Pedersen Zim Transport JSAS 2004

Journal of Southern African Studies
Zimbabwe's Changing Freight Transport and Logistical System: Structural Adjustment and
Political Change
Author(s): Poul Ove Pedersen
Source: Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Sep., 2004), pp. 577-601
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4133910 .
Accessed: 24/03/2011 04:33
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and Journal of Southern African Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Journal of Southern African Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
Journalof SouthernAfricanStudies,Volume30, Number3, September
2004 Carfax Publishing
&Francis
Taylor Group
If
Zimbabwe's Changing Freight Transport

and Logistical System: Structural
Adjustmentand Political Change
POULOVE PEDERSEN
(Danish Institutefor InternationalStudies)
During the 1990s, Zimbabwe'sfreight transportand logistical system underwentdramatic

changes. The article analyses these changes in detail. These changes can be attributedto
three main causes: shifts in Zimbabwe'sown economy caused by the structuraladjustment
policies introducedduring the 1990s; the political developmentsin southernAfrica that led
to greatly increased trade betweenZimbabweand SouthAfricafrom 1993 to 1994; and the
restructuringof global shipping and air transportcaused by liberalisation of the transport
industry. As a result of these changes, Harare has lost to Johannesburg the status of
principal hub for southern Africa that it gained during the 1980s, and Zimbabwe's
centrality to southernAfrica's geo-economy has been reduced.
Introduction
Since the 1970s, transportsystems in the industrialisedparts of the world have undergone
a radical change under the impact of what has become known as the logistical revolution.
Through increased co-ordinationor integrationbetween the different modes of transport,
port-to-port service has become transformedinto door-to-door delivery. The focus has
shifted from simple transportcosts to logistical costs, comprisingboth internaland external
transport, storage and communications related to the commodity flows. Transportand
logistics have often been outsourcedto specialised transportand forwardingcompanies in
order to increase efficiency, and are now increasingly co-ordinatedwith production and
trade by supply chain managers,guaranteeingdelivery within a narrowertime-frame.The
logistical revolutionhas also led to the reorganisationof transportnetworksinto hierarchical
'hub-and-spokes'systems, accompaniedby a new form of transboundaryeconomic region-
alisation aroundthese hubs.
Before 1990, the logistical revolution had little impact on developmentin sub-Saharan
Africa,' including Zimbabwe and its neighbours. Import-substitutionpolicies and the
international commodity agreements tended to insulate African economies from inter-
national development trends in logistics by conferring a clear break in commodity
ownership at the point of export, thus making the internationalbuyers uninterestedin the
inland connections, which were most often controlled by parastatalorganisations.2How-
ever, duringthe 1990s, Zimbabweand its neighboursunderwenta numberof economic and
1 P. O. Pedersen, 'Freight TransportUnder Globalisation and its Impact on Africa', Journal of Transport
Geography, 9 (2001), pp. 85-99; P. O. Pedersen, 'Development of Freight Transport and Logistics in
Sub-SaharanAfrica: Taaffe, Morrill and Gould Revisited', TransportReviews, 23, 3 (2003), pp. 275-297.
2 P. O. Pedersen, 'The Logistical Revolution and the Changing Structureof AgriculturallyBased Commodity
Chains in Africa', CDR Working Paper 02.12 (Copenhagen,Centre for Development Research, 2002) and in
N. Fold and M. N. Larsen (eds), Re-placing Africa in the Global Economy (London, James Curry, 2004,
forthcoming).
ISSN 0305-7070 print; 1465-3893 online/04/030577-26 ? 2004 Journal of SouthernAfrican Studies

DOI: 10.1080/0305707042000254119
578 Journal of SouthernAfrican Studies
political changes that substantially affected Zimbabwe's position within the economic
geography of southernAfrica and brought about changes to Zimbabwe's freight transport
and logistical systems.
First, the economic structuraladjustmentpolicies, introducedin Zimbabwein the early
1990s but only implementedslowly and partially, had devastatingeffects on the Zimbab-
wean economy. This was aggravated by low rainfall in 1997/1998 and 2000/2001 and
serious droughts in 1990/1991 and 2001/2002,3 as well as by increasing political and
economic instability caused by large unplannedpension payments to the war veterans, an
expensive participationin the Zaire/Congowar, growing corruptionand a haphazardand
violent land reformprocess.4During the 1990s, this led to changes in the structureof trade
and production,which have alteredthe demandfor transportas well as the transportsystem
itself.
Devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar in 1991 led to price increases and therefore a
contracting home market at the same time as trade liberalisationled to increased com-
petition from imports. This had serious consequences for manufacturingindustries, which
mostly were unable to compete on the world market, although some were able to
compensate partly for the shrinking home market by exporting to the African market.
However, by the end of the 1990s, even this had become increasingly difficult because of
competition from the rapidly growing South African exports to African markets.5
Agriculturehas been badly affected by the recurrentdroughts. Cotton and maize, in
particular,have become very sensitive to droughtsbecause a large share of the production
has been relocated to the drought-pronecommunal areas. On the other hand, cotton
productionhas benefited from deregulationand privatisation,developing rapidly since the
late 1990s,6while maize production,which has been subject to continuedprice control and
political interference,has been more erratic, resulting in recurrentfood crises.7 Since the
late 1990s, the violent land reform process has also led to a large reductionin production
on commercialfarms, which has had devastatingeffects on export crops, especially tobacco
and horticulture,which constitute a large share of Zimbabwe's exports.
As a result of shrinkingexportsand the greatcost of the war in the DemocraticRepublic
of Congo (DRC), foreign currency has become increasingly scarce since the late 1990s.
This has reduced the imports of necessary productioninputs and machinery,which again
has reducedthe productivityof both industryand agriculture.In 1998 it led to a fuel crisis,
which has been recurrentsince then and has had a serious impact on both productionand
transport(see also the section on road transport)and led to galloping inflation, a rapidly
3 K. BirdandA. Shepherd,'LivelihoodsandChronicPovertyin Semi-AridZimbabwe',WorldDevelopment,

31, 3 (2003),pp.591-610.
4 A. Hammar,'Zimbabwe's UnfinishedBusiness:Rethinking Land,NationandStatein the Contextof Crisis',
in A. Hammar,
introduction, B. Raftopoulos andS. Jensen(eds),Zimbabwe's Business:Rethinking
Unfinished
Land,Nationand Statein the Contextof Crisis(Harare,WeaverPress,2003).
5 D. Simon,'Trading Spaces:Imagining andPositioning the"New"SouthAfricawithintheRegionalandGlobal
Economies',InternationalAffairs,77, 2 (2001),pp.377-405;P. Carmody,'BetweenGlobalisation and(Post)
Apartheid:the PoliticalEconomyof Restructuring in SouthAfrica',Journalof SouthernAfricanStudies,28,
2 (2002),pp.255-275.
6 B. Hanyani-Mlambo, C. Poultonneand M. N. Larsen,'An OverviewReportof the CottonSub-sectorin
Zimbabwe',preparedas partof the DFID-funded project,Competitionand Co-ordination in Liberalized
AfricanCottonMarketSystems,(2002). (www.wye.ic.ac.uk/AgEcon/ADU/research/projects/cottonE/comp-
cord);B. Hanyani-Mlambo, C. PoultonneandM. N. Larsen,'Zimbabwe CountryReport',prepared as partof
the DFID-funded project,Competitionand Co-ordination in LiberalizedAfricanCottonMarketSystems,
(2003).(www.wye.ic.ac.uk/AgEcon/ADU/research/projects/cottonE/compcord).
7 T. S. Jayne,J. Govereh,A. Mwanaumo, J. K. NyoroandA. Chapoto,'FalsePromiseor FalsePremise?The
Experienceof FoodandInputMarketReformin EasternandSouthernAfrica',WorldDevelopment, 30, 11
(2002),pp. 1967-1985.
Zimbabwe's ChangingFreight Transport 579
falling GDP, and growing poverty. It has also led to shifts in the overall demand for
transport,and between modes of transport.
Second, the political changes in South Africa in 1994 and the resultantincrease in trade
with that country have led to large changes in the volume and pattern of trade flows in
southernand eastern Africa as intra-Africantrade, and especially trade with South Africa,
has substitutedincreasinglyfor overseas trade.Thus, between 1990 and 1996, Zimbabwe's
imports from South Africa increased from 20 per cent to 38 per cent of all imports.8As a
result, the position as the principaleconomic centre in southernAfrica that Harareacquired
during the 1980s has shifted south to Johannesburg,a process greatly acceleratedby the
currentcrisis in Zimbabwe. This process has had a large impact on the patternand level
of demand for Zimbabweantransport,and at the same time increased the South African
interest in, and influence on, Zimbabwe's transportsystem. Third, restructuringof the
global shipping and air transportsystems, due to liberalisationin the industrialisedworld,
has had a great impact on African transport systems, not least in Zimbabwe. There,
structuraladjustmentpolicies led to the liberalisationof the truckingindustryand commer-
cialisation (but not privatisation)of the railways and air transportationduringthe late 1990s.
The purpose of this article is to analyse these changes in Zimbabwe's transportsystem.
The article builds on a literaturesurvey as well as on 40 interviews with transportfirms in
Zimbabwe carried out in March 2000. The article also draws on the results of similar
studies carriedout in Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya. The next section surveys the develop-
ment of overseas transport:forwarding,shipping and airfreight.The section after examines
the development of inland transport:the railways and trucking industry; and the fourth
section focuses on the developmentof ruraltransport.Finally, findings are summarisedwith
special attention to the growing influence of South African interests on Zimbabwe's
transportsystem.
Overseas Transport
The Forwarding Industry
On a global scale, large multinationalforwardingcompanies developed rapidly during the
1970s and 1980s, especially to serve the growing containertraffic,which resulted from the
global outsourcingof production.They developed as non-vehicle-owning-common-carriers
(NVOCC) which co-ordinate sea and land transport and customs clearing, and issue
door-to-doorbills-of-lading, but generally do not have their own means of transport.
Due to the lack of direct port access, Zimbabwedeveloped a strongforwardingindustry
already at the time of the first colonisation. The two largest forwarding companies in
Zimbabwe date back to 1884 and 1890, when Manica was established as a trading and
transportcompany and Allan Wack and Shepherdas a warehousingcompany, respectively.
Other companies (now large in size) were set up during the UDI period in the 1970s, and
during the early 1980s after independence, when imports increased again as peace and
internationallegitimacy were re-established.Many small forwarders,mostly doing customs
clearing, were established during the 1990s.
One can roughly distinguish between five different types of forwarding agents in
Zimbabwe according to the structureof their market:
* Full container/bulkforwarders, which ship only bulk commodities or full containers,
mostly to or from one of the inland container terminals. They handle both imports
(mainly industrialproducts) and exports (agriculturalproduce, especially tobacco, and
8 Central Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook1997 (Harare, 1998).

580 Journalof SouthernAfricanStudies
minerals) and attemptto obtain a balance between in- and out-going containersin order
to reduce costs. They number fewer than ten, but are amongst the biggest of the
forwarders.The largesthandle 3,000 to 4,000 containersper year, but most process fewer
than 1,000.
* Consolidators,some of which both consolidate exports and deconsolidateimports,while
others only deconsolidate imports. There are ten to fifteen consolidators.In the current
recession this appears to be too many, with the result that it often takes three to four
weeks to fill a container.One of the largest export consolidatorshas, with considerable
success, attemptedto set itself up as a consolidatorof consolidatorsand, until 1999, it
was by far the largest such firm in Zimbabwe. However, recently two European
forwardershave begun trying to penetratethe consolidationmarket,while some shipping
companies also plan to do so (see below).
* Specialised export forwarders exist only in the export of flowers, fresh fruits and
vegetables. While they may import a little, this is usually only machineryand inputs to
the flower and vegetable growers (see sub-section on airfreight).
* Agents for multinationaloverseas or South African forwarders, which mostly handle
imports. Multinationaloverseas forwardershave traditionallybeen relatively weak in
Zimbabwe because of the strong local companies. Most of the large multinational
forwardersare representedby a local agent, often one of the largerlocal forwarders.Few
have their own offices. Some operated in Zimbabwe for a time but then left again.
However, there have been some new attemptsto enter the Zimbabwe market since the
late 1990s. This trend differs from earlier attempts in that now it is often the South
African offices of the multinationalforwardersthat have extended their activities into
Zimbabwe, and at least one of the multinationalsnow active in Zimbabwe is a South
African company that developed into a true multinationalduring the 1990s.
* Customsclearing agents, of which there are probablymore than 100, often very small,
firms. They play an importantrole at borderposts and the transportterminalsin Harare.
Most of these were established during the 1990s, morally supportedby the drive for
indigenous business development.The few that have grown did so mostly by becoming
agents for multinationalforwarders.Most of the customs clearing agents are small and
have a bad reputationfor being ineffective and corrupt.Customs clearing also plays an
importantrole in the portfolio of many large forwarders.
Some of the forwarding agents own a few trucks for local freight distribution, but
long-distance road transport is usually outsourced to trucking companies and many
forwardershave developed close collaborationswith specific truckingcompanies. A few of
the largest forwardersorganise containerblock-trainsbetween Harareand Durban,Johan-
nesburg and Beira.
To facilitatetrade,a privatecontainerterminalor inland port was establishedby Manica
in Hararein 1975. It was awardeda customs franchiseby the government,enabling import
and export goods to transit South African and Mozambique ports in sealed containers
without customs clearance. Manica had been owned by the Anglo-AmericanCorporation,
but in 1985 most of the shareswere sold to Safren(a large South Africantransportcompany
that then owned the Safmarineshippingline), which alreadyhad similarfranchisesin South
Africa. The Zimbabweancontainerterminal therefore became almost an extension of the
South African system of container terminals. To increase competition, Bak Storage9was
awarded a customs franchise similar to Manica's and opened Harare's second container
tobaccofarmers(whoare still the majority

9 Thiscompanywas originallyestablishedin 1974by commercial
shareholders)to provide them with post-auctionwarehousing capacity.
Zimbabwe'sChangingFreightTransport 581
terminalin 1996-1997.10 In addition, the National Railways of Zimbabwe operate a large

containerdepot (Lochinvar)from where containerblock trains are dispatched.Unlike most
inland container depots in Africa (which are only served by railways), the two container
depots in Hararecater for containerisedfreight transportedby both road and rail. However,
until recently most of the traffic has been by rail, but road transportis now increasing.
The large Zimbabweanforwardersused to control most of the overseas trade flows.
However, duringthe 1990s they came underincreasingpressure,partlydue to the economic
crisis which has led to falling imports, and partly because of increasing competition from
the shipping companies.
Competitionbetween Forwarders and Shipping Companies

Zimbabwe has never had its own shipping industry, but since the early 1980s (after
independence)a numberof shipping companies have been representedin Zimbabweeither
directly or by a shipping agent (see Table 1). Until 1998, the three largest companies were
Safmarine (the largest South African shipping company) with 20-21 per cent of the
Zimbabweancontainer market;the Swiss MediterraneanShipping Company (MSC) with
about 19 per cent of the containermarket;and South African Bridge Shipping, which does
not have any ships of its own but buys slots from other shipping companies. In additionto
these three shipping lines representedby their own local offices, many shipping lines are
representedin Zimbabwe by independentagents. The most importantof these is Shipping
ManagementServices (or Manica Marine or Rennies Shipping Agency), which is part of
the Manica group and agent for a number of large shipping companies (P&O Nedloyd,
IgnatiusMessina, K-Line (Japanese),Lloyd Triestino,CSAV (Chilean),COSCO (Chinese),
Unifeeder (South African) and Mitsui OKS Line (Japanese)).
Traditionally,shippingcompanies in Zimbabweonly issued bills-of-ladingto the inland
container terminals, and left the door-to-door service and container consolidation to the
forwardingcompanies. For instance, MSC, which operatesits own forwardingservices and
truckingin Europe and also in South Africa, has - until now - not done so in Zimbabwe
because they have been primarilyexport-oriented,serving large exporters which operate
their own forwardingservices or use the large local (or South African) forwarders(such as
Manica and Allan Wack and Shepherd).
However, since 1998 the structureof the shipping industry serving Zimbabwe has
changed dramatically.Maersk,today the world's largest containerline, establishedan office
in Zimbabwe in 1997-1998, and by 2000 already had 15-16 per cent of the container
market.In 1999, Maersk acquiredSafmarine,and thus now controls almost 40 per cent of
the containermarketin Zimbabwe,althoughSafmarinecontinues to be managedindepend-
ently. At the same time, the ownership link, which earlier existed between Safmarineand
Manica," has been broken.
Maersk has set up its own forwardingand truckingcompanies and actively attemptsto
bypass the forwardersby contractingdirectly with the exporters,and also plans to go into
consolidation and deconsolidation of containers. This has forced MSC and other large
10 Thereis also a containerdepotin Mutare,but so far it has no customsfranchise.Cornelder,whichnow

operatesthe portin Beira,togetherwiththe Mutaredepotandprobablyalso BBR (an Israeli/South African
railwaycompany,see the sectionon therailways)has a planto establishan inlandfreeportin Mutarewhere
freightcan be containerised
andall containers
to andfromZimbabwe
shouldbe custom-cleared.
The
forwardersandprobablyalso the largeshippersareagainstit, becausetheysee it as just anotherstopon the
way,whichwill maketheirBeiraofficessuperfluous.It wouldalsobe a problemforthecottonexports,which
todayare sentuncontainerisedto warehousesin Beira,wherethe cottonawaitssale andcontainerisation.
11 S. Ngwenya,H. Chipeta,J. C. NkomoandD. L. Banda(eds),TheTransport and Communications Sectorin
SouthernAfrica (Harare,SAPES Books, 1993).
Table 1. Major shipping companies and agents in Zimbabwe.
Approx. no. of containershandled per year**

% of total Total
container
market* Exports Imports Absolute Computed%
Safmarine 20-22 10,000 6,000 16,000 25

MediterraneanShipping Company 19 8,000 2,000 10,000 16
Maersk 15-16 10,000 16
BridgeShippingCompany 2,500 120 2,650 4
Shipping ManagementServices 7,000 5,000 10,000 16
Others 44 15,650" 24
Total 100 64,300 100
* Based on informationfrom interviews with Maersk

** Based on informationfrom interviews
A Computedon the basis of the percentage data
shipping companies to follow suit. MSC and Maersk both organise their own block trains
between the containerterminalsin Harareand Durban and Beira.
One reason for the successful inroads of the shipping companies into the forwarding
market is that liberalisationhas changed the structureof global commodity trade. Previ-
ously, commodities such as cotton and coffee were generally collected by national
parastatalsand sold directly to processing industries in the industrialisedcountries. Now
they are increasingly bought directly from the farmers by large internationaltrading
companies that serve as supply chain managers for the processing industries, supplying
them with inputs of specified quality and often very narrowtime windows of days or even
hours. While the processing industriesneeded the services of the forwardersto organise the
transportflow, the internationaltrading firms make do with the generally lower level of
service provided by the shipping companies because they themselves have logistics as a
core function.12 At the same time, the old, large agriculturalexport organisations are
increasingly doing their own in-house forwarding and thus bypassing the forwarding
industryfrom the other side. Therefore,some of the large export companies that previously
had subsidiary forwardingfirms have divested themselves of these since the mid-1990s.
The restructuringjust describedhas hit the large full-containerforwardersparticularly
hard, forcing some to concentratemore on container consolidation. Other forwardersare
attemptingto offer their services to the growing intra-Africancross-bordertrucking,where
forwarderswere earliernot important.The growth in long-distanceroad transportprobably
means that there will be an increasing demand for agents that can secure full loads and
returnfreight for the trucks.
On a global scale, some of the large internationalforwardersare attemptingto specialise
in serving specific sectors or commodities in order to become supply chain managers (for
example, Panalpinawith respect to the oil sector). However, this requiresa global presence,
which even the largest Zimbabweanforwardersdo not have.
Althoughthe forwardingagent is, in principle,the shipper'sagent, the new trendsin the
sector mean that many of the larger forwarderstend to develop close links or strategic
alliances with shipping or trucking companies in order to obtain quantity discounts;
12 Pedersen, 'The Logistical Revolution and the Changing Structureof AgriculturallyBased Commodity Chains
in Africa'.
discounts that, however, are not necessarily transferredto the shipper. This is likely to
become an increasing dilemma for the forwardersas service firms.
A new marketfor airfreightforwardingwas also developed duringthe 1990s. Here too,
the forwardersalso face competition from the airlines (see below).
Zimbabwe's Trading Ports: Shifting Patterns

Except during the civil war in Mozambique,Beira has been the most importantoutlet for
Zimbabwe's foreign trade since the early colonisation in the 1890s on account of its
geographicalproximity.However, althoughthe simple transportcosts to Beira are therefore
generally lower than to Durban,between 60 and 80 per cent of Zimbabwe's overseas trade
now goes through Durban, and the proportion is still increasing. Since a substantial
proportionof the export freight is shippedFOB (free-on-board),the routingis often decided
by the overseas buyer or his forwarder.The increasing dominance of South African or
South African-basedmultinationalforwarders,which have an interest in using the South
African ports, may also contributeto the preference for Durban.13
However, there are also good economic reasons for choosing Durban, especially for
manufacturedexports, because Spoornet (the South African railways) operate with lower
rates than the National Railways of Zimbabwe, and with a rate structurefavouring light
containers. While Beira port has particularlylow wharfage rates for containers carrying
agriculturaland mineral products.Thus, Durbangenerally has an advantagefor industrial
goods, and Beira for raw materials.However, the frequencyof ship departuresfrom Durban
is higher and waiting times are thereforelower, because operationsare more efficient and
the freight throughputis 10 to 15 times largerthan in Beira. Overall, Mbaraestimatedthat
generalisedtransportcosts, including the cost of time (and tied-up capital), were lower to
Durbanthanto Beira in the mid-1990s.14 In addition,much of the freight consigned through
Beira is shipped on feeder lines (especially the South African Unifeeder) and has to be
transhippedin Durban,because the large liners cannot (or find it unprofitableto do so) go
into the smaller ports in Mozambique.
During the 1990s, Durban also benefited from Zimbabwe's increasingly unbalanced
overseas export/importtrade(with a much largertonnage exportedthan imported).This was
caused partly by falling imports due to the economic crisis and partly by a rapid shift in
imports from overseas to South Africa (which is generally not containerised) once
Zimbabwepermittedincreasedtrade with South Africa in 1993/1994. Zimbabwe's imports
from South Africa increased from 20 per cent to 38 of its total per cent between 1990 and
1996. This led to a large deficit of export containersin Zimbabwe(intervieweesin the large
firms suggested that imports were running at only about half the number of exported
containers).As a result, some productsthat used to be containerisedin Zimbabwe now go
by truckto Johannesburgor Durbanfor containerisation,as those ports have a large surplus
of empty containers.At the same time, it has been necessary to importempty containersfor
the export of tobacco which, for reasons of quality control, most tobacco companiesrequire
to be containerisedin Zimbabwe.This has increasedcosts and has led to both a modal shift
from rail to road transportand a shift in port from Beira to Durban.The large shippinglines
have tended to benefit from this because they generally have a more balanced flow of
13 Ngwenya et al. (eds), The Transportand CommunicationsSector In SouthernAfrica.

14 T. C. Mbara, 'FreightService Choice: a Focus on the ZimbabweanShipper',ATC Research Forum, 5 (1995),
pp. 36-53 (Annual TransportationConvention, South Africa).
containersthan the small lines, because they get a larger share of the import flows, which
are mostly controlled from overseas.
The concentrationof traffic in the port of Durbanis in line with global trends towards
the concentrationof trafficat large hub-ports.However, althoughthere are ongoing projects
to increase the capacity of Durban port, future possibilities to expand its capacity are
constrained by its central-city location.15South Africa therefore has long-run plans to
distributepart of the traffic to other ports. Thus, one of the purposes of developing the
transportcorridorbetween Johannesburgand Maputo is to open an alternativeoutlet for
freight from the Gauteng region. However, the Maputo Development Corridormay also
become importantfor Zimbabwe in the future, if service levels at Maputo port improve.
Airfreight
Airfreight consists primarily of high-value general dry cargo (such as machinery, spare
parts,test samples and other high-value goods such as hunters'trophies, sculptures,ostrich
productsand some textiles), on the one hand, and perishableproducts,such as cut flowers,
fresh fruit and vegetables and meat, on the other hand. The flow of general freight has
primarilybeen from Europeto Africa and the productionof cut flowers and fresh fruit and
vegetables was originally developed to utilise excess airfreightcapacity on the backhaul
from Africa to Europe.
Airfreight originally developed as a by-product of air passenger traffic, and the
production of flowers and fresh fruit and vegetables, therefore, has tended to develop
aroundthe airportswith the largest passengertrafficto and from Europe,especially Nairobi
and Harare. After Zimbabwe's independence, Harare airport developed into the major
airline hub for southernAfrica. This was possible because the embargo on South Africa
protectedHarareagainstcompetitionfrom Johannesburgand since 1991, when the embargo
was lifted,16 Johannesburghas increasingly become the hub for southern Africa. Traffic
through Harare airport continued to increase, but that city is served increasingly via
Johannesburg(and much of the increase in passenger numbersis due to transittraffic) and
the numberof direct regional connections to and from Hararehas decreased.17 At the same
time, the internationaltraffic to Bulawayo and Victoria Falls, which Zimbabwe until the
early 1990s attemptedto channel throughHarare(the first direct flights from Johannesburg
started in 199118), has increasingly been served by direct flights from Johannesburgand
Cape Town. During the 1980s, the national airline, Air Zimbabwe, carried all domestic
airlinetrafficin additionto an extensive regionalnetworkand a numberof routes to Europe,
in total 30-40 per cent of all the internationaltraffic. However, Air Zimbabwe always
operated at a deficit,19and due to liberalisation of air traffic it has faced increasing
competitionduringthe 1990s, especially for domestic traffic.20From 1997 to 1999 the total
15 Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC), Transport and Communications
Integration: the Catalystfor Economic Development in SouthernAfrica (Maputo, 1998).
16 G. H. Pirie, 'SouthernAfrican Air TransportAfter Apartheid', The Journal of ModernAfrican Studies, 30, 2
(1992), pp. 341-348; G. H. Pirie, 'Aviation, Apartheidand Sanctions:Air Transportto and from South Africa,
1945-1989', GeoJournal, 22, 3 (1990), pp. 231-240.
17 Between 1986 and 1996 the numberof direct links to foreign airports(African and non-African)went down
from 23 to 16 in Harare,while they increased from 12 to 54 in Johannesburg.Pedersen, 'Freight Transport
Under Globalisationand its Impact on Africa'.
18 Pirie, 'SouthemrnAfrican Air TransportAfter Apartheid'.
19 Until a presidentialaircraftwas boughtin the mid-1990s, Air Zimbabwewas handicappedby frequentlyhaving
to cancel scheduled flights because President Mugabe, often at short notice, took one of its jetliners out of
service for his numerousinternationalstate or private visits.
20 C. Mutambirwaand B. Turton, 'Air TransportOperations and Policy in Zimbabwe 1980-98', Journal of
TransportGeography, 8 (2000), pp. 67-76.
Table 2. Flower and produce exports from Zimbabwe through HarareAirport.
Flower and
produce exports
as % of total
Total airfreight airfreightinto
in and out of Total flower and and out of
HarareAirport Flower exports Produce exports produce exports Harare
(tonnes) (tonnes) (tonnes) (tonnes)
1985 18,003 338 396 734 4.1

1986 17,491 593 610 1,203 6.9
1987 20,429 1,326 748 2,074 10.2
1988 18,980 2,411 1,413 3,824 20.1
1989 15,889 2,872 2,823 5,695 35.8
1990 16,846 3,722 4,215 7,437 47.1
1991 18,355 4,758 4,354 9,112 49.6
1992 18,351 5,206 3,999 9,205 50.2
1993 21,584 5,770 5,202 10,972 50.8
1994 21,701 9,095 8,989 18,084 83.3
1995 11,630 10,202 21,832
1996 13,832 9,792 23,624
1997 14,729 10,948 25,677
1998 15,120 14,012 29,132
1999 18,900 18,216 37,116
2000
NB: Data for total airfreightare for calendaryears, while data for flower and produce export are from mid-year
to mid-year. They are related to total airfreightfrom the year before.
Sources: Total airfreight:CentralStatisticalOffice, Statistical Yearbook1997 (Harare,1998). Unfortunatelymore
recent data are not available.
Flower and produce export: Informationfrom HorticulturalProductionCouncil.
number of passengers carried fell by more than half. Like most other African airlines, it
operates with a very low load factor21and will require major restructuringin order to
survive in a competitive market.
While specialised air cargo traffic has developed in the industrialisedworld since the
1970s, it took off in Africa only during the 1990s. However, the Southern Rhodesian
governmentestablishedits own air cargo line, Affretair,as early as the mid-1960s in order
to facilitate meat exports and arms imports.22After independence,airfreighttraffic to and
from Harareincreased rapidly from 3,500-4,000 tonnes per year during the late 1970s to
around 18,000 tonnes per annum during the 1980s. Most of this new traffic comprised
imports, and in order to utilise Affretair's increased export freight capacity the
Zimbabwean government attemptedto expand the export of meat and other agricultural
products to Europe. As a result of this effort, the first export of flowers started in 1986,
and this traffic increased rapidly to 18,900 tonnes in 1999/2000 (Table 2). The export
of vegetables is comparable and increased at almost the same rate over the years.
Zimbabwe,to date, has been by far the largest flower exporterin southernAfrica. However,
since 2000, horticultural production has probably dropped due to the invasion and
confiscation of commercial farms. Part of the production seems to be moving
21 Less than 40 per cent, accordingto the InternationalAir TransportAssociation (IATA), WorldAir Transport
Statistics, 44th edition (Montreal/Geneva/London,2000).
22 A. J. Malter, A. Reijtenbaghand S. Jaffee, 'Profits from Petals: the Development of Cut Flower Exports in
SouthernAfrica', in S. Jaffee (ed.), SouthernAfrican Agribusinesses: Gaining ThroughRegional Collabora-
tion, World Bank Technical Paper No. 424 (WashingtonDC, The World Bank, 1999).
586 Journalof Southern
AfricanStudies
to neighbouringcountries, especially Mozambique. (see Joseph Hanlon's article, Renewed

Land Debate and the Cargo Cult in Mozambiquein this issue of JSAS, for a different
perspective of this development in terms of Mozambique's land policy and Zimbabwean
investment in Mozambique). While South Africa has much larger flower production, it
exports little of this. Zambia has a small but growing flower export market.23
During the 1990s, Zimbabwe's horticulturalexports outgrew the passenger airlines'
excess capacity.This was exacerbatedby the declining importsof general freight due to the
recurrenteconomic crises. Therefore,an increasingshare of the exports has been carriedby
all-cargo planes. In March 2000, four cargo lines operatedregularlybetween Harareand
Amsterdam,Maastrichtor Luxembourg(Martinair(KLM), Fast Air (Cargolux),MK Airline
and DHL Aviation (charteredplane from Das Air)), with a total of ten departuresper week.
Most of the planes carry general freight from Europe to Johannesburgand then pick up
flowers in Harare,Nairobi and sometimes Lusaka on the way back. By the late 1990s,
Afrettairno longer had any planes of its own so it bought space from other airlines. From
1997, Affretair,in partnershipwith DHL, held the concession for groundhandlingat Harare
airport.However, Affretairhad long been close to bankruptcyand finally ceased operating
in March 2000, and its remainingassets were sold at auction in 2001. Groundhandling in
Hararewas taken over by a new private company, Aviation Ground Services, which was
incorporatedin December 2001.
Many of the large forwardersserving the shipping industry also forward and clear air
cargo. However, except in the horticulturalsector, specialised airfreightforwardershave
difficulty surviving because the internationalairlines increasingly operate their own for-
warding offices. Even local offices of forwarding companies, which internationallyare
specialised in airfreight,attemptto diversify in Zimbabwe.
Inland Transport
The National Railways of Zimbabwe
The railway lines of the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) focus on the major urban
centres of Harare,Bulawayo, Gweru and Mutareand traversethe main commercialfarming
and mining regions of the country.In 1990, the total distance covered by the railways was
2,759 km, of which over 90 per cent was single track, 1,575 km were managed througha
centralisedtrain control system, and 311 km of track were electrified.24
In contrastto the situationfacing most other African countries, the National Railways
of Zimbabwe(NRZ) traditionallyplayed an importantrole in both the import/exportand the
domestic trades. In 1989/1990 they still carried all the import/export freight to the
Mozambique ports and more than 80 per cent of the freight tonnage to South African
ports.25 In addition, NRZ carried about 90 per cent of all domestic medium- and
long-distance freight (in tonne-km) (23 per cent of all the traffic was coal from Hwange
coalfield).26Until 1986, the NRZ were able to increase their traffic in spite of increasing
maintenanceand rehabilitationproblems.27Then, two-thirdsof the tonnage carriedby the
railways was domestic (partlybecause the import/exporttraffic carriedby the railways had
startedto decline).
23 Ibid.
24 C. Kunaka, 'The Railways and the Zimbabwe Coal Crisis of the Late 1980s', Geographical Journal of
Zimbabwe,22 (1991), pp. 1-14.
25 M. B. Gleave, 'The Dar es SalaamTransportCorridor:an Appraisal',AfricanAffairs, 91 (1992), pp. 249-267.
26 SWECO, 'ZimbabweNational TransportStudy' (Stockholm/Harare,SIDA, 1985).
27 Kunaka, 'The Railways and the Zimbabwe Coal Crisis of the Late 1980s'.
While most African railways have always operated with large deficits,28NRZ were
privately operatedat a surplus until 1947, by which time they had been run down during
the Second World War. However, during the blockade under UDI, the railways regained
importance because they ran on domestic coal and therefore were able to save foreign
currency for oil and motor vehicle imports. Although the railways had suffered from
insufficient renewal during the civil war in the 1970s, at independencethey were still one
of the most efficiently operatedin sub-SaharanAfrica. Thus, the nationaltransportstudy of
198529found that NRZ's tracks were 'generally in excellent or good condition', but the
locomotives were worn out and broke down frequently, resulting in poor locomotive
availability. As a result, the average wagon-km per day decreased and the demand for
wagons increased correspondingly.To solve the capacity problems, more South African
locomotives and wagons were broughtin. However, the increasednumberof wagons tended
to delay their circulationeven furtheron the single-tracksystem. This led in 1988-1989 to
what Kunaka,in a more detailed analysis, called 'the coal crisis of the railways' because
the most apparentfailure of the railways was the inability to move the coal required.30
To overcome the crisis, a long-termcorporateplan for the railways was drawnup. The
oldest partof the rolling stock was scrapped.31Maintenanceand operationsprocedureswere
changed, and block trains were introduced,with the result that the amount of traffic being
ferried directly between origin and destination, without marshalling,increased to 70 per
cent. After a few years, the number of South African wagons in Zimbabwe was reduced
from 6,700 to only 2,000.32
As part of the structuraladjustmentpolicies, NRZ have been free to set their own
market-relatedrates since 1990, and they have been through a process of internal
reorganisation,cost-cutting and downsizing of staff. Between 1990 and 1998, the number
of employees was reduced from 17,200 to 10,800. This has resulted in an increase in the
numberof tonne-kmcarriedper employee from 319,000 to 435,000 (Table 3). However, at
the same time, the total traffichas declined. Measuredin terms of tonne-kmper engine, the
rationalisationefforts led to some improvementin efficiency during the early 1990s. This
was due to an increase in the average load per wagon, in the numberof wagons per train,
in the average haul, and especially in the numberof trips per engine per year (see Table
3). In 1994, efficiency again increased rapidly, but now it was primarily caused by the
scrappingof a large numberof old and little-used steam and diesel engines (the numberof
engines in operationdecreasedfrom 250 in 1993 to only 155 in 1994), while the efficiency
of the remainingengines stagnated,and the numberof tonne-km declined by 20 per cent.
A 1999 memorandumfrom the Ministryof Transportand Energy indicates that, by the
end of the decade, the NRZ was entering a new crisis even worse than that of 1989. The
wagon turnaroundtime was said to be more than 20 days (whereas it was only 14 days
during the coal crisis); the number of Spoornet wagons within the NRZ network (which
should be less than 1,000 at any point in time) reached 3,400 during the last quarterof
28 See for Ghana and Tanzania:P. O. Pedersen, 'The Freight Transportand Logistical System of Ghana', CDR
Working Paper 01.2 (Copenhagen, Centre for Development Research, 2001) and P. O. Pedersen, 'The
Tanga-Moshi-Arusha Corridor:Decline or Restructuringof an African TransportCorridor?',CDR Working
Paper 01.6 (Copenhagen,Centre for Development Research, 2001).
29 SWECO, 'Zimbabwe National TransportStudy'.
30 Kunaka,'The Railways and the ZimbabweCoal Crisis of the Late 1980s'. According to Kunakathere was an
average of 6,700 South African wagons in Zimbabwe in 1989, corresponding to about 50 per cent of
Zimbabwe's own 13,000 wagons. See also G. H. Pirie, 'Reorienting and RestructuringTransportationin
SouthernAfrica', Tijdschriftvoor Econ. en Soc. Geografie, 82, 5 (1991), pp. 345-354.
31 According to the Central Statistical Office, TransportStatistics, volume 1: Census of Transport, 1991/92
Report (Harare,1995), the numberof engine cars in service droppedfrom 338 in 1985 to 280 in 1990, while
the number of freight wagons dropped from 17,902 in 1985 to 12,967 in 1990.
32 Kunaka, 'The Railways and the Zimbabwe Coal Crisis of the Late 1980s'.
Table 3. Operationindicators for NRZ 1981-98.
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
1. No. of locomotives on line 296 306 319 335 338 293 297 294 286 280 271
2. Train engine km (million) 17.9 17.6 18.7 18.2 18.1 19.3 15.7 14.3 13.4 14.2 14.3
3. Net tonne-km (million) 6,611 6,285 6,289 6,412 6,202 6,573 5,932 5,568 5,287 5,590 5,394
4. 285 270 275 278 280 293 253 231 221 229 225
Wagon km (million)
22.3 20.5 19.7 19.1 18.3 22.4 20.0 18.9 18.5 20.0 19.9
5. Net tonne-km/engine
(million)
6. Ave. wagon load (tonnes) 31.3 31.9 32.4 33.2 33.2 33.7 34.2 34.9 34.9 35.9 35.9
7. No. of wagons/train 15.9 15.3 14.7 15.4 15.5 15.2 16.1 16.2 16.5 16.1 15.7
8. Ave. haul (km) 484 470 466 462 458 463 432 409 398 434 392
9. No. of trips per engine 125 122 126 118 117 142 122 119 118 117 135
10. Ave. km per engine ('000) 60.5 57.5 58.6 54.3 53.6 65.9 52.9 48.6 46.9 50.7 52.8
11. No. of wagons 2
12. No. of staff ('000) 17.2 16.8
319 307
13. Tonne-km per employed ('000)
14. 6 X 7 X 8 X 9 tonne-kml/engine) 30.1 38.0 28.0 27.9 27.6 33.7 29.0 27.5 27.0 29.3 29.8
1.35 1.37 1.42 1.46 1.51 1.50 1.45 1.46 1.46 1.47 1.5
15. 14/5 (see notes below)
Notes: (1) The data for 1998 are based on data for 18 months divided by 1.5, and are thereforean approximation.
(2) These figures do not comprise the number of wagons rented from Spoornet.
Sources: National Railways of Zimbabwe, Fact and Figures, tenth edition (Harare, 1996); and for 1998 unpublished information from NRZ.
NB. The indicators in the middle part of the table (rows 6-9) are based on the following equation:
Tonne-km/engine= Ave. wagon load x no. of wagons per train x av. length of haul X no. of trips per engine
where no. of wagons per train is computed as wagon km/engine km
and no. of trips per engine is computed as engine km/engine x 1/ave. length of haul
increase
Unfortunately the right-handside of the equation is consistently larger than the data given by NRZ for the net tonne-km/engine (row 5) by a factor which
inconsistent definitions of the output variables given by NRZ and that we have not taken account of the passenger traffic.
1998; and the numberof non-operationalwagons and engines was increasing.As a result,
NRZ's deficit increasedrapidly, partlybecause NRZ was unable to carryall the freight on
offer, and partly because of the increasing payments for hired South African engines and
wagons and of interest on short-termborrowings.
The Development of the Rail/Road Modal Split

In spite of rationalisations, railway traffic dropped throughout the 1990s, while road
transportincreased. By 1996, 30 per cent of all cross-borderfreight traffic to and from
Zimbabwewas carriedby road33and - for a numberof reasons- the truckingindustrytook
over an increasing share of both domestic and cross-bordertraffic during the late 1990s.
Commercialisationof the railways has led to increasing transportrates, which have
made the railways less competitive relative to road transport.At the same time, road
transporthas been supportedby extremely low and decreasing oil prices. From 37 US
cents/litre in 1991, the price of diesel decreased to only 22 US cents/litre in 1998. This is
little more than half of the average for sub-SaharanAfrica, which decreased from 56 US
cents/litre to 43 US cents/litre over the same period.34Since 1998, fuel prices have been
swinging dramatically.Thus, when the diesel prices in Zimbabwe almost tripled during
2000-2001, the diesel price reached 72 US cents/litre in 2000, and galloping inflation
reduced the price of diesel to only 5 US cents/litrein December 2002 (using the exchange
rate on the parallel market)35- the lowest in the world at that time.
There are also more corridor-specificreasons for the shift in modal split. On the Beira
corridor,Mozambiquelevied very high road transitcharges throughmost of the 1990s,36
and the Mozambique railways, which also operated the port, gave preference to freight
using the railway. This preferencewas removed when Beira port was privatisedin the late
1990s, when the Dutch firm Cornelderobtained a 25-year concession to operate the port.
When the LimpopoRiver was flooded in 1999, a large section of the railway to Maputowas
destroyedand the line was reopenedonly in November 2000. At the same time, the railway
to South Africa via Beitbridge was closed for many months, forcing the trains to use the
Botswana railway, which is much longer and also has serious capacity constraints.
However, the shift in modal split also has deeper structuralroots unrelatedto railway
efficiency and freight rates. The spread of commercial agriculturalproduction into the
communal areas and away from the line of rail during the 1980s - as post-independence
ruraldevelopmentpolicies enabled more equitableaccess to agriculturalextension services,
credit and markets - reduced the role of the railways. Similarly, the development of
intra-Africantrade,especially with South Africa, duringthe 1990s also moved the transport
demand away from the railways. At the same time, the increasing deficit of empty
containersfor exports has tended to favour the truckingindustry,which also benefits from
access to the inland containerdepots, which in many other African countries are reserved
for the railways. Finally, the increasing share of Zimbabwe's imports now coming from
South Africa benefits from trucks,which are willing and able to take return-freightat rather
low rates.
33 SouthernAfrica Transportand Communications

Commission(SATCC),Transportand Communications
Integration: the Catalystfor Economic Development in SouthernAfrica (Maputo, 1998).
34 D. F. BrycesonandT. Mbara,'PetrolPumpsandEconomicSlumps:the Realityof Rural-Urban Linkagesin
Sub-Saharan Africa'sGlobalisation
Process'(unpublished 2001).Thepaperis published
paper,Delft/Harare,
as 'PetrolPumpsand EconomicSlumps:Rural-Urban Linkagesin Zimbabwe'sGlobalisationProcess',
voorEcon.en Soc. Geografie,94, 3 (2003),pp.335-349, but withoutthe datacitedhere.
Tijdschrift
35 G. P. Metschies,'International
Fuel Prices',3rdedition(Eschborn,
Germany,GTZ- Energy,Transport and
Eco-efficiency, May 2003).
36 Mbara,'FreightServiceChoice:a Focuson the Zimbabwean
Shipper'.
Restructuringof the National Railways of Zimbabwe

In parallelwith the attemptsto rationalise,NRZ have been consideringthree differentways
of reorganisingor privatisingthe railways since 1994. First, they considered a model with
a vertical division of managementbetween an infrastructurecompany (trackand communi-
cation), an operationcompany (engines, wagons and workshops) and different companies
concerned with passenger services, parcel services and catering. This model has been
widely used in Europe,but NRZ decided against it because the other railways in the region
(and especially Spoornetin South Africa) are not vertically divided. They thereforefeared
that Spoornet,which is so much bigger than NRZ, would take over all the operationsand
leave Zimbabwe with little or no control over the network.
The second model they considered was a regional division of the network into a
southern and an eastern part divided just north of Gweru (other division lines were
apparentlyalso considered). NRZ actually issued a tender on concessions for these two
networks, to which they received five bids (from the USA, Britain, South Africa (2) and
Israel (but largely financed by South African shareholders)).However, all were for the
southernpart, which has much larger revenue (the big money earners are the coal from
Hwange to Redcliff and sugar, iron ore and other minerals on the Maputo line) and lower
costs than the eastern part. The NRZ therefore had to reject that model too. Another
stumbling block for the model was that the World Bank requiredNRZ to make another
5,000 employees redundant,without guaranteeingthe money for their pensions.
NRZ thereforeconsidered a third option, which they call corridor concessions, where
privatecompanies in joint venturewith NRZ win concessions to operate specific corridors.
This model was inspired by the collaborationwith the Israeli company mentioned above
(now known as BBR), which built the Bulawayo-Beitbridge railway link on a BOT
(build-operate-transfer) contractin 1999. This railway link, which had been on the drawing
board since the 1950s, has shortenedthe route between Zambia and South Africa by 200
km (Figure 1).37
According to a high-rankingNRZ official, in April 2000 NRZ gave the first corridor
concession to a joint venturebetween NRZ and BBR, which obtainedthe concession on the
Mutare-Harare-Lion'sDen railway. In that joint venture, BBR has 51 per cent and NRZ
49 per cent of the votes. The line will have its own staff, but NRZ will manage the
operations.As part of the deal, BBR will build the missing Lion's Den-Kafue railway line
under a new BOT contract.This will link Lusaka to Beira via Harare(Figure 1). BBR has
also accepted that NRZ keep its present employees, because they will be needed for the
constructionand, later, operation of the new railway line. BBR apparentlyhas a similar
contractwith the Mozambiquerailways and Cornelder(which operates Beira port) for the
rehabilitationand operationof the Beira-Mutarerailway, and is probablyalso involved in
the plans for an inland containerterminalin Mutare.However, these differentcontractsare
shroudedin secrecy and apparentlydo not need to go througha public tenderingprocess.
The privateconcessions and BOT contractsare interestingbecause they indicate the future
potential of the trans-nationalrailways.
37 During the 30-year concession period, BBR takes a fee for all trainsusing the line, but NRZ operatethe trains.
Details of the concession have not been made public;however, apparentlyZimbabwehas given BBR some sort
of guaranteeof minimumtraffic,which led Zimbabweto force trains from Zambiato use the Bulawayo-Beit-
bridge connection instead of the transit route through Botswana. This led to a diplomatic crisis between
Botswana and Zimbabwe,because the Botswana Railways (which were operatedby NRZ until the late 1980s)
survive almost entirely on transitfreight, and Zimbabwe had to permit traffic to use the railway line through
Botswana once again.
Zimbabwe's Changing Freight Transport 591
ToDareasSalaam , 0.M
SMA
- LILONGWE
ZAMBIA A o0
LUSAKA Lago de CahoreBassa
Kafue
' Tete
Chirundu
-
I \ tyre
',*
To
Windhoek Lion's
Den Shamwa
+ e T
Livingstone
0 HARARE j
0 S
+ Hwange Gokwe
O
Z l A BW E
Redcliff MUtare
* Gweru
O Gutu
BeiraO
SBulawayo ? Masvingo
S Beit-
bridge
KALAHARI O
.,
DESERT
Polokwane
GABORONE
0o
Wndhok
! I S O U TH A FR I C A I
/ PRETORIA IN D IAN
I I o MAPUTO OCEAN
Johannesbur ?b M4
SWAZI
- I
LAND LEGEND
J Johannesburg
? S..metropolitan area
>1,000,000 pop.
1,000,000-100,000 pop.
O Othertown
Primaryroad
SKimberley ---
Mainrailway N
0 S + Airport
Bloem- - - International
boundary
fontein ** LESOTHO
1 / Rv
River
ToPort
Elizabeth *
- +" o0 Durban km 100 200 300
Figure 1 The transportnetwork in southeasternAfrica.

Road Transport
Developmentof the Road Network
At independence, Zimbabwe inherited road and rail transport systems that were well
developed and efficient by African standards,but which only covered the central parts of
the country,namely the towns and the centralhighlandssettled by white farmers,while the
peripheries,settled by Africans, had deliberatelybeen only poorly linked to the transport
system.
While the colonial governmentsin Ghanaand Tanzaniatendedto see road development
parallel to the railways as unacceptablecompetition during the 1920s to 1950s,38this was
not the case in Zimbabwe. On the contrary, the main roads in Zimbabwe were largely
developed within the same trafficcorridorsas the railways, i.e. where the settler farms were
located. There were two reasons for this difference in policy. First, the railways in
Zimbabwe operatedat a surplusuntil the end of the Second World War and thereforedid
not need protection. Second, long feeder roads to the railways would have meant access
roads into the African rural areas, something that was not seen as desirable by the settler
economy, because it would have reduced the function of the African areas as labour
reserves for the mines and white farms.39However, the concentrationof developmentalong
the line of rail was probably also better for the railways than limitations on road
constructionwould have been.
After independencein 1980, one of the most importantactions of the new government
was to extend and upgradethe road system into the more densely populatedareasof African
settlement in order to increase their market access.40Thus, during the late 1980s, a large
proportionof the state road networkwas upgradedfrom earthto tarredor gravel roads. This
meant that the share of the 18,400 km of state roads which were tarredincreased from 38
per cent to 45 per cent between 1985 and 1990, and the proportionof gravel roads increased
from 27 per cent to 35 per cent, while the share of earth roads droppedfrom 35 per cent
to 20 per cent over the same period.41 At the same time, many new agriculturalmarketing
depots were establishedin the African ruralareas in order to encourageproductionfor the
market.This resultedin a rapidincrease in the smallholderproductionof, especially, maize
and cotton for the marketduring the 1980s.42
There were also plans to upgrade some of the existing feeder and secondary roads in
the rural areas, but that only occurredto a limited extent before the economy tightened in
the late 1980s, while the structuraladjustmentpolicies in the early 1990s stopped further
improvementsof both ruraland state roads almost entirely.43In 1991, only 1,755 km of the
67,000 km of ruralroads administeredby the rural and district councils, communal areas
and the national parks, were surfaced.
38 Pedersen, 'The Freight Transportand Logistical System of Ghana'; Pedersen, 'The Tanga-Moshi-Arusha
Corridor'.
39 G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, Essays in the Political Economy of Rhodesia (New York, Monthly Review Press,
1973).
40 D. D. Rohrbach,'The Growthof SmallholderMaize Productionin Zimbabwe (1979-1985): ImplicationsFor
Food Security', in M. Rukuni and R. H. Bernstein (eds), Southern Africa: Food Security Policy Options
(Harare,Universityof Zimbabwe/MSUFood Researchin SouthernAfrica, 1988); M. Rukuniand C. K. Eicher,
Zimbabwe'sAgriculturalRevolution (Harare,University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1994).
41 CentralStatisticalOffice, TransportStatistics, volume 1: Census of Transport,1991/92 Report (Harare,1995);
Central Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook1997 (Harare, 1998).
42 C. K. Eicher, 'Zimbabwe's Maize-Based Green Revolution: Preconditionsfor Replication', World Develop-
ment, 23, 5 (1995), pp. 805-818.
43 Republic of Zimbabwe, First Five-Year National Development Plan 1986-90, volume II (Harare, 1988);
Republic of Zimbabwe, Second Five-Year National Development Plan 1991-95 (Harare, 1991).
Zimbabwe's Changing Freight Transport 593
Q e0 10000
8000
,0 6000
E24
o 4000
00
2 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97
Year
Figure 2 Trends in the number of commercial vehicles registered for the first time.
Source: CentralStatistical Office, Statistical Abstracts (Harare,different years).
Growth in the Number of Trucks

The development of road transport not only depends on the roads, but also on the
availability of trucks. This has been heavily influenced by the recurrentforeign currency
limitations in Zimbabwe since the 1970s and led to strong swings in vehicle imports (see
Figure 2).
At independencein 1980 there were 16,300 trucks in Zimbabwe. During the first half
of the 1980s this grew by almost 50 per cent to 23,300 in 1985, but duringthe second half
of the 1980s it almost stagnatedand, in 1990, it had increasedto only 27,400 trucks. While
the structuraladjustmentpolicies in the early 1990s halted furtherroad development, the
trade and currencyliberalisation,which were part of the structuraladjustmentprogramme,
led to a rapid increase in the import of trucksduringthe 1990s. Thus the numberof trucks
almost doubled from 27,400 in 1990 to 52,100 in 1999 (see Table 4). Surprisingly,the total
number of trucks continued to increase rapidly after 1996, when the number of new
commercial vehicles registered for the first time dropped to a very low level, probably
because few old vehicles are taken out of use.
Development and Organisation of the TruckingIndustry

Although Zimbabwe developed a fairly efficient truckingindustryduring the UDI period,
a relatively large proportionof the trucks were operated on an 'own-account' basis (i.e.
carrying only the truck owner's own goods) by the large public and private companies,
large-scale farmers and rural traders rather than by common carriers (which may carry
goods on the account of others). Before structuraladjustmentthis patternwas enhancedby
the overvalued currency and relatively cheap and easy access to capital by the large
enterprises.However, own-accounttrucks are generally much smaller than common carrier
trucks44and are utilised less efficiently. The dominance of own-account trucks also tends
to reduce the access to transportby small transportusers.
44 According to a sample survey in 1992, common carriertrucks had an average payload capacity of 34 tonnes
while the average payload capacity of own-account trucks was only 12 tonnes (CSO, 1995).
Table 4. The number of trucks in Zimbabwe, 1980-96.
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1999
Trucks 2.3-4.6 tonnes 6,923 8,414 9,354 11,815 12,997 17,257

Trucks 4.6-9.0 tonnes 8,527 13,642 16,532 23,860 26,246 30,744
Trucks over 9.0 868 1,122 1,563 2,258 2,884 4,172
tonnes
Total number of 16,318 23,278 27,449 37,933 42,127 52,153
trucks over 2.3 tonnes
Trailers (over 550 kg 7,081 11,100 14,910 20,622 22,684 22,628
capacity)
Sources:
Central Statistical Office, TransportStatistics, volume 1: Census of Transport,1991/92 Report (Harare, 1995).
Central Statistical Office, Motor Vehicle Report, Third quarter,1999 (Harare, 1999).
Outsourcingof transportseems to have increased during the late 1990s. Owing to the
constrained economic conditions, many of the large firms were running down their
own-account trucks, and as they did not have the resources to invest in new trucks, they
were forced to outsource their transport.A numberof the large truckingcompanies that I
interviewed said that they had very recently become or were in the process of becoming
transportsubcontractorsto large manufacturersor distributors.
How many of the trucks are operatedby common carriersis not known, even though
this requireda special licence until recently. The truckingcompanies are organised in the
TransportOperators' Association (TOA), which had about 100, mostly large, trucking
companies as membersin 2000, representinga total truckfleet of about2,500, mostly large,
trucks. The TOA estimates that it represents only about 20 per cent of all the trucking
companies in Zimbabwe, but a much larger share of the trucks. The number of trucks in
the large common carriercompanies seems to have stagnatedsince 1993, even though the
total numberof trucksgrew rapidlyduringthat period. However, accordingto the TOA, the
fleet was partly renewed during the early 1990s and the truck size of the large common
carriershad increased,so that the transportcapacity of the TOA memberswas much larger
in 2000 than during the early 1990s.
The almost complete liberalisationof the truckingindustryduringthe late 1990s led to
rapid growth in the numberof mostly small truckingcompanies owned by black Africans.
However, generally they have not become membersof TOA, which today is dominatedby
large, mostly white-owned, trucking companies. Liberalisationmeans that anybody who
owns a truck can now use it for both own-account transportand hire. Only trucks above
ten tonnes need a licence, but it is a licence with no geographical restrictions, as it is
intendedonly to secure safe maintenancestandardsand the efficient operationof the trucks.
This means that many of the 'new' trucks for hire in the ruralareas are not really new but
are owned by traderswho earlier could use them only for own-accounttransport.A likely
result of this is the developmentof the type of spot marketfor transportthat exists in most
African countries,45 but which until recently has been prevented by Zimbabwe's strict
licensing system.
Corridor'.
Zimbabwe's
ChangingFreightTransport 595
Cross-borderTrucking
Although intra-Africantradeis still small as a percentageof all trade,it grew rapidlyduring
the 1990s. This is due to the reduction of trade barriers resulting partly from the
development and expansion of the two trade organisations - the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA) and Southern Africa Development
Community(SADC) - operatingin eastern and southernAfrica with partiallyoverlapping
membership, and partly from the increased level of trade with South Africa since
1993/1994. Until the late 1990s it was Zimbabwe and Kenya, in particular,that benefited
from the increasedintra-Africantrade.However, since the end of the 1990s, South African
exports to other African countrieshave grown rapidly either throughSADC (which South
Africa joined in 1994) or throughbilateraltrade agreementswith countriesoutside SADC,
for example Kenya.46This expansion of South African exports to the African market
increasingly competes with Zimbabweanand Kenyan exports.
Concomitantwith the growth in intra-Africantrade,cross-bordertruckinghas increased
in importance.My research shows that this has resulted in the establishmentof a number
of large trucking companies specialising in cross-border transport. To participate in
cross-bordertraffic, one needs either a COMESA permit or a similar bilateralpermit. The
COMESA permit is valid for entry into all COMESA countries, while SADC encourages
bilateral agreementsbetween those member countries that are not members of COMESA,
for example, South Africa. We do not have information on the number of COMESA
permits, but in 2000 bilateralmultiple-entrypermitsfor South Africa were issued to 1,310
Zimbabweantrucks.According to the Ministryof Transport,this is not much differentfrom
the number of COMESA permits, and the conditions attached to them are also similar.
These permits were issued to 63 companies (of which 90 per cent are located in Harare).
However, cross-bordertruckingis highly concentrated.The 22 companies with more than
ten permits altogetherheld almost 90 per cent of all the permits; and the four largest had
more than 50 per cent of the permits;on average the four largest had 167 permitseach and
the largest almost 200.
The COMESA permitis a multiple-entrypermitto carryfreight between the countryof
the permit holder and any other COMESA country. The holder is also allowed to carry
returnfreight between the two countries and to transitother COMESA countries en route.
Trucks in transithave to pay a bond, but an escort is not needed. However, cabotage, i.e.
the carriageof freight within other COMESA countries or between two foreign COMESA
countries (the third country rule), is not permitted.Some of the large truckingcompanies,
therefore,also have trucks stationedin other COMESA countriesin orderto overcome this
rule and serve the local distributionmarkets.As most of the cross-bordertraffic consists of
transportbetween South Africa and the other countries in southern and central Africa,
Zimbabwe's location as a transitcountry,in combinationwith the very low fuel prices, gave
Zimbabwe's truckingindustry an advantagevis-a-vis most of the other countries until the
recent fuel crisis. The South African transportsector has therefore shown an increasing
interest in the Zimbabweantruckingindustry,and South African companies have increas-
ingly bought into Zimbabwe's cross-bordertruckingcompanies, while others have moved
their headquartersand some of their vehicle fleets to South Africa. A large and increasing
share of Zimbabwe's long-haul truckingindustryis thereforetoday controlled from South
Africa.
Truck utilisation is lower in internationaltraffic than in the domestic market,because
waiting times at border crossings tend to be very long. In 1997, Mushauricited waiting
46 Simon, 'Trading Spaces'.

AfricanStudies
times of two to three days at Beitbridge(between Zimbabweand South Africa), one to two
days at Chirundu(between Zimbabwe and Zambia) and up to one day at other border
crossings.47Ongoing computerisationof customs controls and the introductionof one-stop
borderposts should reduce the waiting times,48but so far does not appearto have done so,
as there are still frequentlylong queues, especially at Beitbridge but also at Chirundu.
The Efficiency of Truck Use in Zimbabwe's TruckingIndustry

The efficiency of Zimbabwe'struckingindustryis generallyhigh comparedwith most other
sub-SaharanAfrican countries. Thus, common carriertrucks in Zimbabwe seem to drive
almost twice as many kilometres per year as in Ghana and Tanzania,49but are probably
more in line with the South African trucking industry, although we do not have detailed
informationon this.
There are a number of structuralreasons for this situation: a better inter-urbanroad
infrastructure,which allows for higher speeds and fewer breakdowns;fewer car hijackings
and robberies,which allows for night driving, somethingconsideredtoo risky in many other
parts of sub-SaharanAfrica; and the greater importanceof the urban/industrialeconomy,
which is less seasonal and offers better opportunities for return loads than would an
agriculturally-basedeconomy.
However, transportmanagementis generally also more professional and managers are
better educated and trained than in other African countries, apart from South Africa.
* My research shows that the large trucking companies operating on the international
marketgenerally have depots, offices or agents in the major towns in the countries they
serve. In recent years some of the large trucking companies have also made strategic
alliances with large forwardersand/orgained fixed contractswith large transportbuyers.
They are therefore better able to obtain return freight than the smaller companies.
Although it has not been possible to obtain precise figures for the amount of return
freight, the large companies generally seem to operate with no more than 10 to 20 per
cent empty returnvehicles, a much better situation than the skewed trade flows would
indicate.
* As in other sub-Saharancountries, most of the truckingcompanies use only one driver
and one loader per truck. They also mostly operate the articulatedtrucks with only one
trailerper motor unit, though it seems to be more common than elsewhere in Africa to
shift trailersin orderto keep the trucksrunning.Some of the interviewedcompanieshave
1.2-1.3 trailersper motor unit, although mostly in the domestic market.
* The accounting systems are generally better developed that in other African countries.
Speedometerswork and are read, and althoughtachometersare not legally requiredeither
in Zimbabweor in South Africa, they are commonly installed although,in practice,they
are often out of order because drivers do not like them.
* Some of the large cross-bordercompanies have radio connections to their trucks while
others control them only from their depots. Trucks operatedon the national inter-urban
47 J. G. Mushauri,Opportunitiesand Problems of Regional Road Freight Transport,Occasional Papers (Harare,

KonradAdenauerStiftung, 1997).
48 See A. Golding and B. Stock, A Survey on 'One Stop Border Post' Beitbridge and Chirundu (Harare,
Federation of Regional Road Freight Associations (FRRFA) and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1999); M. T.
Marx, V. Hecht and C. Weis, Releasing the Handbrake: Perceptions of Regional Road Transport in Southern
Africa, Occasional Papers (Harare,KonradAdenauer Stiftung, 1998).
Corridor'.
Zimbabwe'sChangingFreightTransport597
marketgenerally are controlledfrom the depots, while vehicles used in local distribution
increasingly are equipped with cell phones.
* Although loading and unloading is still mostly done manually, and may take up to half
a day, freight on pallets and mechanisedfreight handling is still more common than in
other African countries,especially in the domestic transportmarketand in the trade with
South Africa. However, containerisationis not very common, and is decreasing. It is
primarilyimports from overseas and some exports that are containerised.However, due
to the present deficit of empty containersin Zimbabwe, a large percentageof the goods
for overseas export now goes uncontainerisedto Durbanor Johannesburgfor container-
isation there (see above). At the same time, the shift of import sourcing from overseas
to South Africa has reducedthe containerisationof imports.Internationaltransportwithin
Africa also is generally not containerisedbecause this reduces the payload.
* The more efficient use of trucks in Zimbabwemeans that buying brandnew vehicles is
more economically viable than in most of sub-SaharanAfrica. Thus, the large trucking
companies buy most of their smaller trucks new, while the large trucks are more
frequently bought second-hand. One of the large trucking companies is involved in a
company that imports, reconditions and repaints second-handtrucks.
Rural Transport
Until the mid-1990s, road transport services in the African rural areas were poorly
developed. Before independencethe labourreserve and racial segregationpolicies were not
only mirrored in the geography of road construction but also in bus and truck route
licensing policies. While many permits to operate buses in the rural areas were issued to
Africans, few such permitswere issued for freight transport.50Trucktransportremainedthe
privilege of often large, white-owned truckingcompanies, which served the towns and the
large-scale commercial farming areas but generally not the African rural areas. Permits
were, to a large extent, used to limit 'unhealthycut-throatcompetition' and protectboth the
railways and the large, established transportcompanies.
After independence, the government continued the restrictive licensing system for
common carriers.This maintainedthe low availability of trucks in rural areas, in spite of
the apparentconcern of the governmentto improve the ruralaccess to transport.51 Thus, in
the early 1990s, there was only one truckfor hire in each of the two districtservice centres
of Gutu and Gokwe, both located in districts with 300,000 to 400,000 inhabitants.52
However, over time, the government has made a number of attempts to set up
publicly-operatedtransportservices in ruralareas. As long ago as the late 1920s, the NRZ
established a road transportwing called Road Motor Services (RMS) to operate regular
ruralfreight services. However, it mostly served the commercialfarmingareasand, over the
years, contract transport(often for the Grain MarketingBoard) became RMS's dominant
activity.53An attemptin the mid-1980s to transformand develop RMS with the purposeof
ensuring adequate transportservices in the rural areas54did not have the desired effect.
During the 1990s, RMS's activities declined, and in order to secure its viability, RMS
50 V. Wild, Profit Not for Profit's Sake: History and Business Culture of African Entrepreneursin Zimbabwe
(Harare,Baobab Books, 1997).
51 Republic of Zimbabwe, First Five-Year National Development Plan 1986-90, volume II (Harare, 1988);
Republic of Zimbabwe, Second Five-Year National DevelopmentPlan 1991-95 (Harare, 1991).
52 P. O. Pedersen,Small African Towns- Between Rural Networksand UrbanHierarchies (Aldershot,Avebury,
1997).
53 B. J. Turton, 'The Role of the Road Motor Services in the Rural Road TransportSector in Zimbabwe',
Geographical Journal of Zimbabwe,22 (1991), pp. 46-61.
54 SWECO, 'ZimbabweNational TransportStudy'.
AfricanStudies
startedcompeting for traffic on the inter-urbanroutes ratherthan serving the rural areas.
After independence,the District Development Fund (DDF) and CentralMechanicalEquip-
ment Department(CMED) were expected to provide freight transportcapacity for both the
governmentand, more generally, the ruralareas. However, by 1990 their transportcapacity
had deterioratedfor lack of reinvestment.55In reality, therefore, African rural areas were
served primarilyby ruralbuses, on which small amounts of freight could be carried, and
by the rural traders' own-account trucks, which, however, could not be hired out to the
farmers.In response to the patternof long-distancelabourmigration,the ruralbus network
developed into a unique system of very long bus routes connecting Harareand other large
towns directly with the most peripheralrural areas. These bus routes made it possible for
migrantworkersto carry industrialconsumergoods directly from Harareand Bulawayo to
the ruralareas on an individualbasis, but also made it difficult to develop a differentiated
retail sector in the ruralcentres. At the same time, the lack of transportfor hire supported
the monopoly status in crop marketingof the registeredruraltraders,because the situation
made it difficult for African farmersto bypass both the ruraltradersand the prohibitionof
private grain sales across district boundaries.
The 1992 ILO study of transportin three ruraldistricts56showed that fully 54 of the 64
tonne-km per household per annum of goods transportedby ruralhouseholds for subsist-
ence purposes (fetching water and firewood, visiting the grindingmill), were head-loaded,
and mostly by women and children. In transportgenerated by agriculture, the use of
intermediate (non-motorised) means of transport(especially ox-drawn scotch carts and
wheelbarrows)was more frequent, but almost 60 per cent of the households also head-
loaded harvested crops and more than a third head-loadedfarm inputs.
In a study of the suppliers to the horticulturalmarket in Hararein the late 1980s,57
Smith showed that they came from areas up to 150 km away, and that 58 per cent used a
scotch cart to get their producefrom the farm to the main road, while 70 per cent used the
bus to get the produce to Harare.
In the 1992 ILO study, 13-17 per cent of the households owned scotch carts, 24-44 per
cent wheelbarrowsand 15-18 per cent bicycles. However, these ownershiprates are lower
than those found in a large baseline survey of communal farmers all over the country in
1989,58namely 32 per cent with scotch carts, 36 per cent wheelbarrowsand 36 per cent
bicycles, while only three per cent had motor vehicles and 0.5 per cent tractors.
Scotch carts were traditionally supplied by producers in the large towns and sold
throughretailersand agents in the district service centres, but by the early 1990s a number
of small local producershad also entered the market in the larger district service centres.
A survey of two large districtservice centres, Gutu and Gokwe, showed that there was one
small-scale producerin each of the centres, each with an output of fewer than 20 scotch
carts per annumbefore the droughtin 1992 underminedtheir market,forcing them to cease
production.59
55 Republic of Zimbabwe, Second Five-Year National Development Plan 1991-95.

56 ILO, Rural TransportStudy in Three Districts of Zimbabwe,volumes 1-3 (Harare,ILO, 1997).
57 J. Smith, 'Transportand Marketingof HorticulturalCrops by Communal Farmerin Harare', Geographical
Journal of Zimbabwe,20 (1989), pp. 1-15; B. Hoyle, T. Leinbach, J. Smith and A. Spencer, 'The Role of
Transportin the Development Process: Case Studies from Quebec, Indonesia, Zimbabwe and China', in B.
Hoyle and R. Knowles (eds), Modern TransportGeography, second revised edition (Chichester,John Wiley,
2000).
58 E. Sunga, E. Chabayanzara,S. Moyo, R. Mpande,P. Mutumaand H. Page, 'FarmExtension Survey Results',
unpublishedmanuscript,(Harare,Departmentof Agricultureand Rural Development, Zimbabwe Institute of
Development Studies, 1990).
59 Pedersen, Small African Towns.
However, when I revisited Gokwe in 2000, the transportpicture had changed radically
as a result of the liberalisationof agriculturalcrop marketingand transportlicensing. The
number of scotch cart producers had increased from one to between 50 and 100 (it is
difficult to give a precise figure because many work only seasonally), with a total annual
outputof at least 2,000 as a result of increasingcotton prices and growing cotton production
during the late 1990s. According to Agritex, most of the farmersnow have a scotch cart.
At the same time, the numberof trucks for hire increased from one to at least 50 as a
result of the liberalisationof the truck licensing during the late 1990s. All over the rural
areas new truckingcompanies were set up. Most were small but some were said to have
up to 40 trucks. However, not all these truckswere new to the ruralareas but were trucks
belonging to ruraltraderswho were now allowed to hire them out when they were not using
them for their own transportrequirements.
Conclusion
Since the early 1990s, Zimbabwe's freight transportand logistical system has undergonea
numberof changes. These changes are partlya result of Zimbabwe's own developmentand
policies but they are also a result of outside forces. Global trends and policies of
liberalisationand privatisationhave led to a restructuringand concentration,not only of
internationaltransport,especially container shipping and air transportation,but also of
internationaltrade. This has precipitatednew competition between traders,forwardersand
transporters,among transportersthemselves and between the different modes of transport.
This has had a large impact on the transportand logistical system in Zimbabwe. At the
same time, the end of apartheidand the lifting of the trade sanctions against South Africa
shifted the economic centre of southernAfrica from Harareto Johannesburg,and gave rise
to a new patternof regionalisationin southernAfrica. South Africa's exports to the other
countries in eastern and southernAfrica have increased rapidly and so have investments,
althoughmore in mining, trade and transportthan in manufacturing.60 South Africa's ports
have also become more importantfor exports from the land-lockedcountries,althoughthey
were always important,even during the anti-apartheidsanctions campaign.
The global changes in containershippinghave generallyresultedin concentrationwithin
the shippingindustry.This is also the case in Africa where Maersk,in particular,expanded
rapidly during the second half of the 1990s.61Together with Safmarine, which Maersk
bought in 1999, Maersk now carries 40 per cent of all Zimbabwe's container traffic.
Zimbabwe never had a shipping industryof its own, but its overseas trade was controlled
to a large extent by large Zimbabweanor South African forwardingcompanies. However,
the large shipping companies now increasingly engage in inland transport in direct
competition with the large forwarders.This has become easier for them to do because the
structureof commodity trade has changed. As a result of trade liberalisationand privatisa-
tion of the parastatals,a large proportionof the commodity trade has been taken over by
large internationaltradingcompanies for which logistics are a core activity. They also have
an interest in the integrationof the whole transportchain, which was never the case with
the parastatalsbecause they operatedonly between the rural buying points and the port.62
At the same time as there has been a concentrationin the shipping industry,there has
also been a strong concentrationof containertraffic on the largest and most efficient ports
where large ships can be operatedat high frequencies.This traffic,which used to be served
60 Simon, 'TradingSpaces'; Carmody, 'Between Globalisationand (Post) Apartheid'.

61 Pedersen, 'FreightTransportUnder Globalisationand its Impacton Africa'; Pedersen, 'Developmentof Freight
Transportand Logistics in Sub-SaharanAfrica: Taaffe, Morrill and Gould Revisited'.
62 Pedersen, 'The Logistic Revolution and the Changing Structureof AgriculturallyBased CommodityChains in
Africa'.
by shippingroutes directlyto the smallerports, is now instead served overlandor by feeder

shippingroutes to the small ports. A result of this is that Beira, which used to be the most
importantport for Zimbabweanexports, is losing out to Durban.In spite of lower direct
transportcosts via Beira, Durbanis often chosen because the total costs (including costs of
transporttime and storage), especially for higher value goods, tend to be lower on account
of the higher frequency of ships. At the same time, Beira is increasingly served by feeder
routes from Durban, because the shipping companies are trying to concentrate their
intercontinentalcontainer traffic in large hub ports. Contributingto the relocation of
overseas traffic from Beira to Durbanis the increasing deficit of containersin Zimbabwe
due to decreasingimportsand a shift of Zimbabwe's importsfrom overseas to South Africa
(where imports are not containerised). An increasing share of Zimbabwe's exports is
therefore sent by truck to Johannesburgor Durban for containerisation,as those centres
usually have a surplus of containers.A final reason is the increasing dominance of South
African-basedshippingand forwardingcompanies, which often have an interestin utilising
their own facilities in South Africa.
In inland transportthere has been a shift in the modal split from rail to road. Although
the Zimbabweanrailways have been more efficient than most other African railways, they
ran into serious financialand efficiency problemsin the late 1980s. A strategicplan for the
restructuringand commercialisationof the railways partly solved the efficiency problems
duringthe firsthalf of the 1990s, but also led to increasedrail transportrates, which reduced
the competitivenessof the railways vis-a-vis the truckingindustry.At the same time, until
2000 the truckingindustrybenefited from extremely low oil prices. The railways also face
more long-run structuralproblems. The government's successful attemptduring the 1980s
to develop cash crop productionand othereconomic activities in the communalareas spread
the demand for freight transportaway from rail and therefore made the railways less
competitive. Similarly,the shift in Zimbabwe's internationaltradefrom overseas to African
markets has reduced the role of railways in international trade. However, there are
indicationsthat the NRZ, throughan increasedfocus on intra-Africanfreight and in a joint
venturewith an Israeli/SouthAfricanrailway company, is now attemptingto develop a new
and larger role for itself, especially in intra-Africantransport.
Zimbabwe has a truckingindustrywith a high quality of service by African standards,
but which was also protectedby restrictivelicensing and operatedwith fairly high freight
rates, in spite of very low oil prices. During the 1980s, a number of large trucking
companies developed a strong position in the growing intra-Africantransportmarket in
southernAfrica. Most of the trade flows consisted of either Zimbabweanor South African
goods, but due to the sanctionsembargo,South African truckingcompanies were unable to
take advantageof this before 1994. After 1994, South Africa's exportsto the othercountries
in southernand eastern Africa have grown rapidly, and the intra-Africantransportmarket
has increasinglybecome focused on South Africa. As a result, some of the large trucking
companies in Zimbabwe have been bought by South African firms, while others have
moved their headquartersto South Africa. However, due partly to the third-countryrule in
COMESA's transportregulationsand partlyto lower oil prices, Zimbabwestill has a strong
position in the truckingindustry.While recent rapid increases in Zimbabwe's oil prices in
Zimbabwedollar (Z$) terms has made road transportvery expensive for Zimbabweans,the
prices in US$ termshave droppedto an extremelylow level. This may still make Zimbabwe
attractiveas a transit country for transportbuyers with access to foreign currency.
The restrictivelicensing system in Zimbabwehas, until recently, preventedthe develop-
ment of efficient ruraltransportservices, probablybecause such services would have made
it difficult to maintain the parastatal crop-buying monopolies. Therefore, the recent
liberalisationof both the agriculturalmarketsand the truckingindustryhas led to a rapid
increase in the supply of rural transportservices. At the same time, there has been a
dramaticincrease in the number of ox-drawn scotch carts, at least in the export crop-pro-
ducing areas. The result has been a strong improvementin rural transport.
A consequence of these changes is that Harare has lost its status as the principal
southern African hub to Johannesburg.This geographical restructuringof the transport
system may be most obvious in air transport,where Johannesburghas rapidly developed
into the major hub for air traffic to and from the region. In the process, Hararehas lost
direct international flights and is instead served by feeder routes from Johannesburg.
Zimbabwe's nationalairline, Air Zimbabwe,which never produceda surplus,is now facing
increasing economic difficulties. Due to the liberalisationof air traffic, it has lost trafficto
private airlines, especially on the domestic routes where Victoria Falls and Bulawayo are
now served by direct flights from Johannesburgand Cape Town. To serve the rapidly
increasing export of flowers and fresh fruit and vegetables during the 1990s, the flight
capacity on all-cargo aeroplanesincreased, but these generally also fly via Johannesburg,
where they deliver general freight from Europe before picking up flowers in Harareand
Nairobi on the returnleg. However, as a result of the decline in air traffic in Harare,some
horticulturalproduce was already going overland to Johannesburgby 2000, in order to
benefit from the higher flight frequenciesthere. The recent contractionof the horticultural
industryis likely to increase this trend.
As a result of these changes in the structureof tradeand transport,Zimbabwe'sposition
within the economic geography of southernAfrica changed during the 1990s. Hararelost
most of the status as the principalhub for southernAfrica that it acquiredduringthe 1980s,
and Zimbabwe's transportsystem is now increasingly controlled and co-ordinatedfrom
South Africa.
POULOVEPEDERSEN
Danish Institute for International Studies, Strandgade 56, DK 1401 Copenhagen K,
Denmark. E-mail: pop@diis.dk

Pedersen Zim Transport JSAS 2004

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pedersen Zim Transport JSAS 2004

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Journal of Southern African Studies

Zimbabwe's Changing Freight Transport

During the 1990s, Zimbabwe'sfreight transportand logistical system underwentdramatic

ISSN 0305-7070 print; 1465-3893 online/04/030577-26 ? 2004 Journal of SouthernAfrican Studies

3 K. BirdandA. Shepherd,'LivelihoodsandChronicPovertyin Semi-AridZimbabwe',WorldDevelopment,

8 Central Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook1997 (Harare, 1998).

tobaccofarmers(whoare still the majority

terminalin 1996-1997.10 In addition, the National Railways of Zimbabwe operate a large

Competitionbetween Forwarders and Shipping Companies

10 Thereis also a containerdepotin Mutare,but so far it has no customsfranchise.Cornelder,whichnow

Table 1. Major shipping companies and agents in Zimbabwe.

Approx. no. of containershandled per year**

Safmarine 20-22 10,000 6,000 16,000 25

* Based on informationfrom interviews with Maersk

Zimbabwe's Trading Ports: Shifting Patterns

13 Ngwenya et al. (eds), The Transportand CommunicationsSector In SouthernAfrica.

Table 2. Flower and produce exports from Zimbabwe through HarareAirport.

1985 18,003 338 396 734 4.1

to neighbouringcountries, especially Mozambique. (see Joseph Hanlon's article, Renewed

The Development of the Rail/Road Modal Split

33 SouthernAfrica Transportand Communications

Restructuringof the National Railways of Zimbabwe

Figure 1 The transportnetwork in southeasternAfrica.

Growth in the Number of Trucks

Development and Organisation of the TruckingIndustry

Table 4. The number of trucks in Zimbabwe, 1980-96.

1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1999

Trucks 2.3-4.6 tonnes 6,923 8,414 9,354 11,815 12,997 17,257

46 Simon, 'Trading Spaces'.

The Efficiency of Truck Use in Zimbabwe's TruckingIndustry

47 J. G. Mushauri,Opportunitiesand Problems of Regional Road Freight Transport,Occasional Papers (Harare,

55 Republic of Zimbabwe, Second Five-Year National Development Plan 1991-95.

60 Simon, 'TradingSpaces'; Carmody, 'Between Globalisationand (Post) Apartheid'.

by shippingroutes directlyto the smallerports, is now instead served overlandor by feeder

You might also like