G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
FIRST DIVISION
Cruz v. People | GR No. 166441 | October 8, 2014
Bersamin, J.
KEYWORDS: TENT
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Article 335 (Now Article 266-A), Article 336, Article 6(3)
PLEADING: Not guilty on both cases (attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC – Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Rape
(Criminal Case No. 2388) and Acts of Lasciviousness (Criminal Case No. 2389);
CA – Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Rape, Acquitted of Acts of
Lasciviousness
OG PENALTY: RTC – Attempted Rape: 4 years and 2 months prison correccional to 10
years prision mayor; Acts of Lasciviousness: 4 months arresto mayor to 4 years and 2
months prison correccional
SUBJECT MATTER: Overt acts and necessary causal relation with intended crime:
Atempted, consummated rape or acts of lasciviousness
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner’s climbing on top of the undressed AAA such that they faced each
other, with him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands, constituted
attempted rape, the crime for which the RTC and the CA convicted and punished him.
(Simplified: Whether or not Norberto is guilty of attempted rape)
FACTS:
1. Norberto and his wife Belinda employed AAA (15) and BBB to help them in
selling their plastic and glass wares in La Union during its fiesta. In La Union, they
parked in front of Maroon enterprises, brought out the goods for display, and set up
2 tents.
2. AAA and BBB went to sleep. Later, AAA was awakened when she felt that
somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breasts and
touching her private part. AAA realized that she was naked. Norberto told her
not to scream or else she would be killed. AAA pleaded with him but he did not
stop. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice so the latter was not able to
pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not to tell
anyone of the incident or he will kill her.
3. AAA went out of the tent to seek Jess’ (house boy) help but she failed to wake him
up. When she got back to the tent, she saw Norberto touching BBB’s private
parts. When she entered the tent, Norberto left.
4. Later, AAA and BBB told Jess what happened and they reported the incident to a
policeman. Norberto was summoned to the police station. His wife, Belinda arrived,
and an argument ensued between them.
5. AAA and BBB went home with the spouses and continued working for them for
more than a week, until December 30, 1994.
6. The RTC found Norberto guilty of attempted rape for the incident with AAA,
and of acts of lasciviousness for the incident with BBB. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision in Criminal Case No. 2388 and acquitted the accused in Criminal
Case No. 2389.
7. Petitioner contends that AAA is not credible because she continued working for
them despite the alleged attempted rape, and he was not proven to be guilty
beyond reasonable doubt because BBB did not even testify. The record also does
not indicate if he was naked or if his penis was out. He also claimed that AAA and
her mother demanded P80,000 from him as settlement.
HOLDING: NO. Petitioner Norberto is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. The intent of
the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and
acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of
acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the
intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does
not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to
penetrate the female's vagina.
REASONING:
1. The basic element of rape, according to Art. 335 of the RPC, is carnal knowledge
of the female or the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.
Slightest penetration consummates the rape, which is why rape in its frustrated
stage is a physical impossibility.
2. In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform
all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. To establish attempted
rape, the State must show that the overt acts, without being thwarted by
extraneous matters, would ripen into rape.
3. As held in People v. Dominguez, Jr.: "The gauge in determining whether the crime
of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual
intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."
4. Here, the actions of the petitioner does not warrant the inference that he
intended to commit rape, and no other offense. He could have intended to
commit only simple seduction.
5. The direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape
did not include equivocal preparatory acts. As a rule, preparatory acts are not
punishable under the Revised Penal Code for as long as they remained
equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one
could determine with certainty what the perpetrator's intent really was.
6. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not
required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed when the
touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with intent to penetrate. The
intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without
such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
7. However, the petitioner did commit acts of lasciviousness against AAA. Unlike in
rape, intent to lie with the female is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Instead,
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
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the only elements, under Article 336 of the RPC are: (a) the offender commits
any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex;
and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using
force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years
of age.
8. The petitioner’s act of embracing AAA and touching her vagina and breasts did not
directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erect
penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred
any inference about his intent to lie with her, At most, his acts reflected lewdness
and lust for her.
9. The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even
from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly
leading to rape.
JUDGMENT: WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner
NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME guilty of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, and,
ACCORDINGLY, PENALIZES him with the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of
arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision
correccional, as the maximum; ORDERS him to pay moral damages of P30,000.00 and civil
indemnity of P20,000.00 to the complainant, with interest of 6% per annum on such awards
reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the
costs of suit.
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
People v. Lizada: Characteristics of overt acts for purposes of attempted rape.
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
​The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the
conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of
being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to
be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any
fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so
long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the
intent of the accused is.
It is necessary that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In
the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to
the offense.
People v. Lamahang: It was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to
cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had
he been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some
other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him)
could also be ultimate felony.

Article 335 (Now Article 266-a). When and how rape is committed. Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. DaIAcC

Carnal knowledge, as defined. The act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a
woman. Carnal knowledge explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable
of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.

Article 336. Acts of Lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any circumstances mentioned in
the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.

Lewd, as defined. Obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of

immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on in a wanton
manner.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
FIRST DIVISION
People v. Borinaga | GR NO. 33463 | DATE: DEC. 1930
PONENTE: MALCOLM J.
KEYWORDS: MOONEY, AMERICAN, KNIFE BUMARA SA CHAIR, SINAKSAK SA
LIKOD FROM THE WINDOW
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: FRUSTRATED MURDER
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies
as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC LEYTE: FRUSTRATED MURDER
(DEFENSE;ALIBI;NO MERIT)
OG PENALTY: RTC – 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of imprisonment, reclusion
temporal, with the accessory penalties and the costs|||
SUBJECT MATTER: ART. 6 - FRUSTRATED MURDER
ISSUE: WHETHER THE FACTS OF THE CASE CONSTITUTE TO ATTEMPTED OR
FRUSTRATED MURDER WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE
FACTS:
Harry H. Mooney, an American, contracted with Lawaan in association with Basilio Borinaga
for the construction of a fish coral. Lawaan, with some of his men, went to Mooney’s shop
and demanded the whole amount stipulated in the contract. Mooney refused to pay and
asked them to wait come back after breakfast.in response to Lawaan’s warning that if he did
not pay something would happen to him. Lawaan left and Mooney returned to his shop.
Later that evening, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor where he had taken a seat on a
chair in front of the said neighbor and his back was facing the window. Borinaga then
striked Mooney with a knife from the window, however, the knife lodged in the back of
the chair. Mooney fell from the chair thereafter but was not injured. Borinaga ran away
but came back 10 minutes later with a knife in hand to try again but Mooney and his
neighbor, Perpetua, turned a flashlight on Borinaga which frightened him causing Borinaga
to flee from the scene of the crime.
Borinaga was later heard declaring in town that his purpose was to kill Mooney and then
apologized to his friends for failing to commit the crime.
3
HOLDING: The crime of Borinaga constitutes frustrated murder.
REASONING:
The act done by Borinaga constitutes an act of frustrated murder. The homicidal intent of
the accused was plainly evidenced.
Murder was in the heart and mind of the accused. Borinaga expressly stated his
purpose, which was to kill, and apologized to his friends for not accomplishing that purpose.
Deadly weapon was used and the blow during the incident was treacherously directed
towards the vital organs of the victim. The means used were entirely suitable for
accomplishment. The crime should be qualified as murder because of the presence of the
circumstance of treachery.
The crime was committed was frustrated murder and not attempted murder, despite Mooney
being uninjured, because the essential condition of a frustrated crime is that the author
performed all the acts of execution, and attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done
to accomplish the work of the assailant completely.
The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of the
will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from further acts. What is known as
the subjective phase of the criminal act has passed.
JUDGMENT: WHEREFORE, Borinaga is found guilty of the crime of frustrated murder and
is sentenced to imprisonment of 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal with
accessory penalties
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
● The essential condition of a frustrated crime, is that the author perform all the
acts of execution, and attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to
accomplish the work of the assailant completely.
● The attendant circumstances established that murder was in the heart and mind
of the aggressor. Within the meaning of Art. 3 of the RPC, the crime committed
was frustrated and not attempted murder.
● The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces
independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from
further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act has
passed.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
4

LYNNX MEM - AID TABLE : ARTICE 6 RPC

STAGES OF PHASE OF THE REASON OF NON IS THE

ACTS OF FELONY PERFORMANCE FELONY
EXECUTION ,IF ANY PRODUCED?

ATTEMPTED NEVER PASSED NON NO

THE SUBJECTIVE
PHASE
Always confined
within the subjective
phase.
The malefactor does
not perform all the
acts of execution
which should produce
the crime.
PERFORMANCE
IS DUE
TO A CAUSE OR
ACCIDENT AND
NOT BY HIS OWN
SPONTANEOUS
DESISTANCE
Spontaneous
desistance;definiti
on: act of discontinuing
the crime when done
during the attempted
stage, exempts one from
criminal liability.
- absolutory cause;
negates criminal liability
because the law
encourages desistance
from committing a crime

FRUSTRATED OBJECTIVE PHASE NON NO

- HAS PASSED THE PERFORMANCE
SUBJECTIVE PHASE IS DUE TO
because the offender
already performed all the
CAUSES
acts of execution INDEPENDENT OF
THE WILL OF THE
● SUBJECTIVELY PERPETRATOR
, the crime is
complete but the
crime is not
consummated
by reason of
causes
independent of
the will of the
offender

CONSUMMATED OBJECTIVE PHASE- PERFORMED ALL YES

the phase where the THE ACTS OF
offender performed EXECUTION
all the acts necessary
to
produce/accomplish
the crime
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
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THIRD DIVISION
Pentecostes v. People | G.R. No. 167766 | April 7, 2010
J. PERALTA
KEYWORDS: Bibili Lang Naman Ng Kape Binaril Na
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Attempted/Frustrated Murder vs. Less Serious Physical
Injuries | Art. 265
PLEADING: Not Guilty
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC: guilty of attempted murder; CA: guilty of less serious
physical injuries
OG PENALTY: Arresto Mayor (6 months)
SUBJECT MATTER: Proof of intent to kill in attempted or frustrated homicide or murder,
necessary; also: Attempted Murder or Less Serious Physical Injuries
ISSUE: W/N The Court of Appeals erred in convicting petitioner of the crime of less serious
physical injuries and not attempted murder, considering the lack of intent to kill but the
presence of injury on the victim.
FACTS:
● Rudy Baclig, after drinking half a bottle of gin, went to the store to buy coffee and
sugar. On the way there, he was passed by a vehicle which moved backward
towards him. Petitioner called him by his nickname, parrod, and hearing his name,
Rudy Baclig came closer—as soon as he was close enough, petitioner drew a
gun and shot him at close range. Rudy ran to the back of the car while the
petitioner sped away.
● Rudy identified the Petitioner as his shooter, despite not being sober. (He’s a
habitual drinker, which means his alcohol tolerance is high.) He sustained a
gunshot wound to the left arm and was discharged from the hospital the next
day. The wound required only ten days of medical attendance. Other than that,
he had no other injuries.
27458, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Carlito Pentecostes, Jr. is
sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor.
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
Proof of Intent to Kill:
The essential and principal element of attempted/frustrated murder is the intent of the
assailant to take the life of his victim. This must be proved in a clear and evident
manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.
When such intent is lacking but injuries are present on the body of the victim, the
crime is only physical injuries and not attempted murder.
Moreover, Article 265 of the RPC provides for the specific conditions of the crime of less
serious physical injuries. It states that:
“Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not described
in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the offended party for
labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the
same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor.”
Attempted Murder vs. Less Serious Physical Injuries
● Attempted Murder: all requisites necessary for murder except for its
consummation, more importantly, the intent to kill and the death of the party.
● Less Serious Physical Injuries: no intent to kill, but with injuries to the person.

HOLDING: NO. The decision of the CA is affirmed, however, with modifications.

REASONING:
● Intent to kill could not be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the
shooting. The petitioner, after shooting Rudy, did not do anything else to
ensure that he killed him—he could’ve run him over, seeing as Rudy went to the
back of his car, but he did not. He shot him in the arm, once, far from hitting any
vital organs, not even shooting him multiple times. Intent to kill could not be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since the intent to kill is not manifest but wounds
are present, his crime is, therefore, physical injuries and not attempted murder.

● And since Rudy’s wound only required ten days of medical attendance and was
discharged the next day, the crime committed is less serious physical injuries
only.

JUDGMENT: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated February 18, 2005, and the Resolution dated April 19, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
DIVISION
Colinares v. People | G.R. No. 182748 | December 13, 2011
Roberto A. Abad
KEYWORDS: Probation, Self-defense, Frustrated/ Attempted Homicide
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW:
● Article 249, RPC - Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions
of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the
circumstances in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide
and be punished by reclusion temporal.
● Presidential Decree no. 968 - An Act Establishing a Probation System
PLEADING:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
1. July 1, 2005 - RTC found Colinares guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide and was sentenced 2y 4mo of prision correccional as min.,
to 6y 1d of prision mayor as max.
2. Appeal to CA, invoking self-defense and alternately seeking reduced penalty,
CA affirmed RTC decision and denied appeal.
3. Petition for review to SC.
OG PENALTY: RTC –
SUBJECT MATTER: Proof of nature, extent, depth & severity of wound necessary:
But note: Listerio supra
ISSUES:
1. May Colinares invoke self-defense? NO
2. Is he guilty of frustrated or attempted homicide? ATTEMPTED
3. May he apply for probation on remand of case to lower court? NO
FACTS:
Complainant Rufino P. Buena testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000,
he and Jesus Paulite went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took
a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind
and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 ½ inches in
diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the
roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the
right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be
smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought
Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing that Rufino suffered two
lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that
these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after
initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite. Arnel claimed self-defense. He
6
testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and
Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of
Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias
then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter
picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias
saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid
the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister’s house.
On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on
the night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home,
Diomedes saw the three engaged in a heated argument with Arnel.
HOLDING/REASONING:
1. No, the victim must have acted with unlawful aggression for Colinares to invoke
Self-defense. In homicide the requisites for invoking self-defense are:
(a) Person that the offender killed/injured committed unlawful
aggression.
(b) Offender employed reasonable and necessary means to repel
unlawful aggression.
(c) Person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that
Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnel’s testimony that it was
Rufino who started it. Arnel’s only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw
those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit
any medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and
his companions.
In contrast, the three witnesses—Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias—testified that Arnel was the
aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract
from their core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it.
Compared to Arnel’s testimony, the prosecution’s version is more believable and consistent
with reality, hence deserving credence.
2. Colinares is guilty of Attempted homicide. Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head
with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering
the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds
that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him. Court
ruled that crime is attempted homicide upon expert testimony by Dr. Belleza stating that
Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull
incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The
wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal
in seven or eight days. His voluntary surrender falls under mitigating circumstances.
3. Arnel is not entitled to probation, because the perfecting of an appeal disqualifies
him to file for probation under Sec. 9(a), of PD 968 stating that probation may not be
extended to offenders who have been convicted with a maximum sentence of more than 6
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
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years. In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide,
but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on
him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two
years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply
for probation.

