From Peasants to Miners: The Background to Strikes in the Mines of Peru

Author(s): Adrian Dewind

Source: Science & Society , Spring, 1975, Vol. 39, No. 1, Latin America: Aspects of Labor
History (Spring, 1975), pp. 44-72
Published by: Guilford Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40401830

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Science & Society

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 FROM PEASANTS TO MINERS:
THE BACKGROUND TO STRIKES
IN THE MINES OF PERU

ADRIAN DEWIND

STRIKE WAVE SWEPT through the mining camps of

the Peruvian Andes from the beginning of 1969 through
197 1.1 There had been occasional strikes by mine workers
in the past, but never before had the strikes been so frequent and
rarely so militant. The mines of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation
were affected most. During this period the corporation's loss of
production days was more than three times greater than during
the entire previous decade. The long strikes included marchas de
sacrificio on the capital, violent confrontations with the police,
kidnappings, and killings.
The Cerro de Pasco Corporation was a wholly-owned subsidiary
of the Cerro Corporation, whose main offices are in New York
City. The company was formed in 1902 as the Cerro de Pasco Min-
ing Company with a capital of $10 million (US) obtained from
prominent North American businessmen and financiers. Over the
next seventy years the company (with several changes in its name)
bought and developed foreign and Peruvian-owned mines, acquired
the largest and one of the most efficient haciendas in the country,
built its own railroads, constructed one of the largest and most
complex smelting and refining plants in the world, and dominated
the mining industry in the mineral-rich central region of Peru.
At the time of the recent strikes the Cerro de Pasco Corporation
was the largest private employer in the country. Its operations re-
quired over 14,000 miners. As one of the most important compa-

1 Most of the material for this article was gathered in Peru from July, 1970 to De-
cember, 1971. The research was financed by the Doherty Charitable Foundation
at Princeton University and the Department of Anthropology of Columbia Uni-
versity.

44

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 45

nies in Peru, the Cerro de Pasco C

considerable political influence.
Traditionally the Peruvian gover
the company in controlling, and at
In October, 1968 the military to
adopted a more friendly attitude
were strikes permitted to continue
but also, as final arbitrator of lab
granted the miners improvements i
and unprecedented wage increases.
The military had come to powe
d'état and immediately began a seri
grams, including extensive agrarian
though there was little resistance
popular support. The poor and mi
rural areas greeted the new laws w
doubted whether the military gobi
of decrees) had either the inheren
carry out significant reforms. The
the public of the earnestness of its
generous strike settlements for th
foreign-owned mining companies.
In the fall of 1971 the federation
resenting the mines, the railroads,
de Pasco Corporation went on str
wages and improved living and wor
than ever before. For the first tim
the nationalization of the three lar
which were all owned by North Am
The call for nationalization of the
ist union leaders and political organ
in the miners' assemblies in each ca
the miners and union leaders over
revealed that in principle most min
tionalization, but they were concer
nationalization might have on their
that if the government were to b
more difficult to obtain wage raises.
were the owners, the miners were

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
46 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

almost every strike since governme

a compromise solution. With the g
a strike for wages could also be int
and thus could be politically dang
tended to prefer foreign bosses
the Peruvian engineers in their
better prepared to operate the mi
ment administration would be corr
Despite the recognized lack of
nationalization, the leftist leaders
the new demand, intending to tur
cation for the miners. The leftist
reforms and liberality in settling
the miners with false ideas about
ultimately represented. One of th
ed reforms was the gradual institu
tion in the ownership and adminis
through a new legal entity, the C
munity). The leftists saw co-ow
obscure the conflict of class interests of the mine workers and the
foreign mine owners. They believed that the government would
reject the demand for nationalization and would thereby reveal to
the miners its true political objective: a renegotiation of the terms
of Peru's economic dependency on foreign capital.
In its defense against the strike the Cerro de Pasco Corporation
ignored the call for nationalization and argued only against the
economic demands. It claimed to be operating the mines at a loss
due to the recent series of strikes and, consequently, to be finan-
cially unable to meet the unions' pliego de reclamas (petition of
demands). The company called on the government to postpone
any renegotiation of the annual labor contract for two more years,
when, they predicted, they would be solvent again.
While arguments on both sides were being considered by the
Ministry of Labor arbitrators in Lima, the conflict between the
workers and the company erupted into violence in the Cobriza
mine. A minor provocation by the company began a chain of
events which ended with the hospitalization of one of the miners
and the mine's superintendent. Two company officials were taken
hostage. They would be held in the union hall, said the Secretary

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 47

General of the union, until the demands of the strike had been
met.

The government's response was determined by its policy fo

economic development, which was to make mining the basis f
the industrialization of the country. More than one-half of Peru
foreign exchange came from the taxation of mineral exports. In
addition, Peru had at least five rich but unexploited copper depo
its which could be brought into production. The government had
decided on the path of foreign financing for the projects; to do s
it had to maintain a favorable investment climate.
In the view of the government, nationalization of the Cerro
de Pasco Corporation was not, ultimately, out of the realm of con-
sideration. However, repatriation of ownership had to proceed
in a way that would not scare off foreign investors. The government
was therefore reluctant to make any unilateral move that would
lead to the nationalization of the mines, and it definitely did not
want the issue forced on them by the miners. Indeed, the generals
were so cautious that they waited until December, 1971, when the
Cerro de Pasco Corporation took the initiative and proposed
selling its holdings to the government. Then it took two years of
secret negotiations before the Peruvian military announced that
it would nationalize the mines, agreeing to pay the Cerro Corpo-
ration 75 to 87 million dollars. By following this slow procedure
and agreeing to pay substantial indemnification for the nationalized
companies, the military government was successful in opening up
foreign capital for the development of the mining industry.2
Aside from the question of nationalization, constant labor un-
rest was a serious obstacle to attracting foreign capital. The mili-
tary believed that they would not be able to interest foreign in-
vestors in Peruvian mines if the frequent strikes by the miners
went unchecked.
In view of the economic and political priorities necessitated by
its development plans, the government decided to end the strike.
It suspended all constitutional guarantees in Peru's central region
and imposed martial law. On November 10, a special anti-guerrilla
force entered the Cobriza camp disguised as construction workers.
They broke into the union hall and freed the hostages. In the process

2 Latin America Economic Report (Andean Times), March 1, 1974, pp. 33-4.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
48 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

they killed at least five miners, in

union. In the following days the
oned leftists and union leader
miners in Cobriza. The strike wave was over.

Why the Miners Struck

The government and the company explained the numerous strikes

primarily in political terms. President Juan Velasco Alvarado and
officials of the Ministry of the Interior accused left-wing agitators
of promoting the strikes to create political chaos which would topple
the government. Company officials agreed that left-wing agitators
were to blame, but tended to see themselves as the major target.
These interpretations did not explain why so many of the miners
had supported the strikes. In Cobriza one of the administrators
claimed unconvincingly that the union leaders had coerced the
miners into joining the strikes with kangaroo trials and threats of
beating or killing the amarillos (those who did not support the
strike). Whatever the explanation, the government and the com-
pany agreed that the time had come to control the miners with a
stronger hand.
To understand the strike wave it is necessary to probe a little
deeper. To be sure, the leftists and union leaders encouraged and
led the miners into making militant economic and political de-
mands, but they did not create the basic motivation. What made
the miners willing and even anxious to engage in the long and
difficult strikes was fundamental. Mining production had become
highly mechanized since the 1930s. This change gradually formed
a new labor system which created new economic and social prob-
lems. The need to solve these problems motivated the miners.
The mining system introduced by the Cerro de Pasco Mining
Company at the beginning of the century required a large and un-
skilled labor force. Peasants were recruited to serve as miners on
a part-time basis. These peasant-miners maintained ties to their
communities and depended on their own agricultural production
for a livelihood even when they were receiving wages in the mines.
By 1935 the corporation had acquired and was operating all
but one of the mines it would ever own in Peru. Increments in
production after this time were obtained primarily through mech-

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 49

anization. The introduction of adva

for a skilled and full-time labor force. After World War II in-
creasing land pressure and the commercialization of the peasant
economy made full-time laborers available for the mines in large
numbers. Separated from their communities and fields, full-time
miners could not rely on agricultural production for any substan-
tial portion of their livelihood. They depended entirely on full
participation in the commercial market. As the percentage of full-
time miners in the labor force increased, so did the need for
higher wages and better living conditions in the mine camps.
Throughout the 1960s strikes became more frequent, but
they were controlled and repressed by both the company and the
government through such techniques as manipulating and buying
off the union leaders or sending in troops. The most severe strike
repression occurred in 1963 when troops occupied the smelter town,
La Oroya, and union leaders were imprisoned.3 The strike wave
of 1969 to 1971 was primarily an expression of the growing eco-
nomic and social needs of the miners' needs, which had been largely
ignored or repressed. The history of mine mechanization and the
transformation of the labor system shows that the basic cause of
labor unrest was the relations of production within the mining
industry itself.

The Mechanization of Mining

The fabulously rich gold and silver deposits of Peru were the
Spaniards' major objective in the conquest and colonization of
the Incas. Although the mining industry declined during most of
the century following independence from Spain, the extraction of
precious metals was continued by English and Peruvian miners.
With the depletion of the richest silver deposits and the rise of
large-scale industry in the United States and Europe, the focus of
mining in Peru shifted from precious to industrial metals: copper,
lead, zinc, and iron. Although silver and, to a lesser extent, gold,
were still mined, industrial metals became the mainstay of the
industry.
With the diversification of the types of metals produced at the
end of the 19th century the technological problems of mining and

3 Genaro Ledesma Izquieta, Complot (Lima, 1964).

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
50 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

metallurgy became more complic

most easily treated ores were min
ing deeper in the ground, were h
chemically more complex and mo
lower percentage of metal conten
be processed to maintain the sam
The traditional Peruvian mini
under these conditions. The extr
based on hand tools, and the met
amalgamation, a process which
proved in over three hundred ye
The industrialization of the mi
the formation of the North Am
Cerro de Pasco Corporation. Th
nology (the combustion engine,
raised the productivity of the m
were replaced by hardened drills
by compressed air. Less dangerou
replaced dynamite. In undergrou
carried ore from the face to the surface in leather sacks or wheel-
barrows, but in machine-loaded gondolas on rails pulled by elec-
tric engines.
The shift from a labor intensive to a capital intensive mining
system was gradual and cumulative, some of the most important
steps in mechanization taking place only after 1950. The most
mechanized mines are in Cerro de Pasco and Cobriza. The Cerro
de Pasco mine has been worked by the open pit method since 1956
In this system ore is taken out of a large open air pit by huge earth-
moving machines and gigantic trucks loaded by power shovels. In
1967 a relatively new extractive system called "trackless mining"
was introduced in Cobriza, which the company describes as the mo
highly mechanized underground mine technique in Latin Americ
The trackless mining system replaced underground rails and train
with diesel-powered loaders and trucks which drive into the min
This system gives a speed and mobility in working different parts of
the mine which are not possible with the cumbersome and slo
train and rail system. Also found in Cobriza is the raise-borin
machine, a sort of drill operated by only two men, which ca
cut connecting shafts between levels of a mine. This machin

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 51

can do in three weeks what the old

ing required eight months to do.4
The reduction of low-grade ores af
mines also became a long and com
most important innovation was flo
minerals from waste material and s
erals from one another. The final
use of electrolytic refining.
The gradual increase in mechani
highly skilled labor force. At first
the direction of a technician or en
zation reduced the need for unskilled workers and increased the
need for mechanics, electricians, welders and other workers who
could understand the basic principles of the combustion engine,
electric circuitry and metallurgy. The mechanization of the dif-
ferent parts of the productive process took place over an extended
period, but the need for skilled laborers became most acute after
the construction of the complex metallurgical processing plants in
La Oroya in 1922 and the installation of concentration mills in
the mines in the late 1930s and early 1940s.
The basic requirements for the average worker became more
advanced. The ability to read and write Spanish, once unnecessary,
became mandatory by the late 1950s. On-the-job training, which
had once been sufficient for a peasant to learn the necessary mining
skills, now had to be augmented with education in the government's
technical schools or in company-run classes. An adequately trained
worker became a valuable asset, difficult to find and costly to re-
place. Mechanization created a need not only for skilled workers,
but also for workers who would stay on the job full-time.

The Transformation of the Labor System

At the beginning of the century it was difficult for mine com-
panies to find workers. Most of the labor force was tied to agri-
culture, either in small villages (comunidades) or on large haciendas.
Village agriculture depended upon both communal labor (minga)
and reciprocal labor exchanged by individuals (aine). A comunero
tempted to go to the mines had to fight social pressure to fulfill his

4 Andean Air Mail and Peruvian Times (Lima), December 11, 1970, pp. 22-3.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
52 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

labor obligations in his village. B

also face the possibility of losing th
him after he returned. On the hac
granted access to agricultural land
working for the hacendado, and if
risked losing their lands. The hac
borers, using persuasion or, if nec
obstacles, the mining companies w
they needed with a system of debt
During the first few decades o
Pasco Corporation, like other min
numbers of laborers by commiss
enganchedores, to supply a certa
ganchedor attracted workers in th
large sums of money which had
mines. The debt owed the engan
company had promised him, was
wages. After working long enough to
could return to their villages.5
A major drawback of this syste
was the extent to which the suppl
agricultural cycle. Most of the wo
contract their labor only when th
labor, especially after the harve
scribed the mass migration to the

. . . entire communities would enlist

work, leaving only the old men and a
planting . . . the enganche agents d
number of railroad passengers wh
pense

Most of the enganche contracts were

the next harvest because most miners would abandon the mines

to return to their fields even if their debts were not totally repaid

5 Alberto Noriega, "El enganche en la minería del Perú," in Boletín de minas, in

dustrias, y construcciones (Lima, 1911), Serie II, Tomo III, Nos. 4-6, pp. 43-6, and
Hildebrando Castro Pozo, Nuestra Comunidad Indigena (Lima, 1924), pp. 117-24
6 Castro Pozo, op. cit., pp. 101-2. (This author's translation.)

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 53

During the harvest, mining operati

at times temporarily suspended.7
One of the reasons why temporar
ceptable to the mining companies w
miners got their major livelihood fr
their wages could be set at an extre
large percentage of the wages paid
the company store.
The method of paying wages first
Corporation virtually forced the mi
at the company store, known as th
the miners in cash only once a mon
miners were issued metal coins at t
get credited for work, these coins
of cardboard the following mornin
tendance at work). The cardboard c
mediately for a bond which was go
mercantil, or it could be exchanged
cash wages. If the miner needed to
had no choice but to make his purc
bonds were not valid anywhere else.
and the recruitment fee owed the
they had new debts to the mercanti
the mines.8

The miners' debts were often inflated by two types of unequal

exchange which forced them to stay in the mines longer. First, the
advances given by the enganchedor were, in part or in whole, in the
form of over-priced goods rather than money. Second, the articles
for sale in the mercantil were priced higher than in other stores.
The state of indebtedness, in some cases, continued indefinitely
and kept the workers in the mines for years. If a miner became in-
capacitated or died, his debt could be passed on to his children.
If the miner attempted to escape without paying off his debt, he
could be forced to work in the mines for even longer. On being

7 ibid., pp. 97-8.

