TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
management prerogative the employer is
a. Due Process
Due process in the context of
employment termination is the right of
an employee to be notified of the reason
for his or her dismissal and, in case of
just causes, to be provided the
opportunity to defend himself or herself
i. Substantive Due Process and Procedural
Due Process
Due process is comprised of two
components — substantive due process
which requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty, or property, and
procedural due process which consists of
the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as
well as the guarantee of being heard by an
impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
Substantive due process
Substantive due process is divided into two,
namely: (a) just causes and (b) authorized
causes
a. Just causes
Just causes are grounds for termination of
employment
It is called just causes because the
termination of employment is justified due
to an employee's actions, behavior, or
omission, either of which resulted in a
serious or grave violation of the law,
employment contract, company policies.
collective bargaining agreement, and any
other employment agreement
In these situations, and in the exercise of its
justified in imposing the penalty of dismissal
on the erring employee
b. Authorized causes
Authorized causes are grounds for
separation of employment
It is called authorized causes because the
separation from employment is justified due
to a legitimate business reason or a
requirement by law or regulations.
In these situations, and in the exercise of its
management prerogative, the employer is
justified letting go of the employee who is
not at fault and thus given a separation pay
3. Consequence if no substantive due
process
if there is no substantive due process, such
as there is no just cause or authorized cause,
in the termination or separation from
employment of an employee, the employer
may be held liable for illegal dismissal
legal dismissal may result in the employer
being held liable for full backwages,
reinstatement, moral damages, exemplary
damages, monetary claims, attorney's fees.
Procedural Due Process
4. Before terminating the services of an
employee, what procedure should the
employer observe?
An employer shall observe procedural due
process before terminating one’s
employment.
5. What are the components of procedural
due process?
A. In a termination for just cause, due
process involves the two-notice rule:
a) A notice of intent to dismiss specifying
the ground for termination, and giving said
employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his or her side;
b) A hearing or conference where the
employee is given opportunity to respond to
the charge, present evidence or rebut the
evidence presented against him or her;
c) A notice of dismissal indicating that upon
due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify
termination.
B. In a termination for an authorized cause,
due process means a written notice of
dismissal to the employee specifying the
grounds at least 30 days before the date of
termination. A copy of the notice shall also
be furnished the Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) where the employer is located.
1. Distribution and Control Products v.
Jeffrey Santos, GR No. 212616, 10 July
2017
DISTRIBUTION & CONTROL
PRODUCTS, INC./VINCENT M.
TIAMSIC, PETITIONERS, V. JEFFREY E.
SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA),
dated November 22, 2013 and May 20,
2014, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
125911. The questioned CA Decision
affirmed the May 16, 2012 Decision[3] and
June 25, 2012 Resolution[4] of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
which, in turn affirmed, with modification
the January 30, 2012 Decision[5] of the
Labor Arbiter (LA), which found herein
respondent illegally dismissed and ordered
his reinstatement and payment of his full
backwages.
The pertinent factual and procedural
antecedents of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioner is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of selling and
distributing electrical products and
equipment with petitioner Vincent M.
Tiamsic as its president. Respondent, on the
other hand, was employed as petitioners'
company driver.
On July 25, 2011, herein respondent filed
against herein petitioners a complaint for
constructive illegal dismissal and payment
of separation pay. In his Position Paper[6],
respondent contended that: he started
working as petitioners' company driver on
April 5, 2005; on December 16, 2010, he
received a notice informing him that he was
being placed under preventive suspension
for a period of thirty (30) days beginning
December 17, 2010 because he was one of
the employees suspected of having
participated in the unlawful taking of circuit
breakers and electrical products of
petitioners; a criminal complaint was filed
against him and several other persons with
the Prosecutor's Office of Mandaluyong
City; he immediately inquired from
petitioner company's Human Resources
Department as to the exact reason why he
was suspended because he was never given
the opportunity to explain his side before he
was suspended but the said Department did
not give him any concrete explanation; and
after the lapse of his 30-day suspension he
was no longer allowed to return to work
without any justification for such
disallowance.
On their part, petitioners claimed in their
Position Paper[7] that: they employed
respondent as their company driver whose
job included the delivery of items purchased
by customers, receipt documentation and
recording of previously purchased products
which were returned by customers and
coordination with the company
warehouseman and the accounting
department concerning all items which are
subject of delivery and receipt by the
company; on February 19, 2010, petitioner
corporation, through its hired auditors,
conducted a physical stock inventory of all
materials stored in the company's warehouse
and in its office building; after such
inventory, it was found out that a number of
electrical materials and products with an
estimated value of P457,394.35, were
missing; a subsequent inventory on April 24,
2010 likewise revealed that a 2000-ampere
circuit breaker worth P106,341.75 was also
missing, as well as thirty-seven (37) pieces
of 40-ampere circuit breakers which had a
total value of P39,940.04; herein respondent
and the company warehouseman were the
only persons who had complete access to the
company warehouse as they were entrusted
with the handling of all products from the
company's suppliers; considering the size
and weight of the missing items, they can
only be carried by no less than two (2)
persons; petitioners demanded an
explanation from respondent and the
warehouseman, but they failed to make an
account as to how these products had gone
missing from the warehouse and office
building; as such, petitioners filed a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and, thereafter,
they suspended herein respondent; and after
the lapse of his suspension, respondent no
longer returned to work.
On January 30, 2012, the LA handling the
case rendered his Decision finding
respondent to be illegally terminated from
his employment, thus, ordering his
reinstatement and payment of his full
backwages amounting to P297,916.67. The
LA held that herein petitioners had the
burden of proving that respondent's
dismissal was valid and their failure to
discharge this burden only means that the
dismissal was not justified and, therefore,
illegal.
Petitioners filed an appeal with the NLRC.
On May 16, 2012, the NLRC promulgated
its Decision dismissing petitioners' appeal
and affirming, with modification, the
decision of the LA. In addition to the
payment of backwages, the NLRC ordered
petitioners to pay respondent separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month for every year
of service, instead of reinstatement.
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the NLRC denied it in
its Resolution dated June 25, 2012.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA.
On November 22, 2013, the CA rendered its
assailed Decision denying the certiorari
petition and affirming the questioned NLRC
Decision and Resolution.
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied
in the CA Resolution of May 20, 2014.
Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari anchored on the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS INTRUDED INTO THE RIGHT
OF THE EMPLOYER TO DISMISS AN
EMPLOYEE WHOSE CONTINUED
EMPLOYMENT IS INIMICAL TO THE
EMPLOYER'S INTEREST; [AND]
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THE
INSTANT CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS, i.e., WHERE DISMISSED
EMPLOYEE FOR VALID GROUND
SHOULD BE PAID ONLY NOMINAL
DAMAGES, IF THE TWO-NOTICE RULE
IS NOT COMPLIED WITH.[8]
The petition lacks merit.
Our Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence
uniformly guarantee to every employee or
worker tenurial security.[9] What this means
is that an employer shall not dismiss an
employee except for a just or authorized
cause and only after due process is observed.
[10]
In the case of Brown Madonna Press, Inc. v.
Casas,[11] this Court held:
In determining whether an employee's
dismissal had been legal, the inquiry focuses
on whether the dismissal violated his right to
substantial and procedural due process. An
employee's right not to be dismissed without
just or authorized cause as provided by law,
is covered by his right to substantial due
process. Compliance with procedure
provided in the Labor Code, on the other
hand, constitutes the procedural due process
right of an employee.
The violation of either the substantial due
process right or the procedural due process
right of an employee produces different
results. Termination without a just or
authorized cause renders the dismissal
invalid, and entitles the employee to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and other benefits
or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time the compensation was not paid up
to the time of actual reinstatement.
