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Joseph E. Stiglitz (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents

Article in Economic Notes · February 2003

DOI: 10.1046/j.0391-5026.2003.00107.x · Source: RePEc

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 [from Economic Notes, Vol. 32.2003, 1, p. 123]
Essay review on:
Joseph E. Stiglitz (2002), Globalization and Its Discontents, W.W. Norton & Co., New York – London
by
Giovanni Ferri (Department of Economics – University of Bari – Italy – g.ferri@dse.uniba.it)

For three reasons, it wasn’t easy for me to write a review on this book for Economic Notes–
Review of Banking, Finance and Monetary Economics. First, Joseph E. Stiglitz (henceforth JES) is
an active member of this Journal’s Advisory Board: I could then be accused of favouritism if my
review is too positive. Second, the book is not so much about economics as much as it is about the
political economy of economic policy making at the international level: A challenging topic
indeed, where maybe other scholars possess better theoretical foundations than I. Last but not least,
I worked somewhat close to the author during the East Asian crisis, while he served as the World
Bank’s Chief Economist: One might therefore hold that any appreciation depends on partisanship.
Transparency demands this be stated upfront.
Has the “boy from Gary, Indiana” (as JES likes to define himself) grown mad? The
question needs to be posed if one reads what Rogoff (2002) contends in his open letter confronting
JES on the book under comment. In my view the answer is that, as Mark Twain put it, “the reports
are greatly exaggerated”. Before we go into some of the details, it is in fact to be mentioned that,
on most of what he argues in the book, JES is neither substantially innovating with respect to what
he already publicly said in the past, nor is he alone in the economics profession or the world elites at
large. Indeed, what the book does is providing for an escalation as to the tone and the terrain of the
confrontation. While it is legitimate to complain that this escalation is harmful to elicit sound
reform tackling the problems at stake, in my opinion, the success or failure of the book will have to
be assessed in the future once it will be possible to fully evaluate whether the change in JES’
strategy paid up or backfired. In the meantime, preliminary evidence (see below) seems to show
that the book is being effective in exhuming more open discussion on the debated issues, also at the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the main target of the book’s criticism and allegations. If
confirmed, this in itself would be a success as one of the chief accusations in the book is that the
IMF erred because its debates were kept behind closed doors.1
Before substantiating this conclusion, we need to go into some of the specific elements in
the book. This means that we have to synthesize the main ingredients of the debate, even though
this risks being pedantic to the many observers who are already very well familiar with it.
The bulk of JES’ accusations is that globalisation is a boon only if it is properly governed,
but the International Economic Institutions (IEIs) and, primarily, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) that should ensure such a governance have failed the task. The conclusion is that the IMF
and the other IEIs (i.e., the World Bank and the World Trade Organization) have to be reformed to
deliver policies that will make globalisation more equitable and, thus, avoid that it is perceived by
many around the world more as a problem than as an opportunity. Lacking such reform, JES
admonishes, discontents might grow: Globalisation might be checked and its great potential benefits
might go lost.
Most of the book is devoted to chastise the IMF for its failure in three main areas: (i) crisis
management (e.g., the East Asian crisis); (ii) development of poorer countries (a problem that JES

1
While I will try to keep away from taking a position in the confrontation, what should be stated is that transforming
the debate into a personal fight is not helpful. It would be useful if this were avoided on both sides, but particularly on
the part of the IMF, which is an institution and not an academician.

1
doesn’t see in the IMF agenda); (iii) transition from planned to market economies (e.g., the
problems with Russia). More generally, the IMF is accused of having undergone a great mutation
from Keynes’ creature to fight global depressions to “the cockpit of market fundamentalism” and
the “Washington Consensus”. In this regard, JES stresses that IEIs need to have a more open
mindset rather than rely on a unique model (there is a plurality of models: There’s no single way to
the market economy) and refrain from prescribing one-size-fits-all policies that may be harmful.
The allegation is that, by prescribing seemingly pro-market policies that however exacerbate the
risks of systemic shocks (e.g., early capital account opening, premature domestic financial
liberalization) and disregard the need for social safety nets, the Washington Consensus is
undermining globalisation. Since, according to JES, they do not cater for the benefits of
globalisation to be shared and, to the contrary, produce growing inequality such policies may have
become the most serious obstacle to expand free trade, the extent of markets and, accordingly, reap
larger gains for the world.
In Chapter 3 (Freedom to Choose?), JES identifies the three pillars of the Washington
Consensus (fiscal austerity, privatisation, and market liberalisation) and contends that “… the
problem was that many of these policies became ends in themselves, rather than means to more
equitable and sustainable growth.” That’s why these policies had to be pursued quickly –and the
assisted countries had to sign in conditionality to this– while there was no serious attempt to adapt
them to local circumstances. First, according to JES, quick privatisation policies can be criticized
on two grounds: (i) expansive (and not contractionary as done in the past) aggregate demand
policies need to accompany privatisations, with the former creating jobs to match the job
destruction by the latter; (ii) privatisations have to be equitable and transparent to avoid breeding
corruption; in turn, this requires that appropriate legal structures and market institutions be formed
before privatising. Second, still in the author’s view, liberalisation –through the removal of
government interference in domestic markets as well as the elimination of barriers to trade and
capital exchanges with abroad– is designed to promote more efficient market allocation. But this
approach may do more harm than good if liberalisation is carried out without putting it in its proper
context and lacking the proper institutional set up. For instance, lacking adequate regulation and
supervision of banks, early capital account opening and also domestic financial liberalisation are
likely sources of instability. Third, according to JES, sequencing of reforms is crucial or
liberalisation will not be successful. In fact, institution building must precede or at least accompany
liberalisation but also there must be a social consensus in the nation that is undertaking such
transformation. And the social consensus may only rest on the respect of a social contract whereby
benefits will be widely shared. Unfortunately, the Washington Consensus does not worry about the
social contract, as it believes in “trickle down economics”, i.e., the idea that growth by itself will
heal the problems it initially causes. But, according to JES, this is not so and even the IFIs have
recognised that poverty reduction must be explicitly addressed in order to make growth sustainable.
However, according to JES, here comes the problem of the priorities: if poverty reduction is
inserted as the 39th item in a list of 40 objectives, maybe it will not get much attention after all and
its inclusion appears driven more by a maquillage intent than by serious concern.
In Chapter 4 (The East Asia Crisis – How IMF Policies Brought the World to the Verge of a
Global Meltdown), JES holds that IMF policies did not work in managing the East Asian crisis
because they were wrong. Approaching the management of the East Asian crisis with its one-size-
fits-all policies of the Washington Consensus, the IMF founded its intervention on: (i) higher
interest rates; (ii) fiscal austerity; (iii) structural reforms. When the policies failed, “the IMF
charged the country(s) with failing to take the necessary reforms seriously. In each case, it
announced the world that there were fundamental problems that had to be addressed before a true
recovery could take place. Doing so was like crying fire in a crowded theatre: investors, more
convinced by the diagnosis of the problem than by the prescriptions, fled. Rather than restoring
confidence that would lead to an inflow of capital into the country, IMF criticism exacerbated the

2
stampede of capital out.” “Because of this … the perception through much of the developing world
… is that the IMF itself had become a part of the countries’ problem rather than part of the solution.
Indeed, in several of the crisis countries, … people continue to refer to the economic and social
storm that hit their nations simply as ‘the IMF’ …”. This has much to do with the fact that those
liberalisation policies were forced onto the East Asian countries that –also because of their long
impressive growth– didn’t have social safety nets. In JES’ view, the single most important factor
leading to the crisis was early capital account liberalisation that, in turn, was pushed onto the
countries by the Washington Consensus, representing in that the vested interests of the financial
community.
In JES’ recount, there were three rounds of mistakes by the IMF. The first derived from
applying to East Asia the policy menu elaborated for high public deficit and inflation-driven Latin
American crises of the 1980s without taking into account that, in light of the impending recession,
the problem for East Asia was lack (and not excess) of aggregate demand and also that East Asian
firms were highly leveraged. So, the IMF advised contractionary fiscal and monetary policies that
aggravated the recession by reducing aggregate demand and trade across the region. Furthermore,
instead of attracting capital via higher yields and stabilising exchange rates, tight monetary policies
magnified bankruptcies of the highly leveraged East Asian corporates and, thus increasing the risk
of default, aggravated the fall in confidence in these countries. The second round of IMF mistakes
had to do with its inadequate understanding of the policies needed to address bank and corporate
restructuring in the face of macro-driven large scale bankruptcies. Failure to perform a quick and
complete closure of endangered banks, uncertainties on the extent and modality of state intervention
triggered major bank runs through the region, disrupting credit flows and destroying precious
informational capital in the banks. In addition, restructuring strategies were unclear and slow,
driving to increased uncertainty and unneeded bankruptcies. The third round of mistakes was the
IMF’s failure to recognize that the harsh policies it was recommending could cause damage to the
East Asian social fabric –lacking social safety nets so badly, just thanks to its marvellous growth
record– and even generate turmoil (as was clearly the case in Indonesia). The problem was later
admitted –e.g., after being cut, food subsidies in Indonesia were restored– but the damage had
already been inflicted
JES points out that China and Malaysia are the best examples of how Eat Asian countries
could avoid or reduce the negative impact of the crisis by following policies that were markedly
different than what recommended by the IMF: China did not have free capital movements and
Malaysia introduced temporary capital controls. In addition, JES holds that: (i) via de-leveraging,
IMF policies may have reduced long-term growth in East Asia; (ii) IMF policy failures –and even
the strategy to adjust policies as they prove inappropriate is very serious, since “bankrupted firms
cannot be un-bankrupted”– partly derived from its insufficient accountability.
At the end of the chapter, JES proposes his seven-point alternative strategy to manage the
crisis: (1) follow expansionary fiscal and monetary policies; (2) promote quick financial
restructuring; (3) but the financial restructuring needed to be coupled with maintaining finance
flows to corporates and a standstill of scheduled debt repayments; (4) financial restructuring could
then be followed by real restructuring; (5) however, real restructuring should take place only with
special bankruptcy provisions (a “super-Chapter 11) aimed at the quick resolution of distress from
macro-driven disturbances; (6) strong (temporary) intervention by the government is required; (7)
once all the previous points are in place, firms can effectively benefit from the large exchange rate
depreciation.
In Chapter 5 (Who Lost Russia?), JES maintains that the deep problems with Russia’s
transition from a planned to a market economy have to be explained in light of the shock therapy
chosen by the country, especially thanks to the advice of Western “market Bolsheviks” advisers,
mostly reflecting US Treasury/IMF mindset and policies. The main shortcoming of these policies
was their failure to recognise and give adequate weight to social and political issues fundamental to
3
the transition. Part of the problem was the failure to understand that institutions with the same
name (e.g., a bank) as their Western homologues existed under the USSR but they played a totally
different role. Thus, the trouble came from disregarding the deep need for institution building:
More attention to this issue could only change the choice from shock therapy to gradualism, as the
success of China testifies.
According to JES, examples of the fiasco of the shock therapy abound. First, a partial price
liberalisation accompanied by stabilisation and “friendly” privatisation played a major role in the
advent of “rent seeking” capitalism in Russia and the situation was only made worse by the early
capital account opening that allowed massive capital flows out of the country. In addition, in light
of its fiscal problems, Russia couldn’t even afford building its needed safety nets. If the near cause
of Russia’s 1998 default was the Asian crisis and the fall in oil prices, the long overvalued ruble
built the background conditions by depressing the economy, helping the “oligarchs” drive capital
out, and lowering confidence in the country. In the occasion, the IMF led Russia to resist the
speculative attacks by borrowing heavily in foreign exchange, a move that can be rationalised with
an attempt to outsmart the market and/or close the devaluation option. There was heated debate
across 19th Street about making a further large loan to Russia in July 1998 since some believed that
this would only aggravate the situation. When the default came (in August) this renewed the global
financial crisis. While the oligarchs gained and Western banks were helped to limit their losses, the
burden of the additional loan eventually came on the shoulders of Russian taxpayers. Finally, the
good news was that the wild devaluation of the ruble revived the economy and this proved that the
Russian economic implosion had to do not only with the lack of supply but also with the lack of
demand induced by (overly) tight policies.
Though Russia had the good company of most other transition economies, its case is the
paramount example of the failure of the transition. The big persistent drop in GDP was coupled
with increased poverty and inequality. JES asks how much of this could be avoided through better
policies. He claims that: (i) over-zealous anti-inflation policies drove the ruble overvalued and
chocked aggregate demand, provoking de-industrialisation; (ii) privatisation without proper tax,
institutional and corporate governance set ups induced asset stripping by the oligarchs and even by
local governments; (iii) the major drive to favour the oligarchs came in 1995 when Yeltzin
launched a massive privatisation through a loan-share swap with the banks that were controlled by
his friends; (iv) at the same time, disregard for the enlarging poverty led to a breach in the social
contract, in turn this destroyed social capital and trust and prevented markets from well functioning;
(v) the above shows that the problem with the shock therapy was not in its speed but rather in its
wrong incentives: lack of understanding on institution building led to policies with far reaching
depressing effects on the role of the middle class (the keystone of a market economy) that were
further aggravated by lack of focus on independent media.
In Chapter 6 (Unfair Fair Trade Laws and Other Mischief), JES states that the problem with
the Russian faulty transition and the choice of wrong policies derived not only from choosing the
“wrong horse” (Yeltzin) but also from trying to avoid public discussion both in the US and at the
international level. JES believes that the debacle was not the result of a deliberate attempt to
undermine Russia –though US/Western interests were taken care of when the July 1998 loan
allowed for the bailing out of the investment banks– but simply depended on bad economic
policies.
In Chapter 7 (Better Roads to the Market), JES further exemplifies his point by contrasting
the success of the transition economies that chose gradualism (e.g., China and Poland) relative to
those that chose the shock therapy approach (e.g., Russia and the Czech Republic). Specifically,
gradual privatisation was a fundamental ingredient to avoid assets stripping. China offers an
example of good sequencing: (i) start the liberalisation from agriculture; (ii) set up the right
incentive “at the margin” (e.g., additional output can be sold at the market price); (iii) pay due

4
attention to social stability (via the two-track system); (iv) within a context of stability and growth,
foster competition before privatisation.
Finally, in Chapter 9 (The Way Ahead), JES holds that the fact that the IEIs propose the
one-size-fits-all policies of the Washington Consensus –shaped by the ideology of market
fundamentalism and refusing government intervention even when there is a strong case for it–
results from the existence of a major problem with their governance. This is a case of global
governance without global government. To whom are the IEIs accountable? They are controlled
by officials from the developed nations representing specific interests even within their own
countries: finance ministers and central bank governors for the IMF-WB, trade ministers for the
WTO. This leads JES to conclude that behind the mindset imposing (questionable) Washington
Consensus policies is the fact that the IEIs cater for particular interests associated with a parochial
perspective. As such, the IEIs lack representation of and accountability to groups other than the
financial community and the business/commerce community of developed countries. Les liaisons
dangereux between top US Treasury/IMF officials and big finance companies reinvigorates the
suspect that IMF views and actions are distorted by these specific interests. And in many instances
there is a conflict between pursuing global stability and catering for these specific interests. Beside,
since the mindset behind policies is pre-established with no open debate –IMF resistance to account
for success stories whose upbringing violated the principles of the Washington Consensus (e.g., the
East Asian miracle) is but an example of the danger of shielding debate behind closed doors–
countries receiving support form the IMF feel left out. Globalisation calls for global institutions
addressing global externalities: according to JES, major changes are needed in the governance and
voting rights of IEIs. Also more openness and transparency is needed as secrecy undercuts
democracy and accountability. While some changes are occurring (e.g., more transparency,
rethinking the strategy behind the large bailouts) the pace is too slow. JES makes two proposals:
one directly to reshape the IMF, the other to more broadly reform the international financial system.
The former proposal is to streamline the IMF and make it more accountable by: (i) refocusing it on
its core business of crisis management, while keeping it away from development and transition
issues; (ii) separate its statistical production from its program management since there may be
conflicts of interests between the two functions; (iii) abandon Article 4 global monitoring in favour
of regional monitoring. The latter is a 7-point proposal: (1) acceptance of the problems with early
capital account opening and of the need to govern short-term capital flows (a Tobin tax?); (2) need
for payments standstill and new workout procedures (e.g., super-Chapter 11) to deal with macro-
driven bankruptcies; (3) phase out the large IMF bailouts since these are major sources of
distortions and moral hazard for creditors; (4) improve banking regulation to limit short-term
lending frenzies (capital/asset requirements may not be enough); (5) better risk management of
exchange rate fluctuations; (6) improve safety nets; (7) enhance crisis response by maintaining
credit flows, avoiding to depress trade, putting responses in proper social and political context,
mandating the IMF to help countries in crisis keep up aggregate demand.
To get this process of reform moving, JES believes that “voices must be raised … to address
the legitimate concerns of those who have expressed discontent with globalization, if we are to
make globalization work for the billions of people for whom it has not, if we are to make
globalization with a human face succeed”.
In my view, this ideological need to mobilise the peoples of the world is the ultimate
motivation behind this book. We may believe this is a wrong approach, but if we don’t recognise
his deep motivation we would fail to understand while a Nobel Prize winner ventured into such dire
straits.
Some criticisms are in order. First, the book is sometimes repetitive and it could be
substantially shorter without loosing much of its contents. Second, not enough credit is given to
some of the changes that are occurring. I’ll give just one example. Ann Krueger, representing the
USA in the top ranks of the IMF, has made an important proposal to build a new framework to
5
assist countries unable to meet their debt payments to international financial markets (thus
facilitating re-negotiation; IMF, 2001). Third, personal attacks on IMF top ranking officials –e.g.,
the allegation that some of them moved from 19th Street to Wall Street– are bad taste and debase the
essay, rather than making it more forceful, also because JES’ thesis is not that there is a Wall Street
conspiracy but, rather, that an unaccountable IMF has outmoded ideas and mindset. Fourth,
sometimes causality can be reverse with respect to what envisaged by JES: e.g., did the barter
economy in Russia come about because of tight monetary policy or because hyperinflation (that was
later fought with tight money)? Fifth, a book with exactly the same title was published just two
years ago (McBride and Wiseman, 2000): Even though choosing the same title is lawful, it would
be elegant to acknowledge it.
These criticisms notwithstanding, several points the book makes cannot be rejected without
thorough discussion.
It is important to reiterate that JES is not alone to make allegations of IMF’s misconduct.
After all, if we disregard his pugnacious tones, so much of what JES writes in this book had not
only been already spelled out by the author in his own speeches and policy papers, but it seems to
substantially overlap with what other respected scholars wrote on the two most noticeable episodes
where IMF policies have been under criticism: The East Asian crisis and the transition in Russia
and other former communist countries. To quote just a few, we can refer to Blustein (2001),
Feldstein (2002), Krugman (1999) and Radelet and Sachs (2000): It is interesting to note that even
this short list includes economists holding very different perspectives on the balance trade-off
between government and market failures.
Another point is the assessment of the extent to which past errors are leading to correction.
While the IMF has moved to adjust, to some degree in the right direction (e.g., Krueger’s proposal
cited above), not all of its moves are credible. For instance, one of the main allegation by JES was
that the IMF lacks accountability. Perhaps in response to this criticism, in July 2001, the IMF
established an Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). Unfortunately, up to now, the IEO is judged
ineffective (if not a maquillage) by most respected scholars. The way the IEO was structured does
not conform to the best received principles: (i) the unit does not have an autonomous budget; (ii)
most, if not all, of its staff come from the IMF; (iii) the unit seems to lack capability to acquire
autonomous information and is thus forced to rely on information derived from the subject it is
supposed to evaluate; (iv) in general, it appears that its whole incentive structure is not conducive
to the IEO taking a strong, independent (and sometimes confrontational) position vis-à-vis the
official IMF standpoint.
But, coming back to the big picture, as said, the book is about the political economy of
economic policy making at the international level. What does this cacophonous phrase mean? It
means that more often than not, there is no single policy option to deal with one particular problem.
A choice has then to be made among different policies and the way this choice is made must itself
be cast in an economic framework to consider its tradeoffs. To be sure, however, different policy
choices will help/harm different interest groups. Transparency and accountability are fundamental
at this juncture, and the need arises for open debate. As said above, in my view, we need not
evaluate the book in terms of its analytic contents but, rather, in terms of its impact to elicit such
open debate. In other words, the book doesn’t intend to offer analytic contributions. Most of JES’
theses in the book are grounded in analytical work already conducted by himself and others.
Naturally, consensus varies across these theses (e.g., agreement is large on payments standstills and
super-bankruptcy procedures to deal with systemic shocks, while debate is still on as to the link
between tight monetary policy and the exchange rate), but this is not the point with the book.
Is then JES’ book being effective at stimulating the needed more open (even harsh) debate?
And, is such debate becoming more open at the IMF? To answer this question, I performed the
following exercise. On 8th November 2002, I downloaded form the IMF website open to the public

6
all the documents having the word “Stiglitz”. I obtained 78 documents starting from one dated 26th
May 1997 to finish with one dated 30th October 2002. Then I grouped the documents into three
different categories: (i) “substantive feedback”, those documents where IMF (officials) were
fighting back JES’ allegations of its misconduct;2 (ii) “institutional report”, all the documents
where reference was made to JES’ institutional engagements; (iii) “academic citation”, those
documents where academic reference was made to one or more JES’ publications. Table 1 presents
all of these documents by title according to their grouping, while Figure 1 pictures the quantitative
importance of each one of the three groups over the twelve half-years between early 1997 and late
2002.
Figure 1 clearly shows a bimodal shape: The first hump crests at 9 documents in the second
half of 1999, then the number of documents reduces as JES returns to academia, but after the book
is out the second peak reaches much higher to 21 documents in the second half of 2002 (even
though my search covers only four of the six months in H2-02) and we can’t even tell yet whether
this is the tip or the phenomenon will still mount in the first half of 2003. What’s more, the
composition of the documents by type changes drastically between the first hump and the second
hike. In the second half of 1999 –while JES was Chief Economist and Senior Vice President at the
World Bank– most of the documents were academic citations (8 out of 9), one was an institutional
report, but none of them was a substantial feedback, though JES was heavily and publicly critical of
the IMF even at the time. On the contrary, in the second half of 2002 –with the book out– the
driving force has been substantial feedbacks (16 out of 21).
From this evidence we may draw two conclusions. First, the IMF has moved from a
strategy of “malignant neglect” (when JES was the World Bank’s Chief Economist and in the first
two years he was back to academia) to one of “substantive feedback” to fight JES’ allegations.
Second, even though some of the IMF’s substantive feedbacks loom around personal accusations,
the debate has been taken to the open: It’s no longer behind closed doors.
Thus, to use a boxing term, was the book a “hit under the belt”? In light of what I argued,
it’s difficult to say but even if we believe that it was, we should recognize that the belt was set
rather high and that the hit seems to be successful.
To finish with another allegory, as those who are familiar with Siena, Italy (the founding
place of this Journal) know well, July the 2nd (together with August 16th) is a very special date for
this medieval city. After a long preparation behind closed doors, horses come to the open career in
the magic Piazza del Campo and the fighting among the many city parishes will soon come to an
end: The Palio prize will be awarded before dusk. In coming to the public arena with the most
vibrant and substantive feedback yet from the IMF to JES, Prof. Rogoff probably didn’t notice that
he was riding on July 2nd. Is there any recondite prophecy? As people know, the Palio race is full
of tricks: Horse-back-riders can try privately bribing rivals before the race starts and, if that fails,
can fight and even hurt each other during the race; sometimes riders miserably fall to the ground.
But the win comes with the horse, not with the rider. Even though there is no guarantee that the
best horse (and not that of the most powerful parish) will win the race, sometimes this happens … at
least at the Palio.

2
As it happens, substantive feedbacks may take widely diverse shapes. The most natural one is when Mr. Dawson
(Director of the External Relations Department of the IMF) writes a letter to a newspaper or magazine that has shown
sympathy to JES’ ideas. Then, when the situation becomes more heated, even the Chief Economist abandons his
readings to write letters to newspapers. Perhaps the most special case is that of Mr. Barro Chambrier (Executive
Director at the IMF for Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of
Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, and Togo) who, in his farewell speech to the Executive
Board of the IMF confesses he discovered that even his daughter was reading JES’ book and, though trying, he’s not
sure of being successful to convince her that JES is wrong.

7
8
 References
Blustein, P. (2001), The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and
Humbled the IMF, New York, Public Affairs Books.
Feldstein, M.S. (2002), “Economic and Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies: Overview
of Prevention and Management”, NBER working paper No. W8837, March.
IMF (2001), IMF Survey, 30, no. 23, December 10.
Krugman, P. (1999), The Return of Depression Economics, New York-London, Norton.
McBride, S., and J. Wiseman (2000; eds.) Globalization and Its Discontents, New York–St. Martin’s
Press & London–Macmillan Press.
Radelet, S., and J. Sachs (2000), “The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis”, in Paul Krugman
(ed.) NBER Conference Report Series. Currency Crises, Chicago-London, University of
Chicago Press.
Rogoff, K. (2002), An Open Letter to Joseph Stiglitz, July 2nd, www.imf.org.

9
Figure 1. Documents with Word "Stiglitz" in IMF Website by Half-year and Motive

25

Stiglitz is Chief Economist at the World Bank Stiglitz returns to academia book is out

20

15

10

0
H197 H297 H198 H298 H199 H299 H100 H200 H101 H201 H102 H202

Substantive feedback Institutional report Academic citation

Source: Author’s calculations on data downloaded on 8 November 2002 from: http://www.imf.org

and listed in Table 1.

10
Table 1. Documents with Word "Stiglitz" in IMF Website Grouped by Motive
Date Substantive feedback Institutional report Academic citation

26 May 1997 (i) Report WB's ABCDE Conf. + (ii) Program IMF-WB Meetings

1 Sep 1997 (i) Program IMF-WB Meetings + (ii) Program IMF-WB Meetings

21 Jan 1998 Reference by Mr. Saito Director Asia Reg. IMF

23 Feb 1998 Program IMF-WB Meetings

20 Apr 1998 Report WB's ABCDE Conference

11 May 1998 Report WB's ABCDE Conference

4 Sep 1998 Journalist's reference at IMF Press Conference

1 Oct 1998 (i) References to two papers + (ii) Reference to a paper

21 Dec 1998 Mr. Mussa questions JES' views at IMF Press Conference

25 Jan 1999 Report AEA Annual Meeting

18 Mar 1999 Program IMF-WB Meetings

1 May 1999 Reference to a paper

10 May 1999 Report IMF-WB-WTO Meeting

24 May 1999 Report WB's ABCDE Conference

1 Jun 1999 Reference to a paper

30 Jun 1999 Reference to a paper

20 Sep 1999 Reference to a paper

23 Sep 1999 Reference at IMF Press Conference

24 Sep 1999 Reference to a paper

14 Oct 1999 Reference to a paper

20 Oct 1999 Reference to a paper

22 Oct 1999 Reference to a paper

26 Oct 1999 Reference to a paper

1 Nov 1999 Reference to a paper

1 Dec 1999 Reference to a paper

21 Jan 2000 Reference to a paper

20 Mar 2000 Reference to a paper

23 Mar 2000 (i) Reference to a paper + (ii) Reference to a paper

1 Apr 2000 Reference to a paper

15 Apr 2000 Letter to Barrons to attack article friendly to JES' views

8 May 2000 Report WB's ABCDE Conference

1 Jun 2000 Conference calendar

19 Sep 2000 Reference to a paper

3 Nov 2000 Reference to a paper

20 Nov 2000 Report IMF Conference

1 Dec 2000 Reference to a paper

18 Dec 2000 Reference to a paper

22 Jan 2001 Report JES participates to two panels at IMF

31 Mar 2001 Reference to a paper

2 Apr 2001 Reference to a paper

3 May 2001 Letter to The Observer to attack article friendly to JES' views

1 Sep 2001 Report of two JES' papers coming out

16 Nov 2001 Reference to a paper

13 Dec 2001 Executive Board's review on transparency

17 Jan 2002 Journalist's reference at IMF Press Conference

11 Mar 2002 Report JES participates to a IMF Conference

14 Mar 2002 Report WB paper citing JES paper

16 May 2002 Mr. Dawson attacks JES on Argentina at IMF Press Conference

13 Jun 2002 Mr. Dawson attacks JES in speech at MIT Club Washington

17 Jun 2002 Letter to Les Echos to attack article friendly to JES' views

18 Jun 2002 Three references in three IEO separate documents

2 Jul 2002 (i) Mr. Dawson attacks JES at IMF Press Brief + (ii) Open letter by Mr. Rogoff

8 Jul 2002 IMF Survey reports open letter by Mr. Rogoff

9 Jul 2002 Two letters to The Toronto Star and The Times to attack articles friendly to JES' views

16 Jul 2002 Letter to The Guardian to attack article friendly to JES' views

25 Jul 2002 Letter to Far Eastern Economic Review to attack article friendly to JES' views

3 Aug 2002 Letter to The Financial Times to attack article friendly to JES' views

5 Aug 2002 (i) Letter to The New Yorker to attack article friendly to JES' views + (ii) IMF Survey reports Mr. Boorman's criticism of JES

12 Aug 2002 Reference to a paper

26 Aug 2002 Letter by Mr. Rogoff to Vedomosti to attack JES' views on Russia Reference to a paper

27 Aug 2002 Letter to Le Figaro to attack article friendly to JES' views

1 Sep 2002 Reference to a paper

2 Sep 2002 Letter to Le Monde to attack article friendly to JES' views

12 Sep 2002 Letter by Mr. Camdessus to Nouvel Observateur to attack JES' views on Russia Reference to a paper

19 Sep 2002 Journalist's reference at IMF Briefing

4 Oct 2002 Letter by Mr. Rogoff to Le Monde to attack JES' views

30 Oct 2002 IMF Executive Director discovers his daugther reads JES book

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