Yes, prediction is important to the scientific endeavor; I agree.

The problem comes down to what

exactly is entailed in such prediction ...

But, first, I’m glad you brought up your second point about facts being a “useful means to an
end” and that the end is “understanding.” Very good point! Precisely, because it answers the
question – ‘what’s the difference between the scientist and the mere technician (be such a car
mechanic, certain sorts of lab techs, ... <and so on>)? You have basically answered it =>
“UNDERSTAND-ING.” The scientist’s work with empirical investigation and predictions is
supposed to add to the store of “funded knowledge” in a scholarly sense (it can certainly be
practical and circumstantially specific, but at some point it must be able to epistemologically add
to the store of “funded knowledge” in the universal sense or at least help to contribute! to such)
That’s good!

Yet, prediction is a broad term and I think there’s a slippery slope to avoid here. By prediction,
we don’t want to imply the scientist is some sort of magical prophet foretelling the future exactly
as it’s going to be (mainly because I’m not so sure one can). With the (semi-)free agency of both
individual things and systemic realities as a whole, we aren’t always going to be able to make
predictions that are 100% accurate. Much of prediction still comes down to probabilities, likely
scenarios, Chaos Theory, and Complexity. It has far less to do, I believe, with materialist
mechanism in the Newtonian sense as it does with the trend of fluid dynamics in both the
physical world (matter and energy) and the world of organisms (bi! ology/biochem./organic
chemistry). At least that’s my take on the matter. What’s yours?

Finally, the term “empirical” can be problematic as well. Empirical investigation can be
characterized by both “use tests” as you put it and by actual experimentation. And, yet, when
we’re speaking about the orientation of our scientific investigation - when we speak about
‘science being empirical’ for instance - I think we’re also focusing on the scope and level of
what it is we are studying as our object – (i.e. the specific fluctuations of the Dow & the Nasdaq
from day to day, the specific activities of a Bill going through Congress, and so on). In other
words, we’re focusing (to some extent) on the formal distinctions & discrete matter of specific
processes/phenomena of those objects or systems we choose to study. (I’m usin! g the term
“matter” here in the technical Scholastic sense that Late Medievals like Aquinas and Scotus used
it as they discussed principles of remote matter, proximate matter, and DS’s notion of the “formal
distinction”) Of course, this implies more than just “experimentation” & “use tests”; and, yet, (I
believe) it’s still covered under the term “empirical.” (At least it has sounded that way to me at
the various times I’ve heard the word used in scientific parlance)

I know Scholastic Philosophy isn’t very popular these days, and perhaps it is too theoretical
and/or legalistic to be of use to us as (social or natural) scientists, but I find that if properly used
its terms are sharp enough to make a good fit with the empirical details of what we look at in the
social sciences. (Much better to me than just the superficiality of terms like the specifics of “X”
or “Y.”) But, what do you think? ...