and Event Overlay
Step 1 - Battlespace Area Evaluation (BAE) - How does the environment

affect operations?
BAE is normally undertaken by the BG Engr (BGE). It is an assessment of the

effects of the battlespace on both friendly and enemy operations. It seeks to
identify likely Avenues of Approach (AA), Mobility Corridors (MC) and Manoeuvre
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Areas. An important part is describing the military aspects of terrain. To ensure

proper attention, we use the pnemonic OCOKA as follows:
• O - Observation & Fields of Fire.
• C - Cover & Concealment.
• O - Obstacles.
• K - Key Terrain.
• A - Avenues of Approach.
The basis of successful BAE is the establishment of a database of the

battle(space) environment which is kept continuously updated from the outset of
planning for operations. This database is interrogated whenever the effect of the
battlefield environment on the threat or on friendly forces is being considered. The
maintenance of the database, a process which runs in parallel with the
commander's Estimate, involves the consideration of all the factors which may
affect the battle(space) environment and thus the ability of both the friendly force
and the threat to operate within the AO. The assessment process will enable a
map overlay to be produced which will indicate likely MCs and AAs. MCs and AAs
may be defined as follows:
The Factors. A wide range of factors, which will vary from operation to operation,
will affect the battlespace environment. Principal amongst these will be:
a. Terrain. The main effect of terrain will be to impose constraints on the ability
to move around the battlefield; the “Going”. Features such as forests, stretches of
water, marshes, mountain ranges and built up areas will physically restrict, to
varying degrees, the ability of all sides to manoeuvre in the battlespace. The
assessment of the effect of terrain on the threat's ability to move must always be
made using the capabilities of the threat's equipment as the yard stick. The
definitions of types of ‘going’ and the explanation of the symbols and colours in
marking overlays of BAE are shown below. Normally the evaluation is in the form
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of an overlay which highlights the effects the ground and the environment will have
on operations for both friendly and opposing forces. The overlay can be used to
identify both threat and friendly forces mobility corridors (MCs) and avenues of
approach (AAs). In peace support operations (PSO), environmental factors can be
highlighted. For example, inter-ethnic boundaries and the ethnic balance of areas
and towns can be highlighted.
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The process of analyzing the factor terrain to come out with MCs and AAs is
referred to as Terrain Analysis. The final product of Terrain Analysis is the
Terrain Overlay. A sample of the process of producing Terrain Overlay is as
shown below.
I
Terrain Analysis Mobility Corridors
I
K II K
KEY TERRAIN II
K K
II
SEVERELY
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K K
II
I
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TERRAIN
I
II
II
I
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I Avenues of Approach
Mobility Corridors AA 1 (North)
CT MC I
II K K
BG MC
II
K K
II
AA 2 (Centre)
K K
II
I
I
I
II
AA 3 (South)
II
I
b. Infrastructure. There may be particular aspects of the infrastructure in the AO

such as nuclear power plants or commercial chemical installations, which, if
damaged, would pose hazards to friendly forces or to the civilian population. There
may also be elements of the communications network; ports and harbours, bridges
and rail links, which have to be preserved in order to support subsequent stages of
a campaign. These limitations on damage to the infrastructure will affect some
aspects of operations such as movement, the risk of collateral damage and the
application of fire support to certain areas of the battlespace. This factor affects the
selection of Key Terrains on the Terrain Overlay as shown above.
c. Climate. The impact of climate (which also includes meteorology), on the

battlespace environment may further worsen the restrictions imposed by the terrain
on movement. Rain will cause rivers and streams to become impassable, and turn
tracks and fields to mud, worsening the ‘going’. Snow and ice can hinder the ability
of wheeled vehicles to manoeuvre freely. Conversely, sudden, unexpected, good
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weather can improve the 'going' and reduce movement problems. Climate will also
affect atmospheric conditions; mist and cloud can inhibit sensors and sights,
degrading the quantity and quality of Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and weapon
performance; bad weather will affect air and aviation operations. Heat can bring
dust and a resultant movement signature; heat ‘shimmer’ will affect optical sights.
Rain can degrade the detection capability of radar and thunderstorms may affect
some communications systems. Weather Effects on Friendly & Enemy Actions
must be analyzed in the form of Weather Analysis to produce Weather Overlay. A
sample is shown below which show shaded areas of water bodies. In this example
the weather is misty or cloudy in the morning thus affecting visibility. Consider
whether the Weather Effects are Unfavourable, Marginal, or Favourable to either
the enemy or own forces. Weather factor may be presented as factual information
concerning
• Temperature - Highs & Lows.
• Cloud Ceiling (Flight envelopes).
• Visibility (Flight envelopes and STAP effects).
• Wind Speed & Direction (OS & NBC Effects).
• Light (First Light/ Last Light, NVG Windows)
II
II
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Weather Template
d. Socio-Economic Issues. In certain operations, there will be a requirement to

limit damage to components of the socio-economic infrastructure such as housing,
key public utilities, industrial complexes and transport infrastructure. This will be
necessary in order to achieve a particular political or economic end state at the
cessation of hostilities and may inhibit operations over the whole or part of the
battlefield. Similarly, the requirement to avoid casualties amongst civilians will also
constrain operations in major centres of population.
Using the Evaluation. The information and overlays which result from the
Battlespace Area Evaluation may be used in two ways:
(1) Display how ground, environment and weather effect enemy operations to
inform threat integration.
(2) Display how ground, environment and weather effect own operations to inform
decisions on where effects on the enemy might take place. The process of Terrain
Analysis can further be illustrated below.
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LAVENDER PINE LAVENDER PINE
MC
2A
MC1
1
MC2A MC2
A
MC MC2
2B
1
B
MC2
MC2B2 MC3
MC3B
MC
MC
2A
MC1
1
2A
MC1 MC2A M C2
1
MC2A MC2
A
A H+4
H+10
MC MC2
MC MC2 2B1
2 B1
B
B M C2
M C2
MC3 MC2B2 MC3
MC2B2
MC3B MC3B H+6

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STEP 2 - THREAT EVALUATION -What are the enemy’s capabilities and what
are his tactics?
Threat Evaluation is the identification of the exact nature of the enemy or broadly
speaking, the threat. An assessment of an enemy’s capacity to conduct
operations and, from consideration of the enemy’s doctrine, the tactics which are
likely to be used in operations to achieve his assessed objectives lead to the
development of overlays showing how an enemy might deploy to achieve his
objectives. The threat model is unconstrained by the effects of the battle space
environment. Thus threat evaluation consists of a series of discrete actions aimed
at identifying the enemy's overall capability, based on his doctrine. These are:
a. What do I know about the enemy? What do I not know about the
enemy? Record as information requirements.
b. What are his objectives in my AO and beyond?
c. What are his strengths within my AO to inform relative strengths?
d. What doctrine and tactics might the enemy use for the assessed
operation (doctrinal overlay)?
Threat Evaluation Identifies the enemy’s doctrinal norms and is independent of

terrain and weather. Tactical doctrine and past modus operandi drive this step.
The products from Threat Evaluation might be the Doctrinal Overlay and the
Order of Battle Overlay (Big to Small) and how they might be arrayed on the
ground. Samples of Doctrinal Overlay and Order of Battle Overlay are shown
below. Additionally, strengths/weaknesses in enemy organization or system terms
should be described in order to come out with list of High Value Targets and
enemy vulnerabilities. G2 should start to advise the Comd at this stage of what is
key to look for - his Priority Information Requirements (PIR). This step in Threat
Evaluation is normally done by describing in words the enemy’s tactics and
options, based on historical analysis and what current information is pertinent. In
describing the enemy/ threats tactics the following should be considered:
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Describe the enemy’s usual tactics - if known

Include major manoeuvre units and activities of critical “shapers”
(Arty/Engrs/Avn/CBRN etc)
Does the enemy tend to follow a standard framework?
Use diagrams / pictures if possible
What identifiable DPs might lead the enemy to adopt a particular option or
to commit a particular asset?
Operational Situation - Organisation

Big to Small
Notes
Dispositions
• General:
•Eastland Forces have deployed 2 Corps
2
groups along the IB, in echelon, 1st Corps as
X X3 !st Ech and 2nd Corps as 2nd Ech.
1
• 1st Corps: Arrayed 2 Divisions up with the
Corps Armd Bde in echelon.
• Divs are arrayed 2 Bdes up with 3rd
Brigade in Echelon, supported by the
Divisional Armd Battalion.
1 • 1st Ech Bdes arrayed as illustrated
XXX
XX 1 2
XX
• 2nd Div assessed as ME Division sp by

2
Corps Armd Bde. 1st Division is SE.
• 2nd Corps: Still in TAAs.
Intent
1 • Eastland Forces are terrain focussed
X X3
14 crossing the IB to make territorial
13
claims.
• Fix in the North, exploit in south.
• Endstate - Land grab to capture terrain
and mineral resources then sue for peace
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14 Armd Bde in Tactical March

Formation
X FSP
3 x BMP-2
RP RG
☯2 x BRM 1K
1 x Comd TACP
12 x T 72S
1xT
72S
1x
9 x 2S1
6 x SA 16
12 x T 72S
IV15 14 x BMP-2
Bde 1xT72S 3 x T 72S 1 x SA 16 1 x MTU-72 1x
3 x BMP-2 1 x SA 13
2xBMP-2
1xT 72S
2xBRM-1K 3 x KMT-6 BTR 1 x ZSU 23/4
Recce 4 x BRM-1K Mineplough 1 x MTK-2 60PA 3 x 2S1 2 x GMZ
1 x RKHM 1 x IMR-2 1 x IMR-2 3x 3 x SA 16 12 x T 72S 2 x MTU 72
1 x R-123M 1 x MTLB Blade 1 x GMZ KTM-6 11 x BMP-2 1 x SA 13 2 x MTK 2
1 x MTK-2 1 x SA 1 x ZSU 23/4 1 x IMR 2 2 x MTLB
16 2 x MTU 72 1 x MTK 2 Blade
RG FP CRP VG MSD FCP MG RSP MB RSP

RP
RP ☯
RG
3xBMP-2
2xBMP-2
1xT 72S
1 x T 72S 3 x T 72S 2 x BRM 1K 1xMTU-72
2 x BRM-1K 1 x Comd TACP 1xMTK-2
4 x BRM-1K 3x2S1 3xSA 16 3 x 2S1 3 x SA 16
12 x T 72S 1xIMR-2 4 x T 72S 1 x SA 13
1 x RKHM 12xT72S 11xBMP-2
1 x SA 16 1xGMZ 1xSA13 1xZSU 23/4 1 x ZSU 23/4 2 x GMZ
1 x R-123M 3 x KMT-6 2 x MTLB Blade
1xIMR 2 2xMTU 72
Mineplough 1xMTK 2
FLK DET
1 x IMR-2
1 x MTLB Blade
1 x MTK-2 FSP
3xBMP-2 71 Km
FP CRP VG MSD MG RSP RSP

25 Km 170 m 350 m 1.75 Km 250 m 115 m 11.5 Km 115 m 89.5 Km 115 m
X
(Each grouping approx. 5-10Kms with a distance totalling approx. 180Kms)
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Step 3 - THREAT INTEGRATION - How might the enemy achieve his objective
in my area?
In the third step of the IPB process the results of BAE are combined with the
doctrinal COAs which have been derived from the Threat Evaluation. Threat
Integration seeks to identify how doctrine will be shaped by the battlefield
environment and turned into practice. The following Overlays are produced:
a. Enemy Commander’s Effects Schematic. This is a schematic

representation of what the enemy comd intends to do in the AO and beyond and
the effects he wants to achieve at various locations. A sample of Enemy
Commander’s Effects Schematics is shown below. It is important to notice that
friendly forces are referred to as ENEMY by the enemy commander. The IO should
produce an enemy Effects Schematic and brief it as part of the Q1 brief.
Enemy Effects Schematic

FIND
SEIZE and DECEIVE
DEFEAT DISRUPT
BLOCK
SECURE
FIND To Confirm en locs.
SEIZE IOT crossings over the river.
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DECEIVE DECEIVE en as to which crossing site.
DISRUPT En ISTAR assets IOT prevent detection.
DEFEAT Strike to DEFEAT en objective.
SECURE The high ground to south of AO IOT

protect open flank.
BLOCK IOT counter any counter-attack.
b. Situation Overlays. Situational Overlays are simply, views of an enemy

COA. It shows the doctinal template as it might move and fight through time and
space (ground). It’s purpose is to provide the Commander and his staff a clear
view of what the enemy might do, so that he can begin to think about his strategy
or “battle-winning idea”. Without this clear view it becomes much more difficult for
him to conceptualize his COA or plan and therefore give guidance to his staff. A
situation overlay also shows graphically how the enemy will be deployed, usually
two-down, at a particular stage in a COA. It sets out the doctrinal model in the
context of the battlefield environment (i.e. situating the doctrinal model in time and
space). An overlay could be produced to show how the enemy will be formed up
as he enters a brigade AO, displaying the likely locations of enemy companies. A
second overlay could display how he would be formed up to conduct a deliberate
attack. Overlays showing forces in motion through manoeuvre areas (AAs and
MCs) will be annotated with time lines. These may be further refined into phase
lines (PL) which indicate points in time and space where the momentum of the
threat’s operation may be lost and where friendly forces may be able to seize the
initiative. The production of situation overlays is intended to identify the
opportunities and constraints the battlefield environment offers to enemy and
friendly forces. Note that the enemy's most likely COA will be the COA which
gives the enemy the most consistent superiority with the least amount of risk and
most closely matches his doctrine.
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The enemy’s most dangerous COA will be the COA with the most decisive
superiority at the critical time but which for the enemy, is a high risk option.
Samples of Situation Overlays are shown below. Enemy COA (Situational
Overlays) should meet certain standards. They must meet the following criteria:
Suitable to accomplish the Red Mission
Feasible - The Enemy COA must have the capability to accomplish the mission in
terms of Time, Space & Resourses.
Acceptable - The advantage gained by executing this COA must justify the cost in
terms of resources.
Distiguishability - Each COA must differ significantly from the others
MB2
Enemy COA 1 FP MG2 MB1 Avenues of Approach AA 1 (North)
K MSD K
RP
CRP MG1
VG
K K
RP
AA 2 (Centre)
K K
AA 3 (South)
Enemy COA 2 FP Avenues of Approach AA 1 (North)

K K
RP
CRP
K MG2 K
VG MSD AA 2 (Centre)
K K
MG1 M
RP
AA 3 (South)
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Enemy COA 3 Avenues of Approach AA 1 (North)
K K
K K
AA 2 (Centre)
K K
FP
RP
M
CRP
MSD
RP MG2 AA 3 (South)
MG1 M
VG
Situation Overlay
+ 20 + 10 H HR
+ 30
En COA 1
En COA 2
En COA 3
En COA 2
En COA 3
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Consolidated +10 H-Hr

MB 2
+30 +20
Situational FP M G2 K M B 1
Overlay
FPK M SD
RP
CR P M G1
RP
VG
CRP
RP K
MG2
K FP
RP VG MSD
MG1 M
RP
K M
K CRP
II MSD
RP MG2
MG1
VG
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c. Event Overlays. An event overlay sets out graphically when and where key
tactical events might be expected to take place. The event overlay should identify
Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) and Decision Points (DPs) that will confirm which
course of action an enemy may be adopting or provide a trigger for friendly forces
action. Timelines will show when key events can be expected to occur. Event
overlays provide the basis from which DPs may be developed and will provide the
information required for the Enemy Action column of the Synchronisation Matrix
which will be discussed later. An Event Overlay is also considered as a
consolidation of all the Situational Overlays (ECOAs) to identify where similarities
and differences occur. Its purpose is to identify through deductive reasoning which
COA the enemy is using. The differences between the NAIs, Indicators, and
Time / Phase Lines associated with each ECOA form the basis of the Event
Overlay. Comparison of the different ECOA will demonstrate where COAs are
similar and where they are different. By conducting a comparison between
Situational Overlays (Separate and distinct ECOAs), a “Comparative Event
Overlay” is constructed. Examples of event overlays are shown below. These
overlays will inform COA development. Time may only permit one very simple
overlay to be produced. Equally, if information is limited on an enemy COA, the
commander may have to direct his G2 staff to make some assumptions on the
enemy’s actions. As more information becomes available, then these assumptions
can either be confirmed or altered.
The selection of NAIs in preparation of Event Overlays is very important. NAI is

a point or area along a particular avenue of approach through which enemy activity
is expected to occur. Activity or lack of activity within an NAI will help to confirm or
deny a particular enemy course of action. These are points and areas in the AO
where the recognition of particular events and activities associated with the threat
will confirm, or deny, the threat’s intentions to pursue a specific COA. Once an NAI
has been identified, the event or activity that will focus attention on the NAI should
be clearly defined and recorded. NAIs should be covered by ISTAR assets or form
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a serial in the Intelligence Collection Plan for action by higher formation. The
following should be considered when selecting NAIs on an Event Overlay:
Enemy in the Offence
Linear NAIs across Avenues of Approach (AA)
NAIs at intersecting AA or Mobility Corridors (MCs)
NAIs on enemy Time/Phase Lines to aid tracking enemy movement
NAIs on expected HVT / HPT locations
Enemy in the Defence
NAIs on defensive positions, both primary and secondary
NAIs on C Attk force assembly areas/routes
NAIs on likely wdr route
NAIs on expected HVT / HPT locations
Event Overlay
NAI 101
(AA1)
En COA 1
NAI 105
En COA 2 NAI 102

(AA 2)
En COA 3
NAI 106
En COA 2
NAI 103
NAI 107 En COA 3 NAI 104 (AA 3)
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QUESTION ONE BRIEF
Question 1 Brief or the Intelligence brief (sometimes called Intelligence Estimate)

is the summary of Question 1. In effect, it pieces together all the output from Q1. It
has the express purpose of informing and supporting the Commander’s decision-
making process. The Commander must SEE the capability of the ground and his
opponent. The IO or G2 Representative will have to make an assessment
through logical reasoning. What he misses at this stage he is likely to get during
the preparation and execution stages of battle. (Operational experience tells us
there will never be a 100% read) Good enough now is better than perfect too late
and that is the essence of the 7 Questions Combat Estimate. No matter how far it
has developed (determined by how much time there has been), the BGE and/or IO
must be prepared to brief the CO and BG staff. If time is short the G2 rep will have
to develop the best briefing product, normally the Event Overlay, and use it to
frame the brief. In these circumstances, he is likely to use more intuition than
analysis. The headings for the Question 1 Brief are as follows:
Terrain Analysis - Engr (OCOKA)
The military effects on operations for the enemy and friendly forces
Weather Analysis – Engr/Air/Arty
Threat Evaluation – G2
The enemy's potential, capabilities and vulnerabilities - identify HVTs
Threat Integration – G2
Situation Overlays (visualise the problem)
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Most Likely Enemy and Most Dangerous COA

