THE CRIMEA MODELAuthor(s): SAMANTHA BRLETICH

Source: Geopolitics, History, and International Relations , Vol. 7, No. 1 (2015), pp. 11-29
Published by: Addleton Academic Publishers

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 Geopolitics, History, and International Relations
Volume 7(1), 2015, pp. 11–29, ISSN 1948-9145

THE CRIMEA MODEL: WILL RUSSIA ANNEX

THE NORTHERN REGION OF KAZAKHSTAN?

SAMANTHA BRLETICH
sbrletich2@gmail.com
George Mason University

ABSTRACT. This article will explore the possible future annexation of Kazakhstan’s
northern region in the context of the annexation of Crimea. The Crimea Model will
identify the conditions that would lead to possible annexation of a country/part of a
country by Russia. The Crimea Model will be applied to Kazakhstan and will be
examined through the Kazakh-Russian relationship, a socio-cultural and historical
lens, and current events. Conclusions will be drawn using current events to determine
if Kazakhstan will be annexed by Russia.

Keywords: Russia; Ukraine; Kazakhstan; Crimea; Eurasia; Nazarbayev; Putin; conflict

Received 1 October 2014 • Received in revised form 15 February 2015
Accepted 15 February 2015 • Available online 1 April 2015

1. Introduction
Ukraine’s Crimea Peninsula was annexed unlawfully by referendum held by
pro-Russian separatists backed by Russia; the referendum is viewed as illegal.
Russian President Vladimir Putin was accused of backing the pro-Russian
separatists to take over Eastern Ukraine after he annexed Crimea. President
Putin denies the annexation was politically motivated and driven by Soviet-
reunification desires, but rather driven by the need to protect ethnic Russians
in Crimea. The international community found that justification to be unaccept-
able and has imposed several rounds of economic sanctions on Russian busi-
nessmen, companies, and oligarchs who are associated with President Putin
and Russian goods. The swift annexation of Crimea has many former Soviet
states worrying they might be next. Outside of Ukraine, multiple pro-Russian
breakaway republics such as Transdnestr in Moldova would welcome such
annexation as well as the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
in the Georgian Republic. There are other at-risk countries that have a sizeable
ethnic Russian population such as Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Kazakhstan.
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 The current political situation in Kazakhstan has gone largely ignored and
the relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan and the friendship between
President Putin and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev is not well
publicized despite its importance for the region. Arguably, the relationship
between Russia and Kazakhstan is the strongest of Russian relationships with
the Former Soviet Republics and both countries have benefitted economically,
politically, and in the realms of military and security. While all of these rela-
tionships remain strong, Kazakhstan is becoming increasingly at risk for Rus-
sian annexation of its Northern region, where there is a high concentration of
ethnic Russians residing.
The anti-Russian, pro-West, pro-European Union EuroMaidain protests
in Ukraine that began in November 2013 fueled by pro-Russian Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Ukraine-EU Association
Agreement, his fleeing from Ukraine, and the seizing of government build-
ings by pro-Russia militants, led to the referendum of Crimea’s annexation
officially making Crimea part of Russia on March 16, 2014. Due to the large-
scale protests, rioting, and violence that tainted the EuroMaidan protests in
Kiev, Putin claimed that ethnic Russians were being poorly treated in Crimea.
After months of fighting and a moderately successful offensive ordered by
new Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, the situation in Ukraine is at a
crossroads. Russian presence in Ukraine confirmed by NATO and an ex-
pected NATO troop force of 4,000 can worsen the situation in Ukraine and
result in another frozen conflict similar to the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova.

2. Current Political Event:

The 2014 Annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea Peninsula
Crimea Model. The situation in Crimea provides for a new international
affairs model, the Crimea Model, which serves as a model for Russian
political and expansionist ambitions in the Former Soviet Union space. The
Crimea Model is based on the recent events in Crimea, where a larger and
more powerful state violates the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of a
smaller nation as a result of political motivations, but disguises its actions as
being motivated by humanitarian or “protectionist” reasons. As a result, the
targeted territory within a country or a full country itself was annexed or given
a more autonomous self-determination status favoring Russia.
There are multiple mandatory conditions for this model to occur: deep
historical linkages (cultural, political, and/or social), a triggering political event,
a willing population to submit to the annexing country, and the perception
that the population’s well-being will be improved – many ethnic Russians in
Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine (although not annexed) feel their life will be
better ruled by Russia. There must also be a large ethnic Russian population
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(relative to size of the total population) concentrated in one geographic area,
Russian-speaking ethnic Russians who are aggressive and nationalistic, per-
ceptions of discrimination among ethnic Russians, a weak government that
cannot govern within its own borders, and poor social welfare conditions.
The population that wishes to be governed by Russia is most likely suffering
from a culture and identity crisis, as the population is torn between historic
and current social identities. Social, religious, or linguistic divides also facil-
itate the Crimea Model.
The Russian policy of protecting Russians abroad is not new. The Russian
Federation has evoked the policy of protection for ethnic Russian minorities
in the near abroad states of Georgia and in Ukraine (Crimea). In 1993, then
President Boris Yeltsin, proposed that ethnic Russians be granted special
status where “national minorities” would be guaranteed full citizenship rights
within the new Former Soviet Republics (Erlanger 1993, par. 10). This policy
known as the Karaganov Doctrine – named after Yeltsin’s advisor Sergei
Karaganov – allowed Russia to justify intervention in the former Soviet Re-
publics based on poor treatment of ethnic Russians. This was a proposal pre-
cipitated by ethnic Russians complaining of poor treatment; the proposal was
heavily rejected for concerns about nationalism, expansionism, chauvinism,
xenophobia, and territorial integrity (Erlanger 1993, par. 4). Kazakh President
Nazarbayev was quoted as saying that the Kazakhstan Constitution does not
provide for such things meaning there will be no violations of Kazakhstan’s
territorial integrity. During the 1990s, Russia was unable to implement the
Karaganov Doctrine due to a shaky economy and a fragile political situation,
but with increased economic growth and a more assertive foreign policy and
a less-than-willing West to interfere, Russia now has the ability to implement
this policy and claim exclusive interest in the region.
The situation in Crimea resulted from a combination of factors separate
from the EuroMaidan protests. In Crimea there is a large ethnic Russian and
Russian-speaking population; Russian naval military presence in Sevastopol;
increased tensions between the Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, and ethnic Rus-
sians; and poor territorial governance and social problems in Ukraine. Crimea
is the only part of Ukraine that has political autonomy, which was granted by
the Ukrainian Constitution. Crimea has its own Constitution, Parliament, and
its own Prime Minister approved by the President of Ukraine. Crimea has
three official languages: Russian, Tatar, and Ukrainian. Russian is the most
widely spoken: there are “987 Russian-language printed media in Crimea,
there are only five published in Ukrainian and four in Crimean Tatar” (Sha-
povalova and Jarabik 2009, 2–3). Fifty-eight percent of the two million
population of Crimea is ethnic Russian, according to a 2001 census; 24% are
Ukrainians.

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 A December 2008 public poll conducted by Razumkov Center, a Kiev
think tank, inquired, “With which cultural tradition do you associate yourself?”:
55.5% of those polled identified themselves as Russian, 8.3% as Ukrainian,
8.6% as Crimean Tatar, and 7.4% identified themselves as pan-European
(Razumkov Center 2008, chart).1 In a 2009 follow-up study, 32% of Crimeans
did not consider Ukraine to be their home country, 48% would like to change
their citizenship mostly to Russian, and 63% would like for Crimea to join
Russia (Shapovalova and Jarabik 2009, 3). This could be the result of the
Ukrainian government failing to incorporate Crimea “fully into Ukraine’s
political and social context” as most Crimeans tend to identify with Russian
authorities (Shapovalova and Jarabik 2009, 4). The linguistic divide of Ukraine
has facilitated conditions for the Crimean Model. The linguistic divide also
reflects a political divide as former President Yanukovych’s supporters were
pro-Russia and resided in the Eastern side of the country. With a strong link
to the Russian identity, it was inevitable that separatist movements in Ukraine
would call for Crimea to become part of Russia. Kazakhstan is/was faced
with a similar situation.
The Russia-Kazakh Relationship. The relationship between Kazakhstan and
Russia before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1980–1990) is worth
examining. This period of relations set the stage for Russia and Kazakh re-
lations today, although they have changed dramatically. Kazakh-Russian
relations were not harmonious during the period of 1980–1990 (Kaiser and
Chinn 1995, 257). The 1980s was marred by ethnic conflicts and nationalism,
discriminatory laws, unequal representation in governing bodies, and Kazakh-
based favoritism. During the 1980s, the Kazakh elites began to reverse the
Russification of Kazakhstan that occurred during the Soviet Era (Kaiser and
Chinn 1995, 262). The inimical relationship was driven by the process of
Kazakhization and the “policies and processes [that] have the objective of
redefining multinational Kazakhstan into a [singular cultural] Kazakh State”
(Kaiser and Chinn 1995, 257, 258). The Kazakh nationalist policy was focused
on securing Kazakhstan’s independence, the return of Kazakh lands to the
Kazakh people, and the establishment of Kazakh religious and language
rights (Smagulova 2006, 307). At this time, Russians were still the majority
in Kazakhstan, but were also the “political, cultural, and social elite” (Kaiser
and Chinn 1995, 306).
The Kazakh reaction to the flood of Russians into their country pre-Soviet
collapse was anti-Russian and anti-tsarist (Kaiser and Chinn 1995, 258).
Even though Russians held considerable influence after World War II and
before perestroika, the fear of worsening interethnic relations “accelerated
the pace of Russian emigration in the 1990s” (Kaiser and Chinn 1995, 260).
Many feared rising irredentism and “forced acculturation” at the hand of the
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Kazakhs (Kaiser and Chinn 1995, 264). In 1986, the year of perestroika, the
Alma-Ata Riots in December “[marked] the beginning of a political reorien-
tation away from Moscow” and “allowed for political Kazakhization” (Kaiser
and Chinn 1995, 265). The riots were student protests and the first real
Muslim revolt in the Soviet Union, which was anti-Russian and executed by
Soviet-educated students (Kaiser and Chinn 1995, 265). Nazarbayev’s political
maneuvering reduced interethnic tension with the passing of the “Friendship
of the Peoples,” policy which guaranteed inter-ethnic equality in Kazakhstan
(Kaiser and Chinn 1995, 266).
The Kazakh-Russian relationship after the collapse of the Soviet Union
(1991–2000). The policies of Kazakhization continued during the period
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This period of Kazakh-Russian
relations was also heavily influenced by the creation of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS). This period was marked by external economic
and political integration as “this period saw concerted efforts to establish a
new model for bilateral economic and political co-operation” (Vinokurov
2010, 2). Kazakhstan considered itself the “Eurasia bridge” which defined
Kazakh relations with Russia, as well as Kazakh economic and political
integration policies, arguably from 1991 until today (Vinokurov 2010, 2).
Nazarbayev, who was a proponent of Eurasian integration, based the policies
on two principles: free will of association and equality of rights (Anceschi and
Sorbello 2014, par. 4).
Kazakhstan gained its independence in 1991 and the government began
enacting pro-Kazakh policies, giving preference to Kazakhs and smaller ethnic
groups who lived in the country. In October 1992, Kazakhstan and Russia
established formal diplomatic relations. Kazakhstan was the last Former Soviet
Republic to declare independence – a symbolic gesture showing Kazakhstan’s
loyalty to Russia. President Nursultan Nazarbayev was interested in renewing
relations with Russia and the Former Soviet Republics to preserve a stable
regional political situation, to protect Kazakh interests, and to pursue a balanced
foreign policy. In September 1993, the CIS states signed the Agreement Estab-
lishing the Economic Union, which proved to be unrealistic; Nazarbayev
proposed the creation of the Eurasian Union in 1994 (Vinokurov 2010, 3, 4).
In January 1995, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus signed the Agreement on
Customs Union and in March 1996, Kyrgyzstan and the Customs Union
countries signed the Agreement on Enhancing Economic and Humanitarian
Integration, which aimed to circulate “goods, services, capital and labor; to
strengthen direct links between market players; and to create a common in-
formation, educational and humanitarian space” (Vinokurov 2010, 4). These
ideals have been the cornerstone of President Nazarbayev’s regional foreign
economc policy.