An employee's removal for just or
authorized cause but without complying
with the proper procedure, on the other
hand, does not invalidate the dismissal. It
obligates the erring employer to pay nominal
damages to the employee, as penalty for not
complying with the procedural requirements
of due process.
Thus, two separate inquiries must be made
in resolving illegal dismissal cases: first,
whether the dismissal had been made in
accordance with the procedure set in the
Labor Code; and second, whether the
dismissal had been for just or authorized
cause.[12]
As to substantive due process, this Court, in
Agusan Del Norte Electric Cooperative,
Inc., et al. v. Cagampang, et al.,[13] held
that:
In termination cases, the burden of proof
rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for just and valid cause; failure
to do so would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was illegal. The employer's case
succeeds or fails on the strength of its
evidence and not on the weakness of the
employee's defense. If doubt exists between
the evidence presented by the employer and
the employee, the scales of justice must be
tilted in favor of the latter. Moreover, the
quantum of proof required in determining
the legality of an employee's dismissal is
only substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence or relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise.[14]
In the instant case, petitioners contend that
their termination of respondent's
employment was based on their loss of trust
and confidence in him.
Loss of trust and confidence is a just cause
for dismissal under Article 282(c) of the
Labor Code, which provides that an
employer may terminate an employment for
"[f]raud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative."
However, in order for the employer to
properly invoke this ground, the employer
must satisfy two conditions.
First, the employer must show that the
employee concerned holds a position of trust
and confidence.[15] Jurisprudence provides
for two classes of positions of trust.[16] The
first class consists of managerial employees,
or those who, by the nature of their position,
are entrusted with confidential and delicate
matters and from whom greater fidelity to
duty is correspondingly expected.[17] The
second class includes "cashiers, auditors,
property custodians, or those who, in the
normal and routine exercise of their
functions, regularly handle significant
amounts of [the employer's] money or
property."[18]
Second, the employer must establish the
existence of an act justifying the loss of trust
and confidence.[19] To be a valid cause for
dismissal, the act that betrays the employer's
trust must be real, i.e., founded on clearly
established facts, and the employee's breach
of the trust must be willful, i.e., it was done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely,
without justifiable excuse.[20] Moreover,
with respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss
of trust and confidence, as ground for valid
dismissal, requires proof of involvement in
the alleged events in question, and that mere
uncorroborated assertions and accusations
by the employer will not be sufficient.[21]
Stated differently, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not needed to justify the loss as long
as the employer has reasonable ground to
believe that the employee is responsible for
the misconduct and his participation therein
renders him unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded of his position.[22]
Nonetheless, the right of an employer to
dismiss employees on the ground of loss of
trust and confidence, however, must not be
exercised arbitrarily and without just cause.
[23] Unsupported by sufficient proof, loss of
confidence is without basis and may not be
successfully invoked as a ground for
dismissal.[24] Loss of confidence as a
ground for dismissal has never been
intended to afford an occasion for abuse by
the employer of its prerogative, as it can
easily be subject to abuse because of its
subjective nature and the loss must be
founded on clearly established facts
sufficient to warrant the employee's
separation from work.[25] Thus, when the
breach of trust or loss of confidence alleged
is not borne by clearly established facts, as
in this case, such dismissal on the cited
grounds cannot be allowed.[26]
Applied to the present case, the LA, NLRC
and the CA are unanimous in their finding
that petitioners were not able to discharge
their burden of proving that their termination
of respondent's employment was for a just
and valid cause. This is a question of fact
and it is settled that findings of fact of quasi-
judicial agencies are accorded great respect,
even finality, by this Court.[27] This
proceeds from the general rule that this
Court is not a trier of facts, as questions of
fact are contextually for the labor tribunals
to resolve, and only errors of law are
generally reviewed in petitions for review on
certiorari criticizing the decisions of the CA.
[28]
It is true that respondent may indeed be
considered as one who occupies a position
of trust and confidence as he is one of those
who were entrusted with the handling of a
significant amount or portion of petitioners'
products for sale. However, even a quick
perusal of the records at hand would show
that petitioners failed to present substantial
evidence to support their allegations that
respondent had, in any way, participated in
the theft of the company's stolen items and
that after his preventive suspension he no
longer reported for work. In other words,
petitioners were not able to establish the
existence of an act justifying their alleged
loss of trust and confidence in respondent.
As to whether or not respondent was
afforded procedural due process, the settled
rule is that in termination proceedings of
employees, procedural due process consists
of the twin requirements of notice and
hearing.[29] The employer must furnish the
employee with two written notices before
the termination of employment can be
effected: (1) the first apprises the employee
of the particular acts or omissions for which
his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second
informs the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him.[30] The
requirement of a hearing is complied with as
long as there was an opportunity to be heard,
and not necessarily that an actual hearing
was conducted.[31]
In Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Rivera,[32]
this Court laid down the guidelines on how
to comply with procedural due process in
terminating an employee, to wit:
(1) The first written notice to be served on
the employees should contain the specific
causes or grounds for termination against
them, and a directive that the employees are
given the opportunity to submit their written
explanation within a reasonable period.
"Reasonable opportunity" under the
Omnibus Rules means every kind of
assistance that management must accord to
the employees to enable them to prepare
adequately for their defense. This should be
construed as a period of at least five (5)
calendar days from receipt of the notice to
give the employees an opportunity to study
the accusation against them, consult a union
official or lawyer, gather data and evidence,
and decide on the defenses they will raise
against the complaint. Moreover, in order to
enable the employees to intelligently prepare
their explanation and defenses, the notice
should contain a detailed narration of the
facts and circumstances that will serve as
basis for the charge against the employees.
A general description of the charge will not
suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically
mention which company rules, if any, are
violated and/or which among the grounds
under Art. 282 is being charged against the
employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the
employers should schedule and conduct a
hearing or conference wherein the
employees will be given the opportunity to:
(1) explain and clarify their defenses to the
charge against them; (2) present evidence in
support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the
evidence presented against them by the
management. During the hearing or
conference, the employees are given the
chance to defend themselves personally,
with the assistance of a representative or
counsel of their choice. Moreover, this
conference or hearing could be used by the
parties as an opportunity to come to an
amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of
employment is justified, the employers shall
serve the employees a written notice of
termination indicating that: (1) all
circumstances involving the charge against
the employees have been considered; and (2)
grounds have been established to justify the
severance of their employment.[33]
In the instant case, the LA, the NLRC and
the CA again uniformly ruled that
respondent was dismissed sans procedural
due process. The only notice given by
petitioners to respondent was the notice of
his 30-day preventive suspension and, as
found by the LA, nothing therein indicated
that he was required nor was given the
opportunity to explain his side, considering
that he was being implicated in the theft of
the subject circuit breakers and other
electrical products. It is true that petitioners
conducted their own investigation but the
same was made without the participation of
respondent.
As to the required notice of termination,
petitioners allege that they did not terminate
respondent from his employment and that it
was the latter who actually decided to
abandon his job. However, the LA, the
NLRC and the CA again unanimously found
that petitioners failed to substantiate their
allegation and the Court finds no cogent
reason to depart from such finding.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, dated November 22, 2013 and May
20, 2014, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
125911, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
2. PLDT v. Domingo, GR No. 197402,
30 January 2021
IRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 197402, June 30, 2021
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner, v.
CECILIO Z. DOMINGO, Respondent.
DECISION
GAERLAN, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari1 dated August 12, 2011 filed by
petitioner Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT) praying for the
reversal of the Decision2 dated January 31,
2011 and the Resolution3 dated June 22,
2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the
case entitled, "Cecilio Z. Domingo v.
National Labor Relations Commission,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 107672.
The Factual Antecedents
Respondent Cecilio Z. Domingo (Domingo)
has been employed by PLDT as an
Installer/Repairman since October 14,
1980.4 In May 2001, Domingo was assigned
as a temporary Storekeeper in one of
PLDT's Data Services Installation
Maintenance Divisions (DSIM), located in
Tambo, Pasay City (DSIM Tambo
Warehouse). Thereafter, he was appointed as
permanent Storekeeper of the DSIM Tambo
Warehouse in June 2001.5
As Storekeeper, Domingo's responsibilities
included ensuring an adequate inventory of
supplies in the DSIM Tambo Warehouse.
Thus, whenever the inventory went below a
certain level, Domingo, as Storekeeper, was
tasked to requisition replenishment stock
from PLDT's warehouses. For this purpose,
Storekeepers accomplish specific requisition
forms where the materials to be requested
are listed, and such forms are brought to
PLDT's warehouses so that such materials
can be withdrawn and brought to the
different DSIM warehouses.6
Particularly, Storekeepers are required to
accomplish requisition form PLD 140,
whenever their base stock modems, required
for the installation and maintenance of
PLDT's data services, went below a certain
limit. Accomplished PLD 140 forms must
be approved by the authorized representative
and then brought to the DSIM warehouse
where the materials needed may be
withdrawn. Meanwhile, to order materials
such as parallel wires, connectors, clamps,
and electrical tapes, DSIM personnel called
Combination Men must accomplish
requisition form PLD 158, where they must
list the particular materials and the number
of units required. The Combination Men
must likewise specify the name of the
project for which such materials will be
used. Upon accomplishing the PLD 158
forms, the Combination Men must have the
same approved by their Supervisor/Team
Leader, and thereafter, the Combination
Men must submit the accomplished PLD
158 forms to the Storekeeper. The
Storekeeper will then bring the PLD 158
forms to regular PLDT warehouses and
withdraw the materials for use by the
Combination Men.7
In 2001, the first year Domingo was
assigned to the DSIM Tambo Warehouse,
the DSMI Tambo Warehouse transacted
only a total of three PLD 140 forms. In
2002, however, the DSIM Tambo
Warehouse showed a drastic increase in
DSIM requisitions, from merely three PLD
140 form transactions to a total of 102 PLD
140 form transactions. On the other hand,
for PLD 158 form transactions, the DSIM
Tambo Warehouse had a total of 277
transactions for 2001 which likewise
drastically increased to 1,336 PLD 158 form
transactions in 2002. Relevantly, the
materials requisitioned using the PLD 158
forms in 2002, which were withdrawn from
the DSIM Sucat and Reposo Satellite
Warehouses, amounted to P17,081,843.31,
which is significantly greater than the
P1,069,285.36 spent for materials
requisitioned under PLD 1588 forms in
2001.8

Because of the drastic increase in materials
requisitioned, PLDT conducted a materials
inventory in December 2002. Upon audit,
PLDT discovered that there was a huge
discrepancy between the total volume of
materials requisitioned, and those materials
actually used in PLDT's projects and the
remaining inventory in the DSIM Tambo
Warehouse. Because of such anomaly,
PLDT decided to conduct an investigation.9
During the investigation, PLDT was able to
retrieve 88 out of the 102 original warehouse
copies of the 2002 PLD 140 forms, and
1,121 out of the 1,336 original warehouse
copies of the 2002 PLD 158 forms. Notably,
a simple examination of these PLD forms
reveals that the signatures of the supposed
"authorized by" and "received by" personnel
were forged and glaringly different from the
specimen signatures of the same employees
on file. Thus, PLDT invited these employees
for investigation where they disclaimed that
those signatures were theirs. Particularly, the
Team Leaders who supposedly signed the
"authorized by" portion of the forged PLD
forms, namely, Vicente Ramos, Ernesto
Alejandro, Ramir Espeno, and Alfred May
(DSIM Team Leaders), all submitted sworn
affidavits strongly denying that they have
authorized or signed the PLD forms. These
DSIM Team Leaders further contended that
the quantity of materials listed under the
PLD forms were abnormally large, and that
it was impractical for them to requisition
materials from warehouses located in Metro
Manila when there are PLDT warehouses
which are nearer to their respective areas in
Davao, Zamboanga, Butuan City, Panay,
and Negros.10
Further, PLDT likewise invited eight of its
employees whose signatures appeared in the
"received by" portion of the forged PLD
forms, namely, Agripino Rivera, Wilfredo
Salvador, Antonio Aquino, Fracel Gammad,
Bernardo Neria, Renato Romero, Romeo
Cayabyab, and Luciano Cambronero.
Similarly, they all stated that the signatures
appearing in the PLD forms are not theirs.11
During the investigation, PLDT likewise
interviewed Nimrod Paradero (Paradero),
the Storekeeper of the DSIM Reposo
Satellite Warehouse, to determine who
received the requisitioned materials listed in
the PLD forms. Relevantly, in his sworn
affidavit, Paradero positively identified
Domingo as the person who presented the
forged PLD forms, and received the
materials listed herein.12 Paradero's
statements were likewise validated by the
DSIM Reposo Satellite Warehouse Vehicle
Security Registry, which showed that on the
dates mentioned by Paradero, Domingo
indeed went to the DSIM Reposo Satellite
Warehouse using a PLDT service vehicle,
with Fleet No. 96-450. Likewise, the DSIM
Sucat Satellite Warehouse Vehicle Security
Registry showed that Domingo went to the
DSIM Sucat Satellite Warehouse on at least
65 separate occasions when the forged PLD
forms were presented.13
Moreover, clerks of PLDT submitted sworn
statements that Domingo asked them to
prepare the forged PLD forms. Particularly,
Maritess Mendoza (Mendoza) stated that
Domingo, on several occasions, handed her
pieces of papers with handwritten notes of
the materials needed and their corresponding
quantities. Thereafter, Domingo instructed
her to type the same on the PLD forms.
Notably, Mendoza's statements were
corroborated by Sheryl Marie Magahis
(Magahis) in her affidavit, where she
testified that she once helped Mendoza type
and prepare the PLD 158 forms upon the
instruction of Domingo.14
Because of the claims of Domingo's
involvement in the above-stated anomalies,
PLDT issued a Memorandum dated May 14,
2004 (First Invitation) inviting Domingo to
appear at a formal inquiry scheduled on May
19, 2004.15 The First Invitation reads:
You are hereby requested to personally
appear together with a Union Council
Representative or a Counsel of your
preference at Field Operations Division
office located at 4th Floor, PLDT Garnet
Building, Emerald Avenue corner Garnet
Street, Ortigas Center, Pasig City on May
19, 2004 (Wednesday) or three (3) working
days upon receipt of this invitation at about
9:00 o'clock in the morning.
This is in connection with the formal inquiry
in your issuance of outside plant materials to
personnel of Data Services Installation and
Maintenance (DSIM) Division covering
January to October 2002 in line with your
special function as internal custodian of
DSIM Satellite Warehouse at Tambo, Pasay
Exchange during the period January to
October 2002.
Specific inquiries shall be based on
materials requisitions that were allegedly
transacted to you by your colleagues or
personnel at DSIM using accomplished and
signed PLD 158 (Requisitions for Materials
and Supplies), PLD 22 (Requisitions for
Reserved materials) and PLD 140
(Requisitions for Department
Accountabilities) covering the year 2002.
This invitation is issued for your
compliance.16 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, Domingo refused to receive the
First Invitation, and failed to attend the
scheduled formal inquiry.17 Nevertheless, in
PLDT's hopes of acquiring the cooperation
of Domingo in determining the truth of the
anomalous transactions involving the forged
PLD forms, PLDT again issued another
Memorandum dated May 25, 2004 (Second
Invitation), inviting Domingo to attend
another formal inquiry scheduled on May
28, 2004, which reads:
This is in relation to our memo with Ref No.
045-02-FOD with subject INVITATION TO
APPEAR dated May 14, 2004, wherein you
chose not to acknowledge receipt during the
formal issuance to you by our Mr. Maliksi
last May 18, 2004 and again by your
immediate supervisor in Mr. Espeno last
May 24, 2004.
We are inviting you for the 2nd time to
personally appear together with a Union
Council Representative or a Counsel of your
preference at Field Operations Division
office located at 4th Floor, PLDT Garnet
Building, Emerald Avenue corner Garnet
Street, Ortigas Center, Pasig City on May
28, 2004 (Friday) or three (3) working days
upon receipt of this invitation at about 9:00
o'clock in the morning.
This is in connection with the formal inquiry
in your issuance of outside plant materials to
personnel of Data Services Installation and
Maintenance (DSIM) Division covering
January to October 2002 in line with your
special function as internal custodian of
DSIM Satellite Warehouse at Tambo, Pasay
Exchange during the period January to
October 2002.
Specific inquiries shall be based on
materials requisitions that were allegedly
transacted to you by your colleagues or
personnel at DSIM using accomplished and
signed PLD 158 (Requisitions for Materials
and Supplies, PLD 22 (Requisitions for
Reserved materials) and PLD 140
(Requisitions for Department
Accountabilities) covering the year 2002.
This invitation is issued for your
compliance.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Again, Domingo did not acknowledge
receipt of the Second Invitation. Domingo
likewise did not attend the scheduled formal
inquiry on May 28, 2004. Thus, PLDT was
constrained to issue a third Memorandum
dated June 7, 2004 (Third Invitation), which
provides:
Regarding your election not to receive and
acknowledge our 1st and 2nd INVITATION
TO APPEAR memos with Ref Nos. 045-02-
FOD dated May 14, 2004 and 051-02-FOD
dated May 25, 2004 which, were
correspondingly and formally issued to you
by our Mr. Maliksi and Mr. Espeno, your
immediate supervisor.
We are requesting you for the 3rd and final
time to personally appear most preferably
with a Union Council Representative or a
Counsel of your preference at Field
Operations Division office located at 4th
Floor, PLDT Garnet Building, Emerald
Avenue corner Garnet Street Ortigas Center
Pasig City on June 10, 2004 (Thursday) or
three (3) working days upon receipt of this
invitation at about 9:00 o'clock in the
morning.
This is in connection with the formal inquiry
in your issuance of outside plant materials to
personnel of Data Services Installation and
Maintenance (DSIM) Division covering
January to October 2002 in line with your
special function as internal custodian of
DSIM Satellite Warehouse at Tambo, Pasay
Exchange during the period January to
October 2002.
Specific inquiries shall be based on
materials requisitions that were allegedly
transacted to you by your colleagues or
personnel at DSIM using accomplished and
signed PLD 158 (Requisitions for Materials
and Supplies, PLD 22 (Requisitions for
Reserved materials) and PLD 140
(Requisitions for Department
Accountabilities) covering the year 2002.

Failure to attend to our 3rd and final
Invitation to Appear shall compel us to
prepare investigation report based on
evidence at hand without you being heard.
This invitation is issued for your
compliance.19
For a third time, Domingo failed to appear at
the formal inquiry scheduled on June 10,
2004. As such, PLDT proceeded with the
investigation without the cooperation of
Domingo. However, due to the invariably
voluminous documents required to be
reviewed, and the number of personnel
interviewed, PLDT was only able to
conclude its investigation after three years in
its Investigation Report20 dated January 19,
2005 (Investigation Report). The
Investigation Report ultimately
recommended that an administrative action
for serious misconduct be instituted against
Domingo as he used his knowledge, skills,
and authority as Storekeeper in making
various fraudulent requisitions of outside
plant materials which were verified to be
unaccounted for, based on the following:
First, all DSIM Team Leaders, submitted
sworn testimonies stating that their
signatures appearing in the "authorized by"
portion of the forged PLD forms were
falsified. In fact, the DSIM Team Leaders,
who are all assigned in areas outside of
Metro Manila, stated that it is impractical
and even ridiculous for provincial
employees to requisition materials from
warehouses in Manila since there are several
PLDT warehouses located near their areas.
Even more, the DSIM Team Leaders
contended that requisitioning materials from
Metro Manila is violative of PLDT's
warehousing procedure, which requires that
provincial employees must requisition
materials and supplies only at warehouses
serving their areas.21
Second, the DSIM Team Leaders testified
that the materials requisitioned under the
forged PLD forms were in excess of the
typical requirements needed for PLDT's
private line's installation and maintenance.
22
Third, based on audit and inventory
conducted at the DSIM Tambo Warehouse,
it was discovered that the materials
requisitioned under the forged PLD forms
were unaccounted for.23
Fourth, the sworn testimonies of Mendoza
and Magahis confirm that Domingo was the
one who instructed them to type and prepare
the forged PLD forms.24
Fifth, the Vehicle Security Registry reports
for both the DSIM Sucat and Reposo
Satellite Warehouses show that Domingo
personally went to these locations on the
dates when the materials under the forged
PLD forms were requisitioned.25Sixth,
Paradero, the Storekeeper of the DSIM
Reposo Satellite Warehouse, positively
identified Domingo as the person to whom
he issued the materials listed under the
forged PLD forms.26

Because of the findings in the Investigation
Report, PLDT issued a Request for
Explanation27 dated February 21, 2005
requiring Domingo to explain in writing
why he should not be dismissed from
service. The Request for Explanation reads:
Investigative findings show that as the
designated internal storekeeper of DSIM
during the period of January to November
2002, you made voluminous requisition of
outside plant materials, which, when verified
in the DSIM internal warehouse, were
unaccounted for. These unaccounted
materials would cost the Company
17,115,796.34 in material losses. Moreover,
the investigation findings also show that you
withdrew and received outside plant
materials from the 3 Company warehouses
when the employee requisitioning (as
evidenced by the attached requisitioning
forms) is either on vacation leave or
assigned in the regional offices, and that the
authorized signatories were forged.
The acts described above constitute Serious
Misconduct, the penalty of which is
dismissal from the service.
In view of the above, you are required to
explain in writing why you should not be
dismissed from the service on the above-
mentioned acts. Submit your explanation
within seventy-two (72) hours upon receipt
of this communication. You may elect to be
heard if you so desire.
Your failure to reply to this letter within the
time required shall be considered as a waiver
of your right to be heard on this matter.
Accordingly, the Company shall proceed
with the evaluation of the case on the basis
of the evidence on hand.28 (Emphasis in the
original)
On February 24, 2005, Domingo, with the
assistance of counsel, submitted a three-page
letter,29 whereby he denied the allegations
made against him. In his letter, Domingo
questioned why he is being made to explain
alleged wrongdoings which were committed
three years earlier. He likewise stated that he
was never informed that an investigation
was being conducted, and that he was never
furnished with copies of the documents and
records which form part of the evidence
against him.
After review and perusal of all the available
evidence, including Domingo's response,
PLDT found that Domingo is guilty of
serious misconduct and issued a Notice of
Termination30 dated May 18, 2005, which
provides:
This has reference to your administrative
case that as the designated internal
storekeeper of DSIM during the period of
January to November 2002, you made
voluminous requisition of outside plant
materials, which, when verified in the DSIM
internal warehouse, were unaccounted for.
These unaccounted materials amounted to
P17,115,796.34 in losses for the Company.
Moreover, it was shown that during the
above-mentioned period , you withdrew and
received outside plant materials from 3
Company warehouses when the employee
requisitioning is either on vacation leave or
assigned in the regional offices, and that the
signatures of authorized personnel in the
requisitioning forms were forged. Said acts
constitute Serious Misconduct.
After careful evaluation of your case
including your written explanation, we find
you liable as charged.
In view of the above, Management has
decided to dismiss you from the service for
Serious Misconduct [effective at] the close
of business hours of May 18, 2005.
This is without prejudice to such other
action as this Company may take including
court action to recover whatever amount is
due from under your accountabilities.31
Proceedings before the Labor Tribunals
Aggrieved of the decision of PLDT to
terminate his employment based on serious
misconduct, Domingo filed a Complaint for
Illegal Dismissal before the Labor Arbiter
(LA), with prayer for reinstatement and the
payment of full backwages.32
On July 25, 2006, the LA rendered his
Decision33 which dismissed Domingo's
Complaint for lack of merit. The LA's
Decision found that PLDT was able to
establish, by substantial evidence, that
Domingo was indeed involved in the
anomalous and fraudulent transactions
concerning the forged PLD forms, and that
the same constitutes serious misconduct,
which is a just and valid ground for
termination of employment.
Unsatisfied with the LA's Decision,
Domingo appealed the same before the
National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).34 However, in its Resolution35
dated June 27, 2007, the NLRC denied
Domingo's appeal:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
Complainant-Appellant's Appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the Decision appealed from is SUSTAINED
in toto.
SO ORDERED.36
Petition before the Court of Appeals
Because of the adverse rulings of the LA
and the NLRC, Domingo assailed the
NLRC's Resolution before the CA via
Petition for Certiorari37 dated March 5,
2009 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In Domingo's Petition for Certiorari dated
March 5, 2009, he alleged that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding that he was validly dismissed from
employment, and that he was not denied due
process of law.38 Particularly, Domingo
argued the following:
First, the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it found that the charges
against Domingo have not yet been
condoned, considering that the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between
PLDT and its employees provides that
offenses are deemed condoned if no show
cause memorandum is issued within two
years from discovery of the offense:
An offense shall be deemed condoned if no
"show-cause" memorandum is issued by the
COMPANY to the concerned employee with
in two (2) years from date of discovery of
the offense if punishable by termination; or
within one (1) year from date of discovery
of the offense, for all offenses not
punishable by termination.39
Considering that the Request for
Explanation was issued in 2005, or three
years since the discovery of the supposed
anomalies, such offense has already been
condoned by virtue of the above-cited
provision.40
Second, the NLRC erred when it considered
the First, Second, and Third Invitations as
the "show cause" notices contemplated in
the above-cited provision because the Labor
Code itself provides that such notices must
contain the statement of the causes for
termination.41
Third, even assuming that the First, Second,
and Third Invitations can be considered as
the "show cause" notices, the NLRC still
committed grave abuse of discretion when it
held that Domingo was validly dismissed,
considering that PLDT presented no proof
that Domingo was properly furnished with
copies of the same.42
Fourth, the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding that PLDT was able to
demonstrate by substantial evidence
Domingo's participation in the falsification
of the forged PLD forms since the sworn
statements relied on by PLDT failed to
attach original copies of the forged PLD
forms, and the mere testimonies of PLDT's
personnel must not be readily believed.43
Fifth, the NLRC committed a grave error
when it found that procedural due process
was observed, considering that no hearing or
conference was conducted, and Domingo
was not furnished with copies of the
investigative findings, nor was he
confronted with all of the evidence against
him.44
On January 31, 2011, the CA rendered its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing,
the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Resolutions of public
respondent NLRC dated June 27, 2007 and
November 28, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is hereby declared illegally
dismissed. Consequently, private respondent
PLDT is hereby ordered to reinstate
petitioner to his former position without loss
of seniority or diminution of benefits with
full backwages from the time of his
dismissal up to the time of his reinstatement.
Likewise, PLDT is directed to pay attorney's
fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary
award.
SO ORDERED.45
In reversing the Resolution of the NLRC,
the CA found that PLDT failed to overcome
the quantum of substantial evidence needed
to establish that Domingo was guilty of
serious misconduct.46
In this regard, the CA was unconvinced with
the testimonies presented by PLDT.
Likewise, the CA found that there was no
malicious intent on the part of Domingo in
using the forged PLD forms, and as such, his
dismissal is illegal.47 Furthermore, the CA
found that no proof was submitted to show
that the First, Second and Third Invitations
were presented and actually rejected by
Domingo. Finally, the CA stated that there
was no clear showing that Domingo was
furnished with a copy of the Investigation
Report.48
Aggrieved, PLDT filed its Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the
CA in the Resolution dated June 22, 2011.49
The Instant Petition
In view of the adverse rulings of the CA,
PLDT came before this Court by way of a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, where PLDT raised
the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO
DOMINGO'S PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI, NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE
TO ESTABLISH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION THAT
WOULD JUSTIFY THE NULLIFICATION
OF THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.50
In fine, in the instant Petition, PLDT
principally argued the following:
First, the CA committed a grave error when
it annulled the Resolution of the NLRC
considering that Domingo failed to
demonstrate that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the said
Resolution.51
Second, the findings of the NLRC are
supported by testimonial and documentary
evidence which is sufficient to overcome the
quantum of substantial evidence required in
illegal dismissal cases.52
Third, the NLRC was correct when it found
that Domingo was not denied due process
because Domingo was given an ample
opportunity to be heard.53
Fourth, considering that Domingo was
validly dismissed, the CA erred when it
ordered PLDT to reinstate Domingo, and to
pay him backwages and attorney's fees.54
Our Ruling
We find the Petition meritorious.
The Court Of Appeals Can Reverse And
Modify The Findings Of Fact Of The NLRC
Only If Grave Abuse Of Discretion Exists.
Preliminarily, it must be stressed that
findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies
such as those of the NLRC must be accorded
great respect and even finality when
supported by substantial evidence.55 Still,
the CA is granted limited jurisdiction under
Rule 65 to review, reverse, and modify the
factual findings of the labor tribunals when
grave abuse of discretion exists:
We have ruled in a litany of cases that resort
to judicial review of the decisions of the
NLRC under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is confined only to issues of want or excess
of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the tribunal rendering them. It
does not include an inquiry on the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence,
which served as basis for the labor official in
determining his conclusion. Findings of fact
of administrative officers are generally given
finality. x x x.56
Grave abuse of discretion has been defined
as "a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough, it must be so grave as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and so gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law."57
Notably, this Court has had numerous
occasions when it found that the NLRC had
committed grave abuse of discretion and
allowed the modification and reversed of its
factual findings, such as when there is an
arbitrary disregard of the evidence on
record, or when the labor tribunals have
misappreciated the evidence to such an
extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if
such evidence had been properly
appreciated.58
Clearly, therefore, before the CA may
reverse and modify the factual findings of
the labor tribunals, there must be a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC. Otherwise stated, the
CA's inquiry in petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65 must be limited to whether the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in arriving at its factual findings.59
Applying the foregoing in the present case,
We fail to see any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC to justify the CA's
modification and reversal of the NLRC's
factual findings, considering that the NLRC
judiciously reviewed the records of the case
and based its ruling on the substantial
evidence presented by both parties.
The Quantum of Proof Required In Illegal
Dismissal Cases Is Merely Substantial
Evidence.
As correctly pointed out by PLDT, the
quantum of proof required in illegal
dismissal cases is substantial evidence.60
This Court has already clarified that
substantial evidence is only such evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion:
In this regard, it is a well-established rule
that the party-litigant who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary to
establish his/her claim has the burden of
proving the same by the amount of evidence
required by law, which, in labor
proceedings, is substantial evidence, or
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." To be clear, in the hierarchy of
evidentiary values, "proof beyond
reasonable doubt is placed at the highest
level , followed by clear and convincing
evidence, preponderance of evidence, and
substantial evidence, in that order." Thus, in
the hierarchy of evidence, it is the least
demanding. "Corollarily, the ground for the
dismissal of an employee does not require
proof beyond reasonable doubt." The
quantum of proof required is merely
substantial evidence — which only entails
evidence to support a conclusion, "even if
other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise."61 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, in illegal dismissal cases, the
employer need only present evidence which
is adequate to support a conclusion, and not
evidence which will establish moral
certainty of guilt on the part of the
employee.
In the present case, the cause of Domingo's
dismissal is serious misconduct. Relevantly,
in Maula v. Ximex Delivery Express, Inc.,62
this Court has explained what the Labor
Code contemplates as serious misconduct:
Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it
is the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error
in judgment. The misconduct, to be serious
within the meaning of the Labor Code must
be of such a grave and aggravated character
and not merely trivial or unimportant. Thus,
for misconduct or improper behavior to be a
just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be
serious; (b) it must relate to the performance
of the employee's duties; and (c) it must
show that the employee has become unfit to
continue working for the employer.63
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This means that in justifying Domingo's
dismissal, PLDT had the burden to prove,
with substantial evidence, that the acts of
Domingo: (1) were of a serious nature; (2)
related to his duties as a Storekeeper of the
DSIM Tambo Warehouse; and (3) has made
him unfit to continue working for PLDT.
In this regard, both the LA and the NLRC
found that PLDT was able to overcome the
burden of proving, with substantial
evidence, that Domingo committed serious
misconduct, and as such, the dismissal of
Domingo was justified.
To recall, PLDT presented numerous
witnesses, documentary evidence, and a
complete Investigation Report which
concluded that Domingo was indeed
involved in a fraudulent scheme in using
forged PLD forms to requisition outside
plant materials, which, when audited, were
found to be unaccounted for. The records
likewise bear that Domingo undisputedly
used and presented the forged PLD forms.
Such possession and use of the said forged
PLD forms already gives rise to the
presumption that Domingo was involved in
the fraudulent scheme against PLDT. As
succinctly ruled by the NLRC:
We hold that since Complainant-Appellant
was found in possession of forged PLD 158s
which he used, as substantially evidenced by
the foregoing pieces of evidence, and since
he failed to make a satisfactory explanation
of his involvement in the anomalous
requisitions, he is guilty of falsification.
As aptly held on the matter by the Supreme
Court, in the case of Alarcon vs. Court of
Appeals, No. L-21846, March 31, 1967 "(I)n
the absence of satisfactory explanation, a
person who is found in possession of a
forged document and who used the same, is
the forger thereof, or the one who caused the
forgery, and therefore, he is guilty of
falsification."64
In stark contrast to the overwhelming
evidence presented by PLDT, Domingo
merely presented bare denials. He
mentioned that he was merely following
instructions, and that he could not have
known about the proper procurement
procedures because Domingo supposedly
never received formal training for his
position as a Storekeeper.
We are unconvinced with Domingo's bare
denials and self-serving evidence. While it
may be true that he did not receive any
training for his position as Storekeeper, it
must be recalled that he was assigned to that
position as early as May 2001, and any and
all anomalies only commenced in 2002. This
means that for at least six months, he learned
and properly followed PLDT's procurement
procedure. Furthermore, as the Storekeeper
beginning May 2001, he was personally
aware that the DSIM Tambo Warehouse
only had a total of three PLD 140 form
transactions and 277 PLD 158 form
transactions in 2001. Clearly, it is
incredulous to claim that he was unaware of
any anomaly since the amount of
transactions involving both PLD 140 and
PLD 158 forms had an unusual, drastic, and
sharp increase in 2002. Thus, he cannot
feign ignorance and pretend to have only
been following instructions when, as
Storekeeper, he was personally involved in
all of the said transactions.
Given the foregoing, this Court finds that
PLDT was able to prove, with substantial
evidence, that Domingo's termination based
on serious misconduct is valid, considering
that:
First, the act of knowingly using the forged
PLD forms to requisition materials is of a
serious matter that cost PLDT
P17,115,796.34 in material losses.
Second, the offense committed by Domingo
relates to his functions as the Storekeeper of
the DSIM Tambo Warehouse. As
Storekeeper, his functions required the full
trust and confidence of PLDT since he was
in charge with the custody of materials and
equipment. Evidently, as a Storekeeper,
Domingo was able to utilize his knowledge
and access to PLDT's materials when he
engaged in the fraudulent transactions.
Third, because of Domingo's acts, he is no
longer fit to continue his employment with
PLDT, considering the latter's loss of trust
and confidence in Domingo, and the
monetary losses PLDT endured because of
the fraudulent scheme.
In sum, We find that the CA erred when it
disturbed the factual findings of the NLRC
as PLDT sufficiently established with
substantial evidence Domingo's valid cause
for termination.
Domingo Was Not Denied Due Process Of
Law.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, We find
that Domingo was not denied due process of
law.
In a plethora of cases, this Court has already
elucidated the requirements to observe
procedural due process in termination cases.
In Distribution & Control Products,
Inc./Tiamsic v. Santos,65 it has been
explained that two written notices are
required to be furnished to the employee
before his or her termination of employment.
In the same case, it has likewise been ruled
that a formal hearing is not necessary so
long as the employee was granted an
opportunity to be heard:
[T]he settled rule is that in termination
proceedings of employees, procedural due
process consists of the twin requirements of
notice and hearing. The employer must
furnish the employee with two written
notices before the termination of
employment can be effected: (1) the first
apprises the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought; and (2) the second informs the
employee of the employer's decision to
dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing is
complied with as long as there was an
opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily
that an actual hearing was conducted.66
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Here, Domingo was furnished two written
notices before his employment was
terminated: (1) the Request for Explanation;
and (2) the Notice of Termination.
As recited above, in the Request for
Explanation, PLDT outlined the particular
acts which were the subject of the serious
misconduct charge against Domingo. The
Request for Explanation likewise asked
Domingo to respond and explain his side
within 72 hours from his receipt of the same.
Finally, the Request for Explanation
informed Domingo that a hearing may be
had if he so desires.
Domingo did respond to the Request for
Explanation by submitting a three-page
letter where he unsatisfactorily explained his
defense. Notably, nowhere in his response
did he request that a formal hearing be
conducted.
Upon review of all the evidence on record,
as well as Domingo's response, PLDT issued
the Notice of Termination where Domingo
was informed that he was being dismissed
from service.
With the foregoing, it is clear that all the
requisites of procedural due process were
complied with. Nevertheless, while this
Court is satisfied that procedural due process
was observed in the present case, We deem
it best to resolve the other arguments that
Domingo raised to supposedly show that he
was deprived of his right to due process.
The Offense Committed Has Not Yet Been
Condoned.
In his submissions, Domingo insists that his
offense has supposedly already been
condoned pursuant to the provision in the
CBA, considering that the Notice to Explain
was only issued to him three years after the
supposed discovery of the offense. On this
note, we cannot fault PLDT for the delay in
the issuance of the Request for Explanation
precisely because Domingo was also at fault
when he intentionally failed to cooperate in
the investigation being conducted by PLDT.
As discussed above, PLDT issued three
invitations – the First, Second, and Third
Invitations – asking Domingo to appear in a
formal inquiry. During the scheduled formal
inquiries, Domingo could have already
explained his side and presented his defense,
which would have enabled PLDT to unravel
the truth and conclude its investigation with
more haste. However, and as seen in the
annotations written in the First, Second, and
Third Invitations, Domingo refused to
acknowledge receipt of the same, which
resulted in further delays in the
investigation. It must be stressed that We
cannot subscribe to Domingo's view that no
proof was presented with regard to his
receipt of these invitations. Such view is not
only self-serving, but likewise appears to be
ridiculous when juxtaposed to the fact that
PLDT attempted to serve a copy of the
invitation to appear three times, on three
separate occasions. Thusly, PLDT's
narrative that Domingo refused to receive
the same holds more water.
We likewise echo the view of the NLRC that
these invitations were already akin to the
"show cause" memorandum required under
the CBA, considering that the same already
informed Domingo that a formal inquiry will
be conducted whereby he will be asked
about his involvement in the fraudulent use
of the forged PLD forms. Prescinding from
this discussion, it is clear that the offense
committed by Domingo cannot be
considered to have been already condoned.
A Formal Hearing Is Not Required In Illegal
Dismissal Cases.
In Domingo's submissions, he also argues
that a formal hearing is required to ensure
that procedural due process is observed. He
likewise contends that since a formal
hearing was not conducted, he was deprived
of the opportunity to cross-examine PLDT's
witnesses, and make an intelligent defense.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
As stated above, jurisprudence is clear that a
formal hearing is not necessary as long as
the employee is given an ample opportunity
to be heard. Our ruling in Perez v. Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company,67 is
instructive:
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides
that, in cases of termination for a just cause,
an employee must be given "ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself." Thus, the opportunity to be heard
afforded by law to the employee is qualified
by the word "ample" which ordinarily means
"considerably more than adequate or
sufficient." In this regard, the phrase "ample
opportunity to be heard" can be reasonably
interpreted as extensive enough to cover
actual hearing or conference. To this extent,
Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing
Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code is in
conformity with Article 277(b).
Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the
Implementing Rules of Book VI of the
Labor Code should not be taken to mean that
holding an actual hearing or conference is a
condition sine qua non for compliance with
the due process requirement in termination
of employment. The test for the fair
procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b)
cannot be whether there has been a formal
pretermination confrontation between the
employer and the employee. The "ample
opportunity to be heard" standard is neither
synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing.
To confine the employee's right to be heard
to a solitary form narrows down that right. It
deprives him of other equally effective
forms of adducing evidence in his defense.
Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist
interpretation is overly restrictive. The "very
nature of due process negates any concept of
inflexible procedures universally applicable
to every imaginable situation."
xxxx

Significantly, Section 2(d), Rule I of the
Implementing Rules of Book VI of the
Labor Code itself provides that the so-called
standards of due process outlined therein
shall be observed "substantially", not
strictly. This is a recognition that while a
formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is
not an absolute, mandatory or exclusive
avenue of due process.68 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
In the present case, Domingo cannot validly
aver that his right to due process was
violated because a hearing was not
conducted considering that the conduct of a
formal hearing is not even essential in the
first place. Even more, PLDT, in the
Request for Explanation, expressly gave
Domingo the opportunity to request for a
formal hearing, which Domingo failed to do.
Hence, Domingo cannot be allowed to
blame PLDT when he himself is at fault.
The Right To Cross-Examine Is Not
Indispensable Since The Technical Rules Of
Evidence Need Not Be Strictly Applied In
Labor Cases.
Notably, in his submissions before this
Court, Domingo likewise argued that he was
denied due process because he was unable to
cross-examine PLDT's witnesses. In support
of his argument, Domingo cited the case of
Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v. Agad,69 where this
Court considered as hearsay evidence the
testimonies of the witnesses therein since no
cross-examination was held.
To clarify, in Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v. Agad,
We did not categorically declare that the
right to cross-examine witnesses in illegal
dismissal cases is indispensabie in order to
satisfy the requirements of due process. At
best, such statement was mere obiter dictum
since it did not pertain to the key issue in the
said case. In this regard, the settled doctrine
that the technical rules of evidence are not
strictly applied in labor cases70 still stands.
In fact, this Court has already had the
occasion of applying this well-settled
doctrine vis-a-vis the right to cross-examine
witnesses in labor cases:
[J]urisprudence is replete with rulings that
administrative bodies are not bound by the
technical niceties of law and procedure and
the rules obtaining in the courts of law.
Hence, whatever merit C.F. Sharp’s
argument might have in the context of
ordinary civil actions, where the rules of
evidence apply with greater rigidity,
disappears when adduced in connection with
labor cases.
The claim of denial of due process on the
part of C.F. Sharp must also be rejected. The
essence of due process lies in the reasonable
opportunity afforded a party to be heard and
to submit any evidence in support of its
defense. What is vital is not the opportunity
to cross-examine an adverse witness, but an
opportunity to be heard.71 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Further, in the recent case of Smart
Communications, Inc. v. Solidum,72 this
Court explicitly stated that cross-
examination is not necessary in labor cases:
It is not necessary that witnesses be cross-
examined by counsel of the adverse party in
proceedings before the labor arbiter
Solidum further alleges that he was denied
the right to cross-examine the witnesses who
submitted affidavits in favor of Smart; thus,
the affidavits must be considered hearsay
and inadmissible. In support of such
contention, Solidum cites Naguit v. National
Labor Relations Commission.
Such contention is misplaced.
The controlling jurisprudence on the matter
is the ruling in the more recent Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company v.
Honrado, where the Court ruled:
It is hornbook in employee dismissal cases
that "[t]he essence of due process is an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one's side x x x. A formal or trial
type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential to due process, the
requirements of which are satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy." Neither is it necessary that the
witnesses be cross-examined by counsel for
the adverse party.
The Court explained the reason why cross-
examination is not required in the
proceedings before the labor arbiter in
Reyno v. Manila Electric Company, citing
Rabago v. National Labor Relations
Commission where the Court ruled:
x x x. The argument that the affidavit is
hearsay because the affiants were not
presented for cross-examination is not
persuasive because the rules of evidence are
not strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies like the NLRC where
decisions may be reached on the basis of
position papers only. x x x.
Clearly, the alleged denial of Solidum's
request to cross-examine the witnesses of
Smart does not render their affidavits
hearsay. Thus, these pieces of evidence were
properly considered by the labor tribunal.73
(Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Given the foregoing, it is apparent that
Domingo's argument is devoid of merit,
considering that he was granted an ample
opportunity to be heard, even though he was
unable to cross-examine PLDT's witnesses.
On another note, the rule that the technical
rules of evidence may be relaxed in labor
cases is similarly applicable in resolving
Domingo's claim that the evidence attached
to PLDT's affidavits are mere photocopies,
and thus, should not be given credence.
Considering that rules of evidence need not
be strictly applied in labor cases, We hold
that the NLRC did not err when it gave
evidentiary weight to the affidavits
presented by PLDT, notwithstanding the fact
that the attachments therein are mere
photocopies.
All said, this Court grants the instant
Petition. We find that the NLRC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it
affirmed the factual findings of the LA that
Domingo's dismissal is valid. The
termination not being illegal, We likewise
overturn the CA's grant of reinstatement,
backwages, and attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
dated August 12, 2011 filed by Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company is
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 31,
2011 and the Resolution dated June 22, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
107672 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the Resolution dated June 27,
2007 of the National Labor Relations
Commission is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
3. Agbon v. NLRC, GR No. 158693, 17
November 2004
Agabon vs National Labor Relations
Commission
GR No. 158693 November 17, 2004
Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home
Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the
business of selling and installing ornamental
and construction materials. It employed
petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny
Agabon as gypsum board and cornice
installers on January 2, 1992 until February
23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims and on December
28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision declaring the dismissals illegal and
ordered private respondent to pay the
monetary claims. It was found out from the
investigations that the abandonment from
work by the petitioners was because they
subcontracted with another company to
which they have been remanded before
when they committed the same initially.
The petitioners alleged that due process has
not been observed.
Issues: Whether or not petitioners dismissal
are illegal.
Whether or not they are entitled to pay.
Held: No. To dismiss an employee, the law
requires not only the existence of a just and
valid cause but also enjoins the employer to
give the employee the opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself. Article 282 of
the Labor Code enumerates the just causes
for termination by the employer:
(a) serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or the latters
representative in connection with the
employees work;
(b) gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties;
(c) fraud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or his duly authorized representative;
(d) commission of a crime or offense by the
employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representative; and
(e) other causes analogous to the
foregoing.Abandonment is the deliberate
and unjustified refusal of an employee to
resume his employment. It is a form of
neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for
termination of employment by the employer.
For a valid finding of abandonment, these
two factors should be present:
(1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and
(2) a clear intention to sever employer-
employee relationship, with the second as
the more determinative factor which is
manifested by overt acts from which it may
be deduced that the employees has no more
intention to work.
The intent to discontinue the employment
must be shown by clear proof that it was
deliberate and unjustified.
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on
a just cause under Article 282, the employer
must give the employee two written notices
and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if
requested by the employee before
terminating the employment: a notice
specifying the grounds for which dismissal
is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be
heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss;
and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and
284, the employer must give the employee
and the Department of Labor and
Employment written notices 30 days prior to
the effectivity of his separation.
The dismissal should be upheld. While the
procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it
should not invalidate the dismissal.
However, the employer should be held liable
for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.
Yes. The rule thus evolved: where the
employer had a valid reason to dismiss an
employee but did not follow the due process
requirement, the dismissal may be upheld
but the employer will be penalized to pay an
indemnity to the employee. This became
known as the Wenphil or Belated Due
Process Rule.
An employer is liable to pay indemnity in
the form of nominal damages to an
employee who has been dismissed if, in
effecting such dismissal, the employer fails
to comply with the requirements of due
process.
The violation of the petitioners right to
statutory due process by the private
respondent warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages.
The amount of such damages is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court, taking into
account the relevant circumstances.
Considering the prevailing circumstances in
the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at
P30,000.00. We believe this form of
damages would serve to deter employers
from future violations of the statutory due
process rights of employees. At the very
least, it provides a vindication or recognition
of this fundamental right granted to the latter
under the Labor Code and its Implementing
Rules.
ii. Contractual Due Process
Labor Law
CONTRACTUAL Due Process
Pinagbayad pa rin ng Korte ang employer ng
halagang P30,000 NOMINAL Damage nang
tanggalin nito ang isang probationary
managerial employee sa kabila ng
pagkakaroon ng sapat na batayan at
pagsunod sa Statutory due process
requirement na Notice and Hearing bago ang
pagtatanggal..
Ang Dahilan ay:
Ang HINDI pag sunod ng employer sa
CONTRACTUAL due process o
pinagkasunduang proseso sa pagtatanggal na
nakasaad sa Company Policy nito. [Abbot
Laboratories, Phil. vs Perlie Ann F. Alcaraz,
2013.]
Kaya, upang maiwasang pagbayarin ng
P30,000 Nominal Damage, katulad nito,
siguraduhing nasunod pareho ang (1)
Statutory due process na Notice and Hearing
na nasa Labor Code AT ang (2) Contractual
due process na nakasaad sa Company Rules,
kung mayroon.
1. Abbott Laboratories v. Alcaraz, GR
No. 192571, 23 July 2013
FACTS: Abbott caused the
publication in a major broadsheet
newspaper of its need for a
Regulatory Affairs Manager,
indicating therein the job description
for as well as the duties and
responsibilities attendant to the
aforesaid position. Alcaraz signed an
employment contract which
specifically stated, inter alia, that she
was to be placed on probation for a
period of six (6) months beginning
February 15, 2005 to August 14,
2005. On the day Alcaraz accepted
Abbott’s employment offer,
Bernardo sent her copies of Abbott’s
organizational structure and her job
description through e-mail. She also
had undergone a pre-employment
orientation and training program as
part of her orientation. In May ,
Alcaraz was informed and asked to
tender her resignation or they be
forced to terminate her services
because she failed to meet the
regularization standards. She then
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and damages against Abbott and its
officers.
She claimed that she should have
already been considered as a regular
and not a probationary employee
given Abbott’s failure to inform her
of the reasonable standards for her
regularization upon her engagement
as required under Article 295 of the
Labor Code. The LA dismissed
Alcaraz’s complaint for lack of merit
because she was unable to meet the
standards set by Abbott as per her
performance evaluation, the
termination of her probationary
employment was justified. The
NLRC reversed the findings of the
LA and ruled that there was no
evidence showing that Alcaraz had
been apprised of her probationary
status and the requirements which
she should have complied with in
order to be a regular employee. The
CA affirmed the ruling of the
NLRC .
Issues:
1. whether or not Alcaraz was
sufficiently informed of the
reasonable standards to qualify her as
a regular employee;
2. whether or not Alcaraz was validly
terminated from her employment;
HELD:
1. YES. Alcaraz was well-aware
that her regularization would
depend on her ability and
capacity to fulfill the
requirements of her position as
Regulatory Affairs Manager and
that her failure to perform such
would give Abbott a valid cause
to terminate her probationary
employment. A probationary
employee, like a regular
employee, enjoys security of
tenure. However, in cases of
probationary employment, aside
from just or authorized causes of
termination, an additional ground
is provided under Article 295 of
the Labor Code, i.e., the
probationary employee may also
be terminated for failure to
qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with the reasonable
standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the
time of the engagement. (b) YES.
Despite the existence of a
sufficient ground to terminate
Alcaraz’s employment and
Abbott’s compliance with the
Labor Code termination
procedure, it is readily apparent
that Abbott breached its
contractual obligation to Alcaraz
when it failed to abide by its own
procedure in evaluating the
performance of a probationary
employee thus, warrants for the
payment of nominal damages.
A company policy partakes of the
nature of an implied contract
between the employer and
employee. Hence, given such
nature, company personnel
policies create an obligation on
the part of both the employee and
the employer to abide by the
same. Records show that
Abbott’s PPSE procedure
mandates, inter alia, that the job
performance of a probationary
employee should be formally
reviewed and discussed with the
employee at least twice; Abbott
is also required to come up with a
Performance Improvement Plan
during the third month review to
bridge the gap between the
employee’s performance and the
standards set, if any. In addition,
a signed copy of the PPSE form
should be submitted to Abbott’s
HRD as the same would serve as
basis for recommending the
confirmation or termination of
the probationary employment.
Abbott failed to follow the
above-stated procedure in
evaluating Alcaraz. Case law has
settled that an employer who
terminates an employee for a
valid cause but does so through
invalid procedure is liable to pay
the latter nominal damages. The
contract is the law between the
parties and thus, breaches of the
same impel recompense to
vindicate a right that has been
violated. Consequently, while the
Court is wont to uphold the
dismissal of Alcaraz because a
valid cause exists, the payment of
nominal damages on account of
Abbott’s contractual breach is
warranted in accordance with
Article 2221 of the Civil Code.