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IQBAL IslamModernScience 2000
IQBAL IslamModernScience 2000
IQBAL IslamModernScience 2000
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Introduction
Islam and Muslims have played a rather insignificant role in the birth and
development of modern science. The historical currents that gave birth to
modern science were diverse and complex. European civilization did receive
certain concepts, ideas, scientific data and theories from the Islamic scientific
tradition but that borrowing was restricted to a period and a worldview which
was characteristically medieval, not modern. During the seventeenth century
Scientific Revolution, these contributions of the Islamic scientific tradition to
European science were lost in the process that gave birth to modern science. In
the final analysis, the Islamic view of Nature has nothing to do with the
concept of Nature on which modern science is based.
The paper asserts that the contributions made by the translation
movement that brought Islamic (and Greek) scientific and philosophical works
to Europe were limited to the beginning of the Renaissance period after which
the scientific enterprise in Europe (and later in the whole of Western world,
including the United States of America) took a decisively different course,
making it a strictly Western phenomenon.
The paper further argues that by severing its ties with the metaphysical
foundations on which Islamic science was based, modern science produced a
fundamental cleavage with whatever it may have received from the Islamic
scientific tradition. It also explores the process of appropriation and
transformation of the Islamic scientific tradition as it flowed into the currents
that were shaping European science at the time of translation movement and
identifies various points of cleavage produced during the process of
appropriation—a severance that fundamentally altered the received material.
Finally, the paper attempts to formulate questions that can be legitimately
asked about the relationship of Islam with modern science.
1 The Middle Ages extend over at least nine hundred years. Most historians take the end of
Roman civilization in the Latin West (around 500 ce) as the beginning of the Middle Ages. The
period between 500 to 1000 forms the early Middle Ages and the period between 1000 and 1200
is generally classified as the transition period. From 1200 to 1450 is the "high" or "late" Middle
Ages. Not all historians agree on these dates. But there is a consensus that by 1450, European
Renaissance was well underway and the Middle Ages were over.
2 The Benedictine Rules were widely adopted within Western monasticism. The monastic life
was primarily devoted to contemplation and worship but there are enough examples to dispel
the generally held view that natural philosophy (as science was then called) was totally absent
from monastic tradition. The well-known examples of Isidore of Seville (ca. 560-636) and the
Venerable Bede (d. 735) testify to the presence of a tradition that was not wholly devoid of
interest in Nature and its study. Raised in Spain, and educated by his elder brother, Isidore lived
under Visigothic rule and became the Archbishop of Seville in 600. His works range from
biblical studies to theology, literature and history. Two of his works, Nature of Things and
Etymologies, are monumental treatises of the Middle Ages which offer encyclopedic accounts of
the whole range of classical learning. The Etymologies is a fascinating account of nature of things
on the basis of etymologies of their names. It exists in more than one thousand manuscripts and
covers all branches of knowledge covered in the Middle Ages: theology, medicine, law,
timekeeping (including the calendar), geography, agriculture, cosmology, mineralogy and
anthropology. For further details on Isidore, see, William H. Stahl, Roman Science: Origins,
Development and Influence to the Later Middle Ages (Madison: University of Madison Press,
1962), 213-23.
3 Ibid., 223-32.
4 For these details, see, David Lindberg, The Beginnigs of Western Science (Chicago: Uni
Chicago Press, 1992), 185.
3 Ibid., and references therein.
between Islam and Latin Christendom. Gerbert arose from his humble
beginnings to the high office of Pope through a series of dramatic events
which exhibit his sharp intelligence as well as scholarship. His election as Pope
Sylvester II in 999 provided him an institutional structure for the pursuit of
his scholarly ambitions. But already in 967 when Gerbert crossed the Pyrenees
into the northeastern corner of Spain to study mathematical sciences with
Atto, the bishop of Vich, he had forged a link with the Muslim Spain which
was to serve as a decisive point of contact between Islamic scientific tradition
and Latin West.
Gerbert's letters are our source for ascertaining the extent of his interest
in Islamic sciences at this early stage of intellectual interaction between
Muslim Spain and Europe. The Letters of Gerbert with His Papal Privileges as
Sylvester II,6 provide ample testimony to Gerbert's wide ranging interests as
well as influence. In these letters, one finds Gerbert asking for specific
manuscripts and books. In one letter, he asks for a book on numbers by the
Arabic speaking Christian Joseph the Spaniard, in another, he asks for a book
on astronomy which had been translated from Arabic by Luptins. He
instructs friends on mathematical and geometrical problems and imparts
instructions on the construction of astronomical model as well as on the use of
abacus for multiplication and division, using Arabic numerals.
6 Harriet Pratt Lattin, ed. and trans., The Letters of Gilbert with His Papal Privileges as Sylvester II
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
David Herlihy, "Demography" in Joseph R. Stiaye, ed., Dictionary of Middle Ages [henceforth
DMA], 13 vols. (New York : Scribner 1982— ), 4: 136-48
During the eleventh and the twelfth centuries, along with the populatio
explosion, there arose a chain of new schools throughout Western Eur
with far broader aims than those of monastery schools. What is important
our purposes is the fact that these schools were centred on the interests of
"master" who directed them, just like the schools in the Islamic civilizat
which attracted students to a particular teacher whose name was synonymo
with that of the school. And just like their counterpart in the Muslim worl
these European schools were not fixed geographically; they went where thei
master-teacher went.8
These new schools multiplied. The number of students and teacher
increased and some of them became large enough to need organization a
administration; this was the beginning of evolution of universities whi
would subsequently become home to an intense scientific activity.
These universities arose in Western Europe as spontaneously as the
schools had. No date can be fixed for their founding because they were
founded. At that early stage, universities were not educational institut
with buildings and charters; rather, the early universities were merel
voluntary associations or guilds where teachers and students pursued th
common interests. The word "university" (from the Latin universitàs) mere
meant a guild, corporation or association where people pursued commo
(universal) ends; it had no educational connotations. Nonetheless, t
customary date for the masters of Bologna to have achieved university status
1150, for those of Paris, about 1200 and those of Oxford by 1220.9
The presence of stable monarchies created opportunities for employmen
of learned scholars at courts as well as need for administrators for grow
state institutions. This meant expansion of universities and their curric
Education in these early universities followed the centuries old tradition
guilds which had been established all over the world. A student entere
university at about age fourteen and studied with a teacher for three to fou
years, attending lectures and discussing various books and authors. At the e
of that period, the student would present himself to be examined for youn
man's degree. Having passed this examination, the student now became a sor
of journey man who could impart instructions to new students under t
direction of a master, while he continued studies. After another period
8 On the medieval schools, see, Nicholas Orme, English schools in the Middle Ages (Lon
Methuen, 1973); John J. Contreni, "Schools, Cathedral", in DMA, 11: 59-63
9 None of these dates can be taken as fixed. They represent a development in the history
Western Europe which spanned two centuries. For an excellent introduction to the histor
universities, see, Astrik L. Gabriel, "University", in DMA, 12: 282-300. Also see, Geo
Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinbur
Edinburgh University Press, 1981). Professor Makdisi has established that these univers
were established on the pattern of Islamic madrasahs.
three to five years, the student could present himself for a higher examina
that would confer full rights on him and give him full membership in
faculty of arts.
These universities were bigger than schools; numbers varied between 2
to 800 students. Oxford probably had between 1,000 to 1,500 students i
fourteenth century, Bologna was of similar size but Paris may have had up
2,500 students.10
For our study, more than number of students, we need to know
curriculum of these universities. What was taught changed over time b
interesting feature of these early universities was their uniformity
curriculum. There were minor differences in emphasis but almo
universities taught the same subjects from the same texts. This may have
the result of paucity of texts at this stage but this common curricu
produced a phenomenal result: medieval Europe acquired a universal s
Greek and Arabic texts as well as a common set of problems which facilita
a high degree of student and teacher mobility across countries. Thus teach
earned their ius ubique docendi (right of teaching anywhere) and mo
between different universities, all of which used Latin as their languag
instruction.
This, again, demonstrates an important parallel between medieval Euro
and the Muslim world where Arabic was the universal language of scholars
and where students and teachers easily moved across a vast geograph
expanse.
Perhaps the most important characteristic of the medieval European
university curriculum was the fact that from its modest beginnings in the
twelfth century, the Aristotelian tradition grew to hold center stage by the
second half of the thirteenth century. This was, partly, due to the intense
transmission activity that had brought the whole Aristotelian corpus from its
Arab home to Europe.
The links between Muslims and Europeans had never been completely
severed. Travellers, traders and border cities with multi-lingual populace kept
the links alive. As early as 950, there was an official exchange of ambassadors
between the courts of 'Abd al-Rahmän (277/890—350/961) at Cordoba and
Otto the Great (912-973) in Frankfurt. As already mentioned, Gerbert had
gone to northern Spain in the 960s to learn Arabic mathematical sciences. A
century later, Constantine (fl. 1065-85), a north African who had become a
Benedictine monk, went to the monastery of Monte Cassino in southern Italy
where he translated medical treatises from Arabic into Latin. These included
10 Ibid.
the works of Galen (d. 129) and Hippocrates, (ca. 460 BC — ca. 377 Be) which
were to become the foundations of medical literature in the West.11
These were, however, "harmless translations"; they did not impinge upon
faith nor posed any problems for the new class of educated Europeans who
found a most attractive intellectual reservoir in Spain. The presence of
Mözärabs12, a cosmopolitan culture, ample supply of Arabic texts and
generous patronage combined to produce a translation movement which was
to transform European learning over the course of a century and a half. While
this translation activity was beginning, the reconquest of Spain further helped
the process. The fall of Toledo in 1085 into Christian hands provided an
excellent library which was exploited to the maximum extent during the next
hundred years.
In an atmosphere ripe with enthusiasm, adventure, conquest, patronage
and texts, there was no dearth of translators. Many Spaniards were fluent in
Arabic. John of Seville (fl. 1133-42) translated a large number of astrological
works, Hugh of Santalla (fl. 1145) also translated works on astrology and
divination and Mark of Toledo (fl. 1191-1216) translated Galenic texts. Those
who came from abroad included Robert of Chester (fl. 1141-50) from Wales,
Hermann the Dalmatian (fl. 1138-43?), a slav and the Italian, Plato of Tivoli
(fl. 1132-46).
The first translations were done without a scheme and merely for the
sake of transmission of knowledge. But soon there arose need for translation
of specific works whose references had been found in earlier translations and
these were done by able translators who searched for these texts. Among the
greatest of these translators was Gerard of Cremona (ca. 1114—87) who came to
Spain in the late 1130s or early 1140s from northern Italy in search of
Ptolemy's Almagest. He found a copy in Toledo, where he remained until he
could master Arabic to translate it.
But once in Toledo, Gerard also found a host of other texts which were'
simply astounding in character. Over the next thirty to forty years, he was to
produce an enormous number of translations, no doubt with the help of a
team of assistants. Thus, in addition to Almagest, he is credited with the
translation of al-Khwärazmi's Algebra, Euclid's Elements and fifteen other
works on mathematics and optics; fourteen works on logic and natural
philosophy, including Artistotle's Physics, On the Heavens, Meterology, and On
Generation and Corruption; he translated twenty-four medical works, nine of
these were Galenic treatises and one was Canon of Medicine, Ibn Slnä's
monumental work which was to remain as the mainstay of medical
11 Michael McVaugh, "Constantine the African", in Charles Coulston Gillispie, ed., Dictionary
of Scientific Biography [henceforth DSB\, 17 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1981-90), 3: 393-95
12 Spanish and often Arabic speaking Christians.
curriculum all over Europe for at least four hundred years. Total number of
books translated by Gerard of Cremona is between seventy and eighty, all of
these were of high quality because of his command over languages as well as
subject matter.
Let us note, even at the expense of digressing, that Gerard is comparable
to Hunayn ibn Ishâq (192/808—260/873), the Nestorian Christian who is
credited with a large number of translations, ranging from medicine,
philosophy, astronomy, mathematics to magic and oneiromancy13 from Greek
and Syriac into Arabic. Out of the 129 titles enumerated by him in his Risälah,
he himself translated about 100 into Syriac or Arabic or into both. The list is
not exhaustive.14 Likewise the medieval European translation movement can
also be compared with the earlier Baghdad translation movement which
brought a large number of Greek, Persian and Syriac texts into Arabic during
a period extending from eighth to tenth century.
