Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2023 UMAK LMT Political Law and Public International Law
2023 UMAK LMT Political Law and Public International Law
2023 UMAK LMT Political Law and Public International Law
PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
6. Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), a member of the Clearing House established by Central Bank of the
Philippines (CBP), filed a complaint for sum of money against CBP. CBP’s Charter provides that it waived its
immunity from suit. May BPI sue CBP although it performs governmental functions?
Yes. CBP is not immune to suit although it performs governmental functions. While the State may not be sued without
its consent, however, immunity from suit may be waived expressly or impliedly. Nonetheless, while the CBP performed
a governmental function in providing clearing house facilities, it is not immune from suit as its Charter, by express
provision, waived its immunity from suit. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Central Bank of the Philippines and Citibank, G.R.
No. 197593. October 12, 2020, J. Hernando.)
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II. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
7. What are the two tests for a valid delegation of legislative power?
Completeness Test Sufficient Standard Test
The law must be complete in all its A sufficient standard is intended to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
terms and conditions when it leaves authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances
the legislative such that when it under which it is to be pursued and effected. This is intended to prevent a
reaches the delegate the only thing he total transference of legislative power from the legislature to the delegate.
will have to do is to enforce it. The standard is usually indicated in the law delegating legislative power.
(Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
10. What are the limitations on the privilege from arrest of the members of the Congress?
a. Crime has a maximum penalty of not more than 6 years;
b. Congress is in session, whether regular or special;
c. Prosecution will continue independent of arrest;
d. Will be subject to arrest immediately when Congress adjourns.
(Art. VI, Sec 11, and People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000)
11. What are the prohibitions attached to a legislator during his term of office?
Incompatible Office Forbidden Office
A member cannot accept any other office or employment in Any office created or the emoluments of which
government during his term unless he waives or forfeits his seat have been increased during the term for which
in Congress. It includes any kind of office or employment in the he was elected, not merely during his tenure or
government, or subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, period of actual incumbency. The ban against
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their appointment to the office created or the
subsidiaries during his term. Forfeiture of the seat in Congress emoluments thereof increased shall, however,
shall be automatic upon the member’s assumption of such other last only for the duration of the term for which
office deemed incompatible with his seat in Congress. the member of Congress was elected.
12. Discuss each Electoral Tribunals provided in the Constitution that will be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with
jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications" of the President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives. These electoral tribunals exercise
jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already been proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14
and 15 of the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest
or quo warranto may be filed after the proclamation of the winner. (Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
191618, November 23, 2010)
III.EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
13. Is the President exempt from criminal liability under the Rome Statute?
No. In determining liability under the Rome Statute, a person's official capacity is irrelevant. This Statute shall apply
equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State
or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground
for reduction of sentence. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person,
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the International Criminal Court from exercising its jurisdiction
over such a person. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano,. G.R. no. 238875. March 16, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
14. May a cabinet secretary, acting as a member of the Board of Directors of a government agency be absolved
from liability considering that he has been appointed as ex-officio member? May he use the defense that he is
acting as an alter ego of the President, hence exempted from liability?
No. The doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to acts of Board of Directors despite him being an
appointee to his Cabinet position. Such a cabinet member sits on the Board of Director ex officio, or by reason of their
office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not
the President, that sat them in the Board. (Manalang-Demigillo vs.TIDCORP, G.R. No. 168613, March 5, 2013)
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15. What are the kinds of privileged communications?
Presidential Communications Privilege Deliberative Process Privilege
Applies to decision-making of the President. Applies to decision-making of executive officials.
Rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of Rooted on common law privilege.
power and the President's unique constitutional role.
Applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final That there is a “governmental privilege against public
and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding
ones. military, diplomatic and other security matters.
(Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
17. Distinguish calling out powers, martial law, and suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out Limitations: The President acts within
Calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the permissible constitutional boundaries
powers President may call the armed forces "to prevent or or in a manner not constituting grave
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." abuse of discretion
The power to declare Martial Law poses the most Limitations: Only for a period of sixty
severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine (60) days, subject to review and
which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be possible revocation by Congress; and
Martial Law used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. review and possible nullification by
Powers It is placed in the keeping of the President for the the Supreme Court.
purpose of enabling him to secure the people from
harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy
their individual freedoms.
Suspension of The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
the privilege of be suspended except in cases of invasion or
the writ of rebellion when the public safety requires it.
habeas corpus
(Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
18. What is the rule on calling the Congress to convene when the President proclaims a state of Martial Law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
Congress should convene in joint session within twenty-four (24) hours without
Congress in session
need for call.
Congress not in The provision only requires that the Congress convene without call, but it does not
session explicitly state that the Congress shall already convene in joint session.
(Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017)
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IV. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
23. President AAA, two months immediately before the next presidential elections, appointed BBB as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court. CCC, one of the shortlisted candidates assailed BBB's appointment, contending
that it is invalid because it violated the prohibition against Midnight Appointments under the Constitution.
Discuss.
The contention of CCC is incorrect because the prohibition on Midnight Appointments is only confined to appointments
made in the Executive Department. The prohibition does not extend to Judiciary because had the framers of the
Constitution intended to extend the prohibition on Midnight Appointments to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. (De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17 and April 20, 2010)
V.CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
VI. CITIZENSHIP
26. Does the requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when a child reaches the age of majority apply to AAA,
an illegitimate daughter of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother?
No. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, AAA automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently,
she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. (Uy-Belleza
vs. Civil Registrar of Tacloban City, G.R. No. 218354. September 15, 2021, J. Hernando)
27. AAA, a semi-caucasian looking person, got lost when he was three (3) years of age, and did not know how to
look for his parents or their house, or even remember the name of his parents nor his own name. He was
taken care of thereafter by a couple from the marketplace in which he was found, and was adopted
subsequently by the said couple in a judicial proceeding. Four decades went by, and AAA is now a
businessman. He wants to run as a congressman in the next election. Is AAA eligible to run as congressman,
possessing the requisite citizenship requirement for the position under the Constitution? Decide.
Yes. AAA possesses the requisite citizenship requirement because foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
The Supreme Court has held that foundlings are natural-born citizens based not only on the Philippine Constitution
and domestic laws on adoption but also on the generally accepted principles of international law. Citizenship is a birth-
right and a decision denying foundlings of such citizenship is effectively a denial of their birth-right. (Poe-Llamanzares
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
28. Will a foundling, abandoned and found within the Philippines prior to the enactment of R.A. 11767 or also
known as the Foundling Recognition and Protection Act, be considered as a Filipino citizen?
Yes. Section 20 of R.A. 11767 provides for the express retroactivity of the law for any foundling insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights pursuant to existing laws. Thus, the provisions of the law will be applied
to the said foundling. (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 11767)
29. AAA was born in the Philippines to a Filipino father and American mother and eventually acquired her
American citizenship as shown by the Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States
(CRBA). She filed her certificate of candidacy as Member of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Biñan. BBB filed a
petition for disqualification on the ground that AAA sought election without making a sworn renunciation
under R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Does R.A. 9225 apply to AAA,
making her ineligible to run for public office?
No. R.A. 9225 particularly applies to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Filipino citizenship through the process of
naturalization. Naturalization is a process through which a State confers an outsider with rights enjoyed by its citizens.
AAA never underwent such a process; because of the circumstances of her birth, she need not go through the process
of naturalization to acquire US citizenship, and per the CRBA, the process to obtain the same was merely to confirm
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such US citizenship. it would be absurd to construe petitioner's submission of documents to the Consular Service of
the US to be akin to one's availment of the naturalization process. Considering that petitioner is a dual citizen by birth,
not a dual citizen by naturalization, it was not incumbent upon her to perform the twin requirements of R.A. 9225 as
the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. (Gana-
Carait vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 257453, August 9, 2022)
VII.BILL OF RIGHTS
31. Does the constitutional right of a person to due process apply to a person held under a deportation
proceeding?
Yes. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that
it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional
right of such person to due process shall not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines
particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings. (Government of the USA vs. Purganan, G.R.
No. 148571, September 24, 2002)
34. Considering its penal nature, may the Court grant due course to petitions invoking a facial challenge on the
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act?
Yes, the Court may grant due course to petitions as permissible facial challenges only in relation to the provisions of
the ATA which involve and raise chilling effects on freedom of expression and its cognate rights in the context of actual
and not mere hypothetical facts. These issues include: (1) whether the section defining and penalizing the crime of
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"terrorism” and the provisions defining and penalizing threats to commit terrorism, among others, are void for
vagueness or overbroad in violation of the constitutional right to free speech and expression; and (2) whether the
powers of the ATC to designate terrorist individuals, groups and organization, approve requests for designation by
other jurisdictions or supranational jurisdictions, apply for the proscription of terrorist individuals, groups, and
organizations, and authorize arrest and detention without judicial warrant based on mere suspicion are
unconstitutional. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 07, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
35. Is Section 4 of RA 11479, the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) which provides for the definition of terrorism void for
vagueness or overbroad in violation of the constitutional right to free speech and expression?
Only the proviso. It is plain and evident from the language used that the enumeration refers to punishable acts, or
those pertaining to bodily movements that tend to produce an effect in the external world, and not speech. The acts
constitutive of the crime of terrorism are clearly forms of conduct unrelated to speech, in contradistinction with the
enumeration in the proviso, which are forms of speech or expression, or are manifestations thereof. The proviso’s
“Not Intended Clause” is void for vagueness as it has a chilling effect on the average person. Before the protester
can speak, he must first guess whether his speech would be interpreted as a terrorist act under Section 4 and whether
he might be arrested, indicted, and/or detained for it. The danger of the clause is made graver by the fact that by
shifting the burden to the accused to explain his intent, it allows for law enforcers to take an “arrest now, explain later”
approach in the application of the ATA to protesters and dissenters - only that it must be the latter who does the
explaining, which makes it even more insidious. The vagueness of such provision is likely to result in an arbitrary
flexing of the government muscle, which is equally aversive to due process. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
252578, December 07, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
36. Is the provision in the ATA that request for designations by other jurisdictions or supranational jurisdictions
be adopted by the ATC after determination that the proposed designee meets the criteria for designation of
UNSCR No. 1373 violative of the Constitution?
Yes. While the State has established a compelling interest, the means employed under the second mode of
designation is not the least restrictive means to achieve such purpose. Unbridled discretion is given to the ATC in
granting requests for designation based on its own determination. Further, there are no proper procedural safeguards
and remedies for an erroneous designation in this respect. The lack of a remedy aside, there exists other suitable
alternatives which are far less intrusive and potentially injurious to protected rights. These include the adoption of an
internal watchlist by law enforcement agencies or the maintenance of a database to monitor potential threats, and
judicial proscription. Since this measure has the effect of impermissibly chilling free speech and its cognate rights, it
should not be made through an executive body's determination that lacks proper standards and safeguards. (Calleja
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 07, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
37. Distinguish the Writs of Habeas Corpus, Kalikasan, Habeas Data, and Amparo.
Writ of Habeas Writ of Kalikasan Writ of Habeas Data Writ of Amparo
Corpus
Who may Natural Person Natural or juridical person, Any aggrieved party By the aggrieved party or
File entity authorized by law, may file a petition for by any qualified person or
people’s organization, non- the writ of habeas entity in the following order:
governmental organization, data. However, in a. Any member of the
or any public interest group cases of extralegal immediate family,
accredited by or registered killings and enforced namely: the spouse,
with any government disappearances, the children and parents of
agency petition may be filed the aggrieved party;
by: b. Any ascendant,
a. Any member of the descendant or collateral
immediate family of relative of the aggrieved
the aggrieved party, party within the fourth
namely: the spouse, civil degree of
children and consanguinity or affinity,
parents; or in default of those
b. Any ascendant, mentioned in the
descendant or preceding paragraph; or
collateral relative of c. Any concerned citizen,
the aggrieved party organization, association
within the fourth civil or institution, if there is
degree of no known member of the
consanguinity or immediate family or
affinity, in default of relative of the aggrieved
those mentioned in party.
the preceding
paragraph.
Rights Right to liberty Right to a balanced and Right to privacy in life, Right to life, liberty, and
involved healthful ecology liberty, or security security
(Rules of Court, Rule 102/A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC/A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC/A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
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39. Is arraignment indispensable before a petition on bail can be heard?
It is not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For
when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. (Serapio vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003)
42. What are the elements for the right against double jeopardy to attach? Is this absolute?
The accused's constitutional right against double jeopardy attaches when the following elements concur: (1) the
accused is charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; (2)
the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded; and (4) the accused is convicted or
acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his/her consent. Yet, the rule on double jeopardy will not apply when there
has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances that rendered the trial court without jurisdiction.
(Mamerto Austria vs. AAA and BBB, G.R. No. 205275, June 28, 2022)
43. What is the Public Trust Doctrine in relation to the Regalian doctrine?
The doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of continuing supervision over the taking
and use of appropriated water. Thus, "[p]arties who acquired rights in trust property [only hold] these rights subject to
the trust and, therefore, could assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust." The doctrine
further holds that certain natural resources belong to all and cannot be privately owned or controlled because of their
inherent importance to each individual and society as a whole. A clear declaration of public ownership, the doctrine
reaffirms the superiority of public rights over private rights for critical resources. It impresses upon states the affirmative
duties of a trustee to manage these natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations and embodies
key principles of environmental protection: stewardship, communal responsibility, and sustainability."
In this framework, a relationship is formed — "the [s]tate is the trustee, which manages specific natural resources —
the trust principal — for the trust principal — for the benefit of the current and future generations — the beneficiaries."
"[T]he [S]tate has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water
resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible." But with the birth of privatization of many basic utilities,
including the supply of water, this has proved to be quite challenging. These exigencies forced the public trust doctrine
to evolve from a mere principle to a resource management term and tool flexible enough to adapt to changing social
priorities and address the correlative and consequent dangers thereof. The public is regarded as the beneficial owner
of trust resources, and courts can enforce the public trust doctrine even against the government itself. (Maynilad Water
Services, Inc. vs. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 202897. August 6, 2019, J.
Hernando.)
IX.LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ELECTION LAW, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
46. Is former Chief Justice Corona’s retirement benefits, survivorship benefits and other allowances under
Republic Act 9946 forfeited due to his impeachment?
No. The effects of a judgment on an impeachment complaint extends no further than to removal from office and
disqualification from holding any public office. Impeachment is designed to remove the impeachable officer from office,
not punish him. It is purely political, and it is neither civil, criminal, nor administrative in nature. No legally actionable
liability attaches to the public officer by a mere judgment of impeachment against him or her, and thus lies the necessity
for a separate conviction for charges that must be properly filed with courts of law. (Re: Letter of Corona, A.M. No. 20-07-
10-SC. January 12, 2021, J. Hernando.)
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47. Does the failure to judicially convict the ousted Chief Justice Corona for any post-impeachment liability due
to his death entitle him, therefore, to retirement benefits?
Yes. Chief Justice Corona may be considered involuntarily retired from public service. Forfeiture of retirement benefits
could have been imposed upon criminal conviction which, however, was pre-empted by his death. Viewing it from
another angle, a judgment of liability in a separate legal proceeding is a resolutory condition after a verdict of ouster
by impeachment has been rendered, in that the impeached official retains all the post- employment privileges already
earned unless otherwise declared by the competent tribunals. Until his liability under the law is so established before
the courts of law, retirement eligibility and benefits have properly accrued to Chief Justice Corona when he was
removed by impeachment. There being no such determination of liability, his entitlement thereto subsisted. (Re: Letter
of Corona, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC. January 12, 2021, J. Hernando.)
48. Is the condonation doctrine applicable to all open and pending administrative cases as of April 12, 2016 or
the date on which the Court had acted upon and denied with finality the Ombudsman's Motion for
Clarification/Motion for Partial Reconsideration in the Carpio-Morales case which abandoned the condonation
doctrine?
The condonation doctrine is still considered as "good law" in all administrative cases involving public officials whose
reelections occurred before April 12, 2016, regardless of the dates of filing of the administrative cases against them
or the status of said cases when the Carpio Morales ruling attained finality. The doctrine applies to those officials who
have been reelected prior to its abandonment. That is because when a public official has been reelected prior to the
promulgation and finality of Carpio-Morales, he or she has every right to rely on the old doctrine that his re-election
has already served as a condonation of his [or her] previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him [or
her] from office, and a new doctrine decreeing otherwise would not be applicable against him or her. (Gaudan V.
Degamo, G.R. No. 226935, February 9, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
50. What are the parameters to satisfy a person’s right to due process in administrative proceedings?
In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process
is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It is enough that the person was accorded
ample opportunity to defend himself and adduce his own evidence. (Ang vs. Belaro, Jr., A.C. No. 12408. December 11,
2019, J. Hernando.)
51. What are the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to
immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (c)
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel
on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
(g) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (j) when the rule does
not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention." (Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
52. Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of
the three-term limit rule?
No. An interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less
than the involuntary loss of title to the office. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the
functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because
it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while
retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law. (Aldovino vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009)
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53. AAA was elected as Mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Thereafter, a new
legislative district, the City of Digos, was created. The territorial jurisdiction of the municipality and the city
are the same. May AAA immediately run as mayor of this newly-created City?
No. As stated, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who
elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants
over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. (Latasa vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154829,
December 10, 2003)
54. AAA is a natural-born Filipino citizen. He was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America (USA)
and lost his Filipino citizenship. In 2009, he applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225, before the
Consulate General of thePhilippines in San Francisco, USA, took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.In the same year, he filed
a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in Bustos,Bulacan, BBB, another candidate for the same position,
filed a Petition to disqualify or to cancel AAA’s COC on the ground that the latter is a foreigner. To support
his claim, BBB presented AAA’s travel record indicating that he has been using his US Passport in entering
and departing the Philippines even after renouncing his American citizenship. Decide.
AAA should be disqualified because he failed to meet the continuing requirement of Filipino citizenship. Under
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that in cases of dual citizenship as a result of a positive act, in this case
repatriation, mere filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is not sufficient for purposes of renunciation of a foreign
citizenship. An affidavit of renunciation of such foreign citizenship shall also be filed in order to qualify for public
office. (Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)
55. Supposing that AAA obtained the highest number of votes, and was thereafter disqualified due to the use of
his US Passport, who will succeed him, (a) the candidate who acquired the 2nd highest number of votes, or
(b) the Vice Mayor? Decide.
The candidate who acquired the 2nd highest number of votes will succeed him because the rule on succession does
not apply to a non-candidate. Under jurisprudence, if a candidate is disqualified by reason of misrepresentation, such
candidate’s Certificate of Candidacy is deemed as not to have been filed. In such cases, succession does not apply
since succession presupposes that there was a valid Certificate of Candidacy. (Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 195649, April 16, 2013)
56. AAA filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for City Mayor. However, his CoC was subsequently canceled
for his material misrepresentation. He was, thereafter, substituted by his wife, BBB. CCC, another candidate
for the City Mayor, opposed BBB’s substitution alleging her substitution was void because there was no
candidate to substitute for because AAA’s CoC was canceled. Decide.
CCC’s contention is correct because for there to be a valid substitution, the candidate substituted must have had a
valid Certificate of Candidacy. Under jurisprudence, when a candidate is disqualified by reason of misrepresentation,
his Certificate of Candidacy will be canceled, and said candidate will be deemed not to have filed his Certificate of
Candidacy. (Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)
57. Distinguish a petition to deny due course or to cancel Certificate of Candidacy (COC) and a petition for
disqualification.
Petition to deny due course or to cancel COC Petition for disqualification
Grounds Concerned with the false representation by a Relates to the declaration of a candidate
candidate as to material information in the COC as ineligible or lacking in quality or
accomplishment fit for the elective
position said candidate is seeking
What should Proof of deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or Possession of a disqualification as
be proved hide a fact relating to the candidate's requisite declared by a final decision of a
for petition residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal competent court, or as found by the
to prosper qualification necessary to run for elective office Commission
Prescriptive Within five days from the last day of filing of COCs, but Any day after the last day of the filing of
Period not later than 25 days from the filing of the COC sought COC, but not later than the date of the
to be canceled proclamation
Effects The person whose certificate is canceled or denied due A disqualified person is merely prohibited
course is not treated as a candidate at all; to continue as a candidate;
One whose COC was denied due course or canceled A disqualified candidate may still be
cannot be substituted because the law considers him substituted if they had a valid COC in the
or her to not have been a candidate at all first place
(Buenafe et. al vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426, June 28, 2022 [Landmark Case Q&A])
58. Distinguish an election contest filed with the PET from a petition for quo warranto.
Election Contest Petition for Quo Warranto
Grounds Anchored on allegations of electoral frauds, anomalies, Attacks the protestee's ineligibility or
or irregularities in the protested precincts specific acts of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines
Who may file Limited to the registered candidate for President or May be filed by any registered voter
Vice-President of the Philippines who received the who has voted in the election
second or third highest number of votes concerned.
Prescriptive Within thirty days after the proclamation of the winner Within ten days after the proclamation
Period of the winner.
(Buenafe et. al vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426, June 28, 2022 [Landmark Case Q&A])
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59. What is the nature of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)?
When the Court acts as the PET, it is not a separate and distinct body from the Court itself. The constitutional provision
refers to the same "Supreme Court sitting en banc." However, it should be recognized that the proceedings before the
PET require a distinct set of rules of procedure owing to the very specific nature of its functions. Thus, the exercise of
jurisdiction of the Court En Banc as the PET is likened to the characterization of specialized courts in relation to the
then Courts of First Instance. They are the same courts having the same jurisdiction, only that specialized courts are
intended for practicality. Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution therefore should not be considered as a
limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court over the pending petitions. (Buenafe et. al vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 260374
and 260426, June 28, 2022 [Landmark Case Q&A])
(Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. no. 162230, April 28, 2010; Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18,
2000; Sec. 38, ICJ)
62. Is the Senate's power to ratify limited to treaties to the exclusion of executive agreements?
No, Article VII, Section 21 does not limit the requirement of senate concurrence to treaties alone. It may cover other
international agreements, including those classified as executive agreements, if: (1) they are more permanent in
nature; (2) their purposes go beyond the executive function of carrying out national policies and traditions; and (3)
they amend existing treaties or statutes. As long as the subject matter of the agreement covers political issues and
national policies of a more permanent character, the international agreement must be concurred in by the Senate.
The constitutional framers were not linguistically ignorant. Treaties follow a different process to become part of the
law of the land. Their delineation from generally accepted principles of international law was deliberate. So was the
use of different terminologies and mechanisms in rendering them valid and effective. (Pangilinan vs. Cayetano, G.R.
no. 238875. March 16, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A]).
63. Does the president enjoy unbridled authority to unilaterally withdraw from a treaty?
No, at no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority to withdraw from treaties
or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be anchored on a determination that they run afoul of the
Constitution or a statute. Any such determination must have clear and definite basis; any wanton, arbitrary,
whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is correctible by judicial review. Moreover, specific circumstances attending
Congress's injunction on the executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or the Senate's specification of the need for
its concurrence to be obtained in a withdrawal, binds the president and may prevent him or her from proceeding
with withdrawal. (Pangilinan vs. Cayetano, G.R. no. 238875. March 16, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
64. What are the guidelines for evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal from international
agreements?
a. The president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines to be contrary
to the Constitution or statutes.
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b. The president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into pursuant to congressional
imprimatur.
c. Third, the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate concurred and
expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence. (Pangilinan vs. Cayetano, G.R. no.
238875. March 16, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
65. When is senate concurrence required in withdrawing from a treaty or international agreement?
Senate concurrence to withdraw from a treaty or international agreement is required (a) when the Senate
conditionally concurs, such that it requires concurrence also to withdraw; or (b) when the withdrawal itself will be
contrary to a statute, or to a legislative authority to negotiate and enter into a treaty, or an existing law which
implements a treaty. (Pangilinan vs. Cayetano, G.R. no. 238875. March 16, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
66. On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. On
March 16, 2018, it formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations
Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this communication the following day,
March 17, 2018. Can the court annul the action of the President of withdrawing from the International
Criminal Court?
No. Through the said actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This was all consistent and
in compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. By this point, all that were needed to enable withdrawal
have been consummated. Further, the International Criminal Court acknowledged the Philippines' action soon after
it had withdrawn. This foreclosed the existence of a state of affairs correctible by this Court's finite jurisdiction. The
International Criminal Court's subsequent consummate acceptance of the withdrawal all but confirmed the futility of
this Court's insisting on a reversal of completed actions. (Pangilinan vs. Cayetano, G.R. no. 238875. March 16, 2021
[Landmark Case Q&A])
Contiguous Zone The contiguous zone is an area of water which does not exceed 24 nautical miles from
the baseline, hence, it extends 12 nautical miles from the territorial sea’s edge.
Exclusive An exclusive economic zone is an area which extends not more than 200 nautical miles
Economic Zone beyond the baseline.
Continental Shelf Continental or Archipelagic Shelf refers to (a) Submarine area’s seabed and subsoil
adjacent to the coastal state but is outside the territorial sea, until the depth of 200 meters
or, beyond the limit, to a depth which allows exploitation, and (b) Areas of seabed and
subsoil adjacent to the islands.
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69. What are the areas not subject to the jurisdiction of individual states?
High Seas Deep Outer Space
Seabed
The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. The sea-bed The exploration and
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by and ocean use of outer space,
this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter floor, and the including the Moon
alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: subsoil and other celestial
(a) freedom of navigation; thereof, bodies, shall be
(b) freedom of overflight; beyond the carried out for the
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; limits of benefit and in the
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted national interests of all
under international law, subject to Part VI; jurisdiction, countries,
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; as well as the irrespective of their
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. resources of degree of economic
These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the the area, are or scientific
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, the common development, and
and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect heritage of shall be the province
to activities in the Area. mankind. of all mankind.
(Art. 87, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; (No. 1, Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed; Art. 1, Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies)
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78. When is there an armed conflict?
An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State (Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 96–127 (Oct. 2, 1995).
79. Distinguish between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law.
International Humanitarian Law International Human Rights Law
Set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to Set of international rules, established by treaty or
limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who custom, on the basis of which individuals and groups
are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and can expect and/or claim certain rights that must be
restricts the means and methods of warfare. It is also respected and protected by their States. The body of
known as the law of war. international human rights standards also contains
numerous non-treaty-based principles and guidelines.
Applied in times of war or armed conflict. Applied in times of war and peace.
Protect persons who are not or no longer taking part in Protect individuals at all times against arbitrary acts by
hostilities; protects civilians and combatants hors de their respective States.
combat including the wounded, sick, or prisoners of war
Obligations under IHL do not permit any derogation. Some human rights treaties permit government
The core principle is to distinguish between civilians and derogation from certain obligations, provided that it is
combatants and the prohibition against inflicting proportional and necessary to the crisis.
unnecessary suffering.
80. Define international conflict, internationalized conflict, and non-international armed conflict.
International Conflict Internationalized Conflict Non-International Conflict
All cases of declared war or of any If a foreign Power sends troops into a Armed conflict not of an
other armed conflict which may arise territory to support a movement opposing international character
between two or more of the High the local government. Intervention may occurring in the territory of
Contracting Parties, even if the state also take place by proxy when that Power one of the High Contracting
of war is not recognized by one of merely supports and guides the uprising Parties.
them. from a distance.
(Art 2 [1], Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12
August 1949 [GCI]; International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
Judgment [Appeals Chamber], 15 July 1999, para 84; Art 3[1], GCI)
82. What are the crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court?
The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as
a whole. The Court has jurisdiction with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against
humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression. (Article 5, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court)
85. What cases are covered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration? Is this absolute?
The Permanent Court shall be competent for all arbitration cases, unless the parties agree to institute a special
Tribunal. However, The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court may, within the conditions laid down in the Regulations,
be extended to disputes between non-Signatory Powers, or between Signatory Powers and non-Signatory Powers, if
the parties are agreed on recourse to this Tribunal. (Article 21 and 26, 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Dispute)
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