8 Dora Mayer de Zulem, The Conduct of the Cerro de Pasco Mining Company (Lima,
1913), pp. 8-11, and Moisés Poblete Truncoso, Condiciones de vida y de trabajo
de la población indigena del Peru (Geneva, 1958), pp. 145-6.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 54 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

returned to the mine he was fin

original loan.9
To get themselves out of debt many miners brought animals and
food with them to the camps. The mine companies welcomed the
miners' living off of their agricultural production because it enabled
them to keep wages low.
As mechanization increased in the mines, the company sought
more highly skilled and more permanent laborers. To attract com-
petent workers the company offered 25-50% higher wages than the
temporary enganchados received.10 In the late 1930s increasing num-
bers of peasants began to come to the mines without the coercion
of the enganche system as a result of the transformations taking place
in the peasant economy as well as the prospect of higher wages.

Mine Labor and the Commercialization of Agriculture

The susceptibility of peasants to the enganche system stemmed
from the increasing inability of the peasant agricultural economy to
sustain them. One of the major strains on the peasant economy came
from the division of lands into minifundios. This division was due to
centuries of encroachments on communal lands by outsiders, to in-
creasing population, and to the Spanish-derived system of partible in-
heritance.11 By the end of the 19th century land pressure had begun
to force peasants to expand their participation in the commercial
market. The need for money to purchase consumption goods led
the peasants to accept onerous loans from the enganchedores. The
ties of peasants to the market were not, however, purely a result of
land pressure.
The traditional closed, corporate peasant community had never
been entirely shut off from the outside economy nor had it ever
been entirely self-sufficient.12 One of its central institutions, the fiesta
system, had originally been imposed by the Spaniards during the

9 Julian Laite, "Industrialization and Land Tenure in the Peruvian Andes," mime-
ographed by the Department of Sociology, University of Manchester, England,
1971; Noriega, op. cit., pp. 51-3, and Zulen, op. cit., p. 11.
10 Castro Pozo, op. cit., p. 120n.
11 Thomas R. Ford, Man and Land in Peru (Gainseville, Florida, 1955), pp. 42-52,
66-7, 97.
12 Eric R. Wolf, "Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion,"
American Anthropologist, Vol. 57 (1955), pp. 465-71.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 55

colonial period. In the fiesta system

of one of the village saints often o
mayordomo responsible. He was
other means, such as a loan from an
of course, paid back by working in th
became known as easy marks for th
The large-scale recruitment of pea
the first few decades of the 20th ce
which the migration to the mines
labor in the mines on the part of
the need for money in the villages,
members to go to work in the min
the enganche system became less im
because of the commercialization of
labor in the fields (aine) gave way
culture became increasingly supp
mercial crops; and artisan goods we
The departure of some members o
meant that they could not fulfill t
to other members. The people with
work had to find a new source of labo
peones from outside the communit
in production while away at the mine
of al partir with a relative or neig
miner provided the land and seeds,
village recruited and paid laborer
miner and the villager divided the
pay the laborers came either from
selling part of the crop to local m
Should the crop fail (a common occ
storms, drought, and plant disea
in debt to the local merchant. Since these local merchants acted as
agents for enganchedores, they would often force the peasants to work
in the mines to repay the debts.
Mine labor affected the consumption and production of artisan

13 Marvin Harris, Patterns of Race in the Americas (New York, 1964), pp. 25-36.
14 The commercial transfer of land titles, as described by Julian Laite (op. ct.), was
also increased by emigration to the mines.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 56 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

goods. Every time peasants acquir

loans from enganche dores or a
stores, the transaction reduced t
duced by village artisans. In add
against the sale of manufactured
the village markets. The compet
the railway system was extended
growing mining industry. The s
made manufactures more readily
Although the peasant villages re
government as traditional comm
closed, corporate nature. Many
worked land in common, but inst
into de facto private property.15
commodities for sale, the village
more "open" type of community
peasants increasingly dependent o
the external market.16 The com
consumption, combined with land
tional obligations of the fiesta c
abandon agriculture for long per
mines on a full-time basis. The
from their villages coincided wi
the mines and the need for perm
As year-round mine labor kept
agricultural production or obtaini
their villages, the company had
miners than they did to the part
could not maintain a family with
than raise wages still further, th
chased extensive pasture lands
support between the miners and
were now tied not to their pe
haciendas of the sierra.
The process by which the Cerro de Pasco Corporation became the

15 Oscar Nunez del Prado, "Aspects of Andean Native Life," Kroeber Anthropology
Society Papers (Berkeley, California, 1955), Vol. 12, pp. 6-7.
16 Wolf, op. cit., pp. 461-6.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 57

owner of the largest latifundia in

flict. The controversy began in 192
Oroya began operations. The smo
destructive amounts of arsenic, lead, and sulfur dioxide. These
chemicals poisoned animals and destroyed crops as far away as
40 kms. The owners of the affected haciendas and community lands
complained and threatened to sue for damages. The company re-
sponded by buying up the hacienda lands and livestock. Since
communal lands legally could not be sold, the company finally
agreed to pay the communities indemnification after a long series
of battles in the courts. Small indemnification payments are still
being made to some communities.
Critics of the company charged that, on the basis of its own
previous smelter operations in Peru and from the experience of
other smelteries in the United States the company must have
known of the danger from the smoke well in advance. The company
could have installed a Cotrell plant, which would have removed
most of the noxious elements. The reason for the company's lack
of precautions, they asserted, was that it had planned all along
to buy up the haciendas; it used the smoke to discourage other
buyers and to get a cheap price. It was further charged that by
destroying the crops in the surrounding peasant communities,
the company had planned to create an ample labor supply.17
The company denied these motives and defended its actions,
claiming that a Cotrell plant was very expensive and of dubious
effectiveness because the process had not been fully developed. There
were also other factors, both financial and political, which entered
into the company's decisions. The cost of building the smelter had
greatly exceeded original estimates, and the company was in debt by
about $8-10 million. The company therefore did not want to make
a large investment in a Cotrell plant which held no promise of
economic returns. Nevertheless, the government forced the company
to reduce smelter production until it had installed a gravity system
for extracting at least the solid particles, mostly lead.
The company also had the option of paying indemnification to

17 CID A, "Perú- Tenencia de la tierra y desarrollo socio -economi co del sector agrí-
cola," (Washington, D.C., 1966), cited in Sven Lindquist, The Shadow: Latin
America Faces the Seventies (London, 1972), pp. 220-22.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 58 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

the haciendas as well as the com

tical climate was strongly against
the company feared it would be
ment in the courts.18

In buying the haciendas instea

the company was making a good
owner of some of the best pas
knowing that when it became ad
control, the haciendas could be p
By 1926 the company had boug
270,000 hectares or 1,057 square
of Rhode Island). Apparently th
livestock were quickly reduced.
lead and, in the course of time
munity to the arsenic. The comp
of sheep and cattle. In 1930, wh
the company to cut back on the
opened a modern meat shop to su
dairy products. In 1941 an adequ
more than 90% of the noxious ele
installed. Helped by modern vet
careful cross-breeding which p
superior to the native chuscos, th
meat and milk for all the miners.

Meanwhile, the pressure for higher wages was mounting. As the

effects of the depression wore off, the company resumed former op-
erations, opening new mines and plants, diversifying its
products, and especially enlarging lead and zinc production. Despite
the expansion, mechanization allowed the company to keep the
number of workers at about the same level as before the depression.
The difference was that more miners were working on a full-time
basis and were becoming increasingly skilled on the job. To attract
and keep workers the company now offered wages up to twelve times
higher than those paid in 1917. Another reason for the higher wages

18 B. T. Colley, "A History of the Cerro Corporation/' an internal memorandum of

the Cerro Corporation (New York, 1958). For a more extensive analysis of the com-
pany's strategy see Laite, op, cit.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 59

was pressure from the workers* un

ognized in the 1940s.
The sale of meat from the haciend
labor costs. The company was able to
the market price. It is difficult to cal
by the company, but an indication
from company statistics. From 1960
an average of 1.11 million kilos o
year. Assuming the price averaged
price, as one company administrato
ployees saved 5.55 million Soles (app
annually. Another way of looking a
reduction in labor costs. Even thou
meat below the market price, the h
annual profit of 6.20 million Soles
the same period.19
The profits made on the hacienda op
ent production methods, the expo
wages as compared to those paid th
when the average basic wage for th
wage paid to shepherds was only
hacienda workers were able to endu
the miners recruited in the enganch
selves with agricultural production
by the company.20
Under the enganche system the m
agricultural production for their li
profited from this dependency by
After 1940 miners stayed on the job
in the past, and they gradually bro

19 These figures are based on the Annual Rep

of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (Lima, 1
20 A similar relationship between a hacienda
by the Northern Peru Mining Corporation
American Smelting and Refining Company
the mining company used the hacienda to pr
is described by Solomon Miller, "Hacienda
Process of Proletarianization of a Tenant Far
Contemporary Change in Traditional Societ
135-225.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
60 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

economy. Although the compan

somewhat, it had managed to mai
agriculture by transferring it, at n
ized sector. This profitable rela
haciendas lasted until 1969, when
haciendas and converted them
Agrícola de Interés Social "Tupa
demands of the middle class in Li
raise the profits of the S.A.I.S. "T
for the nationalized lands, the m
double the previous price.

A Free Labor Market

In the two and a half decades after World War II the difficulty
of recruiting labor disappeared. The stream of migrants from rural
areas grew tremendously. More laborers sought employment in the
mines than the Cerro de Pasco Corporation could hire. Those who
could not find work in the sierra migrated to urban areas and filled
the barriadas of Lima and other cities. A competitive free labor
market was created. Laborers who could no longer depend upon
agriculture were forced to work for wages.
The company took advantage of the surplus of laborers to create
a skilled labor force. Since it could employ only some of the job
applicants, it began to set selective criteria which were not only
technical but also cultural, medical, and political.
The most important requirement was the ability not only to
speak Spanish, but also to be able to read and write to some extent.
At times this requirement was only imperfectly fulfilled, but even-
tually almost all the miners were able to read company work
bulletins, safety regulations, romance comic books, and newspapers.
Medical criteria were the strictest, primarily for economic rea-
sons. Labor laws and the convenio colectivo (the labor contract
signed with the unions) required the company to provide the work-
ers extensive free medical care. Each worker had to pass a medical
examination before being hired. Anyone who needed dental work,
who showed a serious lung ailment in an x-ray (silicosis from previ-
ous work in the mines and tuberculosis are common in the sierra), or

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 61

who had a physical handicap was

applicants were turned down for
Political requirements were num
ance by the PIP (equivalent to the FBI) to show lack of
a criminal record; 2) presentation of identity cards given by the
state for tax and social security purposes; 3) proof of military service
to show that the applicant was over 20 years old and would not be
conscripted from the job; 4) a check against the company "black list,"
which included a large number of known political agitators, militant
unionists, thieves, and people the company considered to be social
or disciplinary problems.21
A free labor market enabled the company to select workers with
basic skills, but not necessarily with the specialized skills which the
company needed. Many of the jobs in the mines required knowledge
or experience in mechanics, carpentry, electricity, etc. beyond what
most applicants had. The company met this problem in two ways:
first, it developed a training program to prepare workers for specific
jobs; second, it began to hire contratistas or outside companies with
already-skilled workers.
Because Cobriza was a new and highly mechanized mine, its train-
ing program and its use of contratistas were perhaps more important
than at other mines. Every year approximately one-fifth of all the
miners in this camp participated in training courses given by the
company. There were two types of courses. Those which taught gen-
eral skills gave workers the background that was necessary for a wide
range of jobs. The topics included mathematics, the principles of
combustion or electricity. Other courses prepared workers to
perform specific tasks, such as the maintenance of heavy machinery,
the operation of rock crushers or pneumatic drills. Some of these
courses were mandatory and others were voluntary but prerequisites
for promotions.
The hiring of contratistas began for reasons of economy. For short-

21 These selective criteria created a fairly homogeneous labor force, which was not
present in less mechanized mines. In Huancavelica Henri Favre found that skilled
and unskilled work was performed by distinct socio-cultural groups: cholos, who
tend to be fully integrated into the commercial market, and indígenas, who tend
to maintain ties with more traditional peasant communities. See Henri Favre,
"Algunos problemas referentes a la industria minera de Huancavelica," Cuadernos
de Antropologia (Lima, 1965), Vol. 3, No. 8, p. 20.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
62 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

term jobs which required skilled

be used only briefly, it was chea
to buy special machinery and t
Utah Construction Company (a N
Peruvians) was hired to erect th
and housing. One of the advantag
to do this construction lay in the
the construction workers and m
was able to fire its workers whenever it was convenient. Peruvian
labor law prohibits permanent employers like mining companies
to fire workers without just cause, the conditions for which are
strictly defined in the law. If the Cerro de Pasco Corporation had
used its own construction workers, it would have been* forced to keep
the workers on the payroll after the project was finished. Because
of the short-term nature of their work, companies like Utah were
exempt from this law.
In some cases it was cheaper to hire contratistas because they
paid their laborers much less than the mine company paid. In Co-
briza, for example, two contratistas from a nearby village were hired
for grounds maintenance. At the time (1971) the lowest wage paid
by the Cerro de Pasco Corporation was 150 Soles, while the men
under the contratistas got only 70 Soles. Other savings for the com-
pany resulted from not having to provide housing, tools, hospital
care, or schooling, and not having to contend with the union when it
decided to lay off some of the workers. One of the reasons the Cerro
de Pasco Corporation paid wages so much higher than other com-
panies was because of the unions.
Successful unionization seems to have been related to the emer-
gence of a full-time labor force. Attempts to unionize the mines
began as early as 1918, but they had little effect until 1929, when
members of the Communist Party led a strike in Morococha. On
the basis of this success, unions sprang up in other mines, and the
Communist unionists called for the formation of a national federa-
tion of miners. The organization was not strong enough to survive
government repression the following year, when the union leaders
were arrested and many workers were massacred by government
troops in Malpaso, the site of the company's first hydro-electric
plant.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 63

The unions were not strong enou

after World War II. By this time the
in the mines had grown, and the n
than in the past, when there had b
to the workers1 reliance on agricult
miners' unions won recognition fr
company, and other unions were f
the miners found themselves incre
the question of wage levels and livi
mines became crucial. These issue
negotiations for a collective labor
the company.22
After the unions were legally recog
force which had been markedly tr
since the Cerro de Pasco first began
debt labor had been replaced by a
laborers were no longer peasants
mines to make up for what they c
for themselves. They were full-tim
ded on wages and commercial cons

The Problems of Wage Labor

Full-time work in the mines and
agriculture transformed the domes
family. The nuclear family tended
as an economic unit as it became
miner's wages for a livelihood. By
an ongoing process.
The company's interest in prom
economic and political. It wanted
would build up skills and a traditio
company had played what it conside
viding the miners with services ra

22 For a more complete history of the mi

Torre, Apuntes para una interpretación m
(Lima, 1949), Voi. 4, pp. 5-137; and Denis
miento obrero minero peruano," mimeogr
Universidad Católica (Lima, 1971).

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
64 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

ing to soccer uniforms and movies. N

of these services, but, company of
criticism rather than praise for
believed that if the workers would
and assume responsibility for pers
be saved both expense and criticis
The company began by selling ho
project was inaugurated, only 40%
Pasco mine lived in company ho
quarters in the old city. To make
operations, the company bought up
city. Displaced miners and towns
built by the company in a new
houses, but were forced to buy the
this part of the project got under w
to the government to build a simil
Oroya smelter and the Morococha
was to shift to the workers the re
improving housing, thereby lower
demands for expensive improveme
Regardless of who owned the ho
workers to adjust to mining camp
practical and cultural problems in suc
to a basically urban way of life, and
the transition was made as smooth
performed three major functions.
their families solve some very rea
their having to learn a new life st
cussions on hygiene, infectious di
rooms, etc.). Secondly, they tried t
values in the workers. They demande
be "presentable/* At the same tim
habits, criticizing visits by membe
a "moral problem." Finally, they se
pany's interests. They policed the
sure they were properly maintain
designated by the company.23

23 Cerro de Pasco Corporation, Annual Rep

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 65

The social workers evaluated the

gave courses to help the famili
ranking system which they estab
away at work, the main burden
camp life was placed on the women,
problem was to make ends meet o
were aimed at practical problems. W
variety of industrially produced foo
bleached flour, canned fruit, etc.),
how to prepare them (on a kerosen
tions provided a nutritious diet. Cl
was mostly store bought. In the se
taught the women how to make sim
save money. The social workers a
women how to furnish and keep
ranged from the "proper" way to a
wall to admonitions against the "un
in the wet, cool shower stalls, a pr
refrigerators were too expensive to
The counseling of the social work
lated to the problem of how to spen
major familial conflicts was over
miner's wages- the obligations of a
dren, the rights of a woman to sha
determine how they should be spen
The social workers often met re
understood the principles of a full
could not afford to buy sufficient me
may have meant saving money, b
woman's work. The accumulation of
required considerable savings, which
Even ideas which could have been
were, at first, rejected because acce
the implied or expressed stigma of
later, however, the facts of life re
what the social workers proposed. T
the women to take this direction by
clothes and the most "presentable"

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
66 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

In the end the social work pro

pany. Its purpose was aptly descr
administrators in Cerro de Pasco:

The point is to keep the women happy. Otherwise on some rainy day
they'll corner their husbands and take their complaints out on them.
Then the husbands will go get drunk and when they get together like
that they go on strike and blame everything on the company.

But rather than make the women happy, the social work program
humiliated them by making them feel as though their rural way of
life was inferior. Then it frustrated them by teaching them to want
and need more than they could afford to buy. Anger was directed
at the company because it set wages at levels which would not support
the standard of living it taught the women to aspire to. Added to
this indignity and frustration was the knowledge that the company
was pressing them to change their lives out of its own self-interest.
It was the increasing pressure on the women and their resulting
frustration and anger that motivated the formation of the Comités de
Damas (organizations which paralleled the men's unions). It is no
surprise that in many strikes the women were more militant and
aggressive than the men.
In the process of establishing a permanent supply of skilled labor-
ers with no support from peasant agriculture and entirely dependent
on mining wages, the company forced miners to depend entirely on
the market for consumption goods. The more the miners conformed
to the company's ideal of an adjusted family life, the more their
needs for market consumption expanded. At the same time the
company's attempt to make workers self-reliant by cutting back on
"paternalistic" services added to the expenses which had to be
covered by a miner's wages. The government exacerbated the prob-
lem by nationalizing the company's haciendas, thereby forcing the
miners to spend almost twice as much money on meat in the open
market.
Each time the workers went out on strike between 1969 and 1971
they complained that it was more difficult to live on their wages than
it had been in the past. The company tried to discredit this claim
by pointing out that wages had risen more than the cost of living
over the previous fifteen years. Although the company's contention

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 67

may have been correct, its argumen

fact that the workers had become in
consumption and needed to buy mo
before. Ironically the company's att
ically independent, and well adjuste
the difficulties and frustrations of
and had done more to provoke strik
create labor peace.

Proletarianization and Class' Conflict

The transformation of the mine

peasant-miners into a body of skilled,
that the present-day miners should
classical Marxist sense. The miners
their labor power for wages in ord
term cannot be applied yet to all th
tion. The proletarian socio-econo
modified by their access to land, tec
which can be used to get out of the
or engage in some other petit-bour
Almost all the laborers who come to the mines still own or have

access to land. Most have only small plots of land which provide a
form of temporary economic security in case of illness, accident, or
loss of job. A smaller number of miners, however, have more sub-
stantial holdings, which can become the basis for an agricultural
life to return to after leaving the mines. On their return they use
whatever savings and separation pay they may have as capital in-
vestment in new land, animals, tools, or whatever else is necessary
to begin commercial farming.
Some miners who do not return to agriculture take up a trade.
On the basis of skills learned in the mines and with their cash
savings, they open their own carpentry, mechanic, or welding shops
in urban areas. Others enter commerce. They open small stores in
cities, towns, or their own villages, or they buy a truck and hire
themselves out as transportistas. Often they are able to use their
contacts in the mines and win a contract to haul ore and supplies

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 68 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

for the company. Some miners b

from mine camp to mine camp s
Workers taking employment in
intention of engaging in wage lab
stone to some other economic act
the mines after a short period of
a result, the average rate of labo
Corporation has been high- 20% i
miners can loosely be categorized in
mine labor is a relatively short-te
form of self-employment. Becaus
ily based on wage labor, they can
temporarily proletarianized. For t
ers, however, wage labor is a mor
in the mines for long periods of ti
They become the most skilled wo
positions. Their livelihood depen
of them leaving the mines or cha
remains only a possibility for th
more justly be called proletarian
The proportion of miners who
has been growing since the 193
mechanization in the mines and
economy. Corporation statistics ind
into recent years. The annual rat
30% in 1958 to 20% in 1969, show
force.26 The present ratio of perm
has probably increased due t
peasant communities decreed in
of this law require that all comun
in their communities and that th
agricultural labor. They are no

24 Richard N. Adams observed in Muquiy

some of the owners of small plots of l
continue traditional subsistence agricultu
cultural trades. See Richard N. Adams,
and Progress in Muquiyauyo (Seattle, 19
25 Cerro de Pasco Corporation, Annual R
26 Ibid.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 69

sources of income such as mine lab

sufficient to support all of its mem
by Article 126 of the Agrarian Refo
more land so that they will no long
Having a permanent residence outsi
for losing the rights of a comuner
these laws are applied, miners will
ing to their villages (as many did w
losing their lands. Since there is no
able in the sierra to provide each ru
the size stipulated as necessary acco
Law, there is bound to be an incr
workers competing for permanent
An increase in the number of perm
ers will intensify the miners' demand
conditions in the camps. Laborers w
the mines for only a few years ac
habitations to live in because they b
temporary. Their intention was to e
as possible rather than to improv
permanent miners settle in the mi
housing. Further, as they adapt to
described earlier), their needs for c
and this will inevitably be expressed
Full-time miners are likely to be mo
to obtain the living conditions and
plans to leave the mines within a f
benefits of strikes differently from
as miners. Temporary miners can ga
long strike which may win only
a worker who knows he will remain
culation includes future as well as i
curred during a strike can be more
year, then over the years which follo

27 Peruvian Government, Estatuto de comun

37-70-A (1970); and Texto único de la ley
No. 265-70-AG (1970).
28 Andean Air Mail and Peruvian Times, A

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
70 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

Having nationalized the Cerro de

into the mining industry as an ent
ment has taken on the responsibili
needs and demands of the miners.
the Peruvian economy in general by
from minerals sold abroad, these ben
if at all, by the miners. Nationaliza
with state ownership without chang
ditions in the mines. For the mine
and conflicts continue. It is the gover
between the laborers and the owne
grams which it has proposed are n
The Comunidad Minera and the
Minera were established by the gover
of eliminating class conflict betwee
giving the miners a vested interes
the mining companies. The Comu
create co-ownership by awarding t
income (renta neta), which must
until it reaches a value equal to 50%
(capital social).2* Co-ownership was
the Cerro de Pasco Corporation ow
profits of the corporation were ap
capital shares were valued at approx
that the corporation would have m
profitability in the future, it would
years to acquire one-half of the cap
tion even this hope of co-ownership b
to the General Mining Law, Article 2
ing to the public sector or involvin
issued bonds from either the mining
tion Financiera de Desarrollo (CO
mitted to obtain shares of the compa
In addition to projecting co-own
that the workers are to receive 4% of the annual net income as cash

29 Peruvian Government, Ley general de minería, Decreto Ley No. 18880 (Lima, 1970).
30 Peruvian Government, Ministerio de Energía y Minas, Declaración anual de la
Cerro Pasco Corporation (1969).

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE MINERS OF PERU 71

benefits. These monetary payments

alter the miners' present incom
profits among 15,000 of the cor
average of less than a week's wages
is about the same as that which miner
sharing plan which the new law abo
Minera and the Comunidad de Comp
formed in the future to adapt to th
alized mines, as the present law now
to have any more interest in the pr
companies than they had in the pas
The government has long recogn
better houses for the miners, and du
tions it sharply criticized the Cerro
to build them. Following nationali
dicated that it will undertake large-s
Even if the government does provi
needed housing, this improvement i
will not decrease their need for wag
that adaptation to a modern way of
to create demands for greater comm
lem is that to live in new and larger
spend more money. Rather than dis
miners and the state as owner could
laborers' demands likely to grow, but
great pressure to resist any increase
The mining industry is a keystone
for industrialization and economic d
nández Maldonado, Minister of E
far as to claim that the entire success of the Peruvian revolu-
tion depends upon the performance of his sector of the econom
(which includes petroleum).31 The large-scale expansion of t
mining industry is to be financed by international loans totalin
hundreds of millions of dollars. The government and private com
panies contract the loans and they assume the responsibility for their
repayment, but ultimately it is the miners who will have to pay o
the interest and principal. The government has appealed to t

31 Latin America, April 20, 1973 (London), p. 125.

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 72 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

miners' patriotism, calling on the

self-discipline at a time when the
So far, however, the governme
neither substantial support for
cooperation in its programs. Labor
of the ex-Cerro de Pasco Corpora
military generals cannot persuade
the discipline and sacrifices which t
record indicates that they will no
armed force.

New York City

This content downloaded from

132.174.254.12 on Mon, 25 Sep 2023 19:17:54 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms