Understanding Taylorism

Author(s): Craig R. Littler

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 185-202
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 29 J%umber
Britishjtournalof SociologyVolume 2 jtuneI978

Craig R. Littler

UnderstandingTaylorism

A B ST R A C T

Sociologyhas frequentlytreatedTaylorismas an abstractedideas-

system. It is also necessaryto considerthe institutionalizationof
Taylorism,as failureto do so leads to an unrecognizedparadox.
Taylorismis analysedhere in terms of the divisionof labour, the
structureof controlovertaskperformance, andthe implicitminimum
interactionemploymentrelationship.
Taylorismrepresentsan organizationalform without any notion
of a career-structure, unlikeotherorganizationalmodelsavailableat
the turn of the century.Therefore,Taylorismcan be definedas the
bureaucratization of the structureof control,but notthe employment
relationship.
In industrial organizationscalculability requires processesof
determining and fixing effort levels. Taylorism representsthe
historicalswitchoverto the creationof new social mechanismsfor
constitutingeffort standardswithin an accelerateddynamic of
deskilling.It is this,not incentivewages,whichis the crucialelement
in Taylorismin relationto wage/effortexchange.
HistoricallyTaylorismwas not the rabid destroyerof the craft
system.It replaced,over time, systemsof internalcontract,which
were indirectformsof employmentand control.The notionof direct
employmentunderliesbothTaylorismandthe bureaucratic model.
Industrialand organizationalsociologyhas frequentlymisconstrued
the significanceand meaningof Taylorism.Bravermanlhas recently
given a heftyshovein the rightdirection,but his analysisis incomplete,
and is vitiated by an historicalromanticism.This articleattemptsto
userecentworkto analyseTaylorismfurther;to relateTaylorismto the
Weberianconcept of bureaucracy;and to clear away some of the
historicalcandy-floss.
THE PARADOX OF TAYLORISM

Industrialsociologyhas frequentlytreatedTaylorismas an ideassy.stem

only. A good exampleof this perspectiveis providedby Miller and

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 IS6 C7raig
R. Littler
Form. In their textbook on industrialsociology, they
standardstory-line,whichrunsasfollows: present the
From I900-20 Taylorismprovidedthe dominantideas about the
'worker'and worker-motivation. But money was not enough and 'a
greatnewidea wastakingroot.The view of the workeras an individual
personalityemerged strongly about I 920 to command the
From I920-40 stage.'
the workerwas seen as a psychologicalcomplex,but
then 'PsychologicalA{an' faltered, and sociology
Manhadneighbours!2 entered industry.
This story-linecontinuesto permeate and influence
even
works.For example,Rose spendsthreechaptersconsidering recent
largelyas a managerialideology,as a 'modeof understanding Taylorism
behaviour'and concludesthat Taylorismwas'refutedby the industrial
it generated'.3SimilarlyFox largely concentrateson opposition
Taylorismas a
managerial ideology,a modeof legitimation,whichfailed.4
However,there is anotherline of thought which treats
ratherdifferently.Instead of regardingTaylorismas a Taylorism
ideology,it is taken as a form of work organization,or discredited
a set of
principlesunderlyingwork organization.The most recent
of this view is Braverman.He arguesfor the central champion
Taylorism. importanceof
The popularnotion that Taylorismhas been 'superseded'
by
schoolsof industrialpsychology,or 'humanrelations',that it later
- becauseof Taylor'samateurishand naiveviewsof 'failed'
human motiva-
tion or becauseit broughtabout a storm of labour
because Taylor and various successorsantagonisedoppositionor
workers
sometimesmanagementas well or that it is 'outmoded' and
certainTaylorianspecificslike functionalforemanshipor hisbecause
tive-pay schemes have been discarded for more incen-
methods: all these representa woeful misreadingof the sophisticated
dynamicsof the developmentof management. actual
5
Thisviewof Taylorismas a significantsetofdesigncriteria
work structuring
organizationdownto the presentday is endorsedby mostwriters
whohave seriouslystudiedthe designand organizationof
example, work.6For
Daviset al. in the only availablesurveyofjob designpractices
inUS companiesconcludedthat:
Currentjob designpracticesareconsistentwithprinciplesof
isationor scientificmanagement. rational-
7

These two views of Taylorismcreatea strangeparadox:on

hand it is a failed ideology,and on the other, it represents the one
principles the basic
of thestructuringof workdownto thepresent.
There are a numberof interlinkedreasonsfor this paradox.
therehas been a failureto relate structureand ideology.TooFirstly,
writershave consideredit adequateto locate Taylorismwithin amany
flow

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 faylorism
Understanding t87

of ideas, and ignore, often for lack of evidence, any other level of
socialreality.8
Associatedwith this type of conceptualizationhas been a failureto
realize that 'ideologies'or 'models'cannot be treated as equivalent;
they cannotbe arrangedalongonedimension.Thusthereis little mean-
ing in conceptualizingTaylorism, industrial betterment, human
relations,etc., as equivalents,as types of 'managerialphilosophy',
whichsucceedeach otherwith the ebb and flow of history.The reason
for the lack of equivalenceis simple. All ideologieshave structural
implications,butsomehavemorethanothers. Forexample,humanrelations
leaves the divisionof labour and the structureof controllargely un-
touched.The consequenceof this is clear.It is necessaryto distinguish
between 'ideologies'in termsof their structuralimplications.Viewed
in this way, some ideologiesrepresentmore of a surfacefroth than
others.
If we look at the basicargumentfromanotherangle, then what the
ideologicalstoryline has failedto considerdeeplyis the institutionaliza-
tion of the differentideas systems.Taylorismdid not fall-backinto the
organizationalDark Ages. On the contrary, the knowledge and
understandingderived from Taylorismwas institutionalizedwithin
industryin termsof the practicesof industrialandproductionengineers.
It resultedin the creationof industrialengineerirlgdepartmentsand
became deeply rooted in the training of general engineersand
managers.9
It is only when we turn from an abstractedideologicalflow to
considerthe processesof institutionalization that historicalconfusions
begin to sortthemselvesout. There are two majorpointshere. Firstly,
all processesof institutionalizationand diSusiontake time. There will
alwaysbe an historicallag betweenthe ideasof intellectualsand those
of active practitioners.Priestsand warriorsnever think alike. Thus
humanrelationsdid not 'happen'in the I930S. It only becameinstitu-
tionallysignificantin the USA in the I940S and in tlle I950S in Britain.
It is possibleto ignorethis culturallag only at the cost of not locating
ideasandidea-systems withinanysocialspace.
The secondpointwe can labelthe 'AmbritFallacy'.This refersto the
continualtendency to conflate the history and culture of two very
differentsocieties,namely Americaand Britain,and the attempt to
drawsociologicalconclusionson the basisof this unrecognizedconfla-
tion. The reason that Taylorismhangs suspendedin an historical
vacuumin relationto Britishindustrialhistoryis the directresultof the
Ambritfallacy.l°Thus, the historicalheydayof Taylorismin Britain
wasnot I9I I or I9I5, butin the inter-waryears.
However,understanding the reasonsforthe paradoxof Taylorism,is
notto directlyanswerthe two implicit questions 'Was Taylorisma
failedideology?'and 'Whatis the structuralsignificanceof Taylorism
in British industrialorganization?' But we can only answer these

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 I88 CraigR. Lzttler
questionsafteranalysisof Taylorism,and an empiricalinvestigationof
Taylorismin Britain.In this paper we shall onlyconcentrateon the
analyticaspectsofthe problem.ll

THE PRINCIPLES OF TAYLORISM

Taylorismgrew out of the systematicmanagementmovementin the

USA in the I880/9oS.12Like some of the other early rnanagement
reformers,only with a greaterintensity,Taylorbelievedin the original
sin and the original stupidity of the worker.Accordingto Taylor
'. . . the naturalinstinctand tendencyof men is to take it easy,which
may be called"naturalsoldiering"'.13 Moreover,any man phlegmatic
enoughto do manualworkwas too stupidto developthe bestway, the
'scientiScway' of doing a job. Thus the role of the workmanwas a
passiveone: they should'. . . do whatthey aretold to do promptlyand
without askingquestionsor makingsuggestions'.l4It is interestingto
contrastthis view of originalsin and originalstupiditywith the Con-
fucianviewof originalvirtue.l5
If we look at Taylorismas a formof workorganization,then we can
proceedto analyseit in termsof threegeneralcategories:the divisionof
labour,the structureof controlovertaskperformance,and the implicit
employmentrelationship.
Bearingin mind practice as well as theory, then lt is clear that
Taylorisminvolvessystematicanalysisof the labourprocessand the
division of labour,l6followedby their decompositionin accordance
with severalprinciples.The systematicanalysisof work (Taylor'sFirst
Principle)wasin orderto developa 'scienceof work'.And thissystema-
tic job analysisformsthe basisfor the calculationof productioncosts,
the establishmentof standardtimes for everytask, and the associated
incentivepaymentsystem.
The decomposition is basedon the followingprinciples:
(I) A general principle of maximumfragmentation.This prescribesthat
afteranalysisof workintoits simplestconstituentelements,management
shouldseekto limitan individual'job'to a singletaskas faraspossible.17
(2) Thedivorce ofplanning anddoing.(Taylor'sFourthPrinciple.)This
principlein particularis basedon the idea that the workeris too stupid
to understandhis ownjob.
(3) Thedivorce
of'direct'
and'indirect'
labour.
. . . progressively
suppressingthat partof the worker'sactivitywhich
consistsof preparingandorganizingtheworkin hisownway.18
Thisprincipleis givenlittle theoreticalattentionbut is very significant
onthe shop-floor.It is an essentialcomponentof moreintensifiedwork.
Indeed it is the Taylorian equivalent of Babbage'sprinciple. All
preparation and servicingtasksare strippedaway to be performedby
unskilled,
andcheaper,workersas faraspossible.19

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 Taylorism
Understandtng I89

ofskillrequirements
(4)Mimmization time.
andjob-learning
handling
ofmaterzal
(5)Reduction toa minimum.
These five principleseonstitutea dynamicof deskilling.Taylorhad
generateda systemoftakinglabour(i.e.job roles)apart.It wasa system
remarkablysimilarto that envisagedby Babbage50 years earlier.20
The majordifferenceis that Babbagedid not constructa corresponding
principleto the divorceof planninganddoing.
It must not be thought that Taylorismwas the only eause of an
increasingdivisionof labour.Taylorismwas botha consequenceand a
causeof deskillingand the corresponding co-ordinationproblems.
Babbagehad no clear idea of the problemsof, and the means of,
re-co-ordinaiionof the fragmentedjob roles.Systematicmanagement
grew out of the intensiSedproblemsof the integrationof the new
divisionof labour. These had been createdby largerfactories,more
specializedmachinesand job roles pre-Taylor,and the failureof the
internalcontractsystemunderchangedeonditions.2l
The secondmajoraspectof Taylorismthen is the new structureof
control,of integration,whichit offiered.This had a numberof aspects:

(I) oftaskcontrol.
Theprinciple Prtnciple)
Third
(Taylor's
This elementhas beenobscuredby the circumlocutory way in which
Taylordescribedit. He talkedabout'bringingthe scienceandworkmen
together'.22What it means in practice is a 'planning department'
whichplansandco-ordinatesthe entiremanufacturing process:
The workof everyworkmanis fullyplannedout by the management
at least one day in advance,and each man receivesin most cases
completewritteninstructions,describingin detailthe taskwhichhe is
to accomplish,as well as the meansto be usedin doingthe work....
This taskspeciSesnot onlywhatis to be donebut how it is to be done
andthe exacttimeallowedfordoingit.23
This is how 'science'and the workmanare broughttogether.A erucial
aspectof this 'bringingtogether'is the prescribingof uniformpractices
and operating proeedures;in other words, standardization.This
representsan historicalshifttowardsa moretotalcontrol,a new level of
control,overthe labourprocess.24
In relationto supervision,standardizationrenders'the produetion
processmore open to understanding....' In other words, it is an
importantstep towardsincreasing'observability'of a subordinate's
task performanceby reducing the problems arising from the in-
eongruenceof superiorlsubordinate skills.25In practicethe idea of a
planningdepartmentwith its conglomeration of funetionsenvisagedby
Taylorat the apexofthe organizationwasrarelyrealized.
Completetask controleould not be aehievedsimplyby a planning
departmentandstandardization. Othermeehanismswereneeessary.

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I 90 CraigR. Littler
(2) Functional organization
This principleis usually lost sight of because it was rarely put
directlyinto praetiee.Even the early aeolyteshad reservationsabout
functionalforemanship.26 Nevertheless,functionalorganizationshould
be notedforseveralreasons.
Functionalorganizationis importantas a prescriptionbecauseit
representsthe idea of a division
of management:
a movementawayfroma
singlehierarchy(Tayloreallsthisthe smilitaryplan').27ForTaylorthe
role of the foremanand gang-bosswas too wide, too powerful,and not
clearly eircumscribed.It needed to be subdividedand deskilledas
muchas the rolesofthe workmen:
Functionalmanagementeonsistsin so dividingthe workof manage-
ment that each man from tlle assistantsuperintendentdown shall
have as few funetionsas possibleto perform.If praeticablethe work
of each manin the managementshouldbe confinedto the perform-
anceof a singleleadingfunetion.28
Thus Taylor advoeated dividing the shop-floorforemen into four
(setting-upboss,speed boss,quality inspector,and repair boss), and
placingthem underthe controlof the planningdepartment.Foremen
likeworkersbeeamesulDject to the ruleof clerks.
Braverman,and many other writers,use the followingquote to
illustratethe Taylorianattackon craftautonomy:
All possible brain work should be removed from the shop and
centredin the planningor laying-outdepartment....29
Butnobodyeonlpletesthisquotation.Letus do so:
. . . leaving for the foremenand gang-bosses
work strictly executive
in nature.30
And this statementoecursin the midstof a long seetionanalysingthe
needto sub-dividemanagerial roles.
The implieationI want to draw is that Taylorismand functional
organizationhad an historiealsignifieaneein relationto 'over-powerful'
foremenandinternalcontraetorsas muchas to eraftdeskilling.
Seeondly,funetionalorganizationis signifieantbeeauseit was taken
seriouslyby non-Westernsoeieties: Russia, and China to a lesser
extent.3l Indeed Bruggerseeks to charaeterizeTaylorismin termJof
this prineiple.
The argument is simple: a major problem for largeneomplex
organizationsis 'integration'of eonflictinginstructions.There are two
basie ways this can be achieved --technologically or ideologieally.
If we cross-relatethis distinctionto the structureof command,then we
get the followingpossibilities:

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Understanding
Taylorism I9I

Command Typeof Integration

Structure Technological Ideological

Modern, ChineseOrganization
Staff-line Western, during
IndustrialOrganization the early I960S

Functional TaylorModel Some Chinese

experiments

(AdaptedfromBruggel,Fig. I 4, p. 275)

The value of this perspectiveis that it locates these particular

Taylorite ideas within a frame of possibilities,and suggestswhat
happened to the Taylorian model in practice namely a shift to
staff/lineorganization.Taylor'sprized'planningdepartment'becamea
seriesof departmentsclipped onto the side of the existingcommand
structure.

(3) Timestudyandthecreation ofa monitoring

system
The institutionalizationof time study representsthe creationof a
separated
monitoringsystemover subordinateactivities.The time study
and schedulingsystemdependsupon the workersfilling in job-cards
and/or time sheets.These writtencommunicationsconstitutea flow-
backof informationto the planningdepartments,and enablesthem to
determineeffiort-levels and compareperformance.The point to be
emphasizedis thatthisflowof informationlargelybypassesthe foremen,
bypasses,thatis, the existingcommandstructure.
The reduced'observability' in large,complexorganizationsbecause
of increasedphysicalseparationand reducedcongruenceof superior/
subordinateskillshad to be solvedby somemeans.Thiswas even more
imperativeif the dynamicof deskillingwasto continue.
What I am arguingfurtheris that as we movefromspecializationto
fragmentationof labour it createsdifferenttypes of problemswhich
mustbe solvedat the levelof the structureof control.

(4) Incentive
payment system
The significanceof this elementof Taylorismhas been much over-
ratedand misunderstood. I will attemptto understandthe real signifi-
canceof incentivepaymentsystemsbelow.
Some of the mechanismsof control advocated by Taylor, and
institutionalized
in variousforms,constitutenot only controlovertask-
performance,but means towardsperpetuationof that control. For
example,the concentrationof 'brainwork'in the planningdepartments
representeda transferof knowledge:Taylorism'tendsto gatherup and

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Ig2 CraigR. Littler
transferto the managementall the traditionalknowledge,thejudgment
and skillof the workers'.32 And, we mightadd, a transferof knowledge
fromthe internaleontraetors,gang-bossesand traditionalforemen.
Seeondly,though Taylor never developedany systematieideas on
training,the move towardsjob roles ineorporatingminimaltraining
time was a erueial step towardsshifting eontrol of training to the
employer.It redueedthe potentialpowerbaseforjob eontrol.
The third aspeetof Taylorismrelatesto the employmentrelation.
It is this whiehenablesus to elearlyrelateTayloriteworkorganization
to bureaueraey.
The employmentrelation embodiedin Taylorismhas been best
broughtout by L. E. Davis:
. . . there is a minimaleonneetionbetweenthe individualand the
organizationin termsof skill, training,involvementand the eom-
plexity of his eontribution,in returnfor maximumflexibilityand
independeneeon the partof the organisationin usingits manpower.
In other wordsthe organisationstrivesfor maximuminterehangeZ
ability of personnel(with minimumtraining)to redueeits depen-
deneeon the availability,ability,or motivationof individuals.33
Daviseallsthisrelationthe bminimum interaetionmodei'.
Nelson diseoversthat Taylorismhas little to say about the 'labour
problem',i.e. the problemof social integration.In briefhis argumentis
that Taylorismpresentsitselfas an answerto the problemof solidarity
when in faet it was an answerto the problemof systemintegration.34
This argumentfalls down beeauseNelsondiseoversan omission within
Tayloriteideas of work organizationwhieh in many ways represents
part of its contributionto eapitalistorganization.As Friedmannpoints
out Taylorismsuceeeded'notinspiteof butjust because ofits omissions'.35
Taylorhimselfmay not have fullyrealizedthe relationalimplication
of his ideas, but this doesnot matter.Minimuminteractioncontinues
to be the culturalrealityin manyWesternorganizations.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF TAYLORISM TO BUREAXJCRACY

It is common to see Taylorismas part of a wider 'rationalization

movement',or as one type of a formalor classiealtheoryof administra-
tion. ISowever,little attempt is made to relate Taylorismto the
Weberianconcept of bureaucraey.This failure to do so has led to
seriouseonsequences.The majoreffect has been to leave Taylorism
isolatedfromthe main body of sociologicaltheory.It is somethingto
throwbrieksat but neverto useas a toolof analysis.
In order to relate Taylorismto the eoneept of bureaueracyit is
necessaryto makea fundamentaldistinetionwithintheWeberianmodel.
If we summarizethe Sve overarehingbeliefs about rational-legal
authorityas a beliefin a set of abstraet,impersonalrulesapplicableto

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Understanding
faylorism I93

everyone,36then the remainingelements of the ideal type can be

dividedinto two categories:thosethatdescribethe officials'relationship
to the organization(or the 'employmentrelationship'),and thosethat
are largelyconcernedwith the structureof control.This resultsin the
followingpicture:37

Structure of control The employment

relationship

(I) Continuousorganizationandbound ( I ) Separationfrom means of produc-

by rules. (W.A. I) tion and administration (WA 5)
(2) Hierarchy (W.A. 3) (2) Non-appropriation of office(W A 6)
(3) Systematicdivisionof labour,with
the necessaryand delimitedpowers
(W.A. 2)
(4) Work performanceis governedby
rules,whichmay be eithertechnical
or legal. (Plusspecializedtraining)
(W.A. 4)
(5) Written records and communica-
tions (W.A. 7)

(6) Unified controlsystem, (3) Formallyfreelabour (W.B. I)

i.e. monocratic (WsB. IO) (4) Appointmenton basis of contract
(W.B. 4)
(5) Selection based on technical or
professionalqualification (W.B. 5)
(6) Career system based on either
(a) seniorityor (b) merit (W.B. 8)
(7) Fixed, money salariesand pension
rights (W.B. 6)
(8) Full-timecommitment,i.e. sole or
primaryoccupation (W.B. 7)

If we examineTaylorismin the above context,then it is clear that

Taylorismrepresentsthebureaucratization
of thestructure
of control,
butnot
the employment relationship.
Taylorismdoes not involve, nor imply, a
careersystem(W.B. 8), nor fixed salaries(W.B. 6). Insteadit involves
what we have calledthe minimuminteractionrelationbetweenindivi-
dualandorganization.
In relationto the structureof control aspectsof the bureaucratic
model, TaylorismtakesW.A. I and W.A. 3 for granted.And the Tay-
lorites sought to introducea systematicdivisionof labour (W.A. 2);
work-performance governedby rulesbasedon 'science'(W.A. 4); and a
systemof writteninstructionand communication(W.A. 7). The Taylor
idea of a planningofficewas an attemptto achievea unifiedsystemof
control (W.B. IO), but with a functional system of organization.
Thereforeit wasnot strictlymonocratic.
In relationto the employmentrelationshipaspectsof the bureaucratic
model, Taylorismtends to take W.A. 5, W.A. 6, W.B. I, W.B. 4, and
N

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I94 CraigR. Littler
W.B. 7 for granted.The notion of 'scientific'selection(W.B. 5) was a
major,explicitprinciplein Taylor'swritings.In practicethe idea was
littledeveloped.38
The centralsignificanceof a careerstructurewithinan organization
has been suggestedby many writers. Careerstructuresand career
motivation are a major, definitive characteristicof 'bureaucratic'
organization.And this elementshouldbe used to distinguishbetween
differenttypes of rational-legalwork organization.Thus the major
characteristicof Tayloriteworkorganizationis the lack of any notion
of a careersystem.It is this whichdistinguishes it fromotheravailable
modelsof organizationat the turn of the century;for example,those
basedon the publicserviceorganizationssuch as police, railwaysand
post office.39
TAYLORISM IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

It is not possibleto reallyunderstandTaylorismwithoutgraspingthe

historicalcontext,notjust in macroterms,but in termsof the specifics
of work organizationpre-Taylor.It is the strengthof Braverman's
analysisthat he looks at Taylorismin this light, but his analysisis
vitiatedby an historicalromanticism.
Braverman'sbasic understandingof Taylorismrevolvesaroundthe
idea of the eraftsystem.It is the transferof knowledgefromthe crafts,
and its monopolizationby managementwhich Bravermansees as the
essenceof Taylorism.This monopoly,under the name of 'science',is
usedto controleachstepof the labourprocessuntil the craftsmanis no
more than an 'animatedtool of management'.In sum, the historical
changeis fromthe craftsystemto Taylorism,suchthat l aylorismllad
the effectof degradingthe crafts.40
Thisis an historicalconfusion.By the turnof the centuryin the USA,
and by the inter-warperiod in Britain,job knowledgewas not, in
general,locked into the craft system,nor was the locus of planning
concentratedin manualjob roles. Failureto considerthe institutional-
izationof Taylorismleadsto a misleadingtelescopingof history.
This type of romanticismconcerning craft control within US
industryat the turnof the centuryhas been stronglyattackedby Jean
Monds,who encapsulatesthe misleadingvisionof the 'goodold days'
with the title 'The Lost Paradiseof Craft Autonomy:with F. W.
Taylor as Serpent'.4lIn fact Mondsis attackingthe work of Mont-
gomeryand KatherineStone, but Braverman'sargumentsare partly
basedon theirwork,andrepresenta similarvein.
Monds' argumentis straightforward. Job control by variouscraft
groupswaslimitedin the USA, and manyof the practicesofjob control
had been destroyedbeforeTaylor arrived on the scene. Secondly,
conflictsand exploitationbetweenskilledand unskilledmarthe image
of paradise.

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Understanding
Taylorism I95

If we leave behindthe craftromanticismof Bravermanand Mont-

gomery,then it is necessaryto think of an historicalshift not from a
simple craft system to Taylorism,but from forms of sub-contract to
Taylorism.Up to the I 870S in Britain the traditionalmanagerial
systemin manyindustrieswas basedon someformof internalcontrac-
tor,whoin largepartranthe shop-floor.Thesevariedfrom
a smallnumberof substantialsub-contractors as in mining,or large
numbersof skilledworkersas sub-contractors each employingonly a
fewchildor unskilledassistants. 42

Moreoverby the I870S and80S the craftelementhad oftenbeendrained

from the contractedwork-group,leaving an ugly husk of piece-
mastershipandexploitation.43
If we appreciatethis fragmentedstructureof the nineteenth-century
work-organization, we are less likely to focuson a limitedsegmentof
workers-the craft aristocracy and thus ignore the systemof social
relationswhichareinvolved.We arelesslikelyeitherto bathethe early
period of capitalism(which after all was the period that Marx was
writingabout)with a roseatehue.
This is not to say that the transitionwas a simpleshiftfrominternal
contractto Taylorism,any more than from the craft systemto Tay-
lorisrn.There is not spacehere to detail the historicalchanges,but in
many industriesthe role of the internalcontractorwas inheritedby
powerful,directly-employedforemen.The picture shiftsfrom a top-
hattedsub-contractor to a bowler-hattedforeman.It was not until the
inter-warperiod in Britain that the heirs of a modifiedTaylorism
drasticallyreducedthe foreman'sareaof discretion.
It is importantto questionthe conventionalversionof Taylorism,
whichhas it that Taylorknewnothingof, nor about,work-groupsand
their significancefor the organization.According to the accepted
versionTaylorwas a 'machineand money'man with his mind fixed
uponthe individual.44
Thisis nonsense.Taylorknewall aboutwork-groups. He knewabout
solidarywork-groups.He knew about their significancein regulating
output;he calledit 'systematicsoldiering'becausehe did not like it.45
'Humanrelations'representsthe 'discovery'of that which Taylorism
had beenconcernedto destroy -work-group solidarity.
But thereis a furtherpoint. It is notjust a questionof Taylorversus
the workers (this is the predominantimage in Braverman).The
Taylorites were concerned to destroy the traditional relationship
betweenthe foremenand the workers,betweenthe internalcontractor
and the workers.The point is that pre-Taylor,pre-systematic manage-
ment, the distinctionbetweenformaland informalwork groupswas
not alwaysclearcut.
From this perspective, 'human relations' representsa different
managerialtacticin relationto workgroups.The Tayloritetacticis to

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I96 CraigR. Littler
tryandbreakthe powerof the workteamsandworkgroupsby pressure,
and by appealto individualambition:to atomizethe workforce.Thisis
the dynamicrealitybehind'technologicalintegration'.Humanrelations
representsan alternativeapproach;it representsa pale suggestionof
'ideologicalintegration',of ideological control.46The latter as a
dynamicprocessis best expressedby Bruggerin relationto Chinese
experience.
The Chineseapproach:
. . . seeksto focusloyaltynot only upon the formalorganisation,but
uponlevelsbothhigherandlowerthanthe organisation. At the lower
level . . . to infuseexistinglevelsof groupsolidarity
withcommitment to the
samevaluesas theformalorganisation. At the higherlevels,it seeksnotto
extendthe focusof loyalty througha hierarchyof formalorganisa-
tion, but to focusit upon a particularsymbolclusterwhich is the
sourceof legitimacynot only of differentlevelsof formalorganisation
but alsoof informalgroupings.47
Thus, discussionof Taylorismin termsof whetherit representstoo
individualistican understandingof the socialrealitiesof workorganiza-
tion is to doubly misunderstandTaylorism,and the historicalpath
whlchlt represents.
. . . .

WAGE/EFFORT EXCHANGE

The purposeof this section is to look at Taylorismfrom a rather

differentperspective-that of wage/effiort exchanges.This approacllis
complementaryto more generalideas on the structureof controland
the processesof the divisionof labour.
An entireliteraturehas built up aroundpaymentsystemssince the
I890S. It has frequentlydominatedmanagerialdiscussionsof work
organizations,and Taylorismitselfhas becomeensnaredin thisformof
interpretation,suchthat the notionof incentivewagesis stillseenas the
predominantelement in Taylorism.This is a mistake.Rather than
allow the literatureand conceptsof paymentsystemsto swampsocio-
logicalanalysis,it is necessaryto do the reverse:to penetratepayment
systemswithpreciseanalytictools.
Let us start by attemptingto deflate the fundamentaldistinction
withinpaymentsystemliterature:that betweentime-wagesand piece-
wages. It is necessaryto recognizethe commonbasis of all types of
wages:
But in the practiceof industry,whethera man be employedon a
time-wageor on piece-wage,both the time occupiedand the work
done are, as a rule, taken into account. . . time-wagevery often
has a piece basis, and piece-wagehas in practicallyall cases a
time-basis.48

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 Taylorism
Understanding 197

In otherwords,time-wagesareusuallybasedon mutualexpectations
about the quantumof work. For example,many foremenand sub-
contractorsin the latter part of the nineteenth century would set
productionquotas.Similarly,piece-workinvolvesimplicitassumptions
of earningso muchterday,or per week.Thus,as Behrendargues,every
employmentcontractinvolvesboth a wage-ratebargainand an effort-
bargain.49
Thus, the sociologicalsignificanceof Taylorismin relationto wage/
effiortexchangedoes notlie in a simple shift to piece-work.Indeed
Taylorhimselfarguedthat his systemof managementcouldbe applied
underanypayment system,and that a varietyof paymentsystemscan be
usedin the samefactorydependingon circumstances. 50
Given this, then a crucialquestionin relationto paymentsystems
relatesto effortdetermination:how do workersdecide what effiortto
put intotheirwork?
Therearethreebroadanswers:(a) customand practice,or (b) based
on formalstandards,or (c) a conflictualtensionbetweenthe two. It is
this distinction,ratherthan the usualclassification,which is sociologi-
callyandhistoricallyimportantin relationto payment-systems.
Using the above distinctionit is possibleto constructthe following
exchangesystems:
of wage/effiort
classification

Informal Formal
Standardsof effort Standardsof effort

Unilaterally Bilaterally
determined determined

Piece-work e.g. the e.g. standard

or Taylorite pricelists
time-wage system

This classificationbringsout the crucial aspect of Taylorismin this

regard.AndindeedTaylorsawhissystemin thisway:
. . . this whole systemrestsupon an accurateand scientificstudy of
unit times,which is by far the most importantelementin scientific
management. 51

In addition,the above classificationoverlapswith a seconddistinc-

tion. It is possibleto distinguishbetweenwage/effortexchangesystems
in termsof their 'transparency'. Somepaymentsystems,suchas simple
piece-work,makethe relationof effortto earningstransparent;(both
supervisorsand workersare fully awareof the effortbargaininvolved
for each task)whilstother systemscompletelyobscurethe effort/wage
relationship.

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I98 CraigR. Littler
The relevanceof the nohon of 'transparency' to the Tayloritepay-
ment schemesis that they attemptedto make wageleffortrelation-
the
shipmoreopaquethan simplepiece-work,in orderto providea built-in
rate cuttingfactor.The way that this was doneis as follows:insteadof
just mappingthe outputrate onto a wage scale, a third intermediary
scale is introduced,namely an 'effortscale'. This is usually derived
from some output targetor 'standardjob-time'.And this effiortscale
providesan apparentarithmeticrationalefor the wage scale, and
obscuresthe relationshipbetweenthe outputrateand the wagescale.
Hobsbawmarguesthat during the nineteenthcenturytherewas a
slow witheringof the customary,traditionalideas concerninglabour
effort.This occurredthrougha collectivelearningprocess;a collective
re-orientationto the marketsystem.52 However,it is notjust a question
of the slowassimilationof the 'rulesof the game'.A traditional,norma-
tive basisto levels of workeffortmust be sociallyconstituted.In this
case standard eXort-levelsare built into the occupation or skill.
Therefore,if job-rolesvrefracturedduringanvccelerating of labour,an
division
increasing number of workers are thrust into for
positions which thereareno
castomary standards. It is this which constituted a major part of the
'labourproblem'at the end ofthe nineteenth century.
Thus 7Caylorism representsthehistorical from traditional
switchover effort-
normsto thecreation of newsocialmechanisms for efort
constituting standards.
However,at thispointin the argumentwe encounteranotherparadox.
Baldamusandotherwritershaveemphasizedthattime-studyrestson
pre-existingnotionsof wage/effortrelationships andof the levelof effiort
in a particularworksituation:
Whetherone is successfulor not in findingthe 'required'standard
times dependsdecisivelyupon the discoveryof the preconceived,
habituallymaintainedstandardsof normalexertionin any type of
operation.The truepurposeof scientificobjectivityin the practiceof
work-measurement is preciselythe oppositeof whatit claimsto be in
theory.... The true purpose... is to guess as consistently as
possible the purely subjectiveelement of effiortstandards,and
subsequently to adjustratesof payin accordancewiththem.53
How can a time-studypractitionerdiscoverpre-existingnotionsof
effort-levelswhere there are none? If work-studywas a managerial
solutionto the widespreadlackof traditionaleffiort-norms, hoavCall it
be basedon 'prevailing notions of the rightlevelof eXort'?
The answeris that most researchon the operationof work-studyis
based on ongoingsystems,where the work-studypractitioneris con-
cernedwith minormethodor productchanges.However,in a situation
of moreradicaljob-changes,a situationof fragmentation and associated
technologicalchange,the work-studyman is a moreactiveparticipant
in establishingthe standardeffiort/levels than somewriterswouldhave
us believe. For example, in the I g20s and I g30s in Britain many

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Understanding
7Caylorism I99

facteriesestablishedassemblyand sub-assemblylines for the firsttime,

fragmentingmanyjobs in the process.And the deskilledworkers,often
women,broughtto the benchignoranceand oftencredulousness about
'therightlevelof effort'.
A distinctionintroducedby Baldamusenables the argumentcon-
cerningthe relationshipof bureaucracyto Taylorismto be completed.
This is the distinctionbetweeneffrort stabilityand efJrort
intensity
controls.54
Effortstabilitymechanismsshift 'effiort'about, so that it is stabilized
betweenpeopleand over time. Effortnow comesin neat packets,and
all the 'packets'danceto the samerhythm.
It is not only necessaryto ironout effort,but alsoto boostit up. This
is the aim of effiort-intensitycontrols.They are not necessarilyseparate
from effiort-stabilitycontrolsin practice.Some meansof control (e.g.
training,incentiveschemes)can have a dual function.However,this
distinctionenablesus to understandthe differentsignificanceof two
aspects of the Taylorian work-studyprocess. Rate-setting,that is
establishinga rate for a job, is primarilya matterof effort-intensity
control.It is at this point that any 'speed-up'eSect is insertedinto the
tasksituation;whilstonce established,incentiveschemesare primarily
a matterof stabilizing effort,of effortroutinization.
It is importantto note that stabilizingeffortensurescalculabilityand
predictabilitywithin the organization. For Weber, bureaucratic
organizationensureda high degreeof calculability,butwhenwe lookat
thebureaucratization of thestructureof controlin industrial
organizations,
then
what 7Caylorism addsto the Weberian elements(work study, monitoring
system,incentivepaymentsystem)is concerned withtheprocesses
of deter-
mining andfxingefort-levels.
Thus, the bureaucratization of controlin industrialorganizations,as
opposedto stateadministration, necessarilyinvolvessomecontrolsover
effortstabilityandintensity.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

If sociologyis to understandthe changesin the formsof workorganiza-

tion fromthe late nineteenthcenturyto the present,thenit is necessary
to penetratethe clichesaboutTaylorism.In particularit is necessaryto
avoidconstruingTaylorismas an abstractedideas-system,and to avoid
the 'Ambritfallacy'.Thus we have analysedTaylorismin termsof the
divisionof labour,the structureof controlover task-performance, and
the implicitminimuminteractionemploymentrelationship.
Further,Taylorismrepresentsa formof organizationdevoidof any
notion of a career-structure for the majority,unlike other forms of
organizationalmodel availableat the turn of the century,such as the
railwaysand post office. ThereforeTaylorismcan be definedas the
bureaucratization of the structureof control,but notthe employment
relahonship.

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 200 CraigR. Littler

Historically,Taylorismshouldbe understoodas the modernstructure

of control, the lineamentsof the new factorysystem, replacingthe
systemsof internalcontractwhich were formsof indirectemployment
and control. It is largely a misinterpretation,based on historical
compression, to see Taylorismas the rabiddestroyerof the craftsystem.
What underliesboth Taylorismand the bureaucraticmodel is the
notionof directemployment, of an unmediatedemploymentrelationship.
In industrialorganizations,calculabilityessentiallyinvolvesprocesses
of determiningand fixingeffort-levels.Thus, Taylorismalsorepresents
the historicalshift to the creationof new social mechanismsfor con-
stitutingeffort-standards within an accelerateddynamicof deskilling.
It is this ratherthan incentivewageswhich is the crucialelementin
Taylorismin relationto wage/effortexchange.
It shouldbe clearthat the purposeof 'UnderstandingTaylorism'is
not only to analysepast formsof workorganization,but to graspthe
present. Taylorism has a continuing influence West and East.55
A sociologicalfocuson the ideologicallevel has obscuredthe ramifying
impactof Taylorism.Only if we comprehendthe structureof controlof
the labour processcan there be any hope of moving beyond a neo-
Taylorism,whateverthe politicalumbrella.
CraigR. Littler,B.SC. (SOC.)
Consultant
Lecturer in Sociolov
CityUniversity
Research Fellow
Polytechnic
of Central London

N O TES

I. H. Braverman,Labour e Monopoly and J. N. Wolfe, Meaninge Control,

Capital,New York, Monthly Review London, Tavistock, I 973, pp. 95-9;
Press,I974. L. Klein, J%ew Formsof WorkOrganisation,
. D. C. Miller and W. H. Form, London,Tavistock,I 976, pp. I 4-I 7.
Industrial Sociology,
New York,Harper& 7. Daviset al., op. cit., p. 80.
Row, I964, pp. 645-84. 8. E.g. S. Haber,EfXiciency andUplift:
3. M. Rose, IndustrialBehazJiour,Scientific Management in theProgressizoe
Era,
London,AllenLane, I975, chs.2-4. I 89FI920, Chicago, University of
4. Alan Fox, BeyondContract: Work, Chicago Press, I964; J. Child, British
PowerandTrustRelations, London,Faber Management fhought,London, Allen &
& Faber,I974, ch. 4. Unwin, I 969; R. Bendix, Work and
5. Braverman,op. cit., pp. 86-7. Authority in Industry,Berkeley,University
6. G. Friedmann, IndustrialSociety, of California Press,I 974 ed.
New York,The Free Press, I955; L. E. 9. Trist,op. cit., p. 96.
Davis, R. R. Canter and J. HoSman, IO. Both Bendix,op. cit., and Braver-
'CurrentJob Design Criteria',I955, in man, op. cit., commandeerthe early
L. E. Davis and J. C. Taylor,Designof industrialhistory of Britain and then
jtobs,London,Penguin,I97X, pp. 65-82; conjoin it with developmentsin the
E. Trist, 'A Socio-TechnicalCritiqueof U.S.A. in the post-warperiod without
ScientificManagement',in D. O. Edge much awarellessof crossingthe Atlantic.

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Understanding
faylorism
20I
II. For empirical studies of the (c) socialinsulationbasedon institutions
significanceof Taylorismin Britainsee of privacy.
my forthcomingarticle. 26. Nelson,I 975,p. 72.
I2. See Daniel Nelson, Managers and 27. Taylornop. cit. Ig03,p. 92.
Workers, Wisconsin,Universityof Wis- 28. Ibid.,p. 99.
consinPress,I 975. 29. Braverman,op. cit., p. I I 3.
I3. F. W. Taylor,'ShopManagement 30. Taylor, op. Cit., I 903, pp. 989.
I903', in F. W. Taylor,Scientific Manage- My emphasis.
ment,London,Harper&Row, I 964, p.30. 3 I . W. Bruggern Democracy andOrgani-
I4. Taylor, 'Why Manufacturers Dis- sationin the ChineseIndustrialEnterprise,
like College Students': Proceedingsof I94&53, Cambridge,CambridgeUni-
the Society for the Promotion of versityPress,I976, pp. 57-8, I84-5 and
EngineeringEducation, I909, I7,87. 274. The functionaltype of organization
I 5. R. P. DorenBritish Factory/7apanese was consideredby someChinesetheorists
Factory,London,Allen & Unwin, I973, to be the most progressive type of
pp.277 and40 I-2. organization.
I 6. Or at least some analysis. In 32. R. F. Hoxie, 'ScientificManage-
practice manufacturerspressured the ment & Labor',I 9 I 5. Extractedin Klein,
earlyTaylorites,as consultants,to speed op. cit., p. 9I.
up the initial researchand process of 33. L. E. Davis, 'The DesignofJobs',
standardizationin order to produce I966, in L. E. Davis and J. C. Taylor,
quick results. Nelson, op. cit., I 975, op. cit., p. 302.
pp.6 I and 65. 34. Nelson,op. cit., ch. 4.
I7. L.E.E)avisetal.,op.cit., I955, in 35. Friedmann,op. cit., p. 65. His
Davisand Taylor,op. cit., pp. 69 and 73. emphasis.
I8. C. Palloix, 'The LabourProcess: 36. Weber, 7CheTheoryof Socialand
from Fordismto Neo-Fordism',in fhe EconomicOrganization, New York, Free
LabourProcessandClassStrategies, C.S.E. Press, I 964, pp. 329-30; M. Albrown
PamphletNo. I n LondonnStage I n I 976, Bureaucracy, London, Macmillan, I 970,
p.52. PP 40-5.
I9. Clearlythis has not been possible 37. The bracketed codes refer to
for all servicingtasks. Some such tasks Weber, list A (i.e. Weber, op. cit.,
have become isolatedpocketsof highly pp. 33e2) or list B (pp. 333-4), plus the
skilledworkers,e.g. the toolroom. specificnumbergiven it by Weber.List
20. L. E. Davis, 'Readying the A refers to the characteristics of legal
Unready: Post-industrial Jobs, I97I ' in authoritysystems,of course,while list B
Davisand Taylor,op. cit., pp. 43I-7. refers to those of the ideal type. This
2 I . Nelson,op. cit., p. 38. leaves four characteristicsunaccounted
22. F. W. -Taylor,'TestimonyBefore for. W.A. 8 is not a characteristicof
the Special House Committee I9I2 in bureaucracy,but simplya statementthat
Taylor, ScientificManagement, op. cit., 'Legal authoritycan be exercisedin a
Pr43 wide variety of different forms...'
23. Taylor, 'The Principles of (Weber, p. 332). W.B. 2, W.B. 3, and
ScientificManagement',I9I I, in Taylor, W.B. g are repeatsof W.A. 3, W.A. 2,
Scientific Management, p. 39. and (W.A. 5 andW.A. 6) respectively.
24. H. G. J. Aitken, faylorism at 38. See Taylor, op. cit., I9I2, p. 42.
Watertown Arsenal,Cambridge, Mass., Forthe practiceseeNelson,op. cit.,p.73.
HarvardUniversityPress, I960, p. 28; 39. Thisraisesa crucialorganizational
Braverman,op. cit., pp. go, I07 and questionin relationto Britain:why did
I I8 - I9. the railways and other public service
25. The concept of 'observability' organizationsnot act, as they did in
refersto the informationconceptionof manysocieties,as modelsfor largescale,
power. 'Observability'dependson three industrial organization between I 880
factors: (a) physical separation, (b) and Ig20? The railways,police and post
congruenceof superior/subordinate skills, office were the major organizational

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202 CraigR. Littler

innovationsof VictorianEngland.At the 48. D. F. Schloss,Methods of Industrial

turnof the century,unlikenow, they still Remuneration, London,Williams& Nor-
exudedconsiderablestatus. gate, I 898, p. I 3.
40. Braverman,op. cit., ch. 5. 49. H. Behrend,'The EffortBargain',
4I. J. Monds, 'WorkersControl and in Ind.&SLabour RezJiew,
Relations vol. IO,
the Historians:A New Economism',in 957
J%ew no. 97, May/JuneI976,
LeftRezJiew, 5o. Taylor, op. cit., I 903, pp. 7I-80.
pp. 8I-I00. 5I. Ibid.,p. 58.
of Modern
S. Pollard, The Genesis
42. 52. E. J. Hobsbawm,Labouring Men,
Management, London,Penguin, I968, p London,Weidenfeld& Nicolson, I964,
59. Also see my forthcomingarticle on PP 350-I.
'Subcontractand Systems of Indirect 53. W. Baldamus,Efficiency andEffort,
Control'* London,Tavistock,I96 I, p. 46.
43. J. Foster, Class Struggleand the 54 Ibid, chs.3 and4.
Industrzal London, Methuen,
Revolution, 55. For the appeal of Taylorism to
I974, pp. 224-38 Lenin, see Bendix, op. cit., pp. 206-7;
Millerand Form,op. cit., p. 655.
44. forits appealto the Chinese,seeBrugger,
45. Taylor,op. cit., I903, p. 32. op. cit., pp. I84-5; for its appeal to
46. See diagramabove. Gramsci,see M. Clark,AntonioGramsci
47. Brugger, op. cit., p. 268. My andtheRevolution thatFailed,New Haven,
emphasis. YaleUniversityPress,I977.

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