Event Overlay (build the Int Collection Plan)
Where to look and what to look for
On completion of the Question1 Brief it now time for the staff to fill the question 1
part of the 7 Questions Estimate Forms. ( See Introduction) Below is a sample of a
completed form for only Question 1.
COMPLETION OF 7 QUESTIONS ESTIMATE FORMS- QUESTION 1
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CHAPTER 2
QUESTION 2 – WHAT HAVE I BEEN TOLD TO DO AND WHY?
INTRODUCTION
What Have I Been Told to Do and Why? From whatever orders are received, a
commander must understand his superior commander’s intentions, the mission
given to him and the context of that mission. He must also understand what effect
(on the problem/enemy) his commander seeks to achieve in a particular period of
time and his own unique contribution to the accomplishment of the overall effect. In
all but the most pressing of situations, or simplest of problems, it will be normal for
commanders at all levels to conduct detailed mission analysis. Question 2 is
concerned with the mission analysis of the comd.
Terminology. Below are important are important terminologies for this chapter:
a. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). BG HQ deals

with a great deal of information during planning and execution of a mission. Most
of this is routine and is not critical to the success of the operation but merely
comes under the general heading of Information Requirements (IR).
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) are those pieces of
information which are CRITICAL to the BG Comd’s decision making – e.g. the
information on which he has to base his key decisions. CCIR are therefore key
to how the battle is fought and doctrine on them is scanty at best and usually
misunderstood. The staff should recommend to the BG Comd during planning
what they see as critical, but the he must ultimately decide personally what he
considers critical to success.
b. Priority Information Requirements (PIR). PIR cover information on the

enemy (such as where his bridges are during a river crossing operation so that
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they become key targets). It is Info about the en that the Comd has designated as
a priority in decision making- “What do I need to know about the enemy?”
c. Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR). FFIR is information

that the Comd needs about his own forces for the op;It enable the Comd to have a
real handle on where the various parts of his tps are and what their status is at any
stage of the battle. It may include unit strengths, dispositions, capability and
readiness -“What do I need to know about myself?”
d. Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI). These are aspects of

friendly forces that, if known by the en, might compromise the op, so must be
protected from enemy detection-“What I have to hide from the the enemy?” What
vital capabilities must we conceal from the enemy - our bridges or the location of
the BG reserve?
Mission Analysis is a logical process for extracting and deducing from a superior’s
orders the tasks necessary to fulfil a mission. It places in context what effect is to
be achieved in the overall design for operations. A commander establishes what
constraints apply, and determines, as the campaign, major operation, battle or
engagement progresses, whether further decisions are required. As such it is a
dynamic process which 'triggers', and then regulates, the remainder of the
Estimate. It is continued thereafter as the situation and the mission are reviewed.
From the orders he receives, a commander must understand the context and
purpose of his own mission statement. The commander and his staff thoroughly
analyze the higher headquarters’ orders to establish horizontal and vertical
nesting, not just for maneuver, but also for all combat support and combat service
support. This step is to ensure they completely understand the higher
headquarters’
• -Commander’s intent.
• -Mission, including tasks, constraints, risk, available assets, and area of
operations.
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• -Concept of the operation, including the deception plan.

There are four basic questions that form the foundation of Mission Analysis. These
are as follows:
• Question 1. — What is my superior Comds intent and my part in his plan?
• Question 2. — What are my specified and implied tasks?
• Question 3. — What Constraints are imposed on my freedom of action?
• Question 4. — Has the tactical situation changed and do I need to take
another decision?
QUESTION 1. — WHAT IS MY SUPERIOR COMDS INTENT AND MY PART IN

HIS PLAN?
The Superiors’ Intent. A commander is required to understand his superiors'

intent 2 up, and mission and concept of operations one up, in order to understand
his own part in the plan. He must establish what effect he has to achieve within his
superior's concept and understand his superior's main effort and endstate. A
Comds’ Intent is therefore a clear, concise statement of what the force must do to
succeed with respect to the enemy and the terrain and to the desired end state. It
provides the link between the mission and the concept of operations by stating the
key tasks that, along with the mission, are the basis for subordinates to exercise
initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original concept of
operations no longer applies. The mission and the commander's intent must be
understood two echelons down. If the commander wishes to explain a broader
purpose beyond that of the mission statement, he may do so in his scheme of
maneuver.
Scheme of Maneuver. The scheme of maneuver describes how arrayed forces

will accomplish the commander’s intent. It is the central expression of the
commander’s concept for operations and governs the design of supporting plans.
Planners develop a scheme of maneuver by refining the initial array of forces and
using graphic control measures to coordinate the operation and to show the
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relationship of friendly forces to one another, the enemy, and the terrain. During
this step, units are converted from generic to specific types of units, such as armor,
light infantry, and mechanized infantry.
QUESTION 2. — WHAT ARE MY SPECIFIED AND IMPLIED TASKS?
Specified and Implied Tasks. Specified tasks are those given in the orders and
implied tasks are those which, though not specifically stated, nonetheless have to
be carried out to achieve the mission. A review of the specified and implied tasks
against the superior's intent should lead to a clear understanding of what must be
done in terms of actions and effects and which action/effect will constitute the main
effort.
Main Effort. Main Effort is referred to as a concentration of forces or means, in a

particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision. The unit,
battle position, sector, zone, axis, avenue of approach, area of operations, theater
of operations, and so forth, the senior commander has determined has the most
important task and purpose at that time, whose success will make the most
difference in the accomplishment of the higher commander's overall mission or
objective. Commanders at all levels should designate a point of main effort along
with supporting efforts. This helps them and their staffs to allocate resources
accordingly, providing focus to the operation while setting priorities and
determining risks, promoting unity of effort, and facilitating and understanding of
the commander's intent. In the offense, the commander will conduct the main
attack where the main effort has been designated. In the defense, the main effort
is that area along the enemy avenue of approach that the defense depends on for
success. The higher commander will influence the main effort with supporting
effort(s). The decision on where to establish the Main Effort will depend on the
higher commander's Intent, the commander's mission analysis, the relative
strengths and the intelligence available. The commander has six main ways, which
may often be combined, to give substance to his MAIN EFFORT:
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a. Narrowing of boundaries to concentrate force-economy of effort elsewhere.

b. Grouping extra combat power on the Main Effort.
c. Allocation of priority for Combat Support.
d. Allocation of priority for Combat Service Support.
e. Use of second echelon forces and reserves.
f. Sequencing of deep, close and rear operations.
Specified Tasks. Specified tasks are those stated in the directives or orders
received by the subordinate from his superior commander. They are those
specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters. Specified tasks are
mostly stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the higher headquarters’ order or plan.
Specified tasks are also found in annexes and overlays. CS and CSS units may
find them in paragraphs 4 and 5 also.
Implied Tasks. Implied tasks are those that must be performed to accomplish a
specified task, but which are not stated in the higher comd’s orders. Implied tasks
are other activities that have to be carried out in order to achieve the mission,
including the requirement to support the superior commander's Main Effort. A
logical check of the operation should reveal the implied tasks. A comparison of the
specified and implied tasks with the superior commander's intent should lead to an
initial deduction of the Main Effort required of the formation or unit. Implied tasks
are derived from a detailed analysis of the higher comd’s orders,the enemy
situation and courses of action, and the terrain. Analysis of the unit’s current
location in relation to its future area of operations provides insights into implied
tasks that may be required to perform specified tasks. Additionally, an analysis of
the doctrinal requirements for each specified task may provide implied tasks.
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QUESTION 3. — WHAT CONSTRAINTS ARE IMPOSED ON MY FREEDOM OF

ACTION?
Constraints on Freedom of Action. Constraints are restrictions placed on a

comd by a higher comd to dictate an action or inaction, thus restricting the freedom
of action the subordinate comd has for planning a mission by stating things that
must or must not be done. Total freedom of action is assumed unless constraints
are detailed. These may include time, space, resources, rules of engagement,
control measures and tasks additional to the mission, such as allocating troops to
the higher formation reserve etc. Constraints may also be imposed such as fire
support co-ordination measures for OS, restricted operating zones for aviation and
emission control measures for certain equipment. Under Mission Command, a
subordinate can assume freedom of action unless he is otherwise constrained.
Specific constraints may include those of time, space and resources, including
combat service support, in the way a commander execute his mission. At all
levels, further limiting factors including political restrictions (such as ROE) which
prohibit the commander from undertaking specific actions may apply. They are
normally found in the scheme of maneuver, the concept of operations, and
coordinating instructions.
QUESTION 4. — HAS THE TACTICAL SITUATION CHANGED AND DO I NEED

TO TAKE ANOTHER DECISION?
Has the Situation Changed? In a changing situation, the original tasks given in
the mission statement may no longer be valid to the achievement of the superior
commander’s intent, which should be clear to him. If guidance is not available, or
time does not allow for the seeking of further guidance, a subordinate may carry
out tasks not previously assigned to him in order to achieve what he believes
continues to be his superior commander’s intent. A commander needs to
determine whether the situation has changed sufficiently to warrant a review of the
estimate. Using Mission Analysis, the commander reassesses the progress of his
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operation against his Mission as the situation develops. The commander can ask
at any time Has the situation changed - and do I need to take another decision?
When there is no change, the answer is No- no change. If there are changes, there
are three possible responses:
• (1) Yes - the situation has changed but his plan is still valid.
• (2) Yes - the situation has changed: my original mission is still feasible but
• he needs to amend his plan.
• (3) Yes - the situation has changed and his original mission is no longer
• valid. In this case, the commander should consult his superior but if for
whatever reason he cannot, he will act on his own initiative to support his
superior commander’s Main Effort, in keeping with that commander’s
original intent. He will also keep in mind the commander’s intent two levels
of command up.
IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The staff gathers two categories of information concerning assigned task—facts

and assumptions. Facts are statements of known data concerning the situation,
including enemy and friendly dispositions, available troops, unit strengths, and
material readiness. Assumptions are suppositions about the current or future
situation that are assumed to be true in the absence of facts. They take the place
of necessary, but unavailable, facts and fill the gaps in what the commander and
his staff knows about a situation. An assumption is appropriate if it meets the tests
of validity and necessity. Validity means the assumption is likely to be true.
“Assuming away” potential problems, such as weather or likely enemy options,
would result in an invalid assumption. Necessity is whether or not the assumption
is essential for planning. If planning can continue without the assumption, it is not
necessary and should be discarded. When possible, assumptions are cleared with
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the higher headquarters to ensure they are consistent with higher headquarters’
plan. Assumptions are replaced with facts as soon as possible. To determine
assumptions, staff should—
• List all appropriate assumptions received from higher headquarters.
• State expected conditions over which the commander has no control but which
are relevant to the plan.
• List conditions that would invalidate the plan or its concept of operations.
OUTCOME OF MISSION ANALYSIS.
The outcome of mission analysis is the commander being absolutely clear on what
effect he must achieve and why. He must keep his mission under review
throughout the remainder of the decision making process and the operation, and
continually review whether the situation varies from that which formed the basis of
the plan. From the Mission Analysis the commander should be able to identify his
CCIRs. Initially CCIRs will be information that is critical to making a plan. CCIRs
may translate into Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) or indeed into information to
enable the commander to make timely decisions. These may be recorded as
Decision Points (DPs). Again from the mission analysis the commander may have
identified key tasks and constraints that might preclude some COAs. This would
enable him to focus the effort of his staff on to the most feasible options without
wasting valuable time on irrelevant COAs. In addition the following should fall out
of the process:
• My Intent (outcome)
• Tasks required to achieve the intent
• Points I need to clarify with my superior
• Direction for the team conducting the estimate
• Initial direction for your subordinates - Warning Order
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MISSION ANALYSIS RECORD SHEET
Completing the Mission Analysis Record Sheet ensures that all the detail and
deductions from mission analysis are recorded. The CCIRs and RFIs that fall out
from the commander’s mission analysis are normally the most critical to both the
planning and execution of the mission. The CCIRs for the execution of the mission
must be understood by the Comd and his staff – and hence they are included in
Coord Instrs in Orders. A sample of this sheet is shown below. A student may be
required to fill this form and the Question 2 part of the Combat Estimate Format.
(See Introduction). Samples of a completed Question 2 part of the Combat
Estimate Format are also shown below.
MISSION ANALYSIS RECORD

2 UP Mission: 1 UP Mission:
Own Mission:
ME:
Tasks Deductions RFIs CCIRs
Specifie
d
Implied
Freedoms
Constraints
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FIRST EXAMPLE
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SECOND EXAMPLE
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CHAPTER 3
WHAT EFFECTS DO I WANT TO HAVE ON THE ENEMY AND
WHAT DIRECTION MUST I GIVE TO DEVELOP MY PLAN?
INTRODUCTION
What Effects Do I Want to Have on the Enemy and What Direction Must I Give to
Develop a Plan? The conclusion of mission analysis is the commander pausing to
collect his thoughts and record his intent and, possibly from his experience, outline
conceptual courses of action. He will also identify actions that his staff needs to
take in order to prepare for and carry out COA development. The less time there is
available for the decision making process then the more direction is required,
otherwise the staff will waste time in developing unnecessary courses of action.
The Comd should allow himself time after Mission Analysis to absorb the info upon
which he has been briefed before identifying the effects he wishes to have in the
AO. Question 3 expresses the Comd’s ‘battle winning idea’; it should highlight the
effects he wishes to have on the enemy in the area of his choice.
The Comd must now decide what effects he wishes to have on the enemy and
why. By applying his experience and intuition he should describe the effects to be
achieved in the form of an Effects Schematic as well as the purpose for each
effect. He should use an Effects Schematic and give clear direction to his staff
detailing how and where he expects the plan to be developed. If possible the
commander should stipulate what effect is likely to be his Main Effort and the End
State. He should also give Commander’s Direction to focus the staff planning
effort. Suggested methods include the use of applicable Functions in Combat,
principles of war or principles of the operation. CCIRs may also be emphasized at
this stage.
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PREPARATION OF COMMANDER’S EFFECTS SCHEMATIC

The Commander should express his intent as the effects that he wants to have on
the enemy, stating the purpose of each effect, to set the enemy up for and achieve
his defeat. He may also direct actions that need to be carried out to prepare for the
achievement of an effect. He must highlight which effect will be his main effort and
make clear his desired endstate. The statement of intent is best supported by a
schematic referred to as Commander’s Effect Schematic. This is done by first
putting a fresh overlay on the Situational Overlay as shown below.
$
Consolidated +10 H-Hr
$ MB 2
+30 +20
Situational
Overlay 5
0 FP M G2 K M B 1
5
( FPK M SD
5$
5 RP
0 CRP M G1
$
$
RP
VG
CRP
5 $ $ RP K
MG2
5
5 $ ( RP
K FP
VG MSD
0 0 M
5 MG1
$ $
RP
K M
CRP
(
K
5 $ RP
II MSD
MG2
$ 0 0 VG
MG1
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The effects are marked on the fresh overlay at the exact locations where the comd
wants to achieve those effects. Alternatively the effects could be marked on a plain
sheet of paper and the purposes written below. Active verbs are used to denote
the effects. Examples are shown below.
Effects Terms
Offensive Ops Defensive Ops Non Kinetic
Find Find Coerce

Surprise / Deceive Deceive Inform
Suppress Deny Isolate
Defeat - C Attack Fix Protect
Strike – Strike Reassure
Isolate Disrupt Influence
Penetrate Block Secure
Contain Turn
Neutralise Delay
Secure
Seize For each effect a
purpose should be given
Examples of Commander’s Effect Schematics are shown below.
Comd’s Effects Schematic
DEFEAT
BLOCK DISRUPT FIND
TURN
Effect Purpose
Find: Take over tracking from LD BG.
Disrupt: En 1st ech East of R FROME, DESTROY recce and adv gd.
Turn: South to North for DEFEAT in EA ANVIL.
Defeat: Main body of 1st ech within boundaries. ME
Block: To secure bde Southern flank.
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Note the first example is the type marked on a sheet of paper. The second
example is the type marked on an overlay but with the purposes written within the
effects. The best practice is to combine the 2 types by marking the effects from the
Situation Overlay and writing the purposes below. This is illustrated below.
COMD’S EFFECTS SCHEMATIC
DEFEAT
BLOCK
DISRUPT
FIND
TURN
Effect Purpose
Defeat: Main bod y of 1st ech w ithin boundaries. ME
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When the overlay is detached from the map the final product of Comd’s Effects
Schematic would look like the overlay below. The Comd hands over this overlay to
his staff for Question 4. He also gives his direction to his staff which will be
discussed in the next section. The Format required for submission of Comd’s
Effects Schematic is shown in the next section.
COMD’S EFFECTS SCHEMATIC
DEFEAT
BLOCK
DISRUPT
FIND
TURN
Effect Purpose
COMMANDER’S DIRECTION
The commander or his chief of staff should then give direction to the staff. The
direction must include request for information, points for clarification from the
higher HQ, and make clear CCIRs. The amount of direction required will depend
on the complexity of the situation, the experience of the staff and the time
available. The Directions are presented in format of the principles of war pertaining
to a particular phase of war or in a format of the functions in combat. It is
recommended that the functions in combat are used as the format for direction.
Functions in combat are a good structure for any operation and use of this
structure makes it less likely that a key area is forgotten. An example of the details
that could be given within each function is discussed in the next section.
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As part of the Comd’s directive, the comd may give details of his own recce or
direct that a preliminary reconnaissance operation should be conducted to find
more information to enable him to make better informed decisions. The comd also
give his direction in the warning order that he gives to his subordinates. Whilst it
should be as full as possible, the warning order should not be delayed while
waiting for more information. It is very helpful to include the commander’s intent
and the intent schematic in the warning order. Additionally information should be
given to subordinates as it becomes available. This will enable their earlier
inclusion and participation, as well as concurrent planning at their own level, in the
planning process.
COMMANDER'S DIRECTION BY FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT
1. Intelligence and Information.
a. The commander's critical information requirements, ie what he needs to know to

identify or confirm enemy courses of action. This may include direction for a
preliminary operation to find more information on the enemy.
b. Review the superior high payoff target list to identify which targets apply at this
level.
c. Preparation of threat integration. The commander should direct which enemy
courses of action to concentrate on and what event and situation overlays need to
be produced to display the key events by time and space of the likely enemy
courses of action and how he will be deployed in situations where/when he might
be targeted.
d. Analyse relative strengths, own and enemy strengths and vulnerabilities in order
to advise protection against enemy strengths and to target his vulnerabilities.
2. Manoeuvre.
a. What movement planning is required in order to get own forces into position
ready for operations?
b. What mobility support is required for the operation?
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c. Does the commander have any conceptual ideas for courses of action?/Give
guidance on course of action development as appropriate.
3. Firepower.
a. How can the available direct fire and offensive support be employed to support
the commander's intent?
b. What are the commander's critical offensive support tasks? Each should be
expressed by task, purpose and endstate. This will be a continual process
throughout COA development.
c. Which high payoff targets are likely to be in my area of operations?
d. What targets need to be attacked to achieve the commander's intent and in what
priority?
e. Give direction on the use of psychological or information operations.
4. Protection.
a. The commander should outline his engineer priorities.
b. What counter mobility tasks are required to shape the enemy?
c. What effects are obstacles required to achieve to support the intent - disrupt,
turn, fix or block?
d. OPSEC:
(1) What engineer support is required to field defences, camouflage and
concealment?
(2) What emission control measures should be in force?
(3) What effect is necessary on the enemy to achieve deception or surprise?
(4) Do I have a part to play in a higher level deception plan?
e. What is the NBC threat and what risk taking is recommended?
f. What is the air threat and consequent air defence priority and tasks?
g. What force protection measures are necessary (eg to counter enemy deep ops).
5. CSS.
a. What are the commander's CSS priorities?
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b. Which are mission essential equipments, leading to repair priorities?

c. What critical timings exist in the 3 functional areas of logistic, medical and
equipment support?
d. Consider demand, distance, duration and destination for the operation as a
whole.
6. Command.
a. Give guidance for the warning order content, including a time and place to meet
subordinate commanders.
b. Where should HQs be sited?
c. What are the communications implications of the operation (need for rebros etc).
d. Media Ops – give direction on the handling of the media for the operation.
e. Give guidance to the R Gp for the recce, based on the intent schematic.
f. At what time will the next central meeting be?
FORMAT FOR COMD’S EFFECTS SCHEMATIC
GAFCSC – Comd’s Effects Schematic

Sketch:
Direction to staff:
1. Enemy
2. Msn analysis
3. Intent:
a. Intent schematic
b. ME
c. End state
4. Direction to All Arms
5. CCIRs and RFIs
Effect purposes:
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7 QUESTIONS ESTIMATE FORMAT- QUESTION 3
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CHAPTER 4
QUESTION 4 – WHERE CAN I BEST ACCOMPLISH EACH
ACTION/EFFECT?
INTRODUCTION
Questions 4-7 form the second stage of the estimate process and are closely
related. These are graphical production of Decision Support Overlay (DSO),DSO
Matrix (DSOM),synchronization matrix graphical control measure. The relationship
between these products is as shown below.
Direction Questions 4-7

To Staff
From DSO/DSOM Development
Comd
COA Selection
Q 4 – Where can I
Plan Refinement
best accomplish
each effect? DSO
Q 5 – What resources
do I need to achieve DSOM
each effect?
Q 6 – When and where do

the actions take place in Synch
relation to each other? Matrix
Q 7 – What control
Control
The Plan WARGAME measures do I need
to impose? Measures
In Question 4 – Where can I best accomplish each effect or action? The effects
being referred to are those that we selected during the preparation of the comd’s
effect schematic in question 3. Thus this is the overlay with the comd’s effect
schematic without the purpose. The simplest way to do this is to put a fresh
overlay on the comd’s effect schematic and trace the effects only. This is referred
to as Draft Decision Support Overlay. This is draft because the exact locations
of the effects may shift slightly if other inputs from the comd’s directives such as
answers to CCIRs, PIRs and recce reports. The issue at stake is not the selection
of a general area where the effects could be. This has already been done by the
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comd in his Comd’s Effects Schematics. The most important issue now is the
selection of the best locations for the effects to be achieved. The staff now use
their experience and the products from Questions 1-3 to refine where best to site
the effects. In academic work most students just make use of the effects that they
selected from the Comd’s effect schematic but in real practice comd’s directives
are likely going to alter the locations of the effects or at worse may even change or
render some of them ineffective. Some effects will be strictly dictated by the
ground – ie for the FIND effect. Other effects could be possible in a number of
locations – ie a STRIKE or DEFEAT effect. This in itself will offer differing options
and potentially lead to one or more draft DSOs. The illustrated process of
producing DSO is shown below.
CONSTITUENTS OF DECISION SUPPORT OVERLAY (DSO).
The constituent parts of the DSO are NAIs, TAIs and DPs. These were mentioned
in Chapter 1 but they will be emphasized for the sake of understanding them in the
context of Decision Support Overlay. These are:
a. Named Areas of Interest (NAI). It is a point or area along a particular avenue

of approach through which enemy activity is expected to occur. Activity or lack of
activity within an NAI will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of
action. These are points and areas in the AO where the recognition of particular
events and activities associated with the threat will confirm, or deny, the threat’s
intentions to pursue a specific COA. Once an NAI has been identified, the event or
activity that will focus attention on the NAI should be clearly defined and recorded.
NAIs should be covered by ISTAR assets or form a serial in the ICP for action by
higher formation.
b. Target Areas of Interest (TAI). The geographical area or point along a mobility
corridor the successful interdiction of which will cause an enemy to either abandon
a particular course of action or require him to use specialized engineer support to
continue and where he can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Not all
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TAIs will form part of the friendly COA; only TAIs associated with higher payoff
targets (HTPs) are of interest to the staff. These are identified during staff planning
and wargaming. TAIs differ from engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas
plan for the use of all available weapons; TAIs might be engaged by a single
weapon. TAIs are points and areas in the AO where the commander intends to
target the threat in order to achieve a specified effect. They are identified during
COA development and form the focus for the integration of resources to achieve
the desired effect.
c. Decision Points (DP)/Decision Lines (DL). An event, area, line, or point on the
battlefield where tactical decisions are required resulting from the wargaming
process or the operations order. Decision points do not dictate commander’s
ecisions, they only indicate that a decision is required, and they indicate hen/where
the decision should be made to have the maximum effect on friendly or enemy
courses of action. These are points in time and space at which the commander
has to make a decision to trigger an action in a particular TAI. There will be TAIs
for contingencies which may not need to be triggered. It is necessary to maintain
surveillance over DPs to queue the decision if necessary. DPs which cannot be
covered by ISTAR assets within the AO should be tasked through the ICP.
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ILLUSTRATED PROCESS OF PRODUCING DSO
Comd’s Effects Schematic COMD’S EFFECTS SCHEMATIC
DEFEAT
DEFEAT
BLOCK DISRUPT FIND
OR DISRUPT
TURN BLOCK
FIND
TURN
Effect Purpose
Disrupt: En 1st ech East of R FROME, DESTROY recce and adv gd. Effect Purpose
Turn: South to North for DEFEAT in EA ANVIL. Find: Take over tracking from LD BG.
Defeat: Main body of 1st ech within boundaries. ME Disrupt: En 1st ech East of R FROME, DESTROY recce and adv gd.
Block: To secure bde Southern flank. Turn: South to North for DEFEAT in EA ANVIL.
Draft DSO - Preparation
DEFEAT
DISRUPT
BLOCK
FIND
TURN
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We have now transferred the effects the Comd seeks to achieve on to the map;
the effects “goose eggs” become NAIs and TAIs. There two ways of refining the
effects. Start with the ME effect, then work backwards through those shaping
operations that allow the ME to succeed, or work laterally left to right etc. Ensure
the BAE, Event Overlay, Bde DSO, enemy COAs, Mission Analysis record, AMA
trace etc are available as these will impact on the location of NAIs and TAIs. At the
end of Question 4 the basic draft DSO is likely to look like this; with NAIs and DPs
linked to TAIs positioned on the ground to conform to the Comd’s Effects
Schematic.
Draft DSO - Preparation
TAI
DP
DEFEAT
TAI
DISRUPT NAI
BLOCK DP
FIND
DP
TAI
TURN
TAI
DP
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7 QUETIONS COMBAT ESTIMATE FORMAT – QUESTION 4
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CHAPTER 5
QUESTION 5 – WHAT RESOURCES DO I NEED TO
ACCOMPLISH EACH ACTION/EFFECT?
Question 5 aims at resourcing the NAIs and TAIs on the draft DSO using the Decision
Support Overlay Matrix (DSOM), i.e. troops to tasks. The combat power required to
achieve the desired effect must be identified. Consideration must be given to the
requirement for all elements of combat power, including direct fire, offensive support,
engineers, air defence and support operations (psychological and information
operations). Relative strengths (own and enemy) in each of the TAIs must be taken into
account, and the effect to be achieved. CSS implications must not be overlooked. Staff
must fully understand their TASKORG and its capabilities / limitations in relation to the
effects so as to resource the effects without the constraints of the TASKORG. All arms
activity including specialist input will be required. Staff also requires a checklist to track
troops who are committed. It is inevitably that you will require more troops than you
have, therefore this leads to the need for sequencing or shaping of different COAs. At
the end of Question 4 the basic draft DSO is likely to look like this; with NAIs and DPs
linked to TAIs positioned on the ground to conform with the Comd’s Effects Schematic.
Draft DSO
TAI
DP
DEFEAT
TAI
DISRUPT NAI
BLOCK DP
FIND
DP
TAI
TURN
TAI
DP
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COA allocating troops to task. It must be emphasized however, that it is imperative that
this stage of the planning is truly an all arms activity to ensure that the differing
methods, by arm or service, of achieving an effect are considered and the relevant
advice is available to the COS/2IC. In addition, each effect (NAI and TAI) must be fully
resourced according to the enemy threat and utilizing the full capabilities of the ORBAT.
This is likely to result in over committing the Bde/BG and will therefore lead to the need
to synchronize activity in Question 6.
It is also vital that the G2 is present at this stage to provide advice on the likely enemy
threat within specified effects boxes at varying stages in the battle. This will then enable
the COS/2IC to counter this threat with sufficient combat power.
The consideration of the type, size and strength of an enemy entering a NAI or TAI will
indicate the friendly force type and strength required to either identify (for NAIs) or
counter (for TAIs) that enemy in the effects box (Relative Strengths). Wargaming
techniques may be useful in helping to answer this question as comprehensively as
possible.
NAIs and TAIs must be resourced according to the effect required by the Comd set
against the likely enemy deployed against it. NAIs and TAIs should be fully resourced
to achieve the effect without undue consideration to the realities of the ORBAT. The
detail is then entered onto a DSOM or similar document that can be compared to the
ORBAT to highlight shortfalls. This will provide different COAs to brief the Comd and
the synchronisation of available resources to achieve the required effect is central to
answering Question 6. Again this must be an all arms consideration to ensure the
correct Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (CAOI).
Some of the NAIs will have already been partly resourced in Question 1, (possibly to get
Bde/BG recce deployed early), others will evolve following Question 3.
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Building a COA - Differing Means

of Achieving an Effect
Defeat by:
Armd sqn
Avn strike
Block by: DEFEAT

Inf coy dug in
Armd sqn
Obs belt DISRUPT FIND
BLOCK
DISRUPT
TURN
Building a COA - Stage 2

Differing Means of Achieving an Effect
Defeat by:
Defeat by: Armd BG
Armd BG CAS
Anti-Tank Pl Obs belt
Avn strike
Block by: DEFEAT

Inf BG dug in
Armd sqn DISRUPT FIND
Obs belt
BLOCK
Block by: DISRUPT
TURN
Inf BG dug in
Anti-Tank Pl
Obs belt
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Defeat by:
Draft DSO
Armd BG
Defeat by:
CAS
Armd BG
Anti-Tank Pl TAI Obs belt
DP
Avn strike
DEFEAT
TAI
Block by: DISRUPT NAI

Inf BG dug in
BLOCK DP
FIND
Armd sqn DP
Obs belt TAI

TURN
TAI
Block by:
Inf BG dug in
Anti-Tank Pl DP
Obs belt
This detail is then entered onto a Decision Support Overlay Matrix. ie allocating troops
to task in order to keep a record of what elements of the Bde/BG have been used.
NA : PIR NA : info for Remark : (Indicators,

L Purpose NAI/D : Collection answered which TAI/DP Special co-ordination,
S N T oc
E D Effect of Assets TA : Troops to TAI,D : Linked to etc.)
AI P AI ati NAI ,DP/ TA : Responsibility tasks which NAIs
o TAI?
Primary Secondary
Asset Asset
1. 101 ST Ident en Recce FOO PIR 1 – which TAI 201 VG

456789 chosen AA AA will the en DP 302 2 x T80
Rd Junc – what is use 1 x BRM 1K
en ME?
A Coy 12 x T80
2. 201 ST 3974 DEFEAT A Coy Gp OS NAI 101
1 x tp 14 x BMP
En MB DP 302
A/Tk sect
FOO
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GAFCSC DSO Matrix (DSOM)

SER NAI TAI DP Location What is the NAI/DP: Collection Assets NAI: CCIR answered NAI: info for which Remarks: (Indicators, Special co-
(6 Digit) purpose/effect of the TAI: Responsibility TAI: Task to troops TAI/DP ordination, etc.)
NAI,DP/TAI? TAI,DP: Linked to
which NAIs
Primary Secondary
Asset Asset
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Q5 – WHAT RESOURCES DP
DO I NEED TO TAI
ACCOMPLISH EACH
TAI
DP
NAI
EFFECT?
DP
TAI
DP
TAI
DSO MATRIX (Draft)
NAI : PIR NAI : info for Remarks: (Indicators,

Location
Purpose/ NAI/DP : Collection answered which TAI/DP Special co-ordination,

NAI
SER
TAI
Effect of the Assets TAI : Troops to TAI,DP : Linked to etc.)

DP
NAI ,DP/ TAI : Responsibility tasks which NAIs

TAI?
Primary Secondary
Asset Asset
1. 101 ST Ident en Recce FOO PIR 1 – which TAI 201 VG

456789 chosen AA AA will the en DP 302 2 x T80
– what is use 1 x BRM 1K
Rd Junc en ME?
A Coy 12 x T80
2. 201 ST 3974 DEFEAT A Coy Gp OS NAI 101
1 x tp 14 x BMP
En MB DP 302
A/Tk sect
FOO
COA BRIEF
COA briefs should include an outline sketch of the plan, so that the commander can
visualize what the staff are briefing – this can be done either on a sketch or directly onto
the map. The scheme of manoeuvre and troops to task should be included as well as
the ME and then the COAs compared for advantages and disadvantages. Examples of
single COA proforma and double COA proforma are shown below. There are 3 main
ways of varying the COAs and these are:
a. Changing of approaches or combining of approaches.
b. Changing of tps or resources allocated to each effect or some of the effects.
c. Variations in the manoeuvres within a specific approach or resourced effect.
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GAFCSC COA Development and Comd’s Decision Brief Proforma: COA
Concept of Ops
Intent
S of M Narrative
COAs should differ in scheme of manoeuvre, task organisation of subordinate units or use of reserve.
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Decision Brief Board

COA 1 COA 2
SOM SOM
ME ME
Advantages Disadvantages Score Criteria Score Advantages Disadvantages
TOTAL
Commanders will have their own criteria for assessing which is the best COA and they
should ensure their staff understand these. Differing criteria might be:
• Functions in Combat (these can be marked out of 10 or those areas deemed

critical by the commander given a heavier weighting)
• Principles of the Operation
• SWOT: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats.
• RTR: Risk , Time, Resources
• or a variety of criteria such as: Feasibility, Casualties, Media Impact, Local
Reactions, Acceptability, Non Lethal Effects etc..
• Commander’s Decision Brief Bullets for each COA:
• Scheme of manoeuvre/task org
• Advantages/Disadvantages
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• Key points
Decision Brief Board

COA 1 COA 2
A Sqn k
BG
k Hide R Noy Bloc
loc
RNCoy B
Res
TU , B C
K
CR2
OC
U
T ,B M/
fd
K
Tp
fd
FIND
ym C
M/
BL
FIND
/fd
n
O
Sq
Recce Tp
BL
A
Recce Tp
Co
½ Milan
½ Milan
C
DEFEAT Tp CR2
Tp CR2
Guns, A Sqn, AH Sqn DEFEAT
Armd Engr Tp(AVLBs) Guns, AH Sqn
SOM SOM
ME ME
Task Org Task Org
Advantages Disadvantages Score Criteria Score Advantages Disadvantages

3 Force 1
2 protection 2
1 Risk vs Security 2
2 Simplicity 1
3 Balance 1
2 Conc of force 2
1 Deception 2
3 Surprise 1
17 Speed 12
TOTAL
5-9
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CHAPTER 6
QUESTION 6 – WHEN AND WHERE DO THE ACTIONS
TAKE PLACE IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER?
Question 6 – ‘when and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?’
is meant to synchronize the mission, concept of operation and the operational
timeline for an effective defeat of the enemy. It provides a highly visible, clear
method for ensuring that the Comd and his staff address all operational systems
when they are refining their chosen COA. The matrix shows the relationship
between activities, units, support functions and key events. It also supports the
staff in adjusting activities based on the Comd’s concept of operation and the
enemy’s most likely COA.
In order to ensure that the most effective use is made of all assets at every stage
of an operation, it is necessary to think through the operation stage by stage by
wargaming and to check what part each element is playing in support of the critical
activity at each stage, assigning discrete responsibilities as appropriate. The
synchronization matrix and DSO will make clear what action each tactical group in
the brigade/BG is expected to be carrying out against the enemy in terms of time
and space. It is critical to the success of any action against the enemy to ensure
that the required combat power is integrated to achieve the desired effect upon the
enemy. It is also important to ensure that all elements of the command that are not
involved in the specific activity against the enemy are still acting in support of the
commander’s overall intent.
Once all the TAIs and NAIs have been considered, the time and space implications
need to be considered as they will affect the scheme of manoeuvre and the
synchronisation and coordination of the plan. Each COA should then be reviewed
against specific criteria (the functions in combat are recommended) to confirm its
feasibility and to identify its strengths and weaknesses. During this process, for
each COA the staff will need to:
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a. Review the tasks, their purpose and troops to task, recording the result on the
DSO matrix.
b. Develop the STAP in order that ISTAR assets are identified to cover NAIs, TAIs
and DPs. Then conduct a troops-to-task audit (and a risk assessment where
insufficient combat power is available).
b. Establish the task organisation for the operation.
PREPARATION OF SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX
A synchronisation matrix is prepared from DSO (shown below), COA Brief and
Operational Timeline. An example of a Synchronisation Matrix Template is shown
below. The matrix has two parts; the integration part which is the upper section
and the synchronisation part which is the lower section. The upper section involves
the integration of the mission with the concept of operation and schematic of the
adopted COA within a given space. The lower section involves the synchronisation
of the activities of the enemy and own forces within a given time and events.
DSO
TAI
DP
DEFEAT
TAI
DISRUPT NAI
BLOCK DP
FIND
DP
TAI
TURN
TAI
DP
6-2
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GAFCSC Synchronisation Matrix

ORIGINATOR
Msn
DTG
Concept of Ops
Timeline
Enemy
DPs
Recce
Manoeuvre
Fire Sp
Air Def
Engr
CSS
Comd
Remarks
6-3
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Below is a synchronisation matrix showing only the lower section. An enemy

activity is synchronise with that of friendly forces in order to defeat the enemy
within a given timeframe. In this example, the enemy is expected to attack. The
friendly forces will move to a fwd Assy Area, replenish and go into def battle to
defeat the enemy by disrupting, turning and blocking it into a given area for a final
defeat.
Synchronisation Matrix
211000 221000 220200 H-hr 231000
Timeline
Recce & Adv En Main
Earliest expect
Enemy En in AO
Gd East of Bodies in EA
FROME ANVIL
DPs 1 2 3
Recce FIND & TRACK
71 Prep DEFEAT DEFEAT Battle

Manoeuvre
72
D Prep TURN TURN Battle Rft DEFEAT Battle
73 $
D Prep DISRUPT DISRUPT Battle Move to BLOCK
74 $ Bde Reserve
MOVE to FAA
Regroup
REPLEN
Fire Sp AMA DISRUPT TURN DEFEAT

Air Def Cover Bde Res
Engr Prep TURN Obs C-Mob sp to BLOCK
CSS A1 in FAA
Comd
1 1. Cue OS & CAS into TURN battle

Remarks
2 1. Cue 71 BG for DEFEAT 2. Switch OS into DEFEAT battle 3. Move 73 BG to BLOCK posns
3 1. 72 BG to rft 71 BG 2. 74 BG as Bde res @ immediate NTM to rft 71 BG in EA ANVIL
Notice the difficulty in understanding a matrix without the integration section. At

best one can understand the time aspect but the space or area involved would not
be clear. Most important omission is the concept of operation which is detecting
the activities of own forces. The following examples further demonstrate the
various parts of a synchronisation matrix.
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EXAMPLES OF SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX

PINE BEECH
MSN: 7 ARMD BDE IS TO ATTACK TO BLOCK EN IN AREA OAK
ORIGINATOR: 7 ARMD BDE
HIGHWORTH AND DEFEAT EN BETWEEN PLS PINE TULIP
AND LAVENDER IN ORDER TO CONC EN EAST OF PL LAVENDER
X DTG: 221300ZOCT
PINE FOR DEFEAT BY 20 ARMD BDE TULIP (-)
73
HIGHWORTH
CONCEPT OF OPS:
Intent is to defeat leading en between II
(1,2)
PLs LLAVENDER AND PINE to force 1 BW W
II
the remaining en to conc E of PL (3,1) Div
7 X 20
PINE ME X
I
(-)
1 BW will estb block at HIGHWORTH I (2,1) 73
to fix en on N axis between PLs PINE (BDE RES) W
and LAVENDER. En on S axis SWINDON

allowed to over extend. Attack with ROSE ROSE
(3,1) in N and (2,2) BG in S into S
flank of respective axes to bring II
about their defeat concentrating en (2,2)
fol-on forces east of PL PINE for PINE
OAK BEECH
defeat by 20 Armd Bde. ME defeat X
of en between PLs LAVENDER and
20
PINE
ENEMY H-20 H-18 H-16 H-14 H-12 H-10 H-8 H-6 H-4 H-2 H H+2 H+4 H+6 H+8 H+10 H+12 H+14 H+16
VANGUARD X THAMES TAI 2/7 TAI 1/6
MAIN GUARD X THAMES TAI 2/7 TAI 1/6
FWD ELM MB X THAMES TAI 2/5/7
Potential DPs
1 BW (1,2) BG Mov Prep Block Posn to Min of Stage 1 Consolidate Block Fix Vanguard
Fix Fw d Elm Main Gd
Fix FSP(s)
BG 2 (3,2) Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr Mov to Def Mn Gd
NTM Attack Def MB N
Def BAG
NTM Attack S
RES BG (2,1) Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr Mov Block Centre

NTM or Mov Block N
or Mov Block S
OS (Sp by Recce Gp) Bde Rd Mov (Tac Gps) Deploy to STAP locs Dis Adv Gd Dis MB Fix Mn
Fix Adv Gd N Gd/MB N
Dis MB S
Engr Mov Obs Plan
Mob Sp to Attacks
AD Mov
Defend Blocking BG Defend FUPs/Initial Tac Movs

CSS - Log Sp Mov + estab BSG Pri to Dump Def/Engr Stores Replen Bde Prep stocks for exploitation Resup stocks on w heels
- Med Estab Med sect/DS fw d Blocking BG Attack BGs
- ES Restore CE of attacking BG Rec of attacking BG
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PINE BEECH
PINE BEECH MSN: 7 ARMD BDE IS TO ATTACK TO BLOCK EN IN AREA OAK
MSN: 7 ARMD BDE IS TO ATTACK TO BLOCK EN IN AREA OAK ORIGINATOR: 7 ARMD BDE
ORIGINATOR: 7 ARMD BDE HIGHWORTH AND DEFEAT EN BETWEEN PLS PINE TULIP
HIGHWORTH AND DEFEAT EN BETWEEN PLS PINE
AND LAVENDER IN ORDER TO CONC EN EAST OF PL
PINE FOR DEFEAT BY 20 ARMD BDE TULIP
LAVENDER
Confirmed Mission X
TULIP
(-)
73
DTG: 221300ZOCT
AND LAVENDER IN ORDER TO CONC EN EAST OF PL
PINE FOR DEFEAT BY 20 ARMD BDE TULIP
HIGHWORTH
LAVENDER
X
(-)
73
DTG: 221300ZOCT
HIGHWORTH CONCEPT OF OPS:

CONCEPT OF OPS:
Intent is to defeat leading en between
PLs LLAVENDER AND PINE to force 1 BW
II
W
(1,2)
II
from Intent is to defeat leading en between
PLs LLAVENDER AND PINE to force
the remaining en to conc E of PL
1 BW
II
W
(1,2)
II
(3,1) Div
the remaining en to conc E of PL (3,1) Div 7 X 20
Mission Analysis 7 X 20 PINE ME

PINE ME X
X (-)
(-) I
I 1 BW will estb block at HIGHWORTH I (2,1) 73
1 BW will estb block at HIGHWORTH I (2,1) 73 to fix en on N axis between PLs PINE (BDE RES) W
SWINDON
Q2
SWINDON and LAVENDER. En on S axis
and LAVENDER. En on S axis
allowed to over extend. Attack with
allowed to over extend. Attack with ROSE ROSE
ROSE ROSE (3,1) in N and (2,2) BG in S into S
flank of respective axes to bring II
flank of respective axes to bring II (2,2)
(2,2) about their defeat concentrating en
about their defeat concentrating en PINE
PINE fol-on forces east of PL PINE for OAK
fol-on forces east of PL PINE for OAK BEECH
BEECH defeat by 20 Armd Bde. ME defeat X
of en between PLs LAVENDER and 20
20 PINE
PINE
ENEMY
VANGUARD
H-20 H-18 H-16 H-14 H-12
Intent from Q2 (my
H-10 H-8 H-6 H-4 H-2 H H+2 H+4 H+6 H+8 H+10 H+12 H+14 H+16
X THAMES TAI 2/7 TAI 1/6
ENEMY
VANGUARD
H-20 H-18 H-16 H-14 H-12 H-10 H-8 H-6 H-4 H-2 H H+2 H+4 H+6 H+8 H+10 H+12 H+14 H+16
X THAMES TAI 2/7 TAI 1/6
MAIN GUARD X THAMES TAI 2/7 TAI 1/6 MAIN GUARD X THAMES TAI 2/7 TAI 1/6
FWD ELM MB
Potential DPs
part in the comd’s X THAMES TAI 2/5/7 FWD ELM MB
Potential DPs
X THAMES TAI 2/5/7
1 BW (1,2) BG Mov Prep Block Posn to Min of Stage 1 Consolidate Block Fix Vanguard 1 BW (1,2) BG Mov Prep Block Posn to Min of Stage 1 Consolidate Block Fix Vanguard
plan) Fix Fw d Elm Main Gd Fix Fw d Elm Main Gd

Fix FSP(s)
BG 2 (3,2) Scheme of manoeuvre from; Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr
Fix FSP(s)
Mov to Def Mn Gd
BG 2 (3,2)
Mission Analysis
Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr
NTM
Mov to Def Mn Gd
Attack Def MB N NTM Attack Def MB N
BG 3 (2,2) Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr

NTM
Def BAG
Mov to Def Mn Gd
Attack S
BG 3 (2,2) friendly MC trace Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr Mov to Def Mn Gd
NTM Attack
Def BAG
RES BG (2,1) Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr Mov

NTM or Mov
Block Centre
Block N
RES BG (2,1) Scheme of Manoeuvre
(approaches), threatfrom Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr Mov
NTM or Mov
Block Centre
Block N
OS (Sp by Recce Gp) Bde Rd Mov (Tac Gps) Deploy to STAP locs Dis Adv Gd
orMov Block S
Dis MB Fix Mn
OS (Sp by Recce Gp) adopted
integration COA required
(effects Q5 Bde Rd Mov (Tac Gps) Deploy to STAP locs Dis Adv Gd
or Mov Block S
Dis MB Fix Mn
Engr Mov Obs Plan

Dis MB S
Engr on the en) and Friendly Mov Obs Plan
Mob Sp to Attacks
Dis MB S
Mob Sp to Attacks
AD Mov AD Forces (resources required)

Mov
Defend Blocking BG Defend FUPs/Initial Tac Movs Defend Blocking BG Defend FUPs/Initial Tac Movs
CSS - Log Sp Mov + estab BSG Pri to Dump Def/Engr Stores Replen Bde Prep stocks for exploitation Resup stocks on w heels CSS - Log Sp Mov + estab BSG Pri to Dump Def/Engr Stores Replen Bde Prep stocks for exploitation Resup stocks on w heels
- Med Estab Med sect/DS fw d Blocking BG Attack BGs - Med Estab Med sect/DS fw d Blocking BG Attack BGs
- ES Restore CE of attacking BG Rec of attacking BG - ES Restore CE of attacking BG Rec of attacking BG
PINE BEECH PINE BEECH

MSN: 7 ARMD BDE IS TO ATTACK TO BLOCK EN IN AREA OAK MSN: 7 ARMD BDE IS TO ATTACK TO BLOCK EN IN AREA OAK
ORIGINATOR: 7 ARMD BDE ORIGINATOR: 7 ARMD BDE
HIGHWORTH AND DEFEAT EN BETWEEN PLS PINE TULIP HIGHWORTH AND DEFEAT EN BETWEEN PLS PINE TULIP
AND LAVENDER IN ORDER TO CONC EN EAST OF PL LAVENDER AND LAVENDER IN ORDER TO CONC EN EAST OF PL LAVENDER
X DTG: 221300ZOCT X DTG: 221300ZOCT
PINE FOR DEFEAT BY 20 ARMD BDE TULIP (-) PINE FOR DEFEAT BY 20 ARMD BDE TULIP (-)
73 73
HIGHWORTH HIGHWORTH
CONCEPT OF OPS: CONCEPT OF OPS:
Intent is to defeat leading en between II Intent is to defeat leading en between II
(1,2) (1,2)
II
II
the remaining en to conc E of PL (3,1) Div the remaining en to conc E of PL (3,1) Div
7 X 20 7 X 20
PINE ME PINE ME
X X
I
(-) I
(-)
1 BW will estb block at HIGHWORTH I (2,1) 73 1 BW will estb block at HIGHWORTH I (2,1) 73
and LAVENDER. En on S axis SWINDON and LAVENDER. En on S axis SWINDON

allowed to over extend. Attack with allowed to over extend. Attack with
ROSE ROSE ROSE ROSE
(3,1) in N and (2,2) BG in S into S (3,1) in N and (2,2) BG in S into S
flank of respective axes to bring II flank of respective axes to bring II
about their defeat concentrating en (2,2) about their defeat concentrating en (2,2)
fol-on forces east of PL PINE for PINE fol-on forces east of PL PINE for PINE
OAK BEECH OAK BEECH
defeat by 20 Armd Bde. ME defeat X defeat by 20 Armd Bde. ME defeat X
of en between PLs LAVENDER and of en between PLs LAVENDER and
20 20
PINE PINE
ENEMY H-20 H-18 H-16 H-14 H-12 H-10 H-8 H-6 H-4 H-2 H H+2 H+4 H+6 H+8 H+10 H+12 H+14 H+16 ENEMY H-20 H-18 H-16 H-14 H-12 H-10 H-8 H-6 H-4 H-2 H H+2 H+4 H+6 H+8 H+10 H+12 H+14 H+16
VANGUARD X THAMES TAI 2/7 TAI 1/6 VANGUARD X THAMES TAI 2/7 TAI 1/6
MAIN GUARD X THAMES TAI 2/7 TAI 1/6 MAIN GUARD X THAMES TAI 2/7 TAI 1/6
FWD ELM MB X THAMES TAI 2/5/7 FWD ELM MB X THAMES TAI 2/5/7
Potential DPs Potential DPs
1 BW (1,2) BG Mov Prep Block Posn to Min of Stage 1 Consolidate Block Fix Vanguard 1 BW (1,2) BG Mov Prep Block Posn to Min of Stage 1 Consolidate Block Fix Vanguard
Fix Fw d Elm Main Gd Fix Fwd Elm Main Gd
Fix FSP(s) Fix FSP(s)
BG 2 (3,2) Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr Mov to Def Mn Gd BG 2 (3,2) Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr Mov to Def Mn Gd
NTM Attack Def MB N NTM Attack Def MB N

NTM Attack
Def BAG
S
BG 3 (2,2) Task Organisation
Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr Mov to Def Mn Gd
NTM Attack
Def BAG
RES BG (2,1)
Enemy activity from
Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr Mov
NTM or Mov
Block Centre
Block N
RES BG (2,1) from Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr Mov
NTM or Mov
Block Centre
Block N
OS (Sp by Recce Gp)

Threat Integration Q1
Bde Rd Mov (Tac Gps) Deploy to STAP locs Dis Adv Gd
or Mov Block S
Dis MB Fix Mn
OS (Sp by Recce Gp) Tasks/Resources
Bde Rd Mov (Tac Gps) Deploy to STAP locs Dis Adv Gd
or Mov Block S
Dis MB Fix Mn
Engr Mov Obs Plan

Dis MB S
Mob Sp to Attacks
Engr Mov Q5 Obs Plan
Dis MB S
Mob Sp to Attacks
AD Mov AD Mov
Defend Blocking BG Defend FUPs/Initial Tac Movs Defend Blocking BG Defend FUPs/Initial Tac Movs
CSS - Log Sp Mov + estab BSG Pri to Dump Def/Engr Stores Replen Bde Prep stocks for exploitation Resup stocks on w heels CSS - Log Sp Mov + estab BSG Pri to Dump Def/Engr Stores Replen Bde Prep stocks for exploitation Resup stocks on w heels
- Med Estab Med sect/DS fw d Blocking BG Attack BGs - Med Estab Med sect/DS fwd Blocking BG Attack BGs
- ES Restore CE of attacking BG Rec of attacking BG - ES Restore CE of attacking BG Rec of attacking BG
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PINE BEECH
X DTG: 221300ZOCT
73
HIGHWORTH
CONCEPT OF OPS:
Activity (effect and

(1,2)
II
the remaining en to conc E of PL (3,1) Div
7 X 20
PINE ME X
timing) from op timeline

1 BW will estb block at HIGHWORTH
to fix en on N axis between PLs PINE
(BDE RES)
I
I
W
(2,1)
SWINDON
(-)
73
Q1 and resourcing of
flank of respective axes to bring
about their defeat concentrating en
ROSE
II
(2,2)
ROSE
PINE
fol-on forces east of PL PINE for
defeat by 20 Armd Bde. ME defeat
PINE
effects Q5 20
X
OAK BEECH
Potential DPs
Fix FSP(s)
NTM Attack Def MB N
Def BAG
NTM Attack S

NTM or Mov Block N
or Mov Block S
Dis MB S
Engr Mov Obs Plan
Mob Sp to Attacks
AD Mov

CSS - Log Sp Mov + estab BSG Pri to Dump Def/Engr Stores Replen Bde Prep stocks f or exploitation Resup stocks on w heels
- Med Estab Med sect/DS f w d Blocking BG Attack BGs
PINE BEECH
X DTG: 221300ZOCT
73
HIGHWORTH
CONCEPT OF OPS:
(1,2)
PLs LLAVENDER AND PINE to force
the remaining en to conc E of PL
PINE
Decision Points
1 BW W
II
(3,1)
7 X 20
Div
ME X
I
(-)
1 BW will estb block at HIGHWORTH
to fix en on N axis between PLs PINE
(DP) tied to
(BDE RES)
I
W
(2,1)
SWINDON
73
ROSE ROSE
flank of respective axes to bring
about their defeat concentrating en
fol-on forces east of PL PINE for
NAIs/TAIs of FF Q4 II
(2,2)
PINE
OAK BEECH
20
PINE
Potential DPs
Fix FSP(s)
NTM Attack Def MB N
Def BAG
NTM Attack S

NTM or Mov Block N
or Mov Block S
Dis MB S
Engr Mov Obs Plan
Mob Sp to Attacks
AD Mov
Defend Blocking BG Def end FUPs/Initial Tac Movs

CSS - Log Sp Mov + estab BSG Pri to Dump Def/Engr Stores Replen Bde Prep stocks f or exploitation Resup stocks on w heels
- Med Estab Med sect/DS fw d Blocking BG Attack BGs
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EXAMPLE 2- COA 1
PINE BEECH
MSN: BLOCK THE EN IN AREA HIGHWORTH OAK ORIGINATOR:
DEFEAT BETWEEN PL PINE AND LAVENDER TULIP HQ 7 ARMD BDE
TO CONC EN E OF PINE FOR DEFEAT BY 20 ARMD BDE LAVENDER
DTG:221300ZOCT
TULIP
HIGHWORTH
CONCEPT OF OPS:
II
Intent is to defeat leading en between (1,2)
1 BW W
PLs LLAVENDER AND PINE to force the II
remaining en to conc E of PL PINE (3,1)
7 X 20 Div
ME
1 BW will estb block at HIGHWORTH to II
(2,1)
fix en on N axis between PLs PINE and (BDE RES)
W
LAVENDER. En on S axis allowed to SWINDON

over extend. Attack with (3,1) in N and
ROSE ROSE
(2,2) BG in S into S flank of respective
axes to bring about their defeat II
concentrating en fol-on forces east of PL (2,2)
PINE for defeat by 20 Armd Bde. ME PINE
OAK BEECH
defeat of en between PLs LAVENDER X
and PINE 20

Potential DPs
BG Mov Prep Block Posn to Min of Stage 1 Consolidate Block Fix Vanguard
1 BW (1,2)
Fix Fwd Elm Main Gd
Fix FSP(s)
Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr NTM Mov to Attack Def Mn Gd N
BG 2 (3,1)
Def MB N
Def BAG
Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr NTM Mov to Attack Def Mn Gd S
BG 3 (2,2)
Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr NTM Mov Block Centre

RES BG (2,1)
or Mov Block N
or Mov Block S
Bde Rd Mov (Tac Gps) Deploy to STAP locs Dis Adv Gd Dis MB Fix Mn Gd/MB N
OS (Sp by Recce Gp)
Fix Adv Gd N
Dis MB S
Mov Obs Plan
Engr
Mob Sp to Attacks
Mov
AD

