In what way, if at all, do the motifs to federalise South Sudan differ from the classical theories of

federalism discussed, amongst other, by Berihun Gebeye?

After many years of civil war South Sudan achieved independent on July 2011. The country is
made up of sixty ethnic groups and various linguistic groupings. The Dinka are the most
prevalent ethnic group, accounting for 40% of the population, followed by the Nuer (20%),
Azande (10%), and Murle (8%). Christian sects account for approximately 61% of the
population, while traditional religion and Islam account for 33% and 6%, respectively (Zemelak,
2019). After South Sudan’s independent in 2011, two years later civil war was started in Juba in
2013 and spreaded throughout the country. The conflict was started because of the competition
for power between Salva Kiir and Rieck Machar which later turned to ethnic conflict as the two
groups mobilized their respective ethnic groups the Dinka and Nuer respectively. The two
leaders had different approaches on how South Sudan should be governed. Salvakiir was against
federalism arguing that Sub division of the country into federal arrangement undermine national
unity. Contrary to this, Rieck Machar was infavour of federalism and proposed 21 states. In this
respect, following the peace agreement the President hijacked the federalism agenda and
increased number of states into 28 and later into 32. The opposition argued that the move is to
control the Nuer territory (Aalen, 2019). The interest of federalism have been increased in South
Sudan when civil war erupted in 2013 and federalism was a major demand of SLM-IO and the
violated 2015 peace agreement was in search of federalism in South Sudan to end civil war
(young, 2017).

There is typically a considerable incentive for ruling political elites in South Sudan to centralize
power. The states and the local governments that make them up are currently not truly
constitutionally viable organizations (Kimenyi, 2012). In South Sudan there is an impediment of
unitary centralized government. The president has the power to appoint and remove the state
governors even to the extent of dissolving the state legislative assembly. The state govern in turn
appoint and remove the counties commissioners who will later appoint the county legislative
council and remove them as well (Ruach, 2014). The transitional constitution also gives the
power to the president to appoint some members of the national assembly up to 66 members
(Article 56(2/C). The constitution also gives power to the président to appoint 30 members of council of
the states (Article, 58(2/b). According to Rauch (2014), the institutional arrangement in the constitution
may look like federal, the overriding powers given to the president shows that it is a unitary system and
the states have no way of checking the prerogatives of the center.

In actuality, they inherited Khartoum's split of the south into ten states, with Juba serving as the
central power instead of Khartoum: in other words, they inherited 'decentralization' rather than
federation. To safeguard the authority of people in charge of the central government,
decentralized states and regions were principally created in South Sudan (Johnson, 2014). Let
alone federalism Salva Kiir has no commitment to allow decentralized system. Violating the
constitution he dissolved the ten existing states and formed 32 new ones. South Sudan is lacking
constitutionalism as the political actors have not expressed any commitment to the creation and
effective operation of federalism. Kiir has fought against the transition to a federal system by
taking a number of unlawful measures, such as dismissing state governments and dissolving ten
states (Aalen, 2019). Such unitary decenteralized governance is always characterized by
centralization of powers at the national level and /or a single organ of government (the executive
in South Sudan). Whatever powers and functions are decentralized to the local level , the
existence of presidential appointment of sub-national officials guarantee their primary loyalty
only to the national government and not to their local constituencies (Rauch, 2014).

Furthermore, there is a highly centralized division of resources, with only 15% of tax money
going to the states and 85% going to the federal government (Zemelak, 2019). Regional in
equalities in resource distribution is high and reaching an agreement on distribution of oil
revenue is also difficult (Young, 2017). In South Sudan, decentralization has mainly gone
unimplemented. County legislative assemblies do not exist in much of the country, and county
commissioners are mostly selected from the center (Aalen, 2019).

Failure to build inclusive system in national decision making, access to resource and job
opportunity since it is dominated by some ethnic group resulted in civil war in South Sudan
(Ruach, 2014).

The National government has three organs, the legislative, and executive and judiciary organ.
However, the states and local governments have only two organs, the executives and legislative
organs (Ruach, 2014).
There are aspiring federal democracies’, which are neither federal in form nor in practice, but a
federal government remains an aspiration; the DRC, Somalia, and Sudan (Cited In Styler and De
Visser, 2015). First, their federal form emerges from conflict. Second, most could correctly be
called quasi- or hybrid federations. They all have highly centralized elements that exhibit very
similar patterns: the powers that are devolved to subnational units are limited through the
establishment of a large number of subnational units, ; most of the significant subnational powers
are exercised concurrently with the national government; taxation powers and the distribution of
revenue are centralized; subnational administrations are also subject to ‘shared rule’ through
central intervention powers; and the institutions and processes of shared rule are effectively
under the control of the centre. Third, the likelihood of a federal practice emerging is not at all
ensured.

In Sudan and South Sudan, the national government may legislate framework laws on all concurrent,
exclusive, and residual matters, leading some commentators to the conclusion that “there are no
exclusive powers of the states, all powers of states being concurrent powers” (A. Auer et al, 2011 Cited
in Styler and De visser, 2015). In Sudan and South Sudan, taxation on petroleum, gas, and mineral
resources, as well as corporate and business profits, are exclusively national, leaving states with
substantially more modest taxation powers over matters such as land, agriculture, and tourism (Styler
and Devisser, 2015 :13). Like in Sudan and Ethiopia in south South Sudan the second house do not
have any veto over legislation passed by the first house (ibid).
References

Kimenyi, M. S. (2012). Making federalism work in South Sudan. ONE YEAR AFTER
INDEPENDENCE, 16.

Johnson, D. H. (2014). Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought.

Zemelak, A. A. (2019). The Missing Element in South Sudan’s Elusive Quest for Peace through
Federalism?. Decentralization and Constitutionalism in Africa, 234.

Aalen, L. (2019). » The Paradox of Federalism and Decentralisation in South Sudan: An

Instrument and an Obstacle for Peace «. Chr. Michelsen Institute Briefing Paper. Oslo: CMI.

Ruach, (2014), South Sudan : The Paradox of the Decenteralized Governance in Multi-Ethnic
States, Ethiopian journal of federal studies, CFS, Addis Ababa University Press