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Final Design Report Valkyleallie
Final Design Report Valkyleallie
Procedure
Since the preliminary design report, we made adjustments to our design based on the feedback
received and the results of our initial analysis. Spurred by competition, we also optimized the design to
meet our objective of achieving a balance between cost, maximum load, and load-to-cost ratio by varying
the number of joints, members, and their placement in the truss. This iterative approach allowed us to
compare various configurations and select the one that best met the project specifications. In addition, we
considered the three different truss conditions - nominal, strong, and weak - to see the range of potential
failure weights.
Though continued attempts were made to write a generative code for designing several iterations
of trusses automatically, ultimately that aspect of the plan had to be scrapped for lack of time. Instead, we
continued to rely on sketching designs, working out joint placement by hand with trigonometry, then
running them through our analysis program one by one.
What changes we made to the design procedure mostly came down to a more focused
optimization process. Learning from our previous designs, we were able to come up with a stronger
intuition for how the strength of the truss might change from specific alterations. More on this in the
discussion section.
Analysis
The experience we gained during the preliminary portion helped us refine our design, ensuring
that the truss could withstand the specified minimum live load while minimizing the chances of buckling.
The release of our classmates’ design results motivated us to try many more variations.
While iterating through designs, we briefly thought that we had stumbled upon a truss design that
was roughly 3 times stronger than most of the strongest designs from the class spreadsheet (152 oz
theoretical max load). This discovery made us suspicious that perhaps we had an error in our code.
Thankfully, we were able to confer with professor Farny, identify the error, and fix it. The error was
predictably in how we calculated the maximum theoretical load.
Another change to the analysis process was to come up with another procedure for numbering
joints and members. This procedure was devised in order to simplify the process of entering the
connection matrix, the joint position vectors, the support matrices, and the load vector. Making this
change shortened the time it took to test design iterations as well as decreased the number of human errors
in entering the information.
Results
Cost:
Joints: 8, $10 per joint
Inches: 124.42, $1 per inch
Cost: $204.42
Summary
As the table and drawing above illustrate, our estimated maximum load for this design is 57.5 oz.
Since we used 124.42 inches of material connecting 8 joints, the cost was $204.42. This gives us a load to
cost ratio of 0.281 ounces per dollar. While this design costs more than the one we submitted in our
preliminary design, the load to cost ratio is notably better. According to the preliminary design results
spreadsheet, among all the classes, this truss has the 3rd best load to cost ratio and the 4th best theoretical
maximum load (considering both confirmed and unconfirmed designs).
Appendix
Hartford Roof Collapse
Chair of Meeting - Kyle
Recorder (minute taker) - Valentino
Analyzer - Allie
1) The participants, date, time, and place of the meeting should be recorded.
Allison Glick, Kyle Bohl, Valentino Tartamella 4/25/2023 → 7:13 - 7:41 pm
2) Agenda
Create an agenda
Summarize Hartford roof collapse article
Discuss most significant facilities in the creation of the arena
Talk about how each facility relates to the Code of Ethics of Engineers
Highlight the specific fails when it came to the use of computer programing
Discuss how to avoid these fails in our personal designs
Talk about the safety factors to use on our own truss, if we were to bring it to fruition
Discuss more about how we would report our truss design to the general public to ensure safety,
specifically what we would report as the maximum load
Highlight what materials and form of construction would make our design most successful if fully
built, talk about changes we would want to see in our final creation of the truss
Talk about how we would ensure every code of ethics would be followed
Finally, a group high five for doing a great job on our project
3. The important points should be summarized, along with who suggested each of them.
● 7:13pm: Kyle opens the meeting, proposing to create an agenda
● Allison writes an agenda for the group and the discussion starts
● Valentino opens by discussing the abnormality that two opinions were not needed, unusual for a
project this size
● Ignoring experts within the subcontracts (Kyle)
● “Engineers should take every bit of criticism sincerely”(Kyle)
○ Highlighted issues by engineers should be taken seriously considering that stadium is
meant to be full of thousands of people.
● Kyle, having researched gyration, concluded that the stadium design had too much mass is
towards the center instead of spread out
● Kyle brings up that computer simulation didn’t take buckling into consideration
● “What an idiot, i even took buckling into consideration” (Allison)
● “852% overload is insane, and its remarkable how it didn’t collapse before then” (Valentino)
● Bunch of opportunities to recognize there were issues (Kyle)
● They focused on profit over ethicability, which ultimately lead to various failures in the creation
of it (Allison)
● Original design drastically different from the final, especially with the connection having
moments where moments shouldn’t of been and therefore weren’t taken into consideration
(Valentino)
● A lot of issues were able to go through the cracks because they could pass issues onto others and
communication was clearly lackluster and inefficient
● 7:41: Group checks through agenda making sure all ideas were discussed, and Kyle closes the
meeting
■
○ 2. The top horizontal bars interested at different points than the diagonal bars, making the
roof especially susceptible to buckling
○ 3. Top layer of roof didn't support the roofing panels themselves, instead it was short
vertical posts that allowed for varied heights and therefore increased drainage.
○ 4. Four Pylon legs inside the edges of the roof supported it instead of the walls or
columns around the stadium.
○ 5. Space frame was not cambered, and as a result, computer analysis predicted the roofs
midpoint could deflect 13-in downward and 6-in upward
● To save time and money, the roof frame was assembled on the ground and then lifted
hydraulically, but once installed the selection measured to be twice the predicted by the computer
analysis. Upon notification of this problem, the general contractor directed the subcontractor to
deal with the problem of being responsible for delays. As a result the subcontractors copped some
of the supports and prefabricated others to make the panels fit.
● January 18, 1978, 4:15 A.M. with a loud crack the center of the arena's roof plummeted 83-feet to
the floor of the arena, throwing the corners into the air. Just hours earlier the arena had been
packed for a hockey game. Luckily it was empty by the time of the collapse, and no one was hurt
● Lev Zetlin Associates Inc. (LZA) discovered that the roof began failing as soon as it was
completed, as three major design errors coupled with underestimation of the dead load by 20%
allowed the weight of the accumulated snow to collapse the roof.
○ The top layer's exterior compression members on the east and the west faces were
overloaded by 852%.
○ The top layer's exterior compression members on the north and the south faces were
overloaded by 213%.
○ The top layer's interior compression members in the east-west direction were overloaded
by 72%.
○
● Six years after collapse, all parties reached an out-of-court settlement and therefore the issue
regarding the stadium's structural integrity was never resolved.
● Technical Concerns
○ Computer analysis is only as good as their programmer, and tends to lead lead engineers
into a false sense of security
○ A tube or I-bar configuration would have been much more stable and less vulnerable to
bending and twisting.
○ Failure of a few members should not lead to such a collapse, more redundancy should've
been built in.
● Procedural Concerns
○ Work divided among five subcontracts coordinated by construction manager
○ Construction managers' refusal to hire a structural engineer led to no one to realize the
structural implications of the bowling structures.
○ Hartford department of licenses and inspection did not require project peer review, which
it usually did for projects this large; a second opinion should've been required, which is
standard procedure.