Mov + estab BSG
CSS - Log Sp Pri to Dump Def/Engr Stores Replen Bde Prep stocks for exploitation Resup stocks on wheels
1
- Med Estab Med sect/DS fwd Blocking BG
S Attack BGs
q
n
2
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EXAMPLE 3-COA 2
(-)X
73MS: BLOCK THE EN IN AREA HIGHWORTH
PINE BEECH
OAK ORIGINATOR:
DEFEAT BETWEEN PL PINE AND LAVENDER HQ 7 ARMD BDE
TULIP
TO CONC EN E OF PINE FOR DEFEAT BY 20 ARMD BDE LAVENDER
II DTG:221300ZOCT
TULIP (3,1)
CONCEPT OF OPS: HIGHWORTH

II
Intent is to defeat leading en between (1,2)
1 BW W
PLs LLAVENDER AND PINE to force the
remaining en to conc E of PL PINE 7 X 20 Div
ME
1 BW will estb block at HIGHWORTH to II
fix en on N axis between PLs PINE and (2,1) SWINDON
(BDE RES) W
LAVENDER. En on S axis allowed to
over extend. Attack with (3,1) in N and
ROSE ROSE
(2,2) BG in S into N and S flank of
respective axes to bring about their II
defeat concentrating en fol-on forces (2,2)
east of PL PINE for defeat by 20 Armd PINE
OAK BEECH
Bde. ME defeat of en between PLs X
LAVENDER and PINE 20

Potential DPs
BG Mov Prep Block Posn to Min of Stage 1 Consolidate Block Fix Vanguard
1 BW (1,2)
Fix Fwd Elm Main Gd
Fix FSP(s)
Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr NTM Mov to Attack Def Mn Gd N
BG 2 (3,2)
Def MB N
Def BAG
Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr NTM Mov to Attack Def Mn Gd S
BG 3 (2,2)
Bde Rd Mov In Hide I Hr NTM Mov Block Centre

RES BG (2,1)
or Mov Block N
or Mov Block S
Bde Rd Mov (Tac Gps) Deploy to STAP locs Dis Adv Gd Dis MB Fix Mn Gd/MB N
OS (Sp by Recce Gp)
Fix Adv Gd N
Dis MB S
Mov Obs Plan
Engr
Mob Sp to Attacks
Mov
AD

Mov + estab BSG
CSS - Log Sp Pri to Dump Def/Engr Stores Replen Bde Prep stocks for exploitation Resup stocks on wheels
1
- Med Estab Med sect/DS fwd Blocking BG Attack BGs
S
q
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EXAMPLE 4
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EXAMPLE 5
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CHAPTER 7
QUESTION 7 – WHAT CONTROL MEASURES DO I NEED TO
IMPOSE?
Question 7 – what control measures do I need to impose? Determine the control

measures that need to be imposed such as boundaries, objectives, report lines,
assembly and engagement areas, limits of exploitation, timings, fire support co-
ordination measures, OPSEC for surprise and security, COMSEC and EMCON
measures. This chapter establishes a standard system for the use of graphic
control measures. It applies to both automated and hand-drawn graphic displays
and overlays. The control measures portrayed are for use on situation maps,
overlays, and annotated aerial photographs. They are also the standard for all
simulations, to include those used in live, virtual, and constructive environments.
Overlays are graphics drawn on top of a map, sketch, or photograph. To ensure

accurate alignment, the overlay must have at least two reference marks at
opposite locations. On automated displays, overlays are graphical information that
is joined electronic ally so that it can be “turned on or off” over or in front of the
primary digital display, such as a map, sketch, or photograph. All obstacles,
friendly, enemy, neutral, or factional, will be drawn using the color green. These
graphics are shown in the mobility and survivability section. All friendly graphic
control measures will be shown in black when drawn manually or on a color
display. Enemy graphic control measures will be shown in red. If red is not
available, they will be drawn in black with a double line or the abbreviation “ENY”
placed on the graphic in at least two places to avoid confusion. If other colors are
used to show friendly or enemy (hostile) factions, then the colors used will be
shown in a legend on the overlay describing what each color means.
This section describes how to label various graphic control measures. Some
boundary labeling can be abbreviated when the abbreviation will not cause
confusion. All text labeling should be drawn so that it can be read when the bottom
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of the overlay is closest to the reader. Labeling written on an angle should be

readable when the overlay is turned a quarter of a turn (90 degrees) clockwise (to
the left).
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CHAPTER 8
NOTES ON TACTICAL DEDUCTIONS FOR COMBAT ESTIMATES WITH

EXAMPLES
In Combat Estimate, time is short and effort must not be wasted on deductions that will not be of much benefit to the operation.
Deductions must result following an examination of the factors. Deductions are not simply restatements of principles and fundamentals.
They must lead to decisions and concrete actions. In other words, deductions lead to decisions that will appear in the plan. They will
influence the grouping, tasks, fire plan, etc. The following are common deductions in Combat Estimate.
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ADMIN DEDUCTIONS
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EXAMPLES OF COMBAT ESTIMATES
COMBAT ESTIMATE FOR 22 MECH BDE-DEFENCE
MISSION: 22 Mech Bde is to:
a. Hold right fwd of Div AO within bdrys.
b. Conduct rearward passage of lines for wdr of Corps Covering Force.
c. Block to defeat AGG leading bdes in EA PANJI.
d. Take part in Div counter attack ops on MOFIAMO.
e. Provide In- Place force on order.
In order to sp 3 Allied Div C/attk to destroy AGG 2nd ech Div.

Posn
Prelim occupied
Time Now 1/3 My time 2/3 Subords time moves and Obj Secure
52 hrs 11min 104 hrs 22min final prep (if given)
19 hrs 20min
1000 hrs 1100 hrs 1800 hrs

M-10 M-8 2233 hrs M-3
M-4
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The time now is 1000 hrs M-10 where M is 11 Mar 08. I have worked out that movement would take 19hrs 20min which means that I must be ready
to move not later than(NLT) 2233hrs M-4. Therefore the time available for battle procedure is 156 hrs 33 min. I can use 1/3 of that time (52hrs 11min)
to conduct my estimate and give orders, leave 2/3 (104 hrs 22 min).
INITIAL WNG O. See Wng O of 011230Z FEB 08.
Sit
Probable Msn.
Own ME
Timings.
O Gp RV & Time .
CSS.
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(Effect / Task / Constraints /
Clarification Up)
Q1. What is the en doing & why?
(Feeds SITUATION ENEMY FORCES Paragraph of Orders- includes key deductions. Tasks/ effects identified contribute to intent schematic and
CONCEPT OF OPS)
1. How does the ground affect en ops?
a. Observation, cover and concealment.
(1) Low lying terrain with coastal savannah 1. Affords good obsn and good fields of fire. 1. 3 x Bn and EW.
vegetation. 2. Need for OPSEC measures to conceal MDA. 2. 3 x Bn.
(2) Terrain marshy with numerous water 3. Direct fire wpns very effective hence need to depl
bodies to the south. them far fwd.
4. Areas good going for both armr and inf.
5. Marshy areas in the South might restrict Armr 3. 1 x Inf Bn
manoeuvre. Need to hold South of area with light inf.
b. Obstacles
(1) River VOLTA main water obs, flows 6. Def to be based on River VOLTA. Need to depl on 4. 3 x Bn.
across Bde frontage from NW-SE with br at home bank.
SOGAKOPE and potential crossing sites at 7. Need to rft River VOLTA and other water obs with 5. 1 x Engr Regt
TODZIKPOTA and AGOTAGA. mines.
8 . Need to secure Xing sites for future ops across 6. Staff planning – G2, G3 and Engr.
(2) River TODZI flows N-S into AVU River.
LAGOON. Marshy areas at DABALA and
ADUTOR. Other water obs are lakes
AMOVIE and ANOR with SONGOR,
AGLOR, DOSI, KADZA, TRUKU, AKA
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and AGBON Lagoons.
c. Routes / Axes.
(1) Comm routes are first class rd 9. First class road and minor roads afford fast appr for 7 . 1 x Engr Regt
ACCRA- DAWA, KASE, Rd AGBOSOME – adv en armr. Need for C/mob and depl of anti tank
SOGAKOPE - KASE . Other minor rds and assets fwd to slow en.
tracks. 10. . Need to ident likely en routes for C mob tasks. 8. 1 X Armd Recce Sqn.
11. Need to delay en adv with covering force and anti- 9. 1 X Armd Recce Sqn.
tanks.
10. 1 x Engr Regt
12. Need to secure rds in sector as MSR.
13. Need to improve tracks and minor rds for own

mob,c/attk and strike routes.
d. Settlements. Major settlements are

SEGE, KASE, BIG ADA, DABALA, 16. Numerous settlements likely to impede Bde ops. 12. 3 x Bn.
AKATSI, TSIAME and ANYARKO. Need to evac and control displaced locals on depl.
79. Facilities in settlement to be utilized to SP CSS 13. DCOS.
plan.
17. Need to minimize collateral damage.
18. Need to reassure locals. 14. G2.
e. Key Terrain. Rd AGBOSOME – 19. Need to depl to cover part of rd within bdry. 15. 3 x Bn.
SOGAKOPE – KASE key terrain.
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h. Avenues of Approach
(a) AA1. ABOR 9596- 20. First class road and minor roads afford fast appr 16. 1 x Bde Recce Sqn,
AVENORFEME 9190 – for adv en armr. Need for C/mob and depl of anti tank
DABALA 7487 –TODZIPOTA- KASE assets fwd to slow en. 17. 1 x Engr Regt
5777. Distance about 40km and width 21. Width can take AGG adv Bde 18. 3 x Bn, 1x Bde Recce Sqn.
about 5km. Good going up from ABOR 22. Need to depl in str to contain en force.
to AVENORFEME. Major obs AVU 23. En has to cross river obs into sector. AGG likely to 19. 1 x Engr Regt and Arty
LAGOON and River VOLTA, likely be vulnerable after Xing. Need to draw en to cross at
xing site on River VOLTA at TODZIPOTA to enter EA PANJI.
TODZIPOTA. Comprises 2 x Bn size 24. River ANGOR likely to restrict en mov South after
MCs. Xing River VOLTA thereby confining en to the North. 20. Staff planning – G2, G3 and Engr.
Need to select EAs to the North of home bank
(b) AA2. ANLOGA- SROGBOE – 21. 1 x Bde Recce Sqn.

AGORTOE- AGOTAGA- KASE. 25. First class road and minor roads afford fast appr
Distance about 42km and width about for adv en armr .
5km. Good going along main rds. 26. AGG required to cross River VOLTA to reach Bde 22. 3 x Bn,1 x Engr Sqn
Approach dominated by marshy areas sector. AGG likely to be vulnerable after Xing.
and lagoons. Major crossing site at 27. Width can take AGG adv Bde
AGOTAGA. Comprises of 3 x Bn size 28. Need to depl in str to contain en force.
MCS. 29. En has to cross river obs into sector. Need to
prevent en from cross at AGOTAGA in order to turn 23. Staff planning – G2, G3 and Engr.
him to EA PANJI.
30. Need to canalize en into EAs 24. 1 x Engr Sqn.
31. Rft obs with mines for effective turning effect.
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Weather Analysis 25. 1 x Bde Recce Sqn.

Normal dry season but occasional rain during 32. Need to empl Bde Recce assets to observe
the time of year. Reduced visibility close to crossing sites effectively.
water bodies from 0600 hrs to 0800 hrs daily.
2. What are the en capabilities?
a. Tactical Doctrine
(1) AGG adv usually on fast approach 33. Need to isolate adv gd fm main forces by deep ops. 26. Bde Recce Assets.
routes based on echs. Use fast appr routes
and do not hold grd on adv. 35. Need for obs. May have to crater rds and prep brs 27. Staff planning – G2, G3 and Engr.
(2) Bdes will normally depl on 2 axes for prelim dml.
(main and secondary) with recce, adv
Gd 15km ahead of main gd. 36. Must delay and disrupt enemy adv
(3) AGG Bde takes 6-9hrs using organic
Engr eqpts in Xing 100m wide rivers at 3 Xing
sites. 28. Task. G3 plan to incl en C2.
(5) Comd Profile 37. AGG Comds’ bearing likely to influence posture
(a) AGG Army Comd. AGG of en. AGG Comds’ likely to be CoG. Need to conduct
Comd is Gen MAURICE OLAFFUBO, special ops to loc and destroy AGG C2
53yrs old ,a veteran of AGG civil war of
1964-67.He is a dictatorial and ruthless 38. AGG Army Comd has a reputation to maint for his
man.His plan for the invasion of Ghana efficient invasion of Ghana and therefore not likely to
was successful and he owes his posn wdr. Inflexible. Unlikely to change his plan.
primarily to his record of efficient
achievement.
.
(b) Comd 1 AGG Corps. Col Gen 39. The character of comd 1 AGG Corps likely to
KANSARA OUDRAGO, 52 yrs old, a prevail on AGG forces to maint the momentum of the
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descendent of a famous warlike tribe. attack and also high morale.

He is an efficient, thorough Comd , but
inclines to be reckless, stubborn and
ruthless. Often moved to comd units 40. Need to generate high tempo of activities.
that need to be rebuilt for morale and Aggressive def essential.
battle honours
b. Aims/Intention and Dispositions.
(1) Intention. AGG Corps sp by , Air Force 41. Need to block en on the main Axis Rd 29. 3 x Bn 2 fwd one in depth.
and Maritime Components likely to attk across AGBOSOME- SOGAKOPE- KASE within bdry by
River VOLTA and conduct offensive ops to depl Bns astride with mob res for C Attk and C pen. 30. 1 x Mech Bn as mob res.
seize TEMA and ACCRA. Intention is to clear
AGBOSOME -AKATSI-KASE highway, seize 42. Need to depl on the home bank and max use of
the br on the River VOLTA at SOGAKOPE major obs.
using heliborne tps and also secure br heads 31. 2x Engr Sqn.
with a Mech Div with the fol objectives:
43. Focus on coord obs plan to deny enemy access on
(2) Immediate Objectives. To seize TEMA all MCs.
and ACCRA using 2nd ech Div.
(3) Subsequent Objectives. Include the OSU

CASTLE, GBC BURMA CAMP, KOTOKA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT and
AJANKOTE Transmission Station.
44. Need for deep ops to disrupt and disloc enemy 32. Air.
(4) Disposn. 1 AGG Corps is currently at plans.
AGBOSOME GR 9814. En leading 1st ech Div
is expected within 2 Div AO very shortly.
(5)Likely COA AGG 1st ech Div is likely

to adv on a main axis, route AGBOSOME-
AKATSI-SOGAKOPE- KASE Highway. Seize
River VOLTA and secure brhd to enable 2nd
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ech force conduct forward passage of lines and

continue adv to seize TEMA.
c. Str and Org. 1 AGG Corps is

organized into 256 and 257 Divs. Each Div is
composed of 3 Bn. En likely to adv on 2 axes
on a narrow front with an armd bde leading.
The main body will be on the main axis while
the rest will be on the secondary axis. Gap
between the 1st and 2nd ech divs likely to be 20-
30Kms.
d. Eqpt. 32. 3 x Bn.

45. OPSEC to incl concealment and dispersal in MDA
(1). Land Assets. 1 AGG Corps units are 46. Ident and cover likely hel LS/DZ with fire. 33. 2 x Bn, Dml Gd
90% CE in tks, guns and vehs. AGG Arty Egpt 47. Need for sy of rear area and MSRs. 34. 1 x Armd Recce Regt
include: 48. Need to cover all main rds with fire. 35. 1 x AD Regt.
49. En likely to adv along rd SOGAKOPE-AKATSI.
(a). 175mm (SP) guns. 50. EAs to be square to rd SOGAKOPE-AKATSI.
51. AGG ME likely to be on main axis rd 36. 3 x Bn and OSG
(b). Bty Fd surv radars with range up SOGAKOPE-AKATSI.
to 40km. 52. SOGAKOPE Br vital to AGG adv on main axis
need to physically hold it. 37. 2 X Mech Bn to block
(c). Bdes will be rft by extra medium
arty and MBRLs from Corps and strategic 38. 1 x CT
Gp. Armd Eqpt include: 53. AGG likely to conduct Xing ops on dml of br. 39. 1x Engr Regt
Need counter en mobility. 40. OS, Arty, Avn,
(i) Lt Panhard 41. Air to ident & destroy en br
assets.
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(ii) EBR Panhard. 54. En likely to task org armr with bdes to form a
coherent all arms group. Need for balance grouping of 42. G3 Staff to plan.
(iii) M113 HOT. own forces to neutralise threat. 43. Arty to provide AD at BRIGHT
STAR.
55. En has numerical superiority. Need for early
attention to write down the en before he gets to MDA.
Deep ops required
56. Anti armr plan vital to def of River VOLTA.
57. En capable of para drop. Need to be prep for anti

descent ops.
58. En Superior in Fire Power.

However, nature of grd will force armr to conc which
will be exploited by coord anti-armr & indirect fire.
(2) Air assets. 1 AGG Corps units are is sp 59. River VOLTA to be rft with artificial obs to delay
by the fol air assets: the en & conc him for destruction.
i. One sqn of 12 x Badger Bombers. Loc at 60. Mixed Mine fd to be use to separate inf from tks.
MANSE.
61. En capable of air superiorly at initial stages. Need
ii. One sqn of 12 Mig 23R (Recce). Loc at for concealment. Def prep to be at ni. AD a pri.
JATONG.
iii. One Sqn 12 Mig 21 FGA.
iv. One Sqn 6 x Puma Hel.
v. One Sqn 6 x BO-105 Hel. “
vi. One Sqn 6 x C-130. Loc at

MANSE
(3). Maritime assets. 1 AGG Corps units are
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sp by the fol maritime assets: 62. Need to protect our sea-shore to prevent any
amphibious ops by AGG.
i. 1 x SKORY Class Destroyer (DD).
ii. 1 X A/S Frigate- RIGA (FF).
iii. 5 x OSA II SSM (FPB).
iv. 2 x KOMAR Class SSM (FPB).
v. 2 x ‘F’ Class S/M.
vi. 1 x CHILIKIN Class Fleet Rep Ship

(A)R.
vii. 1 x MAYAK Class (AGI).
viii. 2 x VANYAK Class MCMV.
ix. 3 x Landing Craft Utility- MP2.
i. Strengths. Manoeuvre Units likely to be rft

by addl corps level assets. Has initial air
superiority. 63. Deep ops to interdict enemy and prevent rft.
64. Need for AD to counter air threat. 44. Arty /Air
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j. Weaknesses. En attk grd of own 45. Bn /Engrs.

choosing and therefore has limited options in 65. Def Prep to be at ni.
own AOR. FFB ops currently fixing AGG. 66. Need for concealment of posn. OPSEC essential. 46. Bn /Staff.
67. Need to Coord all def fire to fix the enemy and 47. AD
defeat him within EA.
68. Need for continued sp for the FFB to 48. Arty/Staff.
enhance their ops.
49. Arty /Air.
What are the enemy’s intentions in my area?
Most Likely COA. COA 2. Adv on Rd

AGBOSOME-SOGAKOPE-,KASE. 50. 2 x Bn astride axis and one in
(1) Likelihood. Most likely. 69. Need to block this axis by physical depl of tps. depth.
(2) Effect. May achieve aim if br is captured 70. Need for obs plan to impede enemy mov. Mines,
intact. Added morale to the en. wire, caterings to be considered. 51. Engr.
Most Dangerous COA COA 1. Uses of

Coastal Rd through ADAFOAH, BEDEKU to 52. RISTA, 1 x Bn.
out flank Div towards TEMA. 71. Need to depl tps to cover flank
(i) Likelihood. Less Likely. and maint surv 53. Staff to consider this option.
(ii) Effect. Xing difficult and 72. To be able to cover this appr, I may have to depl
may lead to cas. 3 Bn fwd. 54. Engrs.
73. Need to constr obs to cover this axis.
Q2. What have I been told to do and why?

Feeds situation, FRIENDLY FORCES (2UP, 1UP) and MISSION Paragraphs of Orders. Also, tasks/effects identified contribute to Comd’s Effects
Schematic (Q 3) and the CONOPS para in Orders.
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1. What is my superior Comds intent and my role in

his plan.
a. Corps Comd. Intents to block the AGG adv 74. Need to effectively destroy AGG forces
along line of the River VOLTA (MOFIAMO). Once within sector.
AGG Land and Air forces are committed and fixed 75. Need to ident AGG likely AAs / MCS.
along our def on MOFIAMO, he will use Corps strike 76. Ident AGG likely Xing sites. 55. 3 x Bn, DSG
force and conduct link-up ops with Freedom Fighters 77. Need to block AGG forces in sector
Bde (FFB) in order to eject AGG forces and restore the within bdrys. 56. RISTA assets depl fwd.
territorial integrity of GHANA. His Main Effort 78. Need to depl to hold sector B in Str.
initially is the block and defeat of AGG on MOFIAMO 79. Need to force early committal of AGG 57. Engr, RISTA assets
and lies with 2 Mech Div. Thereafter, switching to Land and Air forces. 58. 2 x Mech Bn .
offensive ops East of River VOLTA and lies with 3 80. Need to loc AGG adv elms and time en
Allied Div. expected at MDA, incl str and designation of 59. 2 x Mech Bn and 1 x Armd Bn.
AGG in Div sector. 60. OSG and Covering Force..
81. OSG and Air for deep ops. 61. RISTA Assets and G2.
b. Div Comd.
62. Arty for deep ops.
(1) Intent. Destroy leading bdes of AGG 1st OP 63. Bid for air sp.
Ech within bdrys and thereafter secure brhead East of
MOFIAMO to facilitate 3 Corps offensive ops on 2nd
Op Ech.
(2) Scheme of Manoeuvre.
(a) Deep. To use OSG and allocated air resources

to cause max attrition to write down AGG forces
before reaching MOFIAMO.
(b) Close. 3 phase ops.

82. Detail Div Covering Force. 64. 1x Armd Recce Sqn..
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i. Phase 1. 2 Div Covering Force to take over 83. Depl in MDA in str. 65. 3 x Bn.
battle from 3 Armd Bde at BOMBAY SAPPHIRE East 84. Detail to sy xing sites. 66. 1x CT
of MOFIAMO with MDA on home bank of River 85. Auth for dml of BRIGHT STAR. 67. Clarify from Corps HQ – COS.
VOLTA. 22 Mech Bde as right fwd, 21 Mech Bde as 86. Need to create Div EAs.. 68. Planning – G3.
left fwd with 2 Armd Bde in depth as mob res. 87. Canalise en into EAs. 69. Planning G3/ Obs plan – Engrs.
88. Need for liaison. 70. LO’s
ii. Phase 2. 22 Mech Bde to block to defeat 89. Delay ops to wear down AGG forces 71. OS – Arty, Avn, CAS (bid for air
leading Bde in EA PANJI. 21 Mech Bde to hold before MOFIAMO. resources).
BLACK BUSH then block to defeat leading bde in EA
ANVIL while 32 Armd Recce Regt protects Div right
flank, with 2 Armd Bde in res.
iii. Phase 3. Use 2 Armd Bde to estb brhd up to

Easting 80 with 22 Mech Bde providing In–Place Force
for 3 Allied Div to C attk to destroy AGG 2nd ech Div.
(c) Rear. Div tps to sustain the Div and to

preserve its freedom of manoeuvre.
(3) ME. In fol phases:

(a) Phase 1. Drawing of en into EAs.
(b) Phase 2. Destruction of AGG 1st ech leading
bdes.
(c) Phase 3. Estb of brhd up to Easting 80.
c. My Role
Block to defeat AGG on MOFIAMO within bdry.
2. What are my specified and implied tasks?
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1. Specified Tasks.
a. Deploy to defeat en within bdrys. 72. 3 x Bn.

73. LO’s
b. Block to defeat AGG Forces within bdrys on 90. Depl in MDA in str 74. COS
MOFIAMO. 91. Need liaison.
92. Need to clarify plan and timings of wdr 75. Engrs and Arty.
c. Destroy leading Bdes of AGG 1st ech Div on covering force.
MOFIAMO within bdrys, affecting 40% AGG cas. 93. Need for obs plan to canalise en into EAs 76. Staff planning – G2, G3 and Engr.
using OS. 77. Dml – Engr.
d. Estb brhead up to Easting 80 and facilitate 94. Need to ident Div EAs. 78. 1 x CT.
passage of 3 Allied Div. 95. Need to prep BRIGHT STAR for dml. 79. 2 x Mech Bn.
96. Depl Dml Gd. 80. Armd Bn.
97. Fix AGG in EAs. 81. Staff planning – G2/ G3
98. Strike AGG in EAs.
99. Need to cross River VOLTA. 82. 2 x Mech Bn.
100. Occupying brhead in force. 83. Clarify - COS.
101. Need to clarify my role.
2. Implied Tasks.
(a) Covering Force. 102. Require 1x Armd Recce. 84. 1x Armd Recce.
(b) Defeat of en in MOFIAMO within bdrys 103. Likely ME.
(c) Conduct rearward and fwd passage of lines for 3 85. Div/Bde LOs
Armd Bde and 3 Allied Div respectively. . 104. Need to liaise with 3 Armd Bde and 3
(d) Recce C/Attk routes. Allied Div.
(e) Liaison with 3 Armd Bde and 3 Allied Div.
(g) Liaise with 3 Allied Div for C/Attk.
(h) conduct rearward passage of lines for wdr of Corps
(i) Covering Force 105. Require l x Bn for C/attack and 86. 1 x Armd Bn.
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(j) defeat airborne landings within your AO. Ident and prep C /attack routes 87. Engrs Regt.
106. Need to secure C/attck routes 88. 1 x Armed Recce.
(k) Take over battle from Bde Recce.
107. Need to clarify plan and timings for fwd 89. Clarify - COS.
(l) Allow ltd en pen passage of lines.
(m) Block to fix en tac ech
(n) Secure Eastern bank
(o) Conduct fwd passage of lines
(p) river xing ops
(q) Hold Right fwd of Bde AO within bdrys
(r) Hold left fwd of Bde AO within bdrys
(s) Hold rear of Bde AO within bdrys
(t) Create a hard shoulder and defeat en xing
attempts in your AO.
(u) Secure LD for Bde Mob Res
(v) Strike to defeat en tac echs.
(w) Estb brhd up to PL BOMBAY SAPPHIRE
C/Attk tasks.
(x) defeat airborne landings within OA.
(y) Provide Bde screen
(z) Disruption and turning effect on en east of
MOFIAMO.
(aa) Attrition on AGG leading elms
(bb) C-mob tasks against adv en.
(cc) Obs belt On MOFIAMO to canalize en

(dd) Fortification of MDA
(ee) Mob and survivability tasks to sp BGs.
(ff) Obs and mines to reinforce block effect
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(gg) Improve C/attack routes.

3. What Constraints are imposed on me?
a. Timings. 108. Issue initial Wng O – 0112300Z Mar . 90. G2 and Engr.
(c) NMB 071800 Mar except recce parties. 112. Review plan with Div Comd 040900Z Mar 91. Staff coord by COS.
113. Orders complete by – 030500Z Mar . 92. COS.
(d) Bde Screens in posn by 101700 Mar.
114. Issue Div orders – 030600Z Mar . 93. Comd.
(e) BGs deploy into posn by 101800 Mar. 115. Bde’s Issue cfm orders – 050900Z Mar
116. NMB 071800 Mar except recce parties. 94. COS, Staff.
(f) Bde obs plan completed by 110600 Mar.
117. Bde Screens in posn by 101700 Mar . 95. Comd/COS.
(g) MDA to be completed by 110600 Mar. 96. Bde Comd’s.
118. BGs deploy into posn by 101800 Mar.
(h) En not expected before 110600 Mar.
119. Bde obs plan completed by 110600 Mar.

97. COS/LO’s.
120. MDA to be completed by 110600 Mar. 98. 2x Mech Bn ,1x Armd Bn.
99. Blocking – 2 x Mech Bn.
121. En not expected before 110600 Mar.
100. Strike – 1 x Armd Bn.
. 101. Flank Protection – 1 x Armd
122. Need to clarify fol: Recce Regt.
a. Level of collateral damage. 102. Staff checks – G2, G3, G4, Engr.
b. Plan for estb of IDPs camps/evac. COS to coord.
103. COS to clarify.
b. Space.
(1) Frontage of 16 km to be covered.
(2) Real estate does not afford
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required depth for bde.

(3) Manoeuvrability constrained by River V0LTA.
c. Resources. Adequate resources aval.
d. Civil Pop. Settlements are constraints to div ops.
4. Has the situation changed?
a. Situation not changed.

b. Msn still valid.
5. Clarification Required.
a. AGG likely AAs/.MCs.
b. Str and designation if AGG in Div
Sector.
c. Likely AGG Xing sites.
d. AGG Xing eqpts.
e. Time AGG expected at MOFIAMO
f. AGG likely COA.
g. Loc of AMA to prosecute deep
and close ops.
h. Div key terrain and ground of tac
Importance.
i. Loc of Div EA.
j. Obs plan.
k. Loc of HQs and DSA
l. CSS requirement to Sp ops.
m. Likely en COA on contact at MOFIAMO.
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n. Type of threat to br at SOGAKOPE.
o. Options for 3 Div C attk through my def posn.

s. Protection of the sea-shore on my left flank.
DIRECTION
Q3. What effects do I want to have on the
en & what direction must I give to develop a SEE GAFCSC EFFECTS SCEMATIC SHEET
plan? ( Feeds CONOPS para in orders and is used with Qs 5
and 6 to complete Subordinate Unit Msn Statements)
Use functions in Combat or principles of the
operation of war.
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ISSUE WARNING ORDER

Sit
Probable Msn.
Own ME
Timings.
O Gp RV & Time .
CSS.

accomplish each action/ SEE GRAPHICALLY AS A DRAFT DSO
effect?
( Feeds SoM COORD
INSTR para in orders)

required to accomplish UNTIL HAVE SELECTED A COA CONSIDER EITHER:
each action/ effect?
a. FILL IN RESOURCES TO EFFECTS ON THE DRAFT DSO- different
Allocates resources to colours
Effects, to form mission b. FILL IN RESOURCE VARIATIONS DIRECTLY ONTO COA
statements DELOPMENT SHEETS FOR COMD’S DECISION BRIEF.
c. FILL IN A DSOM FOR EACH COA- SEE GAFCSC DSOM
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PROFORMA
Comd’s COA and Decision Brief- FILL IN GAFCSC COA DEVELOPMENT AND COMD’S DECISION BRIEF PROFORMA FOR EACH
COA
Q6. When & where do the actions/effects take place in relation to each other?
Create effects sync matrix – TIMELINE based on the effects/co-ord ident in Q5. Ensure subordinates are not allocated more than one effect at the
same time .
FILL IN GAFCSC SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX
Q7. What control Timings

measures do I need to Locations
impose?
FSCM-
( Feeds COORDINATING Anti-fratricide measures
INSTRUCTIONS para in FSCL
Orders ) NFL
NFA
RFL
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Bdrys,
Report Lines
LOE
LDs
Nicknames
Codewords
MSRs
NAIs
TAIs
AMAs
ARA
Handover lines
Break Clean Lines
No pen Line( NPL)
FPL
RPL
Contact and Coord pts
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Mission
22 Mech Inf Bde is to:
a. Hold right fwd of Div AO within bdrys.
b. Block to defeat AGG leading Bdes in EA PANJI.
c. Estb a brhd east of MOFIAMO.
All in order to facilitate the destruction of AGG 1st ech leading bdes and to sp 3 Allied Divs C-Attk to destroy AGG 2nd ech Div.
Concept of Ops.
1. Intent
To defeat AGG leading Bdes in EA PANJI and thereafter estb a brhd east of MOFIAMO to sp 3 Allied Div C/Attk to destroy AGG 2nd
ech Div..
2. Scheme of Manoeuvre
Three Phase Operation within the close battle framework.
(a) Phase 1. Depl bde right fwd in div AO. 221 BG Left fwd, 222 BG Right fwd, 223 BG Depth. Use Offensive Sp Gp and
obs to disrupt en east of MOFIAMO forcing him to cross at xing site SUGAR BOY.
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(b) Phase 2. Recce to draw en leading elms into EA PANJI, 221 BG fix en on NPL JAPPO for subsequent strike by 222 BG
and bde mob resa to defeat AGG leading echs sp by arty and engrs.
(c) Phase 3. Estb brhd east of MOFIAMO and conduct fwd passage of lines for 2 Armed Bde and 3 Allied Div to C/Attk to destroy
nd
AGG 2 ech div.
(3) ME. In fol phases:
(a) Phase 1. To block en east of MOFIAMO.
(b) Phase 2. Defeat of AGG leading Ech in EA PANJI.
(c) Phase 3. Estb of brhd up to Easting 80.

b. Missions and Tasks.
(1) 221 BG.
(a) Phase 1.
i. Hold left fwd of Bde AO within bdrys.
ii. Be prep to conduct rearward passage of lines for wdr of Corps Covering Force.
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iii. Be prep to defeat airborne landings within ur AO.
(b) Phase 2.
i. Take over battle from Bde Recce on codeword DAKE.
ii. Allow ltd en pen not beyond NPL JAPPO.
iii. Block to fix en tac ech in EA PANJI for subsequent strike by 222 BG and Bde Mob res.
(c) Phase 3.
i. Secure Eastern bank of BLACK BUSH up to PL HARD NUT (Easting 71).
ii. Conduct fwd passage of lines for 222 and 223 BGs to expand brhd.
iii. Subsequently, occupy depth of bde brhd in the gen area of AGORPKO GR 6590.
iv. Conduct fwd passage of lines for 2 Armd Bde and 3 Allied Div on orders.
v. Be prep for river xing ops.
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In order to sp 3 Allied Div C/Attk to destroy AGG 2nd ech div.
(2) 222 BG.
(a) Phase 1.
i. Hold Right fwd of Bde AO within bdrys.
ii. Create a hard shoulder and defeat en xing attempts in your AO.

.
(b) Phase 2.
i. Initially Secure LD for Bde Mob Res.
ii. Strike to defeat en tac echs in EA PANJI.
(c) Phase 3.
i. Estb brhd up to PL BOMBAY SAPPHIRE.
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ii. Subsequently Occupy Left fwd of bde brhd in the gen area of DABLAMORNU GR 7391.
iii. Conduct fwd passage of lines for 2 Armed Bde and 3 Allied Div on orders.
iv. Be prep for river xing ops.
(3) 223 BG.
(a) Phase 1.
i. Hold depth of Bde AO within bdrys.
ii Be Prep for C/Attk tasks.
(b) Phase 2.
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i. Initially hold Depth of Bde AO.
ii. Reinforce 222 BG open flank on orders.
iii. Be prep for C/Attk tasks.
(c) Phase 3.
i. Estb bde brhd up to PL BOMBAY SAPPHIRE.
ii. Subsequently, occupy right fwd of bde brhd in the gen area of VEKOPE GR 7386.
iii. Be prep for river xing ops.
(4) Bde Mob Res.
(a) Phase 1.
i. Bde res.
ii. Be prep to rft 222 BG on SUN CITY on orders.
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(b) Phase 2.
i. Initially Bde res.
ii. Strike into EA PANJI to defeat en tac echs.
(c) Phase 3. Bde Res.
(5) Recce Sqn.
(a) Phase 1.
i. Provide Bde screen up to MOFIAMO.
(b) Phase 2.
i. Draw en leading elms into EA PANJI.
ii. Subsequently, form Bde Res.
(c) Phase 3. Protect bde right flank.
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(6) Arty. Pris:
(a) Phase 1.
i. Disruption and turning effect on en east of MOFIAMO.
ii. 221 and 222 BGs.
(b) Phase 2.
i. Attrition on AGG leading elms in EA PANJI.
ii. 221 and 222 BGs.
(c) Phase 3. Provide covering fire in Sp of brhd ops.

(7) Engrs. Pris.
(a) Phase 1.
i. C-mob tasks against adv en.
ii. Obs belt On MOFIAMO to canalize en to EA PANJI.
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iii. Fortification of MDA.
iv. Mob and survivability tasks to sp BGs.
(b) Phase 2.
i. Obs and mines to reinforce block effect in EA PANJI.
ii. Improve C/attack routes.
(c) Phase 3.
i. Mob sp to brhd op.

ii. Sp xing of asslt forces.
iii. Recce and prep altn xing sites.
iv. Be prep to conduct ferrying/br ops.
(8) Contingency Plan for Phase 3. In the event that the br at SOGAKOPE is blown, the contingency plan for xing MOFIAMO
will be as fols:
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(a) 221 BG.

i. Initially in place force at xing site.
ii. Subsequently, Bde Res.
(b) 222 BG. X at SUGAR BOY to secure far bank.

(c) 223 BG. X at SUGAR BOY to estb brhd up to PL HARD NUT.
(d) Bde Mob Res. X to expand brhd up to PL BOMBAY SAPPHIRE.
(e) Recce Sqn. X and protect right Bde right flank.
(f) Arty. Provide covering fire in Sp of brhd ops.

.
(g) Engrs.
i. Prep xing sites.
ii. Conduct ferrying/bridging ops.
ii. Recce and prep altn xing sites.
iii. Provide mob sp to xing ops.
(9) Fire Plan.
(10) Engr Plan.

c. Coord Instrs.
(1) Timings.
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(c) NMB 071800 Mar except recce parties.
(d) Bde Screens in posn by 101700 Mar.
(e) BGs deploy into posn by 101800 Mar.
(f) Bde obs plan completed by 110600 Mar.
(g) MDA to be completed by 110600 Mar.
(h) En not expected before 110600 Mar.
(2) Locs.
(a) Bde Screens - Near Bank of MOFIAMO.
(b) 221 BG - Area A.
(c) 222 BG - Area B.
(d) 223 BG - Area C.
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(e) Bde Task Force- Area D.

(f) BSA - Area F.
(3) Bdrys. See Trace
(4) Junc Pts. See Trace.
(5) Conc Area. BURMA CAMP.
(6) Dispersal Point. KASE GR 5777.
(7) Phase Lines. See Trace.
(8) Obs Belt. See Trace.
(9) Poss X Sites. See Trace.
(a) SUN CITY GR 7172.

