13 th GIL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETETION ,2023.

TC - 09

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF

AKHAND BHARAT
WRIT PETITION

IN THE MATTER OF:-

CHANCHAL SHARMA................................................................................PETITIONER NO. 1

SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATION ……………………………… PETITIONER NO 2

(FREEDOM FROM RELIGION)

RANJI ENTERTAINMENT ASSOCIATION……………………………… PETITIONER NO. 3

VERSUS
ISSUE 1. UNION OF AKHAND BHARAT..........................................................RESPONDENT

ISSUE 2 UNION OF AKHAND BHARAT........................................................RESPONDENT

ISSUE 3. STATE OF RANJI..................................................................................RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL FOR RESPONDENT

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS..........................................................................................................1

. .................................................................................................2

. ..................................................................................................3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION........................................................................................5

STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................................................6

ISSUES RAISED......................................................................................................................8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...............................................................................................9

ISSUE 1...................................................................................................................................11

ISSUE 2..................................................................................................................................15

ISSUE 3.................................................................................................................................29

PRAYER.................................................................................................................................36

1
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And
AIR All India Report
Anr. Another
Cr.P.C Code of Criminal Procedure
WRT Writ petition
P.C. The Prevention for Corruption Act
Hon’ble Honorable
No. Number
Ors. Others
r/w Read with
F.I.R. First Information Report
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
Pnj. Punjab
S./Sec. Section
SC Supreme Court
Art. Article
E.g., Example
Prov. Provided
SCC Supreme Court Cases
J. Justice
u/s Under Section
v. Versus

2
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

1.) The Constitution of India,1950

2.) The Indian Penal Code,1860

3.) The Criminal Procedure Code,1973

4.) The Cinematograph Act, 1952

BOOKS

1.) Criminal Procedure- R.V. Kelkar’s Criminal Procedure

2.) The code of Criminal Procedure- Ratan Lal and Dhiraj

Lal 3.) Batuk Lal Commentary on CrPC

4.) The Bare Act, Lexis Nexis

5.) Criminal Law IPC P.S.A. Pillai

WEBSITES

1.) http://www.scconline.com

2.) http://student.manupatra.com/

3.) https://www.barandbench.com/

4.) https://indiankanoon.org/

5.) https://www.livelaw.in/

6.) https://lawtimesjournal.in/

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CASES

1. Romila Thapar v Union of India (SCC 802 AIR 2018)

2. Ram Chander Singh Sagar v. State of Tamil Nadu(1978 AIR 475)
3. Arnab Goswami’s case(NO. 130 of 2020)
4. Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat(2011 5 SCC 79)
5. Narender G Goel v. State of Maharashtra {(2009) 6 SCC 65}
6. VK Sharma v. Union of India( 2009 9 SCC 449)
7. Narinderjit singh sahni v. Union of India(2002 2 SCC 210)
8. State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal( AIR 2002 SC 3687)
9. Ram ji lal Modi v. state of U.P.(1957 AIR 1957)
10. king v. Nag shew Hpi
11. baba khalil ahmad case.[(air 1960 all 715 (718)]
12. Ambalal Paragji case(1929 ) Cr App Nos.17 and 18 of 1929.
13. The superintendent, central prison fatehgarh v ram manohar lohia.(AIR 1960 SC 633)
14. S. Rangarajan v P. Jagjivan Ram(1989 2 SCC 574)
15. Sant Das Maheswari v Babu Ram Jodoun, 1969 (AIR 1969, ALL 436)
16. Express Newspapers v. Union of india.(1985 2. S.C.R 287)
17. I.T.C ltd. v. Agricultural produce market committee.(Civil appeal no. 6453 of 2001)
18. M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979 AIR 898)
19. Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh.(AIR 1959 SC 648)
20. Bharat Hydro Power Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Assam(Appeal (civil) 6487 -6488 of 1998 )
21. Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala ( No. 95/ 2005 )
22. State of Maharasthra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah[(2008 ) INSC 1478 (1 September 2008)]
23. Krishna v. State of Madras ( 1957 AIR 297)
24. State of Madras v. Dunkerley( 1959 SCR 379)
25. Hoechst Pharm Ltd. v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1983 SC 1019)
26. Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay(AIR 1954 SC 752)
27. Official Assignee ,Madras v. Inspector General of Registration ( AIR 1981 MAD 54)
28. Pt. Rishikesh v. Salma Begum ( 1995 3 SCR 1062)
29. Zaverbhai v. State of Bombay (AIR 1954 SC 752)
30. T.Barai v. Henry & Hoe [(1983) 1 SCC 177)]
31. Krishna Dist. Co-op. Marketing Soc. Ltd. v. N.V.P.Rao(AIR 1960 SCR 728)
32. M.P. Shikshak Congress v. R.P.F. Commissioner, Jabalpur(1999 (1) SCC 396)

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33. S.M.C. Students, Parents Ass. v. Union of India.(WRT . Petition 418 of 1996)
34. Ministry of information and broadcasting ,Govt of india v Cricket association of Bengal.(
1955 2 SCC 161)
35. S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram,(1989 SCR (2) 204 ,SCC 2574)
36. Anand Patwardhan v. Central Board of Film Certification,( 2003 BOMCR 58,2004(1)
37. Sree Raghavendra Films v. Government of Andhra Pradesh,(1995 (2) ALT 43)
38. Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon, 19969( AIR 1996 SC 1846

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Counsel for the Respondent, State of Ranji hereby humbly submits before the Hon’ble
Court of Jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of Akhand Bharat. However, the
Respondent seeks permission of this Hon’ble Court to not allow the writ Petition.
The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the present case.
The laws of the Federated States of Akhand Bharat are pari materia with the laws of India.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Republic of Akhand Bharat1 is an independent ‘Union of States'. The diversity in cultural
aspects like religion, language, traditions, etc. is truly a remarkable feature. Taking inspiration
from the constitutions of the major democracies in the world, the Constitution of Akhand
Bharat was wisely drafted by the members of its Constituent Assembly. Democracy, Equality,
and Secularism are the essences of the Constitution.

Chanchal Sharma is a seasoned debater and official spokesperson of ‘X’ party which has a
majority at the Centre. She is well-admired by her supporters for her fiery and provocative
style of debating. It is often alleged that the ideology of the ‘X’ party is deeply embedded in
hatred for a minority religion ‘Y’. One fine day, she was invited to a leading News Channel
for a debate on a religiously sensitive issue. During the debate, she got into verbal altercation
with the cleric of Religion ‘Y’.

The state of Ranji has filed an intervention to oppose this application because it may appear
to the people that Central Government is trying to protect her.The fallout was particularly
intense in the State of Ranji, as the followers of Religion ‘Y’ are in overwhelming majority
there. The rampaging crowd burnt buses and damaged public property. The state also
witnessed a new disconcerting trend in which people were seen openly parading with guns,
especially the youth.