JUDGMENT:
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated
July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel
Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him
to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P.
Buena the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner
applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been
remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal
Case T-2213.
SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS

Elements of frustrated homicide:

(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault;
(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and
(3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.

Elements of attempted homicide:

(1) Accused intended to kill the victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault.
(2) Wounds sustained by the victim were not fatal.

Unlawful aggression – assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and

imminent kind.

Three (3) Elements of Self-Defense:

1. unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
2. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
aggression.
3. lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
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FIRST DIVISION attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in
Oliveros, Jr v. People | G.R. No. 242552| March 3, 2021 favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not
J. Caguioa frustrated, murder.
● In this relation, it is settled that circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest
KEYWORDS: palo-palo (fish) on mere conjectures, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Attempted/Frustrated Murder unquestionable existence. The uncertainty on the nature of the wounds warrants the
PLEADING: Not guilty appreciation of a lesser gravity of the crime committed as this is in accordance with
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC: guilty of frustrated murder; CA: guilty of frustrated murder the fundamental principle in Criminal Law that all doubts should be resolved in favor
OG PENALTY: Prision Mayor (8 yrs 1 day) to reclusion temporal (14 yrs, 8mos, 1 day) of the accused
SUBJECT MATTER: Attempted vs Frustrated; Gravity of wounds
JUDGMENT: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Court DECLARES petitioners BENJAMIN M. OLIVEROS, JR., OLIVER M. OLIVEROS, and
ISSUE: Should the accused be convicted of attempted murder instead of frustrated murder due to
MAXIMO Z. SOTTO GUILTY of ATTEMPTED MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 in
gravity of the victim’s wounds?
relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences them to each suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
FACTS:
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. They are further ordered to pay Glenn F. Apostol the
● Victim (Glenn) and his father (Virgilio) went to the public market to buy fish.
amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as civil indemnity, Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
● They noticed that Benjamin was following them.
(P25,000.00) as moral damages, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
● On their way back, Mimielyn approached Glen and Virgilio and they got into a verbal
damages EACH. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum
altercation after accusing him of spreading rumors about his brother’s incompetency if he
from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
wins kagawad. Then, Mimielyn called someone on the phone.
● Benjamin and Oliver (the accused) challenged Glenn to a fight.
● After Glenn dodged an attack, Oliver held Glenn from the back, Benjamin hacked Glenn's DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
face and forehead with a bolo. Oliver, Benjamin and Maximo then mauled and kicked
Glenn. He was also hacked in the shoulder when he was defenseless. Mimielyn also Article 6 of the RPC:
strangled him from behind and pulled his hair. ARTICLE 6. Consummated, Frustrated, and Attempted Felonies.
● Virgilio was also punched and was kicked by the three. He was also hacked by a bolo. xxx
● Policemen saw and arrested Benjamin and Oliver; Maximo and Mimielyn had already left. It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
● Doctor who examined the wounds claimed that the injuries could only possibly cause the as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of
death to the victim due to infection and/or tetanus depending on the body’s resistance the will of the perpetrator.
from the infection
● Qualifying Circumstance for Murder is present: Abuse of superior strength There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
○ Holding him back and use of weapons and outnumbering the victim and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
● Defense claimed: cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
○ No conspiracy
■ Conspiracy existed since they were summoned via a call by Mimielyn Gravity of Wound in appreciating Criminal Liability for Homicide/Murder
■ Passing of the weapon during the attack
○ No intent to kill The doctrine that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not
■ Means used (bolo), location of wounds and number of wounds were medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in
present favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated
○ Defense of a relative murder.
■ No unlawful aggression
○ Should be liable for attempted and not frustrated It is well-settled that in order to convict an accused for the crime of Frustrated Murder or
■ Discussed in the reasoning Homicide, as the case may be, the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim should be
fatal. Otherwise, the accused can only be convicted of Attempted Murder or Homicide. The crucial
HOLDING: Yes. Although all the acts of execution were present, the gravity of the wounds sustained by point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof
the victim were not mortal and therefore the felony should only be attempted murder. showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim's death without timely medical
intervention.
REASONING:
● First, the medico-legal officer testified that the injuries may only possibly cause the Intent to Kill (People v. Delim)
victim's death. Second, if ever the victim would die because of the wounds he sustained, his - in the means used by the malefactors,
death would not be caused by the wounds themselves, but his injuries might cause blood - the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim
loss or he might possibly die due to infection or tetanus if timely medical attention had not - the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the
been given victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
● Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically accused
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
9

U.S. v. Valdes y Guilgan | GR 14128 | Dec. 10, 1918

PONENTE: Torres, J. DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
Article 320. Destructive arson. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
KEYWORDS: period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Arson 1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,
PLEADING: storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: 2. Any passenger train or motor vehicle in motion or vessel out of port.
OG PENALTY: First Instance,arson (6yrs 1 day presidio mayor and to pay one half 3. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive
of the costs) materials.
SUBJECT MATTER: In Arson Art. 320 Frustrated - Jute sacks set on fire but no part
of the building burned. Article 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated
felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
ISSUE: accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
What should the accused be held liable for? nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
FACTS: There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or
● Valdes was accused of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag soaked in kerosene over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
oil, placed near a partition of an inhabited house. by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.
○ House was not burned The original charge was under Art. 549 of the (old) Penal Code but the syllabus
● Valdes admitted before several policemen that he had set the fire, Valdes also says Art. 320
admitted to setting previous fires under the influence of Labarro (not pursued).
○ Contradicted these statements during the trial (placing the rag etc)
● Police were monitoring the house due to repeated arson attempts
○ saw Valdes climbing up the wall of the warehouse behind the
dwelling house, in which some straw that had previously been
burned, and that, when the defendant noticed the presence of the
policeman, he desisted from climbing the wall and entering the
warehouse.|||
● Guligan Valdes was charged with arson.

HOLDING: Frustrated Arson

REASONING:
● Setting fire to some rags and jute sacks soaked in kerosene oil and placed near
the partition of the entresol of an inhabited house
● No part of the house had began to burn, although it would have started if not
extinguished on time
● The author of the punishable act performed all the steps conductive to the burning
of the house, but, notwithstanding these acts, failed to accomplish the criminal act

JUDGMENT:

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with the
modification, however, that the penalty imposed upon the defendant shall be eight years
and one day of presidio mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed in Article 57 of the
Code. The defendant shall also pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.|||
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
10

EN BANC JUDGMENT:
People v. Hernandez | GR L-31770 | DATE December 5, 1929
AVANCENA C.J. In view of these considerations, the judgment appealed from is modified, and in
KEYWORDS: partial roof burned, paddy, stick to get guava accordance with article 549 of the Penal Code the appellant is found guilty of the crime
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: arson of arson, committed in a dwelling, knowing that within it were the offended party and his
PLEADING: children; and, considering one aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC guilty for FRUSTRATED arson defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment, with the accessories, and the costs.
OG PENALTY: RTC- guilty for FRUSTRATED arson
SUBJECT MATTER: Consummated - Part of roof was burned. DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS

ISSUE: Should appellant Hernandez be only guilty for frustrated arson because only part of
the roof was burned?

FACTS: In 1929, Dayrit (the offended party) was about to retire a little past midnight when
he saw that the roof of his house was on fire.
- Dayrit fetched some water to extinguish the fire when he saw HERNANDEZ
(accused) beside his house with a stick.
- The fire was extinguished and a small part of the roof was burned.
- Witnesses Tanglao and Mallari heard the cry for help and they saw HERNANDEZ
running away.
- The testimonies established beyond all doubt the fact that HERNANDEZ was the
one who set fire to the roof.
- Dayrit saw the stock from the appellant’s possession on that night leaning
against the house with the end burnt and a rag soaked with petroleum
dangling from it which was recognized by Dayrit because it was used to get
guava fruits.
- Dayrit (offended party) and Hernandez (appellant) had prior disagreements
because Dayrit had suspected appellant in stealing paddy (bigas/palay) piled
behind his house.
- RTC: Hernandez is guilty of frustrated arson. Sentenced to eight years and
one day presidio mayor, with the accessories of law, and the costs.

HOLDING: NO. The SC ruled that it is consummated arson. The crime of arson was
consummated, notwithstanding the fact that the fire was afterwards extinguished, for,
once the fire has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson does not depend
upon the extent of the damage caused.
Aggravating circumstance of nighttime must be taken into consideration, as having been
doubtless sought by the appellant in order to insure the commission of the crime, the
penalty must be imposed in its maximum degree.
Article 549 of the Penal Code is applicable herein, with the corresponding penalty of
cadena temporal to life imprisonment.

REASONING: Similar cases with United States vs. Go Foo Suy and Go Jancho (25
Phil., 187) and United States vs. Po Chengco (23 Phil., 487).
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
11

SECOND DIVISION
People v. Acosta | GR#126351 | February 18 2000
Quisumbing, J
KEYWORDS:
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Arson
PLEADING: Not Guilty
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC: Convicted- SC: Certiorari
OG PENALTY: RTC –reclusion perpetua and to indemnify private complainant the
amount of P100,000.00
SUBJECT MATTER: Simple Arson (P.D. 1613)
ISSUE:
Did the offender meet all the elements required for Arson to be convicted?
FACTS:
- Elmer Montescarlos believed that Raul Acosta and his wife were hiding Raul’s
live-in partner.
- Elmer stormed the house of the appellant and burned their clothes, furniture
and appliances.
- Later that afternoon, Nephew of the prosecution witness, who lived next door to the
victim, saw Raul carrying a stove and a kitchen knife and when approached,
said he would burn the house of the victim.
- Witness heard chairs and bottles being thrown and saw Acosta inside the house
and saw him pour kerosene on the bed and lit it with a cigarette lighter. The
fire was put off by Acosta's wife using a broomstick.
- At 1 am in the morning, the witness was awoken by dogs and saw that the victim’s
house was burning. Acosta looked happy with a canine smile and crazy looking
expression.
- She peeped and saw Acosta standing in front of the burning house watching the
blaze and not doing anything to contain it.
- On-the spot investigation did not find any incendiary device and the cause of the
fire undetermined.
- Acosta claimed that he slept at his mother’s house,5 houses away, and defense
witness claimed that he saw Acosta watching TV, and actually watched the fire
together when it broke out.
- Appellant threatened the prosecution’s witness that he will burn her house if she
testified against him.
In arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence
of the fire and of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated
testimony of a single witness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to
warrant conviction.
Lastly, it would not be amiss here to point out that "[i]n the crime of arson, the enormity of
the offense is not measured by the value of the property that may be destroyed but
rather by the human lives exposed to destruction." It is indeed a heinous crime that the
law wisely seeks to suppress with the most serious penalty because of its grave anti-social
character.
JUDGMENT:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Raul Acosta y
Laygo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen, in the amount of
P100,000.00 as actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment, is AFFIRMED. Costs
against appellant.
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
ARTICLE 320 (amended by Section 10 of R.A. No. 7659). Destructive Arson. — The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a
result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions.
Circumstantial evidence. Pertinently, Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt."
Arson Corpus delicti:
(1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency
(2) the identity of the defendants as the ones responsible for the crime.

HOLDING:
YES. Circumstantial evidence suggests that Acosta was responsible for the crime as
it satisfied the corpus delicti of arson and his actions prior, during and after the crime was
committed indicates culpability.

