G.R. No.

L-18463 October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant. (ACQUITTED)
MALCOLM, J.:

Facts:
1. About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M.
Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of
testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies had disappeared
from his office.
2. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into special session
by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the Senate informed the body of the loss
of the documents and of the steps he took to discover the guilty party.
3. The day following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the
newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article against
the Philippine Senate.
4. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code – a provision that punishes those who insult the Crown's Ministers.
5. The defendant was found guilty in the municipal court and in CFI Manila.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can
be applied in the case at bar?

Held: No.

Reasoning:
REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of
the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King.
However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor
their representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty
over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of
the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the
SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the state to its inhabitants,
thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on the
acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot
be applied to the present case. Therefore, the respondent was acquitted.

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, respondent. (DISMISSED)
MAKASIAR, J:

Facts:
1. On August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals, with “acts unbecoming a judge when the latter purchased a property
which was previously the subject of litigation on which he rendered decision.
2. Respondent and his wife were also members of Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares and interests in said property were
conveyed.

3. According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly violated Article 1491, par. 5, of

the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was
one of those properties involved in in a case decided by him and that

4. he likewise violated Article 14, par. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3,
par. H, of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a
judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent Judge violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E.
2. Whether or not respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc.

Held: NO and NO

Reasoning:
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under [paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce] because there is no showing that respondent participated or
intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the
corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection
with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where
respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance.

It is [the Court’s] considered view that although [paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14] is
incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the
Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the
relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like
justices and judges.

G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, respondents. (DIVIDED)
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
1. The Ratification Case: On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a case against
the Executive Secretary and the secretaries of National Defense, Justice and
Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from
implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the
present Constitution" referring to that of 1935.

2. Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate

implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including,"
and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the
said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the
Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed
Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification
by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to
ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."

Issue:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 involves a
justiciable or political question.

2. Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution has been ratified to said
Art. XV of the1935 Constitution

Held: Divided

1. First Issue: On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and myself, or six (6) members
of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a
justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote
squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second
question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as is claimed there has
been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or
not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court
should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court
may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the
1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or
three (3) members of the Court held that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit
of judicial inquiry."

2. Second Issue:
On the second question of the validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also held that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified
in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only
one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law
and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.

G.R. No. L-2348 February 27, 1950

GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee, (WON)
vs.
BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.:

Facts:
1. In April 1947, the Collector of Internal Revenue required a member of the
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto, to pay income tax upon his salary
during the year 1946.

2. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of
First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being
taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of
the Constitution.

3. Constitution Article VIII, section 9, 1935 Consti: members of the Supreme Court
and all judges of inferior courts “Justice shall receive such compensation as may be
fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Now,
does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a
diminution thereof? Yes. Page 534 of volume 11 of the American Law Reports
answers the question in the affirmative. Where the Constitution of a state provides
that the salaries of its judicial officers shall not be dismissed during their continuance
in office, it had been held that the state legislature cannot impose a tax upon the
compensation paid to the judges of its court.

Issue:
Whether or not members of the judiciary are subject to income tax

Held: No.

Reasoning:

They are not subject to income tax as imposition which constitutes diminution
and thus is violative of the Constitution. Our Constitution provides in its Article
VIII, section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts" shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office." The prohibition is general,
contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed against all diminution,
whether for one purpose or another. The fathers of the Constitution intended to
prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, and they regarded the
independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any
revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the
salary of a judge as a part of his income is a violation o f t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n . It a l s o p r o v i d e s th a t " u n t i l C o n g r e s s shall provide
o t h e r w i s e , t h e C h i e f J u s t i c e o f t h e S u p r e m e Court shall receive an
annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos". When in 1945 Mr. Justice
Perfecto assumed office, C o n g r e s s h a d n o t " p r o v i d e d o t h e r w i s e " , b y
f i x i n g a d i ff e r e n t salary for associate justices. He received a salary at the
rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.
DOCTRINE: Intent of the framers; Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemus or “Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we distinguish.”’

G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees, (WON)
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for
appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Facts:
1. Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice
Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590
providing that there’s no tax exemption to any public officers and declaring it as not a
diminution.

2. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of the appellant Collector
of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not
received favourably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation,
Congress enacted Republic Act No.590.

3. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the
pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became
Republic Act No. 590.

Issue:
Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD: No.

Reasoning: The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts
have the power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In
Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the functions of the courts
when it inserted the phrase: “payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a
diminution of their salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment
of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office,” found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries
of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and
jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory
act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any
binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute
is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would
be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer
is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution.

G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER,
SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. (DISMISSED)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Facts:

The Chief Justice directed the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the
Supreme Court to discontinue the withholding of taxes from the salaries of the
Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of
the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc.

Judges Nitafan, Polo and Savellano from RTC Manila filed a petition to prohibit
and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial
Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from
their salaries. They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."

Issue:
Whether or not the members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes

Held: No.

Reasoning:
The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax
applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not
clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission regarding the constitutional provision in question until it
was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers
was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of
that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by
the framers.

Hence, the doctrine in Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia vs. David (declared the
salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and
considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in
office) do not apply anymore. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of
the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import
of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents. (DISMISSED)
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Facts:
1. Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, Respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding shares of
the Manila Hotel. There were two entities who participated in the bidding: Petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel (MHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy the shares at
₱ 41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the shares at
₱ 44.00 per share. Eventually, MHC matched the bid price of Renong Berhad at ₱
44.00 per share. MHC even sent a manager’s check to GSIS which the latter
refused. Apprehensive about the GSIS’ refusal, MHC filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus before the Supreme Court.

2. MHC invokes Paragraph 2, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
(commonly known as the “Filipino First Policy”) where it states that in grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. In the same vein, MHC submits that
Manila Hotel has become a part of the national patrimony for its importance in the
national Filipino heritage. Also, the ownership of shares by the GSIS shows that they
are engaged in the hotel business, which makes them part of the national economy.
Thus, the aforementioned constitutional provision can be invoked. Further, MHC
should be considered the preferred bidder since the bidding rules provide that the
shares must be awarded to qualified bidders in case the highest bidder cannot be
awarded the same, provided that the qualified bidders matched the highest bid.

3. On the other hand, GSIS maintains that Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution
cannot be invoked because it is not self-executing and would require an
implementing legislation. Granting that the said provision is self-executing, the
Manila Hotel cannot be considered a part of the national patrimony because it only
refers to lands of public domain, waters, minerals, etc. Further, granting that Manila
Hotel is part of the national patrimony, GSIS is not selling its land or the building, but
its shares of ownership.

Issue:
Whether or not Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution may be invoked as a self-
executing provision.

Held: Yes.
Reasoning:
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by
the executive branch or entered by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract.

While the Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) may be couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as it is consistent
with the Constitution. The SC remarked that Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.

The SC added further that there is a presumption that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing and minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. However, a provision which is
complete and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S.
AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON
RAMA, petitioners,
vs.
HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN.
ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES;
AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondents. (DISMISSED)
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p

Facts:
1. Nine cases of petitions are all about petitions of habeas corpus
2. Petitioners including Benigno S. Aquino Jr. were arrested and held pursuant to
General Order No. 2 issued by the President exercising his powers under martial law
“for being participants or having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize
political and state power in the country and take over the Government by force”
3. The proclamation referred to the provision of the 1935 Constitution provides that
“the President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces of the
Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion.

Issues:
1. Whether the Court may require into the validity of Proclamation No. 1081
2. Is the power to declare martial law by the President subject to judicial inquiry? Is
the question political or justiciable?

Held: No, it’s justiciable.

Reasoning:
(J. Makalintal: In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without
need of receiving evidence as in an ordinary adversary court proceeding, that a state
of rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation No. 1081 was issued.

Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court as
stated in their opinions, is that the question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has
been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution Art. XVII, Sec.
3(2)

Finally, the political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this

Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for
the proclamation of martial law — has become moot and purposeless as a
consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973.

The question propounded to the voters was: “Under the (1973) Constitution, the
President, if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want
President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under
Martial Law?” The overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots, including
citizens between 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal. The question
was thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the Constitution and
transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the
exercise of that power by the President in the beginning — whether or not purely
political and therefore non-justiciable — this Court is precluded from applying its
judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign.

G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE A CONCEPCION, C.J.:ND THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, respondents. (DISMISSED)
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Facts:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of
plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them
from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in
the present 1935 Constitution.

