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The Prosperity of the New Southern

Policy: Achievements and Remaining


Challenges
Jeong Gon Kim* and Yoon Jae Ro**

17
1. Paving the Way for Mutual Prosperity

Along with the introduction of the New Southern Policy (NSP) in 2017,
the Republic of Korea (hereinafter, Korea) and India have been increasingly
realizing the importance of each other as strategic economic cooperation
partners. Under the NSP, Korea has designated India as a strategic partner for
the first time in history, and in response, India has been paying more attention
to potential economic cooperation between Korea and India.
With the launch of India’s Act East Policy (AEP) in 2014, India recognized
Korea as an indispensable partner for the first time, and in 2015, upgraded its
relations to a Special Strategic Partnership (SSP) level, which counts as a
turning point in relations of the two countries. India perceives that the NSP
announced by President Moon Jae-in government emphasizes India as a
strategic partner to continue such a relationship.
Dr. Mohan Kumar of RIS and Dr. Surrendar Singh of Engineering Export
Promotion Council emphasize that India’s AEP and Korea’s NSP converge in
their nature. Dr. Kumar argues that enhancing bilateral cooperation is critical
for both sides, given the excessive economic reliance on China.1
Considering the economic complementarity, experts from both sides
agree that bilateral economic relations are still weaker than expectations.
Announcing the NSP, Korea set a goal of increasing trade with India to $50

** Research Fellow, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.


** Associate Research Fellow, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.
1 Kumar (2021); Singh (2021).

The Prosperity of the New Southern Policy: Achievements and Remaining Challenges 381
billion by 2030. In 2019, the year before the spread of COVID-19, the bilateral
trade volume was about $20.7 billion. And at the current rate of growth it is
unlikely to reach this target on time. Meanwhile, Korea’s investment in India
has increased significantly compared to the past. However, current levels
remain disappointing given the potential of the Indian market and the size of
global investment in India. Dr. Mohan Kumar agrees with this view and says,
“There is a wide scope for increasing trade and investment relations between
the two countries.”2
Nonetheless, it is a meaningful achievement that India, which was
Korea’s 10th largest trading partner in 2010, rose to 8th in 2019. However, it
is insufficient considering the potentials of the two countries. Given that
Korea’s past economic relationship has been tilted in favor of ASEAN, it is
very encouraging that, after the implementation of the NSP, bilateral trade has
increased substantially in comparison with previous period. Dr. Surrendar
Signh explains that bilateral trade has risen post-CEPA, which is attributed to
the changing demand structures and comparative advantages of both economies.
Considering that the Korea-India CEPA has become an impetus for bilateral
trade, it can also be evaluated as a crucial achievement that Korea and India
started negotiations to improve CEPA and agreed on an early achievement
package in the wake of the Korea-India summit in 2018.3
Bilateral investments are also showing a strong upward trend. Recently,
Korea has been increasingly investing mainly in India’s manufacturing
industries such as automobiles, electronics, and steel. And India has been
funding mostly Korea’s automobile, information technology, and banking
industries. Dr. Surrendar Singh evaluates the development of the bilateral
investment relations as follows. “Bilateral investment relations between India
and Korea are robust. Korea’s investment in India is significant and highly
concentrated in manufacturing sectors, followed by real estate. On the other
hand, India’s investment is in Korea is low and mainly concentrated in
automobile and information technology sectors.”4
In addition to the visible achievements mentioned earlier, the fact that
India began to regard Korea as a vital partner due to the NSP is a significant
attainment that cannot be overlooked. India has been bolstering manufacturing