REASONING:
Circumstantial evidence suggests proves he is guilty: He had motive, showed intent to
commit the arson, he was present at the locus criminis, subsequent action of
threatening people points to his culpability
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
DIVISION
People v. Pugal y Austria | G.R. No. 229103 | March 15 2021
PONENTE: Leonen, J.
KEYWORDS: Fireworks, Grocery Store, Fire
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Article 320. Arson
PLEADING: NOT GUILTY
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC – Pugal found guilty of Destructive Arson; Reculsion
Pepetua without eligibility of parole CA – Affirmed RTC’s decision
OG PENALTY: RTC - Violation of Article 320. Destructive Arson
SUBJECT MATTER: Destructive Arson (Art. 320)
ISSUE:
W/N Accused-Appellant is guilty of Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the RPC?
FACTS:
1. On December 31, 2008, around 11:00 p.m., Ferdinand and Franklin were at their
store, FQ Grocery, situated along Salcedo Street in Vigan City, Ilocos Sur. The
store was authorized to sell firecrackers and pyrotechnic devices.
2. Two men, Benjieboy and Pugal, arrived on a motorcycle. While Benjieboy entered
the store, Pugal, holding a mother rocket (kwitis), remained outside.
3. Pugal proceeded to light the firework while aiming it towards the fireworks
display in front of the store, exclaiming "Happy New Year!"
4. Despite Franklin's attempt to intervene, the firework was already airborne and
collided with a mother rocket displayed at the store.
5. The sparks triggered a series of explosions among the other displayed
fireworks. Due to the store's wooden structure, the fire rapidly engulfed the
building.
6. Pugal attempted to flee but was pursued and subdued by Franklin and
Rebamonte.
7. Responding to the explosion, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Rivad arrived at the scene,
witnessing Franklin's restraint of Pugal.
8. After informing Pugal of his rights, PO3 Rivad took him to the police station for
investigation and subsequently to Gabriela Silang General Hospital for a medical
exam.
9. Amid the wreckage, the charred remains of Florencio, the father of Ferdinand
and Franklin, were discovered.
Additional Information:
Contention of Accused-Appellant/ Defense
1. The accused aimed the rocket towards a fireworks display that was near but
not within the FQ grocery store, suggesting that the target was not the store
itself.
2. The accused's lack of proper knowledge in handling a mother rocket is
highlighted, as evidenced by the rocket exploding in his hands, suggesting a
lack of intent to cause harm deliberately.
3. The act of lighting the rocket is described as a celebratory gesture, occurring
minutes before midnight on New Year's Day, and accompanied by the exclamation
12
"happy new year."
4. It's argued that Franklin's warning against firing the rocket was given after the
rocket was already in motion, making it too late for the accused to react even if he
understood the warning.
5. The absence of a clear motive to cause damage or harm to the store owners is
emphasized, noting that the accused and the victims were not familiar with each
other.
6. The accused's instinctual reaction of running away from the fire and not assisting
people inside the building is characterized as a natural human response rather
than indicative of criminal intent.
7. The defense questions the trial court's contradictory statement that the accused
might have intended to start a New Year's joke while also concluding that there
was intent to cause fire and death.
➔ Accused-appellant argues that based on the presented circumstances,
the fire that occurred was an "unfortunate accident," an unintended
consequence of his actions. Therefore, he asserts that he should be
exempted from criminal liability under Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal
Code, which covers cases where the accused committed an act that
resulted in a different and unintended crime.
➔ Alternatively, the accused-appellant suggests that if liability is established,
he should receive a reduced penalty as provided under Article 67 of the
Revised Penal Code, which addresses situations where a mitigating
circumstance is present.
➔ Furthermore, the accused-appellant asserts that under Article 13(3) of
the Revised Penal Code, the circumstance of his lack of intent "to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed" should be taken into consideration
to mitigate his liability as he did not have the intention to cause such
severe consequences as the fire and its destructive impact.
HOLDING:
YES. The accused-appellant cannot invoke Article(4), Article 67 and Article 13(3) to either
exempt him from criminal liability or lessen his offense as his actions that led to the flame
and death of Florencio were done deliberately, driven by malice and intent. The destructive
outcome was foreseeable as warnings regarding a possible ignition of fire were
present.
REASONING:
Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, defines
destructive arson as the intentional and malicious burning of buildings and structures,
regardless of whether they are public or private, including storehouses or factories with
inflammable or explosive materials, committed by an individual or a group of people. In
cases of arson, the corpus delicti principle is generally satisfied by demonstrating the
occurrence of the fire and its intentional causation.
Intent, being a mental state, is inferred from the observable actions of a person. There is a
presumption that a person intends the natural outcomes of their actions. In the present
case, it was established that the accused-appellant knowingly ignited a mother rocket,
aimed it at the fireworks on display in the store, and triggered an explosion that led to
the incineration of the building.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
The evidence presented establishes the appellant's intent to cause the fire. The appellant
intentionally aimed the mother rocket he was holding toward another mother rocket
displayed at the grocery store. As a natural consequence, when the rocket he launched
ignited the store's mother rocket, the resulting sparks ignited the other pyrotechnic
devices nearby, including fountains, lights, small firecrackers, and bawang, all displayed on
a table in front of the store. This chain reaction facilitated the rapid spread of the fire
within the store, which was constructed entirely of wood. The deliberate act of igniting
the mother rocket and directing it toward the fireworks display ultimately led to the
fire that consumed the store. This sequence of events provides compelling evidence of
the appellant's intent to initiate the fire and supports the conclusion that his actions were
not accidental but deliberate.
* Additional notes, just in case ☺️
● For accused-appellant's assertion of lacking intent to commit an offense of such
gravity as a mitigating circumstance to hold weight, there must exist a conspicuous
and clear disparity between the methods employed and the outcomes produced by
those methods.
○ The actions of the accused-appellant, specifically lighting the rocket in
close proximity to the store and aiming it at the mother rocket and other
displayed fireworks, indicate a clear "reckless disregard for human lives"
and property. This behavior demonstrates a lack of consideration for the
potential consequences and dangers posed by the presence of highly
combustible and hazardous materials. The foreseeable outcome of the
accused-appellant's actions was the ignition of any nearby items
that were susceptible to fire, given the volatile nature of the
materials involved. Consequently, the deliberate act of directing the
rocket towards the fireworks display exhibited a blatant disregard for the
safety of people and property, leading to the eventual outbreak of the fire.
○ The evidence overwhelmingly establishes Pugal's deliberate actions and
intent. Upon arriving at FQ store with his own mother-rocket and cigarette
in hand, Pugal encountered a prominent signboard that unequivocally
warned against both testing firecrackers and smoking on the premises.
Despite these clear warnings and the conspicuous presence of
fireworks merchandise on display in the store, Pugal recklessly
proceeded to light his own firework. His action escalated when he
pointed the ignited firework's stick directly at the mother-rocket and
numerous other pyrotechnic items within the store.
■ There was a “no testing, no smoking” sign in front of the store
○ Rather than assisting victims in their efforts to control the flames or
demonstrating any remorse, Pugal tried to escape, only being
apprehended by Franklin Que. Furthermore, Pugal never returned or
even offered an apology to the Que family for the damage and loss he
had caused. These actions speak to his true intentions–not only to initiate
the fire that ultimately consumed the building but also to evade
accountability for his actions. The evidence convincingly supports the
conclusion that Pugal's conduct was driven by malice and an intent to
cause the fire that resulted in the destruction of the building and the death
of the store owner.
13
Cited Jurisprudence in relation to mitigating circumstances
● People v. Isleta - The Court declined to recognize the mentioned mitigating circumstance
due to the fact that the actions undertaken by the accused were adequately capable of
causing and did indeed result in the death of the victim. In this context, a comparable case
determined that a single stab wound, due to its position and extent, was deemed ample to
result in the victim's death–a result which indeed materialized.
JUDGMENT:
The Court finds no reversible error in the Court of Appeals decision convicting the appellant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
December 11, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06926 finding accused-appellant
RICHARD PUGAL y AUSTRIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Destructive Arson is
hereby AFFIRMED.
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
ARTICLE 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed
by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is
merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the
commission or another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordnance storehouse,
archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results,
the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
ELEMENTS OF ARSON
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and
(b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Praeter Intentionem cannot be invoked in this case
● Rule for the application:
Can be taken into account only when the facts proven show that there is a notable and evident
disproportion between the means employed to execute the criminal act and its consequences.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
DIVISION
People v. Dagman | GR 23133 | AUGUST 20, 1925
MALCOLM, J.
KEYWORDS: 40 vs. 1
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Frustrated Murder
PLEADING: none mentioned
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: CFI: frustrated homicide
OG PENALTY: CFI: not mentioned
SUBJECT MATTER: Frustration, belief of offender as basis for stage of offense
ISSUE:
Is the crime committed, frustrated homicide or murder?
FACTS:
● Elias Magbual, an employee of hacienda La Esperanza, was attacked by 40
people. Only 7 were identified.
● They threw a stone at his breast which knocked him down. He attempted to
escape but was wounded by a lance. He also obtained other wounds from
their bolos and clubs.
● He was able to escape successfully.
● CFI: charged with frustrated murder; ruling was frustrated homicide.
● On appeal, two errors are assigned and argued, namely, (1) that the trial judge
erred in finding that the accused had the intention to kill Elias Magbual, the
offended party, and (2) that the trial judge likewise erred in finding that there was
an agreement to kill Elias Magbual.
● Atty General: recommended that is should be frustrated murder as there was
treachery and that penalty should be in its maximum as there was an
aggravating circumstance present which is the use of prohibited arms.
HOLDING:
It is frustrated murder because of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
REASONING:
● The murder should be regarded as frustrated because the offenders performed
all of the acts of execution which should precede the felony as consequence but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the perpetrators; in this instance, the playing possum by Magbual.
● There was an intent upon the part of the assailants to take the life of the
person attacked, which intent may be gathered from the circumstances
surrounding the attack; in this instance, the nature of the wounds, the cry of the
accused, "Vamos a matarle," and their fingering the nose of Magbual to see if
respiration continued.
● Deadly weapons were used, blows were directed at the vital parts of the
body, the aggressors stated their purpose to kill and thought they had killed.
The subjective phase of the crime was entirely passed, and subjectively speaking,
the crime was complete.
● The particular parts of the body of the person struck during the assault, the deadly
character of the weapons used, the violence of the attack, and the accomplishment
14
of the crime with alevosia in such manner as to insure the safety of the
assailants while depriving the victim of the opportunity to make defense,
classifies the crime a frustrated murder.
● And finally, that the victim did not die, was owing to a chance or accident or reason
independent of the criminal act performed
● In US vs Lim Sam
○ The distinction between frustrated murder and attempted murder is this:
In frustrated murder the accused performs all of the acts which he
believes necessary to consummate the crime. Death fails to follow for
causes entirely apart from his will.
○ In attempted murder the accused begins the commission of the crime
by over acts, but involuntarily desists from performing the other acts
necessary to consummate the crime, he being prevented from doing so
by some cause outside of his own will.
○ In the case at bar it appears clearly that the defendant believed that he
had performed all of the acts necessary to consummate the crime of
murder, and, therefore, of his own will, desisted from striking further
blows. He believed that he had killed Keng Kin. Death did not result for
reasons entirely apart from the will of the accused. This surely stamps the
crime as frustrated murder.
○ If, after the first blow, someone had rushed to the assistance of Keng Kin
and by his efforts had prevented the accused from proceeding further in
the commission of the crime, the accused not believing that he had
performed all of the acts necessary to cause death, he would have been
guilty of attempted murder.
JUDGMENT:
Agreeable to the recommendation of the Attorney-General, the judgment appealed from is
modified and each of the defendants and appellants is sentenced to fourteen years, eight
months and one day imprisonment cadena temporal, with the accessory penalties provided
by law, and to pay a one-seventh part of the costs of each instance, and all of the
defendants and appellants jointly and severally are sentenced to reimburse the offended
party in the amount of P65 for medical services. So ordered.
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
Frustrated - Offenders performed all of the acts of execution which should precede the
felony as consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrators.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
15

DIVISION JUDGMENT:The judgment of the court below is, therefore, reversed, and the defendant is
U.S. v. Lim San | GR L-5335|||| DATE November 8, 1910 convicted of the crime of frustrated murder and sentenced to eight years and day of presidio
PONENTE Justice Moreland mayor and to pay one-third of the costs. There being no evidence in the case of the
damages which Keng Kin has suffered by reason of the acts complained of, no indemnity
KEYWORDS: can be required paid in this action.|||
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Frustrated Murder
PLEADING: not guilty
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Court of First Instance- Attempted murder DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
OG PENALTY: Attempted Murder, 7 years of presidio mayor
SUBJECT MATTER: Frustration, Belief of offender as basis for stage of offense ● Frustrated
○ Accused performs all the acts which he believes are necessary to
consummate the crime
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of frustrated murder instead of ○ Death fails to follow for causes entirely apart from the accused’s will
attempted murder? ● Attempted
FACTS: ○ Accused begins the commission of the crime by overt acts, but
1. 10 pm on October 18, 1908 involuntarily desists from performing other acts, by causes outside his
○ It was somewhat dark, only light came from the lamp suspended from the own will.
ceiling of a tienda across the street.
2. Keng Kin was standing just outside the limits of the street, his attention was
towards his dog. He was not expecting to be attacked.
3. Lim San (accused) attacked the victim by driving a bolo straight to his face.
However, in the first blow, the knife had entered the victim’s left eye. Destroying
his eye completely, rendering him incapable of protecting himself from the
subsequent attacks.
4. Treachery was present: victim was surprised, could not defend himself; the
maneuvering of the accused to not attract attention until the moment of
impact.
5. Witnesses, Chua Hung and Greogorio Mariano testified that the accused had
assaulted Keng Kin without cause or provocation and stabbed him several
times with his bolo.

HOLDING: YES, the Court reversed the decision and convicted the defendant of frustrated
murder.

REASONING:
FRUSTRATED MURDER V ATTEMPTED MURDER
● Frustrated
○ Accused performs all the acts which he believes are necessary to
consummate the crime
○ Death fails to follow for causes entirely apart from the accused’s will
● Attempted
○ Accused begins the commission of the crime by overt acts, but
involuntarily desists from performing other acts, by causes outside his
own will.
● In this case, the defendant believed that he had performed all of the acts
necessary to consummate murder. From his own will, he desisted from striking
further blows since he believed that he had killed Keng Kin
○ For this case to be an attempted murder: if someone had rushed to the
assistance of the victim and prevented the accused from proceeding any
further.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
EN BANC
People v. Caballero | GR No. 149028-30 | April 02, 2003
PONENTE
KEYWORDS: 4 brothers killed 2 people in a compound and almost killed 1
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are guilty
of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, par. 1 of the RPC
PLEADING: not guilty
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC – found that all of the accused conspired to cause
injuries to Arnold and are all equally liable.
OG PENALTY: RTC – death and reclusion perpetua
SUBJECT MATTER: Subjectively, crime is complete
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the crime of frustrated murder is proper?
FACTS:
Accused: Armando, Robito, Ricardo, and Marciano
Victims: Eugene (dead), Leonilo (dead), and Arnold (alive)
Ricardo Caballero and his family lived in a compound with other families.
One afternoon, Armando (Baby), Robito (Bebot) and Marciano, Jr. (Jun), all surnamed
Caballero, were having a drinking spree in the house of their brother Ricardo in the
Mondragon Compound.
Then, Eugene Tayactac and Arnold Barcuma arrived in the sari-sari store of Wilma
Broce which was across the Mondragon Compound. Eugene had dinner in the store
while Arnold proceeded to the house of Susana Broce, Eugene's girlfriend, for a chat.
Susana's house was about 15 meters away from the store of Wilma.
Momentarily, Armando arrived in the store and asked Eugene in an angry tone: "Gene
mopalit ka?" (Gene, will you buy?). Eugene replied: "What is this all about? We don't have
any quarrel between us." Armando left the store but stood by the gate of the
barbed-wire fence of the Mondragon Compound. His brothers Ricardo, Robito and
Marciano, Jr. joined him. Ricardo and Robito were armed with knives.
As Eugene walked by the gate of the Mondragon Compound, Armando suddenly
grabbed Eugene towards the compound. Eugene resisted. Spontaneously, Ricardo,
Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined Armando and assaulted Eugene. Armando took the
wooden pole supporting the clothesline and hit Eugene with it. The latter tried to parry the
blows of the Caballero brothers, to no avail. In the process, Eugene was stabbed three
times.
From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw the commotion and rushed to the
scene to pacify the protagonists. Arnold told the Caballero brothers: "Bay, what is the
trouble between you and Eugene?" However, Ricardo accosted Arnold and stabbed the
latter on the left side of his body. Robito, Marciano, Jr. and Armando ganged up on
16
Arnold. Two of them stabbed Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life and hid under
the house of a neighbor.
For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to where the commotion was. He was,
however, met by Robito who stabbed him on the chest. Wounded, Leonilo retreated and
pleaded to his uncle Lucio Broce for help: "Tio,help me because I am hit."
The commotion stopped only upon the arrival of Teresito Mondragon who was able to
pacify the Caballero brothers. They all returned to the compound.
In the meantime, Lucio Broce, the uncle of Leonilo, brought the injured Eugene, Leonilo and
Arnold to the Planters Hospital for medical treatment. Eugene and Leonilo eventually died
from the stab wounds they sustained.
HOLDING:
YES. The Court held that the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder.
REASONING:
U.S. v. Eduave - “A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts
of execution which should result in the consummation of the crime. Subjectively, the crime
is complete. However, the crime is not consummated by reason of the intervention of
causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide cases, the offender is said to
have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and
could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance.”
WHAT WAS THE INTERVENTION? The appellants performed all the acts of execution
but the crime was not consummated because of the timely medical intervention.
WHY NOT CONSUMMATED PHYSICAL INJURIES? It is only physical injuries if the
offender had no intention to kill the victim.
WHY FRUSTRATED MURDER? Because they had intention to kill the victim. Intent to kill
was proved in this case. (check doctrine box for elements)
HOW WAS INTENT TO KILL PROVEN? It cannot be denied that the appellants had the
intention to kill Arnold. In this case, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole.
Appellant Ricardo and accused Robito used knives. Dr. Quisumbing, who attended to and
operated on Arnold, testified that the stab wound sustained by Arnold on the left side
of his body was mortal and could have caused his death were it not for the timely and
effective medical intervention.
JUDGMENT:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Carlos City (Negros Occidental),Branch 57, in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217 up to
RTC-1219 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of
the Revised Penal Code and are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
17

from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum. The appellants are hereby ordered to pay in solidum to the
victim Arnold Barcuma the amount of P25,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as
temperate or moderate damages.
In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the
wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring
medical intervention or attendance.

DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
RPC, Article 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - “Consummated
felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts
of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or
over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.”
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is
either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim or
frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender
intends to kill the victim.”
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of:
(a) Motive;
(b) The nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime;
(c) The nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim;
(d) The manner the crime was committed; and
(e) Words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the
victim.

Essential elements of a frustrated felony:

1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced,
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

U.S. v. Eduave - “To be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be
thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop
prior to the moment when he has performed all the acts which should produce the crime
as a consequence, which act it is his intention to perform.

The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the
crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in
the consummated crime. Thereafter, the phase is objective.

In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective phase in
the commission of the crime. The offender does not arrive at the point of performing
all of the acts of execution which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that
point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.

On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the
acts of execution which should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender
has passed the subjective phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime
is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase.
He did all that is necessary to consummate the crime. However, the crime is not
consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of
the offender.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
18

FIRST DIVISION 7. The following day, Cumigunda surrendered to the police, presented her torn and
People v. Boholst-Caballero | G.R. No. L-23249 | November 25, 1974
bloodstained dress as evidence, and provided a different knife to the
PONENTE
authorities as advised to her by the policeman, which became part of the
KEYWORDS: Husband & Wife, Unhappy Marriage, Self-defense prosecution's evidence.
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW:
PLEADING: Not guilty HOLDING:
SUBJECT MATTER: Elements of Self-defense; Clear and convincing evidence as proof: NO. The court determined that Cunigunda's actions were consistent with the principles of
Also: Parricide; Motive and proof of offense
self-defense. Her use of the knife was justified due to the unlawful aggression and imminent
danger posed by her husband. As a result, she was not found guilty of parricide, and
ISSUE: W/N the accused is criminally liable for the crime of Parricide? her actions were deemed acts of self-defense.
BLUE: Victim — Francisco
REASONING:
RED: Accused-Appellant — Cunigunda
The court recognized that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the husband,
PURPLE: Weapons(s) — Knife (alleged),
Hunting knife Francisco. Francisco's aggressive actions, which included physical violence and
strangling Cunigunda, constituted a clear threat to her life and well-being. As
Cunigunda faced imminent danger to her life due to the unlawful aggression by her
PROCEDURAL HISTORY husband. The court considered the severity of the threat, which left her almost
unconscious due to the strong pressure on her throat.
CFI: PARRICIDE
FACTS: Cunigunda's use of a knife was viewed as a reasonable response to the imminent peril
she was in. She had no other reasonable means available to protect herself from the
1. Francisco and Cunigunda Caballero were married, they had a child together, but
life-threatening aggression of her husband.
their marriage was an unhappy one due to the vices (gambling, drinking,
serenading) and maltreatment of the former to the latter. This led to their The court also found that Cunigunda did not provide sufficient provocation to justify the
separation. aggression or attack by her husband. Her explanation for being out late at night was
2. In the evening of January 2, 1958 Cunigunda went caroling, and on her way home considered valid within the context of the Christmas season and caroling traditions.
she encountered her husband who was drinking tuba (coconut wine) with
some companions. JUDGMENT:
3. Francisco, upon seeing her, was enraged upon the impression that she had IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find that accused- appellant acted in the
legitimate defense of her person, and We accordingly set aside the judgment of conviction
gone prostituting. This led to violent acts of the former where he held the and ACQUIT her with costs de oficio.
hair of Cunigunda, slapped her twice until her nose bled, and was pushed to
the ground.
4. Cumigunda held onto Francisco's waist and discovered a hunting knife tucked
inside his belt line.
5. As Francisco threatened to kill his spouse while choking her, Cumigunda was
fearing for her life, and she managed to retrieve the hunting knife from
Francisco's belt and subsequently thrust it at him, hitting his left side above
the thigh.
6. After freeing herself from the altercation, she ran home and discarded the hunting
knife on her way.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following
do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person
or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
Burden of Proof in Self-Defense: When an individual seeks justification for their actions
on the grounds of self-defense, they bear the burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, the presence of the necessary circumstances that justify their use
of force.
● If a person admits to causing injury or even death to another, which could be
considered a felony, they are presumed to be criminally liable for the act unless
they can satisfactorily demonstrate to the court that their actions were a
legitimate act of self-defense.
FOR RECITATION PURPOSES
ALL ELEMENTS OF SELF DEFENSE ARE PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR
1. The husband engaged in inappropriate behavior and used physical violence
against her, including slapping her face, pulling her hair, pushing her down, and
strangling her. These actions by Francisco constituted unlawful aggression against
Cunigunda.
Cunigunda was strangled and choked by her husband, to the point where she
was almost unconscious due to the strong pressure on her throat.
2. Appellant was facing imminent danger when she was being strangled and choked by
her husband, who was described as a furious aggressor. The situation left her almost
unconscious due to the strong pressure on her throat.
Given the dire circumstances she faced, Cunigunda had no other option but to use any
available means to protect herself from the impending threat of death. As settled in
US. v. PARAS, which held that the reasonable necessity of the means employed in
self-defense is based on the imminent danger of injury, not necessarily the actual harm
inflicted.
19
The knife tucked in her husband's belt was the only reasonable means available to
Cunigunda to free herself and save her life from being strangled and choked to death.
It suggests that her use of the knife was justified and appropriate under the
circumstances.
PEOPLE v. LARA — "It should be borne in mind that in emergencies of this kind human
nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of
self-preservation; and when it is apparent, as in this case, that a person has reasonably acted
upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and to hold the actor
irresponsible in law for the consequences."
● Necessitas Non habet legem. Necessity knows no law.
3. While Francisco may have been upset to find his wife on the road late at night, he was
not justified in inflicting bodily harm with the intent to kill by choking her throat.
Cunigunda offered a valid excuse when confronted by her husband for being out late
at night.
● She explained that she had gone caroling with friends to earn money for
their child.
Francisco should have considered his wife's excuse before reacting with extreme
measures, such as attempting to kill her. Jumping to conclusions and taking such
extreme actions without sufficient provocation is not justified under the principles of
self-defense.
LACK OF MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT
● There is a lack of a clear motive for the appellant to attack and kill her husband.
○ While it is generally not indispensable to prove motive in a homicide case, the
absence of motive is considered important in distinguishing between two
opposing theories or versions of events.
1. Appellant's Emotional State: It is mentioned that although Cunigunda and her husband
had separated, she still claimed to love him, and there was no record of any recent event
that could have triggered her to plan and execute the killing. This suggests that there was
no apparent reason for her to harm her husband.
2. Possible Aggression by the Husband: It was the deceased who had a reason for
aggressive behavior.
○ Francisco confronted Cunigunda angrily and accused her of inappropriate
behavior, which escalated to physical violence against her.
○ This is presented as a possible unlawful aggression that Cunigunda had
to defend herself against.
3. Appellant's Conduct After the Incident: Cunigunda went to the city and presented
herself at the police headquarters, reporting that she had stabbed her husband and
surrendering her blood-stained dress.
○ This conduct is presented as a factor supporting her version of events and her
need for self-defense.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
SECOND DIVISION
Ganal, Jr. v. People | G.R. No. 248130 | December 2, 2020
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.
KEYWORDS: Self-defense; Stones
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Art. 11. Justifying circumstances
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC – GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE;
CA – Affirmed in full.
OG PENALTY: RTC – Applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law. To suffer an indeterminate prison
sentence ranging from six (6) years prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years of
prision mayor medium as maximum; and to pay the heirs: P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SUBJECT MATTER: Elements of Self-defense; Clear and convincing evidence as proof:
ISSUE:
Should the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of relatives be appreciated
in his favor?
FACTS:
● Ganal, Jr. was charged with homicide for the death of Julwin Alvarez. On arraignment,
the petitioner pleaded "not guilty".
● The petitioner admitted the killing but invoked self-defense and defense of relative
before the proceedings in the trial court. Hence, the order of the trial was reversed.
Defense’s Version:
● In the evening, Castillo and Ubino were drinking at the petitioner's house when Angelo,
an intoxicated neighbor, tried to join but was refused. Angelo got angry, picked up
stones to throw at the petitioner, but Ubina prevented him, and Angelo eventually left.
● Later, stones were thrown at neighboring houses, leading Ganal, Sr. to investigate. He
found Angelo and Julwin. Ganal, Sr. tried to defuse the situation, but Julwin, holding
stones, became aggressive and attacked Ganal, Sr. causing him to fall unconscious.
● Ganal, Jr. saw Julwin approaching with a knife and two stones, so he retreated,
grabbed a gun, and fired a warning shot into the air.
● Ganal, Sr. regained consciousness, hid by the gate, and Angelo fled. Julwin continued
advancing towards him, making the petitioner think that the victim was intent on killing
him.
● The petitioner, fearing for his safety, fired at Julwin, who threatened to kill everyone
inside the house. In response, the petitioner emptied his gun. Afterward, the petitioner
called the police
Prosecution’s Version:
● Angelo went to the petitioner's house carrying stones to ward off dogs.
Petitioner, upon seeing the stones, confronted Angelo, warned him with a gun, and
advised him to leave.
● Instead of going home, Angelo went to Julwin's house nearby and told him about
the situation.
● Angelo saw Julwin walking towards the petitioner's house through a partially open gate.
A confrontation ensued, leading to Julwin getting shot in the chest by the
petitioner.
● Angelo fled the scene, hearing three more gunshots, and sought refuge in another
house. Later, he learned that Julwin's body was brought to Julwin's house by the police,
20
with the cause of death determined as severe hemorrhage from multiple gunshot
wounds.
HOLDING:
Yes, the petitioner is acquitted of homicide on grounds of the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. The petitioner invoked the first and second justifying circumstances under
Article 11 of the RPC.
REASONING:
● To successfully claim self-defense, an accused must satisfactorily prove these
elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself or herself.
● The first element, unlawful aggression, is present here. Actual or material unlawful
aggression contemplates the offensive act of using physical force or weapon which
positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Julwin committed
a series of offensive acts that patently revealed his intent to harm the petitioner.
● The test is whether the aggression from the victim puts in real peril the life or personal
safety of the person defending himself or herself; the peril must not be an imagined
threat. Julwin posed a real and immediate danger to the lives and well-being of the
petitioner and his father, far from being a fictional or imaginary threat.
● The third element of self-defense, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself or herself, is also present here. Both the prosecution
and defense were one in saying that it was Julwin who went to the petitioner's
house and instigated the incident.
● As for the second element, reasonable necessity of the means employed was
present. Though petitioner inflicted five (5) bullet wounds and two (2) lacerations on
Julwin, the number of wounds alone should not automatically lead to the
conclusion that there was a determined effort on petitioner's part to kill the
victim. Petitioner was overcome by the instinct of self-preservation on seeing that
Julwin brashly entered into his property and even knocked his father unconscious for
getting in the way. Julwin was determined to inflict injury on the petitioner - he brought
two (2) large stones and a knife for the purpose.
● "the right of a person to take life in self-defense arises from his belief in the necessity
for doing so; and his belief and the reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the light
of the circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in the light of circumstances as
they would appear to others or based on the belief that others may or might entertain
as to the nature and imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill."
JUDGMENT:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 27, 2019
and Resolution dated July 2, 2019 in CA-G.R. CR NO. 41105 of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner PRUDENCIO GANAL, JR. is ACQUITTED of
HOMICIDE on ground of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. SO ORDERED.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
21

DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS

ART. 11. Justifying Circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same
degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and
second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further
requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making
defense had no part therein.
People v. Nugas explains the nature of unlawful aggression, thus:
The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the
aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the
accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack
with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the
intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack
that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude,
nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack).

People v. Olarbe extensively discussed how courts may determine the reasonable necessity
of the means employed:
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel unlawful aggression does not mean
absolute necessity. It must be assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient
tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make comparisons that can easily be made in the
calmness of reason..

In determining the reasonable necessity of the means employed, the courts may also look at
and consider the number of wounds inflicted. A large number of wounds inflicted on the victim
can indicate a determined effort on the part of the accused to kill the victim and may belie the
reasonableness of the means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor.

The courts ought to remember that a person who is assaulted has neither the time nor the
sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used.

It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, the
imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the
reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend
upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
SECOND DIVISION
Abuyo v. People | G.R. No. 250495 | July 7, 2022
M.V. LOPEZ, J
KEYWORDS:
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Art. 11. Justifying circumstances
PLEADING: not guilty
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC – homicide CA – homicide
OG PENALTY: RTC –
SUBJECT MATTER:
ISSUE:
Whether the means employed by Leo is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the
unlawful regression of Cesar?
FACTS:
SUMMARY: Leo Abuyo and his wife encountered Cesar and Charles Tapel, who blocked
their path with a fan knife and a gun. An altercation ensued, leading to Cesar stabbing
Leonardo Abuyo. Leo intervened in self-defense, using a bolo to wound Cesar, who later
died from his injuries.
● Leo Abuyo and his wife were riding their motorcycle home when they
encountered Cesar Tapel and his son, Charles Tapel. Cesar was
armed with a fan knife (balisong), and Charles had a gun.
● Cesar and Charles blocked Leo's path, but Leo managed to swerve the
motorcycle to the left and speed toward his father, Leonardo Abuyo's
house, which was nearby. Charles followed Leo and stood outside
Leonardo's house. In a fit of anger, Charles kicked the bamboo
fence, pointed his gun at people, and demanded that Leo come out.
● Leonardo tried to calm Charles down, but Cesar arrived and stabbed
Leonardo in the lower left part of his chest. Leonardo fled toward
Leo's house, with Cesar in pursuit, wielding the fan knife.
● Leo then went outside and confronted Cesar, who attempted to stab Leo.
In self-defense, Leo grabbed a bolo from a table and struck Cesar's
right hand. Cesar dropped the fan knife, but he managed to pick it up
again.
● Leo stabbed Cesar once more, this time in the lower part of his
stomach.
● RTC and CA: Failed to prove 2nd requisite
HOLDING:
Yes. The facts show that even after Leo hacked Cesar's right hand, Cesar's unlawful
aggression did not cease when he regained possession of the knife. At that point,
Cesar's determination to kill Leo and Leonardo was aggravated — more imminent and more
22
dangerously real — into a fixed mindset to subdue Leo's opposition.
REASONING:
● The circumstances Leo faced during the incident justified the means he used to
defend himself and his father. Rational necessity should be assessed based on
how the situation appeared to Leo at that moment. The law doesn't demand
that Leo should have carefully measured each blow to ensure it didn't
exceed what was strictly necessary to neutralize his attacker or save his own
life. Given the urgency and danger he was in, Leo couldn't be expected to
reflect calmly or pause between blows to assess their effects.
● Cesar's act of attacking Leo and Leonardo with a fan knife was a very real danger
to their lives. Charles' possession of a gun, which could be fired anytime
during the stabbing commotion, exacerbates the danger that lurks on Leo
and Leonardo's mortality. Leo had to repel the best way he can especially that
Leonardo, who was already injured, cannot be expected to aid in his defense.
Lastly, that the stomach wound which Leo inflicted upon Cesar proved to be fatal
does not make the means he employed any less reasonable under the
circumstances. Taken together, Leo is entitled to an acquittal on the grounds of
self-defense and defense of relative.
● The CA and RTC's argument that Leo could have grabbed Cesar's knife when it
fell and could have escaped is unrealistic given the intense and life-threatening
situation. There is no evidence to suggest that the knife was out of Cesar's reach
as he quickly recovered it. The CA and RTC's expectation that Leo should have
aimed for a less lethal strike to disable or disarm Cesar while under such imminent
danger is unreasonable.
● The law requires rational necessity, not indispensable need. In each particular
case, it is necessary to judge the relative necessity, whether more or less
imperative, in accordance with the rules of rational logic. The accused may be
given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether or not they employed
rational means to repel the aggression.
● The courts should not demand that the accused conduct themselves with the
poise of a person not under imminent threat of fatal harm. It must be assumed
that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think,
calculate, and make comparisons that can easily be made in the calmness of
reason.
● Three crucial facts reveal that Leo was impelled by the instinct of
self-preservation rather than homicidal urge
○ 1st: Leo never took advantage of the opportunity to race off an attack
against the disarmed Cesar who lost grip of the knife. Leo could have
preempted Cesar's repossession of the knife with swift, successive, and
injurious blows. Rather, Leo held his ground and was forced to act only
when Cesar repossessed the fan knife.
○ 2nd: There was a threatening presence of Charles who was holding a gun
that could be fired at any given moment during the incident. If Leo was
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
actuated by homicidal intentions, he would have persisted in his attack
against Cesar and thereafter, he would have also raced off an attack
against Charles to preempt a possible gunfire. Leo would have attempted
to kill Charles as well, but he did nothing of that sort. Leo only acted
reactively and retaliated blows only against the striking aggressor.
○ 3rd: Leo voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities after the
incident. As the Court repeatedly observed, unexplained flight is an
indication of guilt. The guilty flee when no man pursueth but the innocent
are as bold as a lion.
ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE IN THIS CASE
● 1st element: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
○ 1st element must be present in self-defense and defense of a relative
○ In this case, there was unlawful aggression when Cesar attacked and
pursued Leonardo, and turned and attempted to stab Leo.
● 2nd element: reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
such aggression
○ Instinct for self-preservation outweighs rational thinking
○ “when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct,
it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act
irresponsible in law for the consequences."
● 3rd element: lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself or herself
○ Requires the person invoking self-defense to not have antagonized the
attacker. A provocation is deemed sufficient if it is "adequate to excite the
person to commit the wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its
gravity."
○ In this case, there was no provocation on the part of Leo since the
attack originated from Cesar and Charles. Leo and his wife were
peacefully traversing their way home when Cesar and Charles blocked
their way and chased them. Similarly, Leo was already in his father's
house when Cesar and Charles started the commotion
JUDGMENT:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28, 2019 and the
Resolution dated November 12, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in are REVERSED. Petitioner
Leo Abuyo y Sagrit is ACQUITTED of the crime of Homicide and ORDERED to be
RELEASED IMMEDIATELY from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another
cause.
23
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
It must be assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to
think, calculate, and make comparisons that can easily be made in the calmness of reason.
The accused had no time to reflect and to reason out their responses. The test is whether the
accused's subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness of the danger was reasonable or
not, and the reasonableness of the accused's belief must be viewed from their standpoint at the time
they acted.
The right of a person to take life in self-defense and defense of a relative or a stranger arises from
their belief in the necessity for doing so; and such belief and reasonableness thereof are to be
judged in light of the circumstances as they then appeared to the accused, not in light of
circumstances as they would appear to others or based on the belief that others may or might
entertain as to the nature and imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill.
The rule is that the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent the
attack depends upon the imminent danger of injury.
People vs. Olarbe
● Accused and his wife were awakened by gunshot sound and shouting from the deceased
who was holding a rifle and a bolo who also forcibly entered their house. He aimed the
gun at the accused, the latter grabbed it and fought for possession and when he was in
possession of it, he shot the deceased. The deceased managed to get his bolo from his
waist turned his assault to the accused’s common-law wife. The accused grab the bolo
and hacked the deceased which caused his death.
● For, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal
reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a
person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to hold the actor
not responsible in law for the consequences.
Ganal Jr. People
● The deceased went to the house of accused armed with a knife and started throwing
stones. When the father of the accused tried to calmly ask the deceased to go home, he
pushed open the gate of the house and hit the accused's father in the chest, causing the
latter to fall and lose consciousness. Seeing this, the accused rushed inside the house,
got his gun, and fired a warning shot in the air. When the deceased continued moving
closer to the accused, the accused shot him once. When the deceased did not retreat and
instead continued moving forward, accused shot him four more times. The deceased died
instantly.
● The Court ruled that the accused's killing of the deceased was justified. The Court
stressed that the instinct of self-preservation prevailed upon the accused during the fateful
incident.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
DIVISION
Baluyot v. People | G.R. No. 253899 (Notice) | January 23, 2023
PONENTE
KEYWORDS: self- defense
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Homicide; Justifying Circumstances (Article 11)
PLEADING: self- defense
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC – Homicide CA – Affirmed RTC
OG PENALTY: RTC – Homicide (7 years, 4 months of prision mayor— minimum; 12
years and 1 day of reclusion temporal)
SUBJECT MATTER: Justifying Circumstance; self- defense
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA failed to appreciate the petitioner’s claim of self-
defense as a justifying circumstance.
FACTS:
Version of the prosecution- Joselito Labandilo (eyewitness)
● While driving his tricycle at around 2:30pm, he and his passenger encountered
people in the middle of the road, saw an ongoing fistfight. He parked 50 meters
away from the commotion.
● Joselito recalled shouting “tama na” when he was about 30 meters away from the
commotion. His passenger then noticed the petitioner’s reddish hands while
carrying a bladed weapon. Joselito saw the petitioner stab the victim multiple times
and thereafter ran and rode a tricycle, leaving Walter Aquino (victim) lying on the
ground.
● Aquino was brought to the Morong Rural Health Unit, while Joselito reported the
incident to the police station
● At 2:35pm, the petitioner voluntarily surrendered at the Morong Police Station
● The post mortem and death certificate of Aquino showed that his cause of death
was Massive Internal Hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds.
Defense’s version:
● Baluyot was heading home from Brgy Sabang when Aquino blocked his path and
punched him. Aquino suddenly drew a knife from behind and tried to stab him,
saying “papatayin kita”. After grappling for possession of the knife for about 3
minutes, he got hold of the knife and stabbed Aquino at least 5 times while Aquino
continued uttering, “papatayin kita”. He left the crime scene and later surrendered
himself to the police station
● Cross examination: he knew Aquino as an acquaintance and denied any
misunderstanding with the latter
● Stated that he stabbed Aquino more than 3 times before his mind went
blank
● Justified his action because Aquino tried to kill him; self- defense
● Alfredo Eva Jr. testified
● He was on his way home from Barangay Sabang when he saw Aquino
24
approach the petitioner. When the petitioner tried evading him, Aquino
drew a bladed weapon and tried to stab the petitioner, but the petitioner
was able to evade the attack by holding Aquino’s hands. Petitioner and
Aquino fell on the ground and wrestled for about 3 minutes until the
petitioner got hold of the bladed weapon and stabbed Aquino.
● RTC: Prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the elements of
Homicide
● The RTC did not give credence to the petitioner’s plea of self- defense.
He only invoked self defense when he took the witness stand.
● PO1 Bautista and PO2 Bamba: petitioner did not claim self- defense
when he surrendered at the police station and admitted to killing Aquino
● failure to inform the police of such circumstance proved fatal to his
defense
● petitioner failed to raise self- defense in his counter affidavit
● Inconsistencies between petitioner and Alfredo’s testimonies
■ Alfredo: Aquino immediately drew a knife and tried to stab
petitioner when the latter attempted to walk away
■ Petitioner: Aquino first punched him and drew a knife only after
they fell on the ground
● Rejected petitioner’s assertion that his mind went blank— he was able to
narrate what happened in sequence and number of times he stabbed
Aquino
HOLDING: Petitioner’s appeal is denied. SC affirmed CA and RTC’s decision of
homicide.
REASONING:
1. Petitioner failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
● The petitioner insists that prosecution failed to prove his liability since their
eyewitness did not see him stab Aquino.
● SC: The petitioner had already admitted to killing Aquino (when he raised self
defense as a qualifying circumstance)
● The prosecution’s weakness of evidence cannot be considered because of his
admission
○ Petitioner’s burden: clear and convincing evidence to establish there was
unlawful aggression
Even assuming that Aquino initiated aggression, self- defense cannot be appreciated since
the unlawful aggression had ceased from the time that petitioner was able to wrest
possession of the knife from Aquino.
● When an unlawful aggression that had begun ceases to exist, the one who resorts
to self- defense no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.
● AGGRESSION: if unlawful aggression is not continuous, no longer constitute
aggression warranting defense of one’s self
○ The fact that the victim was the initial aggressor does not ipso facto prove
unlawful aggression. Although he may have initiated the attack, he
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
25

ceased to be the aggressor the moment he disposed of the weapon.

○ Any subsequent act on the part of the accused (once aggressor is DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
dispossessed of the weapon) is no longer self- defense; RETALIATION TO SUCCESSFULLY PLEAD SELF DEFENSE (Article 11, RPC):
The petitioner was able to parry Aquino’s attack, he was able to hold Aquino’s arms which 1. There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
led him to fall down on the ground. 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to present or repel such
● The petitioner was more than capable of defending himself even without using a aggression
knife. Especially when he claimed that Aquino was drunk 3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
● Petitioner was already on top of Aquino when had successfully disarmed him. defense/ any provocation executed by the person claiming self- defense was
Aquino was unarmed and physically restrained, thus the petitioner was no longer not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression
faced with any imminent or immediate danger.
● In People v Placer:
2. Number and nature of the stab wounds inflicted on Aquino.
○ Test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances:
● The presence of the multiple stab wounds on the victim strongly indicates a
■ Whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life
determined effort to kill the victim.
or personal safety of the person defending himself
● The number and location of the wounds sustained belie petitioner’s claim of self-
■ Peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat
defense
■ Accused must establish the concurrence of 3 elements of
● The petitioner’s acts may be construed as retaliation, not self- defense
unlawful aggression:
● People v. Olarbe (self- defense cannot be appreciated if there is evident lack of
● there must be physical/ material attack or assault
reasonable means employed to repel the attack)
● attack/ assault must be actual or imminent
● in ascertaining the reasonable necessity of the means employed, courts
● attack must be unlawful
may consider the number of wounds inflicted
○ Unlawful aggression kinds:
● large number of wounds can indicate a determined effort to kill the victim;
■ Actual or material unlawful aggression
belie reasonableness of the means adopted to prevent or repel the
● attack with physical force/ with a weapon (shows
unlawful act of the aggressor
intent of aggressor to cause injury)
● “Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful
■ Imminent unlawful aggression
aggression does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that
● An attack that is impending or at the point of
one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think,
happening
calculate and make comparisons that can easily be made in the calmness
● It must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor
of reason. The law requires rational necessity, not indispensable need. In
must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive
each particular case, it is necessary to judge the relative necessity,
and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at
whether more or less imperative, in accordance with the rules of rational
another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and
logic. The accused may be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as
making a motion as if to attack)
to whether or not he employed rational means to repel the aggression”
○ Accused who pleads self- defense admits authorship of the crime
JUDGMENT: ○ Admission requires the accused to rely on the strength of their own
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The January 31, 2020 Decision and the October 12, evidence, not weakness of the prosecution’s
2020 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 42778 are AFFIRMED. ○ Self- defense cannot be appreciated when uncorroborated by
Petitioner Angelito Baluyot y De Guzman is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the independent and competent evidence
crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. ○ Conviction: evidence fails to prove existence of justifying
Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an circumstances
indeterminate period of 7 years and 4 months of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years
and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
THIRD DIVISION
People v. Advincula | G.R. No. 218108 | April 11, 2018
PONENTE: JUSTICE MARTIRES
KEYWORDS: 2 siblings - mongoloid and mentally ill
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Article 11 (1) & (2): Self-defense of a relative
PLEADING: Not Guilty
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC – Murder, Qualified by Treachery and Evident
Premeditation CA – Murder, Qualified by Treachery Only (Prosecution failed to show
accused planned to kill Reggie)
OG PENALTY: RTC – Reclusion Perpetua to Death
SUBJECT MATTER: Test of Unlawful Aggression: Actual and Imminent
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court properly found absent the justifying circumstance of
defense of relative by the accused-appellant?
FACTS: While Rollane (prosecution witness), Reggie, and Joseph were at a store talking,
accused-appellant suddenly sneaked from Reggie’s back, grabbed Reggie’s neck
with his left aim, and drove a knife at Reggie’s side.
Reggies was able to run away but when he stumbled, accused-appellant caught up with
him and stabbed him twice in his chest while he was in a supine position.
Reggie was brought to the hospital and pronounced dead on arrival.
Version of Defense: Accused-appellant was home when Reggie, armed with a kitchen
knife, entered the living room and threatened to stab the accused-appellant’s 2 siblings
- one a mongoloid, and the other mentally ill.
When Reggie saw the accused-appellant, he scampered away. Accused-appellant
followed Reggie to the store, tried to grab the knife from Reggie, got hold of it,
stabbed the right side of Reggie’s body.
HOLDING: YES. The absence of any unlawful aggression on the part of Reggie
renders ineffectual the accused-appellant’s alibi of defense of a relative. Guilty of
murder, qualified by treachery.
REASONING: ON SELF-DEFENSE:
FIRST, the accused-appellant admitted that no confrontation between him and Reggie
took place inside the house, nor did they talk to each other, and nor were his siblings hurt by
Reggie. These admissions readily negate unlawful aggression on the part of Reggie.
SECOND, even assuming there was unlawful aggression on Reggie’s part, such unlawful
aggression ceased to exist when Reggie left the accused-appellant’s house and
proceeded to a nearby store. At this point, there was no longer any aggression from
Reggie.
THIRD, accused-appellant followed Reggie to the store with the specific intention of
26
hurting Reggie. Thus, controverting his claim that he was only defending himself or his
siblings from the alleged threats of Reggie.
FOURTH, when accused-appellant stabbed Reggie, accused-appellant became the
unlawful aggressor retaliating to the alleged earlier unlawful aggression. Aggression, if not
continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting defense of one’s self.
Retaliation = when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill
or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed.
HENCE, the claim of self-defense of relative miserably failed in view of the absence of
evidence, documentary or testimonial, to fortify it. Self-defense is belied by the nature,
number, and location of the wounds inflicted on the victim since the gravity of said
wounds is indicative of determined effort to kill and not just to defend. The stab blows
delivered by the accused-appellant to Reggie resulted in 3 fatal wounds that pierced his
heart, lung, and liver.
ON MEDICAL REPORT:
Rollane testified that the accused-appellant used his left arm to put a headlock on Reggie,
and that with his right hand stabbed Reggie's side. Two more stab blows were delivered by
the accused-appellant to Reggie's chest while he was already in a supine position after he
stumbled. Dr. Palmero's report indicated that Reggie sustained the following fatal wounds
which coincided with Rollane's narration:
- Stab wound, left anterior chest-midclavicular line, measuring 3.2 cm x 1 cm, 6 cm from the
AML;
- Stab wound, left anterior chest-anterior axillary line, measuring 3.2 cm x 1.2 cm, 11 cm
from the AML; and
- Stab wound, abdomen-right upper quadrant, measuring 4 [cm] x 1.5 cm, 17 cm from the
AML.
Dr. Palmero's findings strengthen Rollane's testimony that Reggie stumbled after he ran
away from the accused-appellant:
- Scrapped (sic) wound, right palm, measuring 1 cm x 0.8 cm
- Area of multiple abrasions, right knee, 7 cm x 4 cm
- Area of multiple abrasions, left knee, 8 cm x 4 cm
ON TREACHERY:
Accused-appellant surreptitiously sneaked behind Reggie and gave him a headlock that
restrained his movement, thus denying him the chance to defend himself or to parry the
stab blows the accused-appellant would deliver.
Reggie tried to escape further aggression by running. Accused-appellant caught up with him
when he stumbled. Reggie, who was then bleeding, was no longer in a position to protect
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
27

himself when the accused-appellant delivered 2 more fatal blows.

JUDGMENT: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The 29 April 2014 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06009 finding the accused- appellant RODOLFO
ADVINCULA y MONDANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that he shall be liable to the heirs of Reggie Tan y Arañes
for the following: civil indemnity of P75,000.00; moral damages of P75,000.00; exemplary
damages of P75,000.00; temperate damages of P50,000.00; and loss of earning capacity of
P825,930.00. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
imposed on all monetary awards from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.

ART. 11 (1) & (2): JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

Elements of Justifying Circumstance of Defense of Relative:

1) Unlawful Aggression by the Victim

3 Elements of Unlawful Aggression:

A) There must be a Physical or Material Attack or Assault
B) The Attack or Assault must be Actual or Imminent
C) The Attack or Assault must be unlawful

2 Kinds of Unlawful Aggression:

i) Actual or Material Unlawful Aggression: means an attack with physical force or
with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor
to cause injury;
ii) Imminent Unlawful Aggression: means an attack that is impending or at the point
of happening

2) Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to Prevent or Repel the Aggression

3) Lack of Sufficient Provocation on the part of the Person invoking Self-Defense

SELF-DEFENSE TEST: The test is whether the aggression from the victim put in
real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must
not be imagined or an imaginary threat.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
EN BANC
Colinares v. People | G.R. No. 182748 | Dec. 13, 2011
Justice Roberto A. Abad
KEYWORDS: Huge Stone, Probation, Self-defense, Frustrated v. Attempted Homicide
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW:
● Article 249, RPC - Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions
of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the
circumstances in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide
and be punished by reclusion temporal.
PLEADING:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
● RTC – On July 1, 2005, the RTC found Colinares guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Frustrated Homicide. He was sentenced by 2 years and 4 months of
Prision Correcional as the minimum to 6 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as
the maximum.
● CA – Appeal to CA; invoking self-defense and alternately seeking reduced
penalty. CA affirmed the RTC decision and denied the petitioner’s appeal.
● Supreme Court – Petition for Review
OG PENALTY: RTC – Frustrated Homicide
SUBJECT MATTER: Unlawful aggression or proof thereof; Also: Attempted and
Frustrated Homicide/Murder distinguished; Intent to take life as main element.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Arnel successfully demonstrated that he acted in self-defense by
establishing that there was unlawful aggression committed against him by Rufino –
NO.
2. Assuming that he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of
frustrated homicide – NO. Attempted Homicide only.
FACTS:
Complainant Rufino P. Buena testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000,
he and Jesus Paulite went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took
a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind
and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 ½ inches in diameter.
Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the
roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the
right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to
be smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought
Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing that Rufino suffered two
lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these
injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial
treatment.
28
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite. Arnel claimed self-defense. He
testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and
Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of
Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias
then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The
latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it.
When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel
was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and
hid in his sister’s house.
On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on
the night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes
saw the three engaged in a heated argument with Arnel.
HOLDING and REASONING:
1. NO. When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that
he was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused
must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing
evidence. In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted,
self-defense requires the following:
(a) That the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful
aggression;
(b) That the offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and
(c) That the person defending himself did not act with sufficient
provocation.
In this case, the lower courts found that Colinares failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that
Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnel’s testimony that it was
Rufino who started it. Arnel’s only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw
those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit
any medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino
and his companions.
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing
to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for
being appreciated.
Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack
or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is
not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a
weapon.
In contrast, the three witnesses—Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias—testified that Arnel was the
aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
29

from their core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it.
Compared to Arnel’s testimony, the prosecution’s version is more believable and consistent Elements of attempted homicide:
with reality, hence deserving credence. 1. Accused intended to kill the victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault.
2. HE IS GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE. The main element of attempted or 2. Wounds sustained by the victim were not fatal.
frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The intent to kill
is often inferred from, among other things, the following: Unlawful aggression – assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and
(a) The means the offender used; and imminent kind. The victim must be facing a genuine threat to their safety.
(b) The nature, location, and number of wounds.
Elements of Self-Defense:
In this case, Colinares struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so 1. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
it produced, and the location of the wounds that Colinares inflicted on his victim, the aggression.
Court is convinced that there was an intent to kill. 3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

However, the Court is inclined that Colinares is guilty only of attempted homicide
because when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly
weapon, and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical
assistance, the crime is frustrated. If the victim’s wounds are not fatal, the crime is only
attempted.
Medical Evidence - Medical evidence, such as the severity of the victim's injuries and
the potential for fatal consequences, may be considered in determining the accused's
intent.

Court ruled that crime is attempted homicide upon expert testimony by Dr. Belleza stating
that Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull
incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The
wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in
seven or eight days. His voluntary surrender falls under mitigating circumstances.

JUDGMENT:
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated
July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel
Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to
petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has
been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case T-2213.

DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS

Elements of frustrated homicide:

1. The accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault;
2. The victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely
medical assistance; and
3. None of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
30

DIVISION
People v. Sumicad | G.R. No. 35524 | March 18, 1932
PONENTE
KEYWORDS: LOG LABORERS DI BINAYARAN - MAY UTANG SI CUBOL (BULLY,
GALIT AGAD, NANGHAHABOL, HINABOL ACCUSED, ACCUSED DEFENDED WITH
A BOLO, NAMATAY UNG BULLY AS A RESULT)
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First, Unlawful aggression.chanrobles virtual law library
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third, Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
anrob les v
PLEADING: JULIAN SUMICAD CONFESSED TO THE CRIME BUT TO ONLY TO
REPEL THE AGGRESSION FACED BY HIM
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
RTC – COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE : HOMICIDE
CA – DISMISSED - APPELLANT IS ABSOLVED FROM THE INFORMATION
OG PENALTY: RTC: guilty of the offense of homicide and sentencing him to undergo
imprisonment for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, and requiring him to
indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, as well as to pay the costs
of prosecution
SUBJECT MATTER: SELF DEFENSE
ISSUE:
WHETHER THERE WAS REASONABLE NECESSITY FOR THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY
THE ACCUSED TO PREVENT OR REPEL THE AGGRESSION TO WHICH HE WAS
SUBJECTED
HOLDING: YES. THE ACCUSED (JULIAN SUMICAD) EMPLOYED REASONABLE
NECESSITY TO REPEL THE AGGRESSION OF CUBOL
FACTS:
● The accused was engaged in hauling logs dor the construction of a chapel in the
barrio of Plaridel. When the laborers were resting from the work of the day,
● Segundo Cubol happened to pass the place where the accused was sitting.
The accused demanded payment from Segundo and told the latter
"Segundo, pay me for the five and one-half days work for which you owe me"
Cubol replied "what debt?!" with an insulting tone.
● Cubol struck the accused with his fist. The accused stood up from the from
which he was sitting but Cubol pursued him and continued striking him with
his fists. The accused then drew his bolo and delivered a blow on Cubol’s
right shoulder.
● Cubol launched at the accused with the evident intention of wrestling the
bolo from the accused. To prevent this, the accused struck two other blows
with the bolo, inflicting two deep cuts on Cubol's forehead above the left eye.
○ One of the blows broke through the cranium. The other made a cut
extending from the left eyebrow to the nose and upper lip.
● Cubol only lived an hour or so, and died from the effect of the wounds
received.
○ The accused immediately surrendered himself to the justice of peace
upon suggestion of the witness.
● Upon knowledge that a knife was found in the pockets of the deceased, the
accused testified that when he struck the deceased with his bolo, the latter was
attempting to draw a knife from his pocket.
REASONING:
EVIDENCE ON RECORD:
1. The accused was 25 years of age when this case was tried, has a height of 5 feet
and 1-½ inches, and weight of 105 pounds. The deceased appears to have been
taller, larger and stronger man. The evidence shows that the deceased was
quarrelsome and in the habit of making frequent trouble by fighting in the places
where he happened to be present with others.
a. In the local courts he had been convicted and sentenced to jail for assault
and battery in two different cases. In another case he was convicted of
the offense of inflicting minor physical injuries, being sentenced to
imprisonment for one month and one day
b. In still another case he had been convicted of theft and sentenced to
imprisonment for the same period of one month and one day. The proof
leaves no reason to doubt that the deceased was hot-tempered and that
he had the reputation of being a trouble maker. It is a safe inference from
this proof — and there is nothing to the contrary, — that the deceased
was with good reason considered by his neighbors to be a dangerous
man.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
31

RATIO OF THE COURT WITH REGARD TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD:

2. From the facts above stated it is evident that the quarrel which resulted in
the death of Segundo Cubol was of his own making, and that the accused was
not materially to blame in bringing about the trouble. Two of the elements of DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
self-defense were therefore clearly present, namely, that the deceased was the
aggressor and that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused. SELF DEFENSE

3. Upon this point it will be noted that, when the aggression was begun by the While a man is not, as a rule, justified in taking the life of one who assails him
deceased, the accused retreated until he was cornered in the angle of a pile of without the use of a dangerous weapon, this rule contemplates the situation
logs. His further retreat was this effectually cut off both in the rear and at the sides. where the contending parties are in the open and the person assaulted can
In response to the blows which the deceased delivered with his fists, the accused exercise the option of retreating. Such rule is not applicable to the case where
first delivered a cut on the left shoulder of the deceased; the person assaulted can use a weapon in any way reasonably necessary to his
protection from the aggressor.|||
4. The sanitary officer who exclaimed the body of the deceased meant to say
that this wound alone could not have resulted in death. This we consider to
be the decisive turning point in the case. Upon receiving that cut the PEOPLE VS. JULIAN SUMICAD
deceased should have been admonished that further aggression on his part The deceased here was a bully of known violent character and, although himself
would be met by determined resistance and that any further advance would unarmed, he attempted to take from the accused a bolo, the only means of
be at grave peril to himself. Instead of acting upon this warning, the defense possessed by the latter. The court observed that under the
deceased pressed forward in the attempt to possess himself of the bolo, the circumstances it would have been an act of suicide on the part of the accused to
only means of defense then at the command of the accused. allow the bolo to pass into the hands of his antagonist.|||
5. it was not incumbent on the accused in this case, when assailed by a bully of
known violent disposition, who was larger and stronger than himself. On the
contrary, under the circumstances stated, he had the right to resist the
aggression with the bolo, and if he unfortunately inflicted a fatal blow, it must
be considered to have been given in justifiable self-defense. Upon this point it
may be recalled that the deceased, when asked about the circumstances of the
homicide, admitted that he himself was the aggressor; and it is noteworthy that he
used no word placing blame upon the accused.
6. We are of the opinion that all the elements necessary to constitute justifiable
self-defense were present in this case and the accused should have been
acquitted.

JUDGMENT: We are of the opinion that all the elements necessary to constitute justifiable
self-defense were present in this case and the accused should have been acquitted.
The judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed and the appellant absolved from the
information, with costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
THIRD DIVISION
Rafael Nadyahan v. People | G.R. No. 193134 | March 2, 2016
J. PEREZ
KEYWORDS: Knife vs Belt Buckle & Pieces of Wood
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Homicide + Self Defense as a mitigating circumstance |
Art. 11
PLEADING: Not Guilty? This is a reverse trial
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC – guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide; CA –
affirmed conviction
OG PENALTY: 4y 2mos prison correccional medium as minimum to 8y prision mayor
minimum as maximum
SUBJECT MATTER: When is the means employed in self-defense to be considered of
“reasonable necessity”?
ISSUE: W/N the Court erred in ruling that there is an incomplete self defense, thus also
erring in imposing penalties without considering the circumstances favorable tot he
accused.
FACTS:
Defense ver. (Petitioner himself as witness): Pagaddut (victim) & friends flagged down
petitioner. Acangan (one of Pagaddut’s friends) asked him to give him a ride home on
his motorcycle. Petitioner agreed. Acangan asked that they be treated to a drink, to
which petitioner declined because he had already spent his money on drinks earlier.
Acangan, angered, slapped petitioner on the forehead and kicked his foot. Petitioner
prepared to fight Acangan; Acangan’s friends picked up pieces of wood; petitioner told other
person on the motorcycle to start the vehicle, but before he could leave, he was hit by a
piece of wood on the back. Petitioner took his knife from the motorcycle and ran; Pagaddut
& co. giving chase. Petitioner was hit on the head with a belt buckle, and as he was
starting to lose consciousness, he stabbed Pagaddut. Petitioner eventually
surrendered, 4 days after the fight.
Binwag: Saw one person armed with a knife being chased by two men. Knife person was
eventually cornered by three men and was struck in the head by a club. Binwag left, sensing
danger. That was the last he saw of the fight.
Prosecution ver.: Presented Acangan & Nabejet. According to Acangan, Petitioner & friend
approached them. After saying he has no problem with Pagaddut, petitioner suddenly
wielded a knife. Petitioner saw Pagaddut trying to start the motorcycle engine and kicked
him, subsequently stabbing his upper right buttock. According to Nabejet, petitioner also
stabbed Pagaddut in the back.
HOLDING: No error in the ruling of the CA with respect to incomplete self-defense to
warrant the reversal of Nadyahan’s conviction.
REASONING: Two of the elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense are
present (#1 & #3, see doctrine part), however, the court found that there is no presence of a
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel an attack. In doing so, the
32
Court enumerated five (5) circumstances which proves the aforementioned lack of
presence:
1. There is an intrinsic disproportion between a knife and a belt buckle;
2. Accused-appellant only suffered only a lacerated wound on the forehead while
his victim sustained multiple stab wounds;
3. Victim & Co were drunk before the fight. That being said, a belt buckle and
pieces of wood might not have been potent weapons in the hands of a drunk
wielder, i.e. they’re drunk—how much damage could they have done with those
weapons;
4. Knife wounds were all aimed at vital parts of the body, suggesting that
accused-appellant was warding off belt buckle thrusts and used his knife as a
means commensurate to the thrusts he avoided.
5. Depth and locations of stab wounds indicate that thrusts were meant to kill,
not merely disable the victim, in order to avoid his drunken thrusts.
The trial court also ruled that based on the wounds sustained by the victim, the means used by
petitioner to prevent/repel the attack was not reasonable.
Petitioner defends the use of a knife by claiming that since the aggressors were ganging up on him,
he was put in a situation where he could not control or calculate the blows, nor could he have had
time to reflect whether to incapacitate the victim or hit the less vital parts of his body.
Other reasons: prosecution witnesses’ testimonies were unreliable (victim’s wounds were
frontal, no wounds in the back), thus, petitioner’s testimony was given full credence.
JUDGMENT: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31643 dated 17 December 2009 and 21 July 2010, respectively, are
AFFIRMED.
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
In invoking self-defense, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and
convincing evidence all the elements of the justifying circumstance, namely:
1. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ✔
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it ✘
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself ✔
The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence
between the means of attack and the defense.
(From Boado, pp. 106-107) The reasonableness of the means employed depends upon the
circumstances surrounding the aggression, the state of mind of the aggressor and the available
weapon at the defender’s disposal. TLDR; reasonableness may be measure by taking into account:
1. Whether the aggressor was armed,
2. The nature & quality of the weapon used;
3. The physical conditions and sizes of both the aggressor & the person defending himself.
Note: a discussion of all the elements of self-defense r in Boado, hihi
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
DIVISION
People v. Luague | G.R. No. L-43588 | November 07, 1935
PONENTE
KEYWORDS: acted in self-defense, sufficient aggression, defense of chastity
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Art. 11 - Justifying Circumstances.Those wherein the acts of the
actor are in accordance with law, hence, he is justified. There is no criminal and civil liability because
there is no crime.
PLEADING:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: CFI (Negros Occidental) - Homicide SC – Acquitted; Petition for
review
OG PENALTY: CFI – Homicide
SUBJECT MATTER: WHEN CAN SELF-DEFENSE BE INVOKED IN “DEFENSE OF HONOR”?
ISSUE:
1. Were Natividad Luague and Wenceslao Alcansare guilty of homicide?
2. May Luague invoke self-defense in defense of honor/chastity to justify her actions in
wounding Paulino Disuasido to death?
FACTS:
1. In the morning of February 18, 1935, while the accused Natividad Luague was in her
house situated in Lupuhan, barrio of Agpafigi, municipality of Calatrava, Occidental Negros,
with only her three children of tender age for company, her husband and co-accused
Wenceslao Alcansare having gone to grind corn in Juan Garing's house several
kilometers away.
2. Paulino Disuasido came and began to try and make love to her; that as Natividad could
not dissuade him from his purpose, she went to the kitchen where Paulino followed her,
notwithstanding her insistence that she could by no means accede to his wishes, for Paulino,
bent on satisfying them at all cost, drew and opened a knife and, threatening her with
death, began to embrace her and to touch her breasts; that in preparing to lie with her,
Paulino had to leave the knife on the floor.
3. The accused, taking advantage of the situation, picked up the weapon and stabbed him
in the abdomen; and that Paulino, feeling himself wounded, ran away jumping through
the window and falling on some stones, while the accused set forth immediately for the
poblacion to surrender herself to the authorities and report the incident.
4. The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses (Pablo Alvarez, Olimpio Libosada, Angel
Emia) who contended that Alcansare is prompted by jealousy, designed to do away with
Paulino, it would have been because he observed that his wife somehow returned
Paulino's attentions, for otherwise he would not have indulged in tragic cogitations.
HOLDING:
1. NO. They are acquitted of homicide.
2. YES. Her actions are justified and fall under justifying circumstances of self-defense,
particularly self-defense of chastity, of Art. 11 of RPC.
REASONING:
It is quite incomprehensible why the wife would take upon herself, and the husband
would charge her with the execution of the plan. The observation is no less true if the
spouses plotted in common for it would have been patently disgraceful and cowardly of
the husband to thrust its execution upon the wife at the hazard of her life, and liberty
to shield his own, in the event of prosecution; and there is really nothing of record
33
compelling the supposition that the husband was thus minded.
The theory of the prosecution that the accused husband and his wife had conspired to kill
Paulino is overcome by the very facts which the prosecution itself has attempted to prove. If
such conspiracy had really existed, the accused spouses would have been fully
prepared to carry it into execution.
Natividad Luague's act in mortally wounding Paulino Disuasido, unaided by her
husband and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare, and in the circumstances above set
out, constitutes a justifying circumstance denned in article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code. Aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of a person, he also
has the right to property acquired by him, and the right to honor. The attempt to rape a
woman constitute an aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense.
Inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as aright as precious, if not more,
than her very existence; this offense, unlike ordinary slander by word or deed susceptible of
judicial redress, is an outrage which impresses an indelible blot on the victim.
Furthermore, Luague should be afforded exemption from criminal liability because she
acted in legitimate self-defense of her honor under the imminence of an attempt to
rape from Disuasido. From that moment, it became the only means left to her to
protect her honor.
JUDGMENT:
The Supreme Court acquitted both Natividad Luague and Wenceslao Alcansare for violation of
Art. 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code and ordered for their immediate release, if in
confinement.
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
Art. 11(RPC) - Justifying Circumstances. Those wherein the acts of the actor are in accordance
with law, hence, he is justified. There is no criminal and civil liability because there is no crime.
Absolutory Causes (Art. 11-12) - are those where the act committed is a crime but for some
reason of public policy and sentiment, there is no penalty imposed.
Self-defense - Reason for lawfulness of self-defense: because it would be impossible for the State
to protect all its citizens. Also a person cannot just give up his rights without any resistance being
offered.
Requisites of Self-defense:
1. Unlawful aggression - assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and
imminent kind.
2. Reasonable necessity of means employed to repel it.
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of the person defending himself. Provocation -
any unjust/improper conduct on part of the offended party capable of inciting or irritating
any one.
Self-defense of Chastity - to be entitled to complete self-defense of chastity, there must be an
attempt to rape, mere imminence thereof will suffice.
Onus Probandi - on the accused (sufficient, clear and convincing evidence; must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution).
Quum virginitas, vel castitas, corrupta restitui non potest - virginity or chastity, once defiled,
cannot be restored.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
DIVISION
Mariano y Garcia v. People | G.R. No. 224102 | July 26, 2017
PONENTE: Leonen, J.
KEYWORDS:
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Art. 11 Justifying Circumstances
PLEADING: Self-Defense
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC – CA –
OG PENALTY: RTC – Frustrated Homicide CA-Affirmed
SUBJECT MATTER: Justifying Circumstance: Defense of Stranger
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused can invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of stranger
FACTS:
1. Complainant, Natividad requested Yuki to buy marijuana.Yuki refused leading to an
argument.
2. Natividad slapped Yuki and kicked Pia on her right leg thinking that she was Yuki
3. Mariano in response went inside to tell Pamela
4. Pamela confronted Natividad who proceeded to punch Pamela on the face and
shoulder
5. Mariano pushed Natividad to the ground
6. Witnesses went back inside the house
7. Natividad allegedly attacked Mariano with a piece of wood
a. Or Mariano allegedly attacked Natividad with a piece of wood (no
witnesses)
8. Mariano stabbed the complainant on his buttocks
9. Due to Natividad's continuous hitting, Mariano stabbed Natividad again, this time
on the right side of his body
a. Frederick Natividad's second wound was fatal as it affected the vital organ
of his body, specifically his liver. Had it not been for the timely and
medical assistance rendered, the victim, Frederick Natividad, would have
died.
10. Mariano claimed that he acted in self-defense, defense of a relative, and defense
of a stranger when he stabbed Natividad
11. Natividad did not deny attacking Pamela or Pia as he could not remember these
acts
HOLDING:
YES, all elements to invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger were
present
REASONING:
1. An attack showing the aggressor's intention is enough to consider that unlawful
aggression was committed.Thus, the attack on Pamela should have been
34
considered as unlawful aggression for purposes of invoking the justifying
circumstance of defense of a stranger.|||
2. The reasonable necessity of the means employed in the defense, according to
the jurisprudence of courts, does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon
the imminent danger of such injury.|||
a. State of mind: considered in determining whether a person's means of
repelling an aggressor were reasonable.|||
3. Mariano was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The
victim himself, Natividad, testified that he had no issues with petitioner before the
incident. Thus, all the elements to invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of
a stranger were present in this case.||
4.
Although the offended party was drunk, and therefore, was not able to land his blows, his
attacks were incessant. He had already attacked three (3) other persons — two (2) minors
as well as petitioner's common-law wife — and was still belligerent. While it may be true that
Pamela, Pia, and Yuki had already gone inside the house at the time of the stabbing, it then
appeared to the petitioner that there was no other reasonable means to protect his
family except to commit the acts alleged. It is unreasonable for courts to demand
conduct that could only have been discovered with hindsight and absent the stress caused
by the threats that the petitioner actually faced.
JUDGMENT: WHEREFORE,the petition is GRANTED.The Court of Appeals Decision dated
August 28, 2015 in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 35590 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Petitioner
RYAN MARIANO y GARCIA is ACQUITTED of frustrated homicide. Let entry of judgment
be issued immediately.
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger,
provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the
first circumstance of this article are present and that the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive.
||
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
EN BANC
People v. Narvaez | G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 | April 20, 1983
Makasiar, J.
KEYWORDS: house being chiseled while he was asleep so he shot two people
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender
PLEADING:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC – CA –
OG PENALTY: RTC – reclusion perpetua
SUBJECT MATTER: Is unlawful aggression against the owner a necessary
condition? Also: Art. 429 Civil Code; Presence of Treachery and Evident
Premeditation; Voluntary Surrender; Passion and Obfuscation; Privileged Mitigating
Circumstance & Incomplete Justification (Art. 69); Par. 5, Art. 64
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner acting in defense of his person and of his rights can be treated
as a justifying circumstance and should therefore be exempted from criminal liability.
SUMMARY OF FACTS:
Appellant = Mamerto Narvaez
Victims = Davis Fleischer (dead) and Flaviano Rubia (dead)
Victims, together with their laborers, commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting bamboo
posts along the property line parallel to the highway. At the place of the fencing is the house
and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez.
At that time, appellant who was taking a nap after working on his farm all morning, was
awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house was being chiselled. Getting up and
looking out of the window, he found that one of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed
chiselling the wall of his house with a crowbar, while deceased Rubia was nailing the
barbed wire and deceased Fleischer was commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the
deceased was parked on the highway.
So he addressed the group, saying -'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and
if possible we will talk it over - what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is
appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed,
go ahead.'
Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer,
hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun
on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him. Appellant surrendered to the
police thereafter, bringing with him shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming he shot two persons.
WHAT HAPPENS IF THE FENCING IS COMPLETED? It would prevent appellant from
getting into his house and the bodega of his rice mill since the door of the same opens to
the Fleischers' side.
35
HOLDING:
NO. The Court held that the appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable. The
crime committed is homicide on two counts.
REASONING:
Since not all the elements for justification are present. Say three elements: (a) Unlawful
aggression; (b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
As for the first element, there was unlawful aggression.
HOW WAS THERE UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION? The deceased had no right to destroy
or cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while
he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault on
appellant's property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by
law.
WHY DID THE DECEASED HAVE NO RIGHT TO DESTROY? Appellant was leasing kasi
but he wasn’t able to pay rent so Fleischer sent him a notice (June 25, 1968) na he has to
vacate within 6 months BUT problem is the fencing happened on August 21, 1968, 2
MONTHS AFTER THE NOTICE even though Fleischer had given him up to December
31, 1968 within which to vacate the land, 6 MONTHS DAPAT. He should have allowed
appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of chiselling
the walls of his house and closing appellant's entrance and exit to the highway
As for the second element, In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of
appellant's property which he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code,
however, such an element is absent.
WHY ABSENT? Because when the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his
two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
As for the third element, it is present because of the lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there
was no provocation at all on his part,
WHY IS THERE NO PROVOCATION AT ALL ON APPELLANTS PART? Since he was
asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their
laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him
was no provocation at all.
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Treachery not appreciated
- WHY NOT? Because of the provocation of the part of the deceased.
2. Evident premeditation was not sufficiently established
- WHY NOT? Because the only evidence presented to prove this
circumstance was the testimony of Crisanto Ibañez, a laborer of Fleischer
and Company. This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant
appreciation.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
36

-
There was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill
the victims nor that the accused premeditated the killing, and clung to his
premeditated act.
- Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with
the victims to stop the fencing and destroying his house and to talk
things over just before the shooting.
- Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of
the deceased Davis Fleischer, neutralizes his credibility.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Voluntary surrender was appreciated
- HOW? Because the appellant surrendered to the authorities soon after
the shooting.
2. We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime.
- HOW? The appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its
accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being
closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully violated; his business
was also in danger of closing down for lack of access to the highway.
These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his first house
was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house,
must have so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily
all reason causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in
defense of his rights.
- Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where appellant had thirty
years earlier migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams
and hopes of relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle
crumbling at the hands of the deceased, his dispassionate plea going
unheeded - all these could be too much for any man — he should be
credited with this mitigating circumstance.
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances, RPC. — The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur: REQUISITES FOR JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
(a) Unlawful aggression;
(b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
(c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances, RPC. — The following are mitigating
circumstances:
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced
passion or obfuscation.
ARTICLE 429, NCC. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (n)
People vs. Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238 - As WE have consistently held, there must be
"direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim, . . . it is not enough that
premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent must be
evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime"

People vs. Gida, 102 SCRA 70 - There must be a "showing" that the accused
JUDGMENT: premeditated the killing; that the culprit clung to their (his) premeditated act; and that
WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF there was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the execution of the crime to
ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES, MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING allow them (him) to reflect upon the consequences of the act"
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2)
GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND
OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS
HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS OF
ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF DAVIS FLEISCHER
AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND (P4,000.00) PESOS,
WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR MORAL
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.

CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST

FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST 22,
1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
37

EN BANC essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an
People v. Genosa | G.R. No. 135981 | January 14, 2004 imminent danger thereof on the life or safety of a person.
PANGANIBAN, J.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a
KEYWORDS: Husband bugbog wife. Wife patay husband. sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: Art 246 Parricide upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
PLEADING: their children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC –GUILTY PARRICIDE CA – The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no
OG PENALTY: RTC –DEATH longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
SUBJECT MATTER: Buttered woman syndrome. RA 9262

ISSUE: 2. Appellant herein failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”
1. Can the appellant be granted the justifying circumstance of Self-defense?- NO (BWS).

2. May the appellant herein validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly
constituting self defense?- NO characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in
FACTS: the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient
1. Marivic, the appellant, was married to Ben Genosa. Initially, their marriage was happy, but evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.
it soon turned sour as there were frequent violent quarrels. Ben, who was a habitual drinker, In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the
became physically abusive towards Marivic, provoking her, physically assaulting her, and legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the
subjecting her to various forms of violence. context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to
2. Marivic tried to leave her husband multiple (about 5) times, but Ben would consistently self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.
pursue her, leading to their reconciliation.
3. On the night of the incident, when Marivic was 8 months pregnant, another argument
escalated into violence, with Ben physically assaulting her.
4. Marivic managed to escape to another room. JUDGMENT:
5. There was no provocation on Marivic’s part that evening; instead, her husband initiated the
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby
confrontation.
AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no
6. Fearing for her safety and the well-being of her unborn child, Marivic killed her sleeping aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is
husband with a gun. REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8
○ Experts provided opinions that Marivic exhibited characteristics consistent with months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
battered woman syndrome.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
○ Experts also stated that at the time of the killing, Marivic was experiencing a imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her
reoccurrence of trauma, along with the lingering effects of the abuse she had from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held
endured throughout their marriage. for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
HOLDING:
DISSENTING OPINION: YNARES-SANTIAGO (IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to ACQUIT
1. NO. Marivic Genosa)
2. NO
The prosecution did not object to the presentation of these physical and testimonial pieces
REASONING: of evidence, namely, the medical records of 23 instances of domestic violence-related
1. Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression injuries and the testimonies of neighbors, cousins and even the barangay captain. Indeed,
does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense. Unlawful aggression is the most no person would endure 23 reported instances of beatings if she were planning to kill her
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
spouse in the first place. The majority need not worry that women around the country will
mastermind the killings of their husbands and then use this Decision to bolster their
attempts to employ the BWS defense.
The ponencia's acknowledgment of "Battered Woman Syndrome" as a valid form of
self-defense, is a noble recognition of the plight of, and a triumph for battered women who
are trapped in a culture of silence, shame, and fear. This would however be an empty
victory if we deliberately close our eyes to the antecedents of this case. The facts are
simple. Marivic was suffering from the "Battered Woman Syndrome" and was defending
herself when she killed her husband. Her acquittal of the charge of parricide is therefore in
order.
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense:
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.— The following do not incur any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;
First.Unlawful aggression;
Second.Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third.Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."
SELF-DEFENSE NOT ACCEPTED
Self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome was not fully established because not all
the required elements were present. These elements include:
(a) At least two battering episodes characterized by each phase of the cycle of violence between
the appellant and her intimate partner.
(b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have caused the
battered person to genuinely fear imminent harm from the batterer and honestly believe that
using force was necessary to save her life.
(c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed a probable, though not necessarily
immediate and actual, grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the batterer against the accused.
“Aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there
can be no self-defense – complete or incomplete—on the part of the victim.”
38
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Psychological paralysis
2. Passion and obfuscation
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against
her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or
is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her
child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object,
making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat
of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
39

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment
of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman
syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert
psychiatrists/ psychologists.

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.

(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to
the physical and psychological or emotional distress.

(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological

and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of
cumulative abuse.

(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without
lawful justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child under
surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during
the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a
common child.

(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any other agency or voluntary
organization accredited by the DSWD for the purposes of this Act or any other suitable place the
resident of which is willing temporarily to receive the victim.

(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of taking
care of themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the
biological children of the victim and other children under her care.

SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by
the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
SECOND DIVISION
Aguilar v. DOJ | G.R. No, 197522 | Sept. 11, 2013
PER CURIAM
KEYWORDS: the grenade while in handcuffs
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW: RPC 11 (1) and (5)
PLEADING: To revisit the dismissal of the criminal complaint by the DOJ and the
prosecutor
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: CA, Department of Justice, Provincial Prosecutor – dismissed
the criminal complaint filed by petitioner
OG PENALTY: None
SUBJECT MATTER: Why is the constitutional right of presumption of innocence waived
when a justifying circumstance is raised?
Answer: The presumption to innocence is waived because they confess to being the
cause behind the act. Thus, it is now their burden to prove that their act was attended by
justifying circumstances and not by criminal intent or negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecutor and DOJ committed a grave error by dismissing the criminal
complaint filed by the private complainant with regards to the death of his son because the
policemen acted in self-defense and are presumed innocent?
FACTS:
1. This is a petition for review on certiorari on the dismissal of the criminal complaint
for murder filed by petitioner Eliseo V. Aguilar against respondents Dangupon,
Fortuna, et. al.
2. Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals and the Department of Justice made an
error in affirming the decision made by the provincial prosecutor to dismiss the
criminal complaint.
Petitioner’s claim (With witnesses Adelaida Samillano and Rolando
Corcotchea):
Tetet was arrested by the police for alleged acts of extortion and on suspicion that
he is a member of the CPP/NPA. He raised his hands as a sign of surrender.
Respondents continuously hit different parts of his body with the butt of their rifles
and tied his hands behind his back with a black electric wire. He was brought to
Viga River where the respondents killed him.
Defense claim:
The respondents organized to entrap suspected extortionist Tetet, who was
demanding money from a businesswoman, Macaraig. They apprehended Tetet
at Sitio Talipapa, the location was disclosed in his extortion letters to Macaraig.
Sgt. Hermoso collared Tetet while he was in the middle of receiving money from
Macaraig’s driver.
Tetet was handcuffed and boarded on a military jeep. In the middle of the ride,
40
Tetet said that he would point out to the police where his companions were hiding.
Barte stopped the jeep and returned to Sitio Talipapa. While they were returning to
Sitio Talipapa, Tetet pulled a hand grenade clutched at the bandolier (police
fanny pack), jumped out of the jeep, and turned on his captors by moving to
pull the safety pin off the grenade. Dangupon fired upon Tetet and hit him four
times in the body.
PROCEDURAL
1. CHR: “Dangupon enjoys the presumption of innocence and regularity in the
performance of his official duties, which were not sufficiently rebutted in the
instant case.”
2. Office of the Provincial Director of Occidental Mindoro Police: “it concluded
that respondents conducted a legitimate entrapment operation and that the
killing of Tetet was made in self-defense and/or defense of a stranger.”
3. Provincial Prosecutor: Dismissed petitioner’s complaint against all respondents
for lack of probable cause. “The Provincial Prosecutor held that the evidence on
record shows that the shooting of Tetet by Dangupon was done either in an act of
self defense, defense of a stranger, and in the performance of a lawful duty
or exercise of a right of office." He further observed that petitioner failed to
submit any evidence to rebut Dangupon's claim regarding the circumstances
surrounding Tetet's killing.”
4. DOJ: The DOJ stated that petitioner's suppositions and conjectures that
respondents salvaged his son are insufficient to overturn the presumption of
innocence in respondents' favor
5. CA: No probable cause. No evidence to show deliberate execution. Respondents
are presumed innocent.
HOLDING:
Yes, offenders who commit an offense and invoke a justifying circumstance can no longer
avail of the presumption of innocence. In this case, the police respondents now have the
burden of proof to prove the justifying circumstance of self-defense. There is, in addition,
probable cause to believe that the act was done absent of the justifying circumstance. Thus,
they cannot both be presumed innocent and invoke a justifying circumstance.
REASONING:
1. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. What is determined is
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and
should be held or trial. (Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.)
2. Applying probable cause at the case at hand:
a. Probable cause on the part of Dangupon
Dangupon admitted to shooting Tetet, but was relieved because of the
justifying circumstances of self-defense, defense of a stranger, or in the
performance of a lawful duty or exercise of a right of office.
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
What occurred could have been murder because all elements are present
(see doctrine table). (1 and 2) Dangupon admitted to killing Tetet. (3) Tetet
was rendered defenseless (treachery). (4) There is no relation between
dangupon and Tetet.
Dangupon invokes, however, that there was self-defense (see
doctrine table). However, the witnesses state that (1) Tetet raised his
hands as a sign of surrender. In addition, there was (2) lack of any
sufficient provocation on the part of Dangupon. (3) Tetet was
handcuffed which begs the question how he could have gotten the
grenade from Abordo. (4) Tetet suffered laceration and multiple
gunshot wounds.
The burden is upon the accused to prove clearly and sufficiently the
elements of self-defense, being an affirmative allegation, otherwise
the conviction of the accused is inescapable. (Ortega v.
Sandiganbayan)
b. Existence of probable cause on the part of Fortuno and Abordo
Victims of extralegal killings are silenced by death and may not bear
testimony to their own deaths. Thus, the Court notes the following: (1)
instance the actual presence of the persons charged at the place and
time was committed, (2) the manner in which the victim was executed, or
(3) the possibility that the victim was overpowered by the assailants.
There exists probable cause to believe that Fortuna and Abordo are
probably guilty of the same crime as Dangupon based on (1) they
were with Dangupon at the time of Tetet’s death, (2) Fortuno and
Abordo were there when Tetet was taken to the military jeepney, (3)
Tetet’s movements were restrained via his handcuffs, and (4) Tetet
suffered multiple lacerations and gunshot wounds.
c. Lack of probable cause on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and
Balicol
Not present at the time Tetet was shot nor can conspiracy be proven
JUDGMENT:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110110 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Resolution dated March 10, 2003 of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution dated
November 27, 2008 of the Department of Justice in I.S. No. 2002-414 are NULLIFIED
insofar as respondents PO1 Leo T. Dangupon, 1st Lt. Philip Fortuno, and Cpl. Edilberto
Abordo are concerned. Accordingly, the DOJ is DIRECTED to issue the proper resolution
in order to charge the above-mentioned respondents in accordance with this
Decision.
41
DOCTRINES AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS
Probable cause
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does
not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction. (Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities Inc.)
Murder (Art. 248):
1. Person was killed
2. Accused killed him
3. Killing was attended by any qualifying circumstance mentioned in RPC 248
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide
Self Defense (Art. 11-Justifying Circumstance)
1. Unlawful aggression
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself
Burden of Proof on the accused (self-defense)
The burden is upon the accused to prove clearly and sufficiently the
elements of self-defense, being an affirmative allegation, otherwise the
conviction of the accused is inescapable. (Ortega v. Sandiganbayan)
G06 CRIMLAW CLASS DIGESTS WEEK 9
42

DIVISION
Parties | GR | DATE
PONENTE
KEYWORDS:
OFFENSE/PROVISION/LAW:
PLEADING:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: RTC – CA –
OG PENALTY: RTC –
SUBJECT MATTER:

ISSUE:

FACTS:

HOLDING:

REASONING:

JUDGMENT:

DOCTRINES , PROVISIONS, AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS