Risk Management and Use of Risk-Based Approaches in Inspection, Maintenance and HSE ... (PDFDrive)

STEINBEIS ADVANCED RISK TECHNOLOGIES GmbH
Risk management and use of risk-based

approaches in inspection, maintenance
and HSE analyses of NIS a.d. plants
Final Report for Package B
(selected Annexes only)
Stuttgart, Belgrade, July 7, 2010
Report title: Final report for Package B
Costumer: NIS Petroleum Industry of Serbia
Customer order Nr.: 45/609

Risk management and use of risk-
Internal project Nr.: 10027
based approaches in inspection,
Project title:
maintenance and HSE analyses of
Project start: October 1, 2006
NIS a.d. plants
Project end: December 31, 2010
Subproject: Package B Applicable codes/standards:
Workpackage: WP2.11 Date of order acceptance:
Task: Date of completion:
Additional
contract info:
Participants in the activity: Distribution (list):
Participants / A. Jovanovic, D. Balos, P. Stanojevic,

Distribution: B. Orlic, S. Eremic, O. Tot, M. Ilic, Z. 1 x NIS a.d.
Pavlovic, D. Subotin, D. Jasin, R. 1 x Steinbeis R-Tech
Guntrum, B. Stojanovic
Author(s): A. Jovanovic, D. Balos, R. Guntrum
Doc. Nr.: Version: 06 Date: July 7, 2010
Document Pages: 193 Annexes: 29

data:
Status: Confidentiality:
NIS, petroleum industry, risk management, API 581, risk based inspection,
Keywords:
reliability centered maintenance, Seveso, Safety report
© Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies GmbH, Willi-Bleicher-Str. 19, 70174 Stuttgart, Germany
Table of Contents
List of Figures ................................................... vi
List of Tables ................................................... viii
1 Management Summary Report .................... 1
2 Detail Technical Report .............................. 2
2.1 General part............................................. 2
2.1.1 Introduction ................................. 2
2.1.2 General about NIS a.d. .................. 3
2.1.2.1 Activities ........................................... 3
2.1.2.2 History of the company ....................... 4
2.1.2.3 NIS in numbers.................................. 4
2.1.3 Pancevo Oil Refinery ..................... 5

2.1.3.1 General data ..................................... 5
2.1.3.2 Location of Pancevo Refinery ............... 6
2.1.3.3 Description of the plant ..................... 17
2.1.3.4 Safety of the plant ........................... 23
2.1.4 Novi Sad refinery ........................ 27

2.1.4.1 General data ................................... 27
2.1.4.2 Location description.......................... 27
2.1.4.4 Safety of the plant ........................... 35
2.1.4.5 Description of processes ................... 37
2.1.5 Elemir Gas refinery ..................... 40

2.1.5.1 General data ................................... 40
2.1.5.2 Location description.......................... 40
2.1.5.4 Description of processes ................... 49
2.2 About RBI / RCM methodology .................. 50

2.2.1 General ..................................... 50
2.2.2 Preparation of data base .............. 50
2.2.3 Identifying the Damage
Mechanisms ............................... 52
2.2.4 Calculating the Likelihood of Failure52
2.2.5 Calculating the Consequence of
Failure ...................................... 53
2.2.6 Determine the Financial
Consequences ............................ 54
2.2.7 Calculating the Risk .................... 54
page ii
2.2.8 Remaining life assessment ........... 55

2.2.9 Developing an inspection plan ...... 56
2.2.10 Software used ............................ 60
2.3 General about HSE (HAZOP, Seveso II)
methodology .......................................... 60
2.3.1 HAZOP ...................................... 60
2.3.2 Seveso II Directive ..................... 62
2.4 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Pancevo
Refinery ................................................ 63
2.4.1 The scope of analysis .................. 63
2.5 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Novi Sad
Refinery ................................................ 64
2.6 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Elemir
Refinery ................................................ 64
2.6.1 Executive summary..................... 64
2.6.2 Introduction ............................... 66
2.6.2.1 Objective ........................................ 66
2.6.2.2 Scope ............................................. 66
2.6.2.3 Deliverables .................................... 67
2.6.3 Methodology .............................. 67

2.6.4 Performed activities .................... 67
2.6.5 Unit and process description ......... 68
2.6.6 Results of analysis ...................... 71
2.6.6.1 HAZOP Analysis Results .................... 71
2.6.6.2 Technical discussions ........................ 71
2.6.6.3 Management Systems Evaluation ....... 77
2.6.6.4 API 581 Qualitative (Unit-based)
analysis results ................................ 79
2.6.6.5 API 581 qualitative analysis
(component based) .......................... 79
2.6.6.6 RBI Detailed quantitative analysis ...... 81
2.6.7 Conclusions and recommendations 81

2.7 HSE (Seveso) report for Refinery Pancevo,
Unit FCC ................................................ 83
2.7.1 Introduction ............................... 83
2.7.1.1 General ........................................... 83
2.7.1.2 Implementation of Seveso
requirements ................................... 83
2.7.2 Information on site, plant and unit 84

2.7.2.1 General data ................................... 84
2.7.2.2 Location of Establishment.................. 84
2.7.2.3 Policy the company is pursuing .......... 86
2.7.2.4 Safety management system .............. 86
2.7.2.5 Hazardous materials ......................... 86
2.7.2.6 Meteorological data .......................... 86
2.7.2.7 External activities ............................. 86
2.7.3 Detail description ........................ 86
page iii
2.7.3.1 FCC unit S-2300 .............................. 86

2.7.3.2 Gas concentration unit S-2500 ........... 91
2.7.3.3 Flow charts...................................... 95
2.7.3.4 Condition of the processes ................ 95
2.7.3.5 Hazardous material .......................... 95
2.7.3.6 Utilities and effects ........................... 97
2.7.4 Safety of the plant ...................... 99

2.7.4.1 History of accident ........................... 99
2.7.4.2 Hazards identified ............................ 99
2.7.4.3 Frequency of occurrence of hazards .. 105
2.7.4.4 Consequences of hazards ................ 106
2.7.4.5 Domino effect from Event TOP1 ....... 115
2.7.4.6 Summary of Hazard Analysis ........... 116
2.7.4.7 Measures to prevent or mitigate the
hazards......................................... 116
2.7.4.8 Measures to reduce the consequences
of an accident ................................ 116
2.7.5 Risk assessment ........................117

2.7.5.1 Frequency ranking.......................... 117
2.7.5.2 Damage severity ............................ 117
2.7.6 Conclusions ..............................118

3 RBI / RCM User’s manual ....................... 119
4 References ........................................... 120
5 Annexes .............................................. 121
Annex 1 Geographical position of Pancevo ............ 122
Annex 2 Industrial zone of Pancevo ..................... 123
Annex 3 General plan of Pancevo refinery ............. 124
Annex 4 Organization of Pancevo refinery ............. 125
Annex 5 General plan of Novi Sad refinery ............ 126
Annex 6 Substances in Novi Sad refinery .............. 127
Annex 7 Organization of Novi Sad refinery ............ 129
Annex 8 Responsibilities’ within management system
in Novi Sad refinery .............................. 130
A.8.1 According to the requests of the
standard ISO 9001:2000 (SRPS ISO
9001:2001) ............................... 130
A.8.2 According to the requests of the
standard ISO 14001:2004 (SRPS ISO
14001:2005) ............................. 133
Annex 9 Novi Sad refinery – flow diagram of U 100 136
Annex 10 Refinery Novi Sad – flow diagram of U 200 137
Annex 11 Elemir Gas refinery in NIS Naftagas ......... 138
Annex 12 Integrated management system policy of
NIS Naftagas........................................ 139
Annex 13 Flow diagram of Elemir Gas Refinery ........ 140
Annex 14 Position of unit FCC in Pancevo refinery.... 141
page iv
A.14.1 Blocks in Pancevo refinery ........... 141

A.14.2 General plan of refinery – position of
FCC in Block 6 ........................... 142
Annex 15 QMS/EMS documents of RNP .................. 143
Annex 16 List of available drawings of FCC ............. 146
Annex 17 Main hazards in FCC .............................. 150
Annex 18 Block diagram of Pancevo refinery ........... 154
Annex 19 List of substances in Pancevo Refinery ..... 156
Annex 20 Flow diagrams ...................................... 160
A.20.1 FCC complex, Gas concentration unit -
Propylene splitter section ............ 160
Annex 21 Safety data sheets for substances in FCC . 161
Annex 22 Damage estimates based on overpressure
for process equipment (adjusted from CPS
2000).................................................. 163
Annex 23 Summary of hazard analysis ................... 165
Annex 24 FCC: Bow-tie analysis result ................... 168
A.24.1 TOP1: Release from FA-2514 ....... 168
A.24.2 TOP2: Release from DA-2503 ...... 168
A.24.3 TOP3: Release from DA-2509 ...... 168
RGE: API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for
year 2009 ............................................ 174
Annex 25 RGE: API 581 Qualitative, component based
- Inspection planning............................. 177
page v
List of Figures
Figure 1: RiskNIS packages - Scope of the work ............. 2
Figure 2: Refineries of NIS a.D. .................................... 3
Figure 3: Structure of shares on NIS a.d. ...................... 5
Figure 4: Geographical position of Pancevo in Serbia ....... 6
Figure 5: Google view of Pancevo in Serbia .................... 7
Figure 6: Industrial zone of Pancevo ........................... 10
Figure 7: Industrial zone of Pancevo - Location of
Refinery .................................................. 10
Figure 8: Wind Rose for Pancevo ................................ 16
Figure 9: Years of construction................................... 20
Figure 10: Second phase of expansion ........................ 21
Figure 11: Bombing 1999 .......................................... 22
Figure 12: Oil refinery in Novi Sad .............................. 27
Figure 13: Position of Novi Sad .................................. 28
Figure 14: Position of Novi Sad Refinery ...................... 28
Figure 15: Location of Zrenjanin in Serbia ................... 41
Figure 16: Location of Zrenjanin and Elemir ................. 41
Figure 17: Map of roads ............................................ 42
Figure 18: Distribution of relative wind frequencies per
year (%) ................................................. 45
Figure 19: Seismic activities ...................................... 46
Figure 20: Elemir Gas refinery ................................... 46
Figure 21: Framework of RIMAP procedure within the
overall management system ....................... 51
Figure 22: Methodology and application of detailed RBI . 52
Figure 23: CEN CWA 15740 (RIMAP) Risk Matrix........... 55
Figure 24: NIS risk matrix ......................................... 55
Figure 25: Flowchart of HAZOP Process ....................... 62
Figure 26: Results of API Qualitative Analysis Component
based applied on RGE equipment ................ 65
Figure 27: Results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis
Component based applied on selected RGE
equipment ............................................... 65
Figure 28: Component count for RBI analysis of Elemir
Refinery .................................................. 66
Figure 29: Project web site – Tools and analysis ........... 68
Figure 30: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 1 of 3 ...... 72
page vi

Figure 33: HAZOP Loop 1 .......................................... 75
Figure 34: Results of management system evaluation for
RGE ........................................................ 78
Figure 35: Risk matrix showing the position of the RGE in
qualitative unit analysis matrix.................... 79
Figure 36: API 581 Qualitative risk matrix for component
level, for year 2009 ................................... 80
Figure 37 Preliminary results of API quantitative
(detailed) Analysis Component based applied
on selected RGE equipment ........................ 81
Figure 38: Comparison of different inspection strategies 82
Figure 39: Financial Risk Prioritization ......................... 82
Figure 33: Position of FCC in Pancevo Refinery ............. 85
Figure 34: Access to the FCC complex ......................... 85
Figure 35: Flow chart of FCC ...................................... 88
Figure 36: HAZOP tool – Main page .......................... 100
Figure 37: HAZOP tool - Loop description .................. 100
Figure 38: HAZOP tool – Nodes ................................ 101
Figure 39: HAZOP tool – Drawing ............................. 101
Figure 40: Loop1 - TOP1 Event, FA-2514 ................... 102
Figure 41: Column D 2503 – debutanizer section of S
2500 ..................................................... 103
Figure 42: Column DA-2509 – splitter section of S-2500104
Figure 43: General scenario ..................................... 107
page vii
List of Tables
Table 1: List of blocks in Pancevo Refinery ..................... 8
Table 2: Medium monthly and annual values of the
precipitation quantity ( mm) in Pančevo ....... 14
Table 3: Medium monthly and annual air temperatures in
Pančevo reduced recording to the data for
Belgrade .................................................. 14
Table 4: Medium monthly and annual values of the air
humidity in Pančevo, reduced according to
data for Belgrade ...................................... 16
Table 5: List of commercial products of Pancevo refinery 17
Table 6: Storage capacities of Refinery........................ 19
Table 7: Qualification structure of employees in Pancevo
Refinery .................................................. 25
Table 8: Number of employees in Pancevo Refinery by
type of work ............................................. 25
Table 9: Maximum concentration of employees, first shift26
Table 10: List of units in Novi Sad Refinery .................. 29
Table 11: Average temperatures (Source: Republic
Hydrometeorology Service of Serbia) ........... 31
Table 12: Novi Sad region - Frequency of the winds ...... 32
Table 13: Average value of cloudiness in sky/10 ........... 32
Table 14: Key units in Novi Sad Refinery - characteristics34
Table 15: Number of personnel in Firefighting unit of
Novi Sad refinery ...................................... 36
Table 16: Firefighting equipment ................................ 36
Table 17: Available fire extinguishing means ................ 37
Table 18: Dangerous substances in U 100 ................... 38
Table 19: Dangerous substances in U 200 ................... 40
Table 20: Statistical data on monthly weather
parameters for Zrenjanin region .................. 43
Table 21: Statistical data on seasons weather
parameters for Zrenjanin region .................. 43
Table 22: Temperature distribution in the region - July .. 45
Table 23: Temperature distribution in the region -
December ................................................ 45
Table 24: Frequency and velocity of wind .................... 45
Table 25: RGE supplies ............................................. 47
Table 26: Employees structure in Elemir Refinery ......... 47
Table 27: List of NIS-Naftagas certificates and scope of
certification .............................................. 47
page viii
Table 28: Fire fighting equipment ............................... 49

Table 29: Substances in Elemir Gas refinery ................ 49
Table 30: Proposed action for different category of
Likelihood Factor ....................................... 53
Table 31: Effectiveness of Inspection for General
Thinning .................................................. 57
Table 32: Effectiveness of Inspection for Localized
Thinning .................................................. 57
Table 33: CUI for Carbon and Low Alloy Steels
Inspection Categories ................................ 58
Table 34: CUI for Stainless Steels Inspection Categories 59
Table 35: Inspection Effectiveness for External Damage 59
Table 36: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection
Effectiveness for Furnace Tube .................... 60
Table 37: Typical steps for a Seveso assessment study.. 62
Table 38: HAZOP analysis for Loop 1 .......................... 74
Table 39 Management System Evaluation results with
audit comments ........................................ 77
Table 40: Implementation of Seveso II requirements .... 83
Table 41: Vacuum Gas Oil ......................................... 96
Table 42: C3/C4 Recycle From Alkylation Unit .............. 96
Table 43: Naphtha From LCGO Hydrotreating Unit ........ 96
Table 44: Quality of wet gas ...................................... 96
Table 45: Quality of raw FCC gasoline ......................... 97
Table 46: FCC supplies ............................................. 98
Table 47: Some effect of loss of electricity ................... 98
Table 48: Frequency of occurrence of accidental events 105
Table 49: Definition of Frequency Classes .................. 106
Table 50: Typical damages caused by overpressure .... 107
Table 51: Details on damage caused by pressure wave 108
Table 52: TOP1 – Release from FA-2514, main
characteristics ........................................ 109
Table 53: TOP1 – Release from FA-2514, scenario ...... 110
Table 54: TOP2 – Release from DA-2503, main
Table 55: TOP2 – Release from DA-2503, scenario...... 111
Table 56: TOP3 – Release from DA-2509, main
Table 57: TOP3 – Release from DA 2509, scenario ...... 112
Table 58: EVENT 4 – Release from FA-2953, main
Table 59: Event 4 – Release from FA-2953, scenario ... 114
Table 60: EVENT 5 – Release from FA-2455, main
Table 61: EVENT 5 – Release from FA-2455, scenario.. 114
Table 62: Level of damage (in percent) for the affected
structures .............................................. 115
Table 63: Selected TOP events and scenario .............. 117
page ix
Table 64: Definition of Frequency Classes .................. 118

Table 65: Definition of consequence severity classes ... 118
Table 66: Risk matrix for considered scenarios ........... 118
page x
1 Management Summary Report
page 1
2 Detail Technical Report

2.1 General part
2.1.1 Introduction
Package B within the project RiskNIS Risk management and use of risk-based approaches in
inspection, maintenance and HSE analyses of NIS a.d. pl ants was ordered by the end of
August 2008. The aim of Package B is to additionally provide the guided / supported
implementation of the technology and tools already provided in the basic Package A to
approximately 20% of all equipment in NIS a.d. production units (the assumed most critical
equipment) – ca. 5100 equipment. The scope of work in Package B is presented on the
Figure 1
Aopt. Optional CMMS

Full CMMS System containing:
• Asset management
• Maintenance Personnel planning
• Preventive maintenance
• Master plans
• Reports
Aopt – Optional CMMS
A Basic package B Extended C Full coverage

package package
A. Basic package:
C. * Full coverage
• Feasibility study (all identified equipment)
• Basic implementation for RBI, RCM and Basic package INCLUDED
RCFA: Software Licensing and first
B. Suggested package: • 12871 pieces of equipment for Level 1
year maintenance cost
analysis
Travel and subsistence Basic package INCLUDED
• 5148 pieces of equipment for Level 2
Project Management FULL training INCLUDED analysis
• 2529 pieces of equipment • 1287 pieces of equipment for Level 3
• 200 Equip. RBI level 1
for Level 1 analysis analysis
• 80 Equip. RBI level 2 • 1012 pieces of equipment • 12058 pieces of equipment for RCM
• 20 Equip. RBI level l3 analysis for Level 2 analysis analysis
• 20 components analyzed by • 253 pieces of equipment • 250 pieces of equipment / systems for
RCM for Level 3 analysis RCFA analysis
• 1268 pieces of equipment Introduction of the full scale CMMS (Aopt) is a
• 10 components analyzed by for RCM analysis necessary precondition for this Package.
RCFA • 38 pieces of equipment /
• Implementation of HSE, HAZOP and systems for RCFA analysis
Seveso II Directive
Basic training for RBI, RCM/RCFA and
HSE/HAZOP/Seveso II, first instance of the
training/certification
330 pieces of equipment
5.100 pieces of equipment
31,500 pieces of equipment
Figure 1: RiskNIS packages - Scope of the work
Kick of meeting for Package B was held on September 28, 2008 in Elemir Refinery and
preparation for data collection started immediately. Templates for data collection for RBI,
RCM / RCFA analysis have been developed and agreed with experts from three refineries.
page 2
Order of refineries to be treated with analysis has been agreed as RGE, RNS, RNP, according
to availability of experts to collected / verify data.
Data collection started by the end of December 2008 with Refinery Elemir and for other two
refineries in the first quarter of 2009. First preliminary RBI report prepared for RGE and
delivered in March 2009.
Several meetings were held in order to review the work progress (May 4, June 12, December
12, 2009) and to present plan for the further work. Two workshops were held as well in
Stuttgart (April 2010) with the aim to verify input data and to agree the type and contents of
the reports expected by NIS management.
Analysis have been done as required by the contract for Package B; based on their results
recommendation for improvement / optimization of inspection, maintenance and HSE
practice have been given.
Training, education and certification of NIS a.d. employees started in November 2008 and
finished in January 2010. Training has included both, theoretical courses in the field of risk
management and on-the job training in German companies.
2.1.2 General about NIS a.d.

2.1.2.1 Activities
NIS is the largest oil company in Southeast Europe. It is joint stock company and fifty one
percent of NIS shares is held by the Russian company Gazprom Neft. Corporate
headquarters are located in Novi Sad and Belgrade and production facilities are located
across the whole territory of Serbia. NIS is the only Serbian company which possesses an
integrated and well balanced system of production, refining and trade of crude oil and
petroleum products, as well as natural gas exploitation and which plays a significant role in
stability and security of energy supply.
The company deals with crude refining, sales of petroleum products, and exploitation of
hydrocarbons in Serbia and Angola. Annual NIS crude oil production totals ca. 1 million tons.
NIS owns two oil refineries (Figure 2), Pančevo Oil Refinery and Novi Sad Oil Refinery, with
total refining capacity of ca. 7.3 million tons per year. There is an LPG production facility, so
called Elemir LPG refinery.
Oilfield services business deals with geophysical exploration, drilling and well testing , hydro
probing, transportation, workover and civil construction services. In addition to its retail
network (480 petrol stations), NIS also owns oil depots all over Serbia.
Figure 2: Refineries of NIS a.D.

The company's main business is the exploration of gas and oil in Serbia (mainly in
Vojvodina) for and the production, importing, processing, transportation and marketing of
hydrocarbons (oil and gas). It will hold hold monopoly on all oil imports except the high
quality diesel fuel, called "eurodizel" in Serbia, until 2011. The company is a leading supplier
of petroleum products in the Serbian market. It exports as well motor fuels, benzene,
toluene), road and industrial bitumens to the EU countries, Ukraine, Croatia, Montenegro and
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
page 3
2.1.2.2 History of the company

The development of the oil economy of Serbia began after World War II, when the research,
and a few years later, production of oil and natural gas, as well as distribution and sales of
petroleum products, began in this region. Soon after refineries have been constructed,
companies for transport and trade of natural gas were set up as well.
NIS predecessor company was the Company for Crude Oil Exploration and Production,
incorporated in 1949 by the Resolution of the Government of the Federative National
Republic of Yugoslavia, and which in 1953 was named Naftagas. In 1949 the first gas fields
discovered, in 1951 - started natural gas production and development of the gas
transmission system and first crude oil fields discovered. In 1968 Novi Sad and Pančevo Oil
refineries started up and the largest oil field in the country, discovered (Velebit).
NIS-Oil Refinery Pancevo, a company for production of petroleum, power fluids and
electricity began to work in December 14, 1968 with capacity of 1.32 million tons of crude oil
per year. In the first phase of expansion, December 14, 1979 atmospheric distillation II was
put into operation, which has increased the primary processing capacity 4.82 million tons of
crude oil per year. By commissioning of secondary refinery plants Refinery has been aligned
with a modern European refineries with a modern structure of production facilities. During
the NATO bombing refinery was badly damaged. Direct damage is estimated upwards of 360
million dollars but production capacity is restored soon.
NIS-Oil Refinery Novi Sad for production of all types of motor gasoline, diesel fuel, road and
industrial bitumen, lubricants, and solvent began to work December 13, 1968. During the
bombing in 1999 heavily damaged. Material damage is estimated 320 million dollars. After
reconstruction atmospheric distillation reached the capacity of 500,000 tons per year of
crude oil processing, and platforming, bitumen plant and atmospheric distillation capacity of
2 million tons per year of processing.
NIS was established as a public company for the exploration, production, refining and trade
in crude oil, petroleum products and natural gas in 1991. It has integrated the following
companies: Naftagas, Gas, Energogas, Pančevo Oil Refinery, Novi Said Oil Refinery, Belgrade
Oil Refinery and Kruševac Lubricant Factory (FAM).
Since 1st October 2005 NIS started to operate as a joint stock company dealing with
production of crude oil and gas, crude oil refining and trade in petroleum products,
production and marketing of liquefied petroleum gas.
The privatization of NIS started in 2007. Several companies, including Gazprom Neft, MOL,
OMV, Hellenic Petroleum, Rompetrol and Lukoil expressed interest to acquire the company.
However, on 25 January 2008, Serbia and Russia signed an agreement giving 51% of NIS's
shares to Gazprom Neft for €400 million and €550 million in investments until 2012.
Adjoining contracts signed with Gazprom are the contact about inclusion of Serbia in the
South Stream project and the construction of a gas reserve facility in Banatski Dvor. On 24
December 2008 final contract between the Government of Serbia and Gazprom were signed.
2.1.2.3 NIS in numbers
In 2009, JSC Gazprom Neft completed the acquisition of 51% of NIS shares, while the
Government of the Republic of Serbia remains the owner of 49% of shares. Instead of
previous business strategy mostly oriented to the market of Serbia and internal resources, a
new strategy has been defined for NIS as achievement of long term stable leadership at the
market of petroleum products in South East Europe.
NIS a.d. Novi Sad share capital is 81, 530, 200.000.00 RSD and owns the total of 163 060
400 of 500.00 RSD in nominal value. The structure of the shareholder capital of NIS a.d.
Novi Sad on January 2, 2010 is shown on Figure 3.
page 4
Figure 3: Structure of shares on NIS a.d.

Key task of the company is to increase the competitiveness and efficiency of the company
and improving the business management. Organizing of its business operation according to
international standards will enable NIS to feel secure both in times of globalization in general
as well as in the times when Serbia is entering the EU.
It has 11000 employees, 500 gas stations across Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Montenegro. 1600 internally serviced gas stations, 8 large terminals, 44 warehouses and air
fuel pumping facility at Belgrade Nikola Tesla Airport.
Pančevo Oil Refinery (yearly refines of 4.8m tones of crude oil) and Novi Sad Oil Refinery
(yearly refines of 2.6m tones of crude oil) are owned by NIS and gas Refinery in Elemir, near
Novi Sad.
NIS a.d. in basic figures for the year 2005:
• contributing 20% to the state budget
• 719.560 t of crude oil production
• 295.430.633 m³ of natural gas production
• 7,3 mill. t - refining capacity
• 3,927 mill. t crude processed
In 2007 NIS had a profit of approximately 9 billion RSD (US$ 170 million) and 262 billion
RSD (US$ 5 billion) of revenues. In 2008 total revenues was USD 4.7 billion.
2.1.3 Pancevo Oil Refinery

2.1.3.1 General data
Pančevo Oil Refinery is a fuel-type refinery which produces fuels, paraffin and aromatic
solvents, feed for Petrochemical Complex, bitumen and sulphur and feedstock for
petrochemical industry. Primary and secondary units for crude oil processing were
constructed in such a way as to enable the processing of various types of crude. Today it is
mostly imported crude oil that is being processed (70-80%). It is supplied by way of a
pipeline through Croatia or by barges on the river Danube from Romania and Hungary. The
rest of processed crude oil is of the domestic origin (oil fields located in the province of
Vojvodina).
Refinery's available processing capacity is 4,820 x 106 tons per year of crude oil, i.e. 14,660
tons per day. With this production capacity and with storage capacity of approximately
700,000 cubic meters of crude oil and derivates, it is the biggest factory of this type in
Serbia, meeting the domestic market demand for oil derivatives, with the possibility of
exporting 20% of its production. The assortment of derivates manufactured is extremely
wide.
Crude oil (domestic and imported) is delivered to the Refinery by oil pipeline and river barge,
and the derivatives are dispatched by product pipeline, tank truck, railway and barge.
Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS) has financed the construction of a pipeline from the
island Krk (Croatia) to Petroleum refinery Pancevo, by way of which 6 x 106 tpy of crude oil
can be transported. Reloading facility at the river Danube enables a simple way of supplying
page 5
the crude oil and dispatching the derivatives by barges. Crude oil and its derivatives can also
be loaded and unloaded at the Refinery's own railway transport facilities. There are also
tank-truck loading & unloading facilities.
Head office of the refinery is in Pancevo, Spoljnostarcevacka b.b and legally it is a part of the
joint-stock company NIS - Petroleum industry of Serbia owned Serbia and JSC Gazprom
Neft. Total number of employees is 2300.
Some of planned development projects are:
• meeting EU standards on product quality
• reconstruction of the units and infrastructure in order to improve the process
efficiency and crude oil valorization
• reduction of energy costs
• improvement of environmental protection
• joint projects with neighboring petrochemical company HIP-Petrohemija on better
valorization of by-streams.
2.1.3.2 Location of Pancevo Refinery

Macro location
Pancevo Refinery is situated at exceptionally favorable location - 14 kilometers from
Belgrade, the biggest consumer center in Serbia and about 4 km away from the town
Pančevo on the left bank of the Danube River at its confluence with the Tamiš River. The
Pančevo territory covers an area of approximately 760 square kilometers around the
confluence of the two rivers, between coordinates 20°30’ – 21° East geographic longitude
and (44°40’ – 45°) North geographic latitude. Geographical location of town Pancevo in
Serbia is shown on Figure 4 and Error! Reference source not found..
Figure 4: Geographical position of Pancevo in Serbia
page 6
Figure 5: Google view of Pancevo in Serbia
Map of Serbia, scale 1:2000000, with position of Pancevo is given in Annex 1.
Pančevo is an industrial town with a population of about 130,000 people; 86,000 live in the
city, the remainder in outlying settlements and villages. The largest companies on the
territory of the town Pančevo is represented by an industrial complex (Figure 5a) which
includes the petrochemical plant HIP Petrohemija, Pancevo Refinery of NIS and the chemical
fertilizer plant HIP Azotara.
The industrial complex lays on the city’s southern edge, southeast of Vojlovica (Figure 5b), a
major residential area. The three factories, which cover about 290 hectares, employ about
6,600 people and represent the major employer for the entire Pančevo area. The map of
industrial zone is given in Annex 2 (scale 1:25000).
Micro location
Pancevo Refinery is located in the southeastern and eastern part of the southern industrial
zone, located about 4 km from the town of Pancevo, between settlements Vojlovica and
Starcevo. To the West of the refinery, at a distance of 2.5 km, runs Danube river, with docks
owned by the refinery. Channel Nadel flows to the East of the Refinery.
Residential area of Starčevo is located to the Southeast at a distance of 1 km of Refinery
while residential area of Vojlovica located northwest at a distance of 350m. Several small
villages lie directly to the south of the industrial complex. Sensitive public buildings like
schools are in a distance of about 3 km. Furthermore no traffic routes or major transport
centers are nearby the establishment yet.
The refinery is surrounded by agricultural land. The nearest industrial facilities are located on
the northwestern edge of the refinery and plant Messer-Tehnogas and Petrochemical
Complex Petrochemical HIP-Pancevo.
Pancevo refinery covers an area of 145 hectares. Port on the Danube, area of 3.5 hectares,
and pipeline bridge connecting the port and the refinery, about 2.5 hectares, are located
outside of the refinery.
Refinery itself consists of 24 blocks where production and power units are settled, as well as
necessary infrastructure. Schema of blocks in Refinery is given in Annex 3 and list of blocks
in Table 1.
page 7
Table 1: List of blocks in Pancevo Refinery
No Description
Headquarter
Mashing workshop
Storage and garage
Block I
Technical security center
Trafo F
Entrance gate 2
Central wardrobe
Restaurant
Block II Laboratory
Sample house
Trafo C
FCC Complex control building

Fire brigade house
Block III
Monastery Vojlovica and church
Development and Investment
Flare I and II
Storage tanks for slop and oil water
Block IV API separator
Pumpe house PK-4 with annex
Vessels with hydrogen and nitrogen
Atmospheric distillation I, S-100

Visbreaking, S-200
Platforming S-200
HDS I, S-400
Gas treatment and fractionation, S-500, S-570
Merox TNG, S-500
Gasoline redistillation, S-600
Block V Special gasoline merox, S-650
Udex, S-620
Souer water treatment, S-900
Flare gases recuperation, S-1000
Command room of Block |V
Air compresor room, S-1500
Auxiliary systems, Vapor condensate (S-1300), Fuel gas (S-1500), Alylation
system (S-1800)
Atmospheric distillation II, S-2100

Vacuum distillation, S-2200
FCC with gas treatment, sour water treatment and amine washing (S-2300, S-
2500, S-2900 and S-2950)
HDS II, S-2400
TNG refination, S-2450
Block VI
Alkylation, S-2600
Light gasoline merox, S-2650
Light cracked gasonile merox, S-2750
Heavy cracked gasoline merox, S-2850
Claus, S-2450
Control room for S-2200 and S-2100
Block VII Storage area (15 tanks)
Storage area (9 tanks)

Block VIII
Pump house PK-8 with annex and control room
Thermal power unit

Chemical treatment of water
Block IX
Tanks for own fuel (2 tanks)
Raw water pool and cooling towers
page 8
No Description
Pumps for fire fighting water
Block X Storage area, (24 tanks)
Block XI Storage area (24 tanks)
Block XII Storage area (4 tanks)
Block XIII Storage area (15 tanks)
Block XIV Storage area (6 tanks)
Block XV Storage area (24 tanks)
Bitumen production, S-250

Air compressors
Tanks for feed and bitumen products (11 tanks)
Trafo Bitumen
Block XVI Auto and rail loading of bitumen
Auto and rail loading of LPG
Filling station for liquid derivates
Control building for loading station
Scale for trailers
Tanks for fuel oil (2 tanks)

Warehouse for investment equipment
Sowage
Block XVII Parking
Trailers washing building
Trailer equipment building
Gate 3
Block XVIII Crude oil tanks (4 tanks)
Block XIX Storage area (6 tanks)
Block XX Storage area (12 tanks)
Sulfolane unit, S-3600

Block XXI Control building for Sulfoline unit
Trafo Sulfoline
Block XXII Storage tanks for Sulfoline
Trafo ST-35/6
Block XXIII
Gate 1
Railway building
Garage for locomotives
Loading installation for derivate
Block XXIV Unloading installation for crude oil and semi-products
Oil terminal with the building
Wagon
Sludge sediment
page 9
Figure 6: Industrial zone of Pancevo
Figure 7: Industrial zone of Pancevo - Location of Refinery
page 10
Access to the Refinery is provided by the following roads:

• Entrance 1
o K-1 for the delivery of equipment investment
o K-1A for the workers and the fire exit and entrance
• Entrance 2, K-2 entry for workers and materials for technical good stores
• Entrance 3, K-3 input trailers for shipping products manufacturing
• Industrial rail for transport of raw materials and shipping of products to the
production station Suburb
• Docks on the River Danube on the right side of the road Pancevo - Starcevo.
Natural and protected areas

The territory of Pančevo municipality encompassed the protected area “Ponjavica” Nature
Park, proclamated in 1995 which is located southeast of Pančevo city. This area is significant
because of its connection with surface and underground water from the SZIC, on one side,
and because its importance for protection of natural wetland flora and fauna on the other
side (V level of IUCN protection and III level of national protection). The park, instituted in
1994, and managed by the public Enterprise "Omoljica", located in the homonymous village
of Omoljica3 has an area of 133,54 ha,, which include part of the Ponjavica watercourse and
adjoined areas. The park lies between two villages, Omoljica and Banatski Brestovac.
“Ponjavica” also includes two special nature reservations established in 1961 – “Ivanovo”
and Danube River island “Omoljicka Ada”. In the northeast part of Pančevo municipality,
near the village of Dolovo is located the Monument of Nature “Tri stabla jasena”. This
protected area, instituted in 1999, has three white ash trees estimated to be 200 to 250
years old.
The following natural areas are present in the municipal territory of Pančevo:
• Natural area named “Pancevacki rit”, between old and new road to Pančevo
• is very interesting wetland area. It is old type of environment, such used to exist
around all big lowland rivers in the past. This area is important for bird nesting. These
locations are in procedure for protection within international project Important Bird
Areas. This bog-land are also very interesting and important as place where could be
found different animal species which life circle and activities are closely connected with
nearness of water and bog-lends. It is important to notice that flora of this area has
not yet been investigated. Hence, there is a possibility to find there endangered water
plants.
• Danube River islands (Forkontumac, Stefanac, Cakljanac, Brestovacka Ada,
Ivankovacka Ada) and natural, wooded area on the river banks of Danube and Tamis
river are natural areas important in many aspects of environmental point of view, but
without any level of protection. Like “Pancevacki rit”, this sites suppose to be under
protection as natural heritage and sites of potentially high biodiversity. These locations
are important for nesting a great number of birds; for example, one of them is
Haliaeetus albicilla, species considered as vulnerable according to IUCN ategorization.
It is important to notice that some fish species spawn on riversides and island sides.
River islands flora and fauna of the river banks, similarly to “Pancevacki rit”, have not
yet been investigated, so it can be expected to find there some endangered and
protected species. Jabucki rit and Glogonjski rit are remaining parts of marshes in the
lower reaches of the Tamis River, located northeastern of Pančevo. These natural
areas are out of PTA of SZIC, but they are also important for protection of flora and
fauna biodiversity of this region. The importance of the residual wetland areas of
Pančevo is also recognised at international level. According to the “National Report
prepared for the 7th Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the
Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971) - 1995“ marshlands around Pančevo
are designated for inclusion in the Ramsar List in 2010.
Flora and Fauna
In the territory of Pančevo natural vegetation survives only in small areas along river banks
and canals and in marshes. The most of the area is agricultural nowadays. Autochthonous
vegetation exists only in the few, above mentioned, places. For this reason and for the lack
of information on plant species living in the area, natural areas with autochthonous
vegetation should be protected in this municipality. More than 430 species of plants are
present in the area, including some treathened species that can be found in the natural
areas. No punctual data on the flora and vegetation of Pančevo are available at the moment.
page 11
Fauna of Fauna of the area comprises more than 280 species approximately. Some of these
species are threatened, according to IUCN categorization.
Population
According to the census in 2002. in the municipality of Pancevo lived 127,162 people and 23
different nationality, which speaks of a turbulent history and demographic situation of the
people in this region. About 8,000 reside in the Vojlovica and Topola quarters in the close
vicinity of Pancevo Refinery.
Geological and other characteristics

Geomorphology
Pančevo is located in a flat area of fluvial deposits along the eastern banks of the Danube
River. The municipal territory is part of the Pannonian Basin. In a morphological sense, the
Danube river divides the region into 2 different units:
• mountainous region, south to the river
• plain region, north to the river.
The region located in the north of the Danube river is part of the Pannonian Plate, with
altitude increasing from southwest (around 68 masl) to northeast. The city of Pančevo
belongs to the north plain region with an average altitude of 70 to 78.45 masl (2). Pančevo
is placed on the edge of Banat loess terrace, on the ontact of two big morphological units –
Banat loess terrace and alluvial plains of Danube and Tamis rivers. Alluvial plains extend
along Danube and Tamis rivers, in the direction of their flows, with an average elevation of
70-71 masl. The Banat loess terrace is mainly flat with relics of Tamis old flow in the form of
local depressions and an average altitude of 70 to 85 masl. Both, terrace and plains, are
protected from Tamis and Danube high waters by embankments along the rivers banks. The
city of Pančevo belongs to the north plain region with an average altitude of 70 to 78.45
masl.
Hydrology of the Pančevo area
The region is characterized by a well developed hydrographic network by two typical lowland
rivers, Danube and Tamis, with numerous branches, meanders, old flow streams and
channels. The hydro graphic and hydrological characteristics of this region are of special
significance for determining the general water balance as well as the quantity of water lost to
Danube.
The largest and by far the most important surface water body is the Danube River, flowing
west-southwest of the investigated area. The area from the left river bank to the river
terrace on the east is flat and it’s called alluvial plain. In the recent past it was an area
regularly flooded by high waters of the Danube. In the last century the flood plain of the
Danube was protected from floods to become agricultural land. Amelioration of the area
included digging of a dense canal network, construction of an embankment along the whole
riverbank, drilling a few groups of abstraction wells and installation of many pump-stations
for (ground) water pumping from canals to the river.
In addition, Danube water level rised around 2-3 m by construction of “Djerdap” dam in
1980’s. The result of all the above-mentioned works is that the Danube water level often
surpasses the ground level of its alluvial plain around Pančevo, and almost constantly
surpasses the water level in drainage network. Another important factor of flow regime is
also the regime of “Djerdap” dam exploitation, making it very hard to determine flow regime
in more detail. On the Pančevo monitoring station the mean water level of the Danube river
for year 2002 was 70,84mas, with minimal 70.06 masl and maximum 71.94 masl.
As for hydrological characteristics, maximal flows of Danube occur beginning of spring,
usually in April when it is around 7400 m3/s, minimal is in September with 3200 m3/s.
Based on hydrological data for the period 1997 - 2000 on water measuring profile-Pančevo,
mean Danube flow in this region is 5.326 m3/s (3) . Maximal flow is a consequence of spring
time rainfalls and snow melting throughout the Danube watershed. Strong rains combined
with soil saturated by water from snow melting enable fast water run off that affect river
flow.
Upstream of Pančevo, Tamis and Sibnica Rivers flows into the Danube. Tamis River flows
from northwest to southeast. It is regulated in its lower
part, near its mouth, and therefore it is much deeper here than upstream. Its regime is
directly dependent on the Danube regime. During the Danube maximal water levels, Danube
page 12
can not receive all the water from Tamis, thus creating backwater at Tamis that floods the
surrounding area. At minimal water level in its upstream parts at some points it almost dries
completely. West of the Tamis river there is the Sibnica River and a network of natural and
artificial canals, which are all directly dependent on the Danube regime.
The narrow area of Pančevo, South Industrial Zone of Pancevo, next to the flood plain, and
the SZIC were built on backfilled material, by which the ground level was raised to an
altitude of around 75 masl. This had to be done because of the high groundwater level
especially during the maximum water level in Danube and the influence of “Djerdap” dam.
This caused the creation of an artificial aquifer under the zone (Azotara and Petrohemija) in
its inner parts practically independent from the Danube River, which was the purpose of
these amelioration works. Between the city of Pančevo and the South Zone Industrial
Complex two parallel open canals have been constructed for industrial purposes. The
northern wider canal connects the fertilizer plant to the Danube. This is a navigable canal,
used by ships to carry bulk of raw materials and products, and is itself used as a raw water
source by the fertilizer and the petrochemical industries.
The southern canal is a wastewater canal that is used for discharging industrial effluent. Both
canals are approximately 2 km long. They are divided and surrounded by embankments all
the way from the plants to the Danube. The two canals both originate from the fertilizer
plant HIP Azotara. Those two canals are of great importance for the hydrology and
hydrogeology of SZIC. One the main purposes of canals is to drain the backfilled area, the
shallow aquifer, of the Industrial Complex making a local underground (hydro geological) sub
watershed. At the same time, the canal waters infiltrate the lower alluvial deposits of the
Danube, which means that those canals connect the artificial shallow aquifer with the main
alluvial aquifer.
Geology and Hydrogeology
The wider region around Pančevo is composed entirely of significantly thick quaternary
deposits settled on older Neocene sediments, which are found
only in deep research boreholes. Geology of South Zone Industrial Complex area can be
divided into:
• Oil Refinery region, and
• Region of Petrohemija and Azotara.
The Oil Refinery region belongs to the Banat loess terrace, southeast from Petrohemija. The
altitude of this first terrace from loessoide silt is higher then alluvial plain so there was no
need for backfilling as in case of Petrohemija and Azotara. There was just backfilling with the
purpose of levelling of original ground, which was slightly uneven. Oil refinery was
constructed on backfill heterogeneous material. Regarding the grain size analyses of this
heterogeneous material it is similar with sediments found beneath. The thickness of
backfilled material vary from 0 to 3,5 m. The altitude of Oil Refinery after backfilling is
around 74,21-76,93 masl, with slope from north to south. Sediments found beneath are
mostly presented by loessoide silt, since Refinery was built on Banat loess terrace made of
loess and loessoide silt. Thickness of this sediments, together with backfilled material, goes
from 4,5-12,5m, usually around 7-9m. Under this sediments starts the main aquifer made of
alluvial sands. Altitude of main aquifer overlying is on 61,72-70,94 m.a.s.l
Hydrogeology of Oil Refinery region do not have any specific characteristics comparing with
data given in chapter Hydrogeology of Pančevo area. As it is mention before, backfilling of
this terrain has been done only to level the previous surface of the ground. There is two
underground waters with different hydrodynamic characteristics: aquifer with free water level
(formed in loessial loam) and confined aquifer formed in Quaternary and Neocene sediments.
Hydraulic conductivity of loessial loam is around 2x10-6 cm/s, and for main aquifer around
1,5x10-2 cm/s [RADUS doo, 2004]. Underground water level, for the period September
2001-August 2002, vary from 70,1-72,1 m.a.s.l. General direction of groundwater flow is
from north to south.
Terrain Tectonics
From geotectonic aspect, the investigation area of Pančevo belongs to the south part of
Banat depression on the very border (Danube river) with the Zone of Uncover Neocene. The
oldest sedimentary rocks of Cretaceous age are folded and faulted during the Laramian
stage, between Senonian and Paleogene. During this period the basic tectonic framework
was formed. The tectonic movements in Neocene are weaker.
page 13
In the zone of bare (uncovered) Neocene, it is manifested by re-appearance of existing fault.

The most intensive products of neotectonics in this region according to B.Siric are faults that
divide the terrain on blocks, whose activity began before Neocene. He states as well, that
during Quaternary smaller fault-like structures formed that represent potential zones of
contemporary movements. In investigation area of Pančevo Neocene sediments have
maximal thickness of 500m. Tectonics of the Quaternary was relatively quiet.
Meteorological data
Pančevo is characterized by a continental to a moderate continental climate. The local
climatic conditions in this area are mostly affected by the presence of rivers Danube and
Tamiš, geographic latitude, distance from Mediterranean and Atlantic seas, as well as by its
isolated position in the Pannonian Basin surrounded by high-altitude mountains (Alps, Dinaric
Alps, Carpathian Mountains and Rodhopes). Moreover, significant forest belt located along
the two rivers could also influence on a local scale the municipal climate.
Rainfall
Precipitation distribution in Pančevo area is characterized by an alternation of rather humid
and rather dry periods. Generally, years with lower precipitation show two rainfall seasons
during spring and autumn, characteristic for the continental climate.
During years with high precipitation the spring rainy season extends through the summer
period, showing the influence of the Mediterranean climate regime. Table 2 shows data on
rainfall for the period 1961 do 2003.
Table 2: Medium monthly and annual values of the precipitation quantity ( mm) in Pančevo
J F M A M J J A S O N D Ann.
Mean
38.2 35 42.2 53.1 62.2 84.6 60 50.7 54.7 41.2 48.8 51.8 662.5
value
Maximum 103 100.1 128.8 132.9 171.5 195 227.7 259.7 189 164.4 89.8 146.4 927.8
Year of
max. 1987 1978 1981 2001 1987 1969 1999 1975 2001 1974 1980 1969 1999
value
Minimum 2.2 3.4 2.2 14.4 12.9 7.6 0 0 0 0 4.2 0.3 334.5
Year of
1990 1987 1972 1968 1988 2000 1989 1992 1986 1965 1986 1972 2000
min. value
Lightning is high frequency event in summer. The level of underground water is about one
meter deep. The surface is brick earth covered with concrete.
Air Temperature
Data on medium monthly and annual air temperatures for the period 1961 - 2002 is shown
in Table 3. Mean long-term air temperature value for the period 1962-2002 is 11.3 °C.
Analysis of the average monthly air temperature shows that January is the coldest month
with an average of –0.4 °C while July is the hottest month with an average of +21.8 °C.
Table 3: Medium monthly and annual air temperatures in Pančevo reduced recording to the
data for Belgrade
Mean
-0.4 2.0 6.3 11.7 17.1 20.2 21.8 21.5 17.2 11.7 6.0 1.2 11.3
value
16.31
Maximum 3.7 7.3 10.7 15.5 171.5 19.7 22.8 24.8 26.4 21.2 5.0 13.4
1.3
Year of
max. 1983 2002 2001 2000 2002 2000 1988 1992 1994 1966 1963 1985 2000
value
Minimum -6.7 -4.0 0.6 0.6 7.5 18.1 19.3 17.7 13.6 8.5 0.8 -3.0 10.2
Year of
1964 1985 1987 1997 1991 1974 1979 1976 1996 1974 1988 2001 1978
min. value
page 14
High temperatures during the hot period of the year cause turbulences in the atmosphere
and strong vertical circulation that can favourably effect the dilution of emitted pollutants. It
is known that at a relative humidity higher that 55% and a temperature higher than 25°C,
photochemical smog is formed.
In Pančevo, these conditions are met on a couple of days of July and August. During the
winter period low temperatures and poor turbulences in the atmosphere enable temperature
inversions in Pančevo. Under these conditions dispersion of polluting substances is poor and
concentration of polluting substances in the lower part of the atmosphere occurs. During this
period, therefore immission measurements can detect pollutants concentrations higher than
the law limit values.
Wind
Wind has an important and significant influence on Pančevo climatic characteristcs and air
quality condition, since it could effect the transport and dilution of polluting substance.
Moreover, in specific climatic conditions, it could affect also the city of Belgrade. Wind profile
in the lowest layers of the atmosphere is greatly influenced by local topography, distribution
of water bodies and land ect.
The wind profile in the non-urbane part of Pančevo is under the influence of relatively
smooth terrain. In case of break-through of large atmospheric systems – cyclones, the
movement above Pančevo is in accordance with the circulation in the system of synoptic
scales. At such times a medium to strong wind usually blows. In the urbane part of Pančevo
we have increased ruggedness of urbane units that lead to modifications in wind speed and
wind direction. Meteorological station in Pančevo doesn’t have anemograph, so all the data
about wind are given from the Belgrade observatory. Frequency of winds from various
directions for Pančevo – wind rose - is given in
Figure 8.
page 15
Figure 8: Wind Rose for Pancevo
The dominant wind is the south-eastern wind, called Kosava. It is most frequent during
autumn, winter and early spring. The least frequent are north-eastern, easterly and south-
westerly winds. Southeastern winds are the fastest – higher than 3.5 m/s. Predominant wind
mean speed is 2,9 m/sec and annual average wind speed is 2,3 m/sec. Wind speed
influences the degree of smoke rise from the chimneys. Higher speeds are favourable for
dilution of pollutants from lower sources, but cause smoke rinsing from chimneys in case of
high-point sources2. The less frequent winds in Pančevo have the lowest speeds. These
winds have a detrimental effect on dispersion of polluting substances from ground sources
but enable rising of smoke from high sources to higher altitudes enabling significant
dispersion, that is high degree of dilution of emitted polluting substances from higher
sources.
Air Humidity
The mean annual value of relative humidity for the Pančevo region is around 78%, as shown
in Table 4. The highest monthly average values are recorded during winter season, in
December (88%) and January (88.1%), while the lowest average values are recorded during
summer period, in July and August (around 72%).
Table 4: Medium monthly and annual values of the air humidity in Pančevo, reduced
according to data for Belgrade
Mean value 88.1 84.3 76.1 72.0 71.4 73.0 72.7 72.7 75.6 78.1 84.3 88.0 78.0
Maximum 98 94 93 81 83 86 84 86 85 91 94 97 85.5
Year of max. value 1971 1971 1962 1966 1961 2002 2002 1975 1975 1975 1975 1970 1970
Minimum 81 75 62 65 61 56 61 56 63 66 71 79 71.2
Year of min. value 1985 1998 1972 1968 1992 2000 2000 2000 1986 1961 1963 1989 2000
page 16
2.1.3.3 Description of the plant
Activities
Head office of Pancevo

Refinery:
Address: 26000 PANCEVO,
Spoljnostarcevacka b.b.
Telephone: + 381 13 310 004
+ 381 13 310
Fax: + 381 13 345 255
WWW: http://www.rnp.co.yu
Legal status of the company:
part of the joint-stock company
NIS-Petroleum industry of Serbia
Main downstream markets:
petrochemical & chemical industry,
trading companies within
Petroleum
Industry of Serbia (NIS)
Main export products:
liquefied petroleum gases
(propane, butane, propylene)
Pancevo Refinery performs the following activities:

• Production of petroleum products, thermoelectric power, chemicals and basic chemical
products
• Storage of crude oil, intermediate products and products
• Transportation of crude oil and transport through pipeline
• Laboratory analysis and processing
• Maintenance of process and other equipment
• Development and research services.
With the processing capacity of 4.8 million tons per year, it is the biggest factory of this type
in Serbia, meeting the domestic market demand for oil derivatives, with the possibility of
exporting 20% of its production.
Pancevo Refinery has several development projects (to be realized in next three years) in
order to reach the level of modern European refineries t three years to complete the
following development program:
• MHC / HDT - Hydro treatment of FCC batch and diesel which allows reaching the
European specifications for gasoline and diesel fuel, increasing diesel production at the
expense of motor gasoline and increasing utilization by reducing fuel oil
• Sour water stripper, Amine washing and Claus - supporting plants where extracted
sulfur is hydro treated and sent to be sale as elementary sulphur
• On Line blending - which allows optimal mixing and shortens the time needed for
mixing and lower the number of tank
• Modernization of facilities for receiving and shipping oil from tanks which includes
installation of modern measuring and control equipment and application of technical
solutions that enable the reduction of losses and the strict European emission
standards.
List of commercial products of Pancevo Refinery is given in Table 5 and storage capacities in
Table 6.
Table 5: List of commercial products of Pancevo refinery
Commercial
Product Standard
Code
page 17
Commercial
Product Standard
Code
Gases
Propane PN SRPS B.H2.130
Butane BN SRPS B.H2.132
Isobutene IBN PS RNP 36/99
Propane - Butane mixture PBS SRPS B.H2.134
Propylene PLN PS RNP 26/99

Motor gasoline
Premium MB 95 SRPS B.H2.220
Unleaded gasoline
Premium BMB 95 PS RNP 2/99
Special gasoline
Special gasoline 35/105 SB 35/105 SRPS B.H2.267
Special gasoline 60/80 SB 60/80 PS RNP 35/99
Special gasoline medical SBM Ph.Jug.III
Special gasoline - pan 140/200 PAN 140/200 PS RNP 13/99
Aromatics
Benzene BZ SRPS B.H2.001

Toluene TL SRPS B.H2.002
Gasoline components
Primary gasoline for petrochemical plant PB-PHK PS RNP 37/99

Petroleum
Lighting petroleum PO GM SRPS B.H2.310
Jet fuel GM SRPS B.H2.331
EKO EL
Diesel
Diesel fuel D1 D1 SRPS B.H2.410/1
Diesel fuel D2 D2 SRPS B.H2.410/1

Euro diesel NSD SRPS B.H2.410/1
EKO 3 diesel
Fuel oil
Fuel oil extra light EL PS RNP 3/99
Fuel oil middle S PS RNP 7/99
Bitumen
Bitumen for road BIT 200 BIT 200 SRPS U.M3.010
Bitumen for road BIT 60 BIT 60 SRPS U.M3.010
Polymer bitumen PMB 50/90
Other products
page 18
Commercial
Product Standard
Code
Liquid sulfur TS PS RNP 29/99
Table 6: Storage capacities of Refinery
Product m3
Crude oil 200000

YUNA terminal 40000
LPG 5000
Naphtha 100000
Middle distillates 220000
Fuel oil 240000
Organization and responsibilities

Organization of the refinery is shown given in Annex 3.
History of the plant

Construction years
Pančevo Refinery was founded based on the Decision of Executive Board of the National
Republic of Serbia on 18 December 1959, under the name – Pančevo Oil Refinery – a
company under construction, with the seat in Pančevo, Spoljnostarčevačka bb.
The contracts for engineering with the French company “Lummus“ from Paris and for “UOP“-
USA license were concluded in March 1964, and the first tank foundation was completed in
November 1965In August 1966, equipment worth 7 million pounds started being delivered.
This equipment was imported from England, and the first foundation for Atmospheric
Distillation AD-1 was laid on 1 March 1967.
Installation lasted for 18 months, and the unit was commissioned in September 1968. The
first derivatives were dispatched from the Refinery in October, and official commissioning of
the Refinery was performed on 14 December 1968. In December, Platforming Unit was
commissioned as well, and in 1969, the other units were successively commissioned: two-
stage thermal cracking, gas concentration, gasoline redistillation, Merox Unit for LPG, special
gasoline and kerosene, aromatics extraction – Udex and HDS of middle distillates.
page 19
Figure 9: Years of construction

Commissioning of the first Refinery in this region was successfully conducted with the
Refinery's own human resources that had previously been trained according to the program
compiled and organized by the Refinery experts.
In parallel with the construction of the process units, auxiliary systems and associated
facilities were constructed as well: Power Plant, storage tanks, facilities, jetty at the
Danube...
First Years of Operation
Primary processing installed capacity was 1.32 million tons of crude oil per year. The oil for
processing mostly arrived by barge – the Danube, and in the first year of operation, 1969,
1.055 million tons was processed. Already in 1970, the jetty was expanded, which made it
one of the biggest jetties of that type in the country.
In the following 1971, the Refinery processed 1.3 million tons of crude oil – therefore, it
operated with full capacity. In that year, based on the increased market demand for the
derivatives, the Refinery prepared development and investment program for the Refinery
expansion.“Naftagas“ Novi Sad that Refinery was a part of at the time, in 1973 adopted the
concept of Refinery development in phases. The Refinery was recognized as a fuel-type
refinery for the production of fuels, solvents, bitumen and feed for olefin and paraffin
chemistry. This concept covers the supply of fuel to the regional market, supply of the
required feed to Petrochemical Complex, construction of Yugoslav pipeline, gasification of the
eastern part of Yugoslavia, etc.
Capacity was increased immediately, as an inter-phase expansion, until the implementation
of the planned phases of development. In 1972, RNP used its own resources to reconstruct
the two-stage thermal cracking into atmospheric distillation, thereby increasing the primary
processing capacity to approximately 2 million tons per year.
First Phase of Expansion
For the purpose of developing oil and gas energy sector in SFRY, and for the purpose of
developing chemical and petrochemical industry in the eastern part of the country, the first
phase of Refinery expansion commenced by constructing a new primary unit of atmospheric
distillation 2. This phase of expansion was implemented in accordance with the Contract with
Petrochemical Complex in 1972, as a part of joint investment in which Petrochemical
Complex provided foreign loans from the east and west, and the Refinery provided the funds
in dinars for the customs and other financing within the country.
Installation of this unit was started in August 1976. The unit was designed by ICPRP from
Ploesti (Romania), and the equipment was also supplied from Romania, and from the west as
well. This unit, with the capacity of 3.5 million tons of crude per year, was officially
commissioned on 14 December 1979. This increased the Refinery's total installed primary
processing capacity to 4.820.000 tons per year. In 1976, Platforming Unit was reconstructed,
which increased its capacity by about 65%.
Oil Pipeline
At the end of 1979, on 22 December, Yugoslav oil pipeline from Omišalj to Pančevo was put
into operation. The first quantities of oil were delivered by pipeline to Pančevo in March
1980. The pipeline, with the capacity of 34 million tons per year, connected all Yugoslav
refineries at the time, with a branch for the refinery in Lendava (Slovenia) and transit for
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. “Naftagas“ Novi Sad, i.e. Pančevo Refinery that was a part of
it, was one of the founders and investors of the pipeline construction, and it had its reserved
transport capacity of 6 million tons per year.
Until the closing of the pipeline, which took place by unilateral decision of Croatian
authorities on 6 September 1991, almost all of the crude for Pančevo Oil Refinery's
processing needs arrived by that pipeline. From the beginning of its operation, the pipeline
transported 34.088.000 tons of crude oil for Pančevo Oil Refinery's requirements.
Cessation of crude oil transport by pipeline has not led to Refinery units shut-down. Soon
afterwards, a month later, delivery of crude oil was organized by rail and barge on the
Danube, as well as by pipeline in the part from Elemir via Novi Sad to Pančevo.
The Refinery started using the pipeline once again, after signing the Contract with Croatia,
on 18 June 1996.
Second Phase of Expansion
page 20
Upon completion of the first phase of expansion and increase in primary processing in the
Refinery, it became necessary to build secondary units that provide “deeper“ crude oil
processing, i.e. better crude oil yield.
Construction of the secondary units was implemented as the second phase of Refinery
expansion. However, before that, in 1982, Vacuum Distillation and Bitumen Units were
completed and commissioned. Design and equipment for both units were made in USSR.
Equipment and material for Vacuum Distillation and Bitumen were financed bythe guarantees
of banks from the loan of ex USSR to the Government of SFRY, and the funds in dinars were
provided by the Refinery.
Figure 10: Second phase of expansion

License and basic engineering for the main unit from the secondary unit complex, Fluid
Catalytic Cracking (FCC), were bought from US company TEXACO in 1978. Designs,
equipment and materials were bought in the west, by way of loans that the Refinery, with
the guarantees from our banks, secured in Great Britain.
Construction of secondary units with auxiliary and associated facilities, and adjustments to
the existing Refinery system lasted until November 1985, when the main unit was
commissioned. The other units from FCC Complex – II phase of expansion (Alkylation, HDS,
Merox, etc.) were commissioned in the period from 1985 to 1988.
Financing of II phase of expansion, excluding Vacuum Distillation and Bitumen, was carried
out by way of western loans for those components that had to be imported. Payments in
dinars (customs, transport, insurance, civil works, installation and the like) were effected
from the Refinery funds, from the joint investment funds which mostly consisted of extra
profit from the production of oil and gas, and with considerable assistance and guarantees
from “Privredna banka Pančevo“, “Vojvođanska udružena banka Novi Sad“, “Jugoslovenska
investiciona banka Beograd“, “Genex Beograd“, insurance corporations “Insurance company
Dunav“ and “Insurance company Novi Sad“, and others.
Keeping Pace
In the period up to 1990, two-stage thermal cracking was reconstructed into vacuum residue
visbreaking, aromatics extraction unit (Sulfolane) was constructed, liquid sulphur production
unit (Claus) was commissioned, storage space was expanded, construction of the new water
chemical treatment unit, flare gas recovery unit and a new cooling water system was
completed. Several facilities were built and reconstructed in the Handling Department (new
tank truck loading facility, reconstruction and expansion of API-Separator, in-line blending of
refinery products). In Petrochemical Complex battery limits, a joint unit for secondary waste
water biological treatment was built.
page 21
By the end of nineties, it was already possible to compare the Refinery with the modern
world refineries. The built Refinery units enabled production structure in the ration 80% of
white, highly valuable products, to 20 % of black products.
Sanctions
Security Council introduced at the end of May 1992 sanctions to FR Yugoslavia. Embargo had
very serious consequences for the entire Petroleum Industry of Serbia, and thereby for the
Refinery as well. Direct damages from embargo are estimated to several billion dollars, and
indirect damages, in the form of delayed development, lost profit, and the like, can only be
assumed.
The last barges with the imported crude oil arrived in Refinery on 18 June 1992, and from
that moment on, Refinery was only processing domestic crude oil. Only about one sixth of
the available primary processing units were in operation, under the conditions of dinar and
foreign currency insolvency, multiple limitations in terms of procurement of spare parts and
chemicals, and the like.
At the time of embargo, S-100 was in operation, a small primary processing unit, and the
average processing capacity was 2.400 tons per day. This unit, before the sanctions, was
almost discarded – it was used for occasional processing of slop as well as a spare unit. In
1991, this unit was revitalized and put on stand-by. It proved that the Refinery would not
have been able to operate without it during the sanctions. Namely, there was not enough
crude oil for the operation of big Atmospheric Distillation Unit. All through the sanctions, S-
100 operated without major shut-downs. During embargo, Platforming, Gas Concentration
and Udex with auxiliary units were in function, in addition to S-100.
Even in these conditions, continuity of crude oil processing was preserved, while the
development was not entirely neglected either. This time was used for reparation of process
equipment that had not been in operation, for the preparation of investment and
development projects, professional training and education of personnel, development of
information system.
Because of that, Refinery was ready when the sanctions were lifted: Primary processing units
were ready as early as November 1995. Immediately upon the arrival of greater quantities of
crude oil, the processing capacity was increased to 8.000 tons per day.
In 1996 and 1997, revitalization of all the Refinery units was carried out, and these were
successively being put into operation. This is without precedent that a refinery was
successfully restarted, after most of its units have been out of operation for almost 4 years.
Bombing and reconstruction
In the course of seventy-seven days of NATO bombing of Serbia, the Refinery was bombed
seven times. The first time it was bombed on 4 April 1999, when the Refinery Power Plant
was hit with two missiles. The following attacks took place on 12 April (twice), 13 April, 16
April, 18 April and 7 June. About 60 percent of Refinery units was destroyed, and almost all
of the units and facilities were damaged, to a greater or smaller extent. Direct damages from
the bombing were estimated to more than 400 million dollars, but considerable indirect
damages should be added to the final sum.
Figure 11: Bombing 1999
page 22
Refinery, with its own resources and means, with the employment of domestic contracting
companies, started reconstructing the damaged parts right away.
In the first phase of reconstruction, in less than three months, overhaul and reparation of the
damaged equipment on the major primary processing unit (AD-1) and on some of the units
in Block 5 were completed. In Handling Department and Power Plant, units and facilities
necessary for the operation of process units, acceptance of crude oil and dispatch of finished
products were made operational again. Derivative production was restarted as early as 26
September 1999.
The second phase, which implied a future modernization, was commenced right away.
Bitumen Production and Vacuum Distillation Units were reconstructed and commissioned. By
commissioning Boiler 1 in the Power Plant, Refinery repaired the unit that had been almost
completely destroyed. This resulted in the renewal of the Refinery's own generation of
steam.
The most complex and significant unit for a better crude oil yield in the Refinery, Fluid
Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCC), started operation on 1 September 2000.
In parallel with the reparation, reconstruction and modernization of many units also took
place. Some of the most important are as follows: replacement of the old control systems on
almost all units with the new ones that are used in EU countries, reconstruction of Vacuum
Distillation Unit in accordance with the design by Greek company Asprofos, for the purpose
of increasing the yield, improving the bitumen feed quality, more reliable operation and
easier unit management. FCC was modernized for the purpose of improving yield, and more
reliable and longer operation.
Refinery today
Pančevo Oil Refinery is significant organizational part of and the biggest oil processing
company in NIS-Petrol, which is the biggest branch of shareholding company - Petroleum
Industry of Serbia. That is a fuel-type refinery which produces fuels, paraffinic and aromatic
solvents, feed for Petrochemical Complex, bitumen and sulphur. Primary and secondary units
for crude oil processing were constructed in such a way as to enable the processing of
various types of crude. With the processing capacity of 4,8 million tons per year, it is the
biggest factory of this type in Serbia, meeting the domestic market demand for oil
derivatives, with the possibility of exporting 20% of its production.
Crude oil (domestic and imported) is delivered to the Refinery by oil pipeline and river barge,
and the derivatives are dispatched by product pipeline, tank truck, railway and barge.
Refinery is situated at exceptionally favourable location - 14 kilometers from Belgrade, the
biggest consumer center in Serbia. It has its own Jetty on the Danube and pipeline that
connects them, also truck loading facilities and railway station with the facilities for
derivative dispatch and crude oil acceptance.
Top priority for all employees in Pančevo Oil Refinery is crude oil processing and production
of sufficient quantities of oil derivatives according to the European standards for domestic
requirements and creation of conditions for export, at the same time meeting all
environmental standards. That is achieved by constant upgrading of operation process
quality, better crude oil yield, power optimization and reduction in production costs, and for
that purpose, it has been planned to implement development projects defined in cooperation
with the foreign engineering companies (JGC, SHELL, ABB).
Particular attention is paid to environmental protection. During units reconstruction from
1999 to 2001, by investing into modernization and overhaul of the existing units,
reconstruction and construction of storage tanks and facilities, as well as the preparation of
basic designs for the future modernization, environmental component was integrated into the
entire production cycle: starting from crude oil storing, derivative production, to derivative
dispatch into transport means. Implementation of the planned development technological
projects is of common interest both for industrial zone and for Pančevo town as a whole.
These projects aim at reaching European standards by restricting and controlling detrimental
substance emission into the air, soil and water.
2.1.3.4 Safety of the plant
Management system
Pancevo Refinery has established the quality management system in accordance with ISO
9001:2000 standard, for all its operations. The system is certified by Lloyd’s Registrar
page 23
Quality Assurance. Internal audits and management reviews are conducted once in a year in
accordance with written procedures.
Top management has establish policy of improving the quality of products, services and
environmental protection, which is achieved in the following manner:
• by permanent development of the company, by introducing state-of-the-art
technologies and processes in oil processing areas
• by delivery of products and services to meet buyers' needs with minimum costs
• by delivery of products and services in accordance with the requirements defined by
standards and regulations for petroleum industry
• by consistent implementation and continuous improvement of designed quality
management system, in all operations, by employees
• by continuous and planned specialized education of all employees and in accordance
with the requirements of modern business activities
• by cooperation with scientific research and project organizations, regarding product
and process development projects
• by motivation of employees and improvement of working conditions
• by establishing and maintaining the documented environmental management system,
in accordance with the requirements of ISO 14000:2004 standard.
Environmental Protection Policy consists of the following:
Pančevo Oil Refinery, being the biggest oil processing company in the Republic of
Serbia, for the purpose of its long-term successful business activities and assurance
of sustainable development, within its business policy, places considerable emphasis
on systematic approach to the environmental protection improvement activities.
For that purpose Pančevo Oil Refinery performs the following:
• introduces the environmental protection policy, programs and practice into every
activity, as an important element of managing all business operations.
• Identifies all environmental aspects and puts under control the important ones.
• Operates in accordance with the environmental protection laws and regulations.
• Pursues permanent improvement in environmental protection.
• Systematically reduces detrimental substance emission into the surroundings (air,
water, soil), saves resources and energy, minimizes use of detrimental substances
and the quantity of dangerous waste.
• Minimizes the possibility of detrimental effect on the environment by preventive
measures and the measures to be taken in case of an accident.
• Increases employees’ awareness of environmental protection significance, by
constant education and professional training, as well as by providing information in a
timely and proper manner.
• Develops cooperation with the institutions of local and communal self-government,
responsible for environmental protection, as well as with all other interested parties.
• Procures products not having or having minimum effect on the environment, and
induces suppliers to actively apply all the environmental protection measures,
including application of ISO 14001 in their business activities.
Safety Management System is a part of quality and environment management system and
includes some principles to identify and to evaluate possible hazards and principles to
identify and to realize technical organizational and management activities for the mitigation
and consequence reduction of accidents. Responsible organizational unit for Health, Safety
and Environment issues is Risk Management division.
Critical situations, preparation for emergency situations
The Pancevo Refinery has for many years a fire protection plan, made according to the
requirements of fire protection regulation in Serbia. Existing plan prescribes in details the
behavior of workers in the event of fire and have been made for the following cases:
• protection plan for unplanned production stop
• fire protection plan
o technological preventive plan
o fire distinguishing tactical plan
In 2009 Pancevo Refinery has developed a risk assessment of chemical accidents separately
for all relevant production and technological units. Based on this, protection plan in the case
page 24
of chemical accidents was developed on the level of production units as well as for the whole
plant. Elements of the plan are:
• Forces and assets of the Plan
• Scheme for response to accident
• Training and education program
• Control program
• Other instructions and information.
Total number of employees in the refinery is 1625. Qualification structure of employees is
given in Table 7 and number of employees in different section in
Table 8. Maximum concentration of employees in first shift during working days is given in
Table 9.
General Plan of Refinery Pancevo is given in Annex 1, map in scale of 1:2000, within which
are listed and identified the process unit and storage. The specific plans for individual
facilities are included in the vChapter V of the report.
Table 7: Qualification structure of employees in Pancevo Refinery
Number of
Qualification
employees
PhD 1
MSc 1
BSc 202
College 68
Highly skilled 201
High-school 953
Skilled 137
Elementary school 3
Semiskilled 3
Unskilled 56
Table 8: Number of employees in Pancevo Refinery by type of work
Number of Occasional Permanent Office work

Unit / Section employees work in work in
field field
Production 404 254 50 100
Power plant 108 88 10 10
Manipulation 218
Maintenance 286 286
Laboratory 124 10 114
Research and 65 65
investment
HSE 114
ICT 33
Other (headquarter, 237 273
finance, commercial
affairs)
page 25
Total: 1625
Table 9: Maximum concentration of employees, first shift
Number of
Location
employees
Headquarter 441
Mashing workshop 227
Block V building 69
S-2100 and S-2200 building 29
FCC building 82
S-3600 building 17
S-0250 building 18
Power plant and HPV 57
Laboratory 126
HSE building 35
Measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards

Preventive, organizational measures
Fire will be detected by optical control. Fire sensors do not exist. A new sensor system for
gas detection and continuous measurement has been installed in 2007. An internal
professional fire brigade is located in Block VI. 73 people are working there and 68 are fire
fighters. The available equipment is described in Annex 5. The advantage is a very short
alarm period for rescue operation. Nevertheless in the case of a major accident the fire
brigade will also be addressed by the accident and will not be able to perform the rescue
operations.
Rescue and emergency plans are under construction and do not exist at the moment. This
will be done by Risk Management division.
Preventive, constructional measures
The surface is brick earth covered with concrete. The level of underground water is about
one meter deep and will probably be affected by an accident. Therefore all tanks are build in
basins. A drainage system exists for fire extinguishing water. A new project is running at the
moment with the objective to separate normal water and waste water in different drainage
systems.
The maintaining department has developed a plan of fire water retention.
Technical measures
Due to the requirements of the national laws every three years the safety valves will be
maintained and controlled. The electrical department has developed an electrical emergency
supply system.
A monitoring system has been build up in 2006 and it is managed by the HSE department
and is just in the testing phase.
The waste management and classification will be done by Risk Management department. The
waste will be handled by a contractor.
Measures to mitigate an accident
The intended major maintenance period is every three years. In reality at the moment there
is a major maintenance shut down per year as the process has been modified to increase the
efficiency of the process. The modification can partly lead to erosion and corrosion. This has
to be controlled at the moment by a yearly inspection.
page 26
The pressure vessels will have an inside inspection every three years and every six years the
pressure will be tested. This inspection is based on a national law which is connected with EU
regulations.
It is not an obligation in Serbia but regarding the topic explosion protection the Risk
Management division has started to consider the requirements of the ATEX Directives. An
explosion protection document has been developed which has been submitted to the
Ministry. The exchange of the equipment in regard to the requirements of the ATEX Directive
will be done step by step. Furthermore the German TA Luft will be implemented.
The inspection is in the responsibility of the production and maintaining department of RNP
and planning of safety aspects is in the responsibility of the Risk Management department.
No public utilities are affected by accident consequences as the line connections are
underground.
Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to two accidents in the past. About
10 years ago a safety valve has been fired by lightning and last year a burning flare has
been addressed by lightning.
The normal protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the
protection measure is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance
and continuity will be done. All safety valves are protected by steam extinguishers. This task
is from 2007. in the responsibility of Risk Management division and will be done by an
external party.
Internal communication will be done by phone, radio and mobile phone.
2.1.4 Novi Sad refinery

Novi Sadl Refinery (Figure 12) belongs to NIS Petrol which is, further, an organizational part
of the joint stock company - Petroleum Industry of Serbia, NIS a.d. It is a refinery with
mostly western manufacture and origin technology and equipment dating from '70s and '80s.
In 1980s it was upgraded to 3.000.000 t/year hydro skimming refinery with two distillation
trains, one for domestic naphthenic, low suphur, crude and other for imported paraffinic
crudes. Storage capacity was 677.000 m3. Products were LPG, gasoline, diesel, heating oil,
fuel oils, lube oils and other special products.
On December 31, 1991 RNS became a part of the public company with certain rights and
liabilities in terms of legal transactions and continued business activities within NIS –
Petroleum Industry of Serbia, as Novi Sad Oil Refinery, a part of the company for production
of petroleum products. It produces nowadays different types of fuels as well as raw materials
for basic lubes and bitumen.
The refinery itself and its headquarter is

located on the following address:
NIS-Petrol Novi Sad Refinery
Put Sajkaskog odreda 1
21000 Novi Sad
Figure 12: Oil refinery in Novi Sad
2.1.4.2 Location description
Macro location
Novi Sad Refinery is situated about 1 km away from the town Novi Sad and about 80 km
from Belgrade, on the left bank of the Danube River.
Novi Sad is located in the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina (Figure 13 and Figure 14),
with land area of 699 km², while on the city's official site, land area is 702 km²; and the
urban area is 129.7 km². The city lies on the river Danube and one small section of the
Danube-Tisa-Danube Chanel.
page 27
Figure 13: Position of Novi Sad

The territory of Novi Sad covers an area of 21506 km 2 and its coordinates are 45º 19’ North
geographic latitude and 19º 51’ East geographic longitude. Novi Sad's landscape is divided
into two parts; one is situated in the Bačka region and another in the Syrmia region. The
river Danube is a natural border between them. Bačka's side of the city lies on one of the
southern lowest parts of Pannonia Plain, while Fruška Gora's side (Syrmia) is a horst
mountain.
Figure 14: Position of Novi Sad Refinery

Alluvial plains along Danube are well formed, especially on the left bank, in some parts 10
km from the river. A large part of Novi Sad lies on terrace deposit with an elevation of 80-83
m. The northern part of Fruška Gora is composed of massive landslide zones, but they are
page 28
not active, except in the Ribnjak neighborhood (between Sremska Kamenica and
Petrovaradin.
Refinery Novi Sad (NIS-RNS) is located in the economic zone of the city of Novi Sad - North
4. This zone is foreseen for building large commercial facilities and covers area of 1735
hectares. Refinery itself covers about 256 hectares of industrial space. The site is in north-
eastern part of the city of Novi Sad, south the site flows channel Danube-Tisa-Danube, while
on the north side is the street Put Šajkaškog odreda, the road for settlement Shanghai
(distance about 2 km). On the west side of the refinery are main storage are of NIS
NAFTAGAS-TRAFFIC with installations for filling oil and petroleum products.
On the south side are the production plants and warehouses, factories for the production of
artificial fertilizers "AGROHEM.
On the north-west side is located filling stations with storage tanks for liquid petroleum gas.
Distance from the bottling and storage space is about 250 meters. Along the east side lie the
pipeline installation.
This site has convenient traffic conditions. On the north side of the refinery site is a highway
E-7 (Belgrade - Novi Sad - Subotica) while on the west side is the main road M-7 (Backa
Palanka - Novi Sad - Zrenjanin). On the south side are lying waterways, the river Danube
and Novi Sad channel Savino Selo.
Micro location
Novi Sad Refinery is a complex of process and auxiliary facilities for processing crude oil,
storage facilities, transportation and manipulation utilities, research and laboratory space
and other supporting facilities. In the north part of the refinery there are pipeline
installations.
Refinery is fenced and secured, and the only access is possible from the street Put Šajkaškog
odreda where entrance gates are locating enabling access to the refinery from the road.
Inside the area of Novi Sad Refinery are located 13 production, manipulation and storage
units, including necessary infrastructure. General plan of the refinery is given on Annex and
list of units in Table 10. There are two main production lines in RNS:
• lube oil and bitumen line and

• fuel production line.
Table 10: List of units in Novi Sad Refinery
Unit Unit ID Specification

Storage and manipulation
Storage area with related equipment
Manipulation piping-product lines-crude oil
piping with related equipment
Pump station in storage area and
manipulation
Additives Systems
Blow down System with piping
Transport and delivery
Ponton 1 and Ponton
Oil Rail Ramp
Wagon Filling Station - Section 69
Ramp for refine products loading
Auto Filling Station
Wagon Filling Station - LPG
Half-industrial unit
1000 Half-industrial unit
page 29
Unit Unit ID Specification

Water preparation
02-0100 Water surge and related equipment
0200 HPV
Cooling towers
65 Fire water preparation system
Steam production and distribution of steam and gas
Technological water production Boiler
0300
Section
Steam and condensate unit – reduction
30
station
Waste water treatment
Stream, natural gas, refine gas, fuel oil
53
distribution
Flare
Flare system with related piping and
KRB-400
equipment
U-2100 Atmospheric distillation with stabilization
U-2200 Vacuum distillation
Fuel - secondary
U-2300> Hydro treating with related tank T-1
U-2400 Plat forming unit with related tank T-2
U-2500 LPG production with tanks
U-2600 Unibon unit-Desulphurization
U-2700 Supporting systems
U-5800 Sulphide water treatment units
U-4500 Instrumental air production unit
Lube oil 1
U-100 Atmospheric distillation
U-200 Vacuum distillation
Lube oil 2
HF-400 Hydro finishing
HFH-400 Hydrogen production unit
KR-500 Sour refining with Gurdon>
U-550 Percolation with re-distillation of gasoline
Bitumene production
Bitumen production with raw materials
U-300
storage tanks (G10 i V1 do V6)
Re-treatment and delivery with products
tanks (VT1 do VT9)
U-900 Supporting systems (hot oil system)
Novolin
Oil blending with piping and pump stations
Tanks area of profit centre Novolin
Meteorological, geological and other data

Climate
page 30
Novi Sad has a moderate continental climate, with four seasons. Autumn is longer than
spring, with long sunny and warm periods. Winter is not so severe, with an average of 22
days of sub-zero temperature. January is the coldest month, with an average temperature of
-1.9 °C. Spring is usually short and rainy, while summer arrives abruptly. The coldest
temperature ever recorded in Novi Sad was -30.7°C (-19.3°F) on January 24, 1963; and the
hottest temperature ever recorded was 41.5°C (110.7°F) on July 6, 1950. Average
temperatures are given inTable 11.
The southeast-east wind Košava, which blows from the Carpathians and brings clear and dry
weather, is characteristic of the local climate. It mostly blows in autumn and winter, in 2-3
days intervals. The average speed of Košava is 25-43 km per hour but certain strokes can
reach up to 130 km/h. In winter time, followed by a snow storm, it can cause snowdrifts.
Also it can cause temperatures to drop to around -30°C.
Table 11: Average temperatures (Source: Republic Hydrometeorology Service of Serbia)
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Year
Avg. 2.5 5.7 11.5 17.2 22.5 25.2 27.2 27.2 23.7 18 10.3 4.5 16.3
high °C (36) (46) (57) (67) (76) (81) (85) (85) (77) (68) (54) (44) (65)
(°F)
Avg low -4.4 -2.3 1.2 5.8 10.6 13.6 14.7 14.2 11.2 6.3 2.2 -1.9 5.9
°C (°F) (29) (32) (38) (46) (55) (60) (62) (62) (56) (47) (40) (33) (47)
Rainfall 38 35 41 47 57 82 61 55 36 35 46 44 577
mm (1.5) (1.4) (1.6) (1.8) (2.2) (3.2) (2.4) (2.2) (1.4) (1.4) (1.8) (1.7) (22.7
(in.) )
Winds
The presence of winds opposites directions is characteristic of this region (Figure 14). Most
dominant winds are from two different directions; south-east (18.2%) and north-west
direction (17%). The third kind of wind is western and the least one which can be seen on
this area is Sothern wind. These winds are characterizing the whole Pannonia Basin.
The dominant south-east wind KOSAVA is blowing from December to March, in winter part of
the year. North-west wind is dominating from June to September, in summer part of the
year. The calm weather without the wind is mostly presented in June, July, August and
September. Strength of the wind is between 0,81 – 1,31 m/s.
page 31
Table 12: Novi Sad region - Frequency of the winds

Air humidity
Relative humidity of the air in the Novi Sad region is about 70 to 80 %. During a year it
decreases with temperature increase. The lowest humidity is in summers and the highest in
winters. Average yearly humidity is 76% and it is identical to relative air humidity in the
whole Vojvodina.
Cloudiness and sun
Cloudiness mostly follows the movement of the relative air humidity. The most cloudy,
7.8/10 of the sky, is in February, and the smallest in August, 3.9 (Table 13). The average
value in a year is 5.7/10 of the sky.
The sun shins 2080.2 hours in a year. The sunniest month is July, with average 279.5 hours;
the shortest is in December with only 51 hours of sun. Data for seasons are: springtime
413.3 hours, summer 837.7, autumn 479.7 and in winters only 247.8 hours.
The average number of days with fog in a year is 31.5, and average monthly maximum is
19.8 days (mostly December, less in January). The average maximum number of days with
fog in a year is 56.8 and the minimum is 13 days.
Table 13: Average value of cloudiness in sky/10
Novi Sad 7.1 7.8 6.2 6.1 5.6 5.1 4.4 3.9 4.2 4.7 7.1 7.7 5.7
Bodies of water and flooding

In the region of Novi Sad underground waters, deep on up to 300 m and not so deep one,
are of big importance. In the alluvial water regime is directly depending on Danube river.
High underground water show important amplitudes, while the deep underground waters
show higher stability. On the lower parts of the alluvial valley the underground waters come
the surface and flood it.
page 32
On the loess terrace the level of the underground water rises from October to April.
Oscillations are within 1 to 1.5 m, while the deepness is mostly more then 4 m.
Freatske water are high polluted. Not treated waste water go to the open sewage line, cricks
from the mountain Fruska Gora and drain to the underground, to the not deep water layers
which are use for individual or public water supply. All human facilities in Backa and partly
Novi Sad are drained using open channels.
Areas of seismic activities
In the region seismic activities are possible with intensity 6 - 8 MCS. On location of Novi Sad
Refinery possible earthquake with intensity of 7 MCS.
Geological and hydrological characteristiques
Environment of Novi Sad is characterized by presence of two different morphological units:
Fruska Gora mountain and the Pannonian basin. Their genesis is related to strong orogenic
movements with the participation of deflection. Fruska Gora is an area of erosion, and the
Pannonian plain area reservoirs (lake sediments, les, sand) and erosion (alluvial plain).
Novi Sad Refinery lies on the oldest alluvial carbonate coat that is sandy clay and to some
extent consolidated. In the area of Novi Sad shallow groundwater and deeper ones, up to
300m are of the great importance. The water level in alluvial area is directly related to the
water level of the Danube. High groundwater show significant amplitude, in contrast to the
deep groundwater, which show greater stability.
Wastewater is directly discharged in an open canal network, creeks of Fruska Gora and
further drained in underground, in the shallow water-bearing layers, which are used for
individual and public water supply.
The entire area is Refinery fill-reflux sand thickness from 1:50-2.00m.
Flora, fauna and protected natural and cultural properties
Natural advantages for plant species in the area of Novi Sad and surrounding are not the
same. They are primarily caused by differences in relief, the differences in the amount of
underground water, in geological and pedological soil composition, anthropogenic influence
and other factors.
Biographical characteristics of the area corresponding to the rim of the Pannonia regions.
Observing the physical and geographical distribution of fauna, flora observed the following
characteristic areas:
• region of Bačka with complex agro eco systems
• region of Fruška gora with complex forest

• Fruska Gora Prigorje with cultural landscape and
• Danubian region under the jack forests and flood meadows.
Distinctive forest vegetation of Fruska gora, plant communities loessial.plateau, vegetation of
the Danube alluvial plains, wetlands and meadow vegetation and anthropogenic forest are
developed.
On the location of Novi Sad Refinery there are no rare or endangered plant and animal
species, nor particularly valuable plant communities. Within the refinery, among certain
sections of reservoirs, installation, related facilities and internal roads, there is no other
vegetation except grass cover and low trees around the administration building. According to
the Office for Protection of no registered archaeological sites in the observed area.
Population
Novi Sad iis Serbia's second-largest city, after Belgrade. In its most recent official census
from 2002, the city had an urban population of 216,583, while its municipal population was
299,294. But according to the data from April 2010, the city had an urban population of
286,157, while its municipal population was 372,999. Shanghai, nearby village, occupies an
area of 13 ha, and lives about 1,600 inhabitants.
Activities
The main activities in Novi Sad refinery are:
page 33
• production of derivates, thermalpower energy, chemicals and basic chamical

products
• public transportation by rail, road and river
• laboratory analysis and services
• research - development services
• public storage.
Characteristics of key units in the refinery are given Table 14. Novi Sad Refinery produces up
to 2.5 million tons of crude per year. There are two main production lines in the refinery:
• lube oil and bitumen line and
• fuel production line.

Table 14: Key units in Novi Sad Refinery - characteristics
Capacity Constructe
Unit License
(t/year) d
Atmospheric Distillation AT-500 Pritchard 500.000 1968
Atmospheric distillation I Naphtha Stabilization
USSR 2.000.000 1985
U-2100
Vacuum Distillation U-2200 USSR 1.200.000 1985
Naphtha Hydro treating U-2300 UOP (TPL) 560.000 1985
Platforming U-2400 UOP (TPL) 430.000 1985
Gas treatment (LPG) U-2500 UOP (TPL) 60.000 1985
HDS Unibon (Kerosine /VGO) U-2600 UOP (TPL) 240.000 1985
Atmospheric Distillation U-100 Badger 500.000 1974
Vacuum Distillation U-200 Badger 550.000 1974
Bitumen Badger 200.000 1974
Hydro finishing U-400 Texaco 240.000 1981
Acid Treatment U-500 Texaco 89.000 1985
Lube Oil Blending, Filling and Packaging Texaco 56.000 1981
Substances present in the refinery are listed in Annex 6.
Organization and management system

Organization of Novi Sad Refinery is presented in Annex 7. Quality management and
environmental management systems are certified. Specification of responsibilities based on
certified management systems is given in

Novi Sad Refinery was established in 1968 as an Operating unit within a bigger company
named: Petroleum industry ''Naftagas''. The planned capacity was 500,000 t/ year.
Nowadays available capacity of the refinery is 2.500.000 t/year and the storage capacity is
410.000 m3 m.
In 1972 it is adopted Development Basis for Novi Sad Refinery for the period of 10 years.
The following courses of further development were adopted:
• development of production of all types of lube oils and bitumen (program ''Lube Oil
Plant'' which was effectuated through phases Lube Oil Plant I and Lube Oil Plant II)
and
• fuel production development (''Fuel Plants'' program). Lube oil and bitumen
production was effectuated through phases (Lube Oil Plant I and Lube Oil Plant II).
page 34
First phase of Lube Oil Plant I program in 1973 involved construction of the following
production units:
• Atmospheric Distillation Unit (500.000 t/y)
• Vacuum Distillation Unit (550.000 t/y)
• Bitumen Production Unit (160.000 t/y).
In 1975 realization of the most elaborate RNS program, called Fuel II Plant was started
parallel with the commencement of Yugoslav pipeline construction, the founder of which,
amongst others, was RNS.
Fuel II Plant Process Units involved construction of following production units:
1. Primary Process Units with
• Atmospheric Distillation unit, capacity 2.000.000 t/y
• Gasoline Stabilization Unit, capacity 580.000 t/y
• Vacuum Distillation Unit, capacity 1.200.000 t/y
2. Secondary Process Units with
• Hydro Treating Unit, capacity 500.000 t/y
• Platforming Unit, capacity 430.000 t/y
• HDC Unibon, capacity 230.000 t/y
• LPG Processing Unit, capacity 66.000 t/y
In 1976 Atmospheric Distillation Unit, Vacuum Distillation Unit and Bitumen Production Unit
(Lube Oil Plant I program) were commissioned.
Second phase of Lube Oil Plant II program involved construction of the following production
units:
• Hydro Finishing Unit (240.000 t/y)
• Acid Treatment Unit (80.000 t/y)
• Lube Oil Blending Unit (56.000 t/y).
1979 Fuel II Plant process units construction was started and 1980 Lube Oil Blending Plant
was constructed and started up. 1981 Start-up of Hydrofinishing Unit and other
accompanying units. 1984 Fuel II Plant program Primary Process Units were started up with
the delivery of the first quantity of imported crude oil via Yugoslav pipeline 1986 Fuel II Plant
program Secondary Process Units were started up.
2.1.4.4 Safety of the plant
Measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards
Preventive measures
There is no major maintenance period as the different establishment is only running between
20% and 50% or their normal capacity (missing feed).
regulations.
Safety valves and gas installations have an inspection period of once per year. Gas
installations will also be inspected if the duration of the shut down period is more than one
month.
Preventive constructional measures
underground.
Preventive technical measures
Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to some initial fires (each time fire
on the top of a column). This part is also protected by earthing. In general the normal
protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the protection
measure earthing is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance and
continuity will be done.
Additional measures
Internal communication will be done by radio, phone and mobile phone.
Measures to reduce the consequences of an accident
page 35
The whole staff has a yearly fire extinguishing training and exercise. Evacuation training has
been only done for parts of the establishment. Rescue and emergency plans has been
establishment now. Sub contractors have to pass training (fire protection and workplace
safety) and to do an exam.
There is only one drainage system for fire extinguishing water and normal water. The fire
water retention (shown in Error! Reference source not found.) will be done by hydrants
connected to basins.
Fire extinguishing by foam can be down by fire brigade.
An automatic gas detection system does not exist. A fire detection will be done by optical
control. An automatic fire extinguishing system does not exist. A system for automatic
cooling of the tanks.
Fires will be detected by optical control. Fire sensors do not exist. A new sensor system for
gas detection and continuous measurement has been installed last year.
An alarm plan in the establishment exist. In the case of an accident or a fire the workers will
be informed by radio to leave the establishment.
Operating Fire fighting unit within the Fire protection Service is located on two locations on
refinery territory. Staffing of the unit, 82 persons, is designed by the Plan of Fire protection
of OD RNS, and approved by MUP of Serbia. Actually there are 69 persons working in this
unit, as shown in Table 1.
Table 15: Number of personnel in Firefighting unit of Novi Sad refinery
Position taken
Working position Planned Workers of Workers of Total
the refinery subcontractors number
Manager of operating
1 - - -
unit of fire brigade
Chief of operating unit
1 - - -
of fire brigade
Shift leader of
operating unit of fire 10 9 - 9
brigade
Fireman, department
16 13 - 13
leader
Driver, fireman 16 10 10 20
Fireman, operator 25 7 9 16
UKUPNO 69 39 19 58
Equipment and utilities of Firefighting unit are shown in Table 16.

Table 16: Firefighting equipment
Mobile equipment Type Capacity

Mercedes VP 33/43 6000/6000
Mercedes VPS 26/36 4000/5000/1000
Vehicles Mercedes VPS 26/32 4000/5000/1000
FAP S 2x2000 4000
TAM – Technical vehicle -
Rosenbauer 3 pcs
Ziegler 1pc
Motor pumps
Honda 5 pcs
Flight – floating pump 2 pcs
page 36
Mobile equipment Type Capacity

Turbine vacuum pump 2 pcs
stabile 14 pcs
Fire extinguish monitors
Mobile 4 pcs
Beside the above mentioned mobile equipment, operating firefighting brigade has the
following multipurpose equipment:
- fire extinguishers ( type S-6A, S-9A, S-25A, S-50A, CO2-5, CO2-10 )
- suction and discharge pipes (Ø52 mm, Ø75 mm, Ø110 mm )
- water/foam nozzles
- manifolds / collectors
- mixers for foam
- vatrogasne armature
- insulation facilities
- personal protection equipment (suits for fire approaching, suits for entering
into fire, fire helmets
Systems for storage area extinguishing and cooling
The refinery is provided with ring hydrant net with over 500 hydrants, as well as hydrant
facility for continual maintenance of water pressure in hydrant net.
Firefighting system is separated in 5 stations with suitable capacity of firefighting substances
and utilities (motor and electrical pumps, regulating equipment…). The reason for this
separation is the size of refinery. There are following stations:
• Stara vatrogasnica
• MIX-stanica
• Mešaona Blending benzina
• Terminal JP „Transnafta“
• Mešaona Goriva II
Table 17 shows means for fire extinguishing and capacities.
Table 17: Available fire extinguishing means
Means Capacity Available

73.000 liters + 92.700 liters
Storage tanks for “Polifilm” 75.000 liters
(reserve)
Powder “Monex” 15.125 kg
Firefighting water tanks 10.000 liters 10.000 liters
Almost all tanks are provided with stabile firefighting and cooling systems.
Fire protection of Lube oil I and Lube oil II units
These units are provided with ring hydrant net, stable and mobile monitors, as well as with
numerous fire fighting devices of different types. A fire on process units segments is
extinguished from station „MIX-stanica“, with additional water pressure provision from
station „Stara vatrogasnica“ (and if necessary from Mešaone - Goriva II). Station „MIX-
stanica“ is equipped with two tanks with extracte for fire extinguish, each with capacity of 16
m3, pumps and devices for extracted mixture, as well as with the piping for emulsion
distribution for fire extinguish on of process unit segments and related storage area.
The whole refinery is connected with Fire alarms system, with 24 hours service on both
locations.
2.1.4.5 Description of processes
Main units in Lube oil part of Novi Sad refinery are:
• Gasoline Stabilization Unit, with capacity of 580.000 t/y
page 37
• Vacuum Distillation Unit (U 200), with capacity of 1.200.000 t/y

• Hydro finishing Unit, with capacity of 240.000 t/y
• Acid Treatment Unit, with capacity of 80.000 t/y
• Lube Oil Blending Unit, with capacity of 56.000 t/y
For the analysis within the project, units U 100 and U 200 are considered.
Atmospheric distillation unit, U 100

U-100 processes domestic crude oil Velebit and Kelebija, with capacity of 1500 t/day. Both
crude oil are naphtha origin.
Atmospheric distillation unit consists of following connected section:
• desalter section
• heating section
• atmospheric distillation section.
The main products are:
• Gasolin
• Kerosene
• Atmospheric gas oi
• Light residue.
Simplified diagram showing process parameters is given in Annex 9. Operation of U 100 is
described in Process and operation book Job No BN-5010, 1975 Badger B.V. and in the
project for reconstruction of the unit Industroprojekt Zagreb. There are specific operation
instruction for heater HF 101, desalter and process pumps.
Available related drawings are:
• PI diagrams: DWG.NO.BN-5010 –1107A, rev.10, DWG.NO.BN-5010 –1107B,

rev.10, DWG.NO.BN-5010 –1107C, rev.10, DWG.NO.BN-5010 –1107D, rev.8,
DWG.NO.BN-5010 –1107E, rev.7<
• Process flow diagrams: S-3941-100-04D-01, rev.
• Mechanical scheme: B-3941-100-06D-01, rev.
A detailed description of U 100 is given in the documentation of Quality management

system, in Q6P.U1.01 – Postupak rada atmosferskog postrojenja U 100 (Operational
procedure of Atmospheric unit U 100).
Table 18 lists materials used in process and their basic characteristics in relation to the
toxicity, health and environment. More details about each substance may be found in safety
data sheet.
Table 18: Dangerous substances in U 100
Effect to the Environment Physical

Name Name Quantity (t)
health effect properties
Raw
Crude oil Cancerous Water organism 200.000
material
Product Flammable
Crude gasoline Cancerous Water organism 2.200
liquid
Flammable
Kerosene Cancerous Water organism 16.000
liquid
Flammable
Gas oil Cancerous Water organism 41.200
liquid
Flammable
Atmospheric residue Cancerous Water organism 140.600
liquid
By-product -
page 38
Effect to the Environment Physical

Name Name Quantity (t)
health effect properties
Chemicals No data
Sodium hydroxide Irritant corrosive
available
Irritant,
Risky for water
Deemulgator Potential stable
organism
cancerous
Irritant,
Anticorrosion Harmful for
Dangerous to corrosive
inhibitor water organism
drink
Ammonium Very toxic for
Toxic, Irritant Toxic
hydroxide water organism
From the list of specified materials following dangerous materials are present: H2S in waste
gas, SO2 – in flue gas
Vacuum distillation unit, U 200

Vacuum distillation unit U 200 treats atmospheric residue of crude oil Velebit, Kelebija and
imported crude oil. Products are:
• vacuum gas oil
• VD-1
• VD-2
• VD-3
• VD-4
• paraffin’s slop,
• heavy residue.
Vacuum section consists of the following connected units:
• Heating section,
• Distillation section,
• Vacuum group,
• Tempered water section,
• Fuel oil section.
The unit is connected with the following organizational units:
• Production:
o Atmospheric distillation U 100
o Bitumen Blowing section – unit 300 (compression station),
• Other organizational sections
o Technological preparation section
o Power plant
o Laboratory
o Storage area and re-treatment and
o Maintenance.
Simplified diagram showing process parameters is given in Annex 10 .Detail description of
the unit is given in the documentation of quality management system, Q6P.U2.01 – Postupak
rada vacuum postrojenja U 200 (Operational procedure of the unit U 200).
Table 19 lists materials used in process and their basic characteristics in relation to the
toxicity, health and environment. More details may be found in safety data sheet.
page 39
Table 19: Dangerous substances in U 200
Effect to the Environment Physical Quantity

Category Name
health effect properties (t)
Flammable
Raw material Atmospheric residue Cancerous Water organism 160.000
liquid
Flammable
Vacuum gas oil Cancerous Water organism 12.000
liquid
Flammable
VD1 Cancerous Water organism 13.000
liquid
Flammable
liquid
Flammable
Product VD3 Cancerous Water organism 20.000
liquid
Flammable
liquid
Flammable
Paraffin’s slop Cancerous Water organism 15.000
liquid
Flammable
Vacuum residue Cancerous Water organism 60.000
liquid
By-product
Irritant,
Anticorrosion Harmful for
dangerous to corrosive
Chemical inhibitor water organism
drink
Neutralizer
From the list of specified materials following dangerous materials are present H2S in waste
gas and SO2 given in U 100 while they have the common chimney.
2.1.5 Elemir Gas refinery

Elemir Refinery is a gas-type refinery which produces natural gas, Liquefied Petroleum Gas
(LPG) and gasoline. It is designed by J.F. PRICHAR & COMPANY, 4625 ROANOKE PARKWAU,
CANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, USA and delivered by EDWIN & COMPANY (OLDBURY) LIMITED
BIRMINGHAM ENGLAND Desing-Engineering Job No IN-1776. The refinery is located in
Elemir and was commissioned in 1963.
The natural gas from fields Mokrin, Srpska Crnja and Rusanda is a main feed for Refinery
and the main products are:
• Propane, 45 t/day
• n-Butane, 34 t/day
• isobutene, 38 t/day
• Debutanizer gasoline, 60 t/day
• Process oil, 5 t/day and
• Gasoline, Gt 4,2 t/day.
2.1.5.2 Location description
Micro location of the refinery

Elemir Refinery is located 3 km north-east from small town Elemir and 10 km from the town
Zrenjanin in Vojvodina and belongs to Srednje-banatski province (see Figure 15 and Figure
16 for location of Zrenjanin in Serbia and location of Elemir).
Zrenjanin Municipality covers 1.324 km2, out of which 112.340 ha is agricultural area and
1.392 ha are under forest. The Zrenjanin region has 22 inhabited locations with total
approximately 132.051 inhabitants.
page 40
Figure 15: Location of Zrenjanin in Serbia

Elemir Refinery lays down on 42ha, it is the flat area and the wider surrounding is basin. The
closest houses are in the area of 1km.
The closes industrial facilities are: NIS Petrol storage area, HIP Petrohemija – Factory of
syntactic cauchuck, filling station and distribution unit of LPG of NIS TNG a.d, and main
regulating node for natural gas transportation GRČ Elemir JP Srbijagas. Map of roads is
shown on Figure 17.
In the close environment it could be between 100 to 500 people. There are no public
buildings, schools or hospitals in the surrounding.
Figure 16: Location of Zrenjanin and Elemir
page 41
Figure 17: Map of roads
Micro location of Elemir Gas refinery

General plan of the refinery is given on including position of each unit or building within the
refinery.
Legend:
1. Process unit 4. Separator 7. Control room

2. Process furnace 5. Workshop 8. Boiler
3. Compressor unit 6. Generator building 9. Storage area
page 42
10. Main building 17. Low flare 24. Washing area

11. Tanks for process oil 18. Water preparation unit 25. Cooling towers
12. Trafo station 19 Earth laguna 26. Spare parts storage
13. Production tanks 20. Separator of oil water 27. Firefighting water
retention
14. Filling station for tracks 21. Workshop 28. Main gate
15. Firefighting center 22. Storage of auxiliary
fluids
16. Laboratory 23. Technical gases storage
Geological, meteorological and other data

Air temperature
In the winter period the cold air from north causes significant decrease of temperature, while
the cold air from Carpathian brings dry, windy and cold weather. In springs southwest flows
are dominant causing temperature increase. On east, northeast and southeast cold air
appears mostly in the cold part of the year.
Table 3 and Table 4 show statistical data on metro parameters in Zrenjanin region in the
period 1991 to 2004.
In summers cold air from the north causes bad weather and storms. Cold air is getting fast
worm from the earth and transforms in continental warm air. In June, when southwest winds
blow in high region, the cold air spread in Pannonia, the weather development ends up with
storms.
Table 20: Statistical data on monthly weather parameters for Zrenjanin region
JAN FEB MAR APR MAJ JUN JUL AVG SEP OKT NOV DEC
Tsr(°С) 0.3 2.0 6.5 11.7 17.5 20.8 22.3 22.3 16.8 11.9 6.3 0.8
Tx(°С) 3.3 6.6 12.2 17.3 23.4 26.7 28.3 28.9 23.1 17.7 10.3 3.8
Tn(°С) -2.5 -2.0 1.7 6.4 11.4 14.7 16.0 16.1 11.6 7.3 3.0 -1.9
ApsTx(°С) 17.7 20.2 27.7 30.1 33.5 38.0 38.7 38.7 34.2 30.0 23.6 14.9
ApsTn(°С) -24.6 -17.9 -12.6 -6.7 -0.2 6.0 6.5 7.2 2.2 -8.6 -10.5 -23.1
b.d.mraz 20.9 17.6 11.2 2.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 8.2 19.1
b.d.trops. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.9 7.4 11.8 12.6 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0
U(%) 84 76 67 66 63 65 65 64 71 75 80 85
SS(h) 65.9 120.6 164.3 187.4 251.4 285.4 287.3 284.4 204.0 158.1 89.1 58.6
b.d.vedrih 2.9 5.9 5.4 4.2 5.6 6.5 9.1 11.9 6.0 6.2 4.1 2.8
b.d.tmurnih 14.7 8.4 7.6 8.9 6.4 4.3 4.1 3.8 5.6 6.9 12.0 16.0
RR(mm) 34.3 24.1 26.1 45.9 51.0 81.9 66.5 39.3 62.2 51.5 52.8 50.4
maxRR(mm) 30.7 20.4 22.9 30.4 52.5 62.5 72.3 49.1 60.0 45.9 47.5 44.2
rr>0.1(mm) 10.9 8.7 8.8 11.4 11.4 11.7 10.2 7.7 11.0 8.9 10.8 11.8
rr>10(mm) 1.1 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.0 2.5 1.7 1.2 2.0 1.1 1.8 1.3
b.d.sneg 5.0 5.3 2.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.9 5.1
b.d.s.p. 11.3 7.6 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 8.4
b.d.grad 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Table 21: Statistical data on seasons weather parameters for Zrenjanin region
GOD PRO LET JES ZIM VEG
Tsr(°С) 11.6 11.9 21.8 11.7 1.0 17.6

Tx(°С) 16.8 17.6 28.0 17.0 4.6 23.6
Tn(°С) 6.8 6.5 15.6 7.3 -2.1 11.9
ApsTx(°С) 38.7
ApsTn(°С) -24.6
page 43
b.d.mraz 82.0 13.5 0.0 10.9 57.6 5.0

b.d.trops. 35.7 2.0 31.8 1.9 0.0 35.7
U(%) 72 65 65 75 82 67
SS(h) 2156.5 603.1 857.1 451.2 245.1 1658.0
b.d.vedrih 70.6 15.2 27.5 16.3 11.6 49.5

b.d.tmurnih 98.7 22.9 12.2 24.5 39.1 40.0
RR(mm) 586.0 123.0 187.7 166.5 108.8 398.3

maxRR(mm) 72.3
rr>0.1(mm) 123.3 31.6 29.6 30.7 31.4 72.3
rr>10(mm) 16.0 3.0 5.4 4.9 2.7 10.8
b.d.sneg 19.9 2.5 0.0 2.0 15.4 0.5
b.d.s.p. 31.8 1.6 0.0 2.9 27.3 0.1
b.d.grad 1.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.9
Legend:
Tsr (°С) air average temperature (°С)
Tx (°С) average max. air temperature (°С)
Tn (°С) average minimal air temperature (°С)
ApsTx (°С) absolute max air temperature (°С)
ApsTn (°С) absolute minimal air temperature (°С)
b.d.mraz number of ice days Tn< 0°C
b.d.trops. number of tropical days Tx≥30°C
U (%) relative air humidity u %
SS (h) sunshine in hours
b.d. vedrih number of clear days
b.d. tmurnih number of sunshade days
RR (mm) precipitation (mm)
maxRR(mm) daily max. precipitation (mm)
rr>0.1(mm) number of days with precipitation ≥ 0.1 mm
rr>10(mm) number of days with precipitation ≥10.0 mm
b.d.sneg number of days with snow
b.d.s.p. number of days with show ?
b.d.grad broj dana sa gradom
Cloudiness and sun

Analysis of weather seasons has shown that the smallest cloudiness is in August (3.5/10 of
the sky, 35%). December has the most clouds (77%). The average yearly cloudiness. e.g.
average daily cloudiness is 4.4/10, e.g 55%.
Comparing with the length of the sunshine in individual seasons it may be concluded that
sunshine in summers is 850.6 hours e.g 63.1% of potential, in winters only 226.7 hours e.g.
26.7 of potential. In vegetation period average sunshine isi1506.1 hours or 58.4 of potential.
Fog
The average number of fogy days in a year in Zrenjanin region is 22.4 days or 6.1%. Fog
appears in every month but the most often it appears in December, average 5.6 days
(probability is 18%). Ice days, days with average daily temperature is under 0 o C, most
often appear in January. The average number of icy days in January is 14. t
Relative air humidity

Air temperature distribution based on values of dry and wet thermostat for two months in a
year (July and December) are given in Table 22 and Table 23.
page 44
The average yearly air humidity value in the Zrenjanin region is 78.5%; the lowest monthly
value of daily relative air humidity in July is 69% and the highest in December 85%.
Table 22: Temperature distribution in the region - July
TSv (oC) Tmv (°C) R (%)

7 14> 21 Aver. 7 14 21 Aver. 7 14 21 Aver.
18,1 25,4 19,1 20,5 16,0 18,1 16,4 16,7 80 50 77 69
Table 23: Temperature distribution in the region - December
TSv (oC) Tmv (°C) R (%)

7 14 21 Aver. 7 14 21 Aver. 7 14 21 Aver.
-2,5 1,0 -1,4 -3,0 -3,0 0,0 -1,9 -1,8 85 90 76 85
Air pressure
In Zrenjanin and wider surroundings the air pressure decreases in the period January – April,
and increases. The average value of the air pressure in a year is about 1006 mbar, the
highest is in January, 1010 mbar and lowest in April, 1003 mbar. In October this value is
about 1008 mbar (81 m of see-height).
Precipitation
Average frequency of days with strong precipitation (9.5 mm) is 16,4 days per year, e.g.
13,1% of total number of days with precipitation, what is very law value.
The most of those days appear in May, average 2.2 days, with probability of 7%, and the
lowest number of those days is in October. The highest value was recorded in July. In
summers it happens that one day precipitation is higher then in winter period or in transition
seasons.
Wind
Frequency (%o) and velocity of wind (m/s) are given in Table 24. Weather with no wind
appears mostly in July (91%o), and the lowest freqancy is in February (63%o). The Figure
18 shows “wind rose” for Zrenjanin and this applies for Elemir as well.
Table 24: Frequency and velocity of wind
N NE E SE S SW W NW
Frequency 97 57 80 205 125 77 157 138

Velocity 2.4 1.4 1.9 2.9 2.8 2.1 2.6 2.8
Figure 18: Distribution of relative wind frequencies per year (%)
page 45
Bodies of water and flooding

The level of underground water is 2 – 4 meters. The surface is loam. There was one flooding
in 1998/99. The surrounding area of the establishment has been flooded but not the
establishment. The underground water has been polluted by gasoline because of leaks in the
gasoline pipeline. The relevant pipe has been changed.
Seismic and geological activities
In the area of the establishment there is no specific seismic (Figure 19) or geological risks.
Figure 19: Seismic activities

Activities
Head office of Elemir Refinery

Address:
23208 Elemir Proleterska bb
Telephone:
+ 381 23 758 101 + 381 23 758
Fax:
+ 381 23 738 702
Legal status of the company: part
of the joint-stock company NIS-
Petroleum industry of Serbia
Figure 20: Elemir Gas refinery
Elemir Refinery (Figure 20) is a gas-type refinery which produces natural gas, LPG and
gasoline. It is designed by J.F. PRICHAR COMPANY, 4625 ROANOKE PARKWAU, CANSAS
CITY, MISSOURI, USA and delivered by EDWIN COMPANY (OLDBURY) LIMITED BIRMINGHAM
ENGLAND Desing-Engineering Job No IN-1776.
The refinery was commissioned in 1963. It was the first unit of the kind built in the country,
thus the design standards were the standard of the country that has designed the unit. The
delivery has included: Know-how, license, patents, base engineering and other services. In
the year 1988 reconstruction took place (equipment replacement) with no changes in
technological process. The major outside supplies for RGE and the connected safety
problems are shown in Table 25.
page 46
Table 25: RGE supplies
Type of
Safety problem
supply
There are no safety problems if no electricity will be
delivered. Within less than 5 minutes the internal
Electricity
generator system will take over the supply of
electricity.
Fuel gas No safety problems as the production will stop if no
gas will be delivered
Nitrogen
It will only be used for maintenance
Organization and management system

Elemir Gas Refinery is a part of production division of NIS-Naftagas as shown on NIS-
Naftagas organizational scheme in Annex 11. Total number of employees in RGE is 123.
Qualification structure of employees is given in Table 26.
Table 26: Employees structure in Elemir Refinery
Number of employees
Qualification
RGE Naftagas
PhD /
M.Sc. /
B.Sc. 10 1
College 3
Highly skilled
High-school 43
Skilled 14 45
Elementary school /
Semiskilled /
Unskilled 7
Total 77 46
Responsible for safety aspects in the whole NIS a.d. is the central HSE department of NIS
a.d. and NIS Naftagas Safety department (Department for systematic support - EMS, Safety,
QMS, IMS) and this department is delegating one person to the RGE for HSE duties.
Nevertheless safety is one of the major points of the philosophy of the company.
Management systems are certified and scope of certification is shown in Table 27. Policy
established by top management withing integrated management system is presented in
Annex 12.
Table 27: List of NIS-Naftagas certificates and scope of certification
Evrocert certificates IQ Net certificates

Organizational part
Issue date Number Issue date Number
Research and production 04.12.2003 1081/00 22.12.2003 AT-2808/0

Geophysical Institute 07.12.2003 1052/01 22.12.2003
Drilling 04.12.2003 1055/01 22.12.2003 AT-2840/0

Special works 06.12.2003 1047/01 22.12.2003 AT-3338/0
Maintenance 10.12.2003 1049/01 22.12.2003 AT-2448/0
Transport and building 12.12.2003 1058/01 22.12.2003 AT-3120/0
page 47
Evrocert certificates IQ Net certificates

Organizational part
Issue date Number Issue date Number
Hidrosonda 05.12.2003 1059/01 22.12.2003 AT-3121/0
Drinking water factory “Jazak“ 18.08.2006 1226/00 28.09.2006 AT-00085/0
18.08.2006 1023/00 28.09.2006 AT-05400/0

NIS-NAFTAGAS is founded by the decision of FNRJ Government on 10.02.1949. as a
company for research and crude oil and gas production. Since 31.12.1991. It works within
Petroleum Industry of Serbia.
In 28.09.2005. the Company for research, production, treatment, distribution and trade of
crude oil and its derivates and research and production of gas is founded (Društvo za
istraživanje, proizvodnju, preradu, distribuciju i promet nafte i naftnih derivata i istraživanje i
proizvodnju prirodnog gasa) "NIS" a.d.
NIS-NAFTAGAS is it part dealing with research and production of crude oil, natural gas,
underground water and geothermal energy, engineering in the field of oil industry and design
and construction of facilities.
As for accidents, there was a jet fire in a compressor for fluidisation of Propane (Incoming
pressure 1.6 to 2.8 bar, outgoing pressure 13 to 15 bar). There was a leakage in the
compressor which leads to a jet which was ignited. The fire has been extinguished by closing
the incoming line.
Measures to prevent or mitigate an accident (general)

Organizational measures
There is a major maintenance period once/year. The pressure vessels and columns will have
an inside inspection every three years and every six years the pressure will be tested. This
inspection is based on a national law which is connected with EU regulations.
Safety valves and gas installations have an inspection period of once per year.
Equipment for use in explosive atmosphere has a visual inspection twice a year and an
inspection by external authorized persons every three years.
Constructional measures
underground.
Technical measures
In general the normal protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control
of the protection measure is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the
resistance and continuity will be done.
Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to one accident in the past. At a
top of a small chimney for steam the lightning ignited the steam. The flow has been stopped
and the fire has been extinguished hereby. As a result the instrumentation and control
system has been damaged. This part was not protected by earthing.
Measures to reduce the consequences of an accident (General)
The whole staff has a yearly fire extinguishing training and exercise. The evacuation training
will only be done for a rescue brigade.
Rescue and emergency plans exist partly for the buildings. Fire fighting equipment in RGE is
specified in Table 28. In the case of an accident or a fire the workers will be informed by
sirens to leave the establishment.
The surface is loam. The level of underground water is about 2-4 meters deep. All tanks are
built in basins. A drainage system exists for fire extinguishing water and normal water. The
fire water retention will be done by hydrants connected to two basins (900 and 250 m3).
Fire extinguishing by foam is also possible. A gas detection system has been installed. A fire
detection system is under construction. An automatic fire extinguishing system does not
exist. A system for automatic cooling of the tanks is existing.
page 48
Table 28: Fire fighting equipment
Type Description
3
1. Stable hydrant system 1100 m
2. Stable system for foam 2 m3 of foam
3. Portable systems with S-9 30
4. Portable systems with S-50, 250 10
5. Portable systems with S250 5
6. Portable systems with CO2 10
7. Water guns with foam 3
2.1.5.4 Description of processes

RGE is designed for maximal processing and preparation as follows:
• 1200000 m3/day of natural gas,
• 21.6 t/day of gas condensate and
• 10 t raw gasoline
Main products of the refinery are:
• Propane 45 t/day
• n-Butan 34 t/day
• izo-Butan 38 t/day
• Debutanized gazoline 60 t/day
• Process oil 5 t/day and
• Gazoline Gt 4,2 t/day.
Process may be separated in six main technological operations: separation, dehydration,
absorption, desorption, distillation and rectification.
Natural gas and gas condensate, after separation, go to the dehydration column for drying
with three-ethylene glycol. Dry gas goes for deep cooling and further to the absorption
column where propane, butane, pentene and hexane are absorbed from the natural gas. For
absorption oil is used (150 g/mol).
The processed natural gas is taken from the top of the column. The used absorption oil, with
above mentioned products, goes for stabilization to the de-ethanizer where methane and
ethane are separated from the absorption oil. Further oil goes to distillation where C3 and C8
are distillated and from the column bottom process oil is going out and further heated in the
furnace. This oil is used as a heating fluid in the process unit.
Distillates are condensed and led to the rectification columns where clean components are
derived. In the first rectification column (depropanizer) propane is separated as the pure
component, and the mixture of hydrocarbons from the bottom of the column is led to the
debutanizer. In the second column (debutanizer) the mixture of butane is derived from
debutanizer gasoline on the column bottom. Butane mixture from the debutanizer column
goes to the de-isobutanizer where isobutene is separated from n-butane.
Flow diagram of the refinery is given in Annex 13. Substances present in the refinery are
given in Table 29 and complete description
Table 29: Substances in Elemir Gas refinery
R.br. Substances or group of substances Quantity (t)

1)
30. Verry toxic 5
2)
31. Toxic 10
3)
32. Oxidizing 10
4)
33. Explosive 10
5)
34. Eco toxic 10
page 49
6)
35. Flamable gases 10
7)
36. Slef flamable 50
8)
37. Solid flamable 50
38. Materije koje u dodiru sa vazduhom i vodom 50
9)
39. Verry flamable liquids 1000
10)
40. Flamable liquids 5000
2.2 About RBI / RCM methodology

2.2.1 General
It is commonly accepted that some inspection on the equipment and piping is necessary to
validate the expected condition of the items as well as to assure the integrity of the plant.
However it is difficult to determine exactly how much inspection effort is required. An RBI
analysis assists to determine the required effort by providing three key parameters, the
likelihood of failure of the item, the consequence of failure of the item and the risk from the
combination of likelihood and consequence of failure.
The purpose of a RBI analysis is to focus inspection activities on those pieces of equipment
where failure risks associated with an active damage mechanism are highest.
It should be noted that releases have two main causes, one is failure due to material
degradation, which can be inspected for and the other is a system error, e.g. an operator
error where inspection cannot assist.
Risk based inspection planning is a methodology which prioritizes inspection activities on the
basis of the actual risk reduction associated with each specific activity. It does this through
the following steps:
• Prepare a suitable database
• identify the main active damage mechanisms and possible scenaria – HAZOP analysis
• Perform qualitative Risk-based assessment according to the CEN CWA 15740
• Performed detailed analysis based on API RP 581:2008 - Risk Risk-Based Inspection
Technology
• Calculate the likelihood of failure for each piece of equipment as function of the
different damage mechanisms, the rate of degradation and time in service
• Calculate the consequence of failure associated with each piece of equipment
• Combine the likelihood and the consequence numbers to calculate the risk associated
with each piece of equipment and rank the equipment according to the risk results
• Calculate the reductions achievable in the likelihood of failure through a suitable
inspection program (This is achieved by removing the uncertainty in the actual rate
of degradation or condition of the item and thus reducing the chance of failure)
• Develop the inspection program based on the inspection costs versus the inspection
benefits.
2.2.2 Preparation of data base

The summaries of process description and PFDs for each plant were first reviewed to obtain a
preliminary understanding of the process and the equipment functions. The equipment and
piping items were identified from the PFDs.
Each item was entered in the master workspace in process order. This database was
supported by piping specifications, equipment data sheets, process stream compositions,
operating conditions and other relevant documents. The preparation of this database was an
extensive process.
The datasheets in Excel format were used to gather the data. The key data are also marked
on the PFDs for easy reference.
page 50
Figure 21: Framework of RIMAP procedure within the overall management system
page 51
Figure 22: Methodology and application of detailed RBI
2.2.3 Identifying the Damage Mechanisms

The damage mechanisms of interest are those which develop over a period of time, gradually
weakening the pressure boundary integrity of components until failure is predicted. These
damage mechanisms include internal corrosion and external damage under insulation.
Damage mechanisms for the process units were identified based on supplied data, interviews
with the staff, standard industry process knowledge and using the API documents, together
with R-Tech material and corrosion expertise.
The following “inspectable” active or potentially active damage mechanisms have been
identified and the corrosion circuits are also developed.
The potential damage mechanisms include:
• External Damage (Corrosion under insulation) – CUI

• Internal thinning (generalized / Localized thinning)
• Fatigue damage on the piping systems
• Creep and other elevated temperature related damage mechanisms
• Potential of brittle fracture in the process parts operating under temperatures below
the ambient temperatures
2.2.4 Calculating the Likelihood of Failure

The likelihood of failure of a piece of equipment or pipe is a direct function of the nature and
rate of the degradation mechanisms to which it is subjected. The essential steps are to:
page 52
• Identify the damage mechanism(s)

• Predict the rate of degradation
• Assess the inspection history
Consider the age (Note - in this study a (5) years look ahead was made to give a risk profile
for June 2012), this is to identify equipment with risk that could exceed the inspection
targets between the upcoming and the following plant shut down.
When the likelihood of failure is being assessed, the calculation routine is based on the
simple premise that unexpected catastrophic failures occur when degradation happens faster
than expected. The routine therefore looks at the “what if” scenarios of the corrosion rate
being either twice or even four times the predicted rate and calculates the likelihood of
failure compared with the operational conditions.
It also takes into account the current confidence in the condition based on the nature of the
inspections previously performed and their ability to characterize the extent and rate of the
different damage mechanisms.
These factors are combined by the software to produce a value for the likelihood of failure for
each damage mechanism. This is expressed as a Likelihood Factor, which is a number to be
applied to the generic failure frequency of the particular item. If no damage mechanisms
have been identified, the Likelihood Factor may be 0.5 indicating that the component is 50%
less likely to fail than the industry average for such components. If a severe damage
mechanism is found and the item has not been thoroughly inspected for some time the
Likelihood Factor may be in the thousands indicating that the component may be much more
likely to fail than the industry average and that an inspection is needed urgently.
The general approach is to address those items in the order of the decreasing Likelihood
Factor, as indicated in Table 30.
Table 30: Proposed action for different category of Likelihood Factor
Likelihood Factor
Action
Value
Immediate action should be taken, prioritised by risk. Select
the highest risk item with a value in this range and perform
Likelihood Factor appropriate action. A first step should always be careful
>1000 checking of the input data for errors. If this does not resolve
the problem, a highly effective inspection appropriate to the
damage mechanism should be performed.
100<Likelihood
Address these items next, again prioritizing by risk.
Factor<1000
10<Likelihood
Address these items next, again prioritizing by risk.
Factor<100
Address these items last. Since values in this range indicate
a potential, but not necessarily severe, problem. Action on
1<Likelihood these items may be delayed until all other items have been
Factor<10 addressed or until a convenient time, such as a scheduled
shutdown within the time frame considered in the RBI
analysis.
2.2.5 Calculating the Consequence of Failure

Based on the process flow diagrams (PFDs) and discussion with the risk & process engineers,
each item of equipment was assigned to an inventory group. This group represents the fluid
that could escape in the event of a leak at any one of the items in the group. Each
equipment item is then associated with two inventories, it’s own and the group inventory.
The consequences are calculated taking into account the nature and amount of the fluid
released. The amount and rate of fluid released depends upon factors such as the size of the
hole, the fluid viscosity and density and the operating pressure. The rupture of a large
diameter high-pressure pipe or vessel obviously has a different consequence than a pinhole
leak at a small diameter low-pressure pipe and this method quantifies that difference.
Each piece of equipment or piping has a certain generic (industry average) probability of
failing either by a pinhole type leak, a medium size hole, a large hole or a rupture. The
page 53
consequence of each type of failure is calculated and combined with the probability for that
failure; to calculate the overall risk associated with each piece of equipment.
2.2.6 Determine the Financial Consequences

There are many costs associated with any failure of equipment in a process plant. These
include, but are not limited to:
• Cost of equipment repair and replacement
• Cost of damage to surrounding equipment in affected areas
• Costs associated with production losses and business interruption as a result of
downtime to repair or replace damaged equipment
• Costs due to potential injuries associated with a failure
• Environmental cleanup costs
The approach used in API RBI is to consider all of these costs on both an equipment specific
basis and an affected area basis. Thus, any failure (loss of containment) has costs associated
with it, even when the release of the hazardous material does not result in damage to other
equipment in the unit or serious injury to personnel. Recognizing and using this fact presents
a more realistic value of the consequences associated with a failure. Since the costs include
more than just business interruption, the approach used for quantitative API RBI analysis is
called the financial consequence approach.
The financial consequence of a loss of containment and subsequent release of hazardous
materials can be determined by adding up the individual costs discussed above:
FC=FC cmd+FC affa+FC prod+FCinj+FCenviron
The basic method of risk analysis as presented in API RBI is not changed for the financial risk
analysis. The risk is still calculated as the consequence of failure (now expressed as cost in
dollars) times the probability of failure.
For a rigorous and flexible analysis, the consequences (costs) are evaluated at the hole size
level. Risk is also evaluated at the release hole size level by using the probability of failure
associated with each release hole size. The total risk is calculated as the sum of the risks of
each release hole size.
2.2.7 Calculating the Risk

This is now a very simple step, where the risk associated with each piece of equipment is
essentially given by the formula:
RISK = Likelihood of Failure x Consequence of Failure
The risk is the combination of two key terms:
• Likelihood of failure and
• Consequence of failure
Understanding the two-dimensional aspect of risk allows new insight into the use of risk as
an inspection prioritization tool.
The consequences are calculated based on fluid properties, temperatures, pressures and
inventory.
The likelihood is based on “generic” or “average” failure frequency data.
An analysis is then performed considering important failure mechanisms for each piece of
equipment to determine if it is more, or less likely to fail than average. The result is then
used to modify the likelihood of failure in this study. The consequence and the likelihood are
then combined to give a risk value for each piece of equipment.
A high-risk item may be high risk due to either a high likelihood of failure or a low
consequence of failure or conversely a high consequence of failure and a low likelihood of
failure.
An inspection program can only influence the value of the likelihood of failure, not the
consequence. No matter how much inspection is performed the consequence is unchanged.
Therefore, where a high-risk item is driven by the consequence value, other actions such as
more precise analysis such as Quantitative Risk Assessment and upgrading of mitigation
system may be considered.
page 54
The overall ranking is then done according to the RIMAP risk matrix, shown in the Figure 23.
Alternatively, the risk can be represented in the NIS risk matrix, as shown in Figure 24.
Figure 23: CEN CWA 15740 (RIMAP) Risk Matrix
Figure 24: NIS risk matrix
2.2.8 Remaining life assessment

The remaining life for the equipment and piping items based on the hoop stress was
performed according to the recommendations given in the API 581 BRD, and Steinbes R-
page 55
Tech Software iRIS-Petrol has been used for the analysis. It accounts for both internal
thinning and external corrosion rates. The remaining life is calculated as follows:
1. First, determine the Minimum Wall Thickness (tmin) to be used.
There are 3 options available for specifying this tmin:
• using the Design Corrosion Allowance taken from design documents (which is a
default option)
• using User-defined Minimum Thickness taken from local codes or other
considerations such as structural stability.
• using Calculated Minimum Thickness which is based on ASME code formula:
2. Determine the Remaining Corrosion Allowance where:
in which,
Initial Corrosion Allowance is determined from step (1)

and
Total Wall Loss = Internal Wall Loss + External Wall Loss
3. The Nominal Remaining Life is then calculated as follows:
NomRemLife = (RemCorrAllow) / (Total Corrosion Rate)
in which,
Total Corrosion Rate = Internal Thinning Rate + External Corrosion Rate
Steinbeis R-Tech iRIS-Petro also provides an alternative calculation for remaining life known
as the probabilistic remaining life. It is based on a weighted average of the nominal
remaining life for all possible thinning scenarios.
For internal thinning, 3 states are assumed and the probabilistic remaining life equation is as
follows:
Whereby
State i = 1, is when the thinning rate is as given by the user
State i = 2, is when the thinning rate is 2 times the given rate
State i = 3, is when the thinning rate is 4 times the given rate
Pi is the probability of state i.
(Nominal Remaining Life)i is the remaining life calculated for state i.
A more complex equation is used when external thinning is included or where liner is
involved.
2.2.9 Developing an inspection plan

The key piece of data for the development of an inspection plan is the Likelihood Factor. The
Likelihood Factor for each piece of equipment is a composite i.e.
Likelihood Factor (LF) = LFThinning + LFCUI(ClSCC) +……
page 56
Since an inspection needs to be tailored to fit the particular type of damage expected at a
particular piece of equipment, the key considerations are:
• High total Likelihood Factors
• High overall risks

• The Likelihood Factor per damage type.
• Short or zero probabilistic remaining life.
As agreed with NIS, inspection planning targets are adopted for this inspection planning. For
each equipment item, the driving damage mechanism is identified for inspection. Based on
the inspection planning targets the Likelihood Factor for the relevant driving damage
mechanism is then reduced by assigning appropriate number and effectiveness of inspection.
This is generated by software as inspection.
The actual inspection scope to satisfy the assigned effectiveness is then developed based on
API inspection guideline for each relevant damage mechanisms, as given in the tables below.
Table 31: Effectiveness of Inspection for General Thinning
Inspection
Effectiveness Intrusive Inspection Non-intrusive Inspection
Category
50-100% examination of the
50-100% ultrasonic scanning
A surface (partial) internals
coverage (automated or manual)
Highly Effective removed) and accompanied by
or profile radiography
thickness measurements
Normally 20% ultrasonic scanning
Normally 20% examination (no
coverage (automated or manual),
B internals removed), and spot
or profile radiography, or external
Usually Effective external ultrasonic thickness
spot thickness (statistically
measurements
validated)
2-3% examination, spot external
C Visual examination without ultrasonic thickness
Fairly Effective thickness measurements measurements, and little or no
internal visual examination
Several thickness measurements,
D External spot thickness readings
and a documented inspection
Poorly Effective only
planning system
Several thickness measurements
E taken only externally, and a
No inspection
Ineffective poorly documented inspection
planning system
Table 32: Effectiveness of Inspection for Localized Thinning
Inspection
Category
50-100% coverage using
100% visual examination (with
automated ultrasonic scanning, or
A removal of internal packing,
profile radiography in areas
Highly Effective trays, etc.) and thickness
specified by a corrosion engineer
measurements
or other knowledgeable specialist
20% coverage using automated
100% visual examination (with ultrasonic scanning, or 50%
B partial removal of the internals) manual ultrasonic scanning, or
Usually Effective including manways, nozzles, etc. 50% profile radiography in areas
and thickness measurements specified by a corrosion engineer
page 57
Inspection
Category
Nominally 20% coverage using
automated or manual ultrasonic
Nominally 20% visual scanning, or profile radiography,
C
examination and spot ultrasonic and spot thickness measurements
Fairly Effective
thickness measurements at areas specified by a corrosion
engineer or other knowledgeable
specialist
Spot ultrasonic thickness
measurements or profile
D
No inspection radiography without areas being
Poorly Effective
specified by a corrosion engineer
Spot ultrasonic thickness
measurements without areas
E
No inspection being specified by a corrosion
Ineffective
engineer or other knowledgeable
specialist
Table 33: CUI for Carbon and Low Alloy Steels Inspection Categories
Inspection
Insulation Insulation Not
Effectiveness
Removed Removed
Category
Remove >95% of the insulation
AND For the total surface area:
A
Highly Effective visual inspection of the exposed >95% profile or real-time
surface area with follow-up by radiography
UT, RT or pit gauge is required
For the total surface area:
> 95% external visual
inspection prior to removal
of insulation
> 95% external visual inspection
AND
B AND
remove >60% of total surface
Usually Effective area of insulation including follow-up with profile or real time
suspect areas radiography of >60% of total
surface area of insulation
AND
including suspect areas
visual inspection of the exposed
surface area with follow-up by
UT, RT or pit gauge as required
> 95% external visual
inspection prior to removal
of insulation
>95% external visual inspection
AND
C AND
remove >30% of total surface
Fairly Effective area of insulation including follow-up with profile or real time
suspect areas radiography of >30% of total
surface area of insulation
AND
including suspect areas
D >95% external visual inspection For the total surface area:
page 58
Inspection
Insulation Insulation Not
Effectiveness
Removed Removed
Category
Poorly Effective prior to removal of >95% external visual inspection
insulation AND
AND follow-up with profile or real time
remove >5% of total surface radiography of >5% of total
area of insulation including surface area of insulation
suspect areas including suspect areas
AND
<5% insulation removal and
inspection No inspection or ineffective
E
OR inspection technique or <95%
Ineffective
no inspection or ineffective visual inspection
inspection technique
Table 34: CUI for Stainless Steels Inspection Categories
Inspection
Intrusive Non-intrusive
Effectiveness
Inspection Inspection
Category
No inspection techniques yet
A 95% dye penetrant or eddy available meet requirements of
Highly Effective current test with UT follow-up of "A".
relevant indications.
For the total surface area: > 95% automated or manual
B 60% dye penetrant or eddy ultrasonic scanning
Usually Effective current testing with UT follow-up OR
of all relevant indications. AE testing with 100% follow-up of
relevant indications.
> 30% dye penetrant or eddy For the total surface area:
C
Fairly Effective current testing with UT >67% automated or manual
follow-up of all relevant ultrasonic scanning
indications.
For the total surface area: For the total surface area:
>5% dye penetrant or eddy >30% automated or manual
D current testing with UT ultrasonic scanning
Poorly Effective follow-up of all relevant OR
indications
>60% radiographic testing
Less than “D” effectiveness or Less than “D” effectiveness or no
E
no inspection or ineffective inspection or ineffective inspection
Ineffective
inspection technique used technique used
Table 35: Inspection Effectiveness for External Damage
Inspection
Effectiveness Inspection
Category
A Visual inspection of >95% of the exposed surface area with
Highly Effective follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required
page 59
B Visual inspection of >60% of the exposed surface area with

Usually Effective follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required
C Visual inspection of >30% of the exposed surface area with
Fairly Effective follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required
D Visual inspection of >5% of the exposed surface area with
Poorly Effective follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required
E Visual inspection of <5% of the exposed surface area with
Ineffective follow-up by UT, RT or pit gauge as required
Table 36: Guidelines for Assigning Inspection Effectiveness for Furnace Tube
Inspection
Effectiveness Inspection
Category
Visual inspection, UT thickness measurements of all tubes and
A
strapping at UT measurement locations. FMR at various
Highly Effective
locations
B
Visual inspection, UT thickness measurements of all tubes
Usually Effective
C Visual inspection with UT thickness measurements of 75% of the
Fairly Effective tubes
D
Visual inspection with spot UT measurements
Poorly Effective
E
Visual
Ineffective
2.2.10 Software used

Software used for analysis, R-Tech iRIS-Petro RBI, is fully based on API methodology and
recommendadtion contained in the document API RP 581 Risk Based Inspection Technology,
Second edition (see references [1]).
The software is used for assessment of the risk on equipment/subequipment level and for
developing and evaluating inspection plan and strategies.
Software is described in Chapter 3, together with instructions for the users.
2.3 General about HSE (HAZOP, Seveso II) methodology

2.3.1 HAZOP
The HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) technique provides a means of systematically reviewing
the design and operation of a system to identify the potential occurrence of hazardous
events (impacts on people, property, or the environment), or operability problems (impacts
on process efficiency or productivity). It is based on the premise that a hazard is not realized
if the process is always operated within its design intent.
The HAZOP technique involves structured brainstorming to look for deviations from the
design intent. Structure is provided by the use of a set of guidewords. The guidewords are
applied to various aspects of the design intent, i.e. process parameters, to develop
deviations. The team determines if the deviation could realistically occur and, if there are
realistic causes, evaluates whether the consequences are significant, as defined by the scope
of the study.
The team may then evaluate whether existing safeguards are adequate considering the
causes and consequences of the deviation. The safeguards may be either in the form of
hardware or procedures. In some cases, the team may make recommendations for corrective
action, for study to determine an optimal solution, or for additional investigation to
determine whether a problem exists that warrants action.
The primary objective of the classical form of HAZOP study is the identification of problems
or possible accident scenarios. This information alone is not sufficient to make decisions on
page 60
what should be done. It is useful if a simple risk estimate can be provided for each problem
in order to provide a basis for deciding on the best allocation of resources to address key
problems. Consequently HAZOP-PC provides a means for qualitatively estimating the
likelihood and severity of each problem identified in order to develop a risk estimate.
HAZOP studies can be performed for new plants where the design is nearly firm and
documented, or for existing plants where a significant redesign is planned, or where no
previous study has been performed. HAZOP studies can be conducted not just for processes
but also for storage, transportation, and other systems.
While the HAZOP technique is the most comprehensive hazard analysis method of those
available, it cannot provide complete assurance that all hazards have been identified.
HAZOP Team
HAZOP team members need to be knowledgeable of the process and its operation, at least
some of the team should come from the operating facility. A typical team may consist of the
following members:
• Team Leader
• Process Engineer
• Operations Supervisor
• Safety Engineer
• Maintenance/Inspection Supervisor
• Facilities/Mechanical Engineer
HAZOP Process
Typical HAZOP process is illustrated on the Figure 25.
page 61
Figure 25: Flowchart of HAZOP Process
2.3.2 Seveso II Directive

The Seveso II Directive is based on Article 174 (ex-Article 130s) of the EC Treaty. It is
important to mention that, according to Article 176 (ex-Article 130t) of the EC Treaty,
Member States can maintain or adopt stricter measures than those contained in the Seveso
II Directive.
The aim of the Seveso II Directive is two-fold. Firstly, the Directive aims at the prevention of
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances. Secondly, as accidents do continue
to occur, the Directive aims at the limitation of the consequences of such accidents not only
for man (safety and health aspects) but also for the environment (environmental aspect).
Both aims should be followed with a view to ensuring high levels of protection throughout the
Community in a consistent and effective manner.
The scope of the Seveso II Directive is solely to the presence of dangerous substances in
establishments. It covers both, industrial "activities" as well as the storage of dangerous
chemicals. The Directive can be viewed as inherently providing for three levels of
proportionate controls in practice, where larger quantities mean more controls.
A company who holds a quantity of dangerous substance less than the lower threshold levels
given in the Directive is not covered by this legislation but will be proportionately controlled
by general provisions on health, safety and the environment provided by other legislation
which is not specific to major-accident hazards. Companies who hold a larger quantity of
dangerous substance, above the lower threshold contained in the Directive, will be covered
by the lower tier requirements. Companies who hold even larger quantities of dangerous
substance (upper tier establishments), above the upper threshold contained in the Directive,
will be covered by all the requirements contained within the Directive.
The Directive was amended again in December 2003.
The key elements of preparation of a Seveso assessment are described in the Table 37.
Table 37: Typical steps for a Seveso assessment study
Item
Section heading Summary Comments
No.
Summary of findings and
Executive
1 intended methods of control of
summary
accidents and hazards
Must cover the plant features,
process and layout, and if
Description of plant, special
Introduction and nearby to populated areas
2 features and any limits to the
overview must describe issues in local
scope of the Seveso assessment.
communities that may impact
hazard management.
Methodology – the
Outline of the approach taken by
hazards and This section describes the
the assessment team to
3 effects assessment methodology
illustrate a rigorous approach
management undertaken.
and use of appropriate data.
process
A listing of the hazards that
apply to the plant under
assessment.
In addition to the identification A key first step to describe
Hazard of the major accident hazards, what accidents and hazards
4
identification study the safety-critical elements and apply to the plant being
performance standards (i.e. the assessed.
manner in which the “safety
critical” elements perform in the
context of the major hazard).
page 62
Item
Section heading Summary Comments
No.
Many HAZID exercises are
A supporting list of typical
carried out using a
hazards to assist the
5 Hazard checklist “brainstorming” team review,
comprehensive review of
the checklist is a very useful
applicable hazards.
element to support this review.
A term used in the UK as a
short-hand description but the
A further description of the
step to identify the “safety
safety critical elements (those
Safety-critical critical elements” (SCEs) is a
6 items that help to protect the
elements key identification of the
plant and adjacent
valuable systems used to
communities).
prevent, detect, control or
mitigate the incidents.
A collation exercise of the
Setting of Formal statement of the performance measures
7 performance performance required for the required to be in place to
standards “safety systems” for this plant. enable the SCEs to do their job
effectively.
Usually making use of a generic
Qualitative risk risk matrix, a risk ranking table Assigning risk levels against
8
assessment of the identified risk associated each identified hazard.
with the plant.
Often based on corporate
A section stating the grouped
standards adopted by the plant
acceptance criteria, covering not
operators.
just safety issues but also,
May be already completed,
9 Risk tolerability ecological and amenity
otherwise will require a
consequences criteria plus
“search” of standards accepted
environmental performance and
by the plant operator and
manageability criteria.
collating values.
The means by which the plant
A section describing the manner
operators demonstrate to their
in which the plant’s
regulators and corporate
Demonstration of management intend to manage
management that the hazards
10 major hazards the identified major hazards and
foreseen on the plant will be
management identifying a range of HSE
able to be controlled in some
critical tasks, (in order to
manner by the HSE
prioritise effort and budgets).
management systems in place.
Noting that the management
approaches will require effort to
Escape, be assigned to manage escape,
11 evacuation and evacuation and rescue of
rescue affected personnel on the plant
and adjacent affected
communities.
2.4 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Pancevo Refinery

2.4.1 The scope of analysis
According to the plan for Package B, a
page 63
List of components
2.5 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Novi Sad Refinery
2.6 RBI / RCM Analysis and results for Elemir Refinery

2.6.1 Executive summary
The overall proposed inspection plan for the equipment based on screening results (Table 10
API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for year 2009), shows overall reduction of
almost 50% of equipment to be inspected pro year in next 3 years.
On the other hand, about 10% of equipment has to be inspected more intensively with more
adequate methods and scope than it was practiced so far.
page 64
Figure 26: Results of API Qualitative Analysis Component based applied on RGE equipment
5 0 - 0%
D-4 D-6 D-7 E-

D-5 E-102 E- 101/A E-101/B D-1 D-2 T-7 T-
4 18 - 72%
110 T-5 E-1A/B E-2 T-4 9
L
T-6 T-8
I
K
E
L
3 D-27A T-1 2 - 8%
I
H
O
O
D
2 D-300 T-101 T-2 D-102 T-3 5 - 20%
1 0 - 0%
A B C D E
0 - 0% 5 - 20% 14 - 56% 6 - 24% 0 - 0% 25
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 27: Results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis Component based applied on
selected RGE equipment
page 65
2.6.2 Introduction
2.6.2.1 Objective
The objective of the study was to assess the risk profile of the RGE equipment through the
application of the Risk based inspection methodology and to prioritize equipment for
inspection. Moreover, the goal was to demonstrate the applicability of the overall approach
to the NIS units.
2.6.2.2 Scope
The scope of the RBI study covered all the equipment items and related piping as originally
agreed prior to the project.
Figure 28: Component count for RBI analysis of Elemir Refinery
Number of
Component type
items
Pressure vessel 41
Condenser, Shell 17
Heat Exchanger, Shell 13
Column Top 10
Filter 7
Furnace Tubes (general) 6
Other Equipment 5
Heat Exchanger, Tube Side 4
The scope of work covered the following activities:

1. Understanding the system
This includes activities like HAZOP analysis, review of design assumptions, process
flow diagrams, P& IDs, survey of all maintenance, inspection documents (location,
nature and criticality of flaws, thickness measurements, corrosion rates etc.), repair
and modification records, operating conditions, PSV settings, stream data, materials
of fabrication, vessel coating and insulation details. Review of financial data
including cost of plant shut down and averages cost of process plant.
2. Preparation of Simplified Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) with all data essential to
the RBI analysis of the equipment items.
3. Development of corrosion circuits and determination of expert corrosion rates.
4. Data entry and analysis using Steinbeis R-Tech iRIS-Petrol software.
5. Preparation of documentation of corrosion rates and assessment of damage
mechanisms and mode of failure.
6. Review of inspection records.
page 66
7. RBI analysis and results checking.

8. Preparation of RBI analysis report.
2.6.2.3 Deliverables
The deliverables of the RBI project include:
1) Database of equipment for the process units studied.
2) RBI analysis report for the units include the followings:
a) Six (6) sets of process flow diagrams showing the basic information used in the
analysis.
b) Inspection plan guidelines for selected ‘high risk items’ based on a plan period
agreed with RGE. This consist of tables and reports indicating the overall risk,
likelihood and consequence factors, the recommended inspection methods and
coverage for each equipment item and the active or potential damage
mechanisms identified per equipment item.
c) The assumptions and conclusions of the RBI analysis.
2.6.3 Methodology
General details on applied RBI / RCM methodology and HAZOP are presented in Chapter 2.2
of this report.
A HAZOP study is performed by a HAZOP team, consisting of experienced engineers and
operating personnel from appropriate disciplines, facilitated by an independent chairman
experienced in the use of the HAZOP methodology. The team may include representation
from both the design contractor and from their client who is to operate and maintain the
facility. Typically the team may include process engineers, project engineers, electrical &
instrument engineers, maintenance engineers and senior operating personnel. Other
specialists may be drafted in to the meeting when appropriate.
The HAZOP review is normally based on P&IDs of the planned facility, while PFDs, Cause and
Effect Diagrams, Hazardous Area Classification drawings and Layout Drawings may also be
used to provide additional information. During a HAZOP, the P&IDs will be broken down in to
logical sub-systems (nodes), which may be a vessel, a line interconnecting equipments, or
some other logical sub-system.
The HAZOP technique involves the following steps:
1. Identify the node to be studied.
2. Define the design intent of the node and the normal operating parameters.
3. Apply a HAZOP deviation (e.g. NO/LESS FLOW) to the node.
4. Identify all possible causes for the deviation.
5. Identify for each cause all possible consequences, without regard for the
safeguards in place.
6. Identify all available safeguards to prevent the cause or to limit the
consequences.
7. Recommend any new safeguards where judged necessary.
8. Repeat steps 4 to 7, using the next HAZOP deviation.
9. Repeat steps 3 to 8 until all HAZOP deviations have been applied to the
node.
10. Select the next node to be studied, repeating steps 1 to 9.
Steps 3 and 4 are repeated until all the guide-words have been applied and discussed and
the team is satisfied that all meaningful deviations have been considered. The team then
goes back to Step 1 and repeats the process for the next section or node. Figure 3illustrates
the normal workflow of a HAZOP study.
When a recommendation was proposed, the risk was ranked based on consequences and
frequency, using the COMPANY Risk Ranking Matrix.
2.6.4 Performed activities

In order to be able to perform the given analysis, the following activities have taken place:
1. Training in RBI methodology and presentation of qualitative methods during the
Training RBI from October 30 to November 3 2006
2. First Certification RBI on November 27, 2006
page 67
3. Complete implementation of the qualitative assessment tool in a form of Web-based

software tool (see Figure 8)
a) Integration of the software tool in the project web site (Figure 29)
http://www.risknis.risk-technologies.com
4. Export facility in the software in order to allow offline completion of the questionnaire
(example of offline questionnaire is given in Error! Reference source not found.)
5. Basic demonstration of the methodology and training in Stuttgart, December 2007,
O. Tot, D. Subotin
6. Data collection and assessment performed by NIS RGE team, extended with the
representatives of NIS, RNP and RNS in two sessions:
a. October 2008
b. December 2008
Figure 29: Project web site – Tools and analysis

List of inputs
1. Input PFD diagrams from RGE
2. Description of the process and systems as discussed during the Workshop
Dec. 2007
3. Detailed process analysis – December 2008
4. Detailed data collection for the selected equipment types – October and
December 2008
5. Answers to the NIS BRD questionnaire – June 2007 – March 2008
6. Management system evaluation, last performed in June 2008
7. Overview of inspection results for the given equipment – December 2008
2.6.5 Unit and process description

General description of Elemir Gas refinery is given in Chapter 2.1.5.
Here are repeated and grouped main data.
Purpose of the unit/plant – natural gas refining – separation of the higher fractions of the
carbon hydrates from the lighter ones.
Feed: natural gas
page 68
Outputs: refined gas, Propane 45 t/day, n-Butane 34 t/day, iso-Butane 38 t/day,

Debutanised gasoline 60 t/day, process oil 5 t/day and Gasoline Gt 4,2 t/day
Year of construction: 1963
Re-engineered and re-constructed for operations up to -23°C in 1969.
Design life time- not given in the project documentation, most of the equipment has been
designed according to the ASME Section VIII, edition valid at the time of construction. This is
equivalent to approx. ASME Section VIII, Division 1 according to the current standard
edition. Re-qualification of the equipment to the latest code of construction (ASME) has not
been performed. Analysis of the design and qualification to the current regulation of pressure
vessels in Serbia has been performed on several occasions, mostly by the local Universities.
Elevation above see level: 80 m
Seismic zone: 7 (Mercalli), zone 3 according to API 581 classification.
Typical wind direction: NE-SW
Maximum soil load: 16 N/m2
Expected soil deformation: 6-10cm for 1,85 m depth of foundations
Underground water level: 4m below
Depth of soil freezing: 60 cm
Temperature range: 36 in summer to -30°C in winter, corresponding to the -30 to -5 class
in API 581
Wind loads (to be considered in strength calculations for equipment):
• structures lower than 10 m: 687 N/m2
• structures from 10-30 m: 803 N/m2
• structures from 30-60m: 1003 N/m2
• structures higher than 60m: 1177 N/m2
Snow weight: 740N/m2
Maximal rainfall in 24 hours: 120mm
Temperature zone: Temperate (rainfall between 500-1000 l/(m2 year)
Process stability: from 0-1 unplanned shutdowns per year, from 0-1 planned shutdowns
per year. Process is very stable
Detection systems: Process instrumentation – i.e. high level of liquid propane detector,
regulation and automation system for operating parameter maintenance, security
system AMOT for automatic shutdown of compressors, high concentration of
hydrocarbon detectors, 24 hour human supervision of the process parameters with
hand logging and hourly walk-around, local detectors, visual detection.
Insulation systems: Most of the insulation systems are manually activated, on the spot.
The only exception is the AMOT system for automatic shutdown of the compressors, AMOT,
that can automatically shut down the compressor in cases of high number of rotation, high
level registered in D-1, increased vibrations, low pressure of the fluid (oil), high temperature
of cooling water.
Fire-fighting equipment: Portable fire-fighting equipment S-9, S-250,CO2-10,CO2-30,
water cannons with foam
Temporary repairs and signs of deterioration: some signs of deterioration are present,
however, they are logical consequence of the overall equipment age. Temporary repairs and
repairs with inappropriate materials have been made during the 1990s, mainly due to the
fact that it was not possible to obtain better equipment
Modification of the original design:
• Re-design of the input part of the system – T1, T101....
• Change of the working fluid – instead of the proprietary oil, refining-generated oil is
used
History of incidents:
page 69
• Propane leakage on the compressor, and auto-ignition of the fluid. Apart from
material damage, there was no other damage to the people or environment mainly
due to an early detection of the incident and fast fire extinguishing
• Leakage of propane, butane and gasoline from the underground lines due to the
corrosion of the underground lines. Consequences – propane and butane was easily
spotted, and quickly fixed. Gasoline leakage was discovered at a relatively late stage,
due to the fact that it did not evaporate. Soil remediation has been done by pumping
up the gasoline from the soil, the whole operation lasted 2,5 months
• Problems at the furnace firing – the firing process is manual and can in some cases
lead to the explosive concentrations inside the furnace and consequent injury of the
person performing firing. So far no serious injuries have happened.
Safety and relief valves: the process is inherently clean, there is a potential for some
corrosion mainly from the outside. No significant fouling of the RV has been registered,
however, in the general process of control, some of the valves have been found not to be
functioning.
Fluid information:
Present fluid in the system are:
• Natural and refined gas - 3,8-17,0% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition
temperature 640-645°C, gas with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in
higher concentration might cause suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12,
information marks S9,S16,S36/37/39
Approx. fluid composition: methane ~ 93%, ethane ~ 2,50%, propane ~ 0,30%,
butane ~0,03%, other carbon and nitrogen maximum 3,50%,mostly containing
fractions C1-C4, daily throughput of 1200000 m3 per day (or 500t)
• Propane - 2,1-9,5% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 465°C,
gas with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in higher concentration might
cause suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12, information marks
S9,S16,S36/37/39
Present quantities on site:
o Process 12m3 as liquid, 8m3 as gas
o Storage: maximal 926 m3(as liquid) and 232 m3(as gas)
• Butane - 1,5-8,5% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature 365°C, gas
with no smell or color, flammable and explosive, in higher concentration might cause
suffocation. Danger mark 23, F+, Risk mark R12, information marks
S9,S16,S36/37/39
• Debutanized gasoline - 1,3-7,6% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition
temperature 257°C, liquid with no color, flammable and polluting for soil and water.
Danger mark 33 Xn,F, Risk marks R11,R22/21,R52/53,R58,R65, information marks
S36/39,S45,S61,S62
• Heavy gasoline - 1,3-8,0% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature
205-220°C, liquid with no color, flammable and polluting for soil and water. Danger
mark 33 Xn,F, Risk marks R11,R22/21,R52/53,R58,R65, information marks
S36/39,S45,S61,S62
o Storage: maximal 36 m3(as liquid)
• Methyl-alcohol – 7,3-36% vol explosive concentration, Auto ignition temperature
455°C, liquid with no color, flammable and poisonous. Danger mark T,F, Risk marks
R11 R11,R23/24,25, information marks S-2,7,16,24
o Process: 50l (as liquid)
• Water and steam
page 70
The overall view of RGE is shown on Figure 20.

Figure in Annex 13 shows the overall PFD diagram for RGE, whereas Error! Reference
source not found. show the same diagram in more readable form.
2.6.6 Results of analysis

2.6.6.1 HAZOP Analysis Results
During the first HAZOP Session, several technical issues have been discussed, one of those
being analyzed with the HAZOP methodology (Figure 33 and shows loop analyzed and
The results are available on-line using the link:
http://www.risknis.risk-technologies.com
in the member-area section of the project web site.
2.6.6.2 Technical discussions
Technical problem 1
On the top of column T-5 sometimes a valve has to be opened. In some cases the gas
(Decane) ignites and a flame appears on the top of the valve. In this case the valve will be
closed again.
Discussion: The temperature of the gas is 260 0C. There are two possible ignition sources.
The first possibility is electrostatic ignition. The second possibility is an ignition by hot
surfaces. More probable is the ignition by a hot surface. The gas will heat up the surface of
the gas. Autoignition temperature of Decane is about 210 0C. By turbulence at the end of the
valve an explosive air/Decane mixture will be formed which ignites at the hot surface and
lead to the flame.
Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. A possibility to mitigate
the formation of an explosive air/Decane mixture is to use a three way valve instead of the
existing one. The third line will be connected to a steam line. Both lines have to be opened
instead of only the Decane line. This will have two effects. The surface will be cooled down
under the autoignition temperature and the explosive atmosphere will be inerted. Therefore
an ignition on the surface will not took place.
Technical problem 2
In combination with a pressure drop it may be that there is no liquid phase of Decane at the
bottom of T4 (distillation unit). This will lead to a gas flow to the connected pumps instead of
a liquid flow. The gas will be ignited in the pumps. Same problem will arise if no cooling is
available for the pumps (will be cooled by water and cold oil). Normally two pumps are in
operation and one is stand by. A flow indicator for Decane is responsible for the flow of the
cooling liquids to the pumps.
Discussion: The reason for the ignition is the hot surface of the pumps where an air/Decane
mixture will be ignited.
Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. A possible solution is as
first a temperature measurement at the pumps. In the line between distillation T4 and pump
a valve can be integrated. This has to be opened if the flow indicator for Decane and the
temperature indicator at the pump indicate that there is no flow of liquid Decane. The open
line can be connected to the flare. The valve can be closed again if the flow indicator gives a
signal for liquid Decane flow.
Technical problem 3
Once per year the gas pipelines outside the establishment will be cleaned. Different kind of
liquids and dusts has been accumulated over the period of one year. The Naftagas plant is
responsible for the collecting of these wastes. The waste is delivered by a pressure wave
through the incoming line for gas and is collected in the separator D-300. The technical
problem is twofold. In the loop1 discussed during the Hazop analysis a pressure surges occur
(e.g. water hammer, cavitational hammer). These pressure surges can lead to damages of
plant's equipment (valves, pumps, pipe bends) up to leakage of the pipe system. After the
cleaning the gaseous line will be opened again. Again pressure surges occur and parts of the
equipment can be obstructed completely or partly by remaining particles. This is actual the
case for the heat exchanger E-110.
page 71
Figure 30: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 1 of 3
page 72
page 73
Table 38: HAZOP analysis for Loop 1
Guide Safe Guard

ID Node Parameter Cause Consequence Description Safe Guards
Word Independent
Feed
No safety problem, shut down or Two Safety valves
1 entrance to Flow Less Less Gas Supply FALSE
continuation depending on flow on D-300
D-300
Feed
No Supply Cleaning gas Two Safety valves
2 entrance to Flow No No safety problem TRUE
line on D- 300
D-300
Feed
No safety problem, shut down or Two Safety valves
3 entrance to Pressure Lower Less Supply TRUE
continuation depending on flow on D-300
D-300
Feed
Supply changes, More Valve (LCV 301) to F301 will be partly or Two Safety valves
4 entrance to Composition Higher TRUE
C1-C2 Gas completely closed on D- 300
D-300
Feed
Supply changes, Less PV 401 is an overflow valve and will mitigate Two Safety valves
5 entrance to Composition Less TRUE
C1-C2 Gas increase of level. Storage tank D-27A. on D- 300
D-300
Feed
Filter has to be cleaned. Indication: Pressure Two Safety valves
6 entrance to Pressure Higher Filter in F-301 dirty. . TRUE
increase continuously on D- 300
D-300
page 74
Figure 33: HAZOP Loop 1
page 75
Discussion: There was only a general discussion on the hammer effect on the lines where the
liquid phase is in. A more detailed discussion was about the pressure wave which took place
when the gaseous line will be reopened. As the heat exchanger is not really working at the
moment based on pollution with dust particles the questions raised up what can happen
furthermore in other parts of the plant.
It has been proposed not to concentrate on the possible damages and instead to concentrate
of a mitigation of the pressure wave. At the moment a valve in a 12 inch line with a 3 inch
pipepass will be opened, It has been proposed to include another valve in a 6 inch line with a
2 inch bypass to reduce the pressure wave.
The following proposals have not been discussed in this meeting.
The typical scenarios for the origin of pressure surges are fast closing valves triggered by the
breakdown of auxiliary power and fast acting control devices. The fast deceleration of the
liquid results in high pressure surges upstream the valve, because kinetic energy is
transformed into potential energy. This effect is called water hammer that is explained by the
following example. In a horizontally installed 500 m long pipeline of the size DN 200 which
transports water with a velocity of 3 m/s at ambient temperature, the pressure increases by
a fast closing valve from a stationary pressure of 6 bar up to 40 bar. Hereby the forces
induced to pipe supports exceed the design criteria from 1-5 kN to 125 kN. Due to liquid
inertia, the transported liquid continues to flow downstream the valve with the initial speed,
the pressure decreases and a large expanding vapour bubble is formed directly downstream
the valve. The pressure falls up to saturation pressure of the liquid and is thus lower than the
pressure in the system. Thereby the liquid stream is decelerated and finally accelerated
towards the closed valve (back flow). As a result of fast re-condensation of the vapour
bubble, the liquid flows against the closed valve and is stopped rapidly. The resulting
pressure surge is referred to as cavitational hammer. The amplitude of the first cavitational
hammer downstream the valve is nearly as high as the amplitude of the first water hammer
upstream the valve.
Well-known methods for the prevention of water hammer in pipeline systems are e.g. the
application of air vessels, surge shafts, bladder accumulators, as well as the prolongation of
closing and opening times of valves. The latter is the easiest and the most favourable
method. Due to technical and legal requirements for pipeline operation within the chemical
industries and power plants it is not always possible to decelerate the closing process
undefined.
Air vessels, surge shafts or bladder accumulators are used if the pipeline system is not
designed on the same level. These applications are installed upstream the closing valve in its
immediate proximity. When shutting off the medium flows in to the loft and is braked by
this.
Another possibility is the expansion of valve gears with facilities which decelerate the closure
as soon as the last third of the flow cross section is nearly reached. These can be dampers
(often used with swing check valves) or programmable positioners..
Technical problem 4
There is a leakage in the product lines C3 and C4 to the tanks. As the lines are underground
the leakage and the size of the leakage can not be detected. There is no leak detection
system installed.
Discussion: Leakage is visible by bubbles on the ground if it is raining and by parts of non
growing grass.
Technical solution: This has not been discussed during the meeting. As the amount of gas is
unknown there is the hazard of an explosion. The only possible solution is to repair or to
exchange the lines or to build new lines on the ground and to close the old ones.
Technical problem 5
There is a compressor in use where gaseous Propane will be compressed from 1.7 to 13-15
bars. There are two problems. The first problem is in the case of a leakage in the compressor
(Jet fire, explosion). Hot surfaces near by have a temperature of 500 0C. The volume of the
compressor is about 0.5 cbm. The second problem may occur if liquid propane flows into the
page 76
compressor. This will normally be mitigated by a measurement of gaseous and liquid phase
in the separator before. If this is not working an explosion is possible.
Discussion: This has not been discussed during the meeting.
Technical solution: There will be possibilities by using quick closing valves. This will mitigate
the flow of liquid Propane to the compressor. Further technical specification possible but not
done.
2.6.6.3 Management Systems Evaluation
According to the API 581, Management system evaluation (self-assessment) has been
performed. After this, an audit of the results has been performed in order to revise the
scores achieved.
The results are given in the table below and shown on Figure 34.
Table 39 Management System Evaluation results with audit comments
Maximal Actual Audit Audit comments

Id Section Title
Points Score results
Leadership and The self assessment evaluation is

1. 70 43 40
Administration confirmed
The self assessment evaluation is

confirmed, however, it seems
Process Safety
2. 80 72 65 that not everyone has instant
Information
access to needed safety
information needed (ie MSDS)
Process Hazard The self assessment evaluation is

3. 100 49 45
Analysis confirmed
Version control of the documents

and agreed procedure of the
Management of
4. 80 58 40 “where the latest version of the
Change
i.e. PFD” seems not to be known
to everyone
Operating procedures are not

visibly enough available to
everyone. However, due to the
size of the team, this is
5. Operating Procedures 80 57 50 compensated in quick direct
consultations. Problems only in
cases when one of the
responsible is not reachable (i.e.
illness, holidays etc.)
The self assessment evaluation is

6. Safe Work Practices 85 72 70
confirmed
In the last couple of years a lot

has been done to improve the
7. Training 100 82 75 knowledge, however the lack of
training in the previous periods
has left some traces.
The team is capable of

maintaining the integrity of the
equipment as it is. However, re-
8. Mechanical Integrity 120 111 90 engineering or process
improvement initiatives are not
always considered as possible
solutions
page 77
Maximal Actual Audit Audit comments

Id Section Title
Points Score results
Due to the danger of the current

startup procedure, more has to
Pre-Startup Safety
9. 60 58 45 be done to make sure that the
Review
startup is not considered as
“routine” task
Not all elements needed for

safety report and emergency
10. Emergency Response 65 51 40
response are available on
demand
The incident investigation

practice is normally performed,
however, the damage
11. Incident Investigation 75 65 40 mechanisms are often not
investigated, instead of root
causes often only symptomatic
reactions.
Contractors 45 42 25 Contractors are usually good

managed, however, there are QA
problems in the procurement
12.
process for the “small
equipment” (i.e. valves, safety
valves, etc.)
Assessments 40 20 20 The self assessment evaluation is

13.
confirmed
The RGE has obtained the above

average score even after the
auditing process. The overall
Total 1000 780 645 impression is that the overall
team of process, maintenance
engineers and management is
functioning very well
Figure 34: Results of management system evaluation for RGE
page 78
2.6.6.4 API 581 Qualitative (Unit-based) analysis results

The evaluation according to the API 581 qualitative method has been performed, and the
overall risk of the RGE has been determined to be MEDIUM (or C3). This has several
reasons:
1. Size of the refinery – it is rather small compared with other refineries or other units
that are supposed to be benchmarked by the same methodology
2. The process is fairly simple and stable
3. On the other hand, the process fluids (natural gas, propane, butane, gasoline) are
both explosive and flammable, therefore giving the C consequence class
4. The age of the equipment and the history of damage mechanisms result in the
likelihood ranking of 3.
4
L
I
K
E
L RGE-1 Procesno
3
I postrojenje
H
O
O
D
2
A B C D E
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 35: Risk matrix showing the position of the RGE in qualitative unit analysis matrix
2.6.6.5 API 581 qualitative analysis (component based)

According to API 581, edition 1998, the qualitative analysis has been performed for 99
components, without connecting piping and rotating machinery. The work for this equipment
is still in progress.
Risk matrix for qualitative analysis is shown on Figure 36. The risk assessment results are
shown in Annex 24.
According to the ranking in the risk matrix, the inspection plan can be constructed, for next
two years. According to the risk assessment, the equipment having high and medium high
risk should be inspected at least once a year. Furthermore, for items with high risk, it is
recommended to increase the inspection efficiency from class D (spot testing) to class C, in
order to have better risk control.
For the equipment that has annual maintenance tasks (heat exchangers – cleaning, filters,
condensers), the same inspection interval has been maintained (i.e. each year), although
according to the risk ranking this interval might be increased. This is in line of maximization
of the effort invested, i.e. to use the opportunity to inspect the equipment when normal
maintenance tasks are done.
page 79
The corresponding inspection plan (Annex 25) results in increase of inspection on equipment
identified as critical (6 pieces of equipment), while decreasing the number of equipment to
be inspected each year (i.e. in 2009 from 99 to 51).
5 0 - 0%
4 D-101 D-102 2 - 2%
L C1A/B (potis) C1A/B

I D-1 T-3 T-4 T-6 T- T-1 T-101 T-2
3 (usis) C2A/B (potis) 14 - 14%
K 8 T-5 T-7
C2A/B (usis)
E
L
I D-27B D-27C D-27E D-103 D-104 D-11
H E-10 E-102 E-103 D-111 D-112 D-12
O E-104 E-11 E-110 D-120 D-121 D-
E-101/A E-101/B
O E-113 E-116 E-12 122 D-16 D-2 D-
E-1A/B E-20A FT-
D E-120 E-13 E-14 E- 27A D-27D D-27F
103A FT-103B FT-
2 15 E-16 E-17 E-18 D-28A D-28B D- D-300 T-9 83 - 84%
104 FT-302 HP-1
E-19 E-2 E-20B E- 28C D-28D D-28E
HP-2 JI-1 JI-2 PF-
21 E-22 E-23 E- D-28F D-28G D-
1 PF-2 SP-1
24/A E-24/B E-25 E- 29A D-29B D-29C
3 E-4 E-5 E-6A/B E- D-4 D-5 D-6 D-7
7 E-8 E-9 D-8 D-9 FT-301
1 0 - 0%
A B C D E
0 - 0% 15 - 15% 40 - 40% 36 - 36% 8 - 8% 99
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 36: API 581 Qualitative risk matrix for component level, for year 2009
page 80
2.6.6.6 RBI Detailed quantitative analysis
5 0 - 0%
D-4 D-6 D-7 E-

D-5 E-102 E- 101/A E-101/B D-1 D-2 T-7 T-
4 18 - 72%
110 T-5 E-1A/B E-2 T-4 9
L
T-6 T-8
I
K
E
L
3 D-27A T-1 2 - 8%
I
H
O
O
D
2 D-300 T-101 T-2 D-102 T-3 5 - 20%
1 0 - 0%
A B C D E
0 - 0% 5 - 20% 14 - 56% 6 - 24% 0 - 0% 25
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 37 Preliminary results of API quantitative (detailed) Analysis Component based

applied on selected RGE equipment
2.6.7 Conclusions and recommendations

Presented results so far have DRAFT status; further refinement is planned for the level of
detailed analysis in order to obtain results that are acceptable for plant personnel.
The proper identification of damage mechanisms and inclusion of rotating equipment and
piping is planned for the next cycle of data update.
The preliminary analysis of potential savings in inspection costs is given in Figure 38. The
overview of financial risk for the whole unit is given in Figure 39.
THIS Chapter will be elaborated in the next version.
page 81
Comparison of costs per inspection

strategy
6,000,000 Din.
5,000,000 Din.
4,000,000 Din.
Costs RSD
3,000,000 Din.
2,000,000 Din. Current practice
1,000,000 Din.
RBI optimized
0 Din.
2009 2010 2011
Inspection year
Figure 38: Comparison of different inspection strategies
3,500,000 € 100%
90%
3,000,000 €
80%
2,500,000 € 70%
2,000,000 € 60%
50%
1,500,000 € 40%
1,000,000 € 30%
20%
500,000 €
10%
0€ 0%
E‐1A/B
E‐101/B
E‐101/A
D‐27A
D‐28A
D‐29A
D‐27C
D‐28C
D‐27B
D‐28B
D‐29C
T‐7
D‐2
T‐9
T‐4
D‐4
T‐8
D‐7
D‐6
T‐6
T‐5
D‐1
T‐1
E‐2
D‐5
E‐110
E‐102
T‐3
D‐27D
D‐27F
D‐28D
D‐28F
D‐29B
D‐27E
D‐28E
D‐102
T‐2
T‐101
JI‐1
JI‐2
D‐300
SP‐1
HP‐1
HP‐2
C1A/B (potis)
(usis)
C1A/B(potis)
C2A/B (usis)
C2A/B
Figure 39: Financial Risk Prioritization
page 82
2.7 HSE (Seveso) report for Refinery Pancevo, Unit FCC

2.7.1 Introduction
2.7.1.1 General
Law on changes of the Law on Environmental Protection adopted by the Assembly of the
Republic of Serbia May 2009 contains some of the requirements of Seveso II Directive
(96/82/EC). Between other, Seveso plant is defined as a facility in which activities are carried
out and in which one or more dangerous substances are present in quantities equal or
greater than prescribed. Further obligations of Seveso plants operators are defined, who
must submit information, or to develop a policy to prevent accidents and report safety and
accident protection plan.
Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning of Republic of Serbia has identified facilities
that are subjected to Seveso II Directive and published a preliminary list (14 May 2009).
Refinery Pancevo has been preliminary identified as upper-tier "Seveso" plant.
Corresponding sub-lows which will allow full implementation of the Directive are currently in
preparation. Full implementation of this regulation will provide prevention, preparedness and
rapid response to a chemical accident.
This chapter of Detailed Technical report presents Safety report for a part of Pancevo
refinery, FCC complex (Fluidized Catalytic Cracking) following the requirements of the
Directive and on the base of Safety report for Pancevo Refinery done within the Package A.
Some of general data needed for the report are contained in Volume I of the Detailed
Technical report.
For easier understanding and reading, Cross-reference table is prepared (Table 1) showing
relation between part of reports and requirements from Article 9 of the report.
2.7.1.2 Implementation of Seveso requirements
Table 40 shows relation between requirements of Seveso II directive and individual parts of
Detailed Technical report.
Table 40: Implementation of Seveso II requirements
Corresponding
Minimum data and information to be included in
paragraph of the
the safety report referred to in Article 9
Safety report
Information about management system and organization
of the establishment in relation to the prevention of
I
major accidents, this information must consider the
items listed in Annex III
II Surrounding of the establishment
Description of site and its surrounding, including the
geographical location, meteorological, geological,
A
hydrographic conditions and, where appropriate, its
history.
Identification of installations and other activities of the
B establishment which could present a risk of a major
accident.
Description of areas that may experience a major
C
accident.
III Description of the establishment
Description of main activities and products of major
parts of the plant in terms of safety, sources of major
A accident hazards and the conditions under which such a
major accident could occur including a description of
proposed preventive measures.
Description of processes, in particular the operating
B
methods.
C Description of hazardous substances:
page 83
1. the inventory of dangerous substances,

including: - identification of hazardous
substances (chemical name, CAS number, name
according to IUPAC nomenclature), the
maximum quantity of dangerous substances
present or possible;
2. physical, chemical, toxicological characteristics
and indication of hazards, both immediate and
delayed for man or the environment;
3. the physical or chemical in normal use or under
foreseeable accidental conditions.
This Safety Report is updating the Safety report prepared in May 2008. It therefore
incorporates the organizational changes and technological changes occurring in plant and
refinery from that date.
2.7.2 Information on site, plant and unit

Name and Address of Operator:
Fluid Catalytic Cracking complex (FCC) is a part of Refinery Pancevo and further of NIS
Petroleum Industry of Serbia which is owned by Government of Republic Serbia (41%) and
JSC Gazprom Neft (51%),
The address of the headquarter and refinery itself is:
NIS Petrol Pancevo Refinery
Spoljnostarcevacka 199
26000 Pancevo
Name and Location of Activities
Data about location and activities of the Refinery are given in Chaper 2.1.5Volume I of
Detailed Technical Report.
Basic design of the plant
License and engineering: TEXACO Development Corporation
Detailed engineering: Foster Wheeler
Responsible for preparation of the Safety Report
This report is prepared by Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies,
Haus der Wirtschaft, Willi-Bleicher-Straße 19,
70174 Stuttgart, Germany
2.7.2.2 Location of Establishment
Geographical map of Pancevo Municipality and location of Pancevo Refinery are given in
Annex 1 and Annex 2.
The FCC complex covers 41860 m2 in Block 6 of Refinery Pancevo (see A.14.1 and A.14.2).
Position of FCC is shown on Figure 40.
Complex is located between other blocks of refinery, 3 of them are with production units:
• North - Block 5 with units for oil production built in the first phase of Refinery
construction,
• South - Block 21 with Sulfolan unit,
• Est - Block 9 with power production units.
Block 3 is located on the West side of FCC complex with following buildings: control room for
FCC complex, buildings of fire protection brigade and investment and development unit.
Monastery Volovica with a church is also located west of the Block 6.
Access to the FCC complex (Figure 41) is possible by internal roads - from the East, Street
No. 3, from the West Street No. 2, from North Avenue C and from the South Avenue D.
page 84
Figure 40: Position of FCC in Pancevo Refinery
Figure 41: Access to the FCC complex
page 85
Some accidents took place in the past. 1986 there was a fire in a pressure vessel and a
separator of fuel gas. In 1989 an accident caused by abrasion occurred. The result has been
a small steam leak in a reactor. In 2003 a slide valve was closed caused by a cut cable. The
pressure inside the regenerator increased and cyclones were damaged.
2.7.2.3 Policy the company is pursuing
RNP has established the quality management system in accordance with ISO 9001:2000
standard, for all RNP's operations. Details are given in chapter 2.1.4..
List of RNP QMS and EMS documentation is given in Annex 15.
2.7.2.4 Safety management system
Safety Management System is a part of RNP quality and environment management system
including some principles to identify and to evaluate possible hazards and principles to
identify and to realize technical organizational and management activities for the mitigation
and consequence reduction of accidents. Responsible organizational unit for HSE issues is
Risk Management division.
2.7.2.5 Hazardous materials
FCC ensures deep conversion of vacuum gas oils into gases, gasoline components, diesel
components and fuel oil. Catalytic cracking process breaks or cracks long chain hydrocarbons
into smaller molecules in the naphtha and distillate boiling range to increase gasoline and
diesel production. This process will yield 50-60% gasoline, 20-30% distillate and 30%
butanes and lighter.
Accordingly, hazardous materials in RNP FCC are:
• Propane
• Butane
• Gasoline
• light cracked gas oil
• H2S and
• for internal use fuel gas.
The complete list of hazardous materials is given inError! Reference source not found..
2.7.2.6 Meteorological data
Chapter 2.1.3.2 of this report contains data related to
• Meteorology
• Hydrology
• Geology
• Seismology.
2.7.2.7 External activities
Industrial activities external to the establishment of Refinery Pancevo are described in
Volume I of Detailed Technical Report.
FCC complex is located in Block VI of Refinery Pancevo and it includes following units:
• S-2300: Fluid Catalytic Cracking unit (hereafter FCC)
• S-2500: Gas concentration unit
• S-2550: Merox unit LPG extraction
• S-2600: Alkylation
• S-2750: Merox, Light naphtha sweetening Unit
• S-2850: Merox, Heavy naphtha sweetening
• S-2900: Sour water stripper
• S-2450: Sulphur recovery unit (Klaus)
2.7.3 Detail description

2.7.3.1 FCC unit S-2300
General about process
Catalytic cracking is a key process used to increase the quality and quantity of gasoline
fractions. The most commonly used process is the fluid bed type, which uses a finely
page 86
powdered zeolite catalyst that is kept in suspension in the reactor by the incoming oil feed
from the bottom of the reactor. Upon contact with the hot catalyst, the oil vaporizes and is
cracked into smaller molecules. Vapors from the reactor are separated from the entrained
catalyst and fed into a fractionator, where the desired products are removed and heavier
fractions are returned to the reactor. The catalyst is deactivated by thermal degradation and
through contact with heavy metals in the feed, necessitating regeneration or replacement.
FCC is used in processing of vacuum heavy gas oil which is pumped into the pipe reactor
“RISER” where the actual reaction of cracking is taking place. Unit area is 90 x 100=9000
m2, construction is open and mainly made of concrete. It incorporates also a concrete
chimney with 150m in height and 13m diameter base. This process breaks or cracks long
chain hydrocarbons into smaller molecules in the naphtha and distillate boiling range to
increase gasoline and diesel production. This process will yield 50-60% gasoline, 20-30%
distillate and 30% butanes and lighter. If you do the math you will see that the volume of
products is greater than the volume of the feed.
Capacity of the unit
FCC unit is designed to manufacture 3000t/dan (1.000.000t/year) of heavy vacuum gas oil
that is derived from crude oil Kirkuk. The Pancevo Refinery is mostly processing crude oil of
"REB" and "Kikinda" and processing capacity depends on the availability of supplies and the
market requirements for final products. Flow chart is shown in Figure 42.
Description
Process flow Diagrams Flow through the Unit is shown schematically on the following Process
flow Diagrams:
Drawing No. Title

2231-0-50-2331 Reactor - Regenerator Section
2231-0-50-2332 Catalyst Storage &Air Surge Drum Section
2231-0-50-2333 Feed Preheat and Main fractionator
2231-0-50-2334 Main fractionator Strippers and Overhead
System
2231 -0-50-2531 Compression Section
2231-0-50-2532 Absorption/Deethaniser Section
2231-0-50-2533 Debutanizer Section
2231-0-50-2534 Naphtha Splitter Section
2231-0-50-2535 H2S Scrubber Section
2231-0-50-2536 Depropanizer Section
2231-0-50-2537 C3 Drier Section
2231-0-50-2538 Propylene Splitter Section
Flow charts are given in 0.

The unit is designed for two regimes:
• Winter - maximum production of diesel
• Summer - maximum production of gasoline.
Feed for the unit is heavy vacuum gas oil from the unit S-2200, Vacuum distillation. Block
diagram of Pancevo refinery is given in
page 87
Figure 42: Flow chart of FCC
Reactor / Regenerator section

Fresh feed to the Unit is normally supplied as hot vacuum gas oil from the Vacuum
Distillation Unit. Unit 2200. Cold gas oil from storage can also be used to supplement the hot
feed or as the major source of fresh feed. up to 60% of design throughput. if desired. Excess
hot feed is cooled in the VGO Cooler. EC-2307, and returned to storage. Both feeds are fed
independently into the Feed Surge Drum, FA-2303.
Fresh feed is pumped from the feed Surge Drum by the Fresh Feed Pumps, GA- 302/S, under
flow control through the feed preheat train to the Feed Heater,BA-230l. The preheat train
consists of the Feed/LCGO Product Exchangers, EA-230l A/B, the Feed/ICGO Reflux
Exchangers, EA-2302 A/B, and th~ Feed/Fractionator Bottoms Exchangers)EA-2303 A/B. The
feed is then heated in the Feed Heater and routed to the FF Riser. Provision is made for the
Feed Heater to be bypassed. The additional capability of routing fresh feed to the RF Riser is
provided.
As eparate riser is provided for cracking recycle feed. Recycle feed is pumped to the RF Riser
from the ICGO Stripper, DA-2302,by the lCGO Recycle Pump,GA-2306/S.
Fresh feed and recycle feed enter the Reactor-Stripper, DC-2301, at the base of the FF Riser
and RF Riser respectively, where each feed is vaporized and raised to the reactor
temperature by mixing with hot regenerated catalyst returned from the Regenerator, OC-
2302. Each feed begins to crack immediately on contacting the hot catalyst. The cracking
reaction takes place in the Risers of the Reactor after which most of the catalyst is separated
from the Reactor vapours and falls down to the Reactor stripping section.
The catalyst fines still entrained with the Reactor vapours are disengaged in two two-stage
Reactor Cyclones, FC-230l A/D. Catalyst separated in the Cyclones is returned to the Reactor
bed section by the Cyclone diplegs. The Reactor vapour product passes to the Main
Fractionator, DA-2301, where it is fractionated.
During the cracking reaction carbon is deposited on the surface of the catalyst in the form of
coke. After passing through the Reactor stripping section where stripping steam removes
entrained hydrocarbon vapours, spent catalyst passes from the Reactor through a slide
va1ve to the lower section of the Regenerator, DC-2302, for coke removal.
Coke is removed from the catalyst by combustion to carbon dioxide in the Regenerator using
air supplied by the Air Blower, GB-230l. Mixing of the spent catalyst with hot regenerated
catalyst supplies the heat to start burning." The burning of the catalyst occurs in two stages.
The "primary combustion" stage produces CO and CO2 and releases heat which almost
page 88
instantaneously raises the burning temperature. The "secondary combustion" stage occurs
simultaneously as the CO burns with oxygen to form C02. Combustion of the coke to carbon
dioxide is almost complete at the temperature in the Regenerator. Duri ng start-up the Ai r
Preheater, BC-2301, is used to heat up the Regenerator.
The Air Blower is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being condensed by the
Surface Condenser, EC-2510. Condensate from the condenser is collected in the Condensate
Drum, FA-2520,and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the Turbine Condensate
Pump,GA-2520/S,via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2520. The Inter/After Condenser
condenses the'vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation equipment. Any condensate
formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is vaporised in the Re-
evaporatbr, EA-2522.
Hot gases produced by the combustion of coke leave the dense phase of the Regenerator
and enter the dilute phase where entrained catalyst is removed in three twostage
Regenerator Cyclones, FC-2302 A/F and returned to the Regenerator catalyst dense phase
via the cyclone diplegs. The hot regenerated catalyst leaves the Regenerator via the Fresh
Feed Regenerator Catalyst Standpipe and the Recycle Feed Regenerator Catalyst Standpipe
and passes through the slide valves to the FF and RF Risers.
The hot gases leaving the Regenerator Cyclones pass through the Flue Gas Pressure Control
Valve, PA-2305, the Ori fi ce Chamber, PA-2307,and the Fl ue Gas Diverter Valve, PA-
2306,to the CO Boiler, BF-2301,before exhausting to atmosphere via the Stack. CA-230l.
The CO Boiler produces HP steam (44.1 bar g) by recovering sensible heat, and the heat of
combustion of CO when operating with non promoted catalyst, from the Regenerator flue
gas. The CO Boiler is supplementary fired with fuel oil or fuel gas to provide sufficient steam
to meed the demand of the FCC complex. Boi1er feed water enters the CO Boiler under flow
control and passes through a preheater and economiser to improve the overall efficiency of
steam generation. The steam and water mixture produced in the convection bank is
separated in the steam drum and the steam is then passed through a two-stage superheater.
The steam temperature is controlled by taking a slip stream of steam from the fi rst stage of
the superheater and passing it through an attemperator. The attemperator and preheater are
located inside the steam drum.
Fresh catalyst is fed to the Regenerator from the Fresh Catalyst Hopper, FE-230Z, using the
Continuous Catalyst Addition Device, GB-2302. Equilibrium catalyst for start-up is stored in
the Equilibrium Catalyst Hopper, FE-2301.
Main Fractionator Section

Superheated Reactor vapours from the Reactor, OC-230l, enter the bottom section of the
Main Fractionator, DA-230l. The Reactor vapours are desuperheated by contact with a large
circulating stream of cooled fractionator bottoms over six disc and donut trays. The
fractionator bottoms is circulated by the Fractionator Bottoms Pump, GA-2303/S, and cooled
in the following four parallel heat exchanger circuits:
A. The Feed/Fractionator Bottoms Exchangers,EA-2303 A/B
B. The LCGO Stripper Reboiler, EA-2304.
C. The Debutaniser Reboiler, EA-2505, in the Gas Concentration Unit.
D. The Fractionator Bottoms Steam Generators,EA-2306 A/B.
Controlling the rate and return temperature of this coolant affects the rate of reflux required
higher in the tower. The down flowing coolant for desuperheating the vapour feed also
serves as a scrubbing medium which collects catalyst entrained in the vapours. Catalyst
concentration is reduced to a satisfactory amount by withdrawal of a fractionator bottoms
product at the appropriate rate.
The fractionator bottoms product is drawn off downstream of the Fractionator Bottoms
Steam Generators and cooled in the Fractionator Bottoms Product Cooler, EC-230l, before
being pumped to tankage by the Fractionator Bottoms Product Pump, GA-2304/S. Facilities
exist for the return of fractionator bottoms to the RF Riser should this operation be dictated
by mechanical problems or special product requirements.
lntermedi ate Cycle Gas Oi 1, 1CGO, is withdrawn from a total draw-off tray in the Main
Fractionator. Part is circulated by the lCGO Reflux Pump,GA-2305/S,under flow control, and
page 89
is cooled in the following four parallel heat exchanger ci rcuits before returning to the
colurnn:
A. Feed/ICGO Refl ux Exchangers, EA-2302 A/B.
B. Deethaniser Reboiler,EA-2502,in the Gas Concentration Unit.
C. Naphtha Splitter Reboiler,EA-2507,in the Gas Concentration Unit.
D. 1CGO Reflux Steam Generator,EA-2307.
The main part of this ICGO Reflux Stream is returned to the Fractionator above the draw off
tray. The remainder is returned to the bubble cap trays below the draw off pan in order to
scrub out any entrained catalyst remaining in the vapour from the baffled section, and also
to provide additional cooling of the vapour.
The balance of the ICGO from the total draw off tray passes to the ICGO Stripper, DA-2302.
The ICGO Stripper is reboiled by circulating ICGO Recycle through the ICGO Recycle Reboiler
Pump, GA-2j07/S, to the ICGO Recycle Stripper Reboiler, BA-2302, under flow control. The fi
red heated serves the dual purpose of stripping and preheating the Recycle Feed. Recycle
feed is pumped from the ICGO Stripper by the ICGO Recycle Pump, GA-2306/S, under flow
control to the RF Riser. The ICGO stripper vapour is returned to the Main Fractionator.
Light Cycle Gas Oil, LCGO, is removed from a partial draw off tray in the Main Fractionator.
Part is circulated by the LCGO Reflux Pump,GA-2308/S, under flow control and is cooled
initially by preheating boiler feed water in the LCGO/BFW Exchanger, EA-230S, and
preheating the Debutani ser Feed in the Debutaniser Feed Preheater, EA-2S03. These
combined streams are then cooled by passing some of the LCGO Reflux through the Lean
Sponge Oil Cooler. EC-2305, before returninq to the Main Fractionator. Some of the LCGO
Reflux from the outlet of the Lean Sponge Oil Cooler is pumped by the Lean Sponge Oil
Pump, GA-2309/S, to the Sponge Oil Absorber, DA-2501, in the Gas Concentration Unit
before returning to the Main Fractionator, and some ;s passed to the Gland and Flushing Oil
Surge Drum, FA-2307, to be used as gland and flushing oil.
The remaining LCGO from the Main Fractionator passes to the LCGO Stripper, DA-2303t
where light ends are stripped from the light cycle gas oil with heat supplied by fractionator
bottoms in the LCGO Stripper Reboiler, EA-2304. The stripped vapours are returned to the
Main Fractionator. The LCGO product is pumped by the LCGO Product Pum~ GA-2310/S,
through the Feed/LCGO Product Exchangers, EA-2301 A/~ to the LCGO Hydrotreating Unit
(Unit 2400) or to storage via the LCGO Product Cooler, EC-2303.
A naphtha sidestream is withdrawn from the Main Fractionator between the LCGO draw-off
and the column overheads. Thi s stream is ci rcul ated under f1 ow control by the Top
Pumparound Reflux Pump, GA-23l1/S,to the Propylene Splitter Reboi1er, EA-2515,in the Gas
Concentration Unit before being returned to the Main Fractionator.
Fractionator overheads are cooled and partially condensed in the Fractionator Overhead
Condenser, EC-2306. Water soluble corrosion inhibitor is injected upstream of the
Fractionator Overhead Condenser using the Fractionator Overhead Corrosion Inhibitor Pump,
GA-2514, to prevent hydrogen blistering. Unstabilised gasoline and vapours are separated in
the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304, with the vapours flowing to the GCU Gas
Compressor, GB-2501. Unstabilised gasoline is pumped under level control by the
Fractionator Overhead Pump,GA-2312/S,to the Raw Gasoline Cooler, EA-2501, in the Gas
Concentration Unit and is also used as pumpback ref1 ux to the Main Fractionator to control
overhead temperature. The condensed water phase and sour water passed into the boot of
the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator from other Units is pumped by the Sour Water Pump,
GA-2313/S,to the Sour Water Stripper Unit (Unit 2900).
Process Steam Generation and Blowdown

Boiler feed water from offsite is preheated in the LCGOI BFW Exchanger, EA-2305,and
passed to Fractionator Bottoms Steam Generators,EA-2306 A/B,and the ICGO Steam
Generator, EA-2307,for generation of medium pressure steam. Steam generated in these
exchangers is superheated in the superheat coil of the ICGO Stripper Reboi1er, BA-2302,
and passed to the M.P. Steam Header.
Continuous and intermittent b10wdown from the Steam Generators and the CO Boiler, BF-
2301,are passed to the M.P. B1owdown Drum, FA-2521,where L.P. steam generated passes
to the L.P. Steam Header. The b1owdown passes under level control to the Atmospheric
page 90
B1owdown Drum, FA-2522, where it is quenched with raw water before passing to the oily
water sewer.
Slide Valve Air System
Dry plant air, with a water dew point of -40 °C, is provided to supply the power to actuate
the automatic slide valves. The air supplied to each valve passes to an air motor operated
power unit which directs the air supply to drive the valve in either direction, depending on
the signal being received from the automatic controller. Alternatively, the slide valve can be
moved by the manual operation of a local 4-way valve which performs a similar function. The
Slide Valve Air Surge Drum, FA-230l, is provided to operate the valves during an emergency.
The drum is sized to hold sufficient air to close each operating valve once from the wide open
position without the reservoir pressure dropping below 4.1 bar g.
Spry Water System
In· the event that any portion of the Regenerator exceeds 730 °c for short periods, spray
water from the Spray Water Drum, FA-2302, should be injected into the Regenerator by the
Spray Water Pump, GA-2301 IS. Spry water should be removed from the Regenerator at the
first opportunity to prevent catalyst deactivation and .to regain optimum combustion air
control.
Gland and Flushing Oil System
Light Cycle Gas Oil is normally used as pump gland flush oil and flushing oil for instruments,
the supply being taken from downstream of the Lean Oil Cooler, EC-2305. An alternate diesel
supply is provided at start-up from offsite storage. The LCGO passes into the Gland and
Flushing Oil Surge Drum FA-230~and is continuously circulated around a ring header system
using the Gland and Flushing Oil Pump GA-23l4/S. This system is also used for flushing
equipment which can be taken out of service while the rest of the unit is in operation.
2.7.3.2 Gas concentration unit S-2500
Gas Compression Section
Vapours from the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-230~ are compressed in the two
stage, turbi ne dri ven GCU Gas Compressor, GB-2501, after passing through the First Stage
Compressor Suction Drum, FA-2501. Liquid removed in the Compressor Suction Drum, flows
under gravity back to the Fractionator Overhead Accumulator. Off gas from the LCGO
Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400) is also fed to the First Stage Compressor Suction Drum.
Flashed condensate is injected into the first stage discharge to protect the lines from
hydrogen blistering together with water soluble corrosion inhibitor from the First Stage
Compressar Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-25l5. This stream is then cao1ed and partial1y
condensed by the First Stage Compressor Condenser, EC-2501, befare enteri ng the Second
Stage Compressor Suction Drum, FA-2502. The interstage liquid from this drum is pumped
by the Second Stage Compressor Suction Drum Pump, GA-250l/S to the Deethaniser Feed
Coalescer, FA-2505. Sour water, separated from the hydrocarbon phase in FA-2502,is sent
under level control to the Fractionator FA-2502 are compressed in the second stage of the
GCU Gas Compressor and then injected with steam condensate together with corrosion
inhibitor from the Second Stage Compressor Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2S16, and routed
to the HP Separator Condenser, EC-2502.
The GCU Gas Compressor is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being
condensed by the Surface Condenser, EC-2509. Condensate from the condenser i s collected
in the Condensate Drum, FA-2S19, and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the
Turbine Condensate Pump, GA-25l9/~ via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2519. The
Inter/After Condenser condenses the vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation
equipment. Any condensate formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is
vaporised in the Re-evaporator, EA-2521.
Absorption/Deethaniser Section
The vapours from the compressor second stage are combined w;th liquid from the Raw
Gasoline Absorber,DA-2501 ,and overhead vapours from the Deethaniser ,DA-2502, the C3
Drier Overhead Accumulator,FA-2513,and the Propylene Splitter Overhead Accumulator,FA-
2514,and passed to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler,EC-2502. Flashed condensate
page 91
is injected into the inlet of the airfin to protect the exchanger from hydrogen blistering
together The GCU Gas Compressor is driven by a condensing turbine, the outlet steam being
condensed by the Surface Condenser, EC-2509. Condensate from the condenser i s collected
in the Condensate Drum, FA-2S19, and is pumped to the Offsite Deaeration Facilities by the
Turbine Condensate Pump, GA-25l9/~ via the Inter/After Condenser, EA-2519. The
Inter/After Condenser condenses the vapours withdrawn by the steam jet evacuation
equipment. Any condensate formed in the piping between the turbine and the condenser is
vaporized in the Re-evaporator, EA-2521, with water soluble corrosion inhibitor from the
Second Stage Compressor Discharge Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2516. The combined
stream is cooled and passed to the High Pressure Separator,FA-2504,where hydrocarbon
vapour, hydrocarbon liquid and water are separated. Water i s continuous 1y removed from
the boot and transferred to the Main Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304,before
pass ing to the Sour Wate r Stripper.
The vapour stream from the Hi gh Pressure Separator, FA-2504,is introduced at the base of
the Sponge Oi1 Absorber/Raw Gaso1 i ne Absorber, DA-250l ,where i t i s scrubbed with raw
gasoline and then with 1ean sponge oil to remove C3's and heavier. The raw gasoline is fed
from the Maln Fractionator Overhead Accumulator, FA-2304,by the Fractionator Overhead
Pump,GA-23l2/S, via the Raw Gasoline Cooler, EA-250l,to the Raw Gasoline Coalescer, FA-
2503. Water removed i s returned to FA-2304. The raw gasoline enters DA-2501 where it
contacts the vapours from the High Pressure Separator over slotted ring packing. Ouring
winter operation, debutaniser bottoms recycle from the Debutani Sf'r Bottoms Recyc1e
Pump,GA-2504/S, is pumped with the raw gasoline into the Raw Gasoline Absorber. This is
done to provide suffieient liquid loading both in the Raw Gas01ine Absorber and in the
Deethaniser to effect the desired C3 recovery. The raw gasoline leaves the bottom of the
ABsorber and is pumped by the Raw Gasoline Absorber Bottoms Pump,GA-2502/S,into the
inlet of the High Press ure Separator Ai rfan Cool er, EC-2502.
The vapours emerging from the Raw Gasoline Absorber pass up the co1umn through a
chimney tray and are contaeted with 1ean sponge oil aver slotted ring packing. The lean
sponge oil whieh is unstripped LCGO is pumped fram the FCCU by the Lean Sponge Oi1
Pump,GA-2309/S~and enters the top of the Sponge Oil Absorber,DA-2501, where it removes
a major part of the C315 and C4's from the vapour. The rieh spange oi1 1eaving the
Absorber passes to the Rich Sponge Oi1 Surge Drum, FA-2516. Any vapours whi eh di
sengage are returned to the Absorber be10w the top packed bed. Rieh sponge oil is returned
to the coo1ed LCGO reflux stream which passes to the Main Fractionator, DA-2301. Water
removed from the boot of FA-25l6 is returned to FA-2304.
The overhead gases from the Spange Oi1 Absorber,DA-2501, consisting mainly of hydrogen.
Cl's, C2'5 and hydrogen sulphide flow to the Fuel Gas Scrubber KO Drum,FA-2509, and on to
the base of the Fuel Gas Scrubber, DA-2505. where lean amine is used in the countercurrent
extraction of hydrogen sulphide.
Liquid hydrocarbons from the High Pressure Separator, FA-2504,are pumped by the
Deethaniser Feed Pump, GA-2503/S. together with interstage liquid from the Second Stage
Compressor Suction Drum Pump. GA-250l/S. to the Deethaniser Feed Coalescer, FA-
2505.before passing to the top tray, tray 21, of the Deethaniser.DA-2502. Water from the
coalescer boot is passed to FA-2304.
Light ends are stripped out in the Deethaniser, DA-2502, in order to control the C2 content
in the resulting C3 streams. The overheads from the column are returned to the High
Pressure Separator Airfin Cooler,EC-2502. The column is reboiled by circulating hot intermedi
ate cycle gas oil (ICGO) pumped by the ICGO Reflux Pump,GA-2305/S, through the Deethani
ser Reboi1er. EA-2502. Reboiled vapours return to the column and the liquid product is fed
to the Debutaniser.DA-2503. The flow from the bottom of the Deethaniser represents the
total liquids recovery of the sys tem.
Any free water trapped in the Deethani ser i s removed in the Deethaniser Water Draw Off
Pot, FA-2506, which takes liquid from tray 15 of the co1umn.
Debutaniser Section
The Debutaniser DA-2503, is designed to separate C4'5 and 1ighter from C51S and heavier,
with the overhead having less than 0.3 wt.% pentanes and heavier and bottoms containing
less than 0.5 wt.% butanes and lighter. The feed to this tower is the Deethaniser bottoms
stream. This stream is preheated by circulating hot LCGO. pumped by the LCGO Re fl ux
Pump, GA-2303jS. through the Debutaniser Feed Preheater. EA-2503, and by Debutaniser
page 92
bottoms in the Debutanizer Feed/Effluent Exchanger. EA-2504. Partial1y vaporized feed

enters the Debutanizer. which has 42 trays, on tray 18.
The Debutaniser overheads are totally condensed in the Debutaniser Overhead Condenser,
EC-2504, and passed to the Debutaniser Overhead Accumu1 ator, FA-2507. Water soluble
corrosion inhibitor is injected into the in1et of the condenser by Debutaniser Overhead
Corrosion Inhibitor Pump, GA-2517~ to prevent hydrogen blistering. Water removed in the
boot of the Overhead Accumu1ator is returned to the Main Fractionator Overhead
Accumu1ator, FA-2304 Reflux is returned to the column via the Debutaniser Overhead Ref1
ux Pump, GA-2505/S, and the C3/ C4 product is pumped by the Debutaniser Overhead
Product Pump, GA-2506/S, via the Debutaniser Overhead Trim Cooler, EA-2506, to the C3-
C4 H2S Scrubber, DA-2506,where H2S is removed by contacting with amine.
The column is reboiled by circu1ating hot fractionator bottoms pumped by the Fractionator
Bottoms Pump, GA-2303/S, through the Debutaniser Reboiler, EA-2505. The bottoms s
tream i s used to preheat the tower feed in the Debutaniser Feed/Eff1uent Exchanger,EA-
2504,and then to reboi 1 the Depropani ser, DA-2507, in the Depropani ser Reboi1er, EA-
2509, before passing to the Naphtha Splitter, DA-2504. Provision is made to cool and recycle
a portion of the Debutani ser bottoms to the Raw Gasol ine Absorber, DA-250l, in order to
improve C3 recovery when operating at other than maximum gasoline operations. The
Debutaniser bottoms stream is taken off downstream of the Depropaniser Reboiler and is
cooled in the Debutaniser Bottoms Recycle Cooler, EC-2503, before being pumped by the
Debutaniser Bottoms Recycle Pump,GA-2504/S, to the Raw Gasoline Absorber DA-2501.
Naphtha Splitter Section
Debutaniser bottoms 1S charged to tray 10 of the 20 tray Naphtha Spl itter, DA-2505. The
Sp1 itter i s operated to produce light and heavy naphtha streams, with the light naphtha
having an ASTM end point of 700C and there being a 5.6 0C minimum gap between the light
naphtha 95% ASTM point and the heavy naphtha 5% ASTM point.
The tower overhead is tota11y condensed by the Naphtha Splitter Overhead Condenser,EC-
2505,and passed to the Naphtha Splitter Overhead Accumulator,FA-2508. Part of this liquid
is pumped by the Naphtha Splitter Reflux/ Product Pump,GA-2508/S,as reflux to the Naphtha
Splitter. The remainder is sent to the Light Naphtha Merox Unit (Unit 2750) before passing to
storage.
The tower is reboiled by circulating hot ICGO pumped by the ICGO Reflux Pump, GA-2305/S,
through the Naphtha Sp 1i tter Reboi 1er. EA-2507. The hea vy naphtha bottom product
stream is pumped by the Heavy Naphtha Product Pump, GA-2507/S, via the C Drier Reboiler,
EA-2512, to the Heavy Naphtha Product ~ooler) EC-2507, before passing to the Heavy
Naphtha Merox Unit (Unit 2850) and storage.
Fuel Gas H2S Scrubber Section
Overhead gas from the Absorber, DA-2501, together with off gas from the LCGO
Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400) and sour gas from several sources offsite are fed to the Fuel
Gas Scrubber KO Drum, FA-2509, and passed to the Fuel Gas H2S Scrubber, DA-2505. Lean
DEA (Diethanolamine) from theAmine Regeneration Unit (Unit 2950) is fed into the Scrubber
near the top and contacting with the gas takes place in two 3 metre beds of 38mm ceramic
saddles. The sweet gas leaves the tower at the top and passes to the Refinery Fuel Gas
System. The Rich DEA, containing the absorbed H2S and CO2, passes to the bottom of the
tower and is mixed wlth rich amine streams from the C3-(4 Scrubber, DA-2506, and the
Hydrotreating Unit. This combined stream is then routed to the Amine Regeneration Unit
(Unit 2950).
C3-C4 Scrubber Section
Cooled LPG from the Debutaniser Overhead Trim Cooler, EA-2506, is introduced into the
bottom of the C3-C4 Scrubber, DA-2506. Lean DEA (Diethanolamine) is fed into the top of
the tower and contacted with the LPG in two 3 metre beds of 38mm slotted rings where
transfer of the H2S and C02 from the hydrocarbon to the amine takes place. The rich amine
is taken from the bottom of the Scrubber and routed to the bottom of the Fuel Gas Scrubber,
DA-2505, where 1t is flashed to remove soluble and entrained hydrocarbons before passing
to the Amine Regeneration Unit (Unit 2950).
At the top of the C3-C4 Scrubber, the amine and hydrocarbon are allowed to separate by
gravity. The separated hydrocarbon is then passed through a 1 meter coalescing section to
remove any traces of the aqueous amine before passing out of the tower. The C3-C4 stream
page 93
is then routed to the LPG Merox Unit (Unit 2550) to remove mercaptans before being
pumped by the Depropaniser Charge Pump, GA-2552/S to the Depropaniser, DA-2508.
Depropaniser Section
C3-C4’s from the LPG Merox Unit (Unit 2550) together with C3-C4 recycle from the
Alkylation Unit (Unit 2600) are fed, through the Oepropani ser Feed/Effl uent Exchanger, EA-
25G8, to the Depropani ser, DA-2507. The feed enters on tray 27 of this 53 tray column.
Reboil heat is suplied to the Depropaniser by the Debutaniser bottoms stream in the
Depropaniser Reboiler, EA-2509. The butane/butylene praduct from the bottom of the
Depropaniser is first cooled in the Depropaniser Feed/Effluent Exchanger, EA-2508) and then
by cooling water in the C4 Product Cooler, EA-25l0 , before being routed to the Alkylation
Unit (Unit 2600) or to offsite storage.
The overheads from the column are tota11y condensed in the Depropaniser Overhead
Condenser, EC-2504, and passed to the Depropaniser Overhead Accumulator, FA-25l0.
Water, separated_ out in the boot of this drum,is passed to the Main Fractionator Overhead
Accumulator, FA-2304. Part of the condensed hydrocarbon stream is pumped by the
Depropani ser Refl ux/Product Pump, GA-2509 IS, as refl ux to the Depropani sero The rema
inder i s routed to the (3 Drier, DA-2508.
C3 Drier Section
Water contained in the overhead product of the Depropaniser is separated fram the C315 in
the C3 Drier, DA-2508, in order to produce a propane cut with a dew pOlnt less than -30 °c.
The feed to the C3 Orier t DA-2508 ,is cooled in the C3 Orier Feed Cool er, EA-2511, and
passed through the C3 Drier Feed Coa1escer t FA-2511 t to remove free water. The feed
enters the 30 tray column on tray 18. The tower overheads are partially condensed by the
C3 Drier Overhead Condenser t EA-2513 and fed to the C3 Drier Overhead Accumulator t FA-
2513. The liquid hydracarbon from the Accumu1ator i5 pumped back to the tower as reflux
by the C3 Drier Overhead Reflux Pump, GA-2511/S, via the C3 Drier Reflux Coalescer, FA-
2512. Vapour from the Accumulator i5 recycled to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler,
EC-2502, in the Absorption/Deethaniser Section.
Propylene Splitter Section
Dried C3’s enter the Propylene Splitter t DA-2509 ton tray 41 of tne 101 tray column. The
co1umn overheads are partia11y condensed in the Propylene Splitter Overhead Condenser,
EC-2508 t and pass to the Propylene Splitter Overhead Accumulator, FA-2514. The liquid
hydrocarbon from this drum is pumped back to the tower as reflux by Propylene Splitter
Overhead Reflux Pump, GA-2513/S, while the vapour is recycled to the High Pressure
Separator Airfan Cooler, EC-2502, in the Absorption/ Deethaniser Section.
Propylene product is withdrawn from tray 91 as a side draw and routed to storage offsite via
the Propylene Product Cooler, EA-2516.
Reboil heat to the co1umn is provided from two separate sources. The majority of the heat is
supplied by a top pump around reflux stream from the FCCU Main Fractionator t DA-2301,
and is circlated by the Top Pump around Reflux Pump,GA-2311/S through the Propylene
Splitter Reboiler/Top Pump around Refl ux Exchanger, EA-2515. The remaining heat is
supplied by the Propylene Splitter Reboiler/Steam Condensate Exchanger, EA~25l4, which
uses high temperature steam condensate from the High Temperature Condensate Drum,FA-
2517, as the heating medium.
The propane product is taken from the bottom of the tower and is pumped by the Propane
Product Pump, GA-25l2/S, through the Propane Product Cooler, EA-2517, to offsite storage.
Condensate Collection System
Steam condensate from the Sour Water Stripper Reboiler, EA-2902, and the Amine
Regenerator Reboiler, EA-2952, together with condensate from the M.P. condensate header
is passed into the High Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2517.
Flashed steam is fed into the LP steam main. The hot condensate is primari1y used as a heat
source and is passed to the Propylene Splitter Reboiler/Steam Condensate Exchanger, EA-
25l4, before entering the Low Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2518. Excess condensate
passes directly to the Low Temperature Condensate Drum. If insufficient condensate is
available for reboiling the'Propylene Splitter, boiler feed water is fed into the High
Temperature Condensate Drum.
page 94
Condensate from the LP condensate header is also fed into the Low Temperature Condensate
Drum, FA-25l 7. Flashed steam is exhausted to atmosphere. Flashed condensate is fed by
the Compressor Condensate Booster Pump, GA-25l8/S, to the First Stage Compressor
Condenser, EC-250l, to the High Pressure Separator Airfan Cooler, EC-2502, and to the
Alkylation Unit (Unit 2600) to be used as water wash in the DP Water Wash Settler, FA-2509,
and the DIS Water Wash Settler, FA-26ll. Additional condensate is supplied by the Process
Condensate Pump, GA-2521/S, vi a the flashed condensate header to theCondensate Surge
Drum, FA-2404, in the Hydrotreating Unit (Unit 2400), to the Spray Water Drum, FA-2302,
in the FCCU, and to other intermittent users. The excess condensate fram this pump is
routed to the offsite deaeration facilities. If insufficient condensate is available, boiler feed
water is fed into the Low Temperature Condensate Drum, FA-2518.
Corrasion Inhibitor System
In order to protect certain items of equipment fram corrosion and hydrogen blistering a
water soluble based corrosion inhibitor system has been provided. The corrosion inhibitor i5
mixed with turbine condensate in the Corrosion Inhibitor Drum, FA-2515. The solution is
mixed using fuel gas which is vented to the flare system. The following items of equipment
and its downstream piping are protected by injecting the material using the following pumps:
Main
Injection Pump
Equipment
GA-2514 Main Fractionator OH Corrosion Inhibitor Pump EC-2304
GA-2515 First Stage Compressor Discharge Corrosion Inhibitor Pump EC-2501
GA-2516 Second Stage Compressor Discharge Corrosion Inhibitor Pump EC-2502
GA-2517 Debutaniser Overhead Corrosion Inhibitor Pump EC-2504
GA-2524 Sour Water Stripper Reflux Corrosion Inhibitor Pump DA-290l
Fuel Gas System

Fuel gas from the Refi nery Fuel Gas Sys tem i s fed i nto the Fuel Gas Mixing Drum FA-23l0
before passing to the fuel gas header. At start-up or when insufficient fuel gas is available
fram the Refinery system, fuel gas is provided by vaporising LPG, taken from offsite or from
the feed to the Depropaniser, DA-2507, in the LPG Vaporiser, EA-2310. This is mixed with
the fuel gas from the Refinery in the Fuel Gas Mixing Drum.
The fuel gas header feeds fuel gas to the FCCU heaters via the Fuel Gas KO DrUm,FA-2305,
to the HTU heaters via the Fuel Gas KO Drum, FA-2425, to the Sulphur Recovery Unit via
Fuel Gas KO Pot, FA-2318, and to all other users.
Flare Header System
All safety reliefs resulting fram the lifting of pressure safety relief valves are fed to the
Refinery Flare System via the FCCU/GCU Flane KO Drum,FA-2523. This drum handles reliefs
from the FCCU, GCU, Amine Regeneration L1nit and Sour Water Stripper. Any hydrocarbon
liquid knocked out in the Flare KO Drum is pumped by the Fl are KO Drum Pumps t GA-2525
A/B,to the light slops header. This drum also serves as an atmospheric flash drum at start-up
when raw gasoline from the Raw Gasoline Cooler, EA-250l,is run down, via this drum.to the
light slops system.
2.7.3.3 Flow charts
Complete list of available drawings of FCC complex is given in Annex 16.
2.7.3.4 Condition of the processes
The use of electricity of FCC is 35.4 Mega Watt per day.
Steam is needed as well:
• High pressure steam (45 bar, 4129 C) 620 tons per day.
• Medium pressure steam (16 bar, 3200 C) 410 tons per day
• Low pressure steam (4.5 bar 2000 C) 60 tons per day.
2.7.3.5 Hazardous material
Feed Characteristics
page 95
Following tables give characteristics of main feed for FCC.

Table 41: Vacuum Gas Oil
Crude Source KIRKUK REB

TBP Cut Range (°C) 340 - 380 -
500 590
Gravi ty (oAPI) 25.4
o 3
Specific Gravity at 15.6 C (kg/m ) 0.9315
o
Pour Point ( C) 32 31
Sulphur (Wt%) 2.2 2.35
Basic Nitrogen Wt (ppm) 150
Conradson Carbon Residue (Wt%) 0.3 0.5
Characterization Factor 11. 85
Molecular Weight 360
Table 42: C3/C4 Recycle From Alkylation Unit

C3 (Mol%) 1.99 1.5
IC4 (Mol%) 93.37 93.33
NC4 (Mol%) 4.59 5.11
IC5 (Mol%) 0.05 0.06
Molecular Weight 57.9 57.9
o 3
Specific Gravity at 15.6 C (kg/m ) 119.9 119.7
Table 43: Naphtha From LCGO Hydrotreating Unit

H2S (Mol%) 1.1 0,8
C2 (Mol%) 1.1 1.7
C3 (Mol%) 2.2 2.5
IC4 (Mol%) 1.1 0.8
NC4 (Mol%) 2.2 2.5
IC5 (Mol%) 3.4 2.5
NC5 (Mol%) 5.6 4.1
Naphtha (Mol%) 40.5 23.1
LCGO (Mol%) 42.8 62.0
Products of FCC
Products from FCC unit are:
• Wet gas
• Raw FCC gasoline
• Light cycle gas oil
• Products from the bottom of fractionators
• Intermediate cycle gas oil for production process in FCC
Characteristics of some products are given in next tables.
Table 44: Quality of wet gas
page 96
Regime 1 Regime 2
Component
(%mas) (% mas)
H2S 5.84 7,68
H2 0.15 0.38
CH 4 2.24 5.63
C2 H6 2.17 6.66
C2 H4 1.72 2.76
C3 H8 4.86 10.61
Propylene 22.38 16.56
i-butane 24.78 22.23
n-butane 6.67 6.82
Butilene 29.19 20.67
Table 45: Quality of raw FCC gasoline
Regime 1 Regime 2
Component
(%mas) (% mas)
Molecular weight 9.41 100.8
o
Specific Gravity at 15.6 C 65.9 58.7
IBP 2.24 5.63
10% 2.17 6.66
30% 1.72 2.76
o
Distillation ASTM C 50% 4.86 10.61
70%
90%
EP
Octane number RON 22.38 16.56
MON 24.78 22.23
paraffin 6.67 6.82
olefins
PONA (%vol)
naphthens
aromats
Total sulfur 0.160 0.169
Safety data sheet

Safety data sheets for dangerous substances in FCC are given in Annex 21.
Main hazardous materials in FCC

Quantity of substances contained in FCC is given in Annex 19. Refinery is reporting to the
state authority on type and quantities of substances each year using defined form.
The list of potential explosion hazards is given in Annex 17 as determined in the document
Explosion hazardous zones in Block VI of NIS - Refinery Pancevo (Elaborat o zonama
opasnosti od eksplozije za Blok VI, u NIS – Rafinerija nafte, Pančevo, April – Juni 2003.)
2.7.3.6 Utilities and effects
Major supplies
page 97
The major outside supplies for FCC and the connected safety problems are shown in Table
46.
The internal electrical distribution system is working now without any problems. In the year
2006. the transformer unit has been completely rebuilt.
Table 46: FCC supplies
Type of supply Safety problem
Electricity Possible problem could cause that no electricity

will be delivered and this, further, could cause a
safety problem.
A hazard analysis does not exist.
Fuel gas No problems
Steam Sometimes problems but no safety problems
Instrumental air Only problems if electricity is not available
Nitrogen No problems
Cooling water Smaller problems. Up to now cooling water

delivery was reduced in two cases caused by leaks
in the system.
Loss of electricity
One of the most important outside supplies for FCC is electricity. Hazard analysis has never
been done for this case. Loss of electricity could cause safety problem, even may lead to a
Domino effect if something else goes wrong simultaneously. Loss of electricity could affect
differently some types of equipment as shown in the following table.
Table 47: Some effect of loss of electricity
Equipment/
installation Possible safety problem
affected
Reactor Slide valves will close and reaction will stop. Some
valves will opes due to their basic function and the
steam will be released. Result will be steam in the
reactor and the process will stop. (less than 10
seconds).
Temperature will increase as no cooling exists.
Regenerator Regenerator will be a separate unit as all slide valves
are closed. The remaining coke and catalyst will still
react. There are about 90 tons of catalysts in the
regenerator. A balance of the remaining coke and air
is difficult regarding the high reaction speed.
Nevertheless as the concentration of Oxygen is
reduced the concentration of CO may increase and
may cause explosion problems.
Column Temperature and pressure will increase as the
ventilator used for the air coolers are not longer
working. The safety valve at the top of the column
will open.
Air coolers No problem as the temperature will go done very
fast if the feed will not be continued.
Pressure vessel No problem as functioning is not depending on
electrical equipment.
Sensor/
Are still working as using a 24 V line.
Instrumentation
page 98
Computers Still working as supplied by an internal electricity

line.
2.7.4 Safety of the plant

2.7.4.1 History of accident
The establishment has been build up from 1981 up to 1984. The production started in 1985.
From 1985 to 1992 there was a period of normal operation. From 1992 to 1996 there was no
operation. From 1996 to 1999 was again a period of normal operation. The establishment
has been bombed in 1999 and rebuild in 2000. From 2000 up to now there is again a period
of normal operation. The average production is about 80% of the total capacity.
2.7.4.2 Hazards identified
The Hazards related to the operation of the FCC Unit are associated to uncontrolled release
of hazardous materials, mainly due to failure of components due to causes not directly
related to process deviations (Loss of Containment events).
The cases of possible loss of containment identified and analyzed in the report are chosen to
represent the possible range of hazardous materials that can be released and the process
conditions of the release.
Possible accidental scenarios caused by process deviations are controlled and protected by
the Process Control System and by the Shut Down System, so that their probability of
occurrence can be considered to be negligible. They are therefore not further analyzed in this
report.
The Release cases (Top Events) identified for the analysis are:
1. TOP1 - Release of propylene from the bottom of Vessel FA-2514
2. TOP2 - Release of gasoline from the bottom of column DA-2503
3. TOP3 - Release of propane from bottom of propane splitter DA-2509
4. TOP4 - Release of toxic gas (H2S) from FA-2953
5. TOP5 - Release of mixture of toxic gases from FA-2455.
The above cases allow to represent hazards related to the presence of both, flammable
materials and toxic materials, from vessels, columns and furnaces.
For the Propylene splitter section, including FA-2514, an HAZOP analysis has been done. This
section contains the largest inventory of hazardous material in the Unit, therefore an
assessment of the process deviations for this unit was conducted, to assess if there is any
specific process deviation that can contribute to leaks in this Section.
HAZOP analysis has been done using web based tool designed by R-Tech (Figure 43 - Figure
46) and following .
TOP1: Release of Propylene from bottom of Pressure Vessel FA 2514

In the loop, shown in Figure 47, a pressure vessel (FA 2514) and a condenser (EC 2508)
have been considered. The vessel is a part of the propanizer section; short description of this
section is given in subsection 3.1, simplified flow diagram is given in Annex 1.
The pressure vessel has a volume of 21 m3. The operational pressure is 19.9 bar and the
operational temperature 44 0 C. The pressure vessel contains propylene. The vessel is filled
by max. 10 – 12 m3. The stream is coming from the top of the column with 140 m/hour. The
intention is to recycle the condensed phase to increase the purity of the product. The stream
will be re-circulated in the column.
Sensors are measuring the level and the pressure and are responsible for the regulation.
External sensors are measuring the gas concentration outside the vessel.
The pressure vessel is protected by two safety valves acting by 22 bar. The vessel is design
for 22.5 bar and 52 0 C. The safety valves are designed as a redundant system as one valve
is able to protect the vessel. The design of the valves for one phase dispersion or two phase
dispersion is unknown. (Probably done for one phase dispersion which will not consider the
real situation.) Additional a sprinkler system is installed for cooling the vessel in the case of a
fire.
The whole flow is based on the pressure difference between column and vessel which is 400
mbar.
page 99
No flow to the vessel is possible if a valve is closed but will cause no safety problem.
Figure 43: HAZOP tool – Main page
Figure 44: HAZOP tool - Loop description
page 100
Figure 45: HAZOP tool – Nodes
Figure 46: HAZOP tool – Drawing

More flow is not possible as the pressure in the vessel will increase which will decrease the
pressure difference between column and vessel and will reduce automatically the flow.
Furthermore the heater of the column will be stopped automatically. The deviation flow is
directly connected with the deviation pressure. Therefore pressure is not further considered.
Temperature can not increase or decrease in this loop.
page 101
For a shut down all lines will be cleaned with steam and for a start up all lines will be cleaned
with nitrogen,
Figure 47: Loop1 - TOP1 Event, FA-2514

The Hazop analysis has confirmed that a leak in the pressure vessel is a scenario to be
quantitatively assessed, while no specific process deviations able to cause a more significant
scenario have been identified.
Scenario identification
Following a mechanical failure due e.g. to corrosion, material defects etc, it is postulated that
a complete rupture of a 6” pipe connected to the pressure vessel FA-2514 will occur.
This scenario is chosen to represent a credible worst case of release from the FCC Unit,
giving the process characteristics and the full-bore rupture considered.
In case the resulting pool is not ignited, the accidental scenarios develops as a flammable
gas dispersion with possible Flash Fire or UVCE.
In case of immediate ignition, a Pool Fire will occur.
The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in following
Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
TOP2: Release of gasoline from bottom of Column DA 2503

Column DA-2503 is a part of debutanizer section of Gas concentration unit; description given
in chapter 2.7.3.2 and flow diagram in Annex 20. Simplified flow diagram showing position of
the column is given on Figure 48.
The column has pressure of approx 13 bar and a temperature of 190 C.
This event represents the release of a flammable material at high temperature and pressure,
giving possibly rise to a two-phase jet.
page 102
Figure 48: Column D 2503 – debutanizer section of S 2500

Two possible release scenarios are postulated, one corresponding to a significant leak
(diameter approx 1”) and one corresponding to a major leak (diameter approx 4”).
The release will be in form of a two-phase jet causing, if ignited, a jet fire. In case of late
ignition of the dispersing cloud, Flash Fire or Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE) will
occur.
The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in sections 2.7.5.
TOP3: Release of propane from the bottom of column DA-2509

Propylene splitter DA-2509 is a part of Gas concentration unit, Propylene splitter section;
description of the unit given in chapter 2.7.3.2 and flow diagram in Annex 20/
Column DA-2509 has pressure of approx 21 bar and a temperature of 62 C. Simplified flow
diagram showing position of the column is given on Figure 48.
This event represents the release of propane at relatively high temperature and high
pressure, giving rise to a two-phase jet.
Two possible release scenarios are postulated, one corresponding to a significant leak
(diameter approx 1”) and one corresponding to a major leak (diameter 3”, pipe diameter).
The release will be in form of a two-phase jet causing, if ignited, a jet fire. In case of late
ignition of the dispersing cloud, Flash Fire or UVCE will occur.
page 103
The probability and consequences of the accidental scenarios are analyzed in sections 2.7.5.
Figure 49: Column DA-2509 – splitter section of S-2500
TOP4: Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2953

Vessel FA-2953 is a part of section for amine regeneration; description of unit given in 4...,
simplified technological scheme in Annex 3.
In case of failure of vessel FA-2953, a mixture rich in H2S (approx 90%) will be released.
This case is chosen to represent a possible leak of a toxic material within the Plant.
The release scenario postulated is a leak of diameter of approx 2”, chosen considering the
actual conditions and characteristics of the vessel.
The release will be in form of a gas jet dispersing in atmosphere causing a toxic cloud.
Sections 5.3 and 5.4
TOP5: Release of toxic mixture from the vessel FA-2455

Vessel FA-2455 is a part of of Claus unit; description given in ...; flow diagram given in
Annex 4.
In case of failure of vessel FA-2455, a mixture of H2S (approx 70%), SO2 and CO2 will be
released. This case is chosen to represent a possible leak of a toxic mixture within the plant.
The release scenario postulated is a leak of diameter of approx 4”, chosen considering the
actual conditions and characteristics of the vessel.
The release will be in form of a gas jet dispersing in atmosphere causing a toxic cloud.
page 104
2.7.4.3 Frequency of occurrence of hazards

The frequency of occurrence of accidental scenarios is assessed on the basis of historical
data on leaks and ruptures from typical process components. Statistical data available are
summarized in Table 48.
Table 48: Frequency of occurrence of accidental events
Frequency
Event Fonte
(events/ year)
Leak from Flange seal 4,0 × 10-4 Cremer & Warner, “A report to
the Rijnmond Public Autority”
Leak from pump mechanical seals 6,0 × 10-2 Tab. A 9-2 Lees
Leak from piping diameter
Frequency in /meter (mm)
of pipe/year) Cremer & Warner, “A report to
< 50 9,0 × 10-6
50 – 200 5,0 × 10-6
>200 3,0 × 10-6
Piping rupture diameter
Frequency in /meter (mm)
of pipe/year) Cremer & Warner, “A report to
< 50 9,0 × 10-7
50 – 200 3,0 × 10-7
>200 9,0 × 10-8
Catatrophic tank rupture 1, × 10-5 Cremer & Warner, “A report to
Leak from tanks 1,× 10-4 the Rijnmond Public Autority
The data above are derived from experience up to the eighties; to date the availability of
tools and procedures specifically dedicated to the improving of safety like Safety
Management Systems, RBI etc makes it realistic to consider that the frequency of failure
should be lower than those experienced up to 20 years ago or more.
To take this into account, a factor of reduction of 0.1 is applied to the all the values given in
the Table 2.
The frequency of occurrence of the final scenario depends on the probability of ignition
(immediate or delayed). From technical literature, the following values for the probability of
ignition are considered:
• Immediate ignition of gas/flashing leaks: 0.3 – 0.01
• Immediate ignition of a liquid pool fire: 0.05 – 0.01
• Delayed ignition of flammable cloud: 0.15 – 0.01
• Probability that the delayed ignition will cause an UVCE: the possibility that an UVCE
occurs depend on the amount of flammable material in the cloud. It is considered
that for a quantity of gas within the flammable limits lower than 1000 kg, the UVCE
can not occur, and only a flash fire is considered. For quantity of gas within the
flammable limits higher than 1000 kg, the probability of having UVCE following
ignition is considered to be 0.3.
The frequency of occurrence of accidental scenarios is calculated by Event Tree analysis, on
the basis of estimation of the above values. The frequency of occurrence of the scenarios can
then be classified according e.g. to the classification given in Table 49.
On the basis of the above classification, events having a frequency of occurrence lower than
10-7 per year are considered to be practically not credible and are therefore not further
analyzed.
The frequency of occurrence of the Hazards identified is assessed as described in the
following sections.
page 105
Table 49: Definition of Frequency Classes
Frequency
Classification
(events/year)
Probable > 10-2
Unlikely 10-4 ÷ 10-2
Very unlikely 10-6 ÷ 10-4
Extremely unlikely < 10-6
TOP1: Release of Propylene from bottom of Pressure Vessel FA 2514

The frequency of occurrence of the release (full rupture of a 6” pipe) is estimated considering
20 m of piping.
The resulting leak frequency is estimate to be in the order of 5E-7 events/year.
The frequency of occurrence of a pool fire is estimated to be (considering the probability of
ignition) 5E-8 events /year.
The frequency of occurrence of a VCE / Flash Fire is estimated respectively in 2E-9 and 4E-9
events /year.
Notwithstanding the low frequency of occurrence of the scenarios, the consequence analysis
will be done to assess the consequences of a worst case scenario (even if the frequency
assessment makes it to be considered not credible).
TOP2: Release of gasoline from the bottom of Column DA 2503

The frequency of occurrence of the release (significant and major leaks of a 6” pipe) is
estimated considering 20 m of piping. The resulting leak frequency is estimate to be in the
order of 1E-5 and 5E-7 events/year.
The frequency of occurrence of a jet/pool fire is estimated to be (considering the probability
of ignition) 3E-6 and 1E-7 /year respectively.
The frequency of occurrence of a UVCE / Flash Fire is estimated respectively in 1E-7 and 5E-
9 events/year.
TOP3: Release of Propane from the bottom of Splitter DA-2509

The frequency of occurrence of the release (significant and major leaks of a 3” pipe) is
estimated considering 20 m of piping.
The resulting leak frequency is estimate to be in the order of 1E-5 and 5E-7 events/year.
The frequency of occurrence of a jet fire is estimated to be (considering the probability of
ignition) 3E-6 and 1E-7 /year respectively.
The frequency of occurrence of a UVCE / Flash Fire is estimated respectively in 1E-7 and 5E-
9 events/year.
TOP4: Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2953

The frequency of occurrence of the release is assessed considering the leak from the outlet
section piping of FA-2455. Considering the leak from a tank wall, the frequency is estimated
in the order of 1E-5 events/year.
TOP5: Release of toxic mixture from the vessel FA-2455

The frequency of occurrence of the release is assessed considering the leak from the outlet
section piping of FA-2455. Considering the leak from a tank wall, the frequency is estimated
in the order of 1E-5 events/year.
2.7.4.4 Consequences of hazards
General model
The scenarios that can derive in general from a release, leading to a given outcome, are
represented in the Figure 50. This path was followed while deriving scenarios for FCC
analysis.
page 106
Hazardous
substance
Pressuried Unpressurised leak Other

leak incident
Discharge
Liquid Explosion:
pool Condensed phase
Gas 2-phase Liquid
Runaway
reaction
Dust
Physical
Flash and rainout Evaporation
Dispersion
External
fire
Jet Dense Neutral
Fireball Jet fire Flash fire VCE Pool fire Bleve
Toxic effect Thermal effect Explosion effect

blast and fragment
Outcome
Figure 50: General scenario

The consequence analysis assess the type of release (hazardous substance, type of leak) and
calculate the expected outcome by application of suitable analytical models.
Criteria for damage assessment

Damage caused by accidental scenarios are related to the level of overpressure, heat
radiation and toxic gas concentration reached at given distance from the release source.
The following tables give the criteria, from International technical literature, adopted to
define the damage to equipment or people associated to physical effects of accidents.
Table 50: Typical damages caused by overpressure
Overpressure Observed Effect

1kPa Glass breakage.
page 107
Overpressure Observed Effect

3kPa 90% glass breakage, gauges break
7 kPa Repairable damage to internal partitions and joinery. Cone
roof storage tank collapse
14 kPa House uninhabitable and badly cracked. Fired heater bricks
crack.
21 kPa Wagons and plant items overturned. Half filled cone roof
storage tank uplifts. Unreinforced masonry bearing wall
building destroyed
35 kPa Regenerator bracing fails and frame collapses. Unreinforced
steel or concrete frame building destroyed.
70 kPa Many types of process vessels overturned or destroyed.
Table 51: Details on damage caused by pressure wave
Peak side on overpressure

(psi) (kPaa)
Annoying noise (137dB), if low frequency (1-15 0.02 0.2
Hz)
Occasional breaking of large glass windows 0.03
already under strain
Loud noise (143 dB), Sonic boom glass failure 0.04
Breakage of windows, small under strain 0.1 0.7
Typical pressure for glass failure 0.15 1.0
"Safe distance" (probably 0.95 no serious damage 0.3 2.0
beyond this value)
Missile limit
Some damage to house ceilings; 10% window
glass structure
Limited minor structural damage 0.4 2.8
Large and small windows usually shattered; 0.5 - 1.0 3.5 - 6.9
occasional damage to window frames
Minor damage to house structure 0.7 4.8
Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable 1.0 6.9
Corrugated asbestos shattered 1-2 6.9 - 13.8
Corrugated steel or aluminum panels, fastening
fail, followed by buckling
Wood panels (standard housing) fastenings fail,
panels blown in
Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted 1.3 9.0
Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses 2 13.8
Concrete or cinder block walls, not reinforced, 2-3 13.8 - 20.7
shattered
Lower limit of serious structural damage 2.3 15.9
50 % destruction of brickwork of house 2.5 17.3
Heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial building 3 20.7
suffer little damage
page 108
Peak side on overpressure

(psi) (kPaa)
Steel frame building distorted and pulled away
from foundation
Frameless, self-framing steel panel building 3-4 20.7 - 27.6
demolished
Rupture of oil storage tanks
Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured 4 27.6
Wooden utilities poles (telegraph, etc.) snapped 5 34.5
Tail hydraulic press (40 000 lb) in building slightly
damaged
Nearly complete destruction of houses 5-7 34.5 - 48.3
Loaded train wagons overturned 7 48.3
Brick panels, 8 - 12 in. thick, not reinforced, fail 7-8 48.3 - 55.2
by shearing or flexure
Loaded train boxcars completely demolished 9 62.1
Probable total destruction of buildings 10 69.0
Heavy (7000 lb) machine tools moved and badly
damaged
Very heavy (12 000 lb) machine tool survived
Limit of crater lip 300 2000
Damage estimates based on overpressure for process equipment (adjusted from CPS 2000)
are given in Table 51.
Consequence analysis modeling

The analysis of the consequences of the accidental scenarios has been done using computer
codes, with the process data and assumptions discussed in the preceding chapters. The
analysis has been done considering two meteorological conditions: low wind velocity
associated with stability class F (stable atmosphere) and medium wind velocity associated
with stability class D (neutral atmosphere).
In the following sections, the main results of the consequence analysis are given.
TOP1: Release of Propylene from bottom of pressure vessel FA-2514
The analysis considers the full bore rupture of the 6” pipe at the outlet of the FA-2514
vessel.
The following tables summarizes the main characteristics of the scenarios associated to the
event.
Table 52: TOP1 – Release from FA-2514, main characteristics
LEAK FULL BORE RUPTURE

EQUIPMENT Bottom line of F-2514
SUBSTANCE Propylene
DIAMETER OF Not analyzed 152 mm
OUTFLOW
SECTION
TEMPERATURE Not analyzed 43.3°C
PRESSURE Not analyzed 19.9 barg
OUTFLOW RATE Not analyzed 509 kg/s
page 109
LEAK FULL BORE RUPTURE

The Propylene leak is considered to be directed downward,
forming a pool of liquid that, in case of ignition, will cause a
Pool Fire.
If the pool is not ignited, it will start evaporating and the
SCENARIO resulting cloud will disperse. If the cloud is ignited at
DEVELOPMENT distance from the source, where the gas concentration is
still within the flammable limits, it can give rise to an UVCE
or a Flash Fire, depending on the congestion conditions.
If no ignition is found, the cloud will disperse without any
further consequences.
RELEASE
< 1 minute (considering shutdown activation)
DURATION
The damage distances obtained by consequence analysis are summarized in the following
Table.
The analysis is done also if all scenarios have frequency of occurrence lower than 1E-7
events/year, practically not credible, to obtain an assessment of the damage distances
associated to a major release case.
Table 53: TOP1 – Release from FA-2514, scenario
WEATHER DAMAGE DISTANCE

SCENARIO LEVEL
CONDITIONS (m)
Flame height 29
37.5 kW/m2 20
2
Pool Fire (1) 12.5 kW/m 42
1.5F/ 5D
S1 7 kW/m 2
55
5 kW/m2 63
2
3 kW/m 80
Flammable mass 7000
0.3 bar 150
UVCE(1)
1.5F/5D 0.14 bar 260
S2
0.07 bar 570
0.03 bar 1000
LFL 562
1.5F
Flash Fire(1) LFL/2 758
S3 LFL 400
5D
LFL/2 538
((1)
The scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not credible.
Distances calculated to give assessment of a worst case scenario
TOP2: Release of gasoline from bottom of Column DA-2503

The analysis considers the release from the 6” pipe at the bottom outlet of the DA-2503
column.
The following Table 54 summarizes the main characteristics of the Scenarios associated to
the event.
Table 54: TOP2 – Release from DA-2503, main characteristics
LEAK MAJOR RUPTURE

EQUIPMENT Bottom line of DA-2503
page 110
LEAK MAJOR RUPTURE

SUBSTANCE Gasoline (Modeled as Octane)
DIAMETER OF OUTFLOW
1” 4”
SECTION
TEMPERATURE 191 C 191 C
PRESSURE 12.7 barg 12.7 barg
OUTFLOW RATE 13 kg/s 208 kg/s
The leak is considered to be directed horizontally,
forming a two-phase jet that, in case of ignition, will
cause a Jet Fire and a Pool fire of the rain-out
quantity.
If the jet is not ignited, it will disperse. If the cloud is
SCENARIO
ignited at distance from the source, where the gas
DEVELOPMENT
concentration is still within the flammable limits, it
can give rise to an UVCE or a Flash Fire, depending
on the congestion conditions.
If no ignition is found, the cloud will disperse without
any further consequences.
10 minutes < 1 minute (considering
RELEASE DURATION
shutdown activation)
Table. The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7
events/year, being those having lower frequencies to be considered practically not credible.
Table 55: TOP2 – Release from DA-2503, scenario
Release Size 1” Release Size 4”

WEATHER DAMAGE DAMAGE
SCENARIO
CONDITIONS LEVEL DISTANCE LEVEL DISTANCE
(m) (m)
1.5F/5D Flame Flame
14 20
length length
37.5 37.5
5 7
kW/m2 kW/m2
Jet /Pool
Fire 12.5 12.5
15 16
S4 kW/m2 kW/m2
7 kW/m2 20 7 kW/m2 25
2 2
5 kW/m 25 5 kW/m 28
2 2
3 kW/m 31 3 kW/m 37
1.5F Flammable Flammable
660 3000
mass mass
(2) (1)
0.3 bar - 0.3 bar -
(2) (1)
0.14 bar - 0.14 bar -
(2) (1)
0.07 bar - 0.07 bar -
UVCE (2) (1)
0.03 bar - 0.03 bar -
S5
5D Flammable Flammable
250 2600
mass mass
(2) (1)
0.3 bar - 0.3 bar -
(2) (1)
0.14 bar - 0.14 bar -
(2) (1)
0.07 bar - 0.07 bar -
page 111

SCENARIO
(m) (m)
(2) (1)
0.03 bar - 0.03 bar -
(1)
1.5F LFL 85 LFL -
(1)
Flash Fire LFL/2 112 LFL/2 -
S6 5D LFL 83 LFL - (1)
(1)
LFL/2 112 LFL/2 -
(1)
Distances not calculated, being the scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not
credible.
(2)
Damage distances are not calculated. The mass of gas within flammable limits is lower than 1000 kg
and the explosion is to be considered not credible.
TOP3: Release of propane from bottom of Splitter DA-2509

The analysis considers the release from the 3” pipe at the bottom outlet of the DA-2509
column.
The following table summarizes the main characteristics of the Scenarios associated to the
event.
Table 56: TOP3 – Release from DA-2509, main characteristics
LEAK MAJOR RUPTURE

EQUIPMENT Bottom line of DA-2509
SUBSTANCE Propane
DIAMETER OF
1” 3”
OUTFLOW SECTION
TEMPERATURE 62 C 62 C
PRESSURE 21 barg 21 barg
OUTFLOW RATE 2.8 kg/s 25 kg/s
The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming
a two-phase jet that, in case of ignition, will cause a Jet
Fire.
SCENARIO If the jet is not ignited, it will disperse. If the cloud is
DEVELOPMENT ignited at distance from the source, where the gas
concentration is still within the flammable limits, it can
give rise to an UVCE or a Flash Fire, depending on the
congestion conditions.
> 1 hour 10 minutes (considering
RELEASE DURATION
shutdown activation)
table.
The analysis is done for scenarios having frequency of occurrence higher than 1E-7
Table 57: TOP3 – Release from DA 2509, scenario

SCENARIO
(m) (m)
Jet Fire Flame
1.5F/5D Flame length 19 46
S7 length
page 112

SCENARIO
(m) (m)
37.5
37.5 kW/m2 5 14
kW/m2
12.5
12.5 kW/m2 8 30
kW/m2
7 kW/m2 11 7 kW/m2 42
2 2
5 kW/m 14 5 kW/m 50
2 2
3 kW/m 20 3 kW/m 60
Flammable Flammable
100 3400
mass mass
(2) (1)
0.3 bar - 0.3 bar -
1.5F (2) (1)
0.14 bar - 0.14 bar -
(2) (1)
0.07 bar - 0.07 bar -
(2) (1)
UVCE 0.03 bar - 0.03 bar -
S8 Flammable Flammable
10 260
mass mass
(2) (1), (2)
0.3 bar - 0.3 bar -
5D (2) (1), (2)
0.14 bar - 0.14 bar -
(2) (1), (2)
0.07 bar - 0.07 bar -
(2) (1), (2)
0.03 bar - 0.03 bar -
(1)
LFL 85 LFL -
1.5F
(1)
Flash Fire LFL/2 112 LFL/2 -
S9 LFL 83 LFL - (1)
5D
(1)
LFL/2 112 LFL/2 -
(1)
Distances not calculated, being the scenario frequency lower than 1E-7 events/year, practically not
credible.
(2)
Damage distances are not calculated. The mass of gas within flammable limits is lower than 1000 kg
and the explosion is to be considered not credible.
Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2953

The analysis considers a release from FA-2953. The following Table summarizes the main
characteristics of the Scenarios associated to the event.
Table 58: EVENT 4 – Release from FA-2953, main characteristics
LEAK MAJOR RUPTURE

EQUIPMENT FA-2953
SUBSTANCE H2S (90%)
DIAMETER OF
OUTFLOW 50 mm Not considered
SECTION
TEMPERATURE 77 C
PRESSURE 5 barg
OUTFLOW RATE 2.2 kg/s
SCENARIO The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming a
page 113
DEVELOPMENT dispersing jet.

RELEASE
15 minutes (considering shutdown activation)
DURATION
Table.
Table 59: Event 4 – Release from FA-2953, scenario
Release size 100 mm

Scenario WEATHER DAMAGE DISTANCE
LEVEL
CONDITION (m)
LC50 420
1.5F
Toxic Dispersion IDLH 1300
S10 LC50 230
5D
IDLH 720
Release of toxic gas from vessel FA-2455

The analysis considers a release from FA-2455. The following Table summarizes the main
characteristics of the Scenarios associated to the event.
Table 60: EVENT 5 – Release from FA-2455, main characteristics
LEAK MAJOR RUPTURE

EQUIPMENT FA-2455
SUBSTANCE H2S (70%), SO2 (30%)
DIAMETER OF 100 mm Not considered
OUTFLOW SECTION
TEMPERATURE 102 C
PRESSURE 1 barg
OUTFLOW RATE 2.9 kg/s
SCENARIO The leak is considered to be directed horizontally, forming a
DEVELOPMENT dispersing jet.
RELEASE
Approx 45 minutes
DURATION
Table.
The distances given in the table refer to the concentration of H2S, that is the main
component of the mixture.
Table 61: EVENT 5 – Release from FA-2455, scenario
Release size 100 mm

Scenario WEATHER DAMAGE DISTANCE
LEVEL
CONDITION (m)
LC50 360
Toxic Dispersion 1.5F
IDLH 1100
S11
5D LC50 255
page 114
IDLH 670
2.7.4.5 Domino effect from Event TOP1

Domino effects from Event TOP1 can be mainly due to overpressure effects. The criteria for
the definition of damage levels associated to overpressure are given in Table 50. Table 62
shows the level of damage (in percent) for the affected structures.
Table 62: Level of damage (in percent) for the affected structures
Scenario Scenario Nr. 1 (EML1)

Structure parts, probability (p) 0.0000015
equipment
(example only!) Value % Damage
Description
(milion €) Damage (k€)
• Overpressure of 0.05bar
• Damage of 90% glass
Atmospheric • Instrumentation
500 5 - 10 1200
distillation damage
• In worst case scenario,
about 10% damage
Command center 10 0.0
• Overpressure of 10kPa
(0.1bar).
• Damage of structures of
60%, process equipment
10%
Vacuum
distillation
1100 10 2400 • Metal frames slightly
moved
• Small amount of damage
inside; can be repaired
• Damage of light roof
constructions
• Overpressure of 15 kPa
(0.15 bar)
• Damage, but not
destruction of structures
• Glass and
FCC 11000 30 9000 instrumentation damaged
• Electrical cabling and
control equipment
damaged
• The inner part of the
cooling tower damaged
• Overpressure of 10kPa
(0.1bar).
• Structural damage of
60%, process equipment
of 10%
Sulphurisation 700 10 70 • Metal frames slightly
moved
• Small amount of damage
inside; can be repaired
• Damage of light roof
constructions
Alkylation 1000 100 1000 total damage
Total 14310 13670
page 115
VAR (k €) 20.505
2.7.4.6 Summary of Hazard Analysis
The results of the hazard analysis are summarized in Annex 23. The following information
are given:
• initiating event
• accidental scenarios deriving from initiating event
• frequency of occurrence of accidental scenarios
• damage distances.
2.7.4.7 Measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards

Measures to avoid the occurrence of leaks and ruptures, to avoid ignition of leaking
substances, to limit effects of fires/explosion, to avoid or control process deviations are
Organizational and/or Technical and are described in Chapter 2.1.3.4.
Organizational measures
The intended major maintenance period is every three years. In reality at the moment there
is a major maintenance shut down per year as the process has been modified to increase the
efficiency of the process. The modification can partly lead to erosion and corrosion. This has
to be controlled at the moment by a yearly inspection.
regulations.
It is not an obligation in Serbia but regarding the topic explosion protection the Risk
Management division has started to consider the requirements of the ATEX Directives. An
explosion protection document has been developed which has been submitted to the
Ministry. The exchange of the equipment in regard to the requirements of the ATEX Directive
will be done step by step. Furthermore the German TA Luft will be implemented.
The inspection is in the responsibility of the production and maintaining department of RNP
and planning of safety aspects is in the responsibility of the Risk Management department.
Lighting protection
Lightning is high frequency event in summer and has lead to two accidents in the past. About
10 years ago a safety valve has been fired by lightning and last year a burning flare has
been addressed by lightning.
The normal protection measure is earthing. The maintenance period for the control of the
protection measure is once a year as required by law. The measurement of the resistance
and continuity will be done. All safety valves are protected by steam extinguishers. This task
is from 2007. in the responsibility of Risk Management division and will be done by an
external party.
2.7.4.8 Measures to reduce the consequences of an accident

Constructional and technical measures are presented in Chapter 2.1.3.4.
Further, bow-tie analysis has been done for selected top events described in Chapter 2.7.4.2
and summarized in Table 63.
The bow-tie is a structured method to assess risk where a qualitative approach may not be
possible or desirable. The success of the diagram is that it is simple and easy for the non-
specialist to understand. The idea is a simple one of combining the cause (fault tree) and the
consequence (event tree). When the fault tree is drawn on the left hand side and the event
tree is drawn on the right hand side with the hazard drawn as a "knot" in the middle the
diagram looks a bit like a bowtie.
page 116
The exact starting point of the Bowtie Methodology has been lost in time but it is believed
that they were originally called “Butterfly diagrams” and evolved from the Cause
Consequence Diagram of the 1970s. It is then thought that David Gill of ICI plc developed
the methodology and called them bowties in the late 70’s. It is generally accepted that the
earliest mention of the bowtie methodology appears in the ICI Hazan Course Notes 1979,
presented by The University of Queensland, Australia.
Bowtie diagrams for FCC have been created for selected top events which are to be
prevented by
• analyzing threats that could cause the event to occur
• analyzing consequences of the event occurring
• using available controls to prevent the event occurring and
• using available controls to mitigate against the consequences
Table 63: Selected TOP events and scenario
No Description Content Phase Component

Vessel, Leak, inside
S1: pool fire
TOP1 S2: delayed VCE propylene liquid FA-2514
S3: BLEVE
S4: Flash fire
Column, Leak, bottom
S5: jet fire
TOP2 gasoline liquid DA-2503
S6: UVCE
S7: Flash fire
Splitter, Leak, bottom
S8: jet fire
TOP3 propane liquid DA-2509
S9: VCE
S10: flash fire
Vessel, leak of toxic gas
TOP4 90% H2S, gas FA-2953
S11: Dispersion
Vessel, Leak of toxic (mixture)
gas from the H2S, SO2, gas FA-2455
TOP5 combustion chambers Co2
S12:
Corresponding bow-ties are given in Annex 24.
2.7.5 Risk assessment

The risk associated to the FCC operation is assessed through a Risk Matrix.
2.7.5.1 Frequency ranking
The frequency of occurrence of scenarios is assessed according to the classes given in table :
2.7.5.2 Damage severity

The severity of damages associated to each scenario is assessed according to the following
classes, where the severity is related to the maximum distance at which the damage levels
page 117
are experienced. It shall be noted that the definition of severity considers major hazards
having a potential impact on the population, as required by the Seveso II directive.
Table 64: Definition of Frequency Classes
Frequency
Classification Scenario
(events/year)
PROBABLE > 10-2
UNLIKELY 10-4 ÷ 10-2
VERY UNLIKELY 10-6 ÷ 10-4 S10, S11
-6
EXTREMELY UNLIKELY < 10 S1 – S9
Effects limited to the plant personnel are therefore in this context considered as not defining
a major hazards. These are assessed and controlled by Occupational Health procedures and
analyzes.
Table 65: Definition of consequence severity classes
Classification Damage
No significant effects if not in the vicinity of the

Neligible
involved equipment
Effect dangerous for life (12.5 kW/m2, 0.14 bar,
Significant
IDLH) reached within the FCC Unit.
Serious IDLH) reached outside the FCC Unit, limited
within the Refinery fences.
Major
IDLH) reached outside the refinery fences.
On the basis of the above definition, the risk associated to each scenario can be assessed as
in the following Risk Matrix, where three levels of risk are sown: an High risk area (in red)
where prevention and protection measures shall be considered to reduce the risk, a Medium
Risk area (in yellow) where prevention and protection measures should be considered to
reduce the risk, a Low risk area (in green) where the risk can be considered to be tolerable
and no further measures are necessary.
Table 66: Risk matrix for considered scenarios

S3, S5, S6,
Negligible
S8, S9
Significant S1, S4, S7
Serious S2 S11, S10
Major
Extremely
unlikely Very unlikely unlikely Probable
2.7.6 Conclusions
page 118
3 RBI / RCM User’s manual

Due to size and for easier use of the manual it is given as a separate book.
page 119
4 References
[1] Contract No: 45/609 of September 8, 2006
[2] API RP 581, Risk-Based Inspection Technology, Second edition, September 2008
[3] CEN CWA 15740 RIMAP, 2008
[4] HSE RNP, Implementation of HSE in NIS a.d. Plants NIS RNP Safety report, May 2008
[5] Understanding explosions (2003) By Daniel A. Crowl. Center for Chemical Process Safety of the
AIChE, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 16, Issue 5, Page 449
[6]
page 120
5 Annexes
page 121
Annex 1 Geographical position of Pancevo
page 122
Annex 2 Industrial zone of Pancevo
page 123
Annex 3 General plan of Pancevo refinery
page 124
Annex 4 Organization of Pancevo refinery
page 125
Annex 5 General plan of Novi Sad refinery
page 126
Annex 6 Substances in Novi Sad refinery

Nr Generic, chemical or other
Place in process Mas (t)
name or chemical formula
Raw Intermedi By- Final Max. Av. Av.
Waste Transport Transfer Storage
material ate product product daily monthly yearly
1. Crude oil x R 558527
2. LPG x R 847
3. Primary gasoline x R 27042
4. Motor gasoline MB-95 x R 6957
5. Motor gasoline BMB-95 x R 20527
6. Dizel x R 157221
7. Fuel oil x R 11591
8. Mazut x R 154034
9. Bitumene x R 31320
10. Oil distillate x x R 55796
11. HCl x R 2530
12. NaOH x R 1791
13. NH4OH x B 2
14. Na OCl x R 6
page 127
Nr Generic, chemical or other

Place in process Mas (t)
name or chemical formula
15. NALCO 71221 (Coagulant for
x R 5,2
raw water)
16. NALCO 71601 x R 1,1 t
17. Na3PO4 x R 0,3 t
page 128
Annex 7 Organization of Novi Sad refinery
RNS Director
Director’s Office
Secretariat
Business Coord.
Technical-Technological Department
Department
Information and
Production PR Service
Center for MS
Manipulation
Maintenance
Laboratory Development and Risk Management Legal, personnel and
Investment General Affairs
Power Plant
ICTI Economics Goods Management Finance and Commercial

Counting Business
page 129
Annex 8 Responsibilities’ within management system

in Novi Sad refinery
A.8.1 According to the requests of the standard ISO 9001:2000
(SRPS ISO 9001:2001)
ISO 9001 Requirement Function/job position Comment
4 Quality management system
General requests
- determinig,
documenting,
RNS director,
implementation,
management representative management representative is
4.1 maintenance and constant
improvement of QMS main responsible
effectiveness
top management,
- QMS implementation
management representative
4.2 Requests refering to documentation

Overall management system for
top management,
4.2.1 General requests all QMS documentation and
records
Quality manual Development, management and

4.2.2 management representative
management maintenance
top management, Official management with all
Documentation
4.2.3 management representative documentation, records and
management
MSC manager computer media used in QMS
Records management and

4.2.4 Records management top management
removal
5 MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
Management Development, implementation
top management,
5.1 responsibilities and and improvement of QMS
activities effectiveness
Ensurance that users

top management,
5.2 Focus on user requirements are determined and
met
Quality policy
RNS director
- declaring quality policy
- implementation and Communication and

top management,
5.3 maintenance of quality interpretation of quality policy to
policy all people in the organization
top management,
- quality policy review
5.4 Planning
Setting quality objectives at
certain functions and levels
top management, within the organization,
5.4.1 Quality objectives
management representative measuring quality objectives,
compliance with quality policy
and constant improvement
page 130

obligation
In order to accomplish quality
top management,
5.4.2 QMS planning objectives, QMS has to be
planned
5.5 Responsibilities, authorizations and communication

Defining and communicating
Responsibilities and top management,
5.5.1 responsibilities and
authorizations management representative
authorizations in the organization
Management Appointing management
5.5.2 Direktor RNS
representative representative
Establishing appropriate
5.5.3 Internal communications top management communication processes in the
organization
top management,
5.6 Review by management QMS review in planned intervals
6. RESOURSE MANAGEMENT
Provision of resources
organizational parts
- defining required
managers Defining and providing required
6.1 resources
resources
- provision of required
RNS director
resources
6.2 Human resources
- general provisions, (staff
6.2.1 RNS director Ensuring staff is competent
allocation)
based on adequate qualifications,
top management training, knowledge and
- qualification, awareness
6.2.2 head of the Personnel experience
and training
Section
Infrastructure
- defining required top management
infrastructure and its Operations director Defining, establishing and
6.3 maintenance maintaining infrastructure
- establishment of the
RNS director
required infrastructure
Defining and managing human
6.4 Working environment top management and physical factors of working
environment
7. PRODUCTS REALIZATION
Planning and development of
Planning of products
7.1 top management processes required for products
realization
realization
7.2 Processes applying to customers

Director of Department for
Ensuring that agreement related
Determining requests Materials Flow Management
to customers requests, changes
7.2.1 related to products (MFM),
and amendments has been
(services) Director of techncial and
achieved
technological operations
Revision of requests
Functions of participants in Ensuring the organization has an
7.2.2 related to products
the revision process ability to meet requirements
(services)
Materials Flow Management
Communication with Ensuring potential additional
7.2.3 (MFM),
customers requests are fullfiled
Director of techncial and
technological operations
7.3 Design and development
page 131

Managing and coordinating
From planning design and top management, design and development by
7.3.1
development to managing director of Department for planning, input elements, output
do
changes of design and development and elements, revisions, verifications,
7.3.7
development investments validation and changes
management
7.4 Supply
7.4.1 Supply process

Selection and rating of suppliers
7.4.2 Supply information Director of Department for
and receipt of supplied
commercial operations
Verification of supplied products/services
7.4.3
products
7.5 Production and servicing

Production and servicing Planning, producing and servicing
7.5.1
management in conditions of management
Validation of processes whose
Validation of production resulting output elements can
7.5.2
and servicing processes not be verified by follow-up
monitoring and measurements
Director of technical and
technological operations, Identification of products and
Identification and
7.5.3 Director of Operations management with unique
reproducibility
Director of Handling Dept identification of products
Director of Energy Plant
Identification, verification, safety
7.5.4 Users assets and provision of customers
assets
Maintaining compliance of
7.5.5 Products perservation products during the realization of
internal processes
Determining management
Managing tracking and Director of technical and
7.6 method by monitoring and
measuring devices technological operations
measuring devices
8. MEASUREMENTS, ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENTS
Planning and conducting
processes of monitoring,
8.1 General provisions top management
measuring, analysis and
improvements
8.2 Monitoring and measurements
Director of Department for Tracking information about
Meeting customers
8.2.1 Materials Flow Management customers observations related
requirements
(MFM) to meeting requirements
management
Contrinuous rating of QMS
8.2.2 Internal audit representative,
compliance and effectiveness
MSC manager
Monitoring and measuring Showing processes abilities to
8.2.3 top management
processes performances achieve planned results
technological operations,
Director of Operations
Verification of requests for
Monitoring and measuring Director of Handling Dept
8.2.4 products (controlling,
products characteristics Director of Laboratory
examination, monitoring)
Materials Flow Management
(MFM)
technological operations,
Managing inconsistencies Analysis and treating
8.3 Director of Operations
in a product inconsistencies in a product
Director of Handling Dept
page 132

Determining, collecting and
analyzing data about a process
8.4 Data analysis top management
and product and taking measures
based on the obtained data
8.5 Improvements
Improving QMS effectiveness by

using quality policy, quality
8.5.1 - Constant improvements
top management, objectives, results of revisions,
do - Corrective actions
management representative data analysis, corrective actions,
8.5.3 - Preventive actions
preventive actions and
assesment by the management
A.8.2 According to the requests of the standard ISO

14001:2004 (SRPS ISO 14001:2005)
ISO
Requirement Function/job position Comment
14001
General requests
determining,documenting, top management,
implemetation, MS management representative
4.1 MS management
maintenance and is main responsible
representative
continuous EMS
improvement
Announcement, development,
top management, MS maintenance, communication to
4.2 Environmental policy
management representative all employees; revision and
audit.
4.3 Planning
top management, Identification of important
4.3.1 Environmental aspects MS management environmental aspects,revision
representative and constant updating.
top management, Determining identification

MS management procedures and approaches to
Legal and other representative, legal and other reqests that
4.3.2
requirements EMS coordinator relate to environmental aspects
(Environmental Dept and RNS’ activities, products or
manager) services.
Determining application and
maintenance of documented
general and specific
envionmental objectives in
compliance with adopted policy
top management, and obligation to prevent
General and specific
4.3.3 MS management environemntal pollution.
objectives and programs
representative Development and maintaining of
a program for accomplishing
defined general and specific
objectives that specifies
responsibilities, assets and
deadlines for their realization.
4.4 Application and implementation
Providing resources availability.
Setting, documenting and
communicating objectives,
Resources, objectives,
responsibilities and
4.4.1 responsibilities and Director of RNS
authorizations
authorizations
Appointing one or more
management representatives for
environment.
Qualifications, training top management, Identification of needs for
4.4.2
and awareness MS management professional improvements.
page 133
ISO
14001
representative, Education, professional

Head of the Personnel improvements and gaining
Section experience for competency
purpose.
Presenting EMS to staff and
creating awareness about
environment, motivation of
people.
top management, Implementing and maintaining
4.4.3 Communication MS management internal and external
representative communication.
Determining different types of
documentation that are being
managed, application and
top management,
maintenance of efficient working
MS management
4.4.4 Documentation procedures and controls related
representative,
to EMS.
MSC manager
Documentation (information) can
be on paper and/or in an
electronic form.
Establishing, applying and

top management, maintaining documented
MS management procedures for documentation
4.4.5 Documentation control
representative, control that is required by EMS
MSC manager and standard SRPS ISO
14001:2005.
maintaining documented
procedures for the control of
operations and activities related
Managers directly
to determined important
responsible for performance
4.4.6 Operations controls environmental aspects.
of a specific operation,
Determining working criteria in
direct operations executors.
procedures.
Introducing suppliers and
contractors with specific
procedures and requests.
Identification of potential
accidents and hazardous events,
response and prevention and
top management, mitigation of their environmental
Alertness to response in other employees within the impact.
4.4.7
emergency situations defined competencies and Periodic assessment, if required,
responsibilities. revision of responsiveness in
emergency situations as well as
examination of response
procedures.
4.5 Revision
Establishing, application and
maintenance of regular
monitoring and measuring
procedures of crucial operations
EMS coordinator characteristics that may have an
(Environmental Dept important influence on
4.5.1 Montoring and measuring manager) environment and information
MS management documentation.
representative, Ensuring that calibrated and
verified equipment is used ofr
monitoring and measuring,
keeping records of related
documentation.
EMS coordinator Establishing, application and
4.5.2 Compliance evaluation
(Environmental Dept maintenance of procedures of
page 134
ISO
14001
manager) periodic evaluation of compliance

MS management with applicable legal and other
representative, requests which RNS approved.
maintaining procedures for
MS management
determining inconsistencies,
representative,
identifying the cause of
Inconsistencies, corrective MSC manager,
4.5.3 inconsistencies, taking corrective
and preventive actions other employees within the
and preventive actions in
defined competencies and
proportion to the difficulty of a
responsibilities.
problem and its influence on the
environment.
top management, maintaining procedures for
MS management records management required by
4.5.4 Records control
representative, the standard JUS ISO
MSC manager 14001:2004 and by standards
used in EMS.
Establishing and maintaining one

or more programs and
procedures for performing
planned controls to determine
MS management
whether EMS is in compliance
4.5.5 Internal audits representative,
with planned EMS solution, is it
MSC manager
properly introduced and
maintained and communication
of process results to the
management.
top management, Management has a responsibility
MS management to do EMS revision in planned
4.6 Revision by management
representative, intervals to enable its suitability,
MSC manager adequacy and effectiveness.
page 135
Annex 9 Novi Sad refinery – flow diagram of U 100
page 136
Annex 10 Refinery Novi Sad – flow diagram of U 200
page 137
Annex 11 Elemir Gas refinery in NIS Naftagas
page 138
Annex 12 Integrated management system policy of NIS

Naftagas
page 139
Annex 13 Flow diagram of Elemir Gas Refinery
D-300 D-101 T-1 T-101 T-9 D-16 E-102 E-101 A/B E-2 E-1 A/B E-120 D-120 D-102 T-2 E-104 E-3 D-1 E-5 D-104 E-103 E-6 A/B E-7 D-5 D-103 E-15 D-121 D-4 E-116 E-4 C-1,2 A/B C-102 D-122 F-1; F-201 E-24 A/B T-3 E-9 E-11 E-10 E-12 E-16 E-17 D-6 E-18 T-7 D-7 E-20 A/B T-8 E-21 E-22 E-23 D-8 F-302
F-301 E-110 SC-1 T-4 D-2 E-19
TROFAZNI SEPARATOR DEHIDRATACIONA DEHIDRATACIONA KOLONA ZA SEPARATOR PROPANSKI PROPANSKI PROPANSKI SEPARATOR SEPARATOR APSORBER PROPANSKI PRIHVATNI IZMENJIVAC SEPARATOR PROPANSKI PROPANSKI PRIHVATNI PRIHVATNI VODENI CENTRIFUGALNI SEPARATOR ZA PRIHVATNA VODENI VODENI KOMPRESORI KOMPRESOR KOALESCER PEC DEETANIZER RIBOJLER KONDENZATOR IZMENJIVAC RIBOJLER PRIHVATNA IZMENJIVAC PRIHVATNA POSUDA ZA KONDENZATOR DEIZOBUTANIZER RIBOJLER VODENI KONDENZATOR PRIHVATNA FILTER ZA
FILTER ZA IZMENJIVAC IZMENJIVAC IZMENJIVAC IZMENJIVAC IZMENJIVAC PROPANSKI IZMENJIVAC IZMENJIVAC DESTILATOR PRIHVATNA DEBUTANIZER RIBOJLER
SEPARATOR POSUDA KOLONA POSUDA HLADNJAK HLADNJAK HLADNJAK POSUDA POSUDA HLADNJAK SUD TOPLOTE POSUDA HLADNJAK HLADNJAK SUD ZA SUD ZA PARE HLADNJAK RABLJENO ULJE POSUDA ZA HLADNJAK HLADNJAK WEIR KLARK COOPER-BESSEMER TOPLOTE POSUDA ZA TOPLOTE HLADNJAK POSUDA ZA SIROVI
GASNI TOPLOTE KOLONA SUŠENJE TOPLOTE TOPLOTE TOPLOTE TOPLOTE SEPARATOR HLADNJAK TOPLOTE TOPLOTE POSUDA SMEŠU N-BUTANA I
PROPAN PROPANA PROPAN PROPAN IZO-BUTAN GAZOLIN
KONDENZAT KONDENZATA IZO-BUTANA
1
E-103 PRC
PRC
151 3
LC
131 E-20A E-20B
HCV
150
E-12 E-18
HO HO E-1A E-120 I C-102 II 1
1
D-5 PREMA PREMA
E-24A E-8
TIC
T-5 D-9
LCV 4A
FI
2 PIC 200.1 13
7 E-23
210 LC 8 1 1
LCV TRC FI 9
TRC
T-9 152A 152 200.2
PRC PRC
151
LC
4
E-1B TIC 19 9
E-104
204 T-3 FRC PRC 9 TRC
1 1 1 E-6A FRC
6 9 4 10
KA T -3 PC T-6
E-110 5 E-24B E-9
15
HIC
150 PRC
PREMA TS
PRC
T-7 8
PC 1
301 T-101 E-2
PC
TIC 18
16
TS FRC
13
7
E-2 E-3 4B E-110 150 10
T-1 E-7
6 TIC
6
25
PCV FRC
301B E-6B E-11 FRC 13
19 11 29
10 LC od C-2A C-1A C-2B C-1B F-201
T-8
PCV
D-120 151
D-104 LC
E-2
23
19
6 208
301A
C3 E-3 24
CW FRC
C3 C3 E-7 7
26
LC
1
LC
154
E-102 35 D-8
FIQ
E-7 C-2A C-1A C-2B C-1B E-116 T-4 D-7
102
T-2 E-3 LC D-2 F-1 35 D-6 E-22
PCV
24
E-4 29 30 10
OD/PREMA
PRC CW CW TRC
PREMA E-5
152 TRC 9
C-1A/B 8
UV
154
E-101A E-5
C3 C3
D-101 LC LC od E-4
TRC
E-19 E-21
C3 35
5
2 152 TRC CW
3 E-10 LC
LI LC
D-103 E-15 8
LC
101 LC LC
D-16 19 19
13
3 153
LC
E-101B LC CW CW
LG SC-1
LG D-121 D-4 LC 11
155
GS ELEMIR
156 7
20 5 LC
LI TRC SV TRCAH
129 7 7 160
LCV
LC
D-1 6
101 D-102 114 TSH
163 FRC
14
E-102 FRC
FS
8
SV
6
P RCA
160
5
LS
157
FRC
PREMA E-2 PREMA E-3 PREMA E-7 8
TRC PRIHVATNA POSUDA ZA RABLJENO ULJE
LOŽIVI GAS
128 C3
KA D -9
ULAZNA ŠAHTA
PRERAÐENI
FIQ
103
GAS
KA T-4; T-6; FIQ FIQ

T-8 PCV
106
FIQ FIQ FIQ FIQ 201

ULAZ GASA
100 03-01 107 104
AS
150
FIQ
D-122 NORMALNI
IZOBUTAN
LCV BUTAN
OD
101 F-302 PS-4 GAZOLIN PROPAN
D-9 SMEŠA SMEŠA
U PRELIVNI PREMA PENTANA P-9A/B BUTANA
GR-1/GR-102
OD E-25
P-120A/B P-1A/B/C P-11 P-7A/B P-8A/B
ŠAHT P-2A/B P-4A/B/C P-5A/B
LAH LAL LIC
D-300 301 301 301 P- 30
F-301
SIROVI GAZOLIN IZ
PROIZVODNIH
REZERVOARA
Legenda:
24.08. 2006
Propan U PRELIVNI
N-butan D-27A
ŠAHT Jašin/Subotin
Izobutan
Gazolin
Prirodni gas
S.Josipovic
Preradeni gas
A.Ilic
Apsorpciono ulje Projektni zadatak za izr. URP
Kondezat ugljovodonika
Toplo ulje rekonstr. sist. za prikupljanje i spaljivanje
Rashladni propan
Bogato ulje
fluida u pogonu za proizv. NTG El.
Rashladna voda
NIS Naftagas
TEHNOLOŠKA ŠEMA POGONA TNG
TEG
Loživi gas 1
Pogon za proizv. NTG ELEMIR
page 140
Annex 14 Position of unit FCC in Pancevo refinery

A.14.1 Blocks in Pancevo refinery
page 141
A.14.2 General plan of refinery – position of FCC in Block 6
page 142
Annex 15 QMS/EMS documents of RNP

No Document full name, English File name
1. Environment Management Manual EMS_Poslovnik.doc
2. Identification of environmental aspects EP01.doc
3. Validation of environment impact EP02.doc
4. Legal and other requirements EP03.doc
5. Environment goals and objective EP04.doc
Programs for environment
6. EP05.doc
management
7. Communication in EMS EP06.doc
8. Waste management EP07.doc
9. Dangerous materials management EP08.doc
10. Oil management EP09.doc
11. Readiness for emergency situation EPO10.dok
12. Monitoring and measuring EPO11.dok
13. Nonconformities resolution in EMS EPO12.dok
14. Quality plan PQ000.doc
Plan for implementation and
15. PQ002.doc
certification of EMS
16. Start up and shut down of the unit QG45-01.doc
Instruction for operation and
17. QG46-09.doc
maintenance of swimming roofs
18. Work order QG55-01.doc
Conduction of maintenance works in
19. QG55-02.doc
RNP
20. Equipment control, QG55-03.doc
21. Quality Manual QMS_Poslovnik.doc
Formatting of quality management
22. QP01.doc
system documents
Control of management systems
23. QP02.doc
documents
24. Standards and QP03.doc
25. Control of records QP04.doc
26. Strategic studies – development plans QP05.doc
27. Business analysis and planning QP06.doc
28. Job descriptions QP08.doc
page 143