(b) SUGAR BOY GR 7178.
(10) Air Sp. Bids for CAS to be fwd to Bde HQ ASAP. BALO to coord.
(11) NVP. Use of white lt to be auth by this HQ.
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(12) Limit of Recce. Home bank of River VOLTA.
(13) Ptls. G2 to coord ptl plan with BGs.
(14) Mov Plan. To be issued separately later.
(15 Def Stores. Aval at BSA by 101800 Mar. Units to arrange for collection.
(16) OPSEC.
(a) Prep of def to be conducted at night. Bde MDA to be properly cam.
(b) Mechanical mine laying to be done at ni.
(18) OOM to Occupy Def posns. Recce Sqn, 221 BG, 222 BG, Bde Tac Hq, 223 BG, Bde Main.
(19) OOM for xing Ops. 221 BG, 222 BG, 223 BG, Bde Mob Res, Bde Recce, Bde Tac Hq, Bde Main.
(20) Routes to xing sites. See Trace
(21) FSCM.
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(a) AMAs.
i SOGLOKOPE GR 617798.
ii AMINAPA GR 598678.
iii TSINGWAKOPE GR 570750.
(22) Contingency Plan for C-Attk. C-attk plan to recapture lost posn is as fols:
(a) If 221 BG posn is captured, c-attk on codeword JACKET.
i. 222 BG and Bde task force to serve as c-attk force.
ii. Arty to provide fire sp.
(b) If 222 BG Posn is captured, c-attk on codeword WIPER.
i. 223 BG and Bde task Force as c-attk force.
ii. Arty to provide fire sp.
(c) If Bde HQ is captured, c-attk on codeword KAALU.
i. 223 and Bde Task Force as c-attk force.
ii. Arty to provide fire sp
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COMBAT ESTIMATE- ATTACK
1. Ground Orientation.
a. Grid of own location.

b. Direction of North.
c. Reference points that are going to be used in the estimate.
(1)
(2)
(3)
d. En dispositions and locations.
e. Friendly force dispositions and boundaries (Pl and Coy)
MISSION:
In order to

Prelim
Time Now My time Subords time moves and H HR (if Obj Secure
final prep given) (if given)
131100
121100 121520 130800
130001
Time Now =
Fixed time/s =
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Prelim moves and final prep =

RTM at =
Therefore Time Avail for Battle Procedure =
1/3 : 2/3 rule to give orders to Subordinates time & for them to complete orders & battle prep.
Therefore I have until hrs to do my estimate, write and deliver my orders.
My subordinates will have from to to complete their own battle procedure.
If possible, issue initial warning order.
Sit
Probable Msn.
Own ME
Timings.
O Gp RV & Time .
CSS.

(Effect / Task / Constraints / Clarification
Up)
6. What is the en doing & why?
How does the ground affect
en ops?
f. Objectives. Either side Need to confirm in open, what cover might be around each of the locations. Layout Need o task Recce Pl
of road, in open of Pl posns yet to be confirmed. Location of OP still TBC
g. Routes / Axes.
• Relatively open on either • Likely to be observed on move forward to location. Left flanking possibly • Op has to take place during day.
flank observed from neighbouring en location. Possibly have to cross Bdry? Possibility of smoke/deception.
• All routes cross stream • Is the stream fordable • Task for Recce/Engrs
• Rt flanking has minefield • Hastily layed. Possibility of routes through/around
and other obstacles
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• Front assault flat and • Possible fire sp position to flanks • May require to secure flank areas for
open fire sp
h. Vital Ground. Nil
i. Dominating Ground. Nil
j. Key Terrain. Village of If enemy redeploy into village, will require extended time to clear each building. May need to extend time to complete with
Ashale-Botwe Possible sighting of M113 in village. Bde Comd
k. KAs. Area to front of Must maintain one foot on the ground at all times. Maintain a reserve for unknown. Should keep MG and Anti Tank Pl in the
both fwd Pl positions Good KAs for MG and RPG assault and not have them used for flank
protection
l. Vis. Good Enemy likely to have chosen locations to afford best observation of ground to front
due to limited ability to sight on reverse slopes.
What are the en capabilities? Recent success will have encouraged en that our own abilities are not at a high Should be prepared for a protracted
a. Tac/ Doctrine. Likely to standard. They are unlikely to leave without a significant fight, although it is battle. Ensure no possibility of link-up
stay and fight due to considered that they have sustained a significant number of casualties. Ops with other en forces
recent tactical successes
b. Dispositions.
• Coy in defence around • Assume posn only hastily prepared. Unlikely to have much defence stores. • Possible simultaneous attack to
village achieve greatest surprise and break
will
• What if en greater than Coy • Will need to consider contingency – need more firepower directed against en • Need to have area secure prior to 6
size combat power. May have to hold ground taken. GH Inf Bn assault. Poss use of Bde
reserve
c. Eqpt.
• Possibility of M113 • Needs to be located prior to any assault. If in direct support, need to establish • Elements Anti-tank Pl to be with lead
fields of fire/view Coy on move forward. Recce task to
establish location if any of M113
• Small arms • No unanticipated problems
• 81mm Mortars • Likely to be located within village or other concealed area • Need to try and neutralise ASAP
• MMG • Limited number, possibly deployed on flanks to give cover fire • Need to confirm location. Can be
easily redeployed
• Minefield to W of Village • Have assumed minefield active. All troops to be aware of location and layout • ID minefield bdrys. Need to confirm
with engrs possibility of breaching.
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e. Obs.
• Minefield East of Obj • Will it require use of Engrs/Assault Pioneers? Can it be bypassed • Recce/Engrs to confirm
• Stream to front of • As above
objective
f. Morale. Likely to be good, Unlikely to cut and run without a fight, although due to high number of casualties
although have suffered and extended combat already, possibility of breaking morale if successful in a
casualties decisive initial battle.
g. Air. Nil
h. Indirect Fire
• FPF • FPF likely to be just forward of forward platoons, unless secondary positions
have been hastily prepared within village, in which case, FPF likely to be road
to front
• DFs • River line to front of position. Track junction to West of position. Minefield. • BC to confirm and update. Fire plan
Village of Ogbodzo. Village of Adaman. to be issued. Should include likely en
DFs
i. Strengths.
• In defence with high • Need to try and get early win against one of Pl positions
morale
• M113 sp TBC • Request for Armoured support for attack. • Unlikely to get, therefore will have to
make maximum use of Anti Tank
assets
j. Weaknesses.
• Resupply • May not wish to have protracted fire fight. Possibility of cutting off any resupply • Possibly arty task, or recce after initial
routes from en Bde echelon. find function
• No time for well prepared • Trenches hastily prepared with limited overhead cover. Unlikely to have had • Arty highly effective. If they do fall
positions time to prepare secondary positions in village. back into village, limited advantage
over attacking force.
What are the enemy’s

intentions in my area? • Stand and fight from current locations. Possibly allowing time for echelon • Likely that they will wish to conduct a
Likely COA. forces to link up for counter-attack standard defence of current location.
• Withdraw out of positions and conduct passage of lines with echelon forces. Trg does not suggest complicated
Still not known exact location of second inf Bn tactics possible
Worst COA • Draw friendly forces into M113 KAs then withdraw back into village requiring • May require stores for OBUA. Need
OBUA skills. extra ammo in anticipation. Use of
Arty to restrict rearward movement
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into village.
Q2. What have I been told to • 2 UP (Intent & ME). To maintain a strong defence forward in order to hold 1AG Defeat means to diminish the
do and why? Inf Div for subsequent defeat of main body by echelon forces. ME is with 2GH effectiveness of the en to the extent that
Mech Bde before switching to 1GH Inf de he is either unable to participate further or
3. What is my superior at least cannot fulfil his intentions. Not
Comds intent and my necessarily to destroy him
part in his plan.
• 1 UP (CONOPS). Deploy 2GH Inf Bn to fix en centred on GR 8154 to prevent In order to allow 6GH Inf Bn to fulfil its
any interference from direct fire for 1GH Inf Bn assault on Coy position GR mission, I must have the position cleared
8554. 2GH Inf Bn are subsequently to destroy en Coy position before allowing of en prior to their passage of lines
6GH Inf Bn to echelon through 1GH Inf Bn for destruction of third en Coy
position GR 8258. The Bde will then consolidate prior to an advance to contact
and assault on remainder of 2AG Inf Bde. 6GH Inf Bn are to provide one coy
as Bde Reserve
• My part. Defeat en on forward right coy position and allow subsequent ops by 6 Defeat not destroy. If we encounter
GH Inf Bn unexpected en, could result in time delay.
Possibility of en counter-attack. What is
being done about possible OP position?
7. Specified Tasks. 1) Defeat en coy position centred on GR 850541 Defeat not destroy – see above
(fm Msn / 1 up SOM / Coord
Instr) 2) Provide direct fire support to 2GH Inf Bn assault. Need to have Fire Sp assets in a position
to provide this.
3) On orders, allow forward passage of lines of 6GH Inf Bn Need to brief 6GH Inf Bn on method
4) Provide secure LD or 6GH Inf Bn assault Must not be counter-attacked if to provide

secure LD
5) On orders, advance to contact as lead BG Reconstitution has to happen quickly
8. Implied Tasks. 1) May be used as possible reserve for other BG missions Clarification point
2) Need to have secure routes to own FUP and AA Recce to confirm and provide guides
3) Liaison with 6Gh Inf Bn As above
4) Attack from undetected en locations Must have uncommitted reserve

9. What Constraints are • Time (incl fireplan).
imposed on me? Time now 121100. Op needs to be complete y 131100. Therefore have 24 hours Need to get recce out early
to prepare plan and complete task. Can be deliberate attack Have 5 hours of daylight after first light
First light at 0600. Last light at 1800. before operation needs to be completed.
Need to get fire plan from BC Assume battle lasts for 3 hours, and up to
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6 hours for prelim moves, therefore, O Gp

must be before 121530
• Space (ie Bdrys / LOE).
Restricted by ground and minefield, less so by boundaries Can attack from any angle, although will
likely need engrs for right flank attack to
clear minefield
• Resources.
No armoured support provided. What if M113s are in village Must make maximum use of OS against
1 Bty in direct support unexpected targets, also possibility of
1 sect engrs deception. Anti-tank must move in on
assault
5. Has the situation
changed? Not significantly Mission therefore confirmed
6. Clarification Required. As given above, very few points
DIRECTION
Q3. What effects do I want
to have on the en & what
direction must I give to
develop a plan?
Attack.
SURPRISE • Need to choose route that offers best cover and not too obvious • Major access routes likely to be DFs
• If using deception, need to commit significant amounts of combat power to • Can I afford to use a Coy for
increase likelihood of success. deception? Use of vehicles/arty?
• Do I need t ask Bde Comd to allow me to attack at night? • Unlikely to be granted
• Simultaneous attack likely to be complicated to coordinate, both for direct and • Better to have sequential attack
SIMPLICITY indirect fire
• Difficult to coordinate at night. • COA already discounted
• Need to make sub-unit tasks specific, particularly for MG and Anti-tank • Although primary task must be M113,
use of RPG against defensive
positions not to be discounted
CONC OF FORCE • Assign Coys to strike each Pl position. • Ensure combat power is concentrated
prior to strike
• Arty support must be coordinated with sequence of attack.
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• Fire Sp must be able to bring effective fire onto each location • Recce and MG Pl to establish locs
• Must be able to fix depth Pl posn and any Armoured support • Arty and Mors required to carry out fix
• Must have a credible reserve to maintain momentum
MAINT OF MOMENTUM • If en strength greater than anticipated, may have to request use of Bde reserve • Location of reserve TBC
• Careful selection of FUP and LD required due to openness of terrain • Recce to find locations
SECURITY • With exception of echelon assets directly involved in supporting the assault, all • Location of Ambulance Exchange
other element to be kept well to rear Point critical
ISSUE WARNING ORDER
Sit
Probable Msn.
Own ME
Timings.
O Gp RV & Time .
CSS.
Acknowledge

accomplish each action/
effect?
Approach 1.
Left Flanking • Good approach although possibly in view from other en locations • Need to get recce to confirm
• Avoids minefield
• In view of 2 of the en platoons and OP (still TBC) • OP may be recce target as prelim Op
• Can be observed from village (M113s)
• Restricted arcs for fire support • May have to have fire support on
same flank
Approach 2. • Have to either breach minefield or locate route around • Minefield will be covered by fire –
Right Flanking • Offers best cover from view from majority of en need to suppress
• Can be observed from village (M113s) • Likely to achieve better surprise
Approach 3. • Offers fire support positions from either flank • Likely to be from left flank due to arcs
Frontal • Likely to attack strongest par of en defences • May need extended arty prelims
• Can be observed from village
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Fire sp locs. • Left flank offers best arcs of fire, but potential of being observed from other
locations
• Right flank likely to provide best shoots into village if required
Flank Protection. • Possibility of requesting flank protection to west from 2GH Inf Bn
• Will need to allocate resources to eastern flank
Cut offs. • Arty and fire support to provide limited cut offs. Initial Coy assault will release
additional forces for reserve to assist in task of cut-offs

required to accomplish each
action/ effect?
TASKS:
• Observe/OP – • Recce, FOO parties, Snipers • Recce need to continue with other
tasks given above
• Deception – • Reserve coy – exact possibilities for deception still TBC • TBC
• Suppress
Indirect - • Arty battery, Mortars • Should be able to provide smoke
Direct - • MG, Anti-Tank • Primary task of Anti-Tank is M113s
• Secure FUP & LD - • Recce
• Flank Protection – • Initially reserve Pl, switching to Recce after main assault has started
• Asslt – • 3xCoy
• Res - • 1xPl
• Cut Off –
• Blind -
Q6. When & where do the actions/effects take place in relation to each other? Create effects sync matrix – TIMELINE based on the effects/co-ord ident in Q5
See sync matrix
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Q7. What control measures

do I need to impose? • Location must be secure by 141200 Jan 05
FSCM, Bdrys, LOE • LOE must be appropriate for LD for sequential BG mission
• COMSEC and EMCON as given in Bde Orders (not included in MAPEX)
• Boundaries a given in trace
• BG HQ Main must have comms with BG Comd and lead Coy at all times
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COMBAT ESTIMATE-DEFENCE AT BG LEVEL
Srl Factor Deduction Task/Constraints

(a) (b) (c) (d)
1. BAE.
a. Ground Gen. The ground is gen a low lying 1. Hold and dominate high grounds. Need to 1. CTs and Arty.
savanna type north of SHAI Hills with isolated hill estb OPs on SHAI Hills and ADWUKU as early wng.
features dominating area. Prominent hills incl the SHAI Area of Hill MAMPONG must be held in str.
Hills, NAGLAYO, KYEREKYERETE, OKUTOLEGE,
MAMPONG and ADWUKU. The AFIENYA-AKUSE First 2. First Class rd (high speed AA) must be 2. CTs, Arty and Engrs.
Class rd runs S-N. River OHUDOR also runs N-S. covered to prevent en from using.
3. CTs, Arty and Engrs.
3. Xing pts on River OHUDOR must be reinforce
with other obs and covered by obsn and fire.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
b. Obs. Main obs in area are the SHAi Hills and other 4. Hill features cannot be traversed by armr; 4. Arty and Tp Engr.
high grounds, the dug-out quarries and marshy areas gaps between hill features and other obs should
around River OHUDOR. Settlements may also be be rft and registered as tgts.
restrictive. Settlements incl AGOMEDA(GR0187), 5. Arty.
GIGEDOKUM(GR0383), KODIABE(GR0181) and 5. Settlements should be registered as DF.
DORYUM(GR0278). Other obs are the River DEKYIDOR
and DAWHENYA Dam.
6. Atk Teams/OPs on SHAI
6. A high speed AA. Hills
c. Ground Approaches. 7. Need to blow culverts and brs on it. 7. Tp Engrs
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8. Need to crater choke points esp at rd 8. Tp Engrs

(1) AA1. Extends from north through AGOMEDA DORYUM-AFIENYA junc.
(GR0187) to GIGEDOKUM (GR0383) to 9. Need to register settlements and choke points 9. Arty and CTs.
KODIABE(GR0181) to DORYUM(GR0278) and turns as DFs and be prep for FIBUA.
left into AO. This AA contains a 3rd Class rd, which
is a MC capable of taking armd units. 10. Bobby-trap and crater choke points at
DORYUM and ASUTSUARE juncs. 10. Tp Engrs.
(2) AA2. Along the AKUSE-AFIENYA First class rd. 11. Prep all culverts for prelim dml. 11. Tp Engrs.
Capable of containing all manner of vehs of the 12. Must be covered strongly with Atk wpns.
div. The Obvious MC is rd TEMA-AKOSOMBO. 12. Atk Pl/Teams
(a) (b) (c) (d)

(3) AA3. Extends from the north through East of Hill 13. Need for OPs on SHAI Hills and ADWUKU to 13. CTs and Arty.
LORLORVAO (GR 0889) to the East of SHAI Hills across dominate approach.
tributaries of River OHUDOR. This AA is hard standing
and may be marshy along the river. Has well 14. Choke points of tracks to be cratered and 14. Tp Engrs and Arty
developed tracks along SHAI Hills.. mined and registered as DFs.
15. Tp Engrs.
15. Likely xing areas/pts on tributaries of River
OHUDOR should be rft with obs.
16. CTs/Tk hunting
16. Need to ptl defiles between the hill features. teams.
d. Key and Decisive Terrain.

17. Must be dominated with standing/recce ptls,
(1) Key terrain are SHAI Hills, Hill ADWUKU, the cratered, mined and , registered as DFs. Rd 17. CTs, Tp Recce, Tp
First and 2nd Class rds. AFIENYA-SHAI Hills must be secured. Engrs and Arty.
(2) Decisive Terrain are Hills NAGLAYO and 18. Must be held in str.
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MAMPONG. 19. Create killing areas in area of dug-outs. 18. CTs.