To reassure the population of the State, Ranji State Legislative assembly passed an
amendment in Section 295A of the Akhand Bharat Penal Code, increasing the quantum of
punishment. The amended section provides for the punishment that shall not be less than 10
years that may extend life imprisonment for the offense of blasphemy as defined under section
295A of the code. Subsequently, it got the assent of the President according to Art. 254

. A social welfare organization by the name of Freedom from Religion has challenged this law
in the Supreme Court of Akhand Bharat on the ground that the law of blasphemy itself
violates freedom of speech and expression under Art. 19 of the constitution of Akhand Bharat
and now enhancement of the punishment makes it a draconian law. Therefore, it is liable to be
struck down.

At the same time, the State Government of Ranji took some measures in order to arrest the
growth of Gun Culture in the state. Ranji state government has issued a Notification to ban
songs and movieswhich eulogize gun culture in any manner.

Ranji Entertainment Association has moved the High Court of Ranji, against this notification,
7
arguing that the state government has failed to maintain law and order in the state, and now it is
passing the buck on the entertainment industry, which is not responsible for the rise of gun
culture. Moreover, it is not only that Pollywood industry makes such songs and movies but
Bollywood, Hollywood, Tollywood, and other regional cinema also thrive on songs and movies
glorifying gun culture, outlaws, vigilante justice, etc. The High Court has rejected their
arguments and subsequently, dismissed their petition, aggrieved by the same they have
approached the Hon’ble SC.

Taking cognizance of the same ,Chief justice of Akhand Bharathas decided to club these matters .

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ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the multiple FIRs filed against Chanchal Sharma in different

jurisdictions should be clubbed at one jurisdiction of her choice or not?

2. Whether Section 295A of Akhand Bharat Penal Code is constitutionally valid or

not? If yes, whether the enhancement of the punishment under section 295A by the
State of Ranji is reasonable or not?

3. Whether the ban imposed by State of Ranji on entertainment industry vide

Notification No. 42/2023 is constitutionally valid or not?

9
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1 – Whether multiple FIRs filed against Chanchal Sharma in different Jurisdictions
should be clubbed at one jurisdiction of her choice or not ?

The respondent disagrees from clubbing of FIRs as the offences are committed in various states are
distinct and resisted not under the same jurisdiction authority so that there is no doubt in agreeing
with the argument that the transaction is same but the offences which are committed they are
distinct and the other point they are not registered under any one jurisdiction authority so that
clubbing of FIRs must not be done at the choice of the accused as where her party is in power so
that manipulation of the evidences might be done.

ISSUE 2 - Whether section 295A of Akhand Bharat panel code is constitutional valid or not if
yes, whether the enhancement of the punishment under section 295A by the state of Ranji is
reasonable or not?

Respondent asserts the validity of the section295 A of the Akhnad bharat panel code as it is a
reasonable restriction allowed by constitution article 19 (2) on the basis of public order and it was
constitutionally held valid by the apex court in the ram ji lal modi vs state of Uttar Pradesh 1957.
Now the increase of the punishment up to 10 years is also valid even if it repugnant to the central
law because of proviso (2) of article 254 indian constitution which protects this type of law made
by state legislature if it gets the assent of the president as being done by state of ranji in this case .

ISSUE 3 – Whether the ban imposed the state of ranji on the entertainment industry vide
notification number 42 /2023 constitutionally valid or not?

So as per respondents assertion it must be held as it has been made just to maintain the public order
, notification being as a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioner claiming
right to freedom of speech and expression so as they reasonable restrictions as per clause (2) of
article 19 of indian constitution .So notification must not be declared invalid.

1
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. Whether the multiple FIRs filed against Chanchal Sharma at different jurisdictions should
be clubbed at single jurisdictions of her choice or not?

1.) The counsel here from the respondent side is against the clubbing of the FIRs of the accused
and the reasons for the same are mentioned below-
INVESTIGATION CANNOT RUN AT BEHEST OF ACCUSED
We must, at this juncture note that it is trite law of criminal jurisprudence that investigation cannot
run at the behest of the accused [ iRomila Thapar v Union of India1] , in which Justice
Chandrachud had dissented. An accused cannot be permitted to take control of the investigation by
choosing from where should he be investigated.
Important question arise for consideration at this juncture:

A) Can investigation of an FIR be transferred u/s 406 CrPC?

2.) Section 406(1) CrPC states as follows –

“406. Power of Supreme Court to transfer cases and appeals.

Whenever it is made to appear to the Supreme Court that an order under this section is expedient
for the ends of justice, it may direct that any particular case or appeal be transferred from one
High Court to another High Court or from a Criminal Court subordinate to one High Court to
another Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court.”

ONLY CASE OR APPEAL CAN BE TRANSFERRED

3.) A bare perusal of the provision makes it abundantly clear that an order under this section is to
meet the ends of justice, and a particular ‘case or appeal’ can be transferred from a court to court.
This Section does not empower the Supreme Court to transfer an investigation from one state
to the other. The power under this section can only be used to transfer a case/appeal pending
before a court to a court in another jurisdiction.

1 1
Romila Thapar v Union of India (SCC 802 AIR 2018)

1
 SECTION 406 CRPC-WRONG PATH FOR TRANSFER OF INVESTIGATION
4.) The CrPC as we know today was notified in 1974. Way back in 1978, the Supreme Court in
Ram Chander Singh Sagar v. State of Tamil Nadu 2
held that to move the Supreme Court for
transfer of FIR u/s 406 CrPC amounts to ‘travelling the wrong street.

5.) This has been the settled position of law since then. There are multiple judgments which caution
courts against ordinarily interfering at the stage of investigation.The Supreme Court has time and
again held that an investigation cannot be run at the behest of the accused. The accused has no
choice in the manner in which she should be investigated. This upturns the entire criminal
machinery.

6.) Most recently, in Arnab Goswami’s case 3(2020), the Supreme Court held that “An accused
person does not have a choice in regard to the mode or manner in which the investigation should
be carried out or in regard to the investigating agency.”

Similar views have been expressed in Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat 4, Sanjiv Rajendra Bhatt v.
Union of India and Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala

7.) NO RIGHT TO BE HEARD AT STAGE OF INVESTIGATION

In fact in Narender G Goel v. State of Maharashtra 5, the Supreme Court went up to the extent of
holding that it is well settled that the accused has no right to be heard at the stage of investigation.
The prosecution will however have to prove its case at the trial when the accused will have full
opportunity to rebut the validity and authenticity of the prosecution case. Transfer of investigation
from other jurisdictions to one jurisdiction at the behest of the accused will overturn the entire
criminal jurisprudence and will open up a Pandora’s box.