29. Management review QP10.doc
30. Education and training QP11.doc
Knowladge of management systems in
31. QP12.doc
RNP
32. Personnel evidence QP13.doc
33. Maintenance QP16.doc
34. Maintenance planning QP17.doc
Preventive, corrective and investments
35. QP18.doc
maintenance
36. Unit and equipment overhaul QP19.doc
37. Hardware QP20.doc
38. Security QP21.doc
39. Sales QP23.doc
Contracting, contract elements and
40. QP24.doc
contract review
41. Business communication and protocol QP25.doc
42. Product development QP26.doc
43. Development and investments QP27.doc
44. Facilities construction QP29.doc
45. Development of information system QP33.doc
46. Software QP35.doc
47. Design and construction in
QP36.doc
maintenance
48. Purchasing QP38.doc
49. Suppliers validation and selection QP39.doc
50. Production QP44.doc
51. Control of production process QP45.doc
52. Manipulation QP46.doc
53. Finalization QP47.doc
54. Crude oil and derivates reception QP48.doc
55. Power plant QP50.doc
56. Technological steam production and
QP51.doc
distribution
57. Chemical and technological preparation
QP52.doc
of water
58. Electricity production and distribution QP53.doc
59. Work order for works in refinery QP55.doc
60. Product servicing QP56.doc
61. Material balance counting QP58.doc
62. Legal, general and personnel affairs QP59.doc
63. Library of RNP QP60.doc
64. Product identification and traceability QP61.doc
page 144

65.
Customer supplied product control QP63.doc
66.
67. Delivery of oil products QP65.doc
68. Measuring, control and monitoring
QP66.doc
equipment
69. Customer satisfaction measuring and
QP67.doc
monitoring
70. Internal audits QP68.doc
71. Technical surveillance over the
equipment and conduction of QP69.doc
maintenance works in RNP
72. Control plans QP70.doc
73. Sampling and samples marking QP71.doc
74. Customers complains QP72.doc
75. Corrective and preventive measures QP74.doc
page 145
Annex 16 List of available drawings of FCC

Oznaka NIS-
Drawing Title Design Drawing designation
RNP
Foster
Standard symbols Wheeler 2231-0-50-2300.B LO 03A18A
(FW)
FCC process. Reactor stripper. FW 2231-0-50-2301.F LO 03A18A
FCC process. Regenerator. FW 2231-0-50-2302.G LO 03A18A

FCC process. Air blowers and air
FW 2231-0-50-2303.F LO 03A18A
heaters.
FCC process. Catalytic transport
FW 2231-0-50-2304.F LO 03A18A
and storage
FCC process. Air surge & Spray
FW 2231-0-50-2305.F LO 03A18A
water drums
FCC process. Engineering details FW 2231-0-50-2306.F LO 03A18A
FCC process. Feed preheat system. FW 2231-0-50-2307.G LO 03A18A
FCC process. Main fractionators. FW 2231-0-50-2308.F LO 03A18A
FCC process. ICGO&LCGO strippers FW 2231-0-50-2309.G LO 03A18A
FCC process. Fractionator OH

FW 2231-0-50-2310.F LO 03A18A
System.
FCC process. Gland & flushing oil
FW 2231-0-50-2311.E LO 03A18A
system.
FCC process. CO Boiler FW 2231-0-50-2312.E LO 03A18A
FCC process. Fired heaters burner

FW 2231-0-50-2313.D LO 03A18A
and decoking detail
FCC process. Evaporization system
FW 2231-0-50-2314.E LO 03A18A
for of LPG and gas fuel
FCC process. Battery limit pipelines FW 2231-0-50-2321.B LO 03A18A
FCC process. Light cycle gas oil
hydrotreating unit (2400). Feed FW 2231-0-50-2401.F LO 03A18A
exchangers section.
Light cycle gas oil hydrotreating
unit (2400). Feed exchangers and FW 2231-0-50-2402.F LO 03A18A
reactor section. FCC complex.
unit (2400). Effluent separators &
FW 2231-0-50-2403.F LO 03A18A
recycle gas scrubber section. FCC
complex.
FW 2231-0-50-2404.G LO 03A18A
unit (2400). Compress section. FCC
page 146
Oznaka NIS-
RNP
complex

unit (2400). Stripper section. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2405.F LO 03A18A
complex.
unit (2400). Product exchangers FW 2231-0-50-2406.E LO 03A18A
section. FCC complex
Flare header system. Hydrotreating
unit 2400, SRU 2450 LPG Merox
unit 2550, light naphtha sweetening
FW 2231-0-50-2407.E LO 03A18A
unit 2750 Heavy naphtha
sweetening unit 2850. KO drum FA-
2420. FCC complex
LCGO hydrotreating unit.
Compressor GB-2401A/B & GB- FW 2231-0-50-2408.A LO 03A18A
2420 A/B Auxiliaries. FCC complex
Sulphur production & storage unit.
Sulphur recovery unit, sheet 1. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2451.F LO 03A18A
complex
Sulphur production & storage unit.
Sulphur recovery unit, sheet 2. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2452.B LO 03A18A
complex
Gas concentration unit (2500).
FW 2231-0-50-2501.F LO 03A18A
Compression section. FCC complex
Gas concentration unit (2500). Gas
FW 2231-0-50-2502.G LO 03A18A
absorption section. FCC complex
Gas concentration unit (2500). De-
FW 2231-0-50-2503.F LO 03A18A
ethanizer section. FCC complex
FW 2231-0-50-2504.F LO 03A18A
Debutanizer section. FCC complex
Naphtha splitter section. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2505.F LO 03A18A
complex
Gas concentration unit (2500). H2S
FW 2231-0-50-2506.F LO 03A18A
scrubber section. FCC complex
FW 2231-0-50-2507.G LO 03A18A
Depropanizer section. FCC complex
Gas concentration unit (2500). C3
FW 2231-0-50-2508.H LO 03A18A
drier section. FCC complex
Propylene splitter section. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2509.G LO 03A18A
complex
Corrosion inhibitor section. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2510.F LO 03A18A
complex
Condensate recovery system. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2511.F LO 03A18A
complex
page 147
Oznaka NIS-
RNP
Condensate collection and
FW 2231-0-50-2512.F LO 03A18A
blowdown systems. FCC complex
Steam distribution. HP steam. MP
FW 2231-0-50-2513.E LO 03A18A
steam. FCC complex
FCC Process. LP steam system. FCC
FW 2231-0-50-2514.D LO 03A18A
complex
FCC Process. Cooling water supply.
FW 2231-0-50-2515.D LO 03A18A
FCC complex
Plant air. Instrument air. Flashed
condensate. Boiler feed water. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2516.E LO 03A18A
complex
Fire protection system FW 2231-0-50-2517.D LO 03A18A
Flare header systems. FCC (2300),

GCU (2500) SWS (2900) Amine FW 2231-0-50-2518.E LO 03A18A
regeneration. FCC complex
Nitrogen. Closed amine drain. Light
FW 2231-0-50-2519.E LO 03A18A
slops. OffSpec LPG. FCC complex
Utility and potable water. FCC
FW 2231-0-50-2520.E LO 03A18A
complex
Cooling water balance. Summer
FW 2231-0-50-2521.B LO 03A18A
and winter cases. FCC complex
Cooling water balance. Summer
FW 2231-0-50-2522.B LO 03A18A
and winter cases. FCC complex
Compressors auxiliaries. GB-2301 FW 2231-0-50-2523.C LO 03A18A
and GB-2501.FCC complex
Cooling water return. FCC complex FW 2231-0-50-2524.C LO 03A18A
LP condensate. MP condensate. FCC

FW 2231-0-50-2525.D LO 03A18A
complex.
Merox unit (2550). LPG extraction.
FW 2231-0-50-2551.E LO 03A18A
Sheet1. FCC complex
Merox unit (2550). LPG extraction.
FW 2231-0-50-2552.E LO 03A18A
Sheet 2. FCC complex
EFFL refrigeration alkylation
process (2600). Coalescer section. FW 2231-0-50-2601.D LO 03A18A
Sheet 1 of 11. FCC complex
process (2600). Reactor section. FW 2231-0-50-2602.E LO 03A18A
Sheet 2 of 11. FCC complex
process (2600). Refrigeration
FW 2231-0-50-2603.E LO 03A18A
section. Sheet 3 of 11. FCC
complex
Alkylation unit (2600). Refrigerant
compression. Sheet 4 of 11FCC FW 2231-0-50-2604.F LO 03A18A
complex..
EFFL refrigeration alkylation’s
process Unit (2600). Sheet 6 of FW 2231-0-50-2605.D LO 03A18A
11FCC complex. OP feed caustic &
page 148
Oznaka NIS-
RNP
water wash. FCC complex

process Unit (2600). Sheet 6 of
FW 2231-0-50-2606.E LO 03A18A
11FCC complex. DB feed caustic
and water wash. FCC complex
FW 2231-0-50-2607.E LO 03A18A
11FCC complex. De-isobutanizer
section. FCC complex
process Unit (2600). Sheet 8 of 11. FW 2231-0-50-2608.E LO 03A18A
Re-run section. FCC complex
process Unit (2600). Sheet 9 of 11. FW 2231-0-50-2609.E LO 03A18A
Acid neutralization. FCC complex
FW 2231-0-50-2610.E LO 03A18A
11. Flare and acid blowdown
section.FCC complex
FW 2231-0-50-2611.E LO 03A18A
11. Acid and caustic tankage. FCC
complex
Distribution systems. Flare, acid
blowdown, fresh caustic. FCC FW 2231-0-50-2612.C LO 03A18A
complex
Light naphtha sweetening Unit
FW 2231-0-50-2751.E LO 03A18A
2750. FCC complex
Heavy naphtha sweetening. Unit
FW 2231-0-50-2851.E LO 03A18A
2850. Sheet 1 of 3. FCC complex
FW 2231-0-50-2852.E LO 03A18A
FW 2231-0-50-2853.E LO 03A18A
Sour water stripper (Unit 2900).
FW 2231-0-50-2901.E LO 03A18A
FCC complex
Amine regeneration unit. Sheet 1 of
FW 2231-0-50-2951.F LO 03A18A
2. Diagram 1. FCC complex
Amine regeneration unit. Sheet 2 of
FW 2231-0-50-2952.F LO 03A18A
2. Diagram 2. FCC complex
page 149
Annex 17 Main hazards in FCC
Temperature Pressure Flow

Sign Name of the source Medium Phase Class
(oC) (bar) (t/h)
Columns in FCC
Sirovi benzin
DA-2301 Vrh
V=600 Lako ciklično plinsko ulje; 350oC 3,2/ 89,5
Fractionation column G/F
H=42 Međuciklično plinsko ulje; Dno 3,5 m3/h
D= 4,5 560oC
Produkt dna kolone
DA-2302 Vrh
V=60m3 Striper ICGO Međuciklično plinsko ulje 390oC 61
F 3,5
H=10 Međuciklično plinsko ulje ICGO Dno m3/h
D=2,2m 430oC P
Vrh
DA-2303
Striper LCGO LCGO (lako ciklično plinsko 270oC 123,8
V=35m3, F 3,5
(lako ciklično plinsko ulje) ulje) Dno m3/h
H/D=8m/1,5m
300oC
DC-2301 138,8
Reaktor - striper Vakuum plinsko ulje F 512 2,52
V=350m3, m3/h
DC-2302 Reaktor – regenerator 590-
Katalizator, koks, CO,CO2 S/G 1,7 -
V=700m3, katalizatora 730
FE-2301,
Ciklon posude regeneratora i
FE-2302 Katalizator vazduh 400 4 -
reaktora za katalizator
V=250m3,
page 150

(oC) (bar) (t/h)
Heat exchangers
EA- plinsko ulje Plašt izmenjivača Vakuum EA- plinsko ulje 300/240
300/240 20/24
2301A/B Cevni snop izmenjivača LCGO (Lako cik. plin. ulje) 20/24
Vakuum
EA- Plašt izmenjivača 340/290
plinsko ulje 340/290 12/24 138,8
2302A/B F 12/24 P
Cevni snop izmenjivača Refluks m3/h
Plašt izmenjivača Vakuum plinsko ulje

EA- 330/380
Produkti dann frakcionatora 330/380 24/11
2303A/B Cevni snop izmenjivača 24/11
(Uglj.+360oC)
Plašt izmenjivača 300
EA-2304 LCGO (striper rebojler) 5/11 330
Cevni snop izmenjivača 380
Plašt izmenjivača LCGO (Lako ciklično
EA-2305 250 16 330
Cevni snop izmenjivača plinskulje) F
Produkt dann frakcionatora P

Plašt izmenjivača 235
EA-2306 (Uglj.+360oC) 20/11 340
Cevni snop izmenjivača Para 380
Refluks – Međucik. plin.ulje

Cevni snop izmenjivača 235
EA-2307 (ICGO) F 20/12 340
Plašt izmenjivača Para 340
Pumps
GA–2301/S Pumpa za vodu Voda F 100 11 18m3/h -
Napojna pumpa za vakuum Vakuum plinsko
GA–2302/S F 190 15 168m3/h
plinsko ulje ulje
GA–2303/S Pumpa dna 355 7 50 P

Ugljovodonici
frakcionatora gotov F
GA–2304 /S +360oC 90 13
DA-2301 proizvod
page 151

(oC) (bar) (t/h)
GA–2 305/S Refluks pumpa ICGO 310 7 370

ICGO
GA–2 306/S ICGO recirkulaciona pumpa (Međuciklično F 400 5 170
plinsko ulje)
GA–2 307/S ICGO rebojler pumpa. 390 9 450
LCGO (Lako
GA–2308/S LCGO refluks pumpa ciklično plinsko F 210 10 320
ulje)
GA–2309/S Uljna pumpa apsorbera Benzin F 45 20 70
Pumpa za LCGO gotov LSGO (Lako
GA-2310/S F 250 13 80
proizvod ciklično plinsko ulje)
Pumpa za refluks
GA–2311/S benzin F 140 8 165
frakcionatora DA-2301
Pumpa za vršne produkte F
GA–2312/S frakcionatora (iz posude FA- benzin 50 20 150
2304)
Pumpa za vodu frakcionatora F

GA–2313/S Voda+ugljovodonici 45 3 12 S
FA-2304
LCGO (Lako F
GA–2314/S Pumpe za ulje za ispiranje 15 25 P
cikl. plins. ulje)
Pumpa za kiselu vodu od FA-

GA–2315/S Kisela voda f - - - P
2304 do S-2900
Vessels and tanks
Rezervoar za vakuum plin.
FA – 2303 vakuum plin. ulje f 217 3,87 50m3/h
ulje
Akumulator za vršni produkt Benzin, loživi
FA – 2304 G/f 74 3,52 40
frakcionatora gas
P
FA –2307 Posuda za ulje za LCGO (Lako cikl.
FA –2307 F 74 5,3 10
ispiranje plins. ulje)
Rezervoar za smešu
FA – 2305 Loživi gas G 72 7,03 8
gasovaloživi
page 152

(oC) (bar) (t/h)
gas
FA - 2308 Posuda za dekoksovano VPO vakuum pl. ulje F T 345 8,5 4
FA - 2310 Posuda za TNG TNG G 72 8,8 50
Furnaces
Vakuum plinsko 138
BA– 2301 Peć postrojenja S-2300 F 420 20
ulje m3/h
BA-2302 Rebojler ICGO Loživi gas, ICGO f 420 24 340 -
BF-2301 CO bojler CO, CO2 G 450 14 -
BC-2301 Peć za grejanje vazduha Lož ulje G/F 420 420 10 -
page 153
Annex 18 Block diagram of Pancevo refinery
page 154
page 155
Annex 19 List of substances in Pancevo Refinery

Limit Maximum present quantity
according (t) for the application of
Total
to Seveso Article 9
Substance Quantity
II
(t)
directive
In process Stored
(t)
Annex I, Part 1
1
Ammonium nitrate 2500 / / /
/ / /
2
Ammonium nitrate 5000 / / /
/ / /
Arsenic pentoxide, arsenic (V)
2 / / /
acid and/or salts
/ / /
Arsenic trioxide, arsenious (III)
0,1 / / /
acid and/or salts
/ / /
Bromine 100
Chlorine 25
Nickel compounds in inhalable

powder form (nickel monoxide,
nickel dioxide, nickel sulphide, 1
trinickel disulphide, dinickel
trioxide)
Ethyleneimine 20
Fluorine 20
Formaldehyde (concentration
50
90 %)
1
1 This applies to ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate compounds in which the nitrogen content
as a result of the ammonium nitrate is more than 28 % by weight (compounds other than those
referred to in Note 2) and to aqueous ammonium nitrate solutions in which the concentration of
ammonium nitrate is more than 90 % by weight.
2
This applies to simple ammonium-nitrate based fertilizers which comply with Directive 80/876/EEC
and to composite fertilizers in which the nitrogen content as a result of the ammonium nitrate is
more than 28% in weight (a composite fertilizer contains ammonium nitrate with phosphate and/or
potash).
page 156

Total
to Seveso Article 9
Substance Quantity
II
(t)
directive
In process Stored
(t)
Hydrogen 50 5.72
All units 33.3
Hydrogen chloride (liquefied
250
gas)
Lead alkyls 50
Liquefied extremely flammable

gases (including LPG) and 200
natural gas
2109.1
Acetylene 50
Ethylene oxide 50
Propylene oxide 50
Methanol 5000
4, 4-Methylenebis (2-
chloraniline) and/or salts, in 0.01
powder form
Methylisocyanate 0.15
Oxygen 2000 /
Gaseous oxygen /
Toluene diisocyanate 100 64.8
Toluen 64.8
Carbonyl dichloride (phosgene) 0.75
Arsenic trihydride (arsine) 1
Phosphorus trihydride
1
(phosphine)
Sulphur dichloride 1
Sulphur trioxide 75
page 157

Total
to Seveso Article 9
Substance Quantity
II
(t)
directive
In process Stored
(t)
Polychlorodibenzofurans and
polychlorodibenzodioxins
0.001
(including TCDD), calculated in
TCDD equivalent
The following CARCINOGENS:

4-Aminobiphenyl and/or its salts,
Benzidine and/or salts, Bis
(chloromethyl) ether, Chloromethyl
methyl ether, Dimethylcarbamoyl 0.001
chloride, Dimethylnitrosomine,
Hexamethylphosphoric triamide, 2-
Naphtylamine and/or salts, and 1,3
Propanesultone 4-nitrodiphenyl
Benzen 84.9
Automotive petrol and other

50000
petroleum spirits
Heavy, light and special
1232.2
Gasoline (UN 1993)
Crude oil (UN 1267)

7955.9
Virgin Naphtha
Gazoline 99.6
Other gasoline 9597.31
Annex I Part 2
1. Very toxic 20
0.62
2. Toxic 200
422.2
3. Oxidizing 200
OXIGEN (Refrigerating Liquid)

4. Explosive (where the substance
or preparation falls within the 200
definition given in Note 2 (a))
---
5. Explosive (where the substance

definition given in Note 2 (b))
---
6. Flamable (where the substance

definition given in Note 3 (a))
17.1
page 158

Total
to Seveso Article 9
Substance Quantity
II
(t)
directive
In process Stored
(t)
7a. Highly flamable (where the

substance or preparation falls within
200
the definition given in Note 3 (b)
(1))
7b. Highly flamable (where the

substance or preparation falls within
50000
the definition given in Note 3 (b)
(2))
137.5
8. Extremly flammable (where
the substance or preparation falls
50
within the definition given in Note 3
(c))
147.8
9a- DANGEROUS FOR THE
500
ENVIRONMENT (R50)
7121.41
9b.- DANGEROUS FOR THE
2000
ENVIRONMENT (R51/53)
1.08
10. OTHER CATEGORIES not
covered by those given above in
500
combination with risk phrases:
(i) R14/15)
10. OTHER CATEGORIES not

covered by those given above in
combination with risk phrases: 200
(ii) R29: ‘in contact with water,
liberates toxic gas’ (R29)
page 159
Annex 20 Flow diagrams
A.20.1 FCC complex, Gas concentration unit - Propylene splitter

section
page 160
Annex 21 Safety data sheets for substances in FCC
page 161
page 162
Annex 22 Damage estimates based on overpressure for process equipment (adjusted from
CPS 2000)
Overpressure
Equipment psi 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3
bar
34 69 03 38 72 07 41 76 10 45 79 14 48 83 17 52 86 21 55 90 28 66 03 41 79
Control House Steel

A C D N
Roof
Control House
A E P D N
Concrete Roof
Cooling Tower B F O
Tank: Cone Roof D K U
Instrument Cubicle A LM T
Fire heater G I T
Reactor: chemical A I P T
Filter – Filter H F V T
Regenerator I IP T
Tank: Floating Roof K U D
Reactor: cracking I I
Pine supports P SO
Utilities: gas meter Q
page 163
Overpressure
Equipment psi 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3
bar
34 69 03 38 72 07 41 76 10 45 79 14 48 83 17 52 86 21 55 90 28 66 03 41 79
Utilities: electronic
H I
transformer
Electric motor H I V
Blower – Duvaljke Q T
Fractionation colum R T
Pressure vessel:
PI T
horizontal
Utilities: gas regulato I MQ
Extraction column I V T
Steam Turbine I M S V
Heat exchanger I T
Tank sphere I I T
Pressure vessel:
I T
vertical
Pump I V
Legend:
A - Windows and gauges broken G - Brick cracks M - Controls are damaged S - Piping breaks
B - Louvers fall at 0.2 - 0.5 psi H - Debris-missile damage occurs N - Block walls fall T - Unit overturns or is destroyed
C - switch gear is damaged from roof collapse I - Unit moves and pipes breaks O - Frame collapses U - Unit uplifts (0.9 tilted)
D - Roof collapses J - Bracing falls P - Frame deforms V - Unit moves on foundation
E - Instruments are damaged K - Unit uplifts (half tilted) R - Frame cracks
F - Inner parts are damaged L - Power lines are severed Q - Case is damaged
page 164
Annex 23 Summary of hazard analysis

Consequences
Frequency Damage distance
Occurrence Explosion Dispersion Toxic/
Nr. Event of the Data Accident Scenario (m)
frequency overpressure Flammable
event Fire heat radiation
(bar) threshold
(kW/m2)
37.5 20 0.3 - LC50 -
1. Pool fire 12.5 42 0.14 - IDLH -

5E-8
(immediate ignition) 7 55 0.07 - LFL -
5 63 0.03 - 1/2 LFL -
37.5 - 0.3 150 LC50 -
Leak from bottom of Substance: 12.5 - 0.14 260 IDLH -
2. VCE
TOP1 the vessel FA-2514 5E-7 Propylene 2E-9
(delayed ignition) 7 - 0.07 570 LFL 562
Ø leak: 6"
5 - 0.03 1000 1/2 LFL 758
37.5 0.3 - LC50 -
3. Flash fire 12.5 0.14 - IDLH -

4E-9
(delayed ignition) 7 0.07 - LFL -
5 0.03 - 1/2 LFL -
37.5 5 0.3 - LC50 -
Substance:
Leak from the bottom gasoline 4. Jet fire 12.5 15 0.14 - IDLH -
TOP2 1E-5 3E-8
of the column DA-2503 Ø leak: 1" (immediate ignition) 7 20 0.07 - LFL -
5 25 0.03 - 1/2 LFL -
page 165
Consequences
(bar) threshold
(kW/m2)
37.5 - LC50 -
Mass in flammable
5. VCE 12.5 - condition IDLH -
-
(delayed ignition) 7 - < 1000 kg. LFL -
VCE is not credible.
5 - 1/2 LFL -
37.5 - 0.3 - LC50 -
6. Flash fire 12.5 - 0.14 - IDLH -

1E-7
(delayed ignition) 7 - 0.07 - LFL 85
5 - 0.03 - 1/2 LFL 112
37.5 7 0.3 - LC50 -
7. Jet fire 12.5 16 0.14 - IDLH -

1E-7
Substance:
Major leak from the
Gasoline 5 28 0.03 - 1/2 LFL -
TOP3 bottom of the column 5E-7
Ø leak: 4"
DA-2503 8. VCE
- Scenario frequency very low (<1E-7). Scenarios not credible.
(delayed ignition)
9. Flash fire
5E-9 Scenario frequency very low (<1E-7). Scenarios not credible.
(delayed ignition)
37.5 5 0.3 - LC50 -
10. Jet fire 12.5 8 0.14 - IDLH -

3E-6
5 14 0.03 - 1/2 LFL -
Substance:
Leak from the bottom Propane 37.5 - LC50 -
TOP4 1E-5 Mass in flammable
of Splitter DA-2509 Ø leak: 1" 12.5 - IDLH -
11. VCE condition
-
(delayed ignition) 7 - < 1000 kg. LFL -
VCE is not credible.
5 - 1/2 LFL -
12. Flash fire 37.5 - 0.3 - LC50 -

1E-7
(delayed ignition) 12.5 - 0.14 - IDLH -
page 166
Consequences
(bar) threshold
(kW/m2)
7 - 0.07 - LFL 85
5 - 0.03 - 1/2 LFL 112
37.5 7 0.3 - LC50 -
13. Jet fire 12.5 16 0.14 - IDLH -

1E-7
Substance:
Major leak from the
Gasoline 5 28 0.03 - 1/2 LFL -
TOP5 bottom of the splitter 5E-7
Ø leak: 3"
DA-2509 14. VCE
- Scenario frequency very low (<1E-7). Scenarios not credible.
(delayed ignition)
15. Flash fire 5E-9
Scenario frequency very low (<1E-7). Scenarios not credible.
(delayed ignition)
1300
Substance: 37.5 - 0.3 - LC50
(1.5F)
H2S (90%)
Leak of toxic gas from Ø leak: 50 420
TOP6 1E-7 16. Toxic dispersion 1E-5 12.5 - 0.14 - IDLH
FA-2953 mm (1.5F)
Release 7 - 0.07 - LFL -
height: 3 m
5 - 0.03 - 1/2 LFL -
Substance: 1100
37.5 - 0.3 - LC50
H2S + CO2 + (1.5F)
Leak of toxic gas from SO2 360
TOP7 combustion chamber 1E-5 Ø leak: 100 17. Toxic dispersion 1E-5 12.5 - 0.14 - IDLH
(1.5F)
FA-2455 mm
Release 7 - 0.07 - LFL -
height: 1 m 5 - 0.03 - 1/2 LFL -
page 167
Annex 24 FCC: Bow-tie analysis result

A.24.1 TOP1: Release from FA-2514
A.24.2 TOP2: Release from DA-2503
A.24.3 TOP3: Release from DA-2509
page 168
page 169
Error in material /
design
Fire fighting system

Inspection
Error in
General
Fire detection
discovering
Shielding
corrosion
defects Thermal
Fire jet
effects
Disturbances
in the process
Shutdown system
monitoring
Vibration
Gas detection
Disturbances Corrosion
in the process fatigue Discharge
Jet fire
2-phase
HAC ignition control
Blast design
Disturbances
in the process
Maintenance
Jet Environment
VCE
Fatigue, dispersion effects
thermal Material /
Error in material / fatigue
SMS
Structural
design Pressurized
related
leak
problems

Error in material /
Maintenance
design
Overloadin Pool
Flash Thermal
g explosion
Disturbances in effects
Shutdown system
the process

Manufacturing Discharge Liquid
management
Inspection
errors Other Liquid pool

Change
Environment
SMS
structural Leakage from VCE
damage DA-2509 effects
Repair / errors
mechanism
Acces control
Emergency planning
Fire detection
Sabotage
Shielding
Thermal
Pool fire
effects
Mistake in
process Man made
Procedures
Acces control
disturbance
Mistake in s
maintenance
PPE Person hit by
jet flow
protection system
Acces control
Functional /
Mistake in
SMS
Functional Other
Proactive
transport / Fire,
related incident
explosion
loading problems
and similar
Shield-ing
Domino effect Impact on other

equipment
Training
Any other Other
page 170
Error in material /
design

Inspection
Error in
General
Fire detection
discovering
Shielding
corrosion
defects Thermal
Fire jet
effects
Disturbances
in the process
Shutdown system
monitoring
Vibration
Gas detection
Disturbances Corrosion
in the process fatigue Discharge
Jet fire
2-phase
Blast design
Disturbances
in the process
Maintenance
Jet Environment
VCE
Fatigue, dispersion effects
thermal Material /
Error in material / fatigue
SMS
Structural
design Pressurized
related
leak
problems

Error in material /
Maintenance
design
Overloadin Pool
Flash Thermal
g explosion
Disturbances in effects
Shutdown system
the process

Manufacturing Discharge Liquid
management
Inspection
errors Other Liquid pool

Change
Environment
SMS
structural Leakage from VCE
damage DA2503 effects
Repair / errors
mechanism
Acces control
Emergency planning
Fire detection
Sabotage
Shielding
Thermal
Pool fire
effects
Mistake in
process Man made
Procedures
Acces control
disturbance
Mistake in s
maintenance
PPE Person hit by
jet flow
protection system
Acces control
Functional /
Mistake in
SMS
Functional Other
Proactive
transport / Fire,
related incident
explosion
loading problems
and similar
Shield-ing
Domino effect Impact on other

equipment
Training
Any other Other
page 171
page 172
page 173
RGE: API 581 qualitative risk assessment results, for

year 2009
ID Name Likelihood Consequence Risk
2903 C1A/B (potis) 3 C Medium
2902 C1A/B (usis) 3 C Medium
2905 C2A/B (potis) 3 C Medium
2904 C2A/B (usis) 3 C Medium
2845 D-1 3 D Medium High
2855 D-101 4 C Medium High
2856 D-102 4 E High
2857 D-103 2 D Medium
2858 D-104 2 D Medium
2853 D-11 2 D Medium
2859 D-111 2 D Medium
2860 D-112 2 D Medium
2862 D-120 2 D Medium
2863 D-121 2 D Medium
2864 D-122 2 D Medium
2846 D-2 2 D Medium
2906 D-27A 2 D Medium
2907 D-27B 2 C Medium
2908 D-27C 2 C Medium
2917 D-27D 2 D Medium
2918 D-27E 2 C Medium
2919 D-27F 2 D Medium
2910 D-28B 2 D Medium
2911 D-28C 2 D Medium
2912 D-28D 2 D Medium
2913 D-28E 2 D Medium
2920 D-28F 2 D Medium
2921 D-28G 2 D Medium
page 174

2915 D-29B 2 D Medium
2916 D-29C 2 D Medium
2865 D-300 2 E Medium High
2847 D-4 2 D Medium
2848 D-5 2 D Medium
2849 D-6 2 D Medium
2850 D-7 2 D Medium
2851 D-8 2 D Medium
2852 D-9 2 D Medium
2875 E-10 2 C Medium
2893 E-101/A 2 B Low
2894 E-101/B 2 B Low
2895 E-102 2 C Medium
2896 E-103 2 C Medium
2897 E-104 2 C Medium
2898 E-110 2 C Medium
2899 E-113 2 C Medium
2900 E-116 2 C Medium
2901 E-120 2 C Medium
2866 E-1A/B 2 B Low
2867 E-2 2 C Medium
2885 E-20A 2 B Low
2886 E-20B 2 C Medium
2890 E-24/A 2 C Medium
2891 E-24/B 2 C Medium
2868 E-3 2 C Medium
2869 E-4 2 C Medium
page 175

2870 E-5 2 C Medium
2871 E-6A/B 2 C Medium
2872 E-7 2 C Medium
2873 E-8 2 C Medium
2874 E-9 2 C Medium
2931 FT-103A 2 B Low
2932 FT-103B 2 B Low
2933 FT-104 2 B Low
2923 FT-301 2 D Medium
2922 FT-302 2 B Low
2925 HP-1 2 B Low
2926 HP-2 2 B Low
2927 JI-1 2 B Low
2928 JI-2 2 B Low
2929 PF-1 2 B Low
2930 PF-2 2 B Low
2924 SP-1 2 B Low
2835 T-1 3 E High
2844 T-101 3 E High
2836 T-2 3 E High
2837 T-3 3 D Medium High
2839 T-5 3 E High
2841 T-7 3 E High
2843 T-9 2 E Medium High
page 176
Annex 25 RGE: API 581 Qualitative, component based - Inspection planning

Recommended Recommended
Component Service Start Evaluation Inspection Interval Inspection
Name Description Risk 2009 2010 2011
Type Date Date (Class A inspection Interval (Class D
type) inspection type)
Pressure
D-102 trofazni separator 1969 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
vessel
T-1 ulazni separator Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
kolona za sušenje
T-101 Column 1988 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
gasa
T-2 apsorpciona kolona Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
prečistač posnog
T-5 Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
ulja
T-7 deetanizer Column 1962 2009 High 2 0.5 1 1 1
Pressure
D-101 separator 1962 2009 Medium High 4 1 1 1 1
vessel
Pressure
D-1 prihvatni sud 1962 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1
vessel
Pressure
D-300 trofazni separator 2000 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1
vessel
T-3 deetanizer Column 1962 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1
T-4 Column 1963 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1
T-6 depropanizer Column 1962 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1
T-8 deizobutanizer Column 1962 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1
page 177
T-9 Column 1962 2009 Medium High 5 1 1 1 1
C1A/B KOMPRESORSKE Pressure

1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
(potis) BOCE vessel

1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
(usis) BOCE vessel

1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
(potis) BOCE vessel

1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
(usis) BOCE vessel
Pressure
D-103 međusakupljač 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-104 trofazni separator 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-11 posuda 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-111 posuda 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-112 posuda 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-12 posuda 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-120 separator 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
vessel
Pressure
vessel
Pressure
D-16 trofazni separator 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-2 sakupljač refluksa 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
page 178
Pressure
D-27A rezervoar 1963 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-27D rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-27F rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
vessel
Pressure
D-28B rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-28C rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-28D rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-28E rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-28F rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-28G rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
vessel
Pressure
vessel
Pressure
vessel
Pressure
D-4 prihvatni sud 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
Pressure
D-5 isparivač 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
D-6 sakupljač refluksa Pressure 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
page 179
vessel
Pressure
vessel
Pressure
vessel
Pressure
D-9 prihvatni sud 1962 2009 Medium 7 2 1
vessel
FT-301 Filter Filter 1962 2009 Medium 7 1 1 1 1
Pressure
vessel
Pressure
vessel
Pressure
D-27E rezervoar 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1
vessel
Boiler -
Furnace Tubes
E-10 rebojler 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1
for Fired
Heater
E-102 propanski hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Heat
E-104 izmenjivač lote 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Exchanger
Boiler -
Furnace Tubes
E-11 predgrejač 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1
for Fired
Heater
Heat
E-110 izmenjivač 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Exchanger
Heat
E-113 izmenjivač 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Exchanger
E-116 izmenjivač Heat 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
page 180
Exchanger
E-12 kondenzator para Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Heat
E-120 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Exchanger
E-13 vodeni hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Heat
Exchanger
kondenzator
E-15 Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
propana
Heat
E-16 predgrejač 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Exchanger
Boiler -
Furnace Tubes
for Fired
Heater
Boiler -
Furnace Tubes
for Fired
Heater
E-20B kondenzator para Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Boiler -
Furnace Tubes
for Fired
Heater
E-24/A propanski hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
E-24/B propanski hladnjak Condenser 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
page 181
Heat
Exchanger
Heat
Exchanger
Heat
E-6A/B izmenjivač lote 1962 2009 Medium 8 1 1 1 1
Exchanger
Boiler -
Furnace Tubes
E-9 međubojler 1962 2009 Medium 8 2 1
for Fired
Heater
Heat
E-101/A izmenjivač lote 1963 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
Exchanger
Heat
E-101/B izmenjivač lote 1963 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
Exchanger
Heat
E-1A/B izmenjivač lote 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
Exchanger
E-20A kondenzator para Condenser 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
FT-103A Filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
FT-103B Filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
Filter sa aktivnim
FT-104 Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
ugljem
FT-302 Filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
Other
HP-1 Hidroforska posuda 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1
Equipment
HP-2 Hidroforska posuda Other 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1
page 182
Equipment
Other
JI-1 Jono izmenjivač 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1
Equipment
Other
JI-2 Jono izmenjivač 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1
Equipment
PF-1 Peščani filter Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
Peščani filter-bočna
PF-2 Filter 1962 2009 Low 10 1 1 1 1
filtrac.
Other
SP-1 Posuda za so 1962 2009 Low 10 3 1
Equipment
Total to be inspected: 51 94 56
page 183

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STEINBEIS ADVANCED RISK TECHNOLOGIES GmbH

Risk management and use of risk-based

Report title: Final report for Package B

Costumer: NIS Petroleum Industry of Serbia

Customer order Nr.: 45/609

Subproject: Package B Applicable codes/standards:

Workpackage: WP2.11 Date of order acceptance:

Task: Date of completion:

Participants in the activity: Distribution (list):

Participants / A. Jovanovic, D. Balos, P. Stanojevic,

Author(s): A. Jovanovic, D. Balos, R. Guntrum

Doc. Nr.: Version: 06 Date: July 7, 2010

Document Pages: 193 Annexes: 29

2.1.3 Pancevo Oil Refinery ..................... 5

2.1.4 Novi Sad refinery ........................ 27

2.1.5 Elemir Gas refinery ..................... 40

2.2 About RBI / RCM methodology .................. 50

2.2.8 Remaining life assessment ........... 55

2.6.3 Methodology .............................. 67

2.6.7 Conclusions and recommendations 81

2.7.2 Information on site, plant and unit 84

2.7.3 Detail description ........................ 86

2.7.3.1 FCC unit S-2300 .............................. 86

2.7.4 Safety of the plant ...................... 99

2.7.5 Risk assessment ........................117

2.7.6 Conclusions ..............................118

A.14.1 Blocks in Pancevo refinery ........... 141

Figure 32: Flow diagram of the refinery, Part 3 of 3 ...... 75

Table 28: Fire fighting equipment ............................... 49

Table 64: Definition of Frequency Classes .................. 118

1 Management Summary Report

2 Detail Technical Report

Aopt. Optional CMMS

Aopt – Optional CMMS

A Basic package B Extended C Full coverage

330 pieces of equipment

5.100 pieces of equipment

31,500 pieces of equipment

Figure 1: RiskNIS packages - Scope of the work

2.1.2 General about NIS a.d.

Figure 2: Refineries of NIS a.D.

2.1.2.2 History of the company

Figure 3: Structure of shares on NIS a.d.

2.1.3 Pancevo Oil Refinery

2.1.3.2 Location of Pancevo Refinery

Figure 4: Geographical position of Pancevo in Serbia

Figure 5: Google view of Pancevo in Serbia

Map of Serbia, scale 1:2000000, with position of Pancevo is given in Annex 1.

Table 1: List of blocks in Pancevo Refinery

FCC Complex control building

Atmospheric distillation I, S-100

Atmospheric distillation II, S-2100

Block VII Storage area (15 tanks)

Storage area (9 tanks)

Thermal power unit

Pumps for fire fighting water

Block X Storage area, (24 tanks)