The Interpretation of Plato's "Crito"

Author(s): David Bostock

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1990), pp. 1-20
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182345 .
Accessed: 12/10/2013 07:16

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 The Interpretationof Plato's Crito
DAVID BOSTOCK

Socratesgivesas his leadingpremisein the Crito thatone shoulddo nothing

wrong (obaCg bet &6Itxiv, 49b8). (He says, indeed, that he has lived
his whole life in obedience to this premise, 49a-b.) He then proceeds to
arguethatit wouldbe wrongfor himto tryto escapefromgaol, thusevading
the death penalty he had been sentenced to. But a central problem in
interpretingthe dialogueis thatthe argumentshe offersfor this conclusion
appearto be designedto establisha verymuchstrongerconclusion:it would
always be wrongfor any citizen of Athens to disobey any law of Athens.
Such a conclusion is in itself distinctlyunappealing,and apparentlynot
consistent with the leading premise, for presumablya law might be an
unjust law commandingthe doing of what is wrong. Moreover, in the
Apology Socratesapparentlyreportsone suchcase and envisagesanother.
At 32c-d he says that he did not obey an order from the ThirtyTyrants
because what was ordered was wrong (&6.x6vxt, 32d5); and at 29c-d he
saysthathe wouldnot obey a courtorderto cease philosophising,evidently
on the same ground(though he does not here use the word 6Lxov, or a
synonym). Here, then, it seems to be admittedthat a law, or anyway a
legallyauthoritativeorder,1maycommandone to do wrong,andthatif so it
shouldnot be obeyed. Thissets ourproblem:is it possibleso to interpretthe
Crito thatit does not enjoinobedienceto any andeverylaw?I proposeand
criticisethree lines of interpretationwhich attemptto avoid this 'author-
itarian'readingof the dialogue.They differfromone anothermost notably

l It may of course be argued whether the orders of the Thirty Tyrants did have the
appropriatelegal authority,and it may be observed that the court could not legally make
an order that Socrates should cease philosophising unless Socrates himself were to
propose this as his altemative to the death penalty. But Socratesdoes not suggest that he
did or would disobey these orders on ground of their illegality, but simply on ground of
their wrongness.

Phronesis1990. Vol. XXXVII (Accepted July 1989) 1

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
over the questionof how many distinctand separableargumentsthe dia-
logue contains. I then consider the merits of the authoritarianinter-
pretation.

1. Thedialoguecontainsbut one argument

At 49c-d Socrateselaborateshis leadingpremiseto 'one shouldnot wrong

any person', adding to this 'not even if one has been wronged by him'.
(&x6LIXvis used transitivelyfrom 49blO, and equated with xaxovQydEv
and with xaxog xoet6vat 49c.) At 49e5-7he states a furtherpremise'one
should do what one has agreed to do, provided that it is not wrong'.
(btxatLa6vca evidentlyhas the force of h6tXa 6v-cac.) He then propos-
es that it follows from these premisesthat it would be wrong for him to
escape (49e9-50a3). Crito requests further elucidation, the personified
Laws of Athens are brought upon the stage, and the argumentproper
begins.
Now it is clearthat the first point that the Lawsmake is this: if Socrates
triesto escape, he will be attempting,for his part,to destroythe Laws, and
(thereby)the whole city;for a city couldnot surviveif the verdictsreached
by the courtswereset asideandrenderedpowerlessby individuals.They go
on to add that much could be said on behalf of this particularlaw, that
verdictsshouldbe carriedout (50a8-b8).Thisevidentlysuggeststhe follow-
ing argument:

(i) The lawthatverdictsshouldbe carriedout is fundamentalto

the whole systemof laws.
Hence (ii) Whoeverattemptsto disobeythislaw is attempting(for his
part) to destroythe whole systemof laws.
But (iii) It would be wrongfor Socratesto attempt(for his part) to
destroythe whole systemof laws.
So (iv) It would be wrong for Socratesto attemptto disobey this
law.
Thus (v) It would be wrongfor Socratesto attemptto escape.

I shallcall this suggestedargumentargumentA. If we may grantthe (very

dubious)step from (i) to (ii), whichreceivesno furtherelaborationin the
dialogue, it would seem to be a valid argument(at least if we add, as a
furtherand uncontentiouspremise, that in the present context escaping
would be disobeyingthis particularlaw). Moreover, it clearly does not
generaliseto the conclusionthatSocratesshouldobey anyandeverylaw of

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Athens, but confines attention to one law in particular, as specially
fundamental.2
It is true that argumentA does not entirelyevade the problemwe began
with, since it is surely possible that obeying a verdict reached by a court
would involve doing somethingwrong. Indeed one of our cases from the
Apology was preciselya case of this sort: if the courthad orderedSocrates
to cease philosophising,Socratescould not have obeyed thatorderwithout
doing somethingwhichwas (in his eyes) wrong. (Or even if he would not
quite have called it wrong(8bmxov)- as I observed, he does not quite say
this in so manywords3- at any rate he does very clearlysay that he would
not have obeyed the order.) Now one mighttry to distinguishthe cases in
thisway. In this particularexample,Socratesimaginesthe courtsaying'We
will let you go, but on this condition,that you no longer . . . philosophise.
But if you are caughtstilldoingthis, you will die' (29c7-dl). Perhapswe can
see this as a kindof disjunctiveorder 'eithercease philosophisingand live,
or continueto philosophiseand die'. Then Socrates'proposedresponseis
to obey this order by obeying-the second disjunct, for he clearly does
envisagethat he wouldindeed be put to death (30cl). By the same reason-
ing, the order'Do not litter;penalty?10'wouldcount as being 'obeyed'by
one who both littered and paid ?10, and similarlywith any law to which
some definitepenaltyfor infringementwas attached.But in the case under
considerationin the Critothe court will not have attachedany penaltyfor
failing to obey its order. The verdict evidently was not put in this way:
'Socratesis to be executed;andif he escapesthis he will be banished'.So in
this case we do not have a disjunctiveorder, and there is only one way of
obeying it.
Clearlythisis veryspecialpleading,andwhollyunconvincing.Moreover,
it does not reallyattemptto meet the generalissue, but merelyto sidestep
it, by makinguse of incidentalfeaturesof the two cases in the Apology and
the Crito.A moreplausiblereconciliationof the two dialogueswouldbe to
weaken the Crito'sargumentA by qualifyingstep (ii) - and hence the
remainderof the argument- by addinga ceterisparibuscondition.4Then it
2 The point is not always noticed. For example it is ignored by both sides in the debate
between R. Martin, 'Socrates on Disobedience to Law', Review of Metaphysics 24
(1970/1), pp. 21-38 and F. C. Wade, 'In Defense of Socrates', Review of Metaphysics25
(1971/2), pp. 311-25.
3 Putting 29b6-7 together with 29d2-4we can infer that obeying the supposed order, like
doing wrong (6bLXEW), would be bad and disgraceful (xax6v xa' atoXQ6v). But we
cannot directly infer that it would be doing wrong.
4 This is, in effect, the solution adopted by G. X. Santas, Socrates(Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London, 1979), pp. 48-51.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
maybe saidthatin the situationenvisagedin theApologyotherthingswere
not equal, since (a) the courtorderwas countermandedby a divineorder,
and (b) Socrates' claim was that in continuingto philosophisehe was
attemptingnot to destroythe city (or its laws) but to do it good (30a5-6).
But neitherof these considerationswouldapplyto the situationin the Crito.
However, it cannotbe maintainedthatanysuchceterisparibusconditionis
in fact statedin the Crito,andso one has to admitthaton a naturalreading
the two passagesare simplyin conflict. Lookinga little more deeply, the
placewherea ceterisparibusconditionwouldbe even morewelcomeis as a
condition on the Crito's leading premise that one should never wrong
anyone. For it may be that all the availablecoursesof action do involve
wrongingsomeone (e.g. either the Laws, if Socratesdisobeys the court
order, or the God, if he obeys it), and then the propercourseis to choose
the lesser wrong. But again it cannot be said that the Cnitoshows any
awarenessof this complication;its argumenthas a naive simplicitythat
allows no place for a conflictof obligations.
Despite all this, an importantpointremains.OurargumentA does focus
on one law in particular,that verdictsshouldbe carriedout, and it claims
only that thatlaw ought alwaysto be obeyed (- at least, by one placed as
Socratesis placed,on whichwe havemoreto come). Thisis a longwayfrom
the fully 'authoritarian'readingof the dialogue,andin fact the claimis not
wholly implausible.Many of those who wish to preservea place for the
modem phenomenonof 'civildisobedience'would not feel that they were
bound to deny it. Perhapseven the Socratesof the Apology might have
been led to reconsiderhis position:it is not obviousthatwhatsomeonesees
as a commandof God oughtto be acceptedas overridingthisparticularlaw
of humans. This brings me, then, to the point of my first suggested
interpretation.
The first interpretationis that argumentA is the only argumentto be
found in the Crito.At 50a7-b8the Laws state premise(i) and proceed to
infer(ii). They do not, however,assertthe remainingpremise(iii), thatit is
wrongfor Socrates,in his position, to seek to destroythe whole systemof
laws, and certainlythey have not yet made any attemptto arguefor it. On
the first interpretation,the whole of the rest of their argument(down to
53a) is designedto providesupportfor this premise.They offer two sub-
argumentsfor it: one I shallcall the parent-cityanalogy,and this occupies
50c-51c;the otheris the argumentfromagreement,occupying51d-53a.But
both of these are subargumentsto the main argument,and both are de-
signedto show that it is wrongfor Socratesto attemptto subvertthe whole
system of laws. (He might, however, be right to disobey this or that

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
particularlaw, so long as that disobedience does not threaten the whole
system.5)In supportof this interpretationI note three points.
(a) The ensuing discussionbegins by raisingan objection to the argu-
mentjust suggested:Socratesmightreply 'the city has wrongedus, and the
verdictwas not correct'(50c1-2). This reply is best seen as an objection to
the suggestedpremise(iii): if Socratesdoes attemptto destroythe laws as a
whole, i.e. the city (50bl-2), then this is doing no wrong;it is rathera just
retaliationfor a wrong done.6 A good part of the parent-cityanalogy is
clearlydesignedas a counterto thisreply:it claimsthatSocratesandthe city
(or the country, naTQis) are not on an equal footing; rather, they are so
relatedthat it is wrongfor Socratesto retaliatein this way (5Oe4ff). Thus
the argumentconcludes'It is impiousto offer violence to one's mother or
father,andstill more to one's country ... Considerthen, Socrates,wheth-
er we are rightin sayingthat you are tryingto do us wrong (or 8(xaLa)in
tryingto do whatyou are now tryingto do' (5lc2-8). Assumingthatwe may
identifythe country,the city, and the system of laws as a whole, and that
'destruction'is the extremecase of 'offeringviolence to', this conclusionto
the parent-cityanalogyis exactlythe requiredaffirmationof premise (iii).
(b) Before the parent-cityanalogygets underway (at 50c9), and imme-
diately after it has been suggested that 'the city has wronged us, and the
verdictwas not correct'(50c1-2),the Lawsmake this remark:'Wasthis too
agreedbetween you and us, Socrates,or to abide by whateververdictsthe
city shoulddeclare?'.Clearlythis introducesthe idea behindthe argument
from agreement, which is to be more fully given later. Here at its first
introductionthe specific agreementthat the Laws insist upon is an agree-
ment to abide by whateververdictsare declared (and this is contrasted-
somewhatelliptically- with a suggested agreementto abide by such ver-
dictsonly when they are correct;the Laws claimthat this latteris not what
was agreed). Now it has been claimed that destructionof the law that
verdictsbe carriedout is tantamountto destructionof the whole system of
laws. Conversely,then, an agreementto abideby the law on verdictsshould
5 This firstinterpretationis to be found in Santas (op.cit.), p. 18: 'Socrates'argument,in
all its versions, is an argumentto the conclusion that he must not escape, on the grounds
that he would be disobeying this law [that the verdicts reached by the courts shall be
supreme] ... We do not know whether Socrateswould make the same argumentagainst
disobeyingany law'. (Santas does admit, however, that the argumentsI distinguishas B
and C below purport to establish much stronger claims. On this he remarks 'this
over-arguingis puzzling, and we are unable to resolve the puzzle', pp. 26-8.)
6 Note that Socrates' remarks at 49b-d do not claim that retaliation is always wrong.
Rather, they claim that retaliation is wrong when it involves wronging the person
retaliated against.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
equally be implied by an agreementto abide by the system of laws as a
whole. That, then, shouldbe whatthe longerargumentfromagreementat
51d-53a is arguingfor, and we should interpretit in that light if at all
possible.Thismakesit apartof the argumentgiveninitially:as Socrateshas
agreedto abideby the systemas a whole, it is wrongfor himto tryto destroy
it.
(c) On this interpretation,the basic charge againstSocratesis always
that he is aiming(for his part) to destroythe laws, and that this is doing
wrong, because in fact it is doing themwrong. In the concludingpassage
(53a8-54dl) the Laws are arguingthat escape will bringnone of the ad-
vantagesthat Critoapparentlysees in it (44e-46a),andin the courseof this
they twicerecurto thischarge.Any well-governedcitythatSocratesmayfly
to will reject him as a destroyerof the laws (53b6-cl), and for the same
reasonhe will not be welcomedby the laws of Hades (54c6-8).They refer
also to the two bases for this charge, that Socrateswill not have kept his
agreements,and that he will have done harmto those whomhe least ought
to harm,in retaliation(54c2-5).But they treatthe two coordinately,andas
the second clearlyis partof an argumentto show that he is wrongto try to
destroythe laws, we shouldsee the first in the same way.

2. Thedialoguecontainstwo distinctarguments
The obvious weaknessin the first interpretationis that there really is no
connection between argumentA and the argumentfrom agreement at
5ld-53a. The considerationsadvanced in (b) and (c) above are wholly
programmatic:they enjoin us to see the argumentfromagreementas part
of argumentA if we can, since there are some (not verystrong)pointersto
suggestthis. But thereis an equallystrongpointerin the oppositedirection,
namelythat beforethe Lawsare broughtuponthe scene at all Socrateshas
introducedtwo clearlydistinctpremises.One is the premisethatone ought
not to wronganother,not even in requitalfor a wrongdone to oneself, and
this premiseclearlyis put to use in argumentA. The other is the premise
that one shouldkeep one's agreements,providedthatwhatis agreedis not
wrong, and this premise is of course employed in the argumentfrom
agreement. These being two quite distinctpremises, is it not naturalto
supposethateach will be the mainpremiseof two quitedistinctarguments?
Indeed Socrateshimselfseems to implythis, as soon as he has introduced
his two premises,for he then says:'If we go awayfromhere, withouthaving
persuadedthe city, shallwe or shallwe not be wrongingcertainpeople, and
indeed those whom we least ought to? And shall we or shall we not be

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
abidingby what we have agreed, it not being wrong?'(49e9-50a3).This
passagevery clearlysuggeststhat two distinctargumentsare to come. The
firstof them is (perhaps)argumentA, as outlinedearlier,andthe secondis
evidentlythe argumentfrom agreement.
Moreover,when we do look in detail at the argumentfrom agreement,
we see that it cannot be broughtunderthe wing of argumentA. Its main
claimis simplythat Socrateshas agreedto obey the laws, and therefore(in
accordancewith the premiseon agreements)it wouldbe wrongof him not
to do so. There is no hint that he has agreed only to obey 'the systemas a
whole', thus leaving room for disobedienceto one or anotherparticular
memberof thatsystem.On the contrarythe Lawsclaimthat anyfullcitizen
who remainsin the city 'hasagreedwith us, in so doing, to do whateverwe
command'(51e3-4, cf. 52al-2). Nor do they suggest in this passage (i.e.
5ld-53a) that a failureto obey would amountto an attemptat destruction,
and in fact the destructionof the laws is mentioned only once in this
passage,whereit seemsto me clearthatit is a referencebackto the previous
argumentand not a partof the presentone. (At 52c3 the Lawsdigressto a
special ad hominemargument:at his trial Socratescould have proposed
exile as an alternativeto the death penalty, and so achieved with the
consentof the city whathe is now proposingto effect withoutit. But he had
then saidthathe wouldpreferdeathto exile. Thenthey continue'Butas it is
you do not respectwhat you said then, nor do you show regardfor us, the
laws, whom you are tryingto destroy, and you are behavinglike the most
worthlessslave, tryingto run away in contraventionof the compactsand
agreementsby whichyou have promisedus that you will live as a citizen'
(52c8-d3).Here thefirst point (not respectingwhatyou said then) sumsup
the newly introducedad hominem charge, the second point (trying to
destroyus) refersbackto the accusationof argumentA, andthe thirdpoint
revertsonce more to the theme of agreement,which is then continuedto
53a7. It is not beingsuggestedthat breakingagreementsand runningaway
is itself an attempt to destroy.) I conclude that the attempt to see this
argumentfrom agreementas merelypart of argumentA will not do, and
there are (at least) two distinctand separateargumentsin the Crito.7
This, then, introducesthe secondinterpretation.On thisview, one of the
argumentsis argumentA, construedas before, and this is not fully author-
itarianbecauseit only claimsof one particularlaw thatit oughtalwaysto be
obeyed. But we now construeargumentA as runningfrom the beginning
So, for example, G. Vlastos, 'Socrateson PoliticalObedience and Disobedience', Yale
Review 63 (1974), pp. 517-34, and J. Dybikowski, 'Socrates, Obedience, and the Law:
Plato's Crto', Dialogue 13 (1974), pp. 519-35.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
(SOa8)only to 51c8. The new sentencebeginningon thatline beginswith a
recapitulationof the salient points of argumentA, but then moves on (at
6tW; in 5ldl) to introducea new line of argument,whichwe maynow call
argumentB. This, however, is equallynot a fully authoritarianargument.
Tlhoughit may indeed seem so, from its main expositionin 5ld-53a, we
should rememberthat its leadingpremiseis introducedat 49e5-7 with an
importantproviso:one shouldkeep one's agreements,providedthat what
is agreedis not wrong.Thus even if Socrateshas, by remainingin the city,
agreedto obey each and every one of its laws, it does not follow that he is
obligedto do so. On the contrary,if obedienceto a lawwouldinvolvedoing
somethingwrong,thenby the provisohe is not obligedto obey it, andby the
premisestatedrightat the beginninghe is obligednot to obey it. Plainly,if
thisprovisois regardedas governingeveryclaimmadein argumentB, then
this argumentcannotconflictwith the majorinjunction'do no wrong'.
It is difficultto give an accurateformulationof argumentB, so I shallnot
try to set one out. For one thing, it is not quite clear when Socrates is
supposedto have agreedto obey the laws of Athens. At 51d3, it appears
that he made the agreement- presumablyan agreementto obey the laws
for so long as he was a resident of Athens - at the time when he was
admittedto full citizenship.On the other hand one might take 52e3 as
indicatingthat the agreementwas continuallybeing remadeeach day that
he remainedin Athens as a free man, andhence thathe had agreed,at the
startof the trial, to abide by its verdict.Thus he was bound, not just by a
promisemade long ago, when this particularoutcomecouldnot have been
foreseen, but by a very recent promise, made in full knowledge of the
dangersinherentin it. Anotherdoubtis overjustwhichof Socrates''deeds'
(ratherthan 'words')constitutethe agreement.Up to 52a4it appearsto be
simply his choosing to remain in Athens as a citizen of that city, but
thereafterthe Lawsincreasinglystresshis satisfactionwith the city (and its
institutions),as if thiswerehighlyrelevant.Clearytherecouldbe citizensof
Athens who remainin the city while exhibitingconsiderabledissatifaction
with its institutions,and there could be non-citizenswho remainbecause
they are well-satisfied.Would either of these types of people be held to
have agreed to obey its laws? A much more seriousdifficultyis over just
whatSocrateshas agreed to do. For most of the passage, it is naturalto
suppose that what he has agreed to do is simplyto obey the laws, but at
51e4-52a3it is said that there is anotheralternativeopen to him: he must
either obey or persuade.I shallconsiderhow this is to be interpretedin the
next section.

