Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cadalin v. Poea, G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994
Cadalin v. Poea, G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994
Cadalin v. Poea, G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994
L-104776
OK
FIRST DIVISION
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QUIASON, J.:
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al.
v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's Administrator, et.
al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
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Consolidation of Cases
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the Third
Division while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the Second Division.
In the Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the Second Division referred G.R.
Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).
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In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division granted
the motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the consolidation of said cases
with G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32, which were assigned to the First
Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-
30, Rollo, pp. 369-377, 426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27,
1993, the First Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos.
104911-14 with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 1109;
G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562).
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the
complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to file its
answer.
On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to comply
with the Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent Manifestation,"
praying that the POEA Administrator direct the parties to submit
simultaneously their position papers, after which the case should be
deemed submitted for decision. On the same day, Atty. Florante de
Castro filed another complaint for the same money claims and benefits in
behalf of several claimants, some of whom were also claimants in POEA
Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).
On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the Order
dated October 2, 1984 and an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the
POEA direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers
after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. On the
same day, AIBC asked for time to file its comment on the "Compliance"
and "Urgent Manifestation" of claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a
second motion for extension of time to file the comment.
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On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the
reversal of the said order of the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed
the appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and praying that AIBC and BRII
be declared in default.
On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC,
together with a petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction. On
September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA Administrator from
hearing the labor cases and suspended the period for the filing of the
answers of AIBC and BRII.
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On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates
asked for the substitution of the original counsel of record and the
cancellation of the special powers of attorney given the original counsel.
On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of the
claim to enforce attorney's lien.
On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money claims
(POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants including
Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-06-555.
On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed on
February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.
AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489),
questioning the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA
Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to answer the
amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution
dated November 9, 1987, we dismissed the petition by informing AIBC
that all its technical objections may properly be resolved in the hearings
before the POEA.
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Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was filed on
September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18 co-claimants
against the POEA Administrator and several NLRC Commissioners. The
Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment with a request for the early disposition of POEA Case No. L-
84-06-555. The second was filed on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio
P. Bautista and Rolando R. Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII for violation
of labor and social legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos,
Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII
of violations of labor laws.
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its
motion for suspension of the period for filing an answer or motion for
extension of time to file the same until the resolution of its motion for
reconsideration of the order of the NLRC dismissing the two appeals. On
April 28, 1987, NLRC en banc denied the motion for reconsideration.
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the
complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days
from said date within which to submit their respective position papers.
On June 24, 1987 claimants filed their "Urgent Motion to Strike Out
Answer," alleging that the answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987,
claimants filed their "Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to
comply with the POEA Order of June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988,
AIBC and BRII submitted their position paper. On March 4, 1988,
claimants filed their "Ex-Parte Motion to Expunge from the Records" the
position paper of AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time.
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On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for Execution" of
the Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the grounds that BRII had failed
to appeal on time and AIBC had not posted the supersedeas bond in the
amount of $824,652.44.
In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the motions for
reconsideration.
II
Compromise Agreements
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and AIBC
and BRII have submitted, from time to time, compromise agreements for
our approval and jointly moved for the dismissal of their respective
petitions insofar as the claimants-parties to the compromise agreements
were concerned (See Annex A for list of claimants who signed
quitclaims).
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Rollo, pp.
470-615);
III
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PART B —
4. TERMINATION
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11. BONUS
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IV
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Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989
Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign
law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain's Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector). NLRC invoked Article
221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, vesting on the Commission
ample discretion to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure.
NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the Amiri Decree No. 23,
being more favorable and beneficial to the workers, should form part of
the overseas employment contract of the complainants.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to the
claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA
Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked elsewhere.
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the
filing of the claims of the complainants was three years, as provided in
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as
provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year
as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the
labor cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the simple reason that not
all the complainants worked in Bahrain and therefore, the subject matter
of the action, the claims arising from the Bahrain law, is not of common
or general interest to all the complainants.
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On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the cardinal
rules of administrative due process: namely, (1) the failure of the POEA
Administrator to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII; (2)
some findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence; and (3)
some of the evidence upon which the decision was based were not
disclosed to AIBC and BRII during the hearing.
On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA Administrator
that BRII and AIBC are solidarily liable for the claims of the
complainants and held that BRII was the actual employer of the
complainants, or at the very least, the indirect employer, with AIBC as
the labor contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the POEA
Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was correct
in denying the Motion to Declare AIBC in default.
On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not based on
the Amiri Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled:
(2) the claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to the
claims which are not based on the overseas employment
contracts nor the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976;
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case No.
(L) 86-65-460 should have been dismissed on the ground that the
claimants in said case were also claimants in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-
555. Instead of dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460, the POEA just
resolved the corresponding claims in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In
other words, the POEA did not pass upon the same claims twice.
Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on the
following grounds:
(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their
right to a speedy disposition of their cases as guaranteed by
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The POEA
Administrator allowed private respondents to file their answers
in two years (on June 19, 1987) after the filing of the original
complaint (on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard of its
own rules, affirmed the action of the POEA Administrator;
(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is ten
years; and
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AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776, argued:
(1) that they were not responsible for the delay in the
disposition of the labor cases, considering the great difficulty of
getting all the records of the more than 1,500 claimants, the
piece-meal filing of the complaints and the addition of
hundreds of new claimants by petitioners;
(4) that the prescriptive period for filing the claims is that
prescribed by Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
(three years) and not the one prescribed by Article 1144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (ten years); and
(5) that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA
Case No. L-86-05-460 should be dismissed, this being a private
quarrel between the two labor lawyers (Rollo, pp. 292-305).
Attorney's Lien
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On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to strike out
the joint manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII dated September
2 and 11, 1992, claiming that all the claimants who entered into the
compromise agreements subject of said manifestations and motions were
his clients and that Atty. Florante M. de Castro had no right to represent
them in said agreements. He also claimed that the claimants were paid
less than the award given them by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro collected
additional attorney's fees on top of the 25% which he was entitled to
receive; and that the consent of the claimants to the compromise
agreements and quitclaims were procured by fraud (G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 838-810). In the Resolution dated November 23, 1992, the
Court denied the motion to strike out the Joint Manifestations and
Motions dated September 2 and 11, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp.
608-609).
On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and Claim to
Enforce Attorney's Lien," alleging that the claimants who entered into
compromise agreements with AIBC and BRII with the assistance of Atty.
De Castro, had all signed a retainer agreement with his law firm (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535).
Contempt of Court
On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del Mundo
to cite Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of court and for
violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The said lawyers allegedly misled this Court, by making it
appear that the claimants who entered into the compromise agreements
were represented by Atty. De Castro, when in fact they were represented
by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges against
Atty. De Castro for unethical practices and moved for the voiding of the
quitclaims submitted by some of the claimants.
The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for certiorari
on the grounds that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1)
applied the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the
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The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself during
the negotiation for an amicable settlement of their money claims in
Bahrain as shown in the Memorandum dated April 16, 1983 of the
Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in G.R. No.
104776 that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code of the Philippines,
a special law, prevails over that provided in the Civil Code of the
Philippines, a general law.
In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely abused
its discretion when it: (1) enforced the provisions of the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976 and not the terms of the employment contracts; (2) granted
claims for holiday, overtime and leave indemnity pay and other benefits,
on evidence admitted in contravention of petitioner's constitutional right
to due process; and (3) ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new
hearings for the 683 claimants whose claims had been dismissed for lack
of proof by the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself. Lastly, they allege
that assuming that the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 was applicable,
NLRC erred when it did not apply the one-year prescription provided in
said law (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
VI
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All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although they
disagreed as to the time that should be embraced within the prescriptive
period.
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14, invoking
different grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that the prescriptive
period applicable to the claims was three years, instead of ten years, as
found by the POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the prescriptive
period was one year as prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but
he deferred to the ruling of NLRC that Article 291 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines was the operative law.
These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor Code) refer
to those arising from the employer's violation of the employee's
right as provided by the Labor Code.
In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the
rights of the workers as provided by the Labor Code, but the
provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain, which
ipso facto amended the worker's contracts of employment.
Respondents consciously failed to conform to these provisions
which specifically provide for the increase of the worker's rate.
It was only after June 30, 1983, four months after the brown
builders brought a suit against B & R in Bahrain for this same
claim, when respondent AIBC's contracts have undergone
amendments in Bahrain for the new hires/renewals
(Respondent's Exhibit 7).
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The Labor Code provides that "all money claims arising from
employer-employee relations . . . shall be filed within three
years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they
shall be forever barred" (Art. 291, Labor Code, as amended).