19. Comd,Staff decision.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
e. Obsn and Fds of Fire.
(1) The SHAI Hills, and Hill ADWUKU are major 20. Need to estb OPs on these hills to see 20. CTs / Tp Recce /
beyond them. Trip Flares should be set up in Recce Pl
obstruction to obsn. obscured areas between the hills.
21. Fields of fire must be cleared and battle 21. CTs
posns placed at the fwd slopes of hills.
(2) There are also shrubs and mangroves.
22. Properly reinforced shelter trenches must be

prep before battle is joined. 22. CTs/ Tp Engrs / Asslt
f. Cover and Concealment.
Pnrs
23. Def must be built into the existing vegetation.
(1) Ground is rocky in some areas and gravel in
Track discipline must be observed.
23. CTs
others.
24. Day hrs are longer than ni hrs.
25. Moon lt could afford en advantage of a ni
attk. Need for ni surv plan. 24. CTs to use most of
(2) Existing vegetation provides sufficient concealment if day li for occupation and
properly used.
prep of def
25. CTs, Arty and Sig to
be on the alert.
g. Weather. Normal, but with occasional heavy rains.
Moon is at qtr and provides some amount of light at ni.
First li is 0530 hrs and last li at 1815 hrs.
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Srl Factor Deduction Task/Constraints

(a) (b) (c) (d)
2. Enemy.
a. Threat Evaluation.
(1) Org. 1 AGG Mech Div org as fols: 1. Threat has 3:1 superiority. 1. Must use all aval
(a) 2 x Mech Bde resources to wear down en
(b) 1 x Armd Bde physically and mentally.
(c) Div Tps 2. Prep battle posns before
(2) 3 x Inf CTs captured AKOSOMBO 2. En cannot attk until next 72 hrs. the link up.
3. Need to gather info about link up forces. 3. FGA, covering
Dam and secured the ADOMI Br, captured 4. Need to break cohesion of en deep, break their will force/screens to monitor
and cause max attrition to pers and eqpt(decrease mov of en.
AKUSE and ASUTSUARE, and awaiting a link CE). 4. Aggressive
def(ambushes, mines,
up with Main Body in 72 hrs. recce ptls, arty) to
demoralize en.
(3) All threat elms still at 100% CE. 5. Tk hunting teams must
mov fwd to eliminate or
knockout tks
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(a) (b) (c) (d)

(4) Eqpt.
(a) AMX 30 Tks(105mm). 5. Need for Atk Teams on likely armr AAs. Mines 6. Atk/ Tp Engrs
(b) M113 APCs. to be laid on likely AAs. 7. Aggressive ni ptls by
(c) Ltd ni fighting capability. 6. Must be alert at ni and use illum to degrade CTs.
(d) 105mm How, 120mm mor and 75mm their ni fighting capability. 8. Arty to fire CB and
7. Need to loc arty gun posns. illum to degrade their ni
Recoilless guns capability.
8. Need to cfm the likely loc of re-sup base and 9. FGA.
interdict.
(5) CSS. JUAPONG area likely to be the main re-sup
9. First and 3rd Class rds to be cratered, mined, 10. Tp Engrs.
base for AGG.
booby-trapped and very big trees fell across.
Choke pts/Junc to be registered.
(6) Tac Doctrine. AGG adv on high speed AA in
10. Def must have depth and be prep to fight in 11. CTs.
echs until compelled off. First Ech elms aim at
all dir and c-pen.
penetrating en def and developing the attk in
11. Constant surv to prevent surprise and pen. 12. Screens, OPs.
depth to break their en’s cohesion. The 2nd Ech elms
12. Arty loc/posns must be ident early and
then fol up to augment the efforts of the First . The
eliminated before their attks. DFs far fwd or in 13. Air recce/ Arty.
res rft or replace the First ech, but have no definite
depth.
missions initially. When attking well prep def, AGG
13. Need to prep for armr c-attk.
attks on a wide front with substantial rft or sp from
14. Need to maint a mob res. 14. CTs/Atk Teams.
HQ Comd Arty. Atk forces protect flanks when armd
c-attks are mounted.
(a) (b) (c) (d)

b. Threat Integration.
(1) Aims and EndState. To seize port facilities in 14. Need to hold gen area SHAI Hills strongly to 15. CTs.
TEMA and other industrial concerns to facilitate her prevent en access to TEMA.
war effort in order to annex VOLTA Region incl the 15. Def must be aggressive to lower morale of 16. CTs/Arty.
VOLTA Dam with the VOLTA river as the new AGG.
international bdry.
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(2) Disposn.
(a) 1 x CT – AKOSOMBO/ADOMI Br.
(b) 1 x CT – AKUSE. 16. Need to disrupt these lead elms before the 17. FGA/Arty.
(c) 1 x CT – ASUTSUARE. link up.
17. ASUTSUARE junc likely to be the link up area 18. Covering force / Arty
for all AGG forces. Must be monitored by
covering force and registered as a DF.
(3) En Weaknesses.
(a) The link-up and re-gp. 18. Need for deep ops to disrupt the conc and 19. FGA/Arty
massing of AGG.
(b) Inability to conduct any offensive ops in 19. Need to use this period to adequately fortify 20. CTs.
the 72 hrs. def posns.
20. Must take advantage of these weaknesses 21. Aggressive def, arty,
before the rft. fighting ptls by armr to
cause max cas to pers
and eqpt.
(a) (b) (c) (d)

(4) En COA.
(a) COA1. AGG to adv with an adv gd along 21. Most likely.
AKUSE-AFIENYA axis and force pen of own def
and break out to seize TEMA. 22. Need to mount surv on this axis and put the 22. CTs, arty and engrs.
nec obs to delay and frustrate en effort. Choke
Advantages. pts must be registered and observed.
(a) Disorganise own def.
(b) En may achieve his aim faster.
(c) May not enter own EA.
(d) Own forces may not achieve
effective mutual sp.
Disadvantages. Cas on en will be very high.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(b) COA 2. Conduct a feint on the AKUSE-AFIENYA

axis and carry out a major attk from AA3. 23. Not likely.
Advantages. Likely to achieve deception and

surprise.
Disadvantages.
(a) May not be able to adv fast as expected.
(b) En forces may become disjointed.

(c) Likely to enter own main EA.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(c) COA 3. Conduct feint on AA3 and force a 24. Likely.

major pen through AA2.
Advantages.
(a) Could achieve surprise/deception.
(b) Could achieve speed.
Disadvantages.
(a) Could break cohesion of force.
(b) May not have the required str to mov in
echs.
(c) May suffer hy cas.
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Msn Analysis
(Effect / Task /
Constraints / Clarification
Up)
1. Superior Comds intent.
a. Army Comd.
(1) Intent. To conduct a limited covering force battle forward in

order to delay 1AGG Mech Div for subsequent defeat of main
body in the ADOMI area. 1. Defeat means to diminish the effectiveness
of the en to the extent that he is either unable
(2) ME. ME will be the defeat the second ech of AGG Mech to participate further or at least cannot fulfil his
Div. intentions. Not necessarily to destroy him
b. GOC.
(1) Intent. I intend to conduct a limited covering force 2. Defeat not destroy. If we encounter
battle forward of a Main Defensive Position (MDP). unexpected en from unexpected AA, could
Cause max attrition to the en and fix him in the result in posn being surprise. Must achieve all
round def and mutual sp. What is being done
MAMPONG Hill area by placing a strong block astride
about possible OP position?
his likely avenue of approach. This will fix the lead
elements and enable a strike into the en main body
eastern flank.
(2) SoM. Deploy one Sqn of Armd Recce and 64 Inf

Regt to conduct a limited mobile covering force battle
and then take up def posn in the KYEREKYRETE-
OKUTOLEGE area. 1 Inf BG is to form a ‘hard-shoulder’
forward of the MDP with one Sqn of Armd Recce, with 5
and 2 I nf BGs providing the main defensive force. 64 Inf
Regt to provide one CT as Bde Res at AFIENYA
(3) ME. The defeat of the first ech of 11 AGG Mech

Bde.
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(a) (b) (c)
b. . My role in His Plan. Is to defend within bdrys

inflicting max cas in order to enable subsequent
defeat of first ech AGG Bde. 3. Must canalise AGG into chosen EAs. Obs plan . 1. Task. Obs plan by Engrs.
4. Must plan rearward passage of lines for Covering

force. 2. Task. Rearward passage of lines.
Liaise with South Comd HQ.
2. Tasks. 5. Must cover the width and depth of my AO and 3. C-Attack plan
will require local res.
a. Specified. 4. 2 x CTs required.
6. Must plan for recapture of my AO in conjunction
(1) Fix lead elms of 1 AGG Mech Bde in with S/Comd HQ should it fall into the en
area of SHAI Hills.
(2) Defeat 1st ech of AGG force. 7. Defeat en forward of BG position and allow
subsequent ops by North Comd.
(3) Block astride likely AA.
5. Tasks.
8. To deny AGG from using likely AA, l must a. Conduct Terrain Analysis.
dominate the approach and cover it with fire from b. 1 or 2 CTs for positional def.
the MDP and arty. This will require positional c. STA fwd.
defence and must conduct Terrain Analysis to d. Guns fwd.
determine best siting. I will require STAP, Atk, Inf, Arty e. Engr c-mob task.
and Engr. f. Def stores well fwd.
9. Hold means defend, defeat or deter- It gives me 6. Tasks.

flexibility to conduct a number of different but coord a. Fixing Force – 2 X CTs.
missions within the BG. Likely to need a fix force, b. Strike Force - 1 x CT.
strike force and res. c. Res - 1 x CT
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b. Implied Tasks.
(1) Identify wdr routes for covering force. 10. Clarify Comd plan to assist fwd and rearward 6. Clarification. What is my part in
(2) Intensify ptls to ident en axis and AA. passage of lines of North Comd and Covering fwd and rearward passages of lines.
(3) Mount OPs to observe and call for arty Force.
/mor fire in-depth. 7. Tasks.
(4) Conduct fwd passage of lines. 11. Ident best loc for c-attack for BG.
(5) Mine/wire on other likely approaches. a. Plan c-attack option for BG
(6) Designate tk hunting teams. 12. Issue liaison tasks left to right and front to rear. 1 into my AO.
(7) Mobility/counter mobility. BG and 64 Inf Regt will receive LOs from Me. Discuss
(8) Survivability – construction of with HQ S/Comd locs of junc pts for liaison with 1BG b. Liaise with 1BG – LO/Junc pt.
protective emplacements. and 64 Inf Regt.
(9) Liaison with flanking units. c. Liaise with B CT – LO.
(10) Counter Attack Plans.
(11) Cause max attrition on en. d. Clarify use of junc pt.
13. Ident choke pts and depl Tk hunting teams.
c. Mission Essential Tasks. e. Pls to provide tk hunting teams
(1) Fix AGG Mech Div. 14. Posn to be well dug–in with OHP, cam and
concealed. f. Posns to be prep to withstand
(2) Defeat 1st ech elms of AGG force. hy shelling from en – Pls.
d. Prioritisation of Task. To hold def posn within

bdrys to fix fwd elms of AGG Mech Bde.
3. Constraints.
15. Likely to be my main Effort.
a. Time.
(1) Time now - 0900.

(2) AGG op not before- 1800 D +2.
(3) 1st lt - 0530 hrs.
(4) Last lt - 1800 hrs.
(5) Time aval - 57 hrs. 16. Have sufficient time for thorough prep.
(6) Total Day lt - 34 hrs. 8. Tasks.
(7) Total Ni hrs - 23 hrs. 17. Must be ready for AGG by D + 2 last lt which
allows me 57hrs. My orders to be issued NLT D-Day a. Issue wng O ASP.
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(8) No mov before 081200 May 05. at 1200hrs allowing 40hrs for my pls (1/3 -2/3 rule).
b. Issue orders NLT -1200hrs D Day
a. Wng O - Imm after mission
analysis. c. Occupy posn NLT - 1700hrs D
Day
b. Orders - 1200hrs D Day.
d. Prep posns - 1700 hrs D
c. Time posn occupied - 1700hrs D Day Day to 1500hrs D + 2
d. Prep of MDA - 1700 hrs D Day to

1500hrs D + 2 e. Prep complete -1500hrs
D+2
e. Posn to be def - 1500hrs D+2.
f. AGG expected - 1800hrs D+2.
b. Space.
(1) Must def within bdrys.

18. Need to clarify right bdry. 9. Pt of clarification – Define right
(2) My bdrys need to be carefully defined, bdry.
especially to my right.
(3) Am l free to op as l wish north of SHAI Hills?
(4) No recce beyond Hill MAMPONG.
c. Resources. My BG likely to face AGG Bde. Will

therefore require addl engr resources and
ISTAR assets. 19. Requirement for engr resources and ISTAR assets 10. Clarification. Will l have addl
for early wng. resources for the ops.
4. Change to the Situation. No change.
20. Mission no change. 11. Need to be updated constantly

by S/Comd HQ on new int on op
situation.
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CONSIDERATION OF COURSES OF ACTION
COA 1.
1. Concept of Ops.
a. Intent. To hold area Rd AFIENYA-AKUSE(incl) – Hill MAMPONG strongly to defeat first ech of AGG Mech Bde in order to set conditions
for the defeat of AGG main body.
b. SoM. Tp Recce to form local screen ahead of SHAI Hills to ident, delay and divert attention. Tp Engrs to crater, booby trap the high
speed AA, lay mines/wire or other obvious AA. 2 x CTs to hold fwd strongly between Rd AFIENYA-AKUSE and Hill MAMPONG. Another CT to be
in depth. CT from 64 Inf Regt and Tp Recce to form mob res for c-attack tasks. Arty to cause max attrition in depth.
c. ME. ME is the defeat of first ech of 11 AGG Bde.
2. Advantages.
a. Block en pen through high speed AA.
b. Dominate the key terrain (SHAI Hills and ADWUKU).
c. Have firm control of Decisive terrain (Hill MAMPONG and Hill NAGLAYO).
d. Capable of containing threat from left and right AA.
e. Dominates the AAs.
f. Has good fields of observation/ fire.
g. CTs can mutually sp each other.
h. SHAI Hills likely to break the cohesion of AGG.
3. Disadvantages.
a. CTs/ Pls likely to be too dispersed to cover frontage.
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b. Possibility of infiltration and pen.
c. Attrition will be high on both sides.
COA 2.
4. Concept of Ops.
a. Intent. Sector Defence(Mobile). Hold area Rd AFIENYA-AKUSE and Hill MAMPONG with 1 x CT and conduct mob def with another CT
with a strong c-attackk force ready to strike.
b. SoM. 1 x CT depl north of SHAI Hills to conduct offensive ops to break cohesion of AGG as it enters sector. This CT will reposition
rearwards and maint pressure on AGG and lead en into main EA. CT in area of Hill MAMPONG to block first ech of en in the EA and
allow a strike by the c-attack force (Res plus the depth CT).
c. ME. ME is the c-attack strike.
5. Advantages.
a. Breaks the cohesion of AGG very early.
b. Disrupts the decision cycle of the en.
c. Early attrition of AGG.
d. Diverts attention of AGG as to where the main body is.
e. Over stretches the attackers resources.
f. Will expose en flanks.
g. Will lead en into EA of our choosing.
h. Seeks victory through manoeuvre and not attrition.
6. Disadvantages.
a. 1 x CT cannot effectively cover the frontage.
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b. MDA will lack depth.
c. En may pen the MDA.
d. Mob def requires tac mobility which own forces lack.
e. Requires max coord to prevent fratricide.
f. The SHAI Hills range will obstruct well coord mob def.
g. Arty sp may be dangerous.
MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION AND WHY
7. Commander’s Decision.
a. Selection of COA. COA 1 selected because it satisfies the fol cbt multipliers:
(1) Comd and Con. Allows easier comd and con by the BG Comd to achieve the intent of the command.
(2) Manoeuvre. Allow the threat forces to be canalized into the EA and fixed for eventual defeat. Dugout areas restrict en mov.
(3) Firepower. Max firepower can be generated and brought to bear on the en in EA as there is mutual sp from CTs and Arty.
(4) Protection. Allows own forces to disperse and dig-in and adopt the nec cam and concealment.
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7 Questions Combat Estimate

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7 Questions Combat Estimate

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GHANA ARMED FORCES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

ARMY COMBAT TRAINING SCHOOL

FORMAT OF COMBAT ESTIMATE……………………………………………….5

CHAPTER 1- QUESTION 1 – WHAT IS THE ENEMY DOING AND WHY?..............1-1

Step 1 ‐ Battlespace Area Evaluation………………………………………………………..1‐7

Step 3 ‐ THREAT INTEGRATION…………………………………………………………………………1‐18

QUESTION ONE BRIEF………………………………………………………………………………………..1‐26

COMPLETION OF 7 QUESTIONS ESTIMATE FORMS‐ QUESTION 1…………………………1‐27

CHAPTER 2‐ QUESTION 2 – WHAT HAVE I BEEN TOLD TO DO AND WHY?...........................2‐1

Q 2. — WHAT ARE MY SPECIFIED AND IMPLIED TASKS?.........................................2‐4

Q 3. — WHAT CONSTRAINTS ARE IMPOSED ON MY FREEDOM OF ACTION?............2‐6

Q 4. — HAS TAC SIT CHANGED AND DO I NEED TO TAKE ANOTHER DECISION?.....2‐6

IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS…………………………………..2‐7

CHAPTER 3 COMDS EFFECT SCHEMATICS…………………………………………………………………..3‐1

COMMANDER'S DIRECTION BY FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT……………3-6

CHAPTER 4‐DECISION SUPPORT OVERLAY…………………………………………………………………4‐1

CONSTITUENTS OF DECISION SUPPORT OVERLAY…………………..4-2

ILLUSTRATED PROCESS OF PRODUCING DSO…………………………………………………….4‐4

CHAPTER 5‐ DSO MATRIX……………………………………………………………………………………………5‐1

CHAPTER 6‐SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX……………………………………………………………………..6‐1

PREPARATION OF SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX…………………………6-2

GAFCSC Synchronisation Matrix……………………………………………….6-3

EXAMPLES OF SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX ………………………………………6‐5

CHAPTER 7‐ CONTROL MEASURES……………………………………………………………….7‐1

COMMAND AND CONTROL…………………………………………………………….7‐20

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY…………………………………………………………7‐22

CHAPTER 8‐ DEDUCTIONS AND COMPLETE COMBAT ESTIMATES

COMBAT ESTIMATE FOR MECH BDE‐DEFENCE ………………………………………………..8‐8

COMBAT ESTIMATE- ATTACK……………………………………………….8-46

COMBAT ESTIMATE-DEFENCE AT BG LEVEL………………………………….8-52

The purpose of the Estimate is to make a decision for a course of action,

Consistent with the prerequisites of Mission Command, a subordinate commander

Commander’s Intent (what needs to be achieved in terms of the desired end-state

The Combat Estimate or 7 Questions Estimate is used at all tactical levels of

Questions 1-3 Input

Q 3 – What effects do I want

Direction Questions 4-7

Q 6 – When and where do

FORMAT OF COMBAT ESTIMATE

2. Establish Time Available: (1/3:2/3)

2/3 Subords time Prelim

Acknowledge (incl Atts as required)

Question Answer/Deduction Product for Orders

2. What are the en

What are the enemy’s

Most Likely COA.

Most Dangerous COA

Q2. What have I been told to do and why?

2. What are my specified

3. What Constraints are

5. Has the situation

Q3. What effects do I want

ISSUE WARNING ORDER

Q4. Where can I best

Q5. What resources are

Allocates resources to a. FILL IN RESOURCES TO

ONTO COA DELOPMENT

c. FILL IN A DSOM FOR

FILL IN GAFCSC SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

Q7. What control Timings

COMPLETION OF THE PLAN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ORDERS

4. Subordinate Missions & Tasks

QUESTION 1 – WHAT IS THE ENEMY DOING AND WHY?

Questions 1-3 Input