2 Kumar (2021), op cit., p. 71.


3 Singh (2021), op cit., p. 300.
4 Ibid., p. 300.

382 The New Southern Policy Plus: Progress and Way Forward
by implementing policies including the Make in India initiative and Atmanirbhar
Bharat (Self-Reliant India). India recognizes that Korea can contribute to
India’s manufacturing growth. During the implementation of the NSP, several
Korean companies made large-scale investments in India, which played a
critical role in deepening economic bilateral economic relations. This has
spread a perception in India that Korean companies can help Indian industries
to compete, generate employment and make a significant contribution to
India’s exports. Amb. Shin Bong Kil pointed out that “with a renewed focus
to deepen Korea-India cooperation under NSP, major Korean companies have
shown improved performance.”5 India is now considering Korea to be a key
partner and is expecting more investment from Korean companies.
India’s special status in the NSP can be found in the fact that it added
future-oriented cooperation, in addition to the 3Ps (People, Prosperity and
Peace). The NSP presents a vision that Korea and India can join hands in the
development of future industries. For that to happen, the Korea-India Future
Strategy Group and the India-Korea Centre for Research and Innovation
Cooperation (IKCRI) were established. Cooperation is being encouraged, as
well as symbiotic development in science and technology areas ranging from
renewable energy, advanced material, robotics & automation, engineering,
and biotech. Furthermore, the creation of start-up funds, the Technology
Exchange Center, and the New Delhi Korea-India Start-up Center will also be
the cornerstone of bilateral cooperation for future innovation. Amb. Shin Bong
Kil argues that dedicated efforts to strengthen the ties in startups and SME
sectors will materialize the huge potential of the bilateral relations. This new
level of cooperation vision is in line with the status of a special strategic
partnership and represents a valuable attainment of the NSP.6
The year 2021 is worth remembering because Korea, for the first time,
launched its EDCF (Economic Development Cooperation Fund) project in
India. India is having difficulty in unfolding huge growth potentiality due to
its underdeveloped infrastructure. From 2005 until recently, India has received
Official Development Assistance (ODA) only from G7 countries, NGOs, and
multilateral organizations. It recently included Korea, a G8 country. In response,
Korea has included India as a priority partner for ODA from 2021. As Amb,
Shin Bong-Kil pointed out, initiating the Nagpur-Mumbai Expressway ITS

5 Shin (2021), p. 44.


6 Ibid., p. 44.

The Prosperity of the New Southern Policy: Achievements and Remaining Challenges 383
project in 2021, the first project using the $10 billion financial package agreed
upon by both sides in the past, is a meaningful first step toward reinforcing
Korea-India economic ties.7

2. Advancing People-centered Partnership

One of the critical but largely unnoticed developments between India and
Korea in recent decades is the gradual appreciation of more rooted historical
and cultural bonds between the two countries. Korea and India share a deep
historical link dating back several centuries: the legend of the marriage of the
Korean King Suro with Princess Suriratna from Ayodhya. As Dr. Raghavan
mentioned in her article, this legend has been repeated and used as an opening
in several speeches by both government officials and scholars, since it shows
the two countries could be as close as a shared bloodline.8 In fact, this legend
was appreciated by an agreement reached in the social and cultural sectors
during the revision of the Korea-India CEPA in 2016 to upgrade the monument
of Empress Heo Hwang-ok. In November 2018, First lady Kim Jung-sook laid
the foundation stone for the expansion and improvement of the existing
memorial in Delhi, India.
There has been a huge surge in the last few decades in terms of expanding
and connecting cultural ties between India and Korea. This includes opening
up the cultural centers, easing travel restrictions, increasing exchange students
and academic scholarships, and promoting Korean language programs. The
cultural ties have been institutionalized via the establishment of cultural
centers in both countries. In Korea, the Indian Cultural Centre (ICC)- Swami
Vivekananda Cultural Centre (SVCC) was established in Seoul in July 2011,
and the second center was established in Busan in December 2013. Two
centers organize cultural programs, seminars, workshops, and events to
promote bilateral cultural linkages between India and Korea. For instance,
SVCC holds the “Festival of India in Korea – SARANG” every year, which
has become a crucial annual cultural festival of Korea promoting Indian
culture. The event introduces diverse Indian art forms such as dance, music,

7 Ibid., p. 45.
8 Raghavan (2021), p. 347.

384 The New Southern Policy Plus: Progress and Way Forward
yoga, Indian films, cuisine, arts, and academic works. On the other hand, the
Korean Culture Centre India (KCCI) was established in New Delhi. With the
increased popularity of Korean TV shows and K-Pop in India, KCCI organizes
many cultural programs and events to promote cultural understanding. KCCI
does not limit the events to only K-Pop or K-Drama. It tries to include many
aspects in the programs like food, fashion, music, language. The most famous
program is the Korean language class. With more Indian students wanting to
learn the Korean language, the center’s capacity for its language classes has
increased from 300 to 4,200 seats in 2021. Dr. Raghavan points out the
importance of KCCI in promoting the Korean culture and language in India.
Remarkably, the Korean language has been selected to be included in the
country’s public education curriculum in 2020. The Indian government’s
decision to add the Korean language to the official school curriculum as one
of the second languages symbolizes the importance of Korea-Indian relations.
These cultural centers’ and related agencies’ efforts have played a great role
in promoting the understanding between the two countries. Dr. Raghavan
mentioned in the article that cultural difference was the major reason for
misunderstanding arising between the Indians and Koreans in the workplace.9
The NSP’s goal of increasing people-to-people contacts and cultural exchanges
between two countries has reduced the gap in understanding.
Furthermore, a series of important decisions have been undertaken to
boost people-to-people connections in terms of improving travel between the
two countries. Firstly, there have been increased direct flights between Delhi
and Seoul since 2015, making it easier to visit each other. A more critical
development in recent years is the change in visa requirements. The government
of India extended the visa on arrival facilities from October 1, 2018, which
allows Korean passport holders’ double entry for 60 days for business, tourism,
medical and conference purposes. Korea is the second country after Japan to
be granted access to visas on arrival. The Korean government also extended
the Group Tourist Visa for Indian nationals from March 4, 2019. These
measures encouraged greater contact between the two countries and increased
the number of visitors between the two countries. With the Group Tourist Visa
program, the number of Indians entering Korea has gone up from 119,791 in
2018 to 143,367 in 2019. Indeed, the number of tourists increased 18% in 2019

9 Ibid., p. 351.

The Prosperity of the New Southern Policy: Achievements and Remaining Challenges 385
compared to the numbers in 2018. The number of Korean visitors to India also
gradually increased as travel visa requirements were eased and interest in India
rose. The average number of Koreans who were visiting India was 150,000
from 2017 to 2019.
While more and more Indian students are pursuing postgraduate and
doctoral programs in Korea, there is a perception that the number of Indian
students in Korea remains small. Dr. Raghavan also claimed that there are too
few Indian students in Korea compared to those from China and Japan. There
was an increase in the number of Indian students studying as postgraduate
students at the University of Science and Technology and KAIST. The number
has increased from 86 in 2019 to 119 in 2020.10 We should value steady and
slow progress in accommodating Indian students and try to promote related
programs more.

3. Promoting Regional Stability and Resilience

Bilateral cooperation between Korea and India in the peace pillar of the
NSP has also shown impressive growth. Cooperation in defense and security
matters received continued attention from both governments. First, active
exchange of high-level visits in the field of defense took place to reinforce
bilateral defense cooperation. The Minister of National Defense of Korea
visited India on several occassions (2018, 2019, and 2021). During the last
visit in March 2021, the Minister visited the inauguration ceremony of the
Indo-Korean Bilateral Friendship Park in Delhi Cantonment. The park
commemorates the contribution of Indian peacekeepers during the Korean
War and is a testament to the strong relations between the two countries. Indian
Defence Minister also visited Korea in 2020, and an agreement was signed to
extend logistical support to each other’s navies. In addition, there was a first-
ever visit of an Indian Army Chief to Korea in 2020. These high-level visits
granted new momentum to expanding defense ties between the two countries.
Important measures have been taken to boost cooperation in the defense
industry. India is not only among the top 5 military spenders, but also one of
the emerging defense manufacturing hubs in the world. To support the growth

10 Ibid., p. 356.

386 The New Southern Policy Plus: Progress and Way Forward
of the defense sector, India set up two Defense Industrial Corridors. Even
though India promoted Make in India to achieve the goal of self-reliance in
defense, with this cooperation, India invited many Korean firms to invest in
defense manufacturing. As a part of the overall expansion of defense and
security ties, India and Korea have agreed to start joint production and export
of military hardware, enhance intelligence sharing and boost cooperation in
cyber and space domains.
Korean diplomacy in India also mirrors developments surrounding the
Indo-Pacific Strategy. Acknowledging the economic and strategic significance
of the Indo-Pacific region, Korea’s diplomacy has emphasized cooperation
between the NSP and various Indo-Pacific initiatives to contribute to regional
stability.

4. Remaining Challenges and Future Tasks

4-1. Breakaway from an ASEAN bias and increase the government


inputs
Along with the NSP, Korea-India economic ties are maturing in various
ways, but there still remains room for further improvement.
First of all, it is necessary to adjust the tilt towards ASEAN and significantly
expand the input of resources into economic cooperation with India. In spite of
dedicated efforts in the process of implementing the NSP, its detailed projects
clearly showed a bias toward ASEAN, and this tendency continues in the New
Southern Policy Plus (NSPP). Dr. Mohan Kumar explains the regional bias of
the NSP as follows. “It seems reasonable to assume that for Korea, the
ASEAN would be a higher priority than India at least in the short term.”11
Amb, Shin Bong-Kil argues that “there is need to bring about right balance in
NSP’s focus between ASEAN countries and India.” He also stresses that
“Korea’s partnership with India will continue to grow with the passage of time.
Regardless of which regime comes to power, the underlying spirit of the NSP
should continue to guide Korea’s engagements with India in future.”12

11 Kumar (2021), op cit., p. 76.


12 Shin (2021), op cit., p. 46.

The Prosperity of the New Southern Policy: Achievements and Remaining Challenges 387
In the case of India, even when an agreement had been reached on initiating
a certain project, it took a considerable amount of time to materialize it
specifically. For example, the $10 billion financial package, which combines
the aforementioned EDCF and export credit, only took its first step in 2021,
even though the leaders of the two countries agreed on the package in 2015.
In order to solve this kind of problems, intergovernmental networking should
be strengthened, and major cooperative platforms such as the Korea-India
Future Strategy Group should be utilized to monitor India’s demands closely
and discover future business tasks. To this end, the government should drastically
enhance inputs of resources related to India. This task is especially integral for
initiating mid-to-long-term projects such as cooperation in new industries,
research on science and technology, and infrastructure development. Amb, Shin
Bong-Kil argues that “Going forward, India must get more prominence in
[Korea’s] policy. For that to happen, Korea needs to expand its diplomatic
presence and enhance manpower in missions in India.”13

4-2. A breakthrough in fostering economic ties with India


Secondly, a strategy is required to make a new breakthrough in Korea-
India economic relations. As India strongly raises issues about deteriorating
trade deficit, negotiations on the revision of the Korea-India CEPA have
stalled. Whatever the underlying cause of the trade imbalance, a more forward-
looking approach is needed. It should be seen that the fundamental cause of
bilateral trade imbalance is more attributed to the differences in industrial
structures. However, there are constant complaints of the Indian industry’s
trade imbalance. Dr. Mohan Kumar argues that “it is clear that from India’s
point of view, a trade deficit of this kind is not sustainable. Whether it is a fact
of CEPA tariff rates being higher than MFN rates or low utilization of CEPA
by economic operators, especially on the Indian side, need to be dealt with as
soon as possible.”14 From a different viewpoint, Dr, Surrendar Singh pointed
out that “bilateral trade flows between India and Korea are consistently
expanding after signing of the CEPA, but the overall trade balance is
unfavorable for India as it exports low-value products and imports high-value-
added goods. This result is primarily attributed to various stages of economic

13 Ibid., p. 47.
14 Kumar (2021), op cit., p. 72.

388 The New Southern Policy Plus: Progress and Way Forward
development and varying economic and industrial structures.”15
It is worth noting that Japan has few problem with a trade imbalance
with India despite its close economic ties. In 1958, Japan established JICA
(Japan International Cooperation Agency) to build economic relations with
India. Since the 1980s, when the manufacturing industry entered India, the
Japanese government and companies have actively responded to the Indian
government’s demands for local productions. Besides, large-scale ODA
funds were financed in areas including infrastructure. As a result, Japan has
secured its status as the 5th largest investor in India (accumulated from 2000
to 2020) and the number one ODA donor (as of 2020) and manages the trade
imbalance at a stable level.
As the US-China conflict continues, India’s role as a huge market and an
integral part of the global value chain will become more crucial. In this context,
collaborating with India is where Korea and India’s interests match. Therefore,
it will be a future task to establish a comprehensive economic cooperation
strategy that deepens economic ties with India and builds trust by continuously
carrying out investments and ODA projects that meet India’s demands.
Strengthening investment relations is particularly critical considering
India’s policy direction because India is highly interested in bolstering the
industrial infrastructures in its country. Whereas India has recently strengthened
its protective trade policy, it is very active in attracting foreign investment by
improving the investment environment. Make in India and its follow-up policy,
Self-Reliant India, clearly show this policy direction. In this context, Dr.
Surrendar Singh suggests the following directions for Korea-India investment
ties. “A convergence of sectors under PLI (Production-linked Incentive) and
Korean investment firmly establishes Korea to be a key partner in building
domestic manufacturing capabilities under the Self-Reliant India ventures/
collaboration with Indian firms to create a robust ecosystem of electric battery
manufacturing in the country.”16
Although incentive schemes such as PLI can be an opportunity for
Korean investment companies, there remains considerable uncertainty for
those who want to enter India, as PLI also includes policies to restrict imports.
Besides, the prospects of procuring intermediate goods in India is unclear.
Likewise, India's high trade barriers are yet an obstacle to the facilitation of

15 Singh (2021), op cit., p. 299.


16 Ibid., p. 301.

The Prosperity of the New Southern Policy: Achievements and Remaining Challenges 389
Korea-India trade. In recent years, the average import duty rate for the
manufacturing industry has been going up.
Moreover, India introduced CAROTAR, rules that monitor imports from
third countries through FTA partners. These rules have the purpose of
restricting imports from FTA partners. However, it undermines the potential
benefits of a preferential tariff regime. In this regard, Dr. Surrendar Singh
suggests that “issues related to a restrictive tariff policy and strict provisions
for imports under CAROTAR rules should be addressed so that Korean firms
engaged in manufacturing can operate in a liberal, transparent, and conducive
environment.”17 Korea and India need to discuss ways to improve these trade-
restricted rules.
ASEAN needs to be newly viewed as a space where Korea and India can
broaden their cooperation. While the NSP has mainly promoted projects
focused on bilateral relations, cooperation in third countries can definitely also
be a major policy task. Trilateral collaboration in ASEAN is one of the
examples. India has been making efforts to deepen economic engagements
with ASEAN and implement the AEP, and Korea has already established its
position in ASEAN. Moreover, since Korea and India have previously signed the
FTAs with ASEAN, they are in a good place to cooperate. In this circumstance,
Dr. Prabir De of RIS claims that ASEAN can play a critical role in building a
bridge between Korea and India. He particularly stresses possible trilateral
cooperation in Northeast India, which is adjacent to Southeast Asia. “Northeast
India has been a priority in India’s AEP. AEP provides an interface between
Northeast India and the ASEAN region. Some of the major projects include
Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project, the India-Myanmar-Thailand
Trilateral Highway Project, and its extension to Cambodia, Lao PDR and
Vietnam, etc. Korea may be invited to join some of the connectivity projects
between India and ASEAN. Korea, India, and ASEAN can join hands in
infrastructure development projects in ASEAN as well as in Northeast
India.”18 Korea-India cooperation in ASEAN is still an unknown area, and it
is highly necessary to discuss the possibility through joint research between
the two countries.

17 Ibid., p. 301.
18 De (2021), p. 314.

390 The New Southern Policy Plus: Progress and Way Forward
4-3. Deepening bilateral ties in future industries
Thirdly, bilateral cooperation in future industries should be reinforced.
Bilateral relations in the future industries were mentioned in the joint vision
statement between Korea and India in 2018, and in the NSPP, the 4th industrial
revolution including 5G and AI, future industries including startups and untact
businesses are set as one of their own initiatives. India has enormous potential
in future industries. Not only does India have great significance as a huge
market, but also it can provide practical help to Korea through its excellent
capabilities in science and technology, including ICT. As India is attracted to
industrial innovation that applies Korea’s cutting technology, the future
industry is where the demands of both countries meet. Dr. Mohan Kumar
evaluates the importance of future industry cooperation as follows. “If there is
one area where India can benefit enormously from KOREA, it is in the area of
‘future industries’, which is explicitly listed in NSPP as an actionable measure.
The joint vision statement of July 2018 agreed upon by Prime Minister Modi
and President Moon Jae-in provides a good mandate for the two sides to work
upon in this regard. It must be hoped that under the NSPP, KOREA will do
everything to assist India in the above cutting-edge technologies, which India
desperately needs as it seeks to modernize its economy. This alone will take
the special strategic partnership between the two countries to a whole new level.”19
The establishment of cooperation platforms in future industries is a
valuable achievement of the NSP. Down the line, both countries should make
active efforts to discover specific collaborative projects through these platforms.
That is, through platforms such as the Korea-India Future Strategy Group,
Startup Fund, Technology Exchange Center, and Korea-India Startup Center,
tasks need to be discussed in detail, including promotion of future industries,
joint technology development, bilateral startup investment and cooperation,
and establishment of digital systems and technology standards. It is suggested
for both countries to pay primary attention to where competitiveness, policy
direction, market, and demand match. Specifically, digital innovation in
manufacturing such as smart factories, electric vehicles, renewable energy,
energy efficiency, smart grid, big data technology and software, smart healthcare,
and biotech can be good examples, and these are worth noting. Furthermore,
these areas are where the future industrial policies of both intersect and where

19 Kumar (2021), op cit., p. 74.

The Prosperity of the New Southern Policy: Achievements and Remaining Challenges 391
India’s mid-to-long-term demand would be immense – as a strategic partner
active response is necessary on Korea’s part.

4-4. Reconsideration of India’s strategic importance


Lastly, India’s strategic importance should reconsidered. First, a review
is required as to whether it is appropriate to bind ASEAN and India together
in the NSP. On the one hand, some experts argue that it is proper to put
ASEAN and India in one strategic frame. This means they think the Korean
version of the Indo-Pacific is required, which encompasses ASEAN and India.
From this point of view, Dr. Prabir De says, “In the pursuit of the new
southward strategy, Korea may come out with its Indo-Pacific Vision, which
will then lead the partnership to another higher level.”20
On the other hand, some argue that India should be divided into separate
strategic areas from ASEAN because ASEAN countries and India have very
different political and economic characteristics. This is also linked to the
ASEAN bias of the NSP mentioned earlier. Although this issue needs to be
discussed in the future, it seems clear that regardless of the direction of efforts to
improve the NSP, an India-specific economic cooperation strategy is definitely
recommended.
In order to build strategic relations with India, it is critical to note India's
strategic movements under the US-China competition. The US’ tactical moves
to found technology and production supply chain excluding China are
becoming visible. In accordance with this movement, the US is trying to
contain and block China’s development and engage with countries in the Indo-
Pacific region centered on India. The US regards India as the most important
strategic partner to keep China in check. India is also reinforcing its containment
on China due to historical and political factors such as border disputes and
apprehension of China’s excessive economic influence. QUAD is the result of
such a move. Despite India’s relatively neutral position, QUAD occupies an
integral part in India's foreign strategy. From an economic perspective, as
Asia’s largest group to contain China, India is highly likely to gradually hold
a position in the US-centered economic order. In this regard, Dr. Mohan
Kumar discusses as follows. “A free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific region
would not only ensure that Asia remains multipolar but would also give

20 De (2021), op cit., p. 324.

392 The New Southern Policy Plus: Progress and Way Forward
KOREA and India the necessary strategic space and diplomatic room for
manoeuvre to advance their respective national interests.”21
Under these circumstances, the significance of Korea-India economic ties
are expected to have greater value. In this sense, it is crucial to point out that
their interests are directly consistent with each other amid US-China tensions.
In other words, Korea needs to value India as a new market and production
base other than China, and India can benefit from the advantages of alleviating
trade dependency on China and making its manufacturing competitive by
enhancing economic cooperation with Korea. Also, Korea can further expand
its influence in India based on its competitiveness in future industries.
From a more fundamental strategic perspective, what position Korea will
hold in the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy is a major task. Dr. Mohan Kumar of
RIS states as follows. “From an Indian perspective, it goes without saying that
the success or otherwise of the NSPP will really hinge on whether it can make
a meaningful contribution to the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region,
a vision that India fully shares with the United States of America.”22 In this
sense, if the government of India wants Korea to intervene more deeply in the
US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, Korea’s future economic relations with India
have to be ultimately established based on strategic considerations for the
Indo-Pacific region. That is to say, in terms of economic strategy, it will be
vital to find the interface between the NSP and the US Indo-Pacific strategy.

4-5. Promoting mutual understanding through increased exchanges


Despite the many positive results and the improvements, there remains
scope for much improvement in connectivity between the two countries. As
the NSP claims the people-oriented approach to deepen the ties between two
countries, it is much needed to put resources into human development and
exchange. First, Korean institutions need to put more effort in meeting the high
demand for the Korean language. In the new National Education Policy 2020,
the Indian government has included the Korean language to be offered to
Indian students. It is expected that more qualified teachers will be needed.
Thus, Korean institutions must expand the teachers’ training program to train
the potential Korean language teachers. In fact, KCCI collaborated with the

21 Kumar (2021), op cit., p. 80.


22 Ibid., p. 77.

The Prosperity of the New Southern Policy: Achievements and Remaining Challenges 393
Centre for Korean Studies (CKS) at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU)
and started a training program in the Korean language this year. This year, 20
participants will be participating in the training program and will complete
seven courses in the program. Providing training to students will play an
important role in strengthening the ties between the two countries. Second, it
is necessary to increase the efforts to establish or expand the cultural institutions
in India. For example, the Korea Creative Content Agency operates branches
in the United States, China, Japan, Europe, Indonesia, and Vietnam and
supports the overseas expansion of Korean cultural content but has no base in
India yet. In the case of the Korean Cultural Center, two or more are installed
in major countries such as Japan, China, and the United States, and a culture
promotion center is also operated separately. However, there is only one KCC
in India, and it is thought that it is time to actively promote cooperation at the
level of government ministries and institutions in India.

REFERENCES

De, Prabir. 2021. “Strengthening Economic Relations with ASEAN: Roe that India
and Korea Can Play.” In Kwon Hyung Lee and Yoon Jae Ro eds. The New
Southern Policy Plus: Progress and Way Forward. Korea Institute for International
Economic Policy.
Kumar, Mohan. 2021. “The New Southern Policy Plus and India: Progress and Way
Forward.” In Kwon Hyung Lee and Yoon Jae Ro eds. The New Southern Policy
Plus: Progress and Way Forward. Korea Institute for International Economic
Policy.
Raghavan, Vyjayanti. 2021. “Promoting Korea-India Mutual Understanding: Social
and Cultural Aspects.” In Kwon Hyung Lee and Yoon Jae Ro eds. The New
Southern Policy Plus: Progress and Way Forward. Korea Institute for
International Economic Policy.
Shin, Bongkil. 2021. “New Southern Policy and Korea-India Relations: An Overview.”
In Kwon Hyung Lee and Yoon Jae Ro eds. The New Southern Policy Plus:
Progress and Way Forward. Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.
Singh, Surendar. 2021. “Role of Korea-India Bilateral Economic Ties in India’s Trade
and Investment Strategy.” In Kwon Hyung Lee and Yoon Jae Ro eds. The New
Southern Policy Plus: Progress and Way Forward. Korea Institute for International
Economic Policy.

394 The New Southern Policy Plus: Progress and Way Forward

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