This three-year prescriptive period shall be the one applied
here and which should be reckoned from the date of
repatriation of each individual complainant, considering the
fact that the case is having (sic) filed in this country. We do not
agree with the POEA Administrator that this three-year
prescriptive period applies only to money claims specifically
recoverable under the Philippine Labor Code. Article 291 gives
no such indication. Likewise, We can not consider
complainants' cause/s of action to have accrued from a
violation of their employment contracts. There was no
violation; the claims arise from the benefits of the law of the
country where they worked. (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
90-91).
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Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955], where the issue was the
applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New
York for claims arising from said Code. In said case, the claims would
have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of
Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not "specifically intended to be
substantive," hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of the
forum should apply. The Court observed:
Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, which was applied by NLRC, refers only to
claims "arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right as
provided by the Labor Code." They assert that their claims are based on
the violation of their employment contracts, as amended by the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 and therefore the claims may be brought within
ten years as provided by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(Rollo, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp.
18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed
under the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the
Philippines a "borrowing law," which is Section 48 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and that where such kind of law exists, it takes precedence
over the common-law conflicts rule (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).
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the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga,
Private International Law, 131 [1979]).
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it. There
is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent
with or contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras,
Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to
the forum's public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252
U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection
to labor.
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
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NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent part
provides:
As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not make
any reference as to the computation for overtime work under the Eight-
Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and instead insisted that
work computation provided in the collective bargaining agreements
between the parties be observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is
primarily anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the
ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil
Code should govern."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended by
R.A. No. 19933) provides:
Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall
be commenced within three years after the cause of action
accrued otherwise such action shall be forever barred, . . . .
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Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period
for filing "actions to enforce any cause of action under said law." On the
other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides the
prescriptive period for filing "money claims arising from employer-
employee relations." The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the
employer-employee relations, which is broader in scope than claims
arising from a specific law or from the collective bargaining agreement.
VII
A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776,
claimants aver: (1) that while their complaints were filed on June 6, 1984
with POEA, the case was decided only on January 30, 1989, a clear denial
of their right to a speedy disposition of the case; and (2) that NLRC and
the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default
(Rollo, pp.
31-35).
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
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Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into consideration in
determining whether or not the right to a "speedy disposition of cases"
has been violated, thus:
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served with a
copy of the amended complaint, claimants had been asking that AIBC
and BRII be declared in default for failure to file their answers within the
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ten-day period provided in Section 1, Rule III of Book VI of the Rules and
Regulations of the POEA. At that time, there was a pending motion of
AIBC and BRII to strike out of the records the amended complaint and
the "Compliance" of claimants to the order of the POEA, requiring them
to submit a bill of particulars.
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their
final disposition in the administrative level after seven years from their
inception, cannot be said to be attended by unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedy
disposition of the cases of complainants.
The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were
deployed in different areas, one group in and the other groups outside of,
Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling more than US$65 million
according to Atty. Del Mundo, included:
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Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient definiteness and
clarity of some facts, the claimants were ordered to comply with the
motion of AIBC for a bill of particulars. When claimants filed their
"Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike out the complaint
from the records for failure of claimants to submit a proper bill of
particulars. While the POEA Administrator denied the motion to strike
out the complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correct the deficiencies"
pointed out by AIBC.
The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA Administrator
were interrupted several times by the various appeals, first to NLRC and
then to the Supreme Court.
Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases were
filed against AIBC and BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA Cases Nos.
L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaint was filed on May 29,
1986 (POEA Case No. L-86-05-460). NLRC, in exasperation, noted that
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NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in terminating
the proceedings, thus:
These cases could have been spared the long and arduous route
towards resolution had the parties and their counsel been more
interested in pursuing the truth and the merits of the claims
rather than exhibiting a fanatical reliance on technicalities.
Parties and counsel have made these cases a litigation of
emotion. The intransigence of parties and counsel is
remarkable. As late as last month, this Commission made a last
and final attempt to bring the counsel of all the parties (this
Commission issued a special order directing respondent Brown
& Root's resident agent/s to appear) to come to a more
conciliatory stance. Even this failed (Rollo,
p. 58).
The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay in the
disposition of the cases, to the lament of NLRC, which complained:
A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court (Revised Rules
of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12).
While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain Law,
many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants
were deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia under different terms and
conditions of employment.
NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that
inasmuch as the first requirement of a class suit is not present (common
or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it
is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to
file their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of
the claims is the same (for employee's benefits), there is no common
question of law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of
Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but were
deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own
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demand and not in the claims of the other employees of defendants. The
named claimants have a special or particular interest in specific benefits
completely different from the benefits in which the other named
claimants and those included as members of a "class" are claiming
(Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473 [1913]). It appears that each claimant
is only interested in collecting his own claims. A claimants has no
concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the
fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have
entered into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims.
A principle basic to the concept of "class suit" is that plaintiffs brought on
the record must fairly represent and protect the interests of the others
(Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this
matter, the claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in
a class suit in a judicial proceeding. The most that can be accorded to
them under the Rules of Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one
complaint (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are the
exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of all
indispensable parties.
C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA
Administrator and NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De Castro
guilty of "forum shopping, ambulance chasing activities, falsification,
duplicity and other unprofessional activities" and his appearances as
counsel for some of the claimants as illegal (Rollo, pp. 38-40).
the circular expressly states that said circular applies to an governs the
filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for unethical
conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and POEA have no
jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical conduct of lawyers.
Attorney's Lien
The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated December 14,
1992 was filed by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his claim for
attorney's fees for legal services rendered in favor of the claimants (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 841-844).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the court or
administrative agency which renders and executes the money judgment
secured by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer shall cause written
notice thereof to be delivered to his clients and to the adverse party
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37). The statement of the claim
for the charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo should have been filed with the
administrative agency that rendered and executed the judgment.
Contempt of Court
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2. The average wage per hour for the Philippino (sic) employee
is US$2.69 . . . .
BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not prepared
by them but by a subordinate official in the Bahrain Department of
Labor; (2) that there was no showing that the Bahrain Minister of Labor
had approved said memorandum; and (3) that the offer was made in the
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While said document was presented to the POEA without observing the
rule on presenting official documents of a foreign government as
provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence,
it can be admitted in evidence in proceedings before an administrative
body. The opposing parties have a copy of the said memorandum, and
they could easily verify its authenticity and accuracy.
This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of the
record with unwanted evidence but a statement of public policy. There is
great public interest in having the protagonists settle their differences
amicable before these ripen into litigation. Every effort must be taken to
encourage them to arrive at a settlement. The submission of offers and
counter-offers in the negotiation table is a step in the right direction. But
to bind a party to his offers, as what claimants would make this Court do,
would defeat the salutary purpose of the Rule.
A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for
greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment
contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that "where the laws of the
host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the
laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment
contract." It quoted with approval the observation of the POEA
Administrator that ". . . in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
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AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically
when it refused to enforce the overseas-employment contracts, which
became the law of the parties. They contend that the principle that a law
is deemed to be a part of a contract applies only to provisions of
Philippine law in relation to contracts executed in the Philippines.
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may
just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed
incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms." By such reference to
the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign
contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate
as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the
contract (Anton, Private International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris,
The Conflict of Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]).
giving effect to the parties' own choice of the applicable law (Fricke v.
Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of law
must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their transaction
(Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question
that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in
that country.
B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their right to
due process when said administrative agency granted Friday-pay
differential, holiday-pay differential, annual-leave differential and leave
indemnity pay to the claimants listed in Annex B of the Resolution. At
first, NLRC reversed the resolution of the POEA Administrator granting
these benefits on a finding that the POEA Administrator failed to
consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII, that some findings of
fact of the POEA Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and
that some of the evidence were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII (Rollo,
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pp. 35-36; 106-107). But instead of remanding the case to the POEA
Administrator for a new hearing, which means further delay in the
termination of the case, NLRC decided to pass upon the validity of the
claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC and BRII complain of as being
irregular and a "reversible error."
They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence submitted
on appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to have been
"unilaterally submitted by the claimants and not disclosed to the adverse
parties" (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is enjoined
to "use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process."
Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the merits
instead of remanding them to the trial court for the reception of evidence,
where the same can be readily determined from the uncontroverted facts
on record (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 190 SCRA 653 [1990]; Pagdonsalan v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 127 SCRA 463 [1984]).
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C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for 683 claimants
listed in Annex D of the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 whose
claims had been denied by the POEA Administrator "for lack of proof"
and for 69 claimants listed in Annex E of the same Resolution, whose
claims had been found by NLRC itself as not "supported by evidence"
(Rollo, pp. 41-45).
NLRC based its ruling on Article 218(c) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, which empowers it "[to] conduct investigation for the
determination of a question, matter or controversy, within its
jurisdiction, . . . ."
It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority under
Article 218(c) to remand a case involving claims which had already been
dismissed because such provision contemplates only situations where
there is still a question or controversy to be resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
VIII
The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned
orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.
SO ORDERED.
ANNEX A
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