Tac Attack

February 1977

Stopping the Aardvark.. Page 4

 TAC ATTACK FEBRUARY 1977 VOLUME 17 NUMBER 2

FOR EFFICIENT TACTICAL AIR POWER

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

GENERAL ROBERT J . DIXON

FEATURES COMMANDER

STOPPING THE AARDVARK 4 LT GENERAL SANFORD K. MOATS

PLACE THE FACE 11 VICE COMMANDER
FLEAGLE'S VALENTINE 16
IT'S A HOSTILE WORLD 18
THE RESURRECTION OF
LIEUTENANT LEE 20
THERE ARE THOSE WHO HAVE AND
THOSE WHO WILL 22 COL GEORGE M. SAULS
GCA 26 CHIEF OF SAFETY
DO THE JOB 28 LT COL JOHN PATIERSON
CHIEF, PROGRAMS DIV
DEPARTMENTS CAPT MARTY STEERE
EDITOR
Angle of Attack 3
STAN HARDISON
Down to Earth 10 ART EDITOR
TAC Tips 12
MARY KONOPNICKI
Phyz Biz 14 EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Chock Talk 24 SSGT JAMES H. BROWN
Safety Awards 30 STAFF ARTIST

TAC Tally 31

TACRP 127·1
Articles, accident briefs, and associated material In this magazine are non-directive In nature. All suggestions and recommendations
are Intended to remain within the scope of existing directives. Information used to brief accidents and Incidents does not Identify the
persons, places, or units involved and may not be construed as Incriminating under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Names, dates, and places used In conjunction with accident stories are fictitious. Air Force units are encouraged to republish the material
contained herein; however, contents are not for public release. Wrl~ten permission m11st be obtained from HQ TAC before material may be
republished by other than Department of Defense organizations.
Contributions of articles, photos, and Items of interest from personnel In the field are encouraged, as are comments and criticism. We
reserve the right to edit all manuscripts for clarity and readability. Direct communication Is authorized with: The Editor, TAC ATTACK,
HQ TAC/SEPP, Langley AFB, Va. 23665. Autovon 432·2937
Distribution FX, Controlled by SEPP.

FOO ... A PEOPLE PROBLEM
A review of 1976's Foreign Object mishaps
makes it obvious we need to strengthen the com-
mand's Foreign Object Damage (FOD) prevention
program .
We destroyed or inflicted major damage to one
TAC aircraft engine every four days. These
engine FODs resulted in the loss of almost 6
million dollars and numerous manhours ... losses
we can ill afford .
FOD incidents have caused jammed flight con-
trols, dropped objects, stuck throttles, lost cano-
pies, blown tires, etc. Inspection reports during
1976 pointed out weaknesses in our Consoli-
dated Tool Kit (CTK) program . Tool control was
often weak and various foreign objects were in
the CTKs. Flightline vehicles were noted to have
cotter pins, fasteners, screws, and other foreign
Angle of Attack
objects on their seats and floors. FOD containers
were not always available on the flightline .
Screw bags were not always used in the Phase
Dock area . The list is endless and indicates
inadequate supervision, mismanagement, weak
leadership and a general apathetic attitude
among people who work on or near aircraft.
FOD not only hurts our pocketbook, it disrupts
our flight schedule, training programs , and
creates longer working hours . More importantly,
it creates an environment conducive to an ac-
cident that can cause a loss of life ... something
we can not condone.
The FOD prevention program is a people
program and everyone must actively participate if
we are to make the program more effective.
Everyone who works on or near aircraft must
understand the magnitude of the FOD problem.
Tool accountability programs must be meaning-
ful, engine bay inspections must be thoroughly
accomplished, personal bench stock of screws
and fasteners must not be tolerated. The unit
FOD monitor can not carry the FOD Program ...
he can help manage it, but unless each individual
actively participates, the program will fail. Only
with your help will our Foreign Object Damage
Program become more than an exercise in
" bean " counting . Let's work together to make it a
true prevention program. _::::-
~A~
Colonel, USAF
 STOPPING THE
AARDVARK
By Lt Col Malcolm F. Bolton
Commander, 430th TFS
Nellis AFB , NV
T he F- 111 has as good a brake system as any
tactical fighter in t he inventory. The brakes can
halt a 90 .000 lb F-111 aborting at rotation speed
on a 1 0 .000-foot runway .. . without use of a
barrier. But. as good as they are. it is easy
to abuse the brake system and degrade its
pe rformance . Blowout plugs have been known
to relieve tire pressure ... to the complete bewil-
derment of the pilot who had done nothing
more than a little aggressive taxiing . As such . it
may prove beneficial to delve into the F-111
brake system and give aircrews additional data
over what they are exposed to in the Dash One .
4 FEBRUARY 1977
One item ··· not commonly known is the
design criteria for the brakes .Military specification
Ml L- W-50 13 and General Dynamics Specificat-
ion ZL09503 show that the Air Force required
General Dynamics to equip the F-111 with
brakes that would :
1. Make 45 landing stops at 70 .000 lb gross
weight starting from a powe r-off stal l speed of
112 .1 knots . This energy requirement is still car-
ried as the top of the green zone on the brake
energy chart.
2 . Make five landing stops at 80 .000 lb gross
weight sta rt ing from a power-off stall speed of
120 knots . As you have no doubt guessed. this
is the top of the yellow zone on the brake energy
chart.
3 . Make one aborted takeoff stop at 90 .000
lbs starting from a main gea r unstick speed of
140 knots . As you are probably quick to recog-
nize. this is not the top of the red zone . Red
1one limits have an added factor for engine
thrust decay of 4 million ft lbs. The original
brake energy chart reflected a maximum of 37 .5
mil lion ft lbs for a 90 .000 lb aircraft aborting at
 TIE BOLT FLANGE CONTAINING

Brake housing and tire have been removed from F-Ill A wheel assembly.
Maximum heat concentration occurs in the rotor I stators nearest the housing.
Note that this is approximately 6 inches from tie bolt flange and directly opposite
the tire / wheel bead seat area. Photo 2 shows location of fuse plugs in the wheel
tie bolt flange.

140 kts . The aircraft brakes have now been
tested for energy levels · of 42 million ft lbs
equating to a 100.000 lb aircraft aborting at
140 kts and this now equates to the top of the
red zone .
These requirements are what were used to
build the brake energy charts . They were
constructed strictly from calculated data. As you
can see. the speeds used are not those actually
used in today's operational units . So you might
ask whether they are accurate data .
Actual brake tests done at the Edwards Flight
Test Center on F-111 A No . 1 proved that the
charts were . if anything. conservative. The brake
tests shed a great deal of light on information
about stopping a high speed. heavyweight F-
111 . Information extracted from these tests may
be useful . especially to pilots who have yet to
experience a high energy abort.
In the test and evaluation at Edwards AFB.
eight refused takeoffs (RTO) were performed at
82.000 lbs gross weight; four on a dry runway.
four on a wet runway . Six RTOs were performed
at 90.000 lbs gross weight; three on a dry
runway. three on a wet runway.
A maximum afterburner takeoff roll was
initiated . When the aim refusal airspeed was at-
tained. one throttle was retarded quickly to idle
to simulate an engine failure. After a delay of
approximately three seconds to simulate crew
reaction time. the second throttle was retarded
quickly to idle. maximum antiskid braking
initiated and aft control stick applied . The con-
trol stick was continuously held as far aft as
possible without lifting the nosewheel off the
ground following the same procedures recom-
mended for landing . With the spoilers extended.
it was possible to attain full aft stick without
rotation at 130- 135 KIAS . depending upon the
external loading (82.000 lbs- 130 K lAS; 90.000
lbs - 135 KIAS). Maximum anti skid braking and full
aft stick were maintained to approximately 20
knots . As a preventive measure to keep the
brakes from fusing and immobilizing the aircraft
on the runway . the aircraft was never brought to
a complete stop on the runway.

TAC ATIACK 5
STOPPING THE AARDVARK
THERMAL FUSE
Looking directly into wheel assembly with the brake removed, the fuse plugs are
visible in t he wheel tie bolt flange.
The results of the brake tests showed several
items of interest. Some made it into the Dash
One and are common knowledge . However.
many of the test pilot's comments in the report
did not make it into the handbook and are of
interest. The following are extracts taken from
the F-111 A Category II RTO tests :
1. The RTOs conducted on a dry runway
showed the brakes to be torque-limited down to
approximately 20 KIAS. i.e .. the brake pressure
was never sufficient to lock the whee ls. As a
result. the antiskid did not cycle. (This means
that if you have felt antiskid before on normal
landing and don't feel it on a heavyweight. high
speed abort - it's still working. so keep standing
on the brake pedals ... you're not going to skid
the tires.)
2. The RTOs conducted on wet runways
showed the brake pressure to be sufficient to
lock the wheels. As a result. the antiskid
continuously cycled from the moment maximum
antiskid braking was applied until the brakes
were released . This indicated proper operation
of the antiskid system. i.e .. whenever a wheel
skid was sensed. brake pressure to that wheel
was decreased and a full wheel skid never oc-
curred .
6 FE BRUARY 1977
3. Brake fires occurred on several of the dry
RTOs . In most cases. these were the result of hy-
draulic fluid leaking onto the brakes. The brake
fires that occurred on the 82.000 and the
90.000 pound. 140 KIAS. dry RTOs must be
classified separately. These fires. which were hy-
draulic fires. were much more intense . Sufficient
heat was generated on both RTOs to melt the
brake linings. In both cases. the fires started
shortly before the braking was completed and
were confined to the brakes; the fires never
spread to other parts of the aircraft. Thermal
plug protection caused deflation of both main
gear tires shortly after stopping .
4 . Brake fires did not occur on any wet
runway RTOs . In fact. the wheel thermal plugs
did not melt on the two highest brake energy
wet runway RTOs . This would seem to indicate
that the effective energy absorbed by the brakes
during wet runway braking was somewhat (and
possibly considerably) lower than that indicated
by Figure 5-11 of the Flight Manual. This is due
to the aerodynamic drag acting over a longer
distance. Energy dissipated in aerodynamic drag
during a wet runway stop is significantly higher
(perhaps twice) than for a dry runway. However.
 tional control on a wet runway than on a dry
runway. As a result. there was a tendency to
reduce brake pressure on the "rearward" pedal.
In addition. the pilot's foot occasionally slid up
onto the pedal if a special effort was not made
to "lock" his heel below the pedal prior to brake
application. This amplified steering difficulties.
In general. the aircraft was very responsive to
small steering inputs at high speed since the
rudder is still effective. Caution had to be
exercised to keep from overcontrolling the air-
craft.
7 . At no time during these tests was aircrew
safety a problem. Not once did the wheel
thermal plugs fail to function properly, nor did
the brakes explode. (This is what can happen if the
thermal plugs fail to function properly. ED )

Damage to engine bay area.

do not be fooled; use the precautions contained

in the Brake Energy charts just as you would for
a dry runway.
5. Braking response was smooth. positive and
immediate for all RTOs . Some brake fade was
evident toward end of the braking on the dry
runway RTOs. but it presented no problem. A
small controllable side lurch was apparent at the
initiation of braking when application of both
brakes was not simultaneous. This presented no
problem on a dry runway but did cause an intial
yaw on a wet runway. The aircraft "slid" away
from the original ground track. and thereafter.
considerable attention was necessary to main-
tain direction and ground track through nose
wheel steering . (What engineers refer to as
the "right foot syndrome" may explain this. For
right-handed people. the right foot is more
sensitive to brake pressure than the left. A right-
handed pilot will usually tend to stand on the
left brake more than the right .. . hence a direc-
tional control problem - a good piece of trivia to
remember when operating on a wet or slick sur-
Damage to left engine intake, aux flap and inboard
face. For left-handed people. it's vice-versa.)
underwing panels. The wing fuel tank was also cracked
Also. if aborting above 120 knots. remember to
by the exploding tire.
pull straight back on th e pole. Any differential in
the slabs is going to make the aircraft roll All of the above talks about heavyweight
(wallow) and compound your steering problem. aborts which . hopefully. will remain a very low
6 . The most difficult part of braking on a wet statistic for the future . There are some additional
runway was maintaining full brake pedal deflec- facts about the brakes that apply to everyday
tion while steering with the rudder pedals. The usage that might come in handy. All of it centers
difficulty arose because larger rudder pedal around heat buildup in the brake system which
deflections were necessary to maintain direc- is the greatest threat to the tires and brakes .

TAC ATIACK 7
 - . - lT COL MALCOLM F. BOLTOM is this

STOPPING THE ~~RDV~RK ~onth's Fleagle T-shirt winner.

will occur; and at approximately 450°F, the cord
will melt allowing the tire to fail catastrophically.
It should also be noted that taxiing an aircraft
does not cool tires/brakes.
Keeping this problem in mind. engineers
designed the bead seat area of the tire / wheel
assembly to never see more than 400°F with the
tire inflated . With the temperature available on a
heavyweight abort. it is absolutely necessary to
deflate the tires as the bead seat area can easily
see more than 400°. As it was not feasible to
place thermal blowout plugs near the bead area,
they were set in the wheel tie bolt boss area. To
compensate for location. TAC aircraft blowout
plugs are set to melt at 368°F. Just remember .
on a hot day at Nellis and a long taxi. it's easy to
have a tire casing in the 100° to 150° zone
prior to ever getting on the runway.
So. you ask. what do these numbers warn you
of as a crewmember trying to get a sortie air-
borne? Ponder the following:
Tire and wheel assembly with blowout plug still intact.

Thinking of the brake energy chart in terms of

temperature allows a different perspective when
analyzing brake technique. Considering the
temperatures generated 1n the brake
components. the top of the green zone on the
brake energy chart represents a 1100° - 1 200°
F; the top of the yellow. 1 300° - 1400°F. and
the top of the red approximately 1900°F. The
problem arises in keeping this magnitude of
heat buildup from reaching the tires.
F-111 tires are taxied during qualification
testing for a distance of 30.000 feet at
maximum aircraft weight on a one-time test to
simulate a long taxi. They are also subjected to a
10.000-foot taxi test before each of a series of
takeoffs and 10.000 feet after each landing.
During these tests. taxi speed never exceeds 30
mph. While aircraft tires are designed to take
this. tire carcass temperatures can rise signifi-
cantly. as much as 50°F. Aircraft taxied at
higher speeds can have a much higher tempera-
ture rise. The rise in temperature is due to
flexure of the tire sidewall as it rolls under load.
This problem becomes critical when viewed in
perspective of a tire 's critical temperature limits .
High performance aircraft tires all use nylon
cord. At temperatures of approximately 150°F.
nylon begins to lose strength . If temperatures do
Normal brake installation on F-Ill A. Arrow denotes
not exceed 400°F, the cord will return to full
tire / wheel bead seat area.
strength as it cools . However. if approximately
400°F is exceeded. permanent loss of strength

8 FEBRUARY 1977
 1. Never proceed with any suspect dragging
brake., Never taxi with your feet on the rudder
pedals where you can induce brake drag by the
slightest of foot pressure. A dragging brake can
easily add several 100°F to the brakes just in
taxiing to the runway. This temperature rise
decreases the brake's energy absorbing ca-
pability. and could cause you to start an abo"r t
with a brake already well into the green zone or
even in the yellow zone. With brakes already hot.
you could have a brake or fuse plug failure due
to exceeding brake capacity.
2 . Avoid long distance taxiing without ade-
NOTE: References: A i r Force Fli ght Test
quate cooling time. The heat buildup in the tire
Center. Technical Report 66-16 . F-111 A Cate-
casing lowers the tire's tolerance to hot brakes.
gory II Refused Takeoff Tests. September 1968.
A high energy abort coupled with a lower heat
tolerance could cause a tire/wheel explosion.
Taxiing to quickcheck. back to the chocks for
minor maintenance. then back to the runway
may be too far to taxi without a cooling period.
(Editor's Note : T.0-1 F-111-1 limits taxi distance
to 30.000 feet.)
3 . Maximum temperature in the wheel occurs
approximately 45 minutes to one hour after
braking. If for any reason you've done any heavy
braking. wait until the tire and brake housing are
cool to the bare hand before attempting any-
thing else that may require braking.
4. Brake use is additive as far as heat is
concerned. If you have a propensity to test the
brakes just after touchdown. don't . Wait until
you're ready to stop the aircraft. then get on the
binders and halt it . Pumping the brakes. or eas-
Ing on them throughout the roll. will add a great
deal more heat to the brakes than one smooth
application. The technique of easing on the
brakes for longer than necessary will give you a
good chance of melting the thermal plugs ... just
about the time you get in the.chocks ... tough to
explain to you r commander.
5 . Hydraulic fluid temperature in the vicinity Ueutenant Colonel Malcolm F. Bolton (M.~.
of the brake housing during a maximum Texas Chriatian Oniwtaity) is Commander,
gross weight abort can reach 500 - 600°F. 430th Ta teal Fighter Squa on. 474tb
Since the ignition point of MIL-H-5606 hy- Tactical Wing, · AF8, ·Navada.
draulic fluid is 4 70°F and fire point is 250°F, a His serw:e expenence has included aa&itn-
fire is imminent and will usually last as long as ments wifh SAC. AOC, PACAF~ and TAC, as
fluid is available. If you're doing heavyweight well as staff auignmems with NOitAD and
takeoffs. it makes good sense to preposition a AFSC. Me was ......... to the I« Forc:a Plant
fire truck on the departure-end where he can get ~-()ffice and Generai.Qynamic8
at you in a hurry while you're trapped in the bar- Corporation where he flew all models of the
rier with a burning wheel . F-111 during production acceptance test fly-
As stated at the beginning. the F-111 has an ing. He is a graduate of Air Command and
outstanding brake system. Hopefully. these Staff College, and served a Southeast Asia
words will add to aircrew knowledge of a critical combat tour in F-111s.
system on the F-1 1 1 .

TAC ATIACK 9
Down to Earth
I ~
I I
~ I
'Twas a dangerous cliff, as they freely confessed,
Though to walk near its crest was so pleasant;
But over its terrible edge there had slipped
A Duke and full many a peasant.
The people said something would have to be done,
But their projects did not all tally.
Some said, "Put a fence around the edge of the cliff,"
Some, "An ambulance down in the valley."
The lament of the crowd was profound and was loud
As their tears overflowed with their pity;
But the cry of the ambulance carried the day
As it spread through the neighboring city.
A collection was made to accumulate aid,
And the dwellers in highway and alley
Gave dollars or cents - not to furnish a fence -
But an ambulance down in the valley.
"For the cliff is all right if you're careful," they said;
And if folks ever slip and are dropping,
It isn't the slipping that hurts them so much
As the shock down below- when they're stopping."
So for years (we have heard),
As these mishaps occurred.
Quickforth would the rescuers sally,
To pick up the victims who fell from the cliff,
With the ambulance down in the valley.
10
THE
AMBULANCE
DOWN IN THE
VALLEY
Author Unknown
Said one, to his pleas, "It's a marvel to me
That you'd give so much greater attention
To repairing results than to curing the cause;
You had much better aim at prevention.
For the mischief, of course,
Should be stopped at its source;
Come, neighbors and friends, let us rally.
It is far better sense to rely on a fence
Than an ambulance down in the valley."
"He is wrong in his head," the majority said.
He would end all our earnest endeavor.
He's a man who would shirk this responsible work.
But we will support it forever.
Aren't we picking up all, just as fast as they fall,
And giving them care liberally?
A superfluous fence is of no consequence,
If the ambulance works in the valley.
The story looks queer as we've written it here,
But things oft occur that are stranger.
More humane, we assert, than to suffer the hurt
Is the plan of removing the danger.
The best possible course is to safeguard the source
By attending to things rationally.
Yes, build up the fence and let us dispense
With the ambulance down in the valley. ___:;;-
FEBRUARY 1977
 PLACE THE FACE

This F-84 "Thunderjet" pilot was assigned to the 136th Fighter

Bomber Wing in Korea during May 1952.

The response to our first "Place the Face"
contest was great. But don't stop now ... keep
those cards and letters coming each month for
your chance to win the coveted "Fleagle Fanny
Feather of Fate Award." The competition is keen,
but everyone has an equal opportunity to win.
If you have any "vintage" photos of well known
TAC personnel and would like them included in
our contest, send them to:
TAC/SEPP
Langley AFB, Va 23665
Please include the name of the individual in the
photo, the year and place photo was taken. All
photos will be returned to the sender.
This month brings the photo of a dashing F-84
combat pilot .. can you "Place the Face?"

11
TAC ATTACK

Tac Tips
REFUEliNG MISNOMER :
BRUTE FORCE DISCONNECTS
We have all briefed and rebriefed brute force
disconnect emergency procedures and hope-
fully. we know that the disconnect should be ac-
comp lished as gently as possible. However.
when you suddenly find that long striped thing
on the back end of the airborne gas station
stuck tightly in your sleek fighter's receptacle.
can you still maintain your cool?
Try putting yourself in this pilot's cockpit and
see if you can experience your own sensations
and reactions when. and if. you ever get "hung
up" with a tanker.
The flight was a normal refueling training
mission at flight level 200. Everyone took their
gas without incident until Blue Four initiated his
disconnect. Both the receiver pilot and boom
operator reported. "Negative disconnect."
After approximately 10 seconds (which
probably seems like an eternity when you're
ready to get off the boom). the receiver became
unstable within the refueling envelope. It's
understandable. isn't it? Your palms are all
sweaty. knuckles white on the controls. mouth
dry and sticky as flypaper. and there is a rapid
pounding in your chest.
With verbal corrections back to centerline
from the boom operator. the receiver returned
and stabilized in position . Then. without further
ado. the receive r dropped straight off the end of
the boom before the boom operator could give
any further corrections. The brute force discon-
nect cracked the boom fork assembly, and the
receiver escaped without serious damage.
With a sigh of relief. everyone can now RTB
normally instead of having to make an
emergency landing with a refueling boom wrap-
ped around his sleek fighter . And . how did your
12
... interest items,
mishaps with
morals, for the
TAC aircrewman
mental "hang-up" with the tanker come out?
Hopefully. JUSt as fortunate. if not better.
Here's one recommendation if you are ever
faced with having to make a "bru te force" dis-
connect: Coordinate the disconnect with the
boom operator to reduce the possibility of
damaging equipment. And. if you keep your
cool. you'll be able to get free from that long
striped thing with a "gently" forced disconnect.
•••
From the good guys at the Air Weather Service.
comes the following:
IMPROVED
PilOT WEATHER REPORT FORMAT
A new, improved pilot weather report
(PIREP) format was recently instituted in the
United States. The new format, in use since
15 October 1976, replaced the old "free
form" PIREP format used for many years. The
new PIREP format standardizes the sequence
in which weather elements reported by pilots
are transmitted to base weather stations and
centralized forecast units . The standardized
sequence follows:
/ OV Location (Position, Time, Altitude)
/ TP Type Aircraft
/ SK Sky (Cloud Bases, Coverage, Tops)
I TA Outside Air Temperature
/ WV Wind Velocity (Direction, Speed)
/ TB Turbulence (Intensity, Type, Altitude)
/ IC Icing (Intensity, Type, Altitude)
/ RM Remarks
Pilots can continue to report weather condi-
tions observed in flight without regard to the
new format . Meteorologists will encode PIREPs
in the new format for transmission. The only dif-
ference you will notice is that meteorologists
will request that you report locatio n of observed
weather elements with respect to navigation aids
such as TACANs. VORTACs. VORs. or TVORs.
Pass on a PIREP ... help out a friend.
FEBRUARY 1977
 PHANTOM SHEDS PARTS
The mission was the last leg of a cross-
country flight. The Phantoms made single-ship
takeoffs and while the flight lead was monitoring
number two's rejoin. he noticed something
wrong . The wingman's right travel pod was open
approximately two inches and what appeared to
be the pitot cover and its cord were trailing ap-
proximately 10 feet behind the travel pod .
The departure was immediately terminated .
airspeed reduced. and a recovery to the depar-
ture airpatch initiated . When the aircraft was
configured for landing and the angle of attack
increased . some of the aircraft's "780" gear de-
parted the travel pod. As the F-4 touched down.
the aux air door locks fell out and were sub-
sequently found on the runway. Inventory of the
travel pod after engine shutdown revealed a
nose gear downlock. two main gear downlocks.
one pitot tube cover - with streamer and cord.
one tail hook pin. and _Q ne static ground cord to
be missing.
At the time the aircraft's preflight was done.
the right travel pod door was not secured pend-
ing stowage of the 780 equipment . Weather
precluded continuing the mission . The crew
chief stowed the 780 equipment and departed
TACATIACK
the area . The aircrew stayed with the aircraft.
Forty-five minutes later. the weather improved.
and the aircrew decided to continue the
mission.
Another crew chief arrived and secured the
left travel pod. This was physically checked by
the aircraft commander. He did not physically
check the right pod. although he observed the
door closed. The quick check was performed by
the same crew chief who had secured the left
travel pod door. No ground interphone cord was
used by the quick-check crew. At this time . the
WSO asked the AC if the travel pods had been
secured and expressed the desire to ask the
quick-check crew to recheck pod security.
However. without the ground cord . the request
was not passed on . The aircraft was given a
"thumbs-up " and they took off .
In the future. travel pods at this wing will be
manufactured with the hinge on the bottom .
This should make it easier to detect an un-
fastened door . However. the only way to really
be sure that travel pods are secure is to
physically check them . It'll only take another
couple of minutes. but it'll prevent a lot of
explaining .
13
 Phyz-biz

14 FEBRUARY 1977
 STORifS WITH nlORHlS
By Lt Col Harold Andersen
HO TAC Physiological Training Coordinator
In any discussion of physiological incidents .
we tend to consider only the more spectacular
cases . i .e .. those involving hypoxia or de-
compression sickness . While these cases may
be more intriguing. the potential for mishaps
from such mundane disease as sinus pain. ear
pain or abdominal gas pains should not be
ignored .
Here's an example of one aircrew who was
" laid low. " literally and figuratively. by a com-
mon sinus block. A routine descent from FL 280
to 16.000 feet (cabin altitude decreasing from
6.000 to 5.000 feet) generated right ear and
facial pain. Nasal spray with Afrin. followed by
several vigorous Valsalva maneuvers. failed to
relieve the problems . When cabin altitude
reached 5.000 feet. the crewman lost con-
sciousness. which was regained when the cabin
altitude was increased to 6 .000 feet. He sub-
sequently lost consciousness on two other at-
tempts to decrease cabin altitude (increase
pressure) to 5.000 feet. His fellow crew-
members. fearing for his life . administered
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and external
cardiac massage. On orders of a ground-based
flight surgeon . the aircraft was landed while he
was unconscious. Subsequer,t examination by
an ear. nose and throat (ENT) doctor provided a
diagnosis of "maxillary barosinusitis ." The hap-
less crewmember admitted to having a "cold"
for the previous week. but since he had never
had either an ear block or sinus problem in the
past. felt he would have no problem flying with
it.
Compounding the problem. caused by his
poor judgment. was the unfortunate coincidence
that he was a member of that small (but not
rare) population group which exhibits a fainting
reaction to severe pain . (NOTE : The application
of mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and external
cardiac massage should be initiated only when
indicated by absence of respiration and pulse.)
TAC ATIACK
In another case a sinus block occurred during
a landing approach ; the IP was hit by severe
pain . and turned over the control of the ap -
proach to his student. He landed short of the
runway, striking some power lines . Result: Two
fatalities and one aircraft destroyed. Neither the
IP nor the student ever dreamed that a s1nus
block would be their final undoing .
Moral of these stories : Don 't fly with a cold!
(Where have you heard that before?)
Less common. but still a potential hazard . are
physiolog ical incidents which involve abdominal
gas expansion . The pain generated by the ex-
pansion of gas housed in the large intestine. can
cause severe pain which. even if the victim does
not faint. can cause complete incapacitation .
Under normal conditions. there is gas in the
large intestine. Some of it is formed by the fer-
mentation of food residues by bacteria dwelling
in that area ; some gas (air) has been swallowed.
Regardless of its origins. that gas will expand
enormously when the external pressure on the
body is reduced . Loss of cabin pressurization
which may increase cabin altitude (reduced
cabin pressure) from 8.000 feet to FL 300 or FL
400. can result in expansion ratios of 3 to 5 .5 .
If the gas cannot be passed as flatus. pain will
be continuous and severe.
Flying with a gastro-intestinal condition which
has diarrhea as one of its symptoms. can com -
pound the problem . The presence of diarrhea in-
hibits the normal passage of flatus. The crew-
member. trying to avoid an embarrass ing "ac-
cident." will be apt to retain the gas. When the
"relief valve" is closed off. there are no alterna-
tive escape routes ... all the gas is retained . If.
under these conditions . the crewmember should
become unconscious. voluntary control over the
sphincter muscles would be lost and nature
would take its course .
Moral of this story: Don't fly when you have a
G.l. malfunction . ___::::...
15
C Stan Hardtson. 197 7
IT'S A
HSSTILE
W RLD
By Capt Terry Schwalier
Office of Safety
HQ 9TH AF
Shaw AFB SC
"Ya got that. 3 ," Chuck exclaimed .
" Yeah , I got it ." I must have looked
disinterested . After all. this was my third air
refueling / tactics mission this week . Everything
should be standard-standard . I felt as though I
could predict everything that Chuck was going
to say and must have looked like it. No wonder
Chuck wanted to make sure he had a captive
audience ... at least. I thought I could predict
everything he was going to say.
"Airc rew responsibilities : clearing . I'm primary
for that. You wingmen help out by clearing
through the guy you 're flying off of. Our good
weather today should see a lot of private pilots
out doing their thing. so keep your head out .
"Areas of primary concern will be when we're
below 1 0.000 MSL around Sauls burg City,
Myhrumville. and Lake Rundell Municipal Air-
port. We should be pretty safe in the PCA for
refueling, in the MOA for our road recce. and on
the range for our deliveries ......
That didn't sound right. "Wait a second .
Chuck. what's so safe about a Military Operating
Area ?" I interrupted .
"Well Mike. that's restricted airspace isn 't it?
Must be or the DO wouldn 't have gone through
the hassle that I heard he went through to get it.
No prop jockey in his right mind would dare
18
transit our MOA wit out ear of being violated ."
"That's not right. Chuck," I repl ied. "A MOA is
not restricted airspace . I spent a lot of time in
DOV over the last 3 months trying to get the
MOA approved . I learned plenty. If we have 5
minutes. I c an give you the low-down ."
"Press." Chuck said, as he leaned back in his
cha ir. "We still have 20 minutes until desk-out."
"OK ," I retorted . beginning to feel a little
-pressure as three sets of eyeballs refocused on
me. "First off. a MOA (Military Operating Airs-
pace) is an area which has been designated for
use by the military to contain non-hazardous
activities . By non-hazardous I mean aero and
ACM / BFM . (Hazardous activities are those in
whi c h we release weapons . That requires a
restricted a rea .)
"A MOA was given to us for three reasons .
First. it insures IFR traffic is kept away from us .
This is accomplished with ATC vectoring other
IFR aircraft around the MOA or restricting you to
a certain portion of the MOA and vectoring IFR
aircraft through the other portion . You might
think of yourself as being on an IFR VFR inside'
clearance while working a MOA.
"The second reason for establishing MOAs is
to confine military activities into specific areas .
You could call the MOA the natural outgrowth of
the old Intensive Student Jet Training Areas
around ATC bases . I'm afraid the days of using
any area between airways for aero or formation
FEBRUARY 1977
 '-~
training for us TAC jocks are long gone .
~
That should
"The third . and probably most important.
reason for MOAs is to notify the civilian pilots as
to where our training areas are . Hopefully. they'll
think twice before transiting our MOA on a VF-11
flight plan . However. the point we must re-
member is that the civilian aviator is perfectly
legal in pressing through our MOA. All we can
do is inform him of the area 's existence . The
MOA is not restricted airspace ."
" OK. " Chuck interrupted. "What's the dif-
ference between a MOA and one of our warning
areas?"
"Nothing really," I replied . "ATC services are
about the same . The only difference is that a
MOA is over land and a warning area is over
water . Neither protect you from anything but IFR
aircraft. Like the MOA the warning area is not
restricted airspace .
"Another area the DO is concerned about for
midair collision potential is our low-level route
structure . I'll bet you didn't know that he had to
review our low-levels twice a year to insure
areas of high conflict potential are avoided .
"You remember that the last leg of the Hunky
Dory 132 was swung around to the south last
month . That move was a result of this low-level
review ."
"I sure wish he'd do something about point
Charlie on that same low-level. " Chuck inter-
rupted again. " Three other low-levels cross at
that same place ......
" He is." I replied . FLIP requires us to coor-
dinate with Aman AFB. the route originator.
before our schedulers list it on the daily frag .
TAC ATIACK
MOA
ensure that the m1 itary doesn't
schedule a conflict. We should also see a new
CIF next week that will require us to make a call
on 255.4- 2 miles out from the intersection."
"Super ." Then pausing and squinting his eyes
as if to ponder a problem. Chuck added.
"Doesn't look as though the situation is ever go-
ing to look better . The local area club has nearly
tripled its membership over the past 3 years .
They've also picked up four new airplanes ...
seems as though any VFR flying outside of a
published area or route is not too smart."
'Til second that! " Then I remembered a con-
versation I had with the chief of current ops last
week. "As a matter of fact. the DO types are now
trying to negotiate a new mid-level (1 .500 AGL
to 10.000 MSL) route structure to give us
published routes and keep us IFR between our
training areas and low-level routes. Rumor has it
that beginning in mid-77 . we will have to be in a
published training area / route to fly above 250
KIAS when below 10.000 MSL. A mid-level
route structure would then serve dual purposes :
one to help out our midair collision avoidance
efforts. and the other to allow us to keep the
smash up ."
Chuck looked at his watch . "We'd better
press ." Then tightening his facial expression for
an air of authority. "That was good info. Mike .
Let's keep our heads out ALL the time. " Then.
with a wink. he added. "It's a hostile world out
there. "
"2. "
"3 ."
"4 ." came the reply . ~
19
 THE RESURRECTION OF
(WITH APOLOGIES TO ROBERT W. SERVICE)
By Lt ColT. D. Miller
1st TFW/SE
Langley AFB, VA

There are strange things done in the dark and the sun
By airmen both young and old;
The safety files in their horrid piles
Would make your blood run cold;
In my flights, I've seen strange sights,
But the strangest I ever did see
Was not in the air, but in a barnyard where
I resurrected Lieutenant Lee.

Johnny Lee was from Miami, where the southern breezes flow,
Why he left his home in the South to roam the skies,
God only knows.
Though often told, the lessons bold seemed to pass him like a sieve,
In his homely way he'd often say,
"This ground safety is for others to live."

Now Johnny's great steed was a Zoomie's need,

And a sight I'll never forget,
T'was painted bright red and a dragster's dread,
Four hundred plus in a 'Vette.
A Lieutenant's dream or so it would seem,
With power to spare 'neath the bonnet
But with Johnny the driver, and who could be wiser?
He drove at warp two - like a comet.

The snow and the ice, a seasonal vice, made our Johnny long for his home.
T'was the cold that he dreaded, as the flight line he treaded,
Which chilled clear through to the bone.
Though cautioned by commanders at meetings
On weather, seat belts, tires and speeding,
With extra advice from the· Top to the unit
Car safety was seeded, but how often heeded?
By some, but npt • our Lieutenant.

He was on his way, that fateful day

With his Gib on the long drive to town
A few beers at the bar with stories bizarre helped bring his judgement down.
On a road both narrow and winding, Johnny's speed in the 'Vette was most blinding.
Patchy ice on a curve caused a terrible swerve, with Johnny too late to respond.
In a blur of red, the car took its head,
Left the road, dropping Lee off in a pond.
LIEUTENANT LEE

The scene I observed as I rounded that curve, ten miles from the nearest town,
One comrade out cold, the other most bold, neck deep in ice water dark brown.
The lad in the car appeared better by far, his seat belt kept him from leaving,
The one in the pond, the lieutenant named John, would require some very fast heeding.
To the pond I'd run, though my lips were numb and dragged the body clear,
He was cold as death, but a spark of breath I could see in the winter air.
A car blanket I found, lying around and placed on my frozen chum
A fire would be great, but maybe too late, I needed heat without sears.
Then glancing around, I fatefully found a corral with fifty odd steers.

My course was decided, my actions abided as I piled on the steaming mess,

The cattle out there, with their curious stares, continued to produce - more or less.
I was packing it on at ten after one, a mound like a mummy most grand,
When a voice quite clear, came through to my ear,
'Tm quite warm now, it's the smell I can't standi"

There are strange things done in the dark and the sun
By airmen both young and old;
The safety files in their horrid piles
Would make your blood run cold.

In my many flights, I've seen strange sights,

But the strangest I ever did see
Was not in the air, but in a barnyard where
I resurrected Lieutenant Lee .
(MORAL - FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT AND YOU WON'T GET COLD!)
 THERE ARE THOSE WHO HAVE
HFL YING IN ITSELF
IS NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS,
BUT LIKE THE SEA, CAN BE VERY
UNFORGIVING."
By Capt Raymond K. Ferrell
21st CompW/Fiight Safety
Elmendorf AFB, AK
As one of the more experienced T-38 IPs in
my flight. I was proud to be awarded some of
the more margina l students in the class . Perhaps
it was my natural skill. ability and cunning which
afforded me this " status symbol?" More recently.
I have come to the conclusion that it was the
flight commander's revengeful payment for not
laughing at his jokes . At any rate . there was one
student from whom I learned a great deal. Un -
fortunately. the learning process was only one -
way ... he washed out.
It was a few years ago. while assigned to Air
Training Command. that this incident. which sig -
nificantly affected my attitude toward aviation.
occurred . The student was having problems in
22
the landing phase; specifically. the flare . I think
his problem could be summarized in one state-
ment. His landings would have been acceptable
if the runway had been 25 feet higher or he had
been 25 feet lower. Since this was not the case.
problems developed which affected his ability to
think and perform while airborne .
These problems came to a climax on one of
his final " pre-solo" rides. No longer responding
to verbal instructions. Lt Lurch had been sent
around by the mobile control unit several times
for flaring high . These high flares were naturally
accompanied by low airspeed . He was becoming
quite frustrated and angry with his performance .
To help relieve the tension . I demonstrated a
pattern and landing . To my surprise. his next
pattern was quite good . I was in a mild state of
shock as we approached the overrun . Never
before had he maneuvered his aircraft so close
to the ground with such skill.
Approaching the overrun . the T-37 mobile
control unit located beside a parallel runway
FEBRUARY 1977
AND THOSE WHO WILL
broadcast on guard frequency for a T-37 on
final to go-around . Thinking the rad io trans-
mission was directed toward him. ol ' Lurch im-
mediately selected full afterburner on both
eng ines . While his actions were excessive. noth-
ing he did surprised me . Rather than salvage the
resulting bad approach . I decided to let him
continue the go-around . Noticing his reluctance
to assume a climb attitude. I thought he was
overreacting to his usual low airspeed cond i-
tion.
Approaching the threshold . and sti ll maintain-
ing a slight descent. his intentions became quite
clear . With both engines operating at full af-
terburner and with excessive airspeed . Lurch
lowered the nose of the aircraft. Realizing he
had no intention of going around. but rather
"going in. " I took control of the aircraft . The im-
med iate sequence of events now appears hazy to
me. However. I recall my eyes had assumed a
protruded position; throat had completely
closed ; heart was pounding and slight nausea
TAC ATIACK
instantaneously appeared . The entire sequence
of events took only a few seconds .
For awhile. I shared poor Lurch's anger and
frustrat ion . but finally realized that he had
taught me an invaluable lesson. Frequently, IPs
are cautioned to avoid complacency with exept-
ionally good students . The c hances are remote .
but the possibility always exists that an except -
ional student can fly the aircraft into realms of
flight from which recovery is difficult. if not im -
possible . The fact that a person who always fl ies
with marginal students can become complacent
also . is never discussed . It is just taken for
granted you should be ready for anything from
even the "predictably" unpredictable . Su c h is
not the case .
I'll not bore you by drawing some obvious
conclusions about complacency. safety. etc.
However. this incident brought forth further
meaning to the phrase. " Flying in itself is not
inherently dangerous. but like the sea . can be
very unforgiving. " ~
23
 ... iltddutu ad ittUde~UaU
will£ a ~ dut.

chock talk

Winter Clothes Woes

by SSGT Larry R. Poteat
Explosives Safety NCO
1st SOW, Eglin AF Aux Fld No. 9, Florida

• The loadcrew members were downloading

fla res fro m an aircraft on a cold winter
afternoon . W hile in the process of removing the
ninth flare package . the loadcrew chiefs parka
sleeve caught on the outer lip of the dispenser
tray. causing him to drop the flare package . The
loadcrew tried unsuccessfully to catch the flare.
but it fell four feet to t he ground and was
rendered unserviceable .
• An instrument technician was to troubleshoot
an aircraft's static pressure system during the
cold. predawn hours . The front seat and rails
had been removed by the egress personnel. but
they failed to insure the canopy jettison pin was
installed . The instrument technic ian also failed
to insure the safety pin was installed when he
resumed his wo rk. During an attempt to retrieve
a tool which he had dropped in the cock pit. his W inter c lothi ng also affects our senses of sight
parka sleeve caught on t he canopy jettison and touch ... senses which we all heavily rely
initiator linkage and it actuated. upon to perform our jobs.
The ideal environment to perform Winter clothing has caused many accidents
maintenance is in warmth and comfort . because people were not aware of just how
However. M other Natu re gives us the cold much it rest ricts their pe rfo rmance ... accidents
shoulder during the winter months and out w hich have caused injury to personnel. anc
comes the bulky winter clothing to protect us thousands of dollars damage to equipment.
from the elements. The two mishaps mentioned Don't let you rself be caught in a winter weather
above illustrate how winter clothing can signifi- t rap . Take a little extra time when you' re all bun-
cantly reduce our ability to perform routine d led up in your parka and mukluks ... it wi ll save
maintenance tasks by restricting movement . time in the long run .

24 FE BRUARY 1977

EAGlE FUMES
The four F-15s took off and proceeded to the
tanker. Everything was uneventful until after lead
had finished his refueling . At this time, lead
noted a slight headache developing in the
temples and front part of his head . During an
"Ops" check. the pilot selected 100 percent
oxygen and noted a slight odor which had the
effect of a mild inhaler. He went back to normal
oxygen and initiated a return to base. During the
return. he developed a slight nauseous feeling,
declared an emergency. and put number two in
the lead .
Most of the descent was flown with the
oxygen mask off because this was more com-
fortable. and no odor could be detected in the
cockpit. The headache and nauseous feeling did
not lessen or increase in intensity until landing .
The pilot however. did feel very warm during
the last 5 minutes of flight but had no difficulty
in flying the Eagle. The nauseous feeling disap-
peared approximately 20 minutes after landing
... but the headache lingered for another hour.
The aircraft was impounded and tests were
performed on the oxygen converter. mask. and
connector. No contaminants were found. Tests
were then conducted on the oxygen regulator
and hose . These revealed carbon disulfide
produced from the hose .
The aircraft's windshield had been changed
three days prior to the incident and this was the
first flight since . The pilot involved in the in-
cident later identified the sealant as having the
same odor he had smelled in flight.
What happened? An unauthorized silicone
compound was used to prepare the surface and
it retarded the curing of the sealant. The sealant
contains carbon disulfide which is toxic. Be-
cause it had not fully cured, it gave off vapors
which produced the symptoms.
We were very fortunate this time . The incident
occured near a suitable land ing sight and the
pilot was able to land before he was inca-
pacitated . The ending could have been tragic ...
all because someone used an unauthorized
compound to prepare the windshield surface .
Use the proper materials and equipment when
performing any maintenance.

~. •
•
WAITIJO
A new Editor for TAC ATIACK. Qualifications:
Grade of Captain or Major, with recent
experience in tactical fighters. Must be remote
ineligible and possess some writing ability.
Reporting date: September thru December 1977.
If you're interested in a good job and complet-
ing a staff tour, all at the same time, contact Lt
Col John Patterson or Capt Marty Steere, TAC/
SEP, Langley AFB, VA (AUTOVON 432-3373/
2937) for additional information.

TAC ATIACK 25

By Mr. J. W. Hafley
A TC Consultant
Headquarters TAC
The GCA has been with us for 20 years . but its
days are numbered . " YOU'RE ON GLIDE PATH.
ON COURSE. THREE MILES FROM TOUCH
DOWN ." Those are comforting words on a dark
and rainy night when you are returning from a
tough mission or terminating a long IMC flight .
It's nice to know someone cares and is down
there watching your progress and guiding you
to a safe recovery .
26
Ground Control Approach (GCA)
But time has a way of changing the com-
plexion of all things . Our methods for precision
approach are no exception. GCA is on the way
out in favor of the Instrument Landing System
(ILS). The transition started several years ago
when Air Force declared ILS to be the primary
precision approach aid. The ILS is in common
use today for strategic operations. and more and
more TAC base ILS installations are being com-
missioned. Within the next three years, GCAs
will start to be phased out at many locations .
The GCA . has been around since 1948, and
has served its purpose well . But existing equip-
ment is obsolete, and new generation gear is
extremely expensive and will be in limited
FEBRUARY 1977
 quantity. Maintenance and spare parts costs
have soared and the system requires trained
operators which is another heavy expense . It all
boils down to the cost effectiveness equation .
and GCA just doesn't measure up any more.
The ILS. on the other hand . is an unmanned.
reasonably inexpensive . and passive facility
which is in worldwide use and provides
essentially the same service as GCA. It doesn 't
lose targets in heavy rain like GCA and has a
backup transmitter which automatically comes
on line if something breaks . It provides the pilot
a visual reference of his position during the ap-
proach . and even has backup communications
in many instances . Furthermore . the ILS is the
approach concept upon which the new genera-
tion Microwave Landing System (MLS) is based .
So eventual transition to such a system will be
far easier from ILS than it would be from GCA ..
The big kicker in ILS is the fact that an air-
borne receiver is required . where GCA only
needs two-way radio capability. That fact alone
has delayed an earlier move to dispose of GCA.
For TAC F-4s. the GCA has been . and still is. a
must for precision approach service . But that.
too. is changing . The retrofit program is un-
derway for the F-4 and other birds in Air Force
(both active and Air Reserve Forces) . In about
two years . there should be a receiver in most of
the birds we fly .
Another ILS limitation is that it is not tact ically
transportable . You just can 't set one up
overnight at an unprepared airfield . We do have
TALAR. an interim Microwave Land ing System
(MLS) . It is suitcase size. but only a few C- 130s
are equipped to use it; and no more ground or
airborne equipment is being procured . So. for
tactical needs in the near-term. the GCA is still
our only precision approach aid . Because of
this. we will retain GCA at selected stateside
bases to augment ILS and to provide training for
controllers. maintenance men and pilots .
In the future . however. both GCA and ILS will
give way to the international standard Micro-
wave Landing System . TALAR is just one version
of interim development in microwave frequency
systems which exist today. There are several civil
systems ... the Army has one. and the Swedish
Air Force has used them for years . But the
United States is holding fast against prolifera-
tion and lack of commonality in this new
generation of precision approach aid . The FAA
and DOD are committed to international com -
petition in 1977 for an ICAO standard system . It
TAC ATIACK
is a long range effort. By the time the signal
format is identified . specifications drawn up.
contracts let. prototypes built and tested. and fi-
nally, production started on both ground and
airborne hardware. some years will have passed .
When it comes . it will be a new . generation
facility. Used like ILS. it will provide accuracies
and reliability for automatic approach and land-
ing . In fixed base versions. it will provide varia-
ble glide slopes and curved approach paths for
flexible traffic management. The system will be
produced in a number of versions. from a
"suitcase" tactical facility with straight course
and one glide slope. to the most sophisticated
systems employed for Category 3 (0-0) landings
at major airports . In between . will be austere
civil vers ions for general aviation and feeder air-
ports. and for Category I military fixed base re-
quirements . A building block concept will be
used so that ground systems can start out small
and have growth potential to the more capable
versions when aviation demands increase . Being
an ICAO standard. both civil and military aircraft
will be able to use ground systems worldwide .
The only limiting aspect will be the ground ele-
ments ava ilable and the aircraft receiver ca-
pability. An aircraft computer w ill be necessary
to take advantage of the sophisticated fi xed base
MLS. But because of common signal format.
each aircraft will be able to fly any MLS and use
the combined ground and airborne capabilities
So that's the outlook in the air traff ic control
area . The new systems will take some getting
used to . In the long run . they should provide
both aircrews and controllers w ith better. safer
service .
27
 Do the job

By Maj Mike Frenzel

•••
9th AF/Fiight Safety Officer
Shaw AFB, SC

"I can tell by your expressions that most of

you didn't agree with the findings of that last ac-
cident brief. How can an accident board fault
supervisors for the dumb actions of their
charges? Well. having helped to prepare a few
accident reports. maybe I can shed some light
on their reasoning ."
Everyone settled back in their best monthly
flying safety meeting posture to listen to the
D.O . explain this one. This "old bull" had more
time in Stan/Eval and Safety than half the
audience had in the service . Besides. Colonel
Terry! was fun to listen to. And so he began .. ..
"When I was a flying safety officer several

all of it !!!
years ago. 1 was required to make the often
times difficult distinction between plain findings
and the actual cause of the accident. So what's
the difference? A 'Finding' is a significant step in
the sequence of events that leads to the ac-
cident itself. A 'Cause' is a finding which. if
eliminated. would probably have stopped the ac-
cident sequence. If my memory serves me cor-
rectly, I think the safety manual reads something
like .. .. .
... ... A cause is an act. omission. condition or
circumstance which contributed to the accident
and which. if corrected. eliminated or avoided
would have prevented the accident .. .' This also
summarizes the charter of an accident board.
The name of the investigative game is to find
the root cause of the accirJent. the accident
stopper.
"It's not hard to discover that the airplane
crashed ... we have a smoking hole for that.
Hopefully. we have the pilot who can tell us
what happened ... but this doesn't tell us why 1t
happened. Suppose the pilot was clearly at fault.
How does this bleed over into the supervisory
area? Simple. Answer this question . Did the
supervisor. by some act. omission. condition. or
circumstance. set the pilot up for this accident?
In too many cases the answer is yes. About this
time some of you are saying to yourself - 'I'm
glad I'm not a supervisor.' But you are ... some
are more responsible than others, but you're all
supervisors. Remember the gear-up landing?
Does anyone have a problem faulting the mo-
bileer who left the RSU early? I don't think so ...
what about the IP who popped late. placing the
student in an unfamiliar environment? Not quite
as clear-cut but. if the IP had done what he
briefed he was going to do. a major accident
may not have happened. By the same token. the
flight lead who observes sloppy wing work but
doesn't critique the individual really wasn't a
TACATIACK
flight lead ... he was just up front. The simulator
IP who runs a bor i ng 2-hour period or
terminates early just copped out on his
responsibility. The duty desk officer that gave a
sloppy out-brief and failed to catch an unsigned
FCIF item; the flight commander who knew one
of his pilots stayed up past crew rest and let him
fly anyway .. . and so on. The list is endless. And.
yes. it's a 'what if list. But 'what if your act.
omission. condition. or circumstance actually
contributed .. ..
"Now. turn it around . 'What if we accepted
the heavy responsibility placed on us by virtue
of ... 'what if we demanded perfection of
ourselves and others. 'what if ----------?' We
could do a great deal to reduce accidents. both
directly and indirectly, by just doing what's ex-
pected ... by doing our jobs .. . all of it."
As the D.O. started to sit down. a question
came from the back of the room . The youngest
pilot in the wing timidly asked. "What is the indi-
vidual pilot's responsibility?"
"That's easy," replied Colonel Terryl. "Exactly
what you just did ... ask questions . Look for the
'what if .. .' situation. Don't assume that the IP or
flight lead will stop you before you go too far.
Know or fmd out your limits ... in advance. There
is a lot we can do for ourselves. Not one of us is
immune to mistakes. The other day at the simu-
lator. I was a little sloppy on my crew coordina-
tion. I knew it and so did my other half. as well
as the SEFE console operator. Yet nothing was
said . I didn't accept my responsibility to critique
myself. my crew. or my operator. I was totally
wrong. I hope I'm smarter next time.
"I guess I've talked too much already so I'll
stop on this one last thought. Do your job ... all
of it. Make sure you have an answer for the
question. 'what if ... ?"'
As the D.O . sat down. the audience knew he
had hit close to home. He laid the blame right
where it belonged. on the shoulders of everyone
there. All crew members have a responsibility in
the prevention of their own accidents and in the
prevention of the accidents of others.
After that little talk from the D.O .. everyone
seemed to perform a little better. The Stan/Eval
minor discrepancy rate went up for a while. but
then came back down; not because of compla-
cency. b~t because the air.c rews got better.
Rumor has it the D.O. had some corrective ac-
tion on his last check ... and thanked his SEFE
for it. _:::.-
29
 TAC
SAFETY AWARDS

Maintenance Safety Award

Airman First Class Jett Cates, 35th Organiza-
tional Maintenance Squadron, 35th Tactical
Fighter Wing, George Air Force Base, California,
has been selected to receive the Tactical Air
Command Maintenance Safety Award for this
month. Airman Cates will receive a certificate
and letter of appreciation from the Vice Com-
mander, Tacticat Air Command.

Crew Chief Safety Award

Sergeant Teddy L Conners, 35th Organiza-
tional Maintenance Squadron, 35th Tactical
Fighter Wing, George Air Force Base, California,
has been selected to receive the Tactical Air
Command Crew Chief Safety Award for this
month. Sergeant Conners will receive a certifi-
cate and a letter of appreciation from the Vice
CommandEr, Tactical Air Command.

Sgt Teddy L Conners

30 FEBRUARY 1977
 TRE
InILLT
I

TAC ANG AFR

thru Dec thru Dec thru Dec
Dec Dec Dec
1 976 1975 1 976 1975 1976 1975

TOTAL ACFT. ACCIDENTS 1 33 28 1 11 11 1 4 2

MAJOR ACFT. ACCIDENTS 1 31 26 1 10 14 1 3 2

AIRCREW FATALITIES Il 2 11 20 0 5 1 0 1 0

TOTAL EJECTIONS 0 25 18 1 6 9 1 2 4

SUCCESSFUL EJECTIONS 0 18 13 1 6 1 1 4

TAC'S TOP "5" THRU DEC

TAC FTR/RECCE ARF FTR/RECCE TAC/ARF Other Units
accident free months accident free months accident free months
14 4 TFW 51 121 TFW 113 182 TASG ANG

12 1 TFW 25 132 TFW 93 135 TASG ANG

9 366 TFW 23 156 TFG 85 501 TAIRCW TAC

8 414 TFW 18 122 TFW 82 193 TEWG ANG

7 57 FWW 18 111 TRW 80 602 TAIRCW TAC

MAJOR ACCIDENT COMPARISON RATE 15/16

(BASED ON ACCIDENTS PER 100,000 HOURS FLYING TIME)
7.9 5.4 3.6 2.6 3.1 3.5 5.3 6.4 6.0 6.6 6.3 6.1
TAC 15
16 2.9 8.6 9.0 7.3 8.0 8.1 6.9 6.8 7.5 8.1 7.3 7.0

5.3 2.8 5.3 3.7 4.7 6.8 5.8 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.4 5.4
15
16 10.5 5.0 6.5 4.8 3.8 3.9 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.9
AFRES 15
16 0 0 11.3 8.1 6.1 4.9 4.1 7.2 6.3 5.7 5.3 7.3

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

* U.S' GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977 7 35 - 023/ 4