POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

COLLEGE OF LAW

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

FIRST SEMESTER AY 2023 - 2024

NAME: CRUZ, Reynald C.

SECTION: JD 1-2

CASE DIGEST

TITLE OF THE CASE: Mayor vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

GR # L-74410
DATE: May 4, 1988
PONENTE: Justice Hugo Gutierrez Jr.

CASE DOCTRINE Computation of Period

FACTS On April 18, 1983, Carmen M. Angeles and Edmundo M. Angeles filed an ejectment
case against petitioner Pablo Mayor before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City.
This case was rendered with a decision in favor of the defendant against the plaintiffs,
to which they files a motion for reconsideration of the decision.

Pending the resolution of the motion, the plaintiffs died. The court subsequently
denied the motion for reconsideration, now handled by the heirs of the original
petitioners. Upon their appeal, the Regional Trial Court reversed the said decision
and was set aside.

Following these events, the record shows that: (1) the petitioner received the lower
court’s decision on August 29, 1985; (2) the petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration on the 15th day which was September 13, 1985; (3) the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration was received by the petitioner on September
30, 1985; (4) on October 1, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion for extension for fifteen
(15) days to file a petition for review with the appellate court; and (5) the appellate
court granted the motion for extension conditioned on the timeliness of the motion.

This recommendation, notwithstanding, the appellate court denied the motion for
reconsideration and declared that the petition was filed one (1) day late.

The petitioner assails the private respondent’s computation which was adopted by
the appellate court He insists that he filed his petition for review within the 15-day
extension granted to him in the appellate court’s October 8, 1985 resolution.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the petition for review was filed on time.

RULING: YES

The Court reiterated this mode of computation in the case of De las Alas v. Court of
Appeals (83 SCRA 200), when the Revised Rules of Court was already enforced.

Applying the Lloren rule to the instant case, we find the computation made by the
Court of Appeals erroneous, The petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration with
the trial court on September 13, 1985, which was the fifteenth (15th) day after he
received a copy of the Court’s decision. The motion was denied. He received notice of
the denial on September 30, 1985.
Under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the last day to perfect the appeal
was October 1, 1985. The right to file the petition for review would have expired on
October 1, 1985, not September 30, 1985. When the petitioner asked for an extension
of fifteen (15) days to file his petition for review, the fifteen-day period no longer
includes October 1 because that day was already given to him by Rule 41. The
fifteen-day period is on top of October 1. It started on October 2 and ended on
October 16.

The error of the respondent court becomes more apparent if we assume that the
petitioner asked only for a one-day extension. The last day to file the petition for
review would have been October 2. If he asked for two days, it would have been
October 3. But since he asked for and was given fifteen (15) days, the expiry date is
October 16.

The motion for extension filed by the petitioner was made within the period to file
the desired petition for review. The last day, therefore, of the 15-day extension granted
by the appellate court to file a petition for review was October 16, 1985 when the
petitioner actually filed his petition for review.