The Greco-Latin translation movement continued well into the
thirteenth century. Just like the Greco-Arabic translation movement, it
became more refined over time and as the technical terms and ability of the
translators improved, many works were retranslated. William of Moerbeke (fl.
1260-86) was one such translator who provided a complete Aristotelian corpus
to Latin Christendom along with translation of major Aristotelian
commentators. He revised older translations where needed. He also translated
a number of Neoplatonic works.
With this background in mind, let us now examine how this received
Greek and Islamic tradition was to first become the dominant intellectual
force in Medieval West and then give way to a new and opposing force out of
which grew the worldview which was to produce modern science.
The first thing to note is the texts that were translated. The Medieval
West seems to have been interested in medicine and astronomy at the
beginning of the translation movement in the tenth and eleventh centuries.
During the first half of the twelfth century, a large number of astrological
works were translated along with enough mathematical works to allow a
15 A. C, Croinbie, Tb-' History of Science: From Augustine to Galileo (New York: Dover
Publications, 1995), pp. 56-58. This seminal, though now dated, work by Crombie has an
interesting publication history. This Dover edition, first published in 1995 is an unabridged
republication of the second revised and enlarged edition (1959), reprinted with corrections in
1970 and reprinted in one volume in 1979 by Heineinann Educational Books, I.ondon, under
the title Augustine to Galileo/Volume I. Science in the Middle Ages: 5th to 13th Centuries; Volume
Π. Science in the Later Middle Ages and Early Modern Times: 13th to the 17th Centuries. (Original
publication: Falcon Press Limited, London, 1952, under the title, Augustine to Galileo: The
History of Science A.D. 400-1650.)
233/847) [by Adelard of Bath and Robert of Chester in the 12th century] a
Jäbir ibn Hayyän (d. 200/815) [by various translators in the 12th and
centuries).
This somewhat incomplete, but representative, list clearly shows that the
European intellectual tradition was looking for a particular type of material;
that it was not interested in the Islamic scientific tradition per se; in the
dynamics of its own development, it needed to recover its own antiquity; it
found it in Aristotle's Arab home and recovered it. In this process, it came
across Ibn Sinâ, Al-Kindï and Ibn Rushd and took them as well—not as
representatives of the Islamic scientific tradition but as commentators of
Aristotelian corpus. Notice that those who were translated, were translated
because of their importance for Aristotelian studies and not for their
contributions to Islamic scientific tradition. Had the Islamic scientific tradition
been the need and focus of the European science, the list of translated material
would not have been restricted to the above group of scholars and scientists,
all of whom were profoundly interested in Aristotle.
Note the omissions in the above list: One obvious omission in this
feverish translation activity is Abü Rayhän al-Blrünl (362/973—442/1050)—
Ibn Sïnâ's able contemporary whose vast corpus of writing, which includes
180 works of varying length, embracing vast fields of knowledge, was not
translated. This omission is more than accidental. Al-Bïrûnï was not translated
because he was not needed at that stage by the European scientific tradition. In
fact, his real appreciation had to wait until the twentieth century. And this is
not an isolated example. Medieval Europe was equally uninterested in a host of
other Muslim scientists whose contributions did not fit the requirements of
the nascent science in Europe.16
16 While the responsibility for the views expressed here is mine, I would like to acknowledge the
input of many discussions held with Syed Nomanul Haq on these matters over the years; these
discussions have contributed to the process of crystallization of these views.
17 On reception of Aristotle in Paris, see, Fernand Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West,
trans., Leonard Johnston (Louvian: Nauwelaerts, 1955)
and hence they will not cease to be. This was obviously in direct contradict
to the opening chapters of Genesis. Likewise, both traditions were threaten
by the Aristotelian notion of the Prime Mover as the deity that was etern
unchanging and hence incapable of intervening in the operation of the cos
that ran on its own on the basis of cause and effect relationships. Obvi
there was no room for miracles—a central element in both the Islamic as w
as the Christian traditions. But this was not all. There were other troub
elements in Aristotelian system which had sparked intense debates in
Muslim world and which now arrived in the Latin West: the astrolog
theories which accompanied Aristotle's philosophy taught that human
and will were influenced by celestial objects and hence they impinged
Christian notions on sin and salvation; the nature of soul in Arist
philosophy which argued that the soul was the form and organizing princi
of the body and had no independent existence. It needed a body to exis
hence at death, both the individual's form (i.e. body) and soul ceased to exi
a notion which was, once again, incompatible with Christian teachings on t
immortality of the soul.
But these specific concepts which were incompatible with Christi
teachings were merely the tip of the iceberg; at a more fundamental l
Aristotle posed the same threat to the Latin West as he had posed to M
East: his system was taken to be a rational alternative to the rev
knowledge. This opened floodgates of another kind; now Aristote
philosophy was standing at par with theology and as a rival to biblical stud
A chasm had opened; one could follow theological methods and arrive a
conclusion or follow philosophical methods to arrive at a totally oppo
conclusion, with both claiming to be true. This was the beginning of
classical fight for authority; the rivalry between Athens and Jerusalem, a f
which would been won by Jerusalem for a short while and then lost forever
As the century ran its course, Aristotle bloomed in the new universiti
The most attractive feature of Aristotelian philosophy was its complete
Aristotle had constructed a cosmos in which everything was in p
everything followed a simple basic set of logical assumptions. He offe
cosmology in which universe and its constituents were convincingly mapp
from the outer heavens to the earth in the centre, everything had a func
and all functions were explained. He provided details which the West
never heard before. From his account of motion to the rich and deta
descriptions of his biological corpus, everything fitted so well in an or
cosmos which ran its course and which was explained in terms such as form
matter, substances, actualities and potentialities the four causes, the
elements, contraries, nature, change, purpose, quantity, quality, time
space.
18 For details of Grosseteste's cosmology, see, James McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert
Grosseteste (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 149-88 and 369-441.
The problems were not resolved, however. With time, they became more
sophisticated. It was realized that at the heart of the problem lie two
epistemological claims: one by philosophy and the other by theology. Τoward
the end of the thirteenth century and early in the fourteenth, men like John
Duns Scotus (ca. 1266-1308) and William of Ockham (ca. 1285-1347) tried to
diminish the area of overlap between theology and philosophy by questioning
the ability of philosophy to address articles of faith with demonstrative
certainty. In this attempt to separate theology and philosophy, there was also
an effort to achieve peace and cohabitation. The central doctrine of this peace
plan was that the Articles of faith could not be challenged by philosophy and
natural philosophy could not encroach on religious grounds.
The influence of Islamic scientific tradition and the debates which it
sparked in the theological circles ran their course, often echoing an earlier era
when these issues were bitterly contested within the Islamic world. A good
example is the emphasis on Divine omnipotence in the theological debates of
the fourteenth century—a theme which was central to Christianity. If God is
absolutely free and omnipotent, this means that the physical world is
contingent rather than necessary. This means that there is no necessity that it
should be what it is; it is entirely dependent on God's Will in all respects: in its
form, function, operation, in fact, in its very existence. The observed physical
laws are not necessary, they are imposed by the divine will. The cause and
effect relationships, too, are not necessary; they are contingent. Fire burns but
not because fire and the act of burning are necessarily connected; rather it is so
because God chose to connect them, empowering fire for the function of
burning. God is free, and can choose to "disconnect" the relationship between
fire and its power to burn, as He did in the case of Shadrach, Meshach and
Abednego when they were cast into burning furnace but were not harmed, as
the Book of Daniel recounts (Ch. 3); this miracle represented a perfect
example of God's omnipotence and His right to suspend natural causation
when He chose. It is no accident that this line of argument reads as if one is
reading al-Ghazâlï (450/1058—505/1111): "In our opinion, the connection
between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually
believed to be an effect is not necessary," al-Ghazall had written in his seminal
work, Taba fut al-Faläsifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers)·.
But [with] any two things, where "this" is not "that" and "that" is not "this" and
where neither the affirmation of the one entails the affirmation of the other nor
the negation of the one entails negation of the other, it is not a necessity of the
existence of the one that the other should exist, and it is not a necessity of the
nonexistence of the one that the other should not exist—for example, the
quenching of the thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, burning and contact
with fire, light and the appearance of the sun, death and decapitation, healing and
II
What difference did the ancient and medieval scientific tradition make in
run? Did it have a permanent or continuing influence on the course or th
of Western science, or was it an inconsequential cul-de-sac that ultim
nowhere? Or to pose the question in its most common form, were medieval a
early modern science continuous with each other, or discontinuous?20
They had to reshape the framework of our intellect itself, to restate and
reform its concepts, to evolve a new approach to Being, a new concept o
knowledge, a new concept of science.23
Maier, On the Threshold of Exact Science: Selected Writings of Anneliese Maier on Late Medieval
Natural Philosophy, Selected and translated with an introduction by Steven D. Sargent
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982). Anneliese Maier is one of the most
insightful historians of science who paid special attention to the philosophical underpinnings of
the Medieval science. Most of her work remains unavailable in English. Her other works on the
subject include the nine volume series Storia e Letteratura (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e
Letteratura, 1966); five volumes of her Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholstik [Studies on
late scholastic natural philosophy] all published by Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, between 1949
and 1958; three volumes of Ausgehendes Mittelalter, collective essays on fourteenth-century
intellectual history published in 1964, 1967 and 1977 by Edinioni di Storia e letteratura. A
memorial volume in her honour was published in 1981 as Studi sul XIV secolo in Memoria di
Anneliese Maier, ed. A. Maierù and A. Paravicini Bagliani (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e
Letteratura, 1981) which includes an updated bibliography of her works.
23 Alexandre Koyré, Metaphysics and Measurement: Essays in the Scientific Revolution (London:
Chapman and Hall, 1968), 21.
24 A.C. Crombie, The History of Science: From Augustine to Galileo, II: 121. Crombie makes
several contradictory statements, often within a single page, about the worth and contributions
of "Arab science" to the Western Christendom. Examples abound: "Of the actual knowledge
from the stores of Greek learning which was transmitted to Western Christendom by the
Arabs, together with some additional observations and comments of their own, some of the
most important was the new Ptolemaic astronomy..." (vol. I, p. 64); one can find such examples
on almost every page of the chapters dealing with the "Arab science". Crombie is a forerunner
of a peculiar breed of historians of science who advance the thesis that all that Muslim scientists
did during the golden age of their science and civilization was to "add a few observations and
comments of their own" to the received Greek science. This breed should be taken as a special
branch of Orientalists and though Orientalism has withered out from the mainstream discourse
on Islam, this breed continues to thrive. See, for example, the work by sociologist Toby E.
Huff, The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China and the West (Cambridge: University of
Cambridge, 1993).
25 David Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science, 361.
26 A. Rupert Hall, The Revolution in Science 1500-1750 (London: Longman, 1983)
For the medieval world, its metaphysical content vis matrix, was the ac
quality that produces motion; only the Cartesians tried to elimin
completely the qualitative aspect of motive force.27
Ibn Rush had formulated this problem in Physica in the follow
manner. He first postulated both possibilities and then chose one as b
more correct. Here is how he conceived the problem: On the one ha
motion differs from "perfection" attained as a result of the motion onl
degree, not in essence; thus from this standpoint, motion belongs to the sam
category as the goal to which it is directed, since motion is nothing but
gradual creation of the "perfection" in question. On the other hand, one
consider motion to be the process by which the "perfection" is attained; in
respect, motion is a genus unto itself, since the "way to the thing" (via ad r
is different from the "thing" itself. Thus considered, motion actu
represents a special category. Ibn Rushd then states that the second opinion
more popular but the first is more correct.28
In contrast, new metaphysics of the seventeenth century was to constru
a mechanical "world of lifeless matter, incessant local motion, and rand
collision," to use David Lindberg's eloquent expression.29 The new metaphysi
thus "... stripped away the sensible qualities so central to Aristotelian natura
philosophy, offering them second-class citizenship, as secondary qualities, o
even reducing them to the status of sensory illusions."
For the explanatory capabilities of form and matter, it offered the size, shape, a
motion of invisible corpuscles—elevating local motion to a position
preeminence among the categories of change and reducing all causality t
efficient and material causality. And for Aristotelian teleology, which discover
purpose within nature, it substituted the purposes of a creator God, imposed o
nature from the outside.30
27 Anneliese Maier "The Nature of Motion" in On the Threshold of Exact Science, 21-39.
28 Averroes, Aristotelis stagiritae de hysico auditu libri octo cum Averrois cordubensis vari
eosdem commentaries, vol. 4 of Aristotelis stagiritae omnia quae extant opera, Juntas Ven
1550, cited by Anneliese Maier, On the Threshold of Exact Science, tr. Steven D. Sargent., 25.
29 David Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science, 362.
30 Ibid.
It was this common universe of discourse that was rent asunder by the rise of
modern science as a fesult of which the religious view of the order of nature,
which is always based on symbolism, was reduced either to irrelevance or to a
matter of mere subjective concern, which made the cosmic teachings of religion
to appear as unreal and irrelevant.31
In the same work, Professor Nasr clearly traces the point of cleavage
between the received material and the new science:
From the idea of cosmic order and laws created by God through His Will and
applicable to both men and nature to the idea of "laws of nature" discoverable
completely by human reason and usually identified with mathematical laws,
divorced from ethical and spiritual laws, there is a major transformation that
played a central role in the rise of modern science. This new idea of laws of
nature also eclipsed the earlier Christian understanding of the subject, although
later theologians tried to "Christianize" the seventeenth-century scientific
concept of laws of nature. Interestingly enough, such an event did not take place
in other civilizations with a long scientific tradition such as the Chinese, Indian,
and Islamic, and this is of great significance in the parting of ways between the
modern West and other civilizations as far as the understanding of the order of
nature and its religious significance are concerned.32
31 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996), 129
32 Ibid., 133
ΠΙ
Out of the fourteen authorities quoted, there are five Greek34, seven
Muslims, one French and two Englishmen. Written in the 1390s by a man
who was a public servant, a courtier and a diplomat trusted by three successive
English kings—Edward ΙΠ (1312-1377), Richard Π (1367-1400) and Henry IV
(1366-1413) — these tales, told by a group of about thirty pilgrims, reflect the
general status of these men and an appraisal of their contributions to the
Medieval Ages.
But within a century, that appraisal was going to change. Islam and
Muslims were going to be cast out of the European memory as major players
in the advancement of science and their role was to be delegated to the second
class citizenship—a position that was to remain firmly entrenched in Western
scholarship for almost five hundred years and only yield to a revised appraisal
toward the end of the twentieth century.35
The European Renaissance attempted to rebuild a civilization based on its
antiquity but without taking note of all that had been achieved between the
loss of its classical heritage and its recovery, through a route that favoured
Plato over Aristotle, atomism of Epicurus and Lucretius in preference to
Aristotle's qualitative matter. It was this fascination of establishing direct
relationship with its own antiquity that led Renaissance philosophers and
scientists to discover pre-Socratic and Pythagorean traditions. The task of
reconstruction of science was proceeding in an atmosphere which was hostile
33 Geoffrey Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), Π:
429.
This was the objection raised by Ibn al-Haytham in his monumental wor
Shukuk 'alä Batlamüs.n The weight of centuries which prevented Copern
from publishing his theory for several years,43 also prevented 'Urdí, who sta
that he was afraid of publishing his astronomical theory because it was
different from what was commonly accepted and that he held on to
theory for several years before he published it.44
When Copernicus finally decided to published his book, D
revolutionibus orbium coelestium,4b in 1543, he had only a few days to live
39 G. Saliba, History of Arabie Astronomy, 29, where he mentions the work of Neugebauer w
established the fact that diagrams representing Tusi Couple were found in the manusc
which were accessible to Copernicus.
40 Ibid., 27.
41 Ibid.
42 See, 'Abd al-Hamid Sabrä and Nabil Shehäbi, al-Shtikük 'ala Batlamyüs (Cairo: National
Library Press, 1971), quoted in G. Saliba, History of Arab Astronomy, 251.
43 He had conceived his heliocentric system as early as 1520s but did not publish it until 1543.
44 See, Mu'ayyid al-Dïn al-'Urdï, Kitâb al-Hay'a, The Astronomical Works of Mu'ayyid ai-Din al
'Urdí, ed., G. Saliba (Beirut, no publisher mentioned, 1990), 340, quoted by G. Saliba, History of
Arab Astronomy, TJ.
45 On the Revolution of the Heavenly Spheres.
46 Note that later theories about fear of persecution by Church as being a reason for hesitation
of publishing his work hold no weight in the light of abundant evidence which shows that
Copernicus had in fact circulated his work in manuscript form as early as 1514; the manuscript
was then called De hypothesibus motuum coelestium a se constitutes commentariolus ("A
Commentary on the Theories of the Motions of Heavenly Objects from Their Arrangements");
he gave lectures on his theory in Rome in 1533 before Pope Clement VE, who approved, and a
formal request was made to Copernicus to publish his theory in 1536. See, "Copernicus" in The
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed.(Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1985), 16: 814-15
47 One of the first to be founded was the one at Naples in 1560, by Giambattista della Porta.
48 Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, trans., Stillman Drake (New York: Anchor B
214
that is, in the center—of the celestial orbs and planetary rotations, as it is m
necessary to do".49 He then goes on to make the epistemological leap:
But Galileo's public condemnation could not stop new science; all it did
was to drive it out of Italy into the Protestant world which had a particular
favourable attitude toward the ideology of opposition to the power of Roman
Church and its clergy and support for Copernicanism as well as a mechanism
for rapid dissemination of new scientific knowledge without the fear of
Inquisition.
It will be useful for our purpose to conclude this section by pointing out
the social utility of the new science which was best articulated by the Lord
Chancellor of England, Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who conceived a grand
plan to put the new science in the service of the empire. With Bacon, we enter
a new orbit of utility of science: from discovery of nature's secrets to
49 Ibid., 214.
50 Ibid., 215.
51 Ibid., 177.
command over nature, of course, to the glory of God but for the relie
man's state.
In making possible the shift toward this world and away from the next, the new
science from Descartes to Newton offered a radically altered picture of nature.
Science made nature lawful, and as the definition of creation changed so too did
the human conception of the Creator. A new religious outlook was being
invented. "Natural religion" and "natural theology" became passwords to a
distinctive religiosity. Miracles and divine interventions became rarer; being
religious began to mean thought rather than prayer. A vision of order and
harmony, God's work, replaced biblical texts and stories, God's word. But in the
hands of freethinkers science also permitted the first articulation of a coherent
universe without any creator. The roots our uniquely modern ability to examine
nature and society as self-contained entities and to offer explanations totally
natural, that is entirely human, lie in the crisis of the late seventeenth century. By
the end of the eighteenth century philosophers began to articulate branches of
52 Margaret C. Jacob, Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 74. See also, John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chapters 5 and 6.
53 "On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres".
and eventually a new model of the universe was conceived that not only
transformed the physical universe of Greek and Islamic science but also raised
a totally new set of philosophical and religious questions.
This new cosmos was constructed on the basis of a mechanical
philosophy which emerged in the scientific circles of western Europe during
the first half of the seventeenth century; no one man created it. It was a slow
and organic process, completely European in its origin that evolved in reaction
to the Renaissance Naturalism. Its initial traces can already be seen in Kepler
and Galileo, it gained fuller expression in the writings of such men as Marin
Mersenne (1588-1648),54 Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and Thomas Hobbes
(1588-1679) and René Descartes (1596-1650) provided mechanical philosophy
the philosophical foundations it so urgently needed in order to completely
replace Aristotelian cosmos.
Descartes was able to provide a metaphysical foundation for natural
philosophy which elevated its status to such a degree that it needed no other
justification. All reality, Descartes argued, is composed of two substances
something characterized by the act of thinking and the material realm, the
essence of which is extension. Here we have the famous Cartesian duality, Res
Cogitans and res extensa, defined and distinguished in such a way that they
stand alone, separate and without any need of connection; two independent
and autonomous realms, two absolutely separate entities. To the thinking
substance, one cannot ascribe any properties characteristic of matter
extension, place or motion; and the material realm was totally devoid of any
and all physic characteristics. The very nomenclature used by Descartes served
to emphasize that physical nature is inert and devoid of any source of activity
of its own: the passive participle extensa for matter, in contrast to the active
participle cogitans, which he used to characterize the realm of spirit.
In this reconstruction, the new cosmos was constructed of lifeless and
inert chunks of matter, devoid of any teleology, a bleak and purposeless
physical entity, which was to become the basis of modern science.
In an immense effort to attain certitude, Descartes tried to rid himself of
every trace of received knowledge by a process of systematic doubt, discarding
any proposition that was dubious until he was left with nothing, but the solid
rock of the simplest proposition for which he was to become famous, that
which he could not doubt: cogito ergo sum.55
fixed stars should, by their gravity, fall on each other mutually, he hath placed
those systems at immense distances one from another.58
This Being governs all tilings, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord ove
and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God... He is eternal
and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, his duration reaches from
eternity to eternity; his presence from infinity to infinity; he governs all things,
and knows all things that are or can be [known]. He is not eternity or infinity,
but eternal and infinite; he is not duration or space, but he endures and is
present. He endures for ever, and is every where present; and by existing always
and every where, he constitutes duration and space... As a blind man has no idea
of colours, so have we no idea of the manner by which the all-wise God perceives
and understands all things. He is utterly void of all body and bodily figure, and
can therefore neither be seen, nor heard, nor touched; nor ought he to be
worshipped under the representation of any corporeal thing. We have ideas of his
attributes, but what the real substance of any thing is we know not. In bodies, we
see only their figures and colours, we hear only the sounds, we touch only their
outward surfaces, we smell only the smells, and taste the savours; but their
inward substances are not to be known either by our senses, or by any reflex act
of our minds: much less, then, have we any idea of the substance of God. We
know him only by his most wise and excellent contrivances of things, and final
58 Isaac Newton, The Principia, trans., Andrew Motte (New York: Prometheus Books, 1995),
439-443.
Western science after Newton took a road that was to deepen the chasm
between religion and science. The so-called biological revolution which
completed the modern scientific outlook was decidedly based on a doctrine
which pushed religion out of the foundations of western science, leaving
theologians with a daunting task and scientists with a degree of freedom and
prestige they had never enjoyed before. Separated into two independent
realms, henceforth, religion and science were supposed to live within their
own spheres. This remained the dominant view for most of the nineteenth
century. The biological revolution of the nineteenth century was to complete
the process initiated in the seventeenth century and produced the worldview
now associated with modern science. The work of Darwin on biological
evolution, of Mendel on genetics and of Schleiden and others on the cell
theory transformed the biological sciences, producing a final cleavage with the
Middle Ages and all that had gone before in the world of science. Henceforth,
fixity of species was to be scorned at just like the fixity of the earth and "the
belief that the Creator must have personally attended to the fabrication of
every kind of diatom and bramble was no less primitively animistic than the
belief that His angels governed the revolutions of the planetary orbs".61
• This view did not go unchallenged. The mechanistic biologists had so
clearly and decisively pushed the boundaries of discourse between religion and
science that they "met the full force of ecclesiastical wrath".62 But the
nineteenth century biology was not working in isolation; it had, as its solid
foundation, a vast amount of technical data and a scientific methodology that
had been already established. It built its monumental edifice on the basis of
work done by Leeuwenhoek and Marcello Malpighi (1628-1694), on the
systematic and careful categorizations of Ray and Linnaeus. Unlike Aristotle
the zoologist and Theophrastus the botanist, whose purpose had been to
investigate the functioning of living organism for their philosophical ends, the
biologists and botanists of the nineteenth century were interested in their
subjects for completely different reasons; they were also dealing with an
enormous amount of data63 which needed to be catalogued and once it was
catalogued, there arose internal need to devise theories, based on this data.
63 Aristotle or Theophrastus never knew more than about five hundred distinct kinds of animals
or plants, compared to some six thousand distinct plants which were known and had been
described by 1600; this number trebled during the following century. See, Rupert A. Hall, The
Revolution in Science 1500-1750, 336.
64 See, M. Plessner, "al-Jähiz, Abü 'Uthmän 'Amr Ibn Bahr," in Charles C. Gillipsie, Dictionary
of Scientific Biography [henceforth DSB] (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), 7: 63-65.
65 Ibid.
66 This erroneous opinion has made its rounds among many twentieth century Muslims who
have tried to see in al-Jâhiz a Darwinian precursor. See, for example, the twelve lectures
delivered by Prof. Hamidullah at the Islamia university, Bahawalpur, translated into English by
Afzal Iqbal as The Emergence of Islam, Lectures on the Development of Islamic World-view,
Intellectual Tradition and Polity (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1993), 143-44.
of its folklore".67 This work was translated into Latin during the seventeenth
century. But these works, like those of the Medieval European biologists dealt
with their subject mater within a metaphysics which was to be replaced
gradually but decisively and which was to produce a new biology and a new
worldview in the nineteenth century. But this, again, was a slow process.
Post-Newtonian world was a kaleidoscope of assumptions, methods,
theories and even contrasting and competing metaphysics. The central
question was over the roots of physical world. Did God create a self-sufficient
world, the best of all worlds, but self-sufficient and requiring no further
tinkering or did He need to tinker with the machine: Would a perfect God
create an imperfect world? Debates over these issues were carried out
throughout the eighteenth century as Newtonian mechanics was further
refined and rnathematized.68 Leibniz's (1646-1716) vis vívva (living force),
dynamical systems, fluid dynamics, the physics of elastic media, the theory of
conservation of living force, advocated by the Swiss mathematician Johann
Bernoulli (1700-1782) in his discussion of the collision of elastic bodies, and
the gradual separation and calculus from its purely physical and geometrical
roots—all contributed toward the eventual replacement of all qualitative
aspects of nature. In 1788, Joseph-Louis Lagrange (1736-1813) published his
Analytical Mechanics in* which there was not a single figure. Lagrange boasted
in the preface that neither geometrical nor mechanical reasoning is necessary;
only algebraic operations subject to formal relationships between variable
were needed to explain mechanics.
The eighteenth century was to be called le siècle des lumieres, the century
of light, by the French. The term "enlightenment", first used by Immanuel
Kant (1724-1804) in 1785, was to become associated with this century and the
hallmark of this worldview as "reason" which became synonymous with the
laws of nature. God was to be known, not through His word, the revelation,
communicated to human beings by a prophet, but through His works,
Nature. And Nature could only be known through the new science, not
through the formal logic of the past. Nor was this approach restricted to
natural sciences. If Nature could be known through natural laws, human
nature could also be known through certain laws and if one were to
understand these laws, human condition could be vastly improved. Bacon had
already spoken of the supreme value of science as a means to improve human
welfare, the next step was to put science in service of society and state. This
was done through the establishment of scientific societies, which were
67 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1968), 113.
68 For example, it was after Newton's death that his second law of motion became F=ma (or in
differentials: F=md2x/dt2.
patronized by absolute monarchies. The Royal Society and the Paris Acad
served as initial models on which Peter the Great (1672-1725) founded
academy in St. Petersburg and Fredrick the Great (1712-1786) reorganized th
Berlin Academy in 1743.
In addition to science, technology became the new tool of a vast
transforming concept: progress—that ubiquitous third word of
Enlightenment triad; the other two being natural law and reason. Though th
invention of Newcomen's (1663-1729) steam engine or James Watt's (173
1819) addition of a separate condensor to increase its efficiency had no dire
relationship with the development of the science of mechanics and have bee
shown to be independent innovations, springing purely from the mechanica
necessities of the machines, yet, the very idea of science in the service
society was instrumental in replacing the emphasis on an otherworldl
spiritual, transcendental goal of knowledge to this worldly prosperity, comfo
and ease; science was, henceforth, a way to material progress and it fou
many popularizers. Voltair's Letters on the English (1734), for example, show
how the past ages had been the ages of darkness and backwardness and h
the new science, the works of Bacon, Newton and others had unleashed
potentials, not only for understanding nature, but also about the nature
human beings themselves. Along with this new worldview, came its o
gospels. One such being Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690
John Locke (1632-1704).
Regarded as the father of empiricism, the doctrine that all our knowled
is derived from experience, Locke argued against Plato, Descartes and
scholastics that there is no innate ideas or principles. He supposed mind to b
like a white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas or essence, with
any innate concept of God. According to him, metaphysical rationalis
reasoning about that which cannot be experienced, is simply another- form
illusion. Natural laws can be discovered and understood by way of empir
reason; thus we can gain knowledge of God only through His laws; He is
author of nature, its First Cause—the clock-maker God. In this formulat
God was "becoming a footnote to the knowledge of nature. Others wo
eventually erase even that".69
David Hume (1711-1776) would do exactly that. The three books of h
Treatise of Human Nature, written in France during 1734-1737,70 wou
complete the work of empirical philosophy of Locke and Berkeley (1685
1753). Hume asserted that the so-called First Cause can never be experien
and hence cannot be assumed; he desired to build a theory of knowled
69 Anthony M. Alioto, A History of Western Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 198
262.
rather than years—epochs could allow for gradual change, for apparen
extinction of some organic forms, degeneration of some species from other
and the disappearance of earlier forms. Fossils were thought to be remnants
the Universal Deluge which had submerged earth, according to the Bibl
accounts of Noah's Flood, which was the primary geological event of t
earth's history. By the time the eighteenth century closed, naturalists were
possession of fossils which had no obvious relationship to contempora
species. Buffon had written of gigantic mammoth bones, six times larger th
those of normal elephants.
The work of scientific revolution was completed by Darwin, not only in
the biological sciences but also by completing the philosophical revolu
that had accompanied it. We will have more to say about his contributio
the development of modern science but for now, suffice it to say that the
science was to dispense the ancient doctrine of teleology and replaced it wit
continuous variations, through natural selection. But Darwin did not spr
out of a vacuum; ground had been prepared for his arrival by a steady flow
discoveries and theories throughout the preceding centuries. The publica
of Zoonomia or the Laws of Organic Life (1794) by Erasmus Darwin (173
1802), Charles's Darwin's grandfather, suggested that organisms must adapt
the physical conditions in which they find themselves. Erasmus argued
sensations, hunger, sex, the need for security—all of these and many ot
factors played a role in the acquisition of new parts and modification
species. But it was left to his grandson, Charles, to demolish the now cracki
structure of the old worldview.
IV
centre of the solar system and this scientific discovery was enough to s
very foundation of the belief system which was based on a geocentric s
But this was just the beginning. With Galileo, modern science n
discovered the use of a wonderful little tool, the telescope, it also ent
a structural revolution of its epistemology: henceforth, study of natu
be based on experiments. It is, ultimately, immaterial that Galileo d
fact go on the Leaning Tower of Pisa to perform his experiments in t
what was established was a principle which was as sound as any pri
be and Galileo did have a tool, his telescope from which he could see w
other human being had seen before: the satellites of Jupiter. Ga
established that acceleration creates force and that mass of an object m
by its weight on Earth must be identical with the mass inferred f
happens when it collides with other objects anywhere in the universe
it is accelerated by some force. This principle, known as the equ
principle—which was later to become one of the foundations of
theories of relativity—is one of the fundamental discoveries of moder
which changed the way human beings perceived objects.
71 For example, Coulomb's experimental proof that the forces between electrical ch
subject to the law of the inverse square; the law of variation of the force of a magnetic
distance, variation of the compass and its distribution was mapped in increasing det
and annual fluctuations were established, the magnetic dip was charted and at
to compare the intensities of the Earth's magnetic filed at various places on its s
72 The invention of Wyatt and Paul's spinning rollers, Arkwright's water-frame
looms.
73 Hydrogen atoms are the lightest, carbon atoms are roughly twelve tim
hydrogen atoms, etc. Dalton's papers have been collected by Hyde Wolla
Thomson as Foundations of the Atomic Theory, comprising papers and extrac
(Edinburgh: Alembic Club, 1969).
H That is: if disturbing influences are avoided, no energy is lost in the conversi
to another. This principle of conservation of energy was termed as
thermodynamics.
75 Entropy is a measure of the degree to which the internal energy of an object is not accessible
for practical purposes, degree of internal disorder on an atomic scale. The second law of
thermodynamics states that other things being equal, there will be a tendency for the entropy or
the disorder of an isolated system to increase.
76 Linnean Society of London, named after the Swedish naturalist Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778),
had as its members the leading botanists, zoologists and geologists in England.
77 In fact Lyell and Hooker presented two papers. One by Darwin and the other by Alfred
Russel Wallace (1823-1913). They appended a letter to the papers by "two indefatigable
naturalists" who had "independently and unknown to one another, conceived the same very
ingenious theory to account for the appearance and perpetuation of varieties and of specific
forms on our planet". See, Howard Mumford Jonesan and Bernarad I. Cohen, Science Before
Darwin (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963), 338.
78 First published on November 24,1859 by John Murray, London. All references to this work
are from Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (New York: Mentor Books, 1958).
79 For example, James Clerk Maxwell's one set of mathematical equations which described
electricity and magnetism, systems of classification of plants and animals, etc.
80 Then at Karlsruhe in Germany.
82 Böhm's aim was to demonstrate that hidden-variables theories are indeed possible.
variables theories, with their underlying determinism, must be non-local, maintainin
existence of instantaneous causal relations between physically separated entities. Such
contradicts the simple location of events in both classical atomism and relativity the
points to a more holistic view of the quantum world. Indeed Böhm himself stressed the h
aspect of quantum theory in his later years, after his conversion from Marxism to theosoph
VI
FORMULATION OF QUESTIONS
science and even when they mean science, they usually mean the
sciences.88
88 It is thus not surprising that in most of the public discourse about science, the p
often used is "science and technology", in one breath, without a pause.
89 Quirin Schiemeier, "Designer rice to combat diet deficiencies makes its debut", in
(2001), 551.
90 According to Nature, "the Golden Rice project was promoted by Potrykus, who wanted his
research to help combat the vitamin A deficiencies prevalent in many poor countries,
particularly those relying on rice as a major food source. Rice plants do not normally produce
carotenoids, vitamin A precursors, in the grain. A 'humanitarian board' made up of the two
inventors and representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation, the World Health Organization
and the biotechnology industry, will oversee the distribution of the rice to the research
institutes". Ibid.
From this example, one can also infer the complexity of modern scient
enterprise. The licence-fee waiver for the rice mentioned above invol
seventy patents from thirty-two companies and universities! Syngenta has
announced that it has completed the entire rice genome in the last wee
January 2001.
These developments are of immense importance for survival in a world
governed by scientific instruments, technological products and genetically
altered food. No wonder, then, that since the nineteenth century early
modernists and reformers, the general opinion in the Muslim world has been
that the West was able to advance and colonize the Muslim world because of
its science and technology, both spoken of, as if they were one. This has been
articulated over and over and with such regularity that it has become the
gospel of development debates. But in spite of such an overwhelming interest
in science (or perhaps one should say hunger for science), there exists very
little interest in the study of its impact on the Muslim world or in the
relationship between Islam and modern science. Except for a handful of
scholars, no one has paid any attention to the relationship between Islam and
the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of modern science. As a result,
in comparison to the sophisticated and mature discourse on science and
religion in the Christian tradition, one finds nothing comparable in the
Muslim world. Even the questions have not been formulated and the language
of discourse remains underdeveloped.
What one does find, however, is an alarming trend among a majority of
writers as well as among the educated classes which attempts to find every
single modern scientific discovery in the Qur'än. This has given rise to
mountains of apologetic literature which ranges from enormously popular
book of the French Muslim Maurice Bucaille, The Bible, the Qur'an and
Science, first published as La Bible, le Coran et la science,91 in 1976 and since
then translated into every language spoken in the Muslim world to hundreds
of websites which attempt to prove that the Qur'an is, in fact, the word of
God because it contains scientific theories and facts which modern science has
only recently discovered.9*
91 Maurice Bucaille, La Bible, le Coran et la science: les Écritures saintes examinées a la lumiere des
connaissances modernes (Paris: Seghers, 1976), trans., Alastair D. Pannell and the author as The
Bible, the Qur'an and Science. The English translation was first published in 1978 by the North
American Trust Publications, Indianapolis.
92 A recent search using the words "Islam" and "science" and altavista as search engine listed
1,873,545 occurrences, a random sampling of these listings showed that of all the relevant
entries, a large majority was related to this establishing the divine nature of the Qur'an through
modern science. See, Elma Harder and Basit Kareem Iqbal, "Islam and Science Online", Islamic
Studies, vol. 39, no. 4 (Winter 2000), 685-691.
93 The field of study and analysis that treats of God and of God's attributes and relations to
universe; study of divine things or religious truth; divinity.
94 Sometimes, though inadequately, called speculative theologians.
1. Epistemological consideratio
relation to modern science.
Φ ® Φ