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 “The Assemblies of the Peoples became the principal consultative body
for nationality policy in the state” which prevented polarization between
Kazakhs and Russians; however, Kazakhs dominated the National Assembly
in 1994 and 1999 (Peyrouse 2008, 6). However, the “proportion of Russians
in the Ministry dropped sharply, from [43%] in 1989 to 14% in 1992: out of
14 regional governors in 2002, only two were Russians, those of East
Kazakhstan and Kokchutau” regions (Peyrouse 2008, 6). The March 1994
Parliamentary elections solidified the alienation of ethnic Russians in Kazakh-
stan and furthered the process of Kazakhization: 566 Kazakh candidates were
on the ballot and 128 were Russian candidates “even though voting-aged
Russians outnumbered Kazakhs” (Kaiser and Chinn 1995, 270). The 1994
Parliamentary elections “provided the most recent example of Kazakh he-
gemony seeking [nationalistic measures] and [a] Russian counter-hegemonic
[nationalist] response” (Kaiser and Chinn 1995, 270). The role of Nazarbayev
in Kazakhization was a dual role: he helped initiate the programs and also
performed the role of mediator. President Nazarbayev is a skilled diplomat
whose desire for integration forced him to make compromises on issues of
inter-ethnic harmony and he was successful.
The process of Kazakhization alienated many Russians and allowed them
to assert themselves in Kazakhstan. Many groups were interested in annexing
Northern Kazakhstan, including Russian nationalists and the Cossacks and
beginning in 1992; the “organizations were denied registration or had their
registration revoked for engaging in anti-state or pro-separatist demonstra-
tions” (Kaiser and Chin 1995, 268). Nationalists also formed the “Organiza-
tion for the Autonomy of Eastern Kazakhstan” (Kaiser and Chinn 1995, 267).
Furthermore, Kazkhization made Kazakh the primary language in govern-
ment. The language barrier also caused problems since 55% of Russian civil
servants only understood little of the Kazakh language and 22% admitted that
they did not speak/understand Kazakh (Peyrouse 2008, 6). However, Russians
in Kazakhstan had political rights and could explain the lack of collective
political actions by Russian minorities in Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan’s balancing act between the treatment of ethnic Russians and
the Kazakh state evolved into Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy, which
strives to maintain ties with Russia while “[pursuing] its interests in all sig-
nificant regions, including Russia, the CIS, [other] Central Asia [states],
Europe, the Pacific, the Islamic world and developed industrial countries”
(Vinokurov 2010, 4). In July 1998, three additional bilateral agreements were
signed to boost cooperation: the Declaration On Eternal Friendship and
Alliance, the Agreement On Delimitation of the Sea Bottom in the North
Caspian for Exercising Sovereignty Rights to the Utilization of Subsoil, and
an agreement on the Baikonur Cosmodrom (Vinokurov 2010, 4–5). In October
of 1998, Kazakhstan and Russia signed the Agreement and Programme to
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Enhance Economic Co-operation between the Russian Federation and the
Republic of Kazakhstan (Vinokurov 2010, 5).
The Current Kazakh-Russian relationship (2001–present). Between 2009
and 2014, the countries grew closer diplomatically, politically, and econom-
ically. There also has been an increased focus on energy policy. One common
theme is increased economic integration, with Kazakhstan taking the most
proactive approach by proposing new initiatives. After 2000, Nazarbayev
shifted towards Russia, most likely due to changes in Russian leadership,
which was described as more “pragmatic, capable of achieving tangible results,
and determined to restore Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space” (Vino-
kurov 2010, 6). In 2003, within the framework of Eurasia Economic Com-
munity (EurAsEC), Nazarbayev introduced a single currency, and later
proposed a regional currency, the yevraz (Vinokurov 2010, 7). The bilateral
relationship has also branched off into other areas of integration, including
political and security-based relationships, which have continued to enhance
the relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan.
Russia and Kazakhstan shared multiple memberships in regional organiza-
tions including the CIS, the Customs Union, the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and
the newly formed Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) which entered into force
in January 2015. The CSTO and the SCO are to act as a counterweight to the
European Union and NATO. The CSTO and SCO organizations have held
military exercises to combat terrorism, extremism, separatism – better known
as the three evils.
The relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia has been shaken due to
Putin’s remarks questioning Kazakhstan’s statehood. From 2000 to present,
there have been numerous incidents were Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity
was either threatened by conspirators (in Oskemen in 2000) or by Russian
nationalists including the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) leader
Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Kazakhstan’s economy also suffered and many feel
will continue to suffer if Kazakhstan pursues membership in the EaEU.
Kazakhstan and The Crimea Model. The current situation in Kazakhstan
does not meet all of the criteria for the Crimea Model. However, the Crimea
Model can serve as a predictive model to determine if Kazakhstan is at risk.
The main factor of the Crimea Model that places Kazakhstan at risk is Kazakh-
stan’s large ethnic Russian population which has dwindled. Kazakhstan has
the largest ethnic Russian population in the Former Soviet Union, roughly four
million, almost a quarter of a 17.6 million population. Kazakhstan’s large
ethnic Russian minority makes Kazakhstan’s Northern Region, where most
ethnic Russians live, vulnerable to annexation. Russians first settled in Central
Asia in the 18th century and Russian colonists legally settled in 1896; the
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Russian population increased to fifteen million in 1916 (Peyrouse 2008, 2). The
“Virgin Lands Campaign” program relocated two million Russian, Ukrainian,
and Belarusian persons to Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s non-Kazakh population
to skyrocket: the Russian population in Kazakhstan rose to 20.6% in 1926
and was 42.7% in 1959 and the population of ethnic Kazakhs dropped to
30% (Peyrouse 2008, 2; Zardykhan 2010, 65). Kazakhstan lost half a million
people during the 1970s and in the 1980s “Kazakhstan lost an additional
784,000 people (between 60,000 and 85,000 each year)” and experienced a
negative migratory outflow: for every 1,000 that settled, 1,256 left (Peyrouse
2008, 2).
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russians emigrated out of Kazakhstan
because of a declining standard of living, policies of Kazakhization, and a
bleak future for Russian youth, poor educational opportunities, pro-Kazakh
linguistic policies, and loss of identity with the new Kazakhstan. Between
1989 and 1999, the Russian population decreased from 6 million to 4.5 million
“with an average departure per year of 150,000 individuals” (Peyrouse 2008,
6). In the 1990s, emigrating Russians came from the southern and western
areas and these regions lost approximately 35% of their population: Astana
lost 122,000, or 24%, Northern Kazakhstan lost 186,000, or 20%, and the
Karaganda region lost 335,000, or 19% of its population (Peyrouse 2008, 4).
Emigration during the 1990s hit a peak in 1994 when 300,000 were Russians
left in Kazakhstan. In 1997, only 20% of Russians in Kazakhstan identified
with the new post-Soviet Kazakhstan because “the economic collapse of the
1990s, the obliteration of Russian and Soviet cultural symbols, and the
ethnicization of public offices contributed” to exclusionary and anti-Russian
policies alienating ethnic Russians (Peyrouse 2008, 22). In a 1998 poll, “13.2%
of Slavs [stated] that there [were] conscious efforts to support one ethnic group
and exclude the other” meaning that Kazakhs favoritism (Smagulova 2006,
304). By 2000, “migration from Kazakhstan alone constituted more than 28%
of the internal migration in former Soviet territory” (Peyrouse 2008, 2).
Russians have considerable populations in the North Kazakhstan Province
(48.5% in 2006), Pavlodar Region (38.26% in 2007), Akmola Region (36.5%
Russians in 2009), Kostanay Region (28.6% in 2009), and central Karagandy
Region (39.17% in 2010). Before 1991, the ethnic Russian population in
Kazakhstan was dispersed, making annexation more difficult for Russia to
govern dispersed groups of Russians. In addition, there have been no indica-
tions among ordinary Russian citizens that they would like to see Northern
Kazakhstan annexed. Seventy percent of ethnic Russians in Petropavlovsk
acknowledge that the land does belong to Kazakhs (Kucera 2014, par. 4). No
ethnic minority has made serious claims to the Kazakh homeland because
they have their own, which tends to be either their ancestral homeland or for
ethnic Russians the Soviet Union itself (Smagulova 2006, 306).
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 Russians in Kazakhstan today are not experiencing the same discrimination
as they did during Kazakhization. Russians have political rights and their
culture is respected and celebrated. Kazakhstan annually celebrates Slavic
Orthodox Christmas. Russians also enjoy political and linguistic rights as
granted by the Kazakh Constitution. There are even symbols of Russian and
Kazakh cooperation in Petropavlovsk: a plaque equating Fyodor Dostoevsky
and Chokan Valikhanov stands in Petropavlovsk and a monument honoring
the poets Alexander Pushkin and Abai Kunanbaev stands in the city (Kucera
2014, par. 7).
Past Russian separatist tendencies have largely dissolved due to Kazakh-
stan’s modern policies of tolerance and inclusiveness. Russians do not feel
enough discrimination to create the conditions for a political event leading to
annexation. Unlike the Ukrainian government, the Kazakh government has
fully included Russians in political and social life. The Russian language is
still dominant in Kazakhstan, and is recognized as an official language,
although not a national or a state language as conferred by the Kazakh Con-
stitution of 1995. There have been rumors of a rise in Kazakh nationalism
resulting in mistreatment of Russians, and would not be enough to lead to
annexation of Northern Region of Kazakhstan. The discrimination that Rus-
sians experienced in the 1990s was worse than current conditions and Russia
did not annex the Northern Region despite calls and attempts to annex.
Kazakhstan at the time of its independence resisted calls from Cossack
groups and pro-Russian groups to incorporate Northern Kazakhstan and border
areas with a high concentration of ethnic Russians into Russia. Kazakhization
and nationalistic policies such as making Kazakh the homeland language and
the repatriation of Kazakh returnees or oralmans made Russians uneasy.
Viktor Kazimirchuk was convicted by the Kazakhstan government in 2000
for leading the separatist group “Rus” who wanted to have the Russian
Federation incorporate the border town of Oskemen into Russia (Pannier and
Karabek 2014, par. 5). Moscow indirectly supported the efforts of Kazimirchuk
by hiring Moscow lawyers to defend him and Moscow tacitly supported “Rus”
members and their goals (Pannier and Karabek 2014, par. 9). Kazimirchuk was
released in 2006. In 2007, he returned to Russia and stated that discrimination
existed against ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in East Kazakhstan
Oblast mirroring the rhetoric that led to the annexation of Crimea and the
current hostile situation in Eastern Ukraine (Pannier and Karabek 2014, par.
26, par. 28).
Linkages. In comparison to Crimea, Kazakhstan does not share the same
deep historical linkages with Russia. Crimea became a republic in the Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic after the Russian Revolution of 1917.
Crimea was a Khanate (Crimean Khanate) under the Ottoman Empire and
was conquered by the Russian Empire under Catherine the Great in 1783.
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From 1853–1856, the peninsula was the site of the Crimean War between the
Russian Empire and the alliance of the British, French, the Ottomans, and
Sardinia (modern day Italy). The Russian Empire lost the Crimean War.
During the Russian Revolution, Crimea was controlled by the White Army.
Once the Red Army defeated the White Army, Crimea became the Crimean
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921 and was occupied by Nazi
Germany from July 1942–May 1944. In 1954, Crimea was transferred to the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Crimean Peninsula has always been
part of Russia’s geostrategic ambitions.
Even though Kazakhstan and Russia have a 300 year long history, they
do not share deep strategic, military, and cultural historical linkages. Prior to
Soviet rule, Peter the Great colonized Kazakhstan at the end of the 17 th
century. The migration and resettlement of Russian peoples began in the 18th
century and continued into the 20th century until the Soviet collapse. Kazakh-
stan’s city of Petropavlovsk, which has a large Russian population, was a
defending buffer for Russia and was used to facilitate trade between local
Kazakhs and Russians (Kucera 2014, par. 5). In the 18th century, the Kazakhs
were forced to seek military protection from Russia due to multiple external
aggressors, such as the Zhungars (Oirat Mongols), the Chinese, the Bashkirs,
and the Kalmyks (Smagulova 2006, 305). The first Russian military garrisons
were built along the northwest, northern, and eastern borders, which permitted
Russian and Cossack passage into Central Asia (Smagulova 2006, 305). In
1920, Kazakhstan became a Soviet Socialist Republic within the Russian
Federation and in 1936 (Smagulova 2006, 305).
The Kazakh-Russian relationship has been based on economics, resources,
integration, and cooperation, whereas the Russia-Crimea relationship is rooted
in war and conflict. In Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet is stationed at Sevastopol
and gives the Russians naval access to Georgia and Ukraine, as well as the
ability to counter the NATO and American presence in the region. Although
there always has been a struggle for Crimea, no one is fighting over the
Northern Kazakhstan Region or the other four regions in Kazakhstan that have
a considerable ethnic Russian population. Kazakhstan holds more economic
value than military value. Russia has invested heavily into Crimea and into
Kazakhstan. Russia and Kazakhstan do share Baikonur Cosmodrome which is
used to launch Russia’s Proton-M rockets. Before the completion Nunn-Luger
Act which reduced nuclear stockpiles, Kazakhstan was the world’s third
largest nuclear power as Kazakhstan inherited nuclear stockpiles after the
Soviet Union collapsed.
Russia’s desire to maintain a positive relationship with Kazakhstan comes
from its wish to be an energy superpower. Russia has taken advantage of
Kazakhstan to maintain a certain level of influence over Kazakh energy assets
– oil and gas – since there is growing competition from China and European
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entities. Russia would like to monopolize the transportation of the oil to
secure its own economic status in the region and prevent any interference in
its Caspian Sea aspirations. During the early years following its independence,
Kazakhstan was concerned both about Russia and China violating its ter-
ritorial integrity through their economic relationship(s). Kazakhstan is one of
the world’s largest oil and gas-producing countries. Kazakhstan is also the
second largest oil and gas producer of the former Soviet Republics behind
Russia. Kazakhstan’s energy petroleum industry accounted for one-third of
its GDP in 2008. Kazakhstan has a potential total of 95–117 billion barrels
of oil reserves; proven reserves range from eight to 22 billion (IEA 1998,
203). Natural gas reserves are four trillion cubic meters and 1.5–2.35 trillion
are considered proven (IEA 1998, 221). The Kashagan oilfield is expected to
be the largest oilfield outside of the Middle East with estimated reserves of
50 bbl/d (Zabortseva 2014, 315). The “Kazakh oil is now transported mainly
through Russian territory via old Soviet pipelines…as well as via the new
[CPC] system [formed in 1992] (Tengiz-Novorossisk)” (Kazantsev 2008,
1085). The pipelines are old, decrepit, could cause environmental problems
if they burst, and are costly to repair (Kuniholm 2000, 553). Defects in other
major pipelines such as the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline have made countries
reliant upon Russia and the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline (Kuniholm
2000, 553). Kazakhstan has also relied on rail networks and shipping for
transport (USEIA 2013, 10).
On January 25, 2006, the Presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan signed a
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Russia-Kazakhstan Agreement
on Delimiting the Northern Part of the Caspian Sea, aimed at exercising
sovereign power over subsurface resource management. The instability of
Russian energy politics and its “energy arrogance” has driven Kazakhstan to
seek other energy partners, including “long-term partnerships with major inter-
national oil companies… which will enable [Kazakhstan] to exploit [their]
natural resources effectively” (Kazantsev 2008, 1086, 1087). Russia has focused
on blocking Western access to gas and oil to reduce competition: “in Central
Asia, Russia has carried out the task of neutralizing alternatives to pro-Russian
projects of integration in the post-Soviet space” (Kazantsev 2008, 1087).
Kazakhstan has taken the pragmatic foreign policy approach to demarcation
by securing its own rights while recognizing the superiority of Russia. This
political maneuvering is a pattern of Kazakhstan’s – it uses a multi-vector
foreign policy to placate and avoid confrontation with Russia despite Russia
giving Kazakhstan the short end of the stick in many situations.
Safety and Security of Russians. The events in Crimea were triggered by
a political event that threatened the safety and security of Russians according
to President Putin’s logic and the Karaganov Doctrine. However, in Kazakh-
stan, no such situation currently exists. The region of Central Asia is unstable
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and has seen Islamic extremism rise in recent decades and has seen fighters
from Central Asia travel abroad to fight in Syria and with the Islamic State. In
response, Central Asia governments have become more stringent and repressive
which has only aggravated the situation. There are multiple terrorist and
extremist groups in Central Asia, such as the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (a non-violent
pan-Sunni Islamic group), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad
Union, Soldiers of the Caliphate (Kazakhstan), and China’s East Turkestan
Islamic Movement (Uyghur-based). There are also several Uyghur separatist
groups in Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan Regional Uyghur Organizations, Kazakh
Uyghur Unity (Ittipak) Association, and the Uyghurstan Freedom Association
(Cheung 2004, 999). There is also the threat from Russia’s North Caucasus,
the return of radical jihadi fighters, and external sources of radicalization.
Kazakhstan has the largest Uyghur population in Central Asia and Kazakh-
stan has alienated the group banning pro-Uyghur movements and denying
Chinese-Uyghur citizens asylum – they were sent back to China and executed
(Oka 2006, 369). Uyghurs are labeled terrorists or extremists and are accused
of wanting to establish an Islamic Caliphate and make irredentist demands
inside Kazakhstan (Oka 2006, 369, 370). Suppressing Uyghur nationalism
aligns with SCO’s three principles and with China’s internal policy towards
Uyghurs. Many Uyghur leaders believe that the SCO is a collective way to
“suppress international [Uyghur] movements” since Uyghurs are Turkic people
who share a common ethnic heritage with other Central Asian states (Oka
2006, 369).
There have been multiple terror attacks and increasing levels of internal
instability in Kazakhstan; Russia has not intervened as the situation remains
localized. The prominent acts of terrorism and violence in Kazakhstan did
not occur in the northern part of the country, but rather in the southwestern
provinces. Two notable 2011 incidents, the Zhanaozen protests and massacre
in Mangistau and the two bombings in the oil city of Atyrau, demonstrated
that Kazakhstan was vulnerable to regional events such as extremism, crime,
and social strains. Aktobe has experienced violence and is 100km (63 miles)
from the Russian border. The Kazakhstan Government denies that many in-
cidents reported are terrorist attacks, but are criminals acts.
Another security concern would be the sudden and unexpected death of
President Nazarbayev as Kazakhstan; there is no secession plan. Nazarbayev,
who is currently 73, has no intention of leaving the presidency. According to
Kazakh government officials, he is in good health, despite reports of hospital-
ization and few TV appearances. Since Kazakhstan is a Presidential Republic,
all leadership duties fall on him. A succession crisis is unlikely, but if “Nazar-
bayev begins to lose his ability to manage intra-elite competition in the
country,” which is built on “a broad-based economic [base], with significant

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capacity, financial resources, and political ambitions,” one might occur (Roberts
2012, 2). Many attempts have been made to keep Nazarbayev in power.
In 2011, parliament held a national referendum extending his presidency
without elections until 2020. It was passed unanimously by the upper and
lower houses of the Kazakh parliament and later was rejected by the Consti-
tutional Court facing international pressures. Instead, the Kazakh parliament
sneakily “held early presidential elections three months later, and Nazarbayev
won an additional four-year term with over 95 percent of the vote” (Roberts
2012, 3). The referendum demonstrates the dependency on Nazarbayev and
why there is no apparent need for a succession plan which would undercut
Nazarbayev’s power and rule (Roberts 2012, 3). Putin has a great interest in
who will lead Kazakhstan due to Russian-Kazakh energy agreements, foreign
policy, the treatment of Russians in Kazakhstan, instability and violent Islamism
in Central Asia, and strategic relations with other Central Asian countries. One
thing to monitor will be the Kazakh multi-vector foreign policy is scrapped
or continued at the request of Russia or by the Kazakhstan’s new leader.
The possible random collapse of the Kazakh political system and the
death of Nazarbayev could endanger the Russia-Kazakhstan relationship as
the new leader might assume a Kazakh nationalist approach to foreign policy
and cut Russia out of the Central Asian sphere of influence and out of its
economic affairs. Nazarbayev’s death may also trigger a more aggressive
nationalist movement, which may result in a drastic change in ethnic equality
favoring Kazakhs. New leadership may shift Kazakhstan’s policies more to
the West, since Kazakhstan has a positive attitude toward western institutions.
Kazakhstan continues to cooperate with organizations that Russia dislikes which
may provoke Vladimir Putin to evoke the Karaganov Doctrine or instigate
political instability. New leadership may shift policies towards Russia depend-
ing on how much influence Russia has at the time.
Anti-Russia Opposition. Another concern is growing Kazakh-based national-
ism in the form of opposition and backlash against Russian-Kazakh integration.
Participants in the April 2014 Anti-Eurasia Forum meeting led by ethnic
Kazakhs recognized that Kazakhstan will suffer more since it is the weakest
among the three member-states (Anceschi and Sorbello 2014, par. 8). National-
ist movements have become more vocal as a result of the attempt at large-
scale integration. The Anti-Eurasia Forum labeled the EaEU the “axis of
dictators,” and claimed that “Eurasianism is a new form of colonization by
Russia” (Anceschi and Sorbello 2014, par. 9). There are two other opposition
movements: one movement favoring Western-style political participation and
the other, Nats Patriotsy, calling for more language rights for Kazakhs and
preservation of culture (Anceschi and Sorbello 2014, par. 15). The group that
favors Western-style government was heavily monitored and is not strong
enough to make an impact in Kazakhstan’s political sphere (Anceschi and
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Sorbello 2014, par. 14). Nats Patriotsy is important to Astana. There are
members that have reservations about government policies and officials that
have introduced legislation that would have reduced minority rights to have
the groups’ support (Anceschi and Sorbello 2014, par. 15). Nats Patriotsy
opposes the EaEU as it sees Kazakhstan being tricked into being controlled
by Russia by promises of economic wealth and full integration. Russia has
failed to keep economic promises in the past. If these protests were to be-
come large-scale and transform into anti-ethnic Russian protests, this could
provide Russia with a reason to invade and annex the northern Kazakh ter-
ritory. There have been no indications of this yet.
After Crimea was annexed, Russia failed to protect the Russians in East-
ern Ukraine: Luhansk, Donetsk, and Slavyansk expressed secessionist desires,
held referendums, and asked for a Russian peacekeeping force as they wished
to be unified with Russia; Putin called upon the leaders to delay their refer-
endums. As ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine are being killed in battles,
Russia has done nothing militarily, politically, or diplomatically to help them.
Russia has instead perpetuated the violence, endangering more Ukrainian
and Russian citizens (as some Russian persons active in the Eastern Ukraine
violence) or ethnic Russians living in Ukraine. It is apparent that Putin’s
protectionist and humanitarian doctrine is masking his true intentions and is
selective at best.
Russia has attempted to repeat history by again introducing legislation in
March 2014 that would grant Russian citizenship to anyone who speaks fluent
Russia, “and had once lived, or who had relatives who lived, on the territory
of the Soviet Union” (Trilling 2014, par. 1). The legislation would require
new Russian citizens to waive their citizenship of their current country of
residence, but would not force immigration (Trilling 2014, par. 4). This
would potentially create pockets of ethnic Russians out of the host-country’s
control, impose foreign law violating sovereignty, and an enclave of Russians
in Kazakhstan or worse, or an intra-state conflict. It is unclear if the legis-
lation would provide ethnic Russians abroad with national minority status. If
ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan were granted special status that would guar-
antee them more rights than Kazakh citizens in Kazakhstan, this would
provoke unrest. This legislation failed and such a move shows that Russia is
serious about protecting ethnic Russians abroad and about expansionism.
After the Crimea annexation, the Kazakh government “announced that it
intended to introduce laws punishing ‘illegal and unconstitutional calls for
changes to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Kazakhstan by up to 10
years in prison’” (Kucera 2014, par. 22). Similar to Russian legislation,
Kazakhstan has also promised to provide citizenship to Kazakh oralmans
(Kazakh for “returnee”). In March 2014, there was an order that required
oralmans to settle in “Akmola, Atyrau, West-Kazakhstan, Kostanay, Pavlodar,
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North-Kazakhstan, and East-Kazakhstan provinces;” all but Atyrau and Akmola
border Russia and the required areas have high ethnic Russian populations
(Pannier and Karabek 2014, par. 19–20). There Kazakhstan government has
tried to resettle ethnic Kazakhs to restore the ethnic balance in its northern
region and to make ethnic Kazakhs a majority.
Putin’s rhetoric in late August about Kazakhstan’s statehood does increase
Kazakhstan’s chances of being annexed. Putin’s comments at the Seliger
Youth Forum sends the message to his loyal political partner and friend,
President Nazarbayev, that Kazakhstan was not a state until it was made a
Soviet Socialist Republic in the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan needs to remain
under the Russian sphere of influence and that Kazakhstan’s independence is
questionable. Essentially, Putin was essentially labeling Kazakhstan’s inde-
pendence as an experiment in statehood and state-building. Putin comments
suggest that Kazakhstan will remain a state as long as it remains loyal to
Russia.
According to the transcripts, the questioner referenced nationalism in the
south of Kazakhstan which is interesting as most Russians live in Northern
Kazakhstan; the inquirer was a plant as Putin does not do unscreened or
unscripted news forums or conferences. Rumors of increased anti-Russian
nationalism have been brewing in Kazakhstan in the form of opposition
against Russian-Kazakh economic and political integration which is slightly
accurate because of the Anti-Eurasia Forum, but these claims are exaggerated.
Adding to Kazakhstan’s worries, Russian nationalist and the leader of the
LDPR, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, has claimed that Kazakhstan needs to be ex-
amined like Ukraine in terms of nationalism. Zhirinovsky supported the annex-
ation of Crimea and seems to entertain the thought of annexing Kazakhstan.
Zhirinovsky has called for Kazakhstan’s annexation in the past. In February
2014, Zhirinovsky called for the creation of a “Central Asian Federal Region”
with the capital as Verny (the old Russian name for Almaty); he made similar
remarks in 2005.
In response to Putin’s remarks, President Nazarbayev said they will with-
draw from the EaEU if Kazakhstan’s independence is threatened. When the
agreement for the EaEU was signed, Nazarbayev firmly stated that the organi-
zation will not threaten or endanger Kazakhstan’s independence. From Putin’s
remarks, it can be extrapolated that Nazarbayev embodies Kazakhstan’s state-
hood, that Kazakhstan will cease to exist once Nazarbayev leaves. Hopefully,
these remarks will force the Kazakhstan government to either hold elections
or develop a succession plan for Nazarbayev even if it means undercutting
some of his power. Withdrawing from the EaEU might provoke a Crimea-
like response from Russia.
Compared to Crimea, the annexation of Northern Kazakhstan would be
easier for Russia to maintain as Russia has direct access to the Kazakh-
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Russia border unlike Crimea, and because Russia has numerous energy, oil,
and gas contracts with Kazakhstan. To keep access to Crimea, a land-bridge
across the Kerch Strait has been proposed but would cost an estimated $4.3
billion (150 million rubles).
If Russia were to annex the five Kazakh regions heavily populated with
ethnic Russians, it is unclear if the ethnic Russians would recognize Russian
authority as legitimate. It is also unclear if the ethnic Russians in Crimea
view Russian authority as legitimate despite many identifying with a Russian
identity. There have been personal narratives offering both views. Since most
ethnic Russians are treated well in Kazakhstan, the only benefit that they would
receive is Russian citizenship, which is something that ethnic Russians desire.
However, there are diplomatic ways to achieve this without annexation.
President Vladimir Putin could use his relationship with Nazarbayev to grant
the ethnic Russians “national minority” status under humanitarian pretenses
which would also violate Kazakhstan’s Constitution. In the context of Crimea,
this would not be satisfactory as Putin’s motivations are political, not human-
itarian.
Hypothetically, under Russian rule, the ethnic Russian population in Kazakh-
stan might not benefit politically, socially, or economically. Kazakhstan
provides its citizens (including Russians) with resources and is developing
faster than Russia. Socially, Russia is suffering. Poor health and healthcare, a
declining population, a history of alcoholism, increasing rates of drug use and
AIDs, and the proliferation of xenophobia and the restriction of civil liberties
may deter people from wanting to be under Russian rule even though Kazakh-
stan is an authoritarian country. Currently, Russians can cross the Russian-
Kazakh northern border freely and see friends and family. From available
information, number of pro-Russian separatists is small in Kazakhstan and has
prevented a pro-Russian movement from forming.
Most former Soviet states face pressure from Russia and there has been
spotty rhetoric from Putin warning about closer cooperation with western
organizations such as the EU and NATO. Russia warned Moldova not to
sign/ratify their EU Association Agreement, hinting that Moldova might meet
the same fate as Crime and Ukraine. Moldova’s pro-Russian breakaway
republic, Transdnestr, has been fighting for autonomy since the Soviet col-
lapse. This warning sends a message to all former republics. At this point, if
Kazakhstan chose not to cooperate with Russia, it would be held hostage by
Russian foreign policy and northern Kazakhstan could be the next victim of
Russian annexation. If Kazakhstan were to express desires to become a full
NATO member or choose to make all of their energy agreements with China
or the EU, this could trigger Russia to take action, but this is unlikely since
Russia and Kazakhstan share membership in the same security and energy-
focused regional organizations. However, Nazarbayev’s remarks about the
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EaEU might trigger diplomatic spats and may force Kazakhstan to shift its
priorities away from Russia.

3. Conclusion
Russia currently has the ability and financial resources to implement the
Karaganov Doctrine. The impending collapse of the ruble might slow Russian
actions, but defense spending is expected to remain the same. Russia took
advantage of the military inaction of the West, particularly NATO and the
United States and reluctance of many European countries to place sanctions
on Russia. The military inaction (lack of assistance) of the United States,
NATO, and the EU over Crimea and the violence in Eastern Ukraine provides
Putin with an opportunity to exert more influence over Former Soviet
Republics. The booting of Russia from the G-8 and the economic sanctions
imposed on Russia has not deterred Russian actions. Putin knows what he has
to do to keep the West from interfering in modern-day Russian expansionist
efforts.
Russia’s relationship with Kazakhstan is very resilient, amicable, and built
on mutual interests, and benefits Russia economically and politically. Russia
can control Kazakhstan from Moscow without inheriting Kazakhstan’s prob-
lems, such as extremism and an unpredictable political situation. Russia can
also control Kazakhstan through multiple regional organizations as Kazakh-
stan has shown the willingness to be the bridge between Central Asia and
Russia. However, because of this, President Putin views Kazakhstan has being
weak and is aware that Kazakhstan is willing to placate Russia and sacrifice
its economy as Kremlin actions have slowed down its growth. President Putin
has also stoked any significant economic reform for Kazakhstan that would
have developed out of the EaEU which has been a long-term vision for
President Nazarbayev.
After the Crimea annexation, Kazakhstan was left with no other option than
to cooperate with Russian plans for integration. At this point, complacency
and agreement with Russia and Putin’s policies is a way for Kazakhstan to
maintain its territorial integrity. Putin’s comments about Kazakhstan being
an experiment in statehood may force Kazakhstan to sacrifice some of its
relationships with Western institutions. It is highly unlikely that Kazakhstan
would suspend its membership or remove itself from the CSTO or SCO.
Removal or suspension would inevitability result in the evocation of the
Karaganov Doctrine as Kazakhstan’s refusal to cooperate with Russia would
threaten Putin’s power in Central Asia and in the Former Soviet sphere. If
Kazakhstan were to be annexed or experience a pro-Russian uprising facilitated
by ethnic Russians backed by Russia, Kazakhstan would be the biggest loser.

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If the West is not willing to go to war for the Ukraine, it surely will not go to
war for Kazakhstan.

NOTE

1. Information regarding date of public poll can be found here: http://www.

razumkov.org.ua/eng/expert.php/stsc/tag.php?t=284 This URL is different than the
source in the Works Cited section of this paper.

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