Pakistan: A Decade of Ayub

Author(s): Wayne Wilcox

Source: Asian Survey , Feb., 1969, Vol. 9, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1968: Part II (Feb.,
1969), pp. 87-93
Published by: University of California Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2642306

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 PAKISTAN: A DECADE OF AYU'B

WAYNE WILCOX

Ten years ago, on the night of October 7, Pakistan's unstable par-

liamentary government was toppled in a bloodless coup d'etat. Since 1958 the
country's political fortunes have been largely the product of the will, pur-
poses and imagination of the leader of the October cabal, General-later
Field Marshal and President-Mohammad Ayub Khan. For a decade Ayub
has seen himself as a stern tutor for a divided and undisciplined people. In his
1967 memoirs he pictured himself as an indigenous populist, intent on both
rejecting false westernization and avoiding traditionalist obscuratism. The
constitution which he delivered to his people in 1962 is based on the notion
that there is no "maj ority" in the country that could support a coherent
program of modernization and that therefore purposive government requires
some insulation from the ever-changing whims of parochial factions. Ma-
jorities, for Ayub, grow in the modernization process as the result of de-
velopment; they are not its root support.
For almost half of its twenty-one years, Ayub's leadership has given Pak-
istan relative political stability and a coherent public policy. With unsus-
pected entrepreneurial boldness and large amounts of foreign aid, Pakistan's
developers have earned a grudging world's praise. And after years as a near
client state of the United States, Pakistan's foreign policy managers have
created an unprecedented posture of friendship and multiple alignment with
Washington, Peking and Moscow. For all of these impressive successes, how-
ever, Pakistan at the end of Ayub's first decade remains what it was at the be-
ginning: a politically divided, economically poor, and militarily vulnerable
state.
Since the September War of 1965, Pakistan has been in crisis. The war
disorganized the development process, led to the disruption of aid and trade,
unhinged the delicate alliance system being evolved with Washington, and
brought into the open many latent political forces that had been smothered
in the decentralized rural politics of "basic democracy." A doubling of de-
fense expenditures coincided with two poor crop years, 1966 and 1967, and
reduced foreign assistance. The year 1968 opened with more systemic
strains than any Pakistan had faced since the 1958 coup.

POLITICAL SUCCESSION

Any political system that concentrates governmental authority, foreig

policy leadership and party governance and direction in the hands of one
man is inherently precarious. The stability of such a system in Pakistan

87

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 88 PAKI STAN

depended on the good health, good luck and good sense of its manager. It
has also required a disciplined bureaucratic elite, made possible by the
military's confidence in the President, and low levels of competitive politi-
cal participation in the country.
In December 1967 an assassination attempt on Ayub in East Pakistan was
reported. A few weeks later, an alleged secessionist plot was revealed in which
Indian intelligence, opposition politicians of the "left" variety, disgruntled
civil servants and some lower ranking military personnel were involved. The
special tribunal established to hear the case ran into unexpected trouble in
early fall when a prosecution witness broke down on the stand and confessed
to having committed perjury because of police torture. By years end,
the trial was not over.
Late in January the President caught cold on a hunting expedition. Viral
pneumonia developed, and the 62-year-old leader then suffered a completely
debilitating pulmonary embolism that kept him confined to bed through Feb-
ruary. Rumors grew that the illness was much more serious than reported,
and for the first time in a decade Pakistanis began asking not only "After
Ayub, Who?," but "After Ayub, What?" Although the President rallied
and was able to attend a Commonwealth meeting in London in late spring,
the succession process had begun as the poet recognized: "Authority departs
the dying King." These developments made for the beginnings of the elec-
tion campaign of 1969-70 and were reinforced by the economic dislocations
of a changing nation.
There were other manifestations of the unconstitutional threat to Ayub's
government. The state-controlled press reported some evidence of religious
conflict between various Islamic sects, of tribal discontent in the North-
West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, of peasant violence along the
irrigation canals of Sind, and of union laborers in Pakistan's infant in-
dustries violently striking against government and management. The uni-
fication of Pakistan's linguistically divided western wing was called into
question against government ordinances to the contrary, and the open
opposition to the government became more bold. The question remained:
would the political conflicts of Pakistan be resolved within the govern-
mental system, or would they engulf and destroy it? Another assassina-
tion attempt on Ayub was made in November, and the year ended without
a clear portend of the system's future.

LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION AND THE "SHADOW CABINET"

The speaker of the National Assembly of Pakistan is empowered in the
constitution to act as successor to a fallen president. Few Pakistanis be-
lieve that such a succession will take place, and those who carefully ob-
serve the speakers are pleased with that unlikelihood. The true "shadow
cabinet" that stands behind the system is the leadership of Pakistan's
military services. Those prominent in national life are General Yahya
Khan, who commands the army, General Mohammad Musa, who has re-

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 WAYNE WILCOX 89

tired from army com

A. R. Khan, the Defense Minister who formerly commanded the Pakistan
Navy, and Air Marshal Nur Khan, Commander of the Pakistan Air Force.
The army is the senior service and takes a lion's share of the military budget,
but the exact nature of the influence and alliances between men high in the
civil and military services is veiled.
In the opposition ranks are men who feel that the present system allows
them the chance to win at the polls in 1969-70. In 1968, the opposition
was dominated by the personality of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the 40-year-old
wunderkind from Sind. In various ministerial posts under Ayub Khan,
Bhutto had negotiated the first economic agreements for a Soviet loan
and had broadened relations with Peking. As Foreign Minister during
the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, he had been a "hawk" and only reluctantly
accompanied the President to Tashkent for the signing of the armistice.
Upon return to Pakistan he was forced out of the government and im-
mediately set to work organizing a new Pakistan People's Party.
Bhutto's dramatic rise to power in the opposition testified more to the
vacuum in the opposition than to his great appeal. He had, after all,
served the government he now condemned for most of his political life.
But Suhwawardy, Chundrigar, Fazal Huq and, from the beginning of 1968,
the redoubtable Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh, were dead. Except
for Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, whose Nizam-i-Islami party seemed far
from the alienated urban groups that supported Bhutto, all the opposition
leaders were men of parochial appeal and provincial stature.
With the reopening of schools in the fall, Bhutto undertook a maj or
West Pakistan speaking tour during which his provocative tone left the
government with little choice but to arrest him. The tactics of this deliber-
ate challenge to the government were clear: a jail term just before the
winter elections of 1969 would make Bhutto a martyr and at least partially
lead to his atonement for previous service to Ayub. The electrifying re-
sult of the arrest was not the subsequent student riots, which were severe
but manageable, but rather the entry into formal opposition of retired
Air Marshal Asghar Khan. From East Pakistan came Syed Mahbub
Murshed, who had resigned as Chief Justice of the East Pakistan High
Court in the summer rather than suffer the fetters of a judge. Thus, on both
the unconstitutional and violent as well as the electoral front the govern-
ment of Mohammad Ayub Khan faced testing.
At 63, President Ayub may have another term ahead of him. He may,
however, fall victim to his legal or illegal opposition or to his age. The great-
est strength of Pakistan's political system for the past decade, the unambigu-
ous and vigorous authority of the leader, was compromised in 1968.

THE ECONOMY

In a year marked by tight foreign exchange constraints, the economy

benefited from unusually good monsoon rains; agriculture led the economy

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 90 PAKI STAN

in growth with perhaps a 10% increase, as against the GNP increase of

about 8%. Tight controls on prices slowed the inflationary trends that were
an important problem in 1967, and exports continued to show impressive
growth with an increase of about 8-9% over 1966-67. West Pakistan led
the way in this economic performance which the Aid Pakistan Consortium
members labeled "outstanding," but it was a good year for East Pakistan's
agriculture as well.
Midway into the Third Five Year Plan, Pakistan was forced to scale
down some of its investment goals, but was making steady progress. Seven-
teen new jute mills would open in 1968-69, increasing the production of
processed jute by 15-18%. Cotton textile production in the same period
would go up 13-15%. Cement production increased by almost a million
tons, and chemical fertilizer plants were in the process of construction. Of
most interest structurally, however, were the Chinese aided and built ma-
chine and metals complex at Taxila in Northwest Pakistan, the proposed
Russian-aided steel mill at Kalabagh in West Pakistan, and a possible Rus-
sian-aided atomic power station in Roopur, East Pakistan. The Communist-
aided projects in the heavy industrial and power fields promised to help
Pakistan diversify a production base heavily dependent upon agricultural
and primary products.
Another landmark in the country's economic growth was the initiation
of the Tarbela dam project, the most expensive public works project ever
undertaken. The $827 million engineering feat is the last part of the massive
Indus Rivers program by which Indian and Pakistani claims to the waters
of the western plains of the subcontinent are met by the physical separation
of water sources. The giant Mangla dam, completed more than a year ahead
of schedule, and the Tarbela dam serve to develop huge reservoirs serving
irrigation canals built as part of an integrated British-Indian system. Upon
Tarbela's completion, the canals of both countries will be "disintegrated"
and autonomous, and West Pakistan will have a vast new source of electrical
power as well as more reliable water management control.
During 1968 the Indian and Pakistani governments also met to discuss
the eastern rivers and the Farakka barrage that threatens to reduce fresh
water flow through the East Pakistan delta. Such a reduction, caused by
the diversion of water to end the silting of the port of Calcutta, would lead
to sea water encroachment of some of East Pakistan's most fertile land.
The government discussions of possible alternatives to this development
were inconclusive, but the problem remains potentially the most important
economic question facing East Pakistan.

CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH

Pakistan's philosophy of economic development during Ayub's regime

and before was private enterprise leavened with governmental investment.
The "engine of growth" was the entrepreneur, the government's role one
of harnessing what one expert called "the social utility of greed." No one

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 WAYNE WILCOX 91

who studied the high growth rates of the economy doubted the efficacy of
the system, since Pakistan is one of very few countries to move from a very
modest resource and human skills base to growth rates averaging 6-7% a
year. Yet the pattern of development had social consequences that grated
against the Muslim and democratic conscience of Pakistan's citizenry.
At the 1968 convention of the Pakistan Management Association, the
chief economist of the Planning Commission, Dr. Mahbub-ul-Huq, disclosed
that 66% of the entire industrial capital of the country was concentrated
in the hands of twenty families. The same twenty families controlled 80%
of the banking and 97% of the insurance of the country. These were also
the families with partnerships with vigorous foreign firms. The concentra-
tion of wealth is made more politically difficult by the clannishness and
sectarianism of the entrepreneurial families, drawn almost entirely from
Western Indian Muslim minority groups.
Caught between profit-taking "robber barons" who invest so that they
can profit further, and profit-making large peasants who are prospering
with the aid of government-subsidized inputs, the urban consumer is "odd
man out." Ignored by the rural-based political system, taxed by the price
mechanism, and denied his share of the increasing GNP, the urban intel-
lectual was the alienated figure in the Pakistan of 1968.

FOREIGN POLICY

Since 1965 and the Tashkent agreement, Pakistan has been waiting for
the Soviet Union to become truly "even handed" in Indo-Pakistan relations.
After five years of arduous and effective courtship, Pakistan's diplomats
realized that they had extracted all they could reasonably expect from
China, and perhaps then some. With the United States in an increasingly
distant posture of distracted disillusionment, reducing its economic assis-
tance and refusing to sell arms, Pakistan simply had to develop an arms
supplier and source of investment loans in the USSR. During 1968, Alexei
Kosygin announced the "even handed" policies for which Pakistan had
committed very considerable diplomatic resources: the USSR agreed to
aid Pakistan in heavy metals and power projects, subject to feasibility stu-
dies, and, perhaps more important, agreed to sell arms to Pakistan in spite
of Indian protests. By year's end the shape, scale and quality of these new
agreements were unclear, but the "triangular tightrope" diplomacy about
which Ayub had written in 1967 continued to pay off. A casualty to the new
Soviet aid to Pakistan was the American communications base at Peshawar,
the lease on which was not renewed.
Indo-Pakistan relations did not improve in 1968, although there were
various hopeful prospects throughout the year. The USSR role in counsel-
ing peace and upholding the Tashkent agreement seemed to call for Kosygin
to play a more active part in his travels to South Asia than was the case.
The Farakka Barrage talks broke down in the old acrimony. Sheikh Ab-
dullah did not pursue his bilateral talks as he had during the Shastri leader-

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 92 PAKI STAN

ship. Ayub's domestic stance against Bhutto's anti-Indian, pro-Peking op-

position left him in a poor position to compromise on Kashmir; Indira
Gandhi's equivalent position in Delhi left little room for dialogue.
The Indian arms build-up continued in a qualitative sense, but Pakistan
managed a slight reduction in expenditures and did not acquire expensive
weapons systems from European suppliers. The arms race in the subcon-
tinent slowed more from lack of money than lack of interest, however, and
the USSR sales to Pakistan will constitute a new round of increasing mili-
tary levels. Ayub has managed to maintain some control over military
budgets, but any successor will be under very great pressure to deliver yet
more in the face of India's undeniably greater strength.

SOCIETY AND CULTURE

The great transformations of a nation go unreported because they hap-

pen gradually. In 1968 a generation of Pakistanis who never knew British
India came to their majority. This generation does not have family ties
across the partition lines; it does not remember the time when Hindus and
Muslims cooperated against British rule. It did not participate in the Pakis-
tan movement, and it has grown up in a largely secular state for which
Islam is more or less decorative rather than central.
In East Pakistan this generation discovered politics in the great language
agitation of 1953, celebrated annually as thousands of students march to
the Shaheed (martyr) Memorial in Dacca. Out of the language movement
came the leaders and the idiom of provincial life and a new pride in Bengali
culture. But there is, as Syed Waliullah wrote in his novel Tree Without
Roots, a "great restlessness" in the land, for "there are too many of them
on this land, this piece of raped and ravaged land which yields no more."
And every year another million and a half people are born to that East
Pakistan land.
In West Pakistan the same generation has discovered economics, not
politics. Business schools are crowded, and engineering and the law prized;
religion, the arts and the humanities are for the students who have no choice.
Everyone seems to sense that the vital movers of the society are the civil
and military managers, the professionals and the businessmen. If an in-
tellectual aspires to action, he seeks the competitive examination for the
civil service or takes a Ph.D in economics. But as in East Pakistan, a mil-
lion and a half new West Pakistanis are born every year, most of them to
peasants far from Ph.D's and farther still from participation in Pakistan's
management. In 1968, as in the year before, the actual percentage of literates
in the society declined slightly as population increase outpaced educational
growth. The new literacy of the transistor and the cinema is expanding, but
with unclear import.
Pakistan in 1968, after a decade of leadership by Mohammad Ayurb Khan,
was therefore a vigorous, factionous and turbulent society, struggling with
a poverty cycle that makes it one of the world's poorest countries and oper-

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 WAYNE WILCOX 93

ating a government on a elite, centrist basis that requires gifted, confident

and imaginative leadership. As with Mr. Johnson's dog, the wonder is not
that Pakistan has problems, but that it manages to develop in spite of them.

SELECTED READING

Choudhury, G. W. Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966. New York:

Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.
Myrdal, Gunnar, et al. Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Na-
tions. New York: Pantheon Books for the Twentieth Century Fund, 1968,
3 vols.
Sharma, B. L. The Pakistan-China Axis. Calcutta: Asia Publishing House,
1968.
Wilcox, Wayne. "Political Change in Pakistan: Structures, Functions, Con-
straints and Goals," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 3 (Fall 1968), pp. 341-
354.

WAYNE WILCOX is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at

Columbia University.

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