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 But a genuineproblemfor the presentinterpretationis this. Accordingto
this interpretation,the provisoon keepingagreements,thatwhatis agreed
shouldnot be wrong,is to be takenas applyingto thiswhole argument.But
in thatcase the Lawsmustshow, somewhereduringthis argument,thatit is
not wrongfor Socratesto do whatthe laws now requireof him (namelyto
remainin prisonuntilhe is executed). It is clearthat they make no attempt
to show any such thing - the topic is simply never mentioned- and their
argumentthereforecontainsa very notablegap. Nor are we permitted,on
this interpretation,to repairthe gap by referringbackto argumentA (e.g.
by claimingthat argumentA has alreadyshown that escaping would be
wrong, and inferringfrom this that not escapingwould not be wrong, and
hence inferringonce more, by argumentB, that Socratesis obliged not to
escape).8 For the present interpretationis that argumentsA and B are
wholly independentarguments.Insteadof the claimthat what is agreed is
not wrong, what we find in argumentB are several indicationsthat the
agreementwas fairlyenteredinto. Thus Socrateswas free to agree or not,
andwas not in anywayforcedto agree,for he couldinsteadhavedecidedto
live elsewhere,with no financialpenalty(5ld4-e5, 52e1). Again, there was
no kindof trickeryinvolved,since Socratesknewwhathe was agreeingto,
and had plenty of time to observe how the Laws of Athens did operate
(51e1-2, 52e2-3). These, one mightsay, are considerationstendingto show
that the agreementwas not wronglymade (was made 8xa(os), but this by
no means ensures that what was agreed was not wrong (was bicxaLov).
Thus it appearsthat argumentB, as developed by the Laws themselves,
does not satisfythe provisoon keepingagreementsintroducedat 49e5-7.
Thereis only one passagein argumentB whichone mighttake to contain
a reference to the proviso, and that is at 52e4-5. The Laws have been
summingup theirclaimthatthe agreementwas fairlyenteredinto, andthat
Socratescould at any time have chosento emigrate,and to this they add 'if
we did not please you, and if the agreementsseemed to you to be wrong'
(Et Rh ... b&xatacipaCvov[6 sol al 6.o0XOylaLEIvaL).Now the
impliedclaimthat the agreementwas not wrongcouldbe taken as claiming
that whatwas agreed was not wrong, though it also, of course, could be
taken as claimingthat the agreementwas fairlystruck.It may be that the
Laws are suggesting, in this ambiguousphrase, that the first (relevant)
interpretationfollows from the second. But in that case one can only say
that they are mistaken:a perfectlyfairagreementmayyet be an agreement

' This, if I understand him rightly, is how Santas proposes to fill the apparent gap
(op.cit., pp. 21-5).

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
to do whatis wrong.Howeverit maybe thatwe shouldsee them as arguing
in this way:the factthatSocrateshas remainedin the city showsthathe has
agreed to obey its laws, and the furtherfact that he is especiallysatisfied
with the city - that its laws 'pleasehim'- showsfurtherthat in his opinion
what he has agreed to do is not wrong. So this is an argumentumad
hominem: Socrates, at any rate, is bound to accept that the proviso is
satisfiedbecausethe Lawsdo in fact please him, andif he had agreedto do
something wrong he would not be pleased. On this account, then, the
crucialprovisois mentioned,andit is argued,not exactlythatit is satisfied,
but that Socratesmust thinkthat it is.
Now this may be how Platointendedhis argumentto be taken, thoughif
so one can only say that the reasoningis wholly specious. For the sake of
argument,let us supposethatuntilthe time of his trialSocrateswas indeed
verysatisfiedwiththe lawsof Athens, andwiththe decisionsreachedin the
courts, applyingthose laws. It evidently cannotfollow that he was also
pleased with the verdictthat convictedhim of impietyand corruptingthe
young, andpresumablyhe was not at all pleasedwith thisverdict.Equally,
it cannotfollow that he is now pleasedto submitto the deathpenalty, and
he is in no wayboundto thinkthatwhatthe agreementhasled to in thiscase
is not wrong. More generally, the initial agreement is no doubt to be
conceivedof as a generalagreement,to do whateverthe lawscommand.But
the proviso, that one should keep this agreement only where what is
commandedis not wrong, must be shownto be satisfiedin eachparticular
case. It is clearthat the Lawsmake no attemptto show that it is satisfiedin
thiscase, and thus argumentB, as stated, pays no attentionto the relevant
form of the proviso.9In fact, I thinkit is more naturalto say that it ignores
this provisoaltogether,in effect replacingit with the differentprovisothat
the agreementbe fairlymade. It thus appearsto be of a fully authoritarian
bent, requiringobedience to any and every law from every citizen who
chooses to remainin the city, knowingwhat its laws are. Unless, perhaps,
we can save the situationby requiringeitherobedienceor persuasion?
I No doubt the proviso is, in Socrates' own opinion, satisfied in this case. In his view,
submittingto the death penalty will no doubt be sufferinga wrong, but not doing wrong.
(The suggestion that it is doing wrong to his friends, his children, or - we may add - his
wife, is one to which he pays no serious attention. Similarlywith other suggestions that
one might make, e.g. that it will harm the reputationof Athenian democracyif such a
miscarriageof justice is not prevented, and the people given no opportunityto repent.)
But although Socrates may indeed think that acceptingdeath would not be wrong, still
this point is not argued, or even mentioned, duringargumentB. And argumentB would
apparentlyhave applied even if Socrates had taken a quite different view of his obliga-
tions to other people (and to himself).

10

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
3. Thedialoguecontainsthreedistinctarguments
Since the alternativeof either obeying or persuadingalso occurs within
what we are at present calling argumentA, let us first reconsiderthis
argumenta little more thoroughly.Again, there are too many difficulties
over the detailsfor it to be sensibleto attempta preciseformulation.
At 50c9 the Lawsask Socrates'Whataccusationdo you bringagainstus
and the city, that you shouldattemptour destruction?'.They then get him
to admitthat he has no fault to find with the laws on marriage,and on the
careandeducationof children.Moreover,sincethese mattersareregulated
by laws, they the Lawsclaimto be his parents,andto have been responsible
for his care and educationas a child; he is their offspring,and their slave
(50dl-e4). Fromthis they infer that they and Socratesare not on an equal
footing. Just as a slave would be wrong to retaliate in kind against his
master,and just as Socrateswouldhave been wrongto retaliateagainsthis
father, so equally Socrateswould be wrongto retaliateagainstthe Laws;
they areindeedtryingto destroyhim, butit is neverthelesswrongfor himto
try to destroythem in turn(50e4-51a7).So far, the discussioncan easily be
seen to be focusedtowardsargumentA as set out:whatis at issueis whether
Socrateshas the rightto (try, for his part, to) destroythe Laws,in his own
self-defence, and the Lawsclaimthat he has no such right.
Again, it is not quiteclearwhatexactlyis the basisof thisclaim.It maybe
suggestedthat, on orthodoxGreekmorality,a son is wrongto tryto kill his
biological parents, even in self-defence. Thus Oedipus should not have
killed Laius when he met him at the crossroads,even if it was in self-
defence, and even though Oedipus owed nothing to Laius for his up-
bringingand education(and did not know who he was). Of course, when
the matter is put in this way, then the claim of the Laws to be Socrates'
parentslooks verythin indeed:they cannotreasonablysay that theirblood
runsin his veins, or that withoutthem he literallycould not have existed.
Besides, this makes it irrelevantthat Socrateshas no fault to find with the
laws on marriage,upbringing,and education.Perhapsit is better, then, to
supposethat the Lawsare claimingmuchthe samestatusas a foster-parent
or guardian,to whom the child owes some debt of gratitudefor benefits
received. But in that case, of course, the analogy looks him thin in a
differentway. If your guardianis murderouslyattackingyou, surely you
may kill in self-defence, if there is no other way of surviving?But I leave
these issues unsettled, since my concern is not so much to criticise the
argumentas to determinewhat it is supposedto be.
Up to the presentpoint (51a7), we can quite easily see the argumentas

11

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
concernedwith the specific point of destroyingthe Laws, as argumentA
requires.We can also see the concludinglines (51c2-8, quoted above p. 5)
as equally concerned with this point. But already a different theme has
creptin. At 50e9-51a2,leadingup to theirclaimthat Socrateshas no rightto
retaliatein kind on this question of destruction,the Laws have also men-
tioned that childrenand slaves ought not to answerback, or to hit back.
This apparentlyleads them into makingmuchgreaterclaimsfor the rights
of parents, and still more of the state. They claim that in all mattersone
should reverence, soothe, and yield to the state even more than to one's
parents,and in fact one should do or submitto whateverit commands,no
matterwhat the consequencesto oneself (51a7-cl). This goes far beyond
the previous claim that no one who has been born, brought up, and
educatedin Athens should seek to destroyits laws, and it really cannot be
countedas partof ouroriginalargumentA at all. It apparentlyclaimsfor all
laws the unquestioningobedience that argumentA claims only for one
particularlaw. Let us dignify this passage with the name 'argumentC'
(thoughreallyit does not deserveto be called an argument,but is simplya
claim). We may regardargumentC as slotted into the middle of argument
A, or - perhaps better - we may regard argument C as following A, and
developed out of it by pressing the parent-cityanalogy to further and
strongerconclusions.In that case the concludingpassage51c2-8,whichwe
previouslytook as the conclusionto A alone, may be seen rather as the
conclusionto A and C together; it is ellipticalenough to be taken in this
way.
My thirdinterpretation,then, recognisesthreedistinctargumentsin the
Crito:-A, C, andB .10As before, A is not fullyauthoritarian,becauseit only
claims obedience for one particularlaw, the law that verdicts should be
carriedout. (And it claims this obedience either from all who have been
bornin Athens, underits laws, or fromallwho havebeen born,broughtup,
and educated in Athens, and have no fault to find with its laws on these
matters.Perhapswe oughtto addhere, in view of 5lc9-dl, thatit is not only
these lawsthat arerelevant,but also anyfurtherlawsconferringbenefitson
the citizens. But it may be better to suppose that this mention of further
benefits that the laws confer is more relevant to argumentC (enjoining

10I think this is now the most common interpretation. See e.g. the debate between
Martin and Wade (opp.citt., n. 2), and between G. Young, 'Socrates and Obedience',
Phronesis 19 (1974), pp. 1-29, and R. J. McLaughlin,'Socrateson Disobedience; a reply
to G. Young', Phronesis 21 (1976), pp. 185-97. Also R. Kraut, Socrates and the State,
Princeton 1984.