This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter
and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly
situated.

Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate
implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said

proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of
the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to
approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the
proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and
any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a
justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or
without valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in force.
HELD:

First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon
whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935 Constitution.

It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution

should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the
alleged ratification of the old constitution.

The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance
with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as
jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution)
shall show.

Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those
lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the
Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the
Citizen’s assemblies void.

Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that

persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means
by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or
segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s
Assemblies must be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void.

Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices
made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in
plebiscites.

This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we
had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely,
uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the
voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when
necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision
of COMELEC is void.

The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the
intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the
Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73.

The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of
checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said
plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which
form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended,
to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the
alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same
are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.

Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935
Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the
Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the
alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102.

Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of
Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified
to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines.
The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a
matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in
many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices
of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition
of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition

normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual
acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional
recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly
assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law
of Public Officers.

The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not
constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court
prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and
their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions,
some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently
thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No.
1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these
conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to
remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action
under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning
legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is
an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed
Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive
department of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions
therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that
the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the
1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the
people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect;
and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without
prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a
plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the
1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the
time of such plebiscite.

Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have
accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely,
Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes
to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986 (DISMISSED)

ALAMPAY, J.:

Facts:
1. Petitions were filed questioning the validity of BP 883, calling a special election for
President and Vice-President on February 7, 1986.

2. The law was enacted following the letter of President Marcos to the BP that he
was "irrevocably vacating the position of President effective only when the election is
held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as Pres. by taking his oath of
office ten days after his proclamation."

3. The principal ground for the challenge to the validity of the statute was that the
conditional resignation of the President did not create a vacancy required by Article
VII, Sec. 9 which authorized the calling of a special election.

Issues:
1. Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court should allow incumbent President Marcos
to run on that said special election.

Held:
After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to dismiss. On the other hand, 5 Justices voted to
declare the statute unconstitutional.

In accordance with Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, of the view that as there were
less than ten votes for declaring BP 883 unconstitutional.

The petitions should be dismissed.

On the second issue, it turned out to be a political question. It can only be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election.

Thus, it is outside the ambit of the courts. (political)

The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot,
either to the give the incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new president.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO(G.R. No. 73748 -

May 22, 1986)

FACTS:
1.On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 1 announcingthat she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.2.On
March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquinogovernment assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed througha direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units
of the New ArmedForces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs
to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held
that:1.The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in
effective control of the entire country;

2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure

government; and

3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

[A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.]

LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals
dated 14 November 1990.

Facts:
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a
letter dated Nov. 14, 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of
his seniority ranking in the CA. It appears from the records that petitioner was first
appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office
on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, “An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.” He was then
appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy
minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought
about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary. A Screening
Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as
an exercise of her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the
petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the
petitioner’s ranking changed from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that
the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued
order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno’s request. A motion for
consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the
change of ranking. They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment
because the court he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of
his last appointment.

Issue:
Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of the CA and IAC
that would negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner existing prior to
said EO No. 33.

Held:
The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it
was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary
government of Corazon Aquino in the people's power. A revolution has been defined
as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it as a sudden, radical, and fundamental
change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence. A
government as a result of a people’s revolution is considered de jure if it is already
accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany,
Japan, and others. In the new government under Pres. Aquino, was installed through
the direct exercise of Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would
negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C.
TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M.
RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the
Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of
the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS,
RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and
TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents. (DISMISSED)

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Facts:

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was
elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known
as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M. de Leon received a Memorandum

antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin
Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as
Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The other petitioners were
also replaced. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the
Minister of Local Government."

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982
(BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on
June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall
have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to
replace them and to designate their successors.

Issue:

Whether or not the Memorandum issued by the OIC Governor designating the
respondents to replace the petitioners from their respective positions was valid.
Held:

The Supreme Court held it was not valid. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a
plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent
OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate
respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure especially

considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State
to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities. Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures
the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the
barangays form a part, and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over
local governments. Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution
further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore,
the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982
should still govern.

Principles:

"SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and... qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25, 1986."

"Sec. 27 - This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all
previous
Constitutions."

"Sec. 8. - The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x "

"Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of

instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or... revoked."