8.) Apart from statutory provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), we find
our answer in three judgments –
a) VK Sharma v. Union of India,

2
Ram Chander Singh Sagar v. State of Tamil Nadu(1978 AIR 475)
3
Arnab Goswami’s case(NO. 130 of 2020)
4
Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat(2011 5 SCC 79)

1
5
, Narender G Goel v. State of Maharashtra {(2009) 6 SCC 65}

1
 b) Narinderjit Singh Sahni and Anr v. Union Of India , and
c) State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal.
9.) In VK Sharma v. Union of India6, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, while hearing a
writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and rejecting the request to consolidate all
pending cases across the country into one, granted liberty to the petitioner to approach respective
High Courts to bring in all pending cases within its territorial jurisdiction to one court.

10.) In Narinderjit singh sahni v. Union of India7, the Supreme Court held that each individual
transaction which has been brought about by the allurement of the financial companies, must be
treated as a separate transaction. This, for the reason that the investors/depositors are different; the
amount of deposit is different, and; the period when which the deposit was effected is also
different.

DISALLOWED V K SHARMA REASONING

11.) In State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal8, proceedings were initiated in different courts, but the High
Court in its jurisdiction u/s 482 CrPC, while relying on the decision in V K Sharma case ,
transferred all pending cases in the state of Punjab to a Special Judicial Magistrate. Against this
order, the State of Punjab approached the Supreme Court. A three judge bench of the Supreme
Court observed that the High Court had mechanically followed the decision in VK Sharma and
observed that the said order is not in accordance with law and should not be treated as a precedent.

12.) It further observed that although the Supreme Court has ample powers under Article 142(1)
of the Constitution, the same cannot be exercised contrary to law. It concluded that the decision in
VK Sharma, not being under Article 142, the order to direct the applicant to file applications for
consolidation of cases pending in different courts to be tried in a single court was not in accordance
with law. VK Sharma was thus expressly overruled.
13.) Therefore, apart from a direct order against consolidation/clubbing of FIRs by the Supreme
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, there is a three judge bench decision which holds that a
direction in the form of liberty to the accused to approach respective High Courts for consolidation
of FIRs to be tried in one single court within such states in its jurisdiction is also not in accordance
with law.
14.) If at all the Supreme Court wishes to do so, the issue has to be referred to a larger bench, as a
two-judge bench is bound by the decision in Rajesh Syal. The Supreme Court has to tread
cautiously

1
6
VK Sharma v. Union of India( 2009 9 SCC 449)
7
Narinderjit singh sahni v. Union of India(2002 2 SCC 210)
8
State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal( AIR 2002 SC 3687)

1
on this, as there are many cases pending across the country involving cheating to multiple investors
nationwide. If at all the law is to be interpreted differently, the factors including strain on
witnesses, investigating agencies etc have to be weighed in.

STATUS QUO
15.) Therefore ,it can be observed that there exists a direct order against the filing of awrit petition
under article 32 of the constitution for the clubbing of multiple FIRs into one. In fact as held in the
Rajesh Syal judgement ,an accused does not even have the the freedom to approach a particular
highcourt in order to request for the amalgamation of various FIRs into one court within a state
falling in its territorial jurisdiction .he status quo can now only be changed provided a larger bench
decided to adjudicate over this issue.

(a)Whether clubbing of FIRs at one jurisdiction provide advantage to Chanchal sharma?

PARTY (X) IS IN POWER WHERE F.I.Rs ARE DEMANDED TO BE CLUBBED AND
SHE IS THE SPOKESPERSON OF PARTY (X ).

16.) Chanchal sharma moved supreme court to club all her FIRs at one jurisdiction i.e.,her home
state ,Indraprastha where party X is in power.the state of Ranji filed an intervention to oppose this
application .It is clear that it will provide definite advantage to the Chanchal sharma as she is the
spokes person of the party whose government is ruling the state of Indraprastha.

HIGHER PROBALILITY OF EVIDENCE MANIPULATION DURING INVESTIGATION

17.). If the FIRs of Chanchal sharma will be clubbed at single jurisdiction of her choice then there
will be higher probability of evidence manipulation by the investigating authority and the
authenticity of investigation will lose its ground as there is the government of that party to which
Chanchal sharma is the spokesperson and it will apply whole of its authority to make Chanchal
sharma free from all kind of accusations to protect the image of the party as it is the workers in
which the image of party rests with.

1
 2. Whether section 295A of Akhand Bharat Penal code is constitutionally valid or not? If Yes
,Whether the enhancement of the punishment under section 295A by the state of ranji is
reasonable or not?.
1.) Yes, The counsel from the respondent side is in favour of the constitutional validity of section
295A of I.P.C .The counsel here first of all would like to mention the bare act definition of the
section 295A of I.P.C.

BARE ACT DEFINITION

2.) 295A. Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by
insulting its religion or religious beliefs.—9
Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class
of 273
[citizens of India], 274
[by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that
class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
4[three years], or with fine, or with both.

BLASPHEMY LAW

3.) According to Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), acts that are deliberately performed
with preplanned and evil intent to hurt a particular group’s religious sentiments or religious values
are a crime prosecuted under the law. Section 295A, in a sense, can be dubbed the blasphemy law
of India wherein denigrating religious views or ideas through signs, visual representation, spoken
or written words is considered a punishable offense.

4.) The accused in the present case is a seasoned debator and official spokesperson of ‘X’ party
which has a majority at the centre .Here it is already mentioned in facts of the case that she is well
admired by her supporters for her fiery and provocative style of debating .It is often alleged that
the ideology of the ‘X’ party is deeply embedded in hatred for a minority religion ‘Y’.

9
Section 295 A of Indian Penal Code

1
NON BAILABLE AND NON COMPOUNDABLE OFFENCE

5.) It was widely reported that the FIR is registered under Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 ("IPC"). Section 295-A IPC is a cognizable offence, which means that the police can register
an FIR on a complaint lodged by a private citizen without any kind of prior judicial oversight.

POLICE CAN APRREST WITHOUT WARRANT

6.) Since the offence is also non-bailable and non-compoundable, the police can invoke Section 41
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ("Cr.P.C.") and arrest any accused person without a warrant.
Such complaints can be lodged anywhere in the country at the instance of purportedly aggrieved
complainants and there have been instances of States not being averse to registering multiple FIRs
on identical or similar allegations.

7.) The genealogy of section 295A IPC can be traced back to 1927, when a book 'Rangila Rasul'
was published. This book was objected to by a minority community of then undivided India on the
ground that it allegedly contained certain objectionable passages about the founder of their faith.
The publisher, Mahashe Rajpal, was arrested initially, but was later acquitted. This gave rise to
demands for a specific law against causing insult to religious feelings and the British Government
duly obliged by enacting Section 295A IPC.

AIM AND SCOPE -Maintain social peace and equality between religious groups

8.)The aim and the scope for introducing these laws were to maintain social peace and the method
was for enhancing equality between the religious groups. Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code
was introduced in the code by Section 2 of the Criminal Law of Amendment Act of 1927 with an
aim for punishing deliberate and malicious acts that intend to outrage or defame the religious
feelings of any class by insulting the religions or the crimes of blasphemy.

9.) The provisions that are contained in the section are similar to those of the common law crimes
of blasphemy. Blasphemous words are punishable because they tend to endanger peace, deprave
public morals, and shake the fabric of society for being a cause of civil strife. The primary element
of the section is to insult or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of any class of
citizens of India.

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10.)Therefore, for invoking Section 295A, there are the fundamentals that must be there if one
want to invoke this section against someone .These are mentioned below-

 The accused must insult or attempt to insult the religion or religious beliefs of any
class or group of citizens;
 The said insult or defamation must be with the deliberate and malicious intention of
outraging the religious feelings of the particular class or group of citizens;
 The said insult or defamation must be by words, either spoken or written or by signs or by
visible representation or otherwise.

11.) The following three points mentioned above are fulfilled by which we can invoke section 295
A against Chanchal sharma .As she insults the religion Y by her defamatory words which are
spoken maliciously and deliberately.

12.) The objectives of Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code are:

 To prevent the person from causing insult to the religious sentiments or religious faith of
the people belonging to the other community

 To punish the persons involved in attacking the religious feelings or beliefs of the people
of the other community.

 To prevent the person from causing enmity among different groups on the ground of
religion.

RAM JI LAL MODI V. STATE OF U.P10. -Constitutional validity of 295 A

13.) In 1957, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the said
section in Ramji Lal Modi vs. State of U.P. The Court held that Section 295A IPC does not penalise

10
Ram ji lal Modi v. state of U.P.(1957 AIR 1957)

1
any and every act of insult to or attempts to insult any religion or the religious beliefs of a class of
citizens.

DELIBRATE AND MALICIOUS INTENTION

14.) The Court cautioned that only those acts of insults or attempts to so insult can be penalised
under this provision which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging
the religious feelings of that class.

15.) The Court further clarified that the provision would only apply to such aggravated forms of
insult to religion, that is calculated to disrupt the public order. Further, the intention to offend the
Indians citizens of a certain faith must both be deliberate and malicious and must be meant for the
Indian citizens of that class.

16.)In Ramlal puri case ,it was held that section 295A IPC requires a delibrate and malicious
intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens .If a book gives an objective
picture based on historical facts ,it will not come within the mischief of section 295A IPC. The
test to be applied in determining whether th impugned act falls within the mischief of the section is
-

Is the complaint that of an abnormal or hypersensitive man,or that of an ordinary man of

ordinary common sense.If the complaint falls under the latter category ,the person will be
accountable otherwise not.

17.) The intention to outrage the religious feelings must be deliberate and premeditated .Only a cold
,calculated and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings is punishable under section
295A of IPC. In king v. Nag shew Hpi 11,it was held that an act may be delibrate without being
malicious ,since it may be reckless without being intentional .But for a charge under section 295A
,I.P.C.,the prosecution must show insult for the sake of insulting and with an intention which
springs from malice .

BABA KHALIL AHMAD CASE12

18.) In baba Khalil Ahmad ,it was held that the writing must be with deliberate and malicious
intention of outraging the religious feelings of a class of citizens of india.It was further held that ,in

11
king v. Nag shew Hpi
12
Baba Khalil Ahmad case.[(air 1960 all 715 (718)]

1
section 295A ,IPC ,the word malicious has not been used in popular sense .In order to establish
malice as contemplated by this section it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the
applicant bore ill will or enmity against specific persons .If an injurious act was done voluntarily
without a lawful and just excuse ,malice may be presumed. The court has to judge the intention not
from the declaration made by the writer ,but from the nature of the language he used and from the
circumstances in which the work was published .Such intention must be judged primarily by the
language of the work itself though it is permissible to receive and consider external evidence also.

AMBALAL PARAGJI CASE -Violently abusive and bitter criticism against the founder of a
13

religion would fall under section 295 A ,I.P.C.

19.) In Amba lal case ,it was held that the violently abusive and bitter criticism against the founder
or prophet of a religion or against a system of a religion might amont amount to stir up hatred or
enmity against the persons who follows that religion .To attribute to the Mohammedan religion the
teachings of the doctrines of Dawood ,a heretic (opposed to the doctrine or opinion contrary to the
fundamental doctrine of islam ) is insulting to that religion ,and if done deliberately and
maliciously would fall under section 295A I.P.C.

20.) The Court did clarify that Section 295 A punishes only the aggravated form of insult on
religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the
religious feelings of that class. Later, in The Superintendent, Central Prison Fatehgarh v Ram
Manohar Lohia., 14
a proximate link between the exercise of speech and public disorder was
necessitated, rather than a far-fetched, remote or fanciful connection. Developing upon the same
approach in S. Rangarajan v P. Jagjivan Ram,15 it held that the connection between speech and
disorder must resemble that of a ‘spark in a powder keg’; Further bolstering this test in 2011, it
held that only speech that amounted to ‘incitement to imminent lawless action’ could be
punished.

DELIBERATE AND MALICIOUS REMARKS BY CHANCHAL SHARMA

21.) The accused here has deliberately and maliciously spoken the words against the god of
religion ‘Y’.She used very unpleasant language against the god of religion ‘Y’.And it is clearly
mentioned in the facts about the ideology of party ‘X’ which is totally against the religion ‘Y’.We
can call the remarks by Chanchal sharma as malicious because it is already mentioned in the facts
that she is well

13
Ambalal Paragji case(1929 ) Cr App Nos.17 and 18 of 1929.
14
The Superintendent, Central Prison Fatehgarh v Ram Manohar Lohia .(AIR 1960 SC 633)

1
15
S. Rangarajan v P. Jagjivan Ram(1989 2 SCC 574)

2
admired by her supporters for her fiery and provocative style of debating .From this we can
conclude that here the words spoken by chanchal sharama are meant to defame and hurt the
religious sentiments of people of religion ‘Y’.

SANT DAS MAHESHWARI V. BABU RAM JADOUN16

22.) The constitutional guarantee of the right to freedom of religion under Article 25 and Article 26
is subjected to public order, morality and health. In the case of Sant Das Maheswari v Babu Ram
Jodoun, 1969 it was held that Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code has no intention of
prohibiting or punish anything which acts as a mere profession, practice, or propagation of religion
or any of the things that have been specified under Article 26 of the Constitution of India. Thus, it
was interpreted through the verdict of the court that Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code does
not come into conflict with Article 25 and Article 26 of the Constitution of India

23.) For a law restricting fundamental rights, such as IPC 295A, to be constitutional, it must satisfy
two tests1 :

one, the restriction must be for the purposes enshrined under clauses 2-6 of Article 19, and two,
the restriction must be reasonable. IPC 295A does come within the ambit of 19(2) as far as the
objective of its implementation goes. In contexts such as that of the Nupur Sharma controversy
elucidated above that this right is subject to reasonable restrictions.

Why there is need of reasonable restriction?

24.) In the context of the necessity of a reasonable restriction, it is helpful to look at the rights
granted by the state under Article 19 not as absolute but as subject to reasonable restrictions that
represent the rights of others. In other words, if the fundamental rights offered by the state are the
claims of the individual derived from society, reasonable restrictions are the rights claimed by
society from the individual. Therefore, a major flaw would be to look at the rights as
fundamental but not the

2
16
Sant Das Maheswari v Babu Ram Jodoun, 1969 (AIR 1969, ALL 436)

2
limitations. The responsibility of the court to maintain this balance was pointed out in Express
Newspapers v. Union of india.17

25.) By the above mentioned case laws ,especially the Ram ji lal modi v. State of U.P.,we can
definitely say that the article 295A of Akhand Bharat penal code is constitutionally valid as held by
the supreme court in Ram Ji Lal Modi case.

The enhancement of the punishment under section 295 A by the state of Ranji is reasonable

Doctrine of Repugnancy will prevail here.

26.) The enhancement of the punishment through an amendment by the state of Ranji to a term of
10 years that may extend to life imprisonment for the offence of blasphemy as defined under
section 295A of the Akhand Bharat Penal Code is valid due to the doctrine of Repugnancy.

27.) A study of the Indian Constitution is absolutely essential for any person attempting to study
and understand the law of the country. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. It has the
distinction of being the longest written constitution in the world. This is because the makers of our
constitution did not want to exclude any subject which would later lead to a conflict of interest.

28.) One of the significant portions of the Constitution deals with Center-State relation. Various
doctrines regarding this have been incorporated in various Articles of the Constitution.The
objective of this paper is to explore the doctrine of repugnancy within the ambit of the Indian
constitution. The Doctrine of Repugnancy has been stated in Article 254 of the Indian Constitution,
under Part XI.

ARTICLE - 254 (CENTRE STATE RELATIONS)

29.) The issue falls within the ambit of the relations between the Center and the States , as provided

17
Express Newspapers v. Union of india.(1985 2. S.C.R 287)

2
for in the Constitution. The counsel describes in detail, what Article 254 purports to stand for,
along with the provisions and the exceptions stated in the Article. It explains the importance of the
Article under the context of Indian Federalism, as well as the significance of the Article in making
the Constitution lean more towards the federal side.. It also examines when does repugnancy arise
and how it can be solved, by citing precedents.

Black Laws Dictionary Interpretation of Repugnancy18.

30.) Blacks' Law Dictionary defines repugnancy as an inconsistency or contradiction between two
or more parts of a legal instrument (such as a statute or a contract).
Repugnancy means the conflict between two pieces of legislation which when applied to the
same facts produce different results. Repugnancy arises when the provisions of two laws are so
inconsistent and irreconcilable that it is impossible to do one without disobeying the other.

31.) In the Indian context, if such a conflict arises between a central and a state legislation, then
the central law will prevail. This has been stated in Article 254 of the Indian Constitution and has
also been further clarified by the Supreme Court in various cases like I.T.C Ltd. V. Agricultural
Produce Market Committee.19

32.) In M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India 20the Supreme Court held that, where the provisions of a
Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent list are fully inconsistent and absolutely
irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the
repugnancy.

33.) In most federal constitutions and democracies across the world, the doctrine of repugnancy is
embedded to resolve the conflict between a law made by the center and a conflicting law made by
the state. In most case, the decision is in favor of the central law. In the United States of America,
if a federal law conflicts with a state law, then the federal law pre-empts the state law. In Australia,
until 1986, the law for the territories was considered repugnant to the Commonwealth law, which
was the supreme law.

34.) The Constitution under Schedule VII sets out the various subjects on which the Parliament and

18
Black laws Dictionary
19
I.T.C ltd. v. Agricultural produce market committee.(Civil appeal no. 6453 of 2001)

2
20
M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979 AIR 898)

2
State may legislate, under List I and List II respectively. Under List III, also known as the
Concurrent List, both the Parliament and the states have the power to make laws.
It is under Article 254 that the Constitution provides that in case both the Parliament and the state
make a law upon a matter in the Concurrent List and the laws are such that they are irreconcilable,
then the law made by the Parliament shall prevail and the law made by the state shall be deemed to
be repugnant to the extent of its repugnancy with the Central law.

Doctrine Of Repugnancy In The Indian Constitution

35.) Article 254 of the Indian Constitution talks about the doctrine of repugnancy. It involves
solving questions of repugnancy between the Central and the State law.According to Article
254(1), if any provision of a state law is repugnant to a provision in a law made by the Parliament,
which the Parliament is competent to enact, or with any existing law regarding any matter in the
Concurrent List, then the Parliamentary law would prevail over the State law. It will be of no
importance whether the Parliamentary law was enacted before or after the State law. To the extent
of repugnancy, the State law will be void.

36.) It is due to this Article that the power of the Parliament to legislate upon matters contained in
List III i.e., the Concurrent List is supreme. The Article gives an overriding effect to any statue
which the Parliament is competent to enact and which has been enacted by it.

37.). The application of this provision most commonly arises when there is a direct conflict
between statues enacted by both the Center and the State on matters in the Concurrent List, and
there is repugnancy between them. Repugnancy arises between two statues when they occupy the
same field and are completely inconsistent with each other and have irreconcilable provisions, as
stated in the case of Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh.21

38.) The Supreme Court held in the case of Bharat Hydro Power Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Assam22, as
well as in the case of Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala 23, that every effort should be made to
reconcile the two enactments and construe them both, in such a way, so as to avoid them being
repugnant to each other. If the two enactments operate in different fields without encroaching upon
each other, then there will be no repugnancy.

21
Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh.(AIR 1959 SC 648)
22
Bharat Hydro Power Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Assam(Appeal (civil) 6487 -6488 of 1998 )
23
Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala ( No. 95/ 2005 )

2
39.). It is essential that the repugnancy should exist in fact. It should also be clearly and sufficiently
shown that the Central and State laws are repugnant to each other. It was held in the case of State
of Maharasthra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah24, that there was no such repugnancy between Ss. 13 to
16 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 which is a State Act and Section 5(2)
of the Telegraph Act, 1885, which is a Central Act.

40.) It should be noted that, based on the rule of pith and substance, if the Center made a law upon
a subject in the Central or Concurrent List and the State made a law on a matter in the State List,
then the question of repugnancy would not arise. As seen in Krishna v. State of Madras25, and in
State of Madras v. Dunkerley,26 a State law would not be rendered invalid, on its incidental
encroachment in the Concurrent List, if it is enacted with respect to a matter in the State List.

41.) It would be void if it is enacted with respect to a matter in the Union List.
Article 254(2) provides a manoeuvre to save a State law which is repugnant to the Central law on
matters provided for in the Concurrent List. As such, it relaxes the rule of repugnancy contained in
Article 254(1).

42.) Under ordinary circumstances, the Central law reigns supreme over a State law, rendering the
State law void. However, there may arise some extraordinary circumstances in a State, under which
special provisions made by the state will be more desirable than a uniform central law. As such
Article 254(2) was incorporated in the Constitution to maintain an element of flexibility and to
make it possible to have a State law suitable to local circumstances against a contrary Central law
on a matter.

43.) The Article states that if a state law has been enacted on a subject in the concurrent list
and it contains provisions repugnant to the provisions of a central law, then with respect to
that particular matter, the state law will prevail in the concerned state. The law should have
been reserved for the consideration of the president and it should have received his assent.
The result of this assent will be that, the state law would continue to operate in that particular
state and would overrule the application of the central act in that state only. It is essential
that both the laws deal with a subject on the concurrent list.

24
State of Maharasthra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah[(2008 ) INSC 1478 (1 September 2008)]
25
Krishna v. State of Madras ( 1957 AIR 297)
26
State of Madras v. Dunkerley( 1959 SCR 379)

2
44.) Explaining the effect of Article 254(2), the Supreme Court said in the case of Hoechst Pharm
Ltd. v. State of Bihar27, that the result of obtaining the assent of the president in respect to a state
act which was inconsistent with a previous union law relating to a concurrent subject would be that,
the state law would prevail in that state and it would override the provisions of the Central act in
that state only.

45.) The Supreme Court observed in Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay 28, the words with
respect to that matter are of great importance in the Article 254(2). It stated that the important thing
to consider was whether the legislation was in respect to the same matter. If the later legislation
deals with a matter which is distinct from the subject of the earlier legislation but is of a cognate
and allied character, then Article 254(2) will have no application.

46.) Article 254(2) does not operate when the two Acts operate in different fields. An illustration of
this is the case of Official Assignee ,Madras v. Inspector General of Registration29, where the
Central Act concerned Insolvency under entry 9 of List III and the State Act related to Stamp duties
under entry 44 of List III. It was held that no stamp fees would be payable on the sale deed
executed by the Official Assignee.

47.) Article 254(2) was implemented with the view of saving those state laws falling under the
Concurrent List from being superseded by central laws due to the doctrine of repugnancy.

The sub-clause operates when two conditions are present. These conditions are:
• There must be a valid central law on the same subject matter and in the same field in the
concurrent list to which the central law relates.
• The state law must be repugnant to the central law
The Article will cease to operate if both the central and the state law have not been enacted on the
same subject matter in the concurrent list.

48.) In Pt. Rishikesh v. Salma Begum30, the Supreme Court held that if an enacted Parliamentary
law is brought into effect after enactment of a State law which had received the assent of the
President, then the State law would prevail because the parliamentary law was the earlier law.

27
Hoechst Pharm Ltd. v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1983 SC 1019)
28
Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay(AIR 1954 SC 752)
29
Official Assignee ,Madras v. Inspector General of Registration ( AIR 1981 MAD 54)
30
Pt. Rishikesh v. Salma Begum ( 1995 3 SCR 1062)

2
49.) The proviso to Article 254(2) enables the Parliament to enact at any time, any law on any
subject matter, including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the State law on the same
matter in the Concurrent List. The proviso thus, increases the power of the Parliament by providing
it the power to enact a law, repugnant to the earlier state law. The state law is only protected by
Presidential assent, in so far as the Parliament does not enact another law on the same matter which
is repugnant to the State law.So here in our present case ,parliament after the enactment by the state
legislature does not make any law after presidents assent.

50.) If the Parliament does so, then those provisions of the state law which is repugnant to the
central law will be void. But as mentioned in our facts the parliament doesn’t enact any law in the
same matter after the law enacted by the state got approval from the president. It is of essence that
both the earlier state law and the later central law are enacted on the same subject. This provision
also provides the Parliament to expressly declare the earlier state law as repealed. Even if it is not
expressly repealed, the state law will become void as soon as the subsequent central law is enacted
on that subject.

51.) This principle was illustrated in the case of Zaverbhai v. State of Bombay31, where a central
law was enacted to regulate the supply, production and distribution of essential commodities in
1946. The law also prescribed punishments for those who acted in contravention of the act. The
Bombay legislature did not consider these punishments adequate and enacted another law in 1947,
increasing the amount of punishment. This subsequent state law received the assent of the president
and continued to operate, until 1950, when the parliament itself amended the original law and
increased the punishments. The Supreme Court held that the state law would become void as it was
repugnant to the central law and both the laws had been enacted on the same subject of enhanced
punishments.

52.) The facts of our case are similar to that of the facts mentioned in the zaverbhai v state of
Bombay case,in which the increased punishment by the state of Bombay after presidents assent
remain valid till the parliament itself make enhancement in the original punishment law .But in our
case as mentioned in facts the parliament does not make any law after the state got approval from
the president.so it will deemed to be a valid law.

53.) To ascertain repugnancy, it will be taken into consideration whether the Parliament intended to

2
31
Zaverbhai v. State of Bombay (AIR 1954 SC 752)

3
lay down an exhaustive code regarding the subject, which would replace the State Law. If the
Parliament did not intend to lay down an exhaustive and unqualified code, then there can be no
inconsistency and any qualification or restriction introduced by another law cannot be said to be
repugnant to the Central law. The Supreme Court further stated that before coming to this
conclusion, the Court must fully satisfy itself that the two laws are so inconsistent that they cannot
stand together, and thereby must be repealed by implication.

54.) In T.Barai v. Henry & Hoe 32

the court held that, Article 254(2) is an exception to the general
rule laid down in Article 254(1).

55.) In Krishna Dist. Co-op. Marketing Soc. Ltd. v. N.V.P.Rao 33, the state law which had been
enacted after the central law and which had received the assent of the president would continue to
operate over the central law, if there was a repugnancy between the two. If there was no such
repugnancy, then the two laws would continue to co-exist.

56.). The Supreme Court further interpreted Article 254(2) in the case of M.P. Shikshak Congress
v. R.P.F. Commissioner, Jabalpur34, by holding that the sub clause would be applicable only in
those cases where the Central law was enacted before the state law. And in our case the same thing
is happening i.e the centre law is enacted before the state law . Even if the state act receives the
assent of the president, it would be of no avail because the repugnancy was with the central act
which was enacted by the parliament after the enactment of the state law. The sub clause would not
apply if the state act became repugnant to a parliamentary law enacted after the state law. This was
additionally retreated in S.M.C. Students, Parents Ass. v. Union of India.35

57.) The constitution of India has been called quasi-federal in nature by the distinguished jurist
K.C.Wheare. This is due to the fact that the constitution has several unitary as well as federal
features. However, the founders of our constitution defined it as a federal one.

58.) Article 254 is a classic example of how both unitary and federal features exist in the Indian
constitution. The Article provides that in case of a conflict between a central and a state law on the
same subject, the provisions of the central law will prevail over the conflicting provisions of the
same

32
T.Barai v. Henry & Hoe [(1983) 1 SCC 177)]
33
Krishna Dist. Co-op. Marketing Soc. Ltd. v. N.V.P.Rao(AIR 1960 SCR 728)
34
M.P. Shikshak Congress v. R.P.F. Commissioner, Jabalpur(1999 (1) SCC 396)

3
35
S.M.C. Students, Parents Ass. v. Union of India.(WRT . Petition 418 of 1996)

3
law. It even provides the parliament with the power to expressly repeal an earlier state law by
enacting a subsequent legislation.

59.) Conversely, protection has also been afforded to the laws made by the state. If a state law is
conflicting with a central law, it may still continue to operate if the state law has received the
assent of the president. the earlier state law.

3
(3.) Whether the ban imposed by the state of ranji on entertainment industry vide
notification no. 42/2023 is constitutionally valid or not?

1.) The Counsel from the respondent side is in the favour of the ban imposed by the state of ranji
on the songs and movies which eulogize gun culture in any manner.
2.). Freedom of speech and expression is the concept of being able to speak freely. It is often
regarded as an integral concept in modern liberal democracies. Films have also been accepted as a
form of speech and expression. Films have been banned because of issues related to obscenity, sex
and violence .Many films are banned or targeted in the name of maintaining public order;
respecting beliefs, sentiments and traditions; or for criticizing the state on a certain issues.

3.) Test of Restrictions under Article 19(2) to 19(6).

The restrictions to be imposed on the fundamental freedoms under Article 19(2) to Article 19(6)
must satisfy the following tests:

1. The restriction must be imposed by or under the authority of a law duly enacted by
the appropriate legislature. The law authorising the restriction must be reasonable.
2. The restriction imposed must be for the particular purpose or object envisaged in the
specific clauses, i.e., Article 19(2) to 19(6). There has to be a reasonable nexus
between the restriction imposed and the objects mentioned in the respective clause.
3. The restriction must be reasonable.

4.). Regarding the test to be applied, the Supreme Court in State of Madras v G Row36 laid the basic
principle that test of reasonableness whenever prescribed shall be applied to each individual statute
impugned and no abstract or general principle of reasonableness shall be laid down as applicable in
all cases.
5.) Before discussing the principles relating to reasonable restrictions, it is important to see the
provisions as laid in the Constitution. Article 19(2) states that the government may impose
reasonable restrictions upon the freedom of speech and expression in the interest of the following
factors;

1. Sovereignty and integrity of India

2. The security of the State,
3. Friendly relations with foreign States,
4. Public order,
5. Decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court

3
36
State of Madras v G Row(1952 AIR 196 )

3
 6. Defamation
7. Incitement to an offence
Article 19(3) confers the state with the authority to impose reasonable restrictions upon the
freedom to assemble peacefully without arms in the interest of the following;

1. Sovereignty and integrity of India

2. Public order
Article 19(4) states that the government may impose reasonable restrictions upon the freedom to
form associations and unions in the interest of;

1. Sovereignty and integrity of India

2. Public order
3. Morality
Article 19(5) grants the government the power to impose reasonable restrictions upon the freedom
to move freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom to reside or settle in any part of the
territory of India in the interest of the following factors;

1. In the interest of the general public or

2. The protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe
Under Article 19(6) the government may impose restrictions upon the freedom to practice any
profession in the interest of the general public, and further, the government may make laws in
relation to professional or technical qualifications for practising any profession and the government
shall not be barred from carrying out any business or trade, industry or service.

Principles laid by the Supreme Court

6.) “In the Interest of” – The Supreme Court has, in detail discussed wordings of these provisions.
In all these provisions, the term, “in the interest of” has been repeated. It is to be noted here that it
is not to be used interchangeably for “for the maintenance of” Thus, for instance, in the interest of
public order does not mean that the law enacted by the government in order to be protected by the
above-mentioned provisions need to be for the purpose of maintaining public order. The ambit of
these provisions is hence very wide. In other words, a law which is not designed to directly ensure
public order but penalizes the ones whose activities are detrimental to the same, the law shall be
protected under reasonable restrictions.

3
7.) Public Order – Public order is mentioned in clauses (2) and (4). Public order is a very wide
concept which entails the idea of a peaceful society where its members can coexist maintaining the
socially accepted morals and values. Thus, the government takes into consideration the aspiration
and opinions of the society at large while enacting laws in the interest of public order. Public order
is different from Public security as the later is embodied by the former. It is considered that any
disturbance to peace and tranquillity to public peace harms public order.
8.) It was held by the Supreme Court in The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram
ManoharLohia, public order must be demarcated from the other grounds mentioned under Article
19(2) and taken in an exclusive sense to mean public peace, safety and tranquillity as opposed
to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife and war, affecting the security of the State. In
this case, it was further held that the speech should have a direct nexus to public order.
9.) Reasonableness – With respect to the ambit of reasonable restrictions, the Supreme Court
in Chintaman Rao v State of Madhya Pradesh had laid down the principle that the legislative view
of what constitutes reasonable restriction shall not be conclusive and final and that it shall be
subjected to supervision by the Supreme Court.
10.) As mentioned earlier, the most basic rule while testing whether a law falls within the ambit of
reasonable restriction is that no general or abstract rule shall be adopted for the application of all
case. Each case has to be seen independently. The test of reasonableness shall be however on the
basis of the following grounds; “The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the
underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be
remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time”
With respect to the reasonableness of the restriction imposed, it is to be noted that the question is
not whether the judge finds it reasonable or not, but whether a reasonable man would consider the
restrictions reasonable or not.

11.) In Chintaman Rao v State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court opined that a restriction in
order to be referred to as reasonable shall not be arbitrary and shall not be beyond what is required
in the interest of the public. The reasonable implies intelligent care and deliberation Legislation
which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of
reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed.
12.). In Express Newspapers v Union of India, it was held by the Supreme Court that there ought to
be a reasonable balance between the freedoms enshrined under Article 19(1) and the social control
permitted by clauses (2) to (6). In addition to this, the restriction imposed shall have a direct or
proximate nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the law.

3
Whether state govt. has failed to maintain law and order in state?
13.) No, the state govt. has not failed in maintaining the law and order in the state as it has done
whatever is needed to stop the issue from escalating like amending section 295A of Indian penal
code by increasing the quantum of punishment to 10 yr so that there will be decrease in the cases of
hate speeches and there will be no disputes among different classes of people due to increase in
period of punishment.

14.) Punjab’s Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) government recently ordered a complete ban on public
display of weapons and songs glorifying violence. In a communication to the Director General of
Police, Commissioners of Police, District Magistrates and Senior Superintendents of Police, the
Punjab Home Department also directed a review of all firearm licences issued in the state so far
within three months.
15.) The Punjab government has been under Opposition pressure over “worsening” law and order.
Songs celebrating the gun culture are very popular in Punjab, and concerns have been raised earlier
too over their influence on society.

16.) Undisputedly, lawlessness and terror hamper the growth of any state. Taking note of the
sudden rise in the crime graph, the Punjab Government has banned public display of firearms,
release of songs promoting gun culture on social media, besides dispensing with new arm licences
for next three months. Also, a major reshuffle in the Police administration has been ordered to
improve the state of affairs.
17.) Being sensitive to images projected in the media, the adolescent minds crazily follow the stage
performers inciting violent vibes in songs. A few of them align with gangsters under temptation of
earning quick bucks or cheap popularity. Several youngsters, disillusioned of the employment
opportunities, get trapped in ugly pursuits which afford instant relief. Such vicious and violent
indulgences have crossed all civilised boundaries in the recent past, vitiating law and order.
Glorifying lethal or deadly weapons, even licensed ones is indeed ignoble. It induces negativity in
our socio-cultural framework.

 The proliferation of firearms in the state goes hand-in-hand with the Punjabi pop music’s
popularity, especially those with lyrics referring to guns and featuring men flaunting such
weapons.

3
  For instance, Sidhu Moose Walla was booked for promoting guns in 2020. In May that
year, pictures of him firing an AK-47 went viral, for which he was booked under Arms Act.
He was again booked in July for promoting guns and violence through another one of his
songs.
 Other Punjabi singers have faced police action too, like Elly Mangat for allegedly
participating in celebratory firing in 2019, Sippy Gill for his songs allegedly promoting
weapons and violence in 2020, etc.
 There has been concern over the Punjabi pop culture’s normalization of gun culture for a
while now. In 2019, the Punjab and Haryana HC took note of this issue and directed the DGP
to prevent the playing and performance of songs that glorify liquor, drugs and violence.

What stats say about gun culture in Punjab?

18.) According to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), Punjab reported 2,073 cases
related to gun violence between 2016 and 2020.Even though the state has only 2 percent of the
country's population, Punjab holds more than 10 percent of the gun licenses in the country.Punjab,
which was hit by terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s, has approximately 4 lakh arms license holders,
including those of prohibited bore and non-prohibited bore, and most of these were issued during
the militancy period, according to official sources.

Ministry of information and broadcasting ,Govt of india v Cricket association of Bengal. 1955 2
SCC 16137

19.) Though movie enjoys the guarantee under Article 19[1](a) ,there is one significant difference
between the movies and other modes of communication .Movie motivates thoughts and actions and
assures a high degree of attention and retention. In view of scientific improvement in photography
and production ,the present movie is a powerful modes of communication .It has a unique capacity
to disturb and arouse feelings .It has much potential for evil as it has for good .With these qualities
and since it caters for mass audience who are generally not selective about what they watch ,the
movie cannot be communicated with others modes of communication .It cannot be allowed to
function in a free market place just as does the newspaper or magazines .Censorship by prior
restraint is therefore ,not only desirable but also necessary.

37
Ministry of information and broadcasting ,Govt of india v Cricket association of Bengal.( 1955 2 SCC 161)

3
 (a) S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, 198938

20.) In S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, a film was issued a ‘U’ certificate by the Board until it
was revoked by the Madras High Court and also banned the public exhibition of that movie amid
the protests against it. The film dealt with a very sensitive topic of reservation policy in Tamil
Nadu. The movie was critically acclaimed as it received the National Award by the Directorate of
Film Festival of the Government of India.

21.) The matter was heard by the Supreme Court on an appeal where it was observed that a movie
cannot be restricted from the public exhibition on the threat of demonstrations or protests by the
general public. These protests are beyond the reasonable restrictions placed under Article 19(2) of
the Constitution. A mere intimation of violence by the public shall not be a restriction on freedom
of speech and expression as it is a duty of the state to protect these fundamental rights at any cost.

Anand Patwardhan v. Central Board of Film Certification, 2003

22.). A case regarding a filmmaker’s harassment by the Board. In Anand Patwardhan v. Central
Board of Film Certification, 39the Censor Board examined a film and ordered the filmmaker to
carry out two cuts and one addition for the movie to be eligible for a ‘U’ certificate. The petition
was filed on the directions of the Censor Board, where it was observed that the cuts ordered were
an act of abuse of power by the Censor Board to harass the filmmaker which was in violation of the
right to speech and expression through cinematograph under Article 19(1)a.

Sree Raghavendra Films v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1995

23.) In another case, Sree Raghavendra Films v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 40

a film’s
exhibition in the Telugu language was suspended by the provisions under Section 8(1) of the
Andhra Pradesh Cinemas Regulation Act, 1955, even when the Censor Board sanctioned the
unrestricted exhibition of the movie. The reason behind the suspension was cited as it may hurt
sentiments of certain communities. The court observed that the authority that ordered the
suspension did not even watch the movie and hence, it quashed the order on grounds of
arbitrariness.

38
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram,(1989 SCR (2) 204 ,SCC 2574)
39
Anand Patwardhan v. Central Board of Film Certification,( 2003 BOMCR 58,2004(1)

4
40
Sree Raghavendra Films v. Government of Andhra Pradesh,(1995 (2) ALT 43)

4
 Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon, 199641

24.) This case is better known as the Bandit Queen case. The Supreme Court while dealing with
this case once again upheld the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1) through
cinematograph. The court refused the restrictions on the exhibition of the film on grounds of
obscenity. The petitioner contended that the exhibition of the film shall be restricted for its nature
of depiction of the life story of a bandit, Phoolan Devi in the film and the picturisation of rape
scenes were also questioned along with the image of Gujjar community harmed with some
particular scenes in the movie.

25.) The Supreme Court observed that a film cannot be restricted simply because the content is
obscene, indecent or immoral. The abusive language or nudity in the movie was to further the case
regarding the depiction of the reality of the life story of Phoolan Devi. The movie was provided
with the ‘A’ certification under Section 5(B) with restricted viewership for adults only.

26.) The state government under the reasonable restrictions has the authority to put ban on the
songs and the movies which promotes the gun culture, as mentioned above the state can do it for
the maintenance of law and order in the society or in other words for the maintenance of public
order.As we have provided above the proof that how the crime rate is increasing in the state of
Punjab due to the promotion of guns in the songs and movies and also Punjab is also among the top
state whose people have large number of gun licences .And that’s the reason for the increase in the
crime in society so we can say that songs popularizing guns leads to real life crimes and makes the
mind of the people more evil .

41
Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon, 19969( AIR 1996 SC 1846)

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 PRAYER

Wherefore it is prayed, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited,
that this Hon'ble Supreme Court of the Akhand Bharat may be pleased to hold that:

1.) The Writ Petitions are not maintainable.

2.) The Hon'ble High Court of Ranji was r ig ht in holding that submissions made by the

petitioner must be declined.

3.) And pass the other Order, Direction, Relief that it may deem fit in the Best Interests of
Justice, Fairness, Equity and Good Conscience.

Sd/-

(Counsel for the Respondent)