590986

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PSPXXX10.1177/0146167215590986Personality and Social Psychology BulletinEhrlich and Gramzow

Article

Personality and Social

The Politics of Affirmation Theory: When

Psychology Bulletin
1­–13
© 2015 by the Society for Personality
Group-Affirmation Leads to Greater and Social Psychology, Inc
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DOI: 10.1177/0146167215590986
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Gaven A. Ehrlich1 and Richard H. Gramzow1

Abstract
It has been well established in the literature that affirming the individual self reduces the tendency to exhibit group-favoring
biases. The limited research examining group-affirmation and bias, however, is inconclusive. We argue that group-affirmation
can exacerbate group-serving biases in certain contexts, and in the current set of studies, we document this phenomenon
directly. Unlike self-affirmation, group-affirmation led to greater ingroup-favoring evaluative judgments among political partisans
(Experiment 1). This increase in evaluative bias following group-affirmation was moderated by political party identification
and was not found among those who affirmed a non-political ingroup (Experiment 2). In addition, the mechanism underlying
these findings is explored and interpreted within the theoretical frameworks of self-categorization theory and the multiple
self-aspects model (Experiments 2 and 3). The broader implications of our findings for the understanding of social identity
and affirmation theory are discussed.

Keywords
group-affirmation, self-affirmation, intergroup processes, ingroup bias

Received March 21, 2014; revision accepted May 13, 2015

People tend to evaluate information and make judgments in a
manner that best serves the interests of groups to which they
belong (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis,
2002). One way to mitigate the expression of ingroup bias is
through self-affirmation (Steele, 1988). By bolstering the self-
concept in one domain, one becomes less defensive in the face
of threats to other self-relevant domains, including group mem-
berships (Sherman & Cohen, 2002). Some researchers have
argued that, if affirming an aspect of one’s individual identity
can lead to a reduction in group-level biases, then affirming an
aspect of one’s social identity should produce a similar effect.
The limited research that has addressed this question, however,
has been inconclusive. In fact, we argue that group-affirmation
can have the opposite effect—accentuating certain biases. In a
series of experiments, we demonstrate that affirming one’s
group identity can lead to greater group-serving biases, both in
terms of intergroup evaluative ratings and correspondence
between personal beliefs and perceived ingroup beliefs. We
also present some preliminary evidence elucidating the mecha-
nism behind this bias-enhancing effect and lend some clarity to
the contradictory findings in the literature.
Social Identity and Self-Affirmation
Social identity theorists argue that people possess various
social identities derived from their group memberships (Tajfel
& Turner, 1986). Social identity theory is based on the notion
that people continually strive to enhance or maintain positive
self-images and, further, that group memberships often com-
prise important components of the self-concept (Tropp &
Wright, 2001). From this perspective, ingroup biases result
from a need to see one’s group (and thus oneself) in a positive
light. It follows that when people define themselves in terms
of a social identity, the personal self-image will overlap with
the image of the ingroup. Thus, phenomena that reflect favor-
ably on the group will also reflect favorably on the individual.
Likewise, threats to the group will be perceived as threats to
the individual’s self-concept. People can counter threats to the
individual or to the group and maintain a positive view of the
self by exhibiting biases that make the ingroup seem more
favorable than other groups (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Riek,
Mania, & Gaertner, 2006).
Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) emphasizes an
alternative means by which individuals can maintain positive
views of the self and the ingroup. In the face of threatening
information, people can repair their damaged self-images
1
Syracuse University, NY, USA
Corresponding Author:
Gaven A. Ehrlich, Department of Psychology, Syracuse University, 430
Huntington Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244, USA.
Email: gaehrlic@syr.edu

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2 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
and maintain a sense of integrity by affirming a valued
domain of the self unrelated to the threat (Spencer, Fein, &
Lomore, 2001). This can be accomplished, for example, by
reflecting on a positive aspect of one’s self-concept or engag-
ing in an activity that makes such an aspect salient, such as
writing about an important self-relevant value (Crocker,
Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008). While doing this, individuals
experience a boost to their self-worth and become more con-
fident and secure, enabling them to evaluate potentially self-
threatening information in a less defensive manner. For
example, people tend to interpret ambiguous self-relevant
information in a way that is consistent with their preexisting
beliefs and desires (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). After affirming
the self, however, people are more likely to consider evi-
dence that contradicts their own beliefs or view an issue from
perspectives other than their own (Sherman & Cohen, 2002).
This self-affirmation effect extends to group-based threats
and biases. If the motivation to protect the self is satisfied
through self-affirmation, one can respond to information and
threats relevant to one’s group memberships (other domains
of the self) in a more objective way, thus making the group-
serving biases normally exhibited following a threat less
necessary. This bias-reducing pattern has been found in a
number of group-based contexts, including group-serving
attributions made by intramural sports teams (Sherman &
Kim, 2005), perceptions of racism exhibited by ingroup
members (Adams, Tormala, & O’Brien, 2006), and self-
reported ethnic prejudice (Zarate & Garza, 2002).
Group-Affirmation
Although a number of studies have shown that affirming an
aspect of the individual self can reduce group-serving judg-
ments, there is some ambiguity with respect to the effect of
group-affirmation on ingroup biases. Derks, van Laar, and
Ellemers (2009) argue that self-affirmation enhances per-
sonal identity whereas group-affirmation enhances social
identity. To the extent that these identities overlap and are
highly connected, it could be reasoned that group-affirma-
tion should be just as effective at countering group-related
threats as is self-affirmation. Thus, it might be expected that
affirming a group identity will bolster one’s sense of self-
integrity, making one more open to possible group-threaten-
ing information and mitigating the need to make group-serving
judgments. Some empirical findings seem to support this
logic. For example, Sherman, Kinias, Major, Kim, and
Prenovost (2007) found that affirming the group reduced the
tendency of intramural athletes to attribute a positive game
outcome to internal, team-related factors (just as a self-affir-
mation exercise had done). Additionally, Gunn and Wilson
(2011) found that men (Experiment 1) and Canadians
(Experiment 2) who performed a group-affirmation task
were more willing to express feelings of collective guilt and
shame after reading about historical ingroup transgressions
against women and Canadian Aboriginals, respectively.
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The bias-reducing effect of group-affirmation has not
been reproduced consistently, however. Cehajic-Clancy,
Effron, Halperin, Liberman, and Ross (2011) found that
Israeli students who performed a self-affirmation task were
more willing to express group-based guilt, acknowledge
responsibility for wrongdoing, and support reparative mea-
sures with respect to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Students
who performed a group-affirmation task, however, did not
show this reparatory shift and continued to demonstrate a
significant bias favoring the ingroup. Similarly, Glasford,
Dovidio, and Pratto (2009) found that students who were
given the opportunity to affirm their American identities
showed no increase in collective guilt after reading a report
describing a bombing run made by American soldiers in
which many Iraqi civilians were killed. In addition, partici-
pants who affirmed their nationality exhibited less psycho-
logical discomfort after reading the report than did those who
did not group-affirm, and this pattern was especially strong
for those highly identified with their nationality. The authors
explain this decrease in psychological discomfort following
group-affirmation as a reduction in “intragroup dissonance.”
This finding also suggests an increased willingness to toler-
ate ingroup transgressions (and thus a greater tendency to
exhibit biases favoring the ingroup) among the group-
affirmed. There seems, then, to be some contradictory
hypotheses and findings concerning the effect of group-affir-
mation on ingroup biases. In some cases, affirming one’s
group identity appears to have a bias-reducing effect similar
to that of self-affirmation, but in other cases group-affirma-
tion seems to be ineffective at reducing group-favoring
biases and might, in fact, exacerbate them.
An alternative way to consider the potential effects of
group-affirmation on group-level biases may help resolve
these apparent contradictions. Perhaps there are distinct pro-
cesses occurring when one affirms a group compared with
when one affirms the personal self. In some cases, these pro-
cesses may result in similar outcomes (such as reducing
ingroup biases) and sometimes they may lead to contrasting
outcomes. Derks et al. (2009), for example, found that both
self-affirmation and group-affirmation led to feelings of self-
improvement and achievement motivation among highly
identified members of stigmatized groups. They argue, how-
ever, that these similar outcomes resulted from different pro-
cesses. Self-affirmation increased achievement motivation
by inducing participants to focus on their individuality and
sparking their desire for personal success and mobility.
Group-affirmation, by contrast, did so by inducing highly
identified group members to focus on their collective iden-
tity and by sparking their desire for group-level success.
Thus, these authors contend that affirming a group identity
encourages group members to think and behave in ways that
improve the position of the group as a whole, whereas affirm-
ing an individual identity directs group members’ attention
away from the group and allows them to focus on personal
outcomes.
Ehrlich and Gramzow
A similar discontinuity between self- and group-affirma-
tion may exist in the context of group-serving biases. Two
models help provide a theoretical basis for this distinction:
self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes,
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and the multiple self-aspects
framework (McConnell, 2011). According to SCT, one’s
self-concept can be categorized at different levels of abstrac-
tion, ranging from the self as an individual to the self as the
embodiment of an ingroup. Whether one categorizes the self
at the group level depends, in part, on the contextual salience
of that group identity. The SCT framework also posits that, at
the individual level, one’s personal goals and motivations are
most salient. At the group level, the goals and achievements
of the collective are most salient and become merged with
those of the individual (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). In addi-
tion, McConnell’s multiple self-aspects framework posits
that one’s overall self-concept can be construed as a collec-
tion of various context-dependent selves. Different contexts
activate different aspects of the self and make the affective
traits and emotional states associated with those aspects
more salient. Greater salience can lead to a greater tendency
to exhibit specific behaviors and attitudes corresponding to
those traits and emotional states.
A self-affirmation manipulation may provide a boost to
the self by inducing a focus on positive aspects of one’s
global (individual-level) sense of self, or “overall self-con-
cept of worth” (Steele, 1988, p. 266), thus making aspects of
the self that are related to certain group memberships less
salient and mitigating the need to defend those identities. In
fact, Critcher and Dunning (2015) demonstrated that affirm-
ing the self reduces defensiveness in the face of threat pre-
cisely because it expands the working self-concept and
directs attention away from the threatened domain. We posit
that a group-affirmation manipulation, in contrast, may
directly activate that group’s self-aspect or social identity,
making any constructs associated with that group psycho-
logically predominant. Presumably, these constructs would
include biases toward salient outgroups and the desire to
enhance and defend the worth and integrity of the ingroup. If
so, affirming the group may exacerbate, rather than reduce,
ingroup-favoring biases in the face of threat. In addition, it is
likely that the link between group-affirmation and self-aspect
activation would be especially strong for groups with which
one is highly identified. Such groups, which would comprise
a significant part of an individual’s self-concept (Tropp &
Wright, 2001), may be especially sensitive to threat and
prone to bias if their identities are made salient through a
group-affirmation procedure.
There is some tangential evidence for our proposed pro-
cess in research that has looked at self-affirmations that are
domain relevant versus domain irrelevant (i.e., whether an
individual is affirmed in the same or different domain in
which he or she is threatened). Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik,
and Aronson (1997), for instance, found that, in the context
of attitude–behavior symmetry, individuals who were
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3
affirmed in a domain relevant to their dissonant behavior
actually showed exacerbated levels of dissonance as com-
pared with those who were affirmed in an irrelevant domain.
Similarly, in a series of studies exploring escalation of com-
mitment, Sivanathan, Molden, Galinsky, and Ku (2008)
found that participants who affirmed themselves on traits
with low relevance to decision-making ability demonstrated
a reduced tendency to justify their decisions and escalate
their commitment, whereas those who affirmed themselves
on traits relevant to this ability continued to engage height-
ened commitment. Thus, affirming the self-concept in the
same domain in which one is threatened may actually back-
fire and produce a different outcome than affirming the self-
concept in an irrelevant domain. Similarly, it is possible that
responding to a group-level threat by affirming that very
same group (as opposed to an irrelevant group or an aspect of
the individual self) would have a similar, bias-enhancing out-
come. In a series of experiments, we document this phenom-
enon directly.
The Current Research
In three experiments, we investigated the relationship
between group-affirmation and ingroup bias. Specifically,
we tested whether, in certain contexts, affirming the group
(in contrast to affirming the self) not only fails to reduce
defensiveness and biases but can also exacerbate them. In
Experiment 1, we examined the tendency of American politi-
cal partisans to engage in evaluative biases following either
a self-affirmation or group-affirmation. We hypothesized
that affirming the self and affirming the group in this threat-
ening context would have contrasting effects on the strength
of the ingroup–outgroup evaluative bias. In Experiment 2,
we sought to lend some clarity to the mechanism behind the
bias-enhancing effect of group-affirmation observed in
Experiment 1. Specifically, we examined the effects of two
different group-affirmations (one related to politics and one
unrelated to politics) on a broader array of political attitudes.
In addition, we tested whether group-affirmation effects
were stronger for persons highly identified with their party.
In Experiment 3, we sought to further delineate the processes
underlying group-affirmation. Specifically, we tested
whether group-affirmation (in contrast to self-affirmation)
makes ideas associated with that group more salient.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we provide a basic test of whether self-affir-
mation and group-affirmation can have contrasting effects on
ingroup biases. To determine what group-level contexts
members of our participant pool found particularly important
(and thus were likely to identify strongly with), we conducted
a pilot study in which undergraduates at our university were
asked to indicate the most important groups to which they
belonged. Results from the pilot study revealed that political
4 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
party membership was the social identity selected most fre-
quently behind only athletic team affiliation. Given the acces-
sibility of political partisans on a college campus and the
applicability of political affiliation to a broad range of people
(as opposed to identification with a particular sports team),
that was the social identity context we selected. Given our
research question, we felt that political party affiliation would
be an especially informative identity on which to focus for
additional reasons. In the United States, there are two major
political parties (Democrats and Republicans) providing a
built-in intergroup comparison. This intergroup context is
especially contentious and bias ridden. By definition and in
practice, the Democratic and Republican parties in the United
States are highly threatening to one another (Binning,
Sherman, Cohen, & Heitland, 2010; Chambers & Melnyk,
2006; Ware, 2011), and it is likely that hostile interparty atti-
tudes and biases would be a core component of partisans’
political party self-aspects. Therefore, we thought that this
would be an ideal context within which to examine our
hypotheses at the intergroup level.
Specifically, we examined the effects of both self-affir-
mation and group-affirmation on evaluations of one’s own
political party (ingroup) and the opposing party (outgroup).
Participants in this study performed a self-affirmation,
group-affirmation, or control task and then rated members
of their political party and the opposing party on positive
and negative traits. Because of the contentious nature of the
political domain1 and the inherent threat that results from
rating outgroup members in such a domain (McQueen &
Klein, 2006), we expected that, by default, participants
would demonstrate an evaluative bias favoring their own
political party. That is, we predicted that participants in a
control condition would evaluate the ingroup more posi-
tively than the outgroup. However, consistent with previous
research, we predicted that participants who affirmed a per-
sonal self-aspect would express this bias to a lesser degree.
Most importantly, we hypothesized that group-affirmation
would not lessen intergroup bias in this context. Indeed, we
predicted that affirming one’s political party would exacer-
bate the propensity to evaluate the ingroup more favorably
than the outgroup.
Method
Participants and design. A total of 170 undergraduates in an
introductory psychology course received partial course credit
for participating in this study. The sample consisted of 109
women and 61 men aged 18 to 29 years (M = 18.79, SD =
1.21). Participants were randomly assigned to the self-affir-
mation, group-affirmation, or no-affirmation (control)
condition.
Procedure and measures. Participants completed an online
questionnaire containing three sections. The first section
consisted of demographic questions and a set of political
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party affiliation questions. The second section consisted of
the affirmation manipulation, and the third section consisted
of the political attitude measures.
Political party affiliation. Participants first indicated whether
they were a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent. If
participants indicated that they were Independents, they were
asked if they saw themselves as closer to the Republican or
Democratic Party. This selection of political party affiliation
determined which party was the ingroup and which party
was the outgroup for each participant. Overall, there were a
total of 43 Republicans, 82 Democrats, and 45 Independents.
When Independents were collapsed across the party in which
they felt closest to, the final sample resulted in 58 Republi-
cans and 112 Democrats.2
Affirmation manipulation. Participants in the self- and
group-affirmation conditions completed the standard values-
affirmation manipulation adapted from previous research
(Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Fein & Spencer, 1997;
Gunn & Wilson, 2011). Participants were presented with 15
values (e.g., “Art/music,” “Social life,” and “Concern for
others”). Participants in the self-affirmation condition were
asked to select the value that they thought was most impor-
tant to them as individuals and to write a paragraph explain-
ing how that value pertained to them and why they thought
it was so important. Participants in the group-affirmation
condition were asked to select the value that they thought
was most important to their political party as a group. They
were then instructed to write a paragraph explaining how that
value pertained to their political party and why members of
that party thought it was important. Participants in the no-
affirmation (control) condition were asked to list everything
they had eaten or drank in the previous 48 hours. The no-
affirmation instructions were taken from Cohen et al. (2000),
who argue that participants can turn any values-based task
(such as writing about an unimportant value) into a self-
affirming task and, thus, something completely irrelevant
and arbitrary should be used as a control.
Dependent measures. Following the affirmation manipu-
lation, participants were presented with a scale on which
they indicated how well they thought various positive traits
(e.g., “Honest,” “Ethical”) and negative traits (e.g., “Igno-
rant,” “Immoral”) characterized members of both their own
political party and members of the opposing political party.
These traits and rating procedures were selected primarily
from Chambers and Melnyk (2006) and the order in which
the groups were evaluated was counterbalanced. Ratings
were made on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all character-
istic) to 7 (extremely characteristic). Participants’ responses
for the positive traits and negative traits were averaged for
each target group producing four trait-related outcome vari-
ables: positive ingroup (α = .83), negative ingroup (α = .69),
positive outgroup (α = .83), and negative outgroup (α = .67).
Ehrlich and Gramzow
5.5
5
Negave Atudes
4.5
4 Ingroup
Outgroup
3.5
3 As hypothesized, affirming the self and affirming the group
2.5
Self-Affirm Control Group-Affirm
Figure 1. Effect of affirmation condition on negative attitudes
toward members of participants’ own political party (ingroup) and
opposing political party (outgroup; Experiment 1).
Note. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the means.
Results
We conducted a 2 (group: ingroup, outgroup) × 2 (valence:
positive, negative) × 3 (affirmation: self, group, control)
mixed ANOVA on trait ratings, with group and valence as
within-subjects factors. The three-way interaction was sig-
2
nificant, F(2, 167) = 3.62, p = .029, ηp = .04. We examined
the patterns contributing to this interaction separately by trait
valence.
For the positive traits, there was a significant group main
2
effect, F(1, 167) = 103.17, p < .001, ηp = .38. Overall, partici-
pants rated members of their own political party (M = 5.00, SD
= 0.80) more positively than members of the opposing party
(M = 4.08 SD = 0.91). There was not a significant main effect
for affirmation condition, F(2, 167) < 1, nor was there a Group
× Affirmation interaction, F(2, 167) = 2.10, p = .126.
For the negative traits (Figure 1), the group main effect
2
was significant, F(1, 167) = 45.03, p < .001, ηp = .21.
Overall, participants rated members of their own political
party (M = 3.57, SD = 0.95) less negatively than members of
the opposing party (M = 4.30, SD = 1.03). There was not a
significant main effect for affirmation condition, F(2, 167) =
2.24, p = .110. However, there was a significant Group ×
2
Affirmation interaction, F(2, 167) = 3.20, p = .043, ηp = .04.
Contrast analyses revealed that this interactive pattern for
negative traits was driven by a linear contrast across affirma-
tion condition for outgroup evaluations, F(1, 167) = 6.87, p
= .01. Participants in the group-affirmation condition (M =
4.57, SD = 1.00) rated the outgroup most negatively, fol-
lowed by the participants in the control condition (M = 4.25,
SD = 0.95), and then those in the self-affirmation condition
(M = 4.07, SD = 1.10).
In addition, simple effects tests indicated that the differ-
ence between ingroup and outgroup ratings on the negative
traits was greatest for those who affirmed their political
party. Specifically, the discrepancy between ingroup and out-
group ratings was significantly greater for those who affirmed
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5
the group (Mdiff = 1.11, SDdiff = 1.35) compared with those
who affirmed the self (Mdiff = 0.58, SDdiff = 1.23), t(112) =
2.17, p = .032, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.05, 1.00],
or for those in the control condition (Mdiff = 0.49, SDdiff =
1.61), t(111) = 2.21, p = .029, 95% CI = [0.06, 1.17].
Discussion
had contrasting effects on the tendency to exhibit group-
based evaluative biases. These findings provide support for
the notion that, unlike affirming a personal aspect of the self,
affirming a group identity in the face of threat can actually
increase biased judgments relevant to that group. Importantly,
the focus on political parties provided a naturally threatening
context and facilitated the examination of bias at the inter-
group level. It is noteworthy that, in this context, group-affir-
mation elevated intergroup bias specifically when examining
negative trait evaluations. That is, the outgroup was evalu-
ated more negatively than the ingroup to a significantly
greater degree in the group-affirmation condition than in
either the self-affirmation or control conditions (although
ingroup bias was observed to some extent in all conditions).
Experiment 2
The findings from the previous experiment can readily be
interpreted based on the multiple self-aspects framework
(McConnell, 2011) and SCT (Turner et al., 1987). The group-
affirmation task presumably activated the self-aspect associ-
ated with a specific social identity (political party), thus
making associated constructs (e.g., political issues) and
motivations (e.g., negative attitudes toward the opposing
party) more salient. Experiment 2 was designed to test three
additional predictions that emerge from this interpretation.
First, we predicted that the effect of group-affirmation on
bias would be most pronounced when that group is a particu-
larly important aspect of the self. Consistent with this predic-
tion, a number of studies have shown that group identification
predicts greater levels of ingroup and intergroup bias (e.g.,
Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000). The procedure for deter-
mining political affiliation used in Experiment 1 did not
assess the strength of party identification. Therefore, we
included a continuous measure of party identification in
Experiment 2. We hypothesized that the effect of political
party-affirmation on bias would be strongest for those highly
identified with their party.
Second, we predicted that, if a group-affirmation indeed
activates a specific group-level aspect of the self, such a
manipulation would result in an increased correspondence
between perceptions of the self and of the group. One mani-
festation of this phenomenon would be greater overlap
between attitudes attributed to the self and attitudes attributed
to the ingroup. To explore this prediction, additional depen-
dent measures were added in Experiment 2. Specifically,
6 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
participants indicated how strongly they personally supported
various controversial political issues and how strongly they
thought the issues were supported by each political party. We
hypothesized that participants who affirmed their political
party (relative to those who did not) would show more over-
lap between the degree to which they personally support the
issues and the degree to which they perceive their ingroup
supports the issues.
Third, we predicted that these group-affirmation effects
would be specific to the affirmed group. If one interprets the
act of affirming the same group that has just been threatened
as a domain-relevant affirmation (Sivanathan et al., 2008),
then it should be the case that affirming one particular group-
level identity would not activate self-aspects associated with
other, unrelated groups. Therefore, an affirmation of one
group identity should not influence biases related to a differ-
ent group. In Experiment 2, participants affirmed their politi-
cal party, affirmed their university identity, or completed a
control task. We hypothesized that affirming one’s political
party would increase evaluative bias favoring the ingroup
party (replicating Experiment 1) and lead to greater self–
ingroup overlap in perceived issue support. In contrast,
affirming one’s university should not enhance group-related
biases in the political domain.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 178 undergraduates
in an introductory psychology course who received partial
course credit for participating. The sample consisted of 89
women and 89 men aged 18 to 30 years (M = 18.93, SD =
1.33). Participants were randomly assigned to the political
party-affirmation, university-affirmation, or no-affirmation
condition.
Procedure and measures. Participants completed an online
questionnaire containing three sections. The first section
contained demographic questions and a set of political party
identification questions. The second section consisted of the
affirmation manipulation, and the third section consisted of
the political attitude measures.
Political party identification. As in Experiment 1, partici-
pants indicated whether they were a Republican, Democrat,
or Independent. If they indicated that they were Independent,
they were asked whether they saw themselves as closer to
the Republican or Democratic Party. Overall, the sample
consisted of 42 Republicans, 69 Democrats, and 67 Indepen-
dents. When Independents were collapsed across the party
with which they felt closest to, the final sample resulted in 65
Republicans and 113 Democrats.
In addition, as a measure of party identification, partici-
pants were asked to indicate how strongly they identified
with both the Republican and Democratic parties on a 7-point
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
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Affirmation manipulations. The procedure was identical to
Experiment 1 for the political-party-affirmation and control
conditions. Participants in the university-affirmation con-
dition were asked to select the value that they thought was
most important to students at their university and to write a
paragraph explaining how this value pertained to those stu-
dents and why it was important to them.
Dependent measures. Participants next completed a
series of attitudinal measures. They evaluated each political
party on the same traits used in Experiment 1. Participants’
responses for the positive traits and the negative traits were
averaged for each group producing four outcome variables:
positive ingroup (α = .87), negative ingroup (α = .80), posi-
tive outgroup (α = .89), and negative outgroup (α = .80).
Participants also were presented with a list of 12 politi-
cally sensitive issues/policies (e.g., “Same-sex marriage,”
“Obamacare,” and “Strict gun control laws”) and asked to
indicate separately how strongly they personally, the
Republican Party, and the Democratic Party supported each
policy. Responses were recorded on a scale from 1 (totally
oppose) to 7 (totally support). The order of all dependent
measures was counterbalanced.
Results
Trait ratings. Using a general linear model (GLM) procedure,
we examined the effects of affirmation condition, political
party identification, and the Affirmation × Identification
interaction on participants’ attitudes toward members of
their political party (the ingroup) and the opposing political
party (the outgroup). We treated target group (ingroup, out-
group) as a within-subjects factor, and affirmation condition
(no-affirmation, university-affirmation, party-affirmation)
and party identification (centered continuous) as between-
subjects predictors.
For the positive traits, only the group main effect was sig-
2
nificant, F(1, 175) = 103.75, p < .001, ηp = .37. Participants
rated members of their party more positively (M = 4.78,
SD = 0.92) than the opposing party (M = 3.78, SD = 1.06).
Importantly, this ingroup preference did not differ as a func-
tion of affirmation condition and party identification: three-
way interaction, F(2, 172) < 1.
For the negative traits, the group main effect was signifi-
2
cant, F(1, 175) = 72.50, p < .001, ηp = .29, such that partici-
pants rated members of the opposing party more negatively
(M = 4.25, SD = 1.03) than their own party (M = 3.41, SD =
0.96). Importantly, there also was a significant Group ×
Affirmation × Identification interaction, F(2, 172) = 3.76,
2
p = .025, ηp = .04.
To specify the precise patterns contributing to the overall
interaction (Figure 2), we used a series of regression analy-
ses to examine the effects of party identification (a continu-
ous variable) and target group (the within-subjects factor) on
negative trait ratings within each affirmation condition. In
Ehrlich and Gramzow 7

No-Affirmaon
University-Affirmaon
5
Negave Trait Rangs 5

Negave Trait Rangs

4.6 4.6
β = .22 β = .05
4.2 4.2
3.8 Ingroup 3.8 Ingroup
Outgroup 3.4 Outgroup
3.4 β = -.15
β = -.08 3
3
Low High
Low High
Party Idenficaon
(a) Party Idenficaon (b)
Party-Affirmaon
5
Negave Trait Rangs

4.6
β = .45**
4.2

3.8 Ingroup
Outgroup
3.4 β = -.38*
3
Low High
(c) Party Idenficaon

Figure 2. Party identification predicting negative trait ratings of the ingroup and the outgroup in the (a) control condition, (b)
university-affirmation condition, and (c) political party-affirmation condition (Experiment 2).
Note. “High” and “low” levels of party identification refer to 1 SD above and below the mean, respectively.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

the no-affirmation condition (Figure 2a), only the main effect
for group was significant, such that the outgroup was rated
more negatively than the ingroup, b = .765, SE = .163,
t(172) = 4.70, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.44, 1.09]. This effect
was not moderated by party identification, b = .115, SE =
.122, t(172) = .95, p = .34.
Likewise, in the university-affirmation condition (Figure
2b), only the main effect for group was significant, such that
the outgroup was rated more negatively than the ingroup, b =
.743, SE = .166, t(172) = 4.48, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.42,
1.07]. This effect was not moderated by party identification,
b = .144, SE = .107, t(172) = 1.34, p = .18.
In the party-affirmation condition (Figure 2c), again there
was a significant main effect for group, such that the out-
group was rated more negatively than the ingroup, b = .969,
SE = .173, t(172) = 5.59, p < .001 95% CI = [0.63, 1.31]. This
effect, however, was moderated by party identification, b =
.612, SE = .156, t(172) = 3.92, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.30,
0.92]. As shown in Figure 2c, party identification was a sig-
nificant predictor of negative trait ratings for both the
ingroup, b = −.272, SE = .117, t(172) = 2.33, p = .021, 95%
CI = [−0.50, −0.04], and outgroup, b = .340, SE = .122,
t(172) = 2.78, p = .006, 95% CI = [0.10, 0.58]. Thus, only for
participants who affirmed their political party, the more they
identified with that party the less negatively they rated mem-
bers of their party and the more negatively they rated mem-
bers of the opposing party.
Self-party issue overlap. To test the prediction that group-affir-
mation would increase overlap between personal attitudes
and ingroup attitudes, we examined patterns of personal,
perceived ingroup, and perceived outgroup support for the
controversial political issues. For each participant, we com-
puted two within-person correlations: one for the correlation
between ratings of self-support and perceived ingroup sup-
port across the 12 issues (self–ingroup overlap) and a second
for the correlation between ratings of self-support and per-
ceived outgroup support (self–outgroup overlap).3
Using a GLM procedure, we examined the effects of affir-
mation condition, party identification, and the Affirmation ×
identification interaction on each of the two within-person
correlations (self–ingroup overlap and self–outgroup over-
lap). We treated group (ingroup, outgroup) as a within-sub-
jects factor and affirmation condition (no-affirmation,
university-affirmation, party-affirmation) and party identifi-
cation (centered continuous) as between-subjects factors.
Overall, there was a significant group main effect,
2
F(1, 175) = 59.61, p < .001, ηp = .25, such that participants
exhibited greater self–ingroup overlap (M = .33, SD = .38)
than self–outgroup overlap (M = −.043, SD = .419). In addition,

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8 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 

No-Affirmaon University-Affirmaon
0.7 0.7
Self-Party Issue Overlap

Self-Party Issue Overlap

0.5 0.5
β = .16 β = .23*
0.3 0.3
0.1 Ingroup 0.1 Ingroup

-0.1 Outgroup -0.1 Outgroup

β = -.01 β = -.30**
-0.3 -0.3
Low High
(a) Low High
(b)
Party Idenficaon Party Idenficaon

Party-Affirmaon
0.7
Self-Party Issue Overlap

0.5
β = .67***
0.3
0.1 Ingroup
-0.1 Outgroup
β = -.39**
-0.3
Low High
(c) Party Idenficaon

Figure 3. Party identification predicting self-party issue overlap for the ingroup and the outgroup in the (a) control condition, (b)
university-affirmation condition, and (c) political party-affirmation condition (Experiment 2).
Note. “High” and “low” levels of party identification refer to 1 SD above and below the mean, respectively.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

a significant Group × Affirmation × Identification interaction overlap, b = .377, SE = .082, t(172) = 4.59, p < .001, 95% CI
2
was found, F(2, 172) = 3.95, p = .021, ηp = .05. = [0.22, 0.54]. As predicted, this effect was moderated by
To specify the precise patterns contributing to the three- party identification, b = .309, SE = .074, t(172) = 4.18, p <
way interaction (Figure 3), we examined the group and iden- .001, 95% CI = [0.16, 0.46]. As shown in Figure 3c, identifi-
tification effects within each affirmation condition. In the cation was a significant predictor of both self–ingroup over-
no-affirmation condition (Figure 3a), there was a significant lap, b = .189, SE = .044, t(172) = 4.29, p < .001, 95% CI =
group main effect, such that participants exhibited more per- [0.10, 0.28], and self–outgroup overlap, b = −.120, SE =
ceived self–ingroup overlap than self–outgroup overlap, b = .050, t(172) = −2.39, p = .02, 95% CI = [−0.22, −0.02].
.385, SE = .077, t(172) = 4.99, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.23, Although a similar pattern was found in both the univer-
0.54]. This effect was not moderated by party identification, sity-affirmation and party-affirmation conditions (Figures 3b
b = .046, SE = .058, t(172) = .80, p = .43. and 3c, respectively), the positive relationship between party
In the university-affirmation condition (Figure 3b), identification and self–ingroup overlap was significantly
there was also a significant group main effect, such that stronger in the party-affirmation condition (Figure 3c, dashed
participants showed more perceived self–ingroup overlap line) than in the university-affirmation condition (Figure 3b,
than self–outgroup overlap, b = .350, SE = .079, t(172) = dashed line), b = .125, SE = .053, t(172) = −2.35, p = .018.
4.45, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.20, 0.51]. Surprisingly, this The strength of the relationship between party identification
effect was moderated by party identification, b = .156, SE and self–outgroup overlap in these two conditions (solid
= .051, t(172) = 3.07, p = .003, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.26]. As lines), however, was not significantly different, b = .028, SE
shown in Figure 3b, identification was a significant predic- = .061, t(172) = .46, p = .65.
tor of both self–ingroup overlap, b = .064, SE = .030,
t(172) = 2.11, p = .04, 95% CI = [0.004, 0.12] and self–
Discussion
outgroup overlap, b = −.092, SE = .034, t(172) = −2.67,
p = .008, 95% CI = [−0.16, −0.02]. Experiment 2 provides further support for the notion that
A similar, but significantly stronger, pattern was found in affirming a group identity can lead to greater group-serv-
the party-affirmation condition (Figure 3c). There was a sig- ing bias, while extending the findings from the first exper-
nificant group main effect, such that participants showed iment in three main ways. First, higher levels of group
more perceived self–ingroup overlap than self–outgroup identification were associated with greater levels of

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Ehrlich and Gramzow
group-serving evaluative bias in this experiment.
Specifically, following a political-party affirmation, the
more identified a participant was with that ingroup, the
less negatively he or she evaluated the ingroup party and
the more negatively he or she evaluated the outgroup. This
finding is consistent with the prediction that the effect of
group-affirmation on bias should be stronger when that
group is a particularly important aspect of the self. Second,
group-affirmation also predicted greater overlap between
a participant’s personal attitudes toward controversial
political issues and the attitudes he or she attributed to the
ingroup party. Likewise, group-affirmation predicted less
overlap between personal attitudes and the attitudes attrib-
uted to the outgroup. As with evaluative intergroup bias,
the tendency to perceive greater self–ingroup overlap (and
less self–outgroup overlap) was most pronounced for par-
ticipants who were highly identified with their political
party. This finding is consistent with the notion that a
given group-affirmation activates that particular group-
level aspect of the self, yielding a greater psychological
correspondence between the personal self and that group
identity. Third, affirming one’s political party led to
greater bias specific to that group identity, whereas affirm-
ing one’s university identity did not (evaluative intergroup
bias) or did so to a significantly lesser degree (self–party
overlap). This pattern is consistent with the prediction that
the bias-enhancing effects of group-affirmation are largely
restricted to the affirmed group.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was designed to further address the processes
underlying group-affirmation. Specifically, we sought to test
directly our assumption that affirming a group identity would
activate concepts associated with that particular group mem-
bership. The self–party issue overlap findings from
Experiment 2 provided initial evidence for this process.
However, we sought to demonstrate at the most direct and
basic level that affirming a group identity makes ideas asso-
ciated with that group more salient. In comparison, we
sought to show that affirming the self activates different con-
cepts than does affirming the group. Based on the notion that
self-affirmation directs attention to positive aspects of one’s
global (individual-level) self-concept (Critcher & Dunning,
2015) and in accordance with research conducted by Crocker
et al. (2008) on the positive feelings associated with self-
affirmation, we anticipated that affirming the self (as opposed
to affirming the group) would make positive constructs/feel-
ings more accessible. We tested these hypotheses in
Experiment 3 using a word accessibility task. Specifically,
we predicted that affirming one’s political party would lead
to greater accessibility of politically relevant words/con-
structs, whereas affirming the self would lead to greater
accessibility of positive constructs not necessarily related to
politics.
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9
Method
Participants and design. A total of 263 U.S. citizens were
recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, and they
received US$0.20 for participating in this study. The sample
consisted of 175 women and 88 men aged 18 to 79 years
(M = 35.76, SD = 13.24). Participants were randomly
assigned to the self-affirmation, group-affirmation, or no-
affirmation (control) condition.
Procedure and measures. Participants completed an online
questionnaire containing two sections. The first section con-
sisted of the affirmation manipulation and the second section
consisted of the word accessibility task.
Affirmation manipulation. The affirmation manipulation
was identical to that used in Experiment 1.
Word accessibility task. Following the affirmation manipu-
lation, participants engaged in a word accessibility task. Par-
ticipants were told that a list of 55 words would be flashed on
the screen. The list contained five categories of words: posi-
tive traits (e.g., “Honest,” “Trustworthy,” “Considerate”),
positive general words (e.g., “Love,” “Laughter,” “Joy”),
negative traits (e.g., “Ignorant,” “Immoral,” “Stubborn”),
negative general words (e.g., “Rape,” “Cancer,” “Pain”),
and politically relevant words (e.g., “Obama,” “Abortion,”
“Congress”). The positive and negative traits were identical
to the trait ratings used in Experiments 1 and 2. The politi-
cally relevant words were taken from research demonstrating
that people tend to associate those words with politics and
political identities (Burdein, Lodge, & Taber, 2006; Lodge &
Taber, 2005). The words were organized into seven columns,
and their placement in those columns was randomly assigned
to each participant. Participants were instructed to “Please
scan the following list of words and, as quickly as possible,
select the five words that stand out to you the most.”
Results
A GLM procedure was used to test the effect of affirmation
condition on the accessibility of various word categories. It
was found that for negative general words, there was no sig-
nificant difference in accessibility across affirmation condi-
tions, F(2, 260) = 1.85, p = .16. For negative traits, however,
there was a significant difference across conditions,
F(2, 260) = 4.61, p = .011, η2 = .034. Simple effects tests
revealed that participants in the control condition (M = 0.35,
SD = 0.60) selected significantly more negative traits than
those in both the self-affirmation condition, M = 0.13, SD =
0.37; t(260) = 2.95, p = .003, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.37], and in
the group-affirmation condition, M = 0.20, SD = 0.46; t(260)
= 2.00, p = .046, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.30].
Most critical to our analyses, however, was that there were
significant differences in accessibility across conditions for
10
both positive and politically relevant words. For positive
words, this held for positive words in general, F(2, 260) = 8.13,
p < .001, η2 = .06, and for positive traits, F(2, 260) = 4.10, p =
.018, η2 = .03). Participants in the self-affirmation condition
selected significantly more positive general words (M = 1.98,
SD = 1.20) than those in the group-affirmation condition, M =
1.33, SD = 1.19; t(260) = 3.60, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.30, 1.03],
and the control condition, M = 1.36, SD = 1.18; t(260) = 3.47,
p = .001, 95% CI = [0.27, 0.99]. Similarly, self-affirmed par-
ticipants selected significantly more positive traits (M = 1.66,
SD = 1.02) than those who affirmed the group, M = 1.22, SD =
1.05; t(260) = 2.57, p = .011, 95% CI = [0.12, 0.75]; or did not
affirm at all, M = 1.25, SD = 1.18; t(260) = 2.44, p = .015, 95%
CI = [0.07, 0.76].
In contrast, the significant overall effect for politically rel-
evant words, F(2, 260) = 16.52, p < .001, η2 = .11, was driven
by higher values in the group-affirmation condition.
Participants in the group-affirmation condition selected sig-
nificantly more politically relevant words (M = 1.91, SD =
1.33) than those in the self-affirmation condition, M = 0.86,
SD = 0.93; t(260) = 5.71, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.70, 1.40],
and control condition, M = 1.50, SD = 1.23; t(260) = 2.31, p
= .022, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.78].
Discussion
Experiment 3 provides some additional insight into the pro-
cesses underlying group-affirmation. As we had anticipated,
participants who affirmed their political party demonstrated
greater accessibility of politically relevant concepts than
those who performed self-affirmation or control tasks. Also,
consistent with our reasoning, self-affirmation increased the
accessibility of positive concepts and traits. It should be
noted, however, that this experiment does not provide a
direct test of group-relevant self-aspect activation following
affirmation. Although these data demonstrate that political
party-affirmation increases the accessibility of words gener-
ally associated with political identities (Burdein et al., 2006;
Lodge & Taber, 2005), it cannot be determined whether
affirming the group also made salient the idiosyncratic con-
structs and motivations that made up participants’ individual
political party self-aspects.
General Discussion
It is well established that self-affirmation reduces a host of
self-serving and group-serving biases. Typically, self-affirma-
tion tasks make reference to personal aspects of the self (for a
review, see Sherman & Cohen, 2002). An emerging question
is whether similar psychological processes occur when
affirming a group-level aspect of the self. Although some
intriguing findings relevant to this topic have been reported
(e.g., Cehajic-Clancy et al., 2011; Gunn & Wilson, 2011;
Sherman et al., 2007), not all of these studies specifically
were designed to address this issue. Moreover, the findings
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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
from these studies could lead to varying conclusions. The
present research was designed to address systematically the
effects of group-affirmation on group-serving bias to bring
some initial clarity to this issue.
The central question addressed in the current research is
whether affirming one’s group identity has similar effects on
group-serving biases as does affirming one’s personal iden-
tity. We proposed that group-affirmation activates the self-
aspect associated with a given group membership and, by
doing so, may actually enhance or exacerbate biases associ-
ated with that group identity. Support for this guiding hypoth-
esis was found across three experiments.
In Experiment 1, we found that participants tended to
evaluate members of the opposing political party more nega-
tively than they evaluated members of their own party. This
group-serving evaluative bias was magnified when partici-
pants first affirmed a value endorsed by the group (i.e.,
group-affirmation) compared with when they endorsed a
personally held value (i.e., self-affirmation). Experiments 2
and 3 followed up on these findings and explored more thor-
oughly the mechanisms involved in group-affirmation.
Experiment 2 provided evidence for the proposed link
between group-affirmation and self-aspect activation. For
participants who affirmed their political party, the more they
identified with that party, the more negatively they rated
members of the opposing party and the more overlap there
was between their personal and perceived ingroup support
for controversial political policies. For participants who
affirmed a group unrelated to politics (university affiliation),
however, stronger party identification produced no increase
in negative outgroup attitudes and was only a modest predic-
tor of self–party overlap. Finally, in Experiment 3 we found
that, whereas self-affirmation induced a focus on positive
words and concepts in general, group-affirmation induced a
focus on concepts specific to that affirmed group identity.
Theoretical Implications
Findings from the present research can be used to consider
conceptual ideas stemming from SCT (Turner et al., 1987;
Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) and the multiple
self-aspects framework (McConnell, 2011) in the context of
psychological processes proposed by affirmation theory
(Steele, 1988). The current and existing research establishes
that, when focusing on the personal self, an affirmation task
reduces group-serving biases. Such a self-affirmation effect
is a fundamental tenet of affirmation theory (Sherman &
Cohen, 2002). We consider this pattern also to be consistent
with SCT and the multiple self-aspects framework because it
implies that focusing on one level of the self renders judg-
ments and biases related to other specific self-aspects or
identities less psychologically relevant.
We believe that this same process can account for the con-
trasting effect that group-affirmation had on group-serving
biases in the current set of experiments. By inducing a focus
Ehrlich and Gramzow
on a specific group-level aspect of the self, a group-affirma-
tion presumably activates the psychological attributes (e.g.,
attitudes, stereotypes, norms, behavioral tendencies, inter-
group comparisons) pertinent to that group membership.
Once activated, this group-specific mind-set guides subse-
quent thoughts, judgments, motivations, and behaviors. A
by-product of this mind-set would be an increase in biases
that serve to establish, protect, and enhance the worth and
integrity of that group. In short, a self-affirmation allows for
a more objective orientation toward a particular group mem-
bership by leading people to categorize themselves at the
individual level and, thus, highlighting aspects of the broader
self unrelated to the group. A group-affirmation, in contrast,
increases group-relevant subjectivity by leading people to
recategorize themselves specifically at that group level and,
thus, reinforces any biases inherent to that group member-
ship. This logic is also consistent with research exploring the
contrasting effects of affirmations in domains relevant and
irrelevant to threat (Blanton et al., 1997; Sivanathan et al.,
2008). Indeed, we found in Experiment 2 that affirming a
group identity unrelated to politics did not have the same
bias-enhancing effect as did affirming one’s political party.
We believe that our findings and theoretical reasoning
help clear up some of the confusion in the literature regard-
ing group-affirmation and bias. For instance, the Israeli stu-
dents in Cehajic-Clancy et al.’s (2011) study who affirmed
their nationality may have shown no increase in collective
guilt or responsibility because the biases and motives associ-
ated with their self-aspects as “Israelis” had become more
salient (presuming that, given the historical and ongoing
intergroup tension, Israelis and Palestinians are not “sup-
posed” to feel guilty or responsible for the suffering of the
other group). On the contrary, Gunn and Wilson (2011) may
have found an increase in feelings of collective guilt and
shame for an ingroup’s historical mistreatment of a particu-
lar outgroup (men’s mistreatment of women and Canadians’
mistreatment of aboriginal tribes) after group-affirmation
because that type of behavior is no longer considered socially
acceptable. Thus, one’s “male” and “Canadian” self-aspects
may contain the sentiment that mistreatment of women and
aboriginals, respectively, is wrong and that guilt and shame
are the proper emotions to exhibit toward such transgres-
sions. Affirming these group identities presumably would
make such feelings particularly salient, intense, and influen-
tial. Thus, this interpretation could also be used to predict
decreases in bias in some group contexts, provided those
unbiased feelings are associated with that particular social
identity.
There were also a couple of unanticipated findings in
these studies that are worth further consideration because of
their theoretical relevance. The first is the observation from
Experiment 2 that participants who affirmed their university
showed a similar pattern with respect to self–ingroup overlap
as the participants who affirmed their political party (although
this pattern was significantly stronger for those who affirmed
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11
their university). Thus, a university-affirmation induced par-
ticipants who were highly identified with their political party
to exhibit greater issue overlap with their party, but it did not
affect their intergroup trait evaluations. This result may be
attributable to the notion that one’s political identity and uni-
versity identity are not mutually exclusive. In addition to
being a component of one’s political self-aspect, for exam-
ple, one’s stance on such issues as abortion or gay rights may
be a part of one’s university self-aspect as well. So, although
there may not be an explicit, direct connection between one’s
political and university identities, such that making one’s
university affiliation salient would make one view the oppos-
ing political party more negatively, there may be an indirect
relationship between the two self-aspects, such that both are
associated with certain politically relevant issues.
Another result that warrants further discussion is the lack
of an affirmation effect on positive trait ratings in Experiments
1 and 2. In Experiment 2, for example, although there was a
significant three-way interaction between group type, affir-
mation condition, and party identification for negative trait
ratings, there was only a significant group type main effect
for the positive ratings (such that participants rated members
of their own party more positively than members of the
opposing party). This finding is somewhat surprising given
that much of the intergroup bias literature emphasizes ten-
dencies toward ingroup positivity and favoritism (Brewer,
1979). Nevertheless, people have also been shown to explic-
itly hold and express negative attitudes toward members of
outgroups (Tajfel, 1982). It is possible that the current find-
ings were restricted to negative ratings due to the nature of
the groups being studied. The American political arena is
characterized by disagreements between two opposing par-
ties over fundamental values, and this frequently leads to the
expression of negative and vitriolic feelings toward members
of the opposite party (Ware, 2011). Thus, negative attitudes
may become especially salient if one’s political identity is
activated following a group-affirmation task.
Future Directions
Our experiments address a relatively untouched and incon-
sistent area of research, and the current findings open the
door to many interesting questions and directions for future
investigation. For instance, future research should explicitly
assess the link between group-affirmation, self-aspect activa-
tion, and bias. Our results lend support to the notion that
affirming the group activates that group’s self-aspect, thus
leading to the biased tendencies associated with that self-
aspect. However, our evidence for this process is indirect in
nature (increased overlap between individual and ingroup
issue support and greater salience of constructs relevant to
that identity). It would be useful to test whether group-affir-
mation directly activates the idiosyncratic attitudes and
biases that individuals associate with their group identities
and whether it is this activation that leads to greater bias.
12
Future research should also assess the boundary conditions
of the affirmation effects observed in our experiments. In the
context of political affiliation, we found that affirming the
group can lead to a greater tendency to engage in biases favor-
ing that group in the face of threat. The political domain is
unique, however, in that it is a highly competitive, and some-
times even hostile, intergroup context. Is the bias-enhancing
effect of group-affirmation limited to contexts in which there
are clearly defined and opposing groups? Also, would a simi-
lar pattern of results be found if these studies were conducted
in the context of a group where members do not have a choice
in membership, such as ethnicity? Would the results hold in a
minimal-groups setting, or does group-affirmation only have
an effect on bias if the groups are well established?
In addition, are there contexts in which a group-affirma-
tion manipulation would actually “work”? In other words,
are there situations in which the collective self would overlap
with the individual self to the extent that reflecting on one’s
collective identity would provide a boost to one’s overall
sense of self-worth and result in less of a need to exhibit
intergroup bias? Perhaps group-affirmation would be more
effective if a different technique was used. Although we
employed the traditional and commonly used values-affir-
mation manipulation, a manipulation in which participants
are provided false positive feedback about their group, for
example, may provide a self-integrity boost without neces-
sarily making attitudes and biases associated with that group
psychologically predominant. In particular, such a manipula-
tion might increase positive feelings about the ingroup with-
out necessitating increased intergroup bias.
Finally, future research should explore the effects of
group-affirmation on people’s tendencies to exhibit biases at
other levels of identity. It has been demonstrated that self-
affirmation can reduce biases at both the individual level
(Cohen et al., 2000) and the collective level (Sherman &
Kim, 2005). In the current research, we show that group-
affirmation does not reduce biases at the collective level
(and, in fact, can even exacerbate them), but does this effect
translate to the individual level? In other words, would
affirming a collective level self-aspect reduce personal self-
relevant biases?
Conclusion
The current research suggests that affirming the group does
not have the same psychological consequences as does
affirming the self. Whereas self-affirmation buffers against
threats to one’s social identity and reduces group-favoring
biases, affirmations of the groups themselves appear to main-
tain or magnify these biases. The current findings document
that there are contexts wherein affirming one’s group identity
can lead to a greater willingness to defend the ingroup and
exhibit biases toward outgroups. These findings reinforce the
fundamental distinction between the personal, individual-
level self and the collective, group-level self.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at Uni of Southern Queensland on June 18, 2015
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.
Notes
1. Although there is much evidence demonstrating the inherently
threatening, confrontational nature of American politics (e.g.,
Ware, 2011), we thought it necessary to test this directly and
demonstrate that there is in fact a threat taking place when
operating in this context. Therefore, we conducted an experi-
ment in which participants were asked to engage in a thought
task that was either politically relevant or politically irrelevant.
Participants then completed two measures designed to indicate
the presence of threat: the State Hostility Scale (Anderson,
Deuser, & DeNeve, 1995) and the biosocial model of threat and
challenge (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell,
2001). Participants who engaged in the politically relevant
thought task scored significantly higher on the State Hostility
items than those who engaged in a politically irrelevant thought
task, F(1, 261) = 105.63, p < .001, η2 = .29, 95% confidence
interval (CI) = [1.38, 2.04]. Similarly, participants reported
feeling significantly more threatened following the political
thought task than the non-political thought task, F(1, 261) =
66.71, p < .001, η2 = .20, 95% CI = [1.16, 1.90]. These data
were collected using the same participants who took part in
Experiment 3. Complete details regarding this experiment can
be found online in the supplementary materials section.
2. We also ran all analyses with Independents removed from the
sample (i.e., without collapsing them across political party) and
found no changes in the pattern of results.
3. We also conducted a Fisher’s Z transformation on the within-
person correlations, but this did not affect the results. We report
Pearson’s r because the results will be more readily interpretable.
Supplemental Material
The online supplemental material is available at http://pspb.
sagepub.com/supplemental.
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