12

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
obedience to al laws) than to argumentA (forbiddingdestructionof the
laws).) Both C andB appearat firstsightto be fullyauthoritarian,requiring
obedience to any and every law. But, as this interpretationhas it, they are
not, for both are protected by includingthe alternative'either obey or
persuade'.We have alreadynoted that this alternativeis explicit in argu-
ment B; we now note thatit is also presentin argumentC (at 51b3-4,and at
51c1). How, then, is this alternativeto be interpreted?
One thing that is clear is that the 'persuasion'alternativeconcems
persuasionas to the rightnessor wrongnessof the commandin question('or
to persuade (the city) where x6 b&xaLovlies' (51c1), 'or to persuade us
(the Laws)if there is somethingwe do [djxaczg' (51e7) ). The traditional
interpretationhas been this. In the case of a law whicha citizenregardsas
unjust, he is at libertyto persuadethe assemblythat it is unjust, and thus
obtain its repeal. Similarlywith a parental command regarded as un-
reasonable:the parentmay be persuadedto rescindthat command.It has
recentlybeen objected"1 thatthis accountin effect neverdoes allowdisobe-
dience, since it does not envisage one disobeyingfirst and persuading
afterwards.But we can readilyextend the traditionalaccountto allow for
this, if we wish. In a Greekcourtof law (thoughnot, of course,in an English
one) it was permissibleto plead that though one had broken the existing
law, stillone oughtnot to be condemned,becausethe law in questionwas a
bad one. And such a plea is of course equally in order with a parental
command.So we may certainlyallow this much:one has done no wrongif
one disobeys an existinglaw (or parentalcommand),but afterwardssuc-
ceeds in persuadingthe city (or the parent)thatthe disobediencewas in this
case justified. But, accordingto the traditionalaccount, one has done
wrongif one both disobeysand also does not succeedin persuadingthe city
or parent- eitherbeforeor afterthe event- thatdisobediencewasor would
be justified. In this case one has neither obeyed nor persuaded, and is
thereforeat fault.
However, my thirdsuggestedinterpretation(which is in effect Kraut's
interpretation)12will not rest contentwith this, for it clearlyallowsfor the
possibilityof there being a commandwhichit wouldbe wrongto obey and
yet one which the relevant authoritycould not be persuadedto see as
wrong. That is, the authoritycould not be persuadedbeforehandto with-
drawit or afterwardsto pardoninfringementsof it. So, accordingto this
interpretation,the alternativeshould be construedin this way: one must

" E.g. Kraut, op.cit., ch. 3 (passim).

12 Op.cit.,n. 10.

13

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
either obey or tryto persuade."3 If one disobeys,but does tryto persuade-
either before or after the event -then one is not at fault, even though the
attemptat persuasionmaynot be successful.No doubt,if whatis command-
ed is not wrong,thenone shouldobey the command,whetherit comesfrom
the state or from a parent. But where what is commandedis wrong, then
one should not obey it, but try to persuade. In the case of a parental
commandaddressedto an adultson or daughter,if the persuasiondoes not
succeedthen that, presumably,is the end of the matter.In the caseof a law,
if the persuasiondoes not succeed, then no doubt the appropriatepenalty
will be suffered.But in each case one hascommittedno wrong.That,at any
rate, is whatthisthirdinterpretationproposes.In its favouris the factthatit
removes the authoritariansting from argumentsB and C. But what else
may be said for it?
Krautargues (pp. 91-103) that the analogybetween parentsand cities
mustbe takenas drawinga parallelbetweenon the one handcitiesandtheir
citizensandon the otherhandparentsandtheiradultoffspring.If this is so,
then indeedhis interpretationof 'persuadeor obey' seemspreferable,since
Greek society wouldhardlysupposethat a fully adultmanshouldobey his
ageingfatheron all matterson whichhe did not succeedin persuadinghim
otherwise.The consequenceis no doubtfairlydrawn,butthe premiseupon
whichit rests is insecure.The text nowheresays that the relationshipit is
concemedwithis specificallythatbetweenparentsandadultoffspring,and
there is a strongindicationthat it is not, since this same relationis held to
obtain between mastersand slaves (5Oe4,e8). It clearlycannotbe said of
slavesthattheydo no wrongby disobeyingtheirmaster'scommand,so long
as they have at leasttried(butfailed)to dissuadehimfromit. Krautreplies,
if I understandhim rightly,that the master-slaverelationshipis relevant
only to argumentA (concemingthe destructionof the superiorparty),and
not to argumentC (concemingobedience to it) (pp. 105-8). But the two
argumentscannotbe so clearlyseparated,since it is undeniablethat argu-
mentC growsout of, anddevelops,the considerationdeployedin argument
A. It is certainlyopen to us to hold that the thoughtin argumentC, as in
argumentA, is that the relationshipof a citizento his city is comparableto
the relationshipof a youngchildto its parents,or a slaveto his master:thus
if persuasionfails, obedienceis required.
Moreoverthis readingis very stronglysupportedby a point in the text
that Krautappearsto overlook. At 51b2-3it is said that one shouldrever-

13 It is well known that dFetIv can mean 'try to persuade'. Success is not automatically
implied (as it is with the English verb).

14

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ence (oaj3EoftaL)and yield to (oF&'E(xFLv)
the state even more than to one's
parents. On Kraut's account of 'persuading'- i.e. trying, but perhaps
failing,to persuade- this maypossiblybe viewed as a way of 'reverencing'
one's parents or one's state, but it can hardlybe described as a way of
yieldingto them. As he himselfexplains,a fatherwho has not been obeyed
by his adultson, andwho has not been convincedby the persuasionoffered
(either before or after), will generallydo nothingfurtherand expect noth-
ing further.Thereis no penaltyhe can impose (save the extremepenaltyof
disinheritance,which anywayhe can only impose once), and the son has
entirelyfulfilledhis obligations.But a fatherin such a situationwill hardly
think 'he has yielded to me'. I concludethat Kraut'spositive argumentin
favourof his interpretationis unconvincing:it is muchmore probablethat
the relationshipbetween the citizen and the city is being compared (in
argumentC) to the relationshipbetween a young child and its parents,
whichis in factsimilarto the relationshipbetweena slaveandhis master.In
their case, obedience is expected, and disobedienceis set down as wrong,
unless it is justifiedby a successfulattemptat persuasion.
There are two furtherargumentsagainstKraut'sinterpretation.One is
that it is of course the personifiedLaws themselves who propoundthe
alternative'either obey or persuade',meaningpresumablythat they the
Lawswill be satisfiedif eitherdisjunctis fulfilled.But very clearlythelaw is
not satisfied by an unsuccessfulattempt at persuasion,14 and what Kraut
means to suggest is that the demandsof moralityare satisfiedby this, at
leastwhenit wouldbe wrongto obey, but not the demandsof the law. Thus,
as he sees it, the personifiedLawshave a doublerole: they both represent
the actual laws of the city, and yet can keep a distance from them and
represent moralityinstead (as when they admit that the verdict against
Socrateswas not a correct verdict, 54b8). However, where the 'obey or
persuade'alternativeoccursin argumentB (at 51e7-52a3), it is surely as
part of an account of what the actual laws of the city require, as is the
permissionto emigratewith no financialpenalty,just above (51d-el). So
there seems to me to be no escape from the objectionthis way: the actual
laws evidently would not be satisfied by unsuccessful attempts at
persuasion.
Finally,the Lawssay that if Socratesescapes he will have both failed to
obey andfailedto persuade(52a3-4).Now quitea naturalwayof takingthis
chargewould be to supposethat it claimsthat Socrateshas not obeyed the

14
By contrast, the law may be satisfied by a sincere but unsuccessfulattempt to obey, as
Kraut urges on pp. 69-70.

15

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
law againstimpietyand corruptingthe young, and also has not persuaded
the jury that he should not be condemnedon this account. If that is the
correct way of taking it, then our proposed third interpretationmust
certainlybe rejected, since Socratesevidentlydid tryto persuadethe jury
that he should not be condemned. However, it may well be that this
'natural'way of takingthe remarkis mistaken,for afterall our personified
Lawsdo admitthatthe verdictwasincorrect,andso apparentlytheyshould
concede that Socrateshas obeyed the Law againstimpietyand corrupting
the young. So perhapswhat they meanis this: havingbeen foundguiltyon
this charge, Socrates (if he escapes) will not be obeying the subsequent
decision that he should thereforebe executed, and equallywill not have
persuadedthe jurythat a differentpenaltywouldbe moreappropriate.But
then again we can reply that he did try to persuadethe jury to impose a
differentpenalty.(It maywell be saidthathe did not tryveryhard.Though
the alternativethat was in the end proposed may not have been too un-
reasonable,15 the maintenorof his secondspeechin the Apologycanhardly
be describedas a seriousplea for leniency;it is more naturallyseen simply
as defiance. But this does not alter the fact that he did make an attemptat
persuasion.)In response to this objection, Krautclaims that in order to
count as 'persuading'the juryon this issue, Socratesshouldhave urged,in
his secondspeech, that his escapefromgaol wouldbe justified(p. 89). But
thatis evidentlyquiteunreasonable.It is surelyenoughthathe shouldhave
tried to persuadethe jury that the death penaltywas not an appropriate
penalty, and that indeed he did (37a-b).
I concludethat there are too manyindicationsthat, in the Crito,merely
trying (but failing) to persuadedoes not count as fulfillingthe command
eitherto obey or to persuade,andthatourthirdinterpretationmustalso be
rejected. Let us take stock.

On all interpretations,the dialoguecontainsargumentA. Thisis not afully

authoritarianargument,since it claimsonly that thereis one particularlaw
that ought alwaysto be obeyed. Neverthelessit is authoritarianenoughto
producea potentialconflictwiththe leadinginjunctionto do no wrong.It is
not plausible, however, to see argumentA as the only argumentin the
dialogue;at least we mustadmitthatargumentB is presentedas a different
and independentargument.

IS This question is discussed in T. C. Brickhouseand N. D. Smith, 'Socrates'proposed

penalty in Plato's Apology', Archivfir Geschichteder Philosophie64 (1982), pp. 1-18.

16

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Argument B should be preventedfrom reachinga fully authoritarian
conclusionby the fact that, when its premiseis firstintroduced,an impor-
tantprovisois attached:one shouldkeep agreements,providedthatwhatis
agreedis not wrong.However,whenargumentB is actuallydeveloped,this
provisodoes not appear.In its place, two otherprovisosaresuggested- one
(by implication) is that the agreement should be fairly made, with no
duress, ignorance,or trickery;and the other is that persuadingthe other
party to alter the agreementis an acceptable alternativeto keeping it.
Neither of these provisospreventthe argumentfrom conflictingwith the
leadinginjunctionto do no wrong.Concerningthe firstof them, thispointis
uncontroversial;and I have just been arguingthat the same point should
also be admitted concerningthe second, since what is intended is that
disobedienceis permittedonlywhenthereis a successfulattemptat persua-
sion. ArgumentB, then, mayfairlybe characterisedas a fullyauthoritarian
argument,for its concessionsfall far shortof what we actuallyrequire.
Finally, there is also argumentC. This is no less authoritarianthan
argumentB, and it seems in fact to be a furtherand separateargument.
Although it evidently grows out of a considerationthat is relevant to
argumentA, it buildsupon anddevelopsthatconsiderationso as to lead to
a muchmore authoritarianresultthan A does by itself.
As my finalquestion,I ask:wasthiswhatPlatointended?Did he meanto
be arguingfor the authoritarianconclusionthatone shouldalwaysobey any
and every law (failingpersuasion)?Or was it a mistakeon his partthat he
allowedhimselfto use argumentsthat do (purportto) establishthis strong
conclusion,when all that he actuallywishedto arguefor was a muchmore
limited result?

4. Theauthoritarianinterpretation
There are three points which may suggest that Plato did indeed mean to
arguefor the strongconclusionthat one shouldalwaysobey any and every
law. Of these the firsttwo would carrylittle weight by themselves,but the
third is - it seems to me - of some significance.
In the concludingsectionof the dialogue,whenthe Lawsturnto consider
the disadvantagesof escaping,one of the pertinentquestionsthat they ask
is this: when you are livingin exile, Socrates,whatwill you say? 'Willyou
saythe sameas you saidhere, thatvirtueandjustice,andcustomsandlaws,
are of most value to men?' (53c6-8). We of course expect to be told that
Socrates,while in Athens, had praisedvirtueand justice above all else (i
4L)nQxa'l h bLxaLoauv?). But is it not a little surprising to be told that he

17

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
had accordedthe same praise also to customsand laws (Ta' v6tLpaxacioi
v6lioL)?The implicationmust be that Socrates had supposed that the
demandsof the law andthe demandsof moralityneverwouldconflictwith
one another.t6No doubt this is difficultto reconcilewith Apology 32c-d,
whereSocratesappearsexplicitlyto allowthatmoralitymayconflictwitha
legally authoritativeorder. But here we may turnto the second point.
Later in the same concludingpassage the laws themselves are distin-
guished from their applicationby men. Socrates, admittedly,has been
wronged, but he has been wronged 'not by us, the Laws, but by men'
(54b8-cl).7 In a similarvein it maybe urgedthatthe commandof the Thirty
Tyrants,though(perhaps)legallyauthoritative,was not a commandof the
laws themselves, but should rather be regardedas a commandof men
wronglyapplyingthe law. Clearly,anyonewho wishesto maintainthatthe
laws are never morally in the wrong will need just such a distinction
between the laws themselves and their applicationby particularmen at
particulartimes. It may be no accidentthat the Critodoes indeed insist
upon it.
These two points are perhaps suggestive, but equally they could not
unreasonablybe discounted, as reading too great a significanceinto a
coupleof strayremarkswhichsurelywerenot intendedto revealthe overall
strategyof the dialogue.But my thirdpoint evidentlyis of importancefor
the interpretationof the dialogue as a whole. It goes back to the in-
troductorysection, where Socratesis setting the terms for the debate to
come.
When Crito first pleads that Socrates should accept his offer of an
arrangedescape, he several times refers to 'whatmost people will think'
(44b9-c5,44dl-5, 45d6-46al).Fromthe first,Socratesrejectsthisappealto
the majorityopinion (44c6-7), and he begins his reply by arguingfor its
worthlessness(46c6-8).He proposes,as an alternative,thatone shouldpay
attentiononly to the opinionsof the one manwho knowsaboutwhateveris
at issue, the expert (6 wQ6vL&Log, 47alO; 6 Ot&arT xat Ana(WV,
47blO-11). This, he says, applies equally where morals are concerned
(47c9-10),for heretoo we shouldpayattentiononlyto 'he who understands
about right and wrong, this one person and the truth itself (6 itat(ov
nEQL TWV 6LxaLLv xaci &&xwv, 6 Ed5 xai acu'r'iA dXVsta, 48a6-7).

16Quite how we are to understand'customs' in this context is unclear. But perhaps it

would not be unreasonable to take the reference to be to written laws (v6tol) and to
unwritten laws (v6Rtpa).
17 By contrast, at 51a3-4 it is apparentlythe Lawsthemselveswho are seeking to destroy
Socrates.

18

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Thusthe methodthatSocratessuggests,for the properconsiderationof the
questionbefore us, is that we shouldconsultthe moralexpert.Moreover,
since it is nowhere suggestedthat the method cannot be followed in the
present case, we should presumablysee the dialogue as pursuing this
method. But who, then, is the expertwho is consulted?
Well, the obvioussuggestionis thatit is the Lawsthemselves:the person-
ified Laws are taken to be those who know about right and wrong, and
whose opinionsthereforeshouldbe listenedto. If thisis not the implication
of the introductorysection, then who else mightbe suggestedas the moral
expertwhose adviceis sought?Thereseem to be just two alternatives.One
is that it is Socrateswho is the expert, since after all the argumentthat is
rhetoricallyput into the mouthof the Lawsis presumablyto be understood
as being in fact Socrates'own reasoning.But (a) it wouldbe distinctlyodd,
to say the least, if we aresupposedto take Socratesas here implyingthathe
himselfis the moralexpert,since everywhereelse in Plato'sdialogueshe is
consistentlyportrayedas disclaimingthisstatus.Besides, (b) thereseems to
me to be altogethertoo much'irony'in Socratessaying'we mustconsultthe
expert'and meaning'I mustwork it out myself, for I am the expert'. And
finally(c) as the dialogueends Socratestells us thathe hearswhatthe Laws
have been saying,as if it is indeednot his voice but another's(54d2-5),so as
to preservethe impressionthat he has been listeningnot to his own advice
but to someone else's. On the otherside, one mustof courseagreethat the
Laws are presented as arguingfrom premises that Socrates himself has
introducedat 49a-e (even if they do misrepresenthis premiseon keeping
agreements).Thus it may be that we should understandSocratesas here
claimingto be himselfthe expert,howeverimprobablethatmayseem in the
light of the other dialogues.But it seems to me rathermore probablethat
the presumedexpertis the Laws, who clearlycan be regardedas a further
and differentsource, availablefor consultation.
The other alternativeis that the 'expert' who is consulted duringthe
dialogueis neitherSocratesnor the Lawsbut simply'the truthitself , as the
wordingof 48a6-7(quotedabove) may perhapssuggest. If this was indeed
Plato's intention, then (a) one can only say that the 'method'being pro-
posed is a sham, and not in any way parallelto the method of consulting
expertsover bodilyhealth and fitness (47al3-b3, 47d7-el). In moralques-
tions, there is no practicalway of setting out to 'consultthe truth itself',
unlessone can firstassumesome genuineexpertwho does knowthis truth.
Moreover(b) the wordingof 48a6-7('the expertandthe truth')is surelynot
best understoodas implyingthat the only expert in this area simplyis the
truth;rather,if one does consulta properexpert,then one willtherebyhave

19

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
consulted the truth, because by hypothesisthe expert knows the truth.
Moregencrally,the implicationthatthereis an expertto be consultedis not
satisfiedmerelyby the suppositionthatthereis a truthto be discovered,and
I am unwillingto believe that Plato thoughtotherwise.
It mustbe admittedthatthe Critois uniqueamongPlato'searlydialogues
in implyingthat there is such a thing as the moralexpert. Elsewhereit is
explicitlyclaimed that there is no such thing (e.g. Protagoras319b-320b,
Meno 89e-96c). But at the same time the Critois unique in attributinga
seriousmoralargumentnot to Socratesnorto one of his interlocutorsbutto
a personified abstraction,the Laws of Athens. It seems to me a very
reasonableconjecturethatthese two featuresarerelated,andthatthe Crito
does meanto implythat the lawsare the experts- or, at any rate, thatthey
are the best approximationto expertsthat is availableto us. (The idea is
perhapsthis:the lawsandcustomsof the city, thoughfallible- for they can
sometimesbe 'persuaded'thatthey are in the wrong- are neverthelessthe
only repositorywe have of 'the wisdomof the ages' in moralmatters.)For
that reason, their advicemust alwaysbe treatedwith the greatestrespect.
No doubt the argumentsof the Critodo push this line of thought.too far,
andthe moralsupremacythatthey claimfor the lawsis not endorsedin any
other early dialogue. PresumablyPlato came to see that the implications,
when strictlycarriedthrough,are unacceptable,andthat thereis a need to
distinguish,muchmore firmlythanthe Critodoes, betweenwhatis legally
wrongandwhatis morallywrong."8 But I suspectthathe didquiteseriously
mean, in the Critoitself, to arguethatthe good manwillneverintentionally
disobeythe law.

MertonCollege, Oxford

18 For all we know, the Crito may have been his first dialogue, preceding even the

Apology. (R. Hackforth,in his The Compositionof Plato'sApology (Cambridge,1933),

argues that there is reason to believe that the Apology was not composed until six years
after the speeches it purportsto relate.)

20

This content downloaded from 129.68.65.223 on Sat, 12 Oct 2013 07:16:45 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions