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30-GD Commissioner of Customs v. CTA, 224 SCRA 665,671 (1993)
30-GD Commissioner of Customs v. CTA, 224 SCRA 665,671 (1993)
30-GD Commissioner of Customs v. CTA, 224 SCRA 665,671 (1993)
Private respondent then filed cases before the BUREAU OF CUSTOMS through the
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS for the refund of berthing fees under protest, but it did not
prosper. This matter was then elevated at the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, but of
no avail.
On July 28, 1978, the COURT OF TAX APPEALS reversed the decision of
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, rendering that the private respondent is entitled to a
refund, amounting to PhP 40, 551.
The COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS contends that the government has the authority
to impose and collect berthing fe226es whether a vessel berths at a private pier or at a
national port. It is also of the belief that KIWALAN is a national port, for it is within the
jurisdiction of the collection district and territorial limits of the national port of Iligan.
On the other hand, private respondent countered that the right of the government to
impose berthing fees is limited only to national ports; further, KIWALAN is not a national
port, considering that it is operated by a private corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not a vessel engaged in foreign trade which berths at a privately
owned wharf or pier is liable for the payment of berthing charges under Sec. 2901 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD No. 34?
HELD: NO, the Supreme Court ruled that the subject vessels, not having berth at a
national port, but at the port of KIWALAN which was constructed by a private
corporation, are not subject to berthing fees. Private respondent are further entitled to
receive the refund for the berthing fees it previously paid.
KIWALAN was not accorded the status of a national port as per Customs
Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 or in Executive Order No. 72. It was neither included
in the list of national ports specified on said orders, nor there was a showing that it was
converted as a national port. It is a settled rule in Statutory Construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. This rule
is expressed in the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction
be extended to others. It further lies on the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Moreover, Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by PD No.
34, expressly provided that only the national ports are subject to berthing fees, to wit: