JOHN AUBREY JAMERO

JD-2 PROPERTY AND LAND LAW 5TH WEEK CASE DIGESTS

MONASTERIOPE V. TONG. GR 151369, MARCH 23, 2011

FACTS: The instant petition stemmed from an action for ejectment filed by herein respondent
Jose Juan Tong (Tong) through his representative Jose Y. Ong (Ong) against herein petitioners
Anita Monasterio-Pe (Anita) and the spouses Romulo Tan and Editha Pe-Tan (Spouses Tan). The
suit was filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, Iloilo City and docketed
as Civil Case No. 2000(92).
In the Complaint, it was alleged that Tong is the registered owner of two parcels of land known as
Lot Nos. 40 and 41 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9699 and T-9161,
together with the improvements thereon, located at Barangay Kauswagan, City Proper, Iloilo City;
herein petitioners are occupying the house standing on the said parcels of land without any contract
of lease nor are they paying any kind of rental and that their occupation thereof is simply by mere
tolerance of Tong; that in a letter dated December 1, 1999, Tong demanded that respondents vacate
the house they are occupying, but despite their receipt of the said letter they failed and refused to
vacate the same; Tong referred his complaint to the Lupon of Barangay Kauswagan, to no avail.
ISSUE: Whether or not that the respondent should have filed an accion publiciana and not an
unlawful detainer case, because the one-year period to file a case for unlawful detainer has already
lapsed.
RULING: No. Respondent sent petitioners a demand letter dated December 1, 1999 to vacate the
subject property, but petitioners did not comply with the demand. A person who occupies the land
of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.[20] Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted
from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become
unlawful.[21] Respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioners on March 29, 2000, which
was less than a year from December 1, 1999, the date of formal demand. Hence, it is clear that the
action was filed within the one-year period prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer
case.
ONG VS. PAREL
FACTS: Ong spouses filed an action for forcible entry against defendant Parel before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila alleging among other things that defendant Parel through
strategy and stealth constructed an overhang and hollow block wall along the common boundary
of the parties' adjoining lot, i.e., beyond Lot No. 17 owned by Parel and inside Lot No. 18 owned
by plaintiffs Spouses Ong, thereby illegally depriving plaintiffs of possession of the said portion
of their lot; that plaintiffs discovered respondent's illegal possession of their lot on August 23, 1994
when they had the boundaries of their lot resurveyed; that plaintiffs made various demands from
the defendants to remove the constructions they introduced in the said lot of the plaintiffs and
vacate the same, the last of which demands having been made on December 19, 1994.
Defendant Parel denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged that the overhang and
hollow block wall had already been in existence since 1956 and that these structures are within the
boundary of lot 17 owned by him.
ISSUE: Whether or not gaining entry without the knowledge or consent of the owner or remaining
resident of another without permission is dispossession by stealth.
RULING:No. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that
in actions for forcible entry the plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth and that the action is filed any time
within one year from the time of such unlawful deprivation of possession. This requirement implies
that in such cases, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as
he acquires possession thereof by unlawful means. The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was
in prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the
defendant. The one year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally
counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when entry was made through stealth,
the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof. If the alleged
dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in section 1, Rule 70, the proper recourse
is to file a plenary action to recover possession with the regional trial court.
In this case, Petitioners contention that although they denominated their complaint as one for
forcible entry based on the ground of stealth, the allegations in the body of the complaint
sufficiently established a cause of action for unlawful detainer does not persuade us. In unlawful
detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his
right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In the instant case, the complaint
does not allege that the possession of respondent ever changed from illegal to legal anytime from
their alleged illegal entry before plaintiffs made the demand to vacate. There was no averment in
the complaint which recites as a fact any overt act on the part of the petitioners which showed that
they permitted or tolerated respondent to occupy a portion of their property.
AYALA LAND VS RAY BURTON 29 SCRA 48
FACTS: On March 20, 1984, KARAMFIL bought from AYALA a piece of land. The transaction
was documented in a Deed of Sale of even date, with certain special conditions and restrictions on
the use or occupancy of the land. The said special conditions and restrictions were attached as an
annex to the deed of sale and incorporated in the "Memorandum of Encumbrances" at the reverse
side of the title of the lot. On February 18, 1988, KARAMFIL sold the lot to PALMCREST. This
deed was submitted to AYALA for approval. AYALA gave its written conformity to the sale but
reflected in its approval the same special conditions/restrictions as in the previous sale.
PALMCREST in turn sold the lot to Ray Burton Development Corporation (RBDC), now
respondent, on April 11, 1988. Sometime in June of 1989, RBDC submitted to AYALA for
approval a set of architectural plans for the construction of a 5-storey office building on the subject
lot. Since the building was well within the 42-meter height restriction, AYALA approved the
architectural plans.
The September 21, 1990 issue of the Business World magazine featured the "Trafalgar Plaza" as
a modern 27 storey structure which will soon rise in Salcedo Village, Makati City. Stunned by this
information, AYALA, through counsel, then sent a letter to RBDC demanding the latter to cease
the construction of the building whose dimensions do not conform to the previous plans it earlier
approved. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on April 28, 1994 in favor
of RBDC. Dissatisfied, AYALA appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment
of the trial court
ISSUE: Whether or not RBDC acted fraudulently in its act of submitting 2 building plans, one of
which violated the given restrictions.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that the RBDC was the party guilty of misrepresentation
and/or concealment when it resorted to the fraudulent scheme of submitting two (2) sets of building
plans, one (1) set conformed to the Deed Restrictions, which was submitted to and approved by
AYALA, while another set violated the said restrictions, and which it presented to the Makati City
Building Official in order to secure from the latter the necessary building permit. It is noteworthy
that after the submission of the second set of building plans to the Building Official, RBDC
continued to make representations to AYALA that it would build the five-storey building in
accordance with the first set of plans approved by AYALA, obviously for the purpose of securing
the release of the title of the subject lot to obtain bank funding. AYALA relied on RBDC's false
representations and released the said title. Hence, RBDC was in bad faith.
FAJARDO V. FREEDOM TO BUILD, 337 SCRA 115 (2000)
FACTS: The respondents, Freedom to Build, Incorporated, an owner-developer and seller of low-
cost housing, sold to Petitioner Spouses, Eliseo and Marissa Hajardo, a house and lot designated
Lot No. 33, Block 14, of the De la Costa Homes on Barangka, Marikina, Metro Manila on which
the Contract to Sell executed contained a Restrictive Covenant providing certain prohibitions such
as No unit may be extended in the front beyond the line as designed and and implemented by the
developer. The above restriction were also contained in the Transfer Certificate of Title.
The Petitioners despite repeated warnings, extended the roof of their house to the property line and
expanded the second floor of their house to a point directly above the original front wall.
Freedom to Build, Inc. filed an action to demolish the unauthorized structures.The RTC ruled in
favor of Freedom to Build, Inc.. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the demolition of the structure
RULING: No. The lower court did not err in granting the demolition of the structure.he Supreme
Court held that Restrictive covenants are not, strictly speaking, synonymous with easements.
While it may be correct to state that restrictive covenants on the use of land or the location or
character of buildings or other structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or rights,
it can also be contended that such covenants, being limitations on the manner in which one may
use his own property, do not result in true easements, but a case of servitudes (burden), sometimes
characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative easements. Negative easement is the
most common easement created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner
of the land from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he would be entitled to do.
Courts which generally view restrictive covenants with disfavor for being a restriction on
the use of one's property, have, nevertheless, sustained them where the covenants are reasonable,
not contrary to public policy, or to law, and not in restraint of trade. Subject to these limitations,
courts enforce restrictions to the same extent that will lend judicial sanction to any other valid
contractual relationship. In general, frontline restrictions on constructions have been held to be
valid stipulations.
JAVIER V. LUMONTAD, G.R. NO. 203760, DECEMBER 3, 2014

FACTS: Petitioner filed a forcible entry complaint against the respondent in the Municipal Trial
Court of Taytay, Rizal. Petitioner, claims to be the son of the late Vicente Javier who was the
owner of a parcel of land (with an area of 360 sqm) located at Corner Malaya and Gonzaga Streets,
Barangay Dolores. Taytay Rizal (subject land). covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 00-TY-002-
11458. Petitioner together with his family lived in the residential house erected in the subject land
and has continued possession of the property even after the death of his father, Vicente. After the
death of Vicente. respondent erected a two-story building (subject building) on the subject land
despite the objections and protest of the petitioner. Hence. the complaint of forcible entry was
filed. Respondent admitted that during Vicente's lifetime. he indeed was the owner and in physical
possession of the subject land. Nevertheless. She claimed to be the owner of the portion where the
subject building was being constructed, as evidenced by TD No, 00-TY-002-1303115 in her name.
Hence, she took possession of the said portion not as an illegal entrant but as its owner. The MTC
dismissed the complaint for want of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. In its ruling. it was
found out that Vicente actually subdivided the subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot. with an
area of 187.20 sq. m. was given to petitioner. while the second lot. with an area of 172.80 sq. m.
and where the subject building was erected. was given to one Anthony de la Paz Javier (Anthony).
son of Vicente by a previous failed marriage. but was eventually acquired by respondent from the
latter through sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a forcible entry?

RULING: No. In forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical
possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should
expressly employ the language of the law, but it would suffice that Facts are set up showing that
dispossession took place under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he,
prior to the defendant's act of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had
been in prior physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as
the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the subject matter." Here, the petitioners established that there has been prior physical possession
thru the deceased Javier. Furthermore, The "how" (through unlawful entry and the construction of
the subject building), "when" (March 26, 2007), and "where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the subject
land) of the dispossession all appear on the face of the complaint. Hence, a prima facie case of
forcible entry is present and should be accepted within the jurisdiction of the lower court.
BUSTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 120784-85

FACTS:Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957.4 He had four (4) children, namely:
Manuela, Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo. On September 30, 1964, the heirs
executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Paulino Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela
sold her share to Moses G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale. The description
of the property reads as follows:

"A parcel of an irrigated riceland located in the barrio of San Isidro, Masantol, Pampanga. Bounded
on the North, by Paulino Fajardo; on the East, by Paulino Fajardo; on the South, by Paulino Guinto.
Containing an area of 5,253 sq. mts., more or less. Declared under Tax Declaration No. 3029 in
the sum of P710.00."

At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga. Later, the cadastre
was conducted and the property involved in the partition case were specified as Lots 280, 283,
284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of
the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B.

Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to her brother-
in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.During the hearing, Trinidad died, and her
heirs parted with her estate, including the lot claiming by Mendoza. Lot 284-B was then sold to
Spouses Viray, herein private respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of Mendoza. He then sold
the subject land to Spouses Bustos, herein petitioners, who were actually lessees of the husband of
Trinidad on the land in question. Since Spouses Bustos were in actual possession of the land,
Spouses Viray filed an action for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Bustos.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.

RULING: No. Petitioners cannot be ejected from the subject land. The stay of execution is
warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in question and are
occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned
would certainly result in grave injustice.

The issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the Spouses
Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale. Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is
the necessary and logical consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners of the
property.

Under Article 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing, without other
limitations than those established by law. The owner has also a right of action against the holder
and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.

Under Article 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing, without other
limitations than those established by law. The owner has also a right of action against the holder
and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. 128177

FACTS: A parcel of land was originally owned by Adriano Soriano and subsequently leased to
the De Vera spouses. Roman Soriano, one of the children of Adriano Soriano, acted as the
caretaker of the property during the lease period. After the lease ended, the heirs of Adriano
Soriano subdivided the property into two lots, one of which was sold to petitioners Braulio and
Aquilina Abalos. The Abalos spouses filed an application for registration of title over the land,
which was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Roman Soriano,
however, filed an action for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership, and damages
against the Abalos spouses. The trial court denied the Abalos spouses' motion to dismiss, and the
case proceeded. Meanwhile, the Abalos spouses filed a motion for execution of a post-decisional
agreement that allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property. The motion was granted by the
agrarian court, but Roman Soriano filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Roman
Soriano died during the pendency of the case, and his heirs were substituted as party-plaintiffs.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition and authorized the substitution of the De Vera spouses
by the Abalos spouses.
The heirs of Roman Soriano filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, which granted
their petition and denied the motion for execution filed by the Abalos spouses. The Abalos spouses
then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which was denied.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ordered the dismissal of the
case. The heirs of Roman Soriano filed a complaint with the DARAB for security of tenure. The
land registration court held the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution and/or writ of
possession in abeyance until the resolution of the security of tenure case. The Court of Appeals
annulled the resolution of the land registration court and ordered the issuance of the writ of
possession in favor of the heirs of Roman Soriano. The Abalos spouses filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not although private in the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to
limitations that may be imposed by law.
RULING:Yes. The Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to
security of tenure and they have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the
leasehold relationship is established. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees
which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation
of their only means of livelihood. 8 The exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the
exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.
A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of
the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated
differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the
area while it is being occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration
that the latter’s occupancy was unlawful.
GARCIA VS. CA
FACTS: Atty Garcia and her wife, Remedios, sold a parcel of land to their daughter and her
husband -Spouses Magpayo. The latter then mortgaged the land to Philippine Bank of
Communication (PBCom) to secure a loan. The mortgage was registered at the Makati Register of
Deeds. Four days after the mortgage, Atty Garcia's title was cancelled and a Transfer of Certificate
title was issued to the Spouses Magpayo.
Upon the maturity of the loan, the Spouses Magpayo failed to pay the same, hence it was
extrajudicially foreclosed and was put into public auctuion which PBCom was the highest bidder
amd bought the land. PBCom then filed a petition for writ of possession which was intervened by
Ma Jose Garcia, herein petitioner by motion for intervention.
Garcia alleged that PBCom had no right over the land as he was in actual and adverse possession
of the same and that he inherited it as one of the heirs of his mother. He asserted that the ownership
of the property was not transmitted to her sister and her husband at the time of the execution of the
Deed of Sale between them and their father, Atty Garcia.
ISSUE: Whether Garcia takes ownership and thus has the right over the land by mere possession.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a
manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain
rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro
Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold
the subject property to the Magpayo spouses.
On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.
Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.
Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession
of a holder. "A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims
to be so." On the other hand, "one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a
superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong." The
records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was
merely tolerated by his parents.
RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Rodil Enterprises, Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides O’Racca Building
(O’RACCA), owned by the Republic of the Philippines (REPUBLIC). RODIL entered into a
sublease contract with the private respondents Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria
Footwear and Chua Huay Soon, members of the Ides O’Racca Building Tenants Association, Inc.
(ASSOCIATION).

On 12 September 1982, BP 233 was enacted. It authorized the sale of “former alien properties”
classified as commercial and industrial, and the O’RACCA building was classified as commercial
property. Pursuant thereto, RODIL offered to buy the building. While pending for appraisal of
market value of the property, the ASSOCIATION offered to lease the same building through the
Department of General Services and Real Estate Property Management. Pending action for
RODIL’s offer to buy the building, RODIL requested for another renewal of the lease for 5 years.
The Management suspended the request of RODIL for renewal of lease for 5 years because
ASSOCIATION’s offer to lease was more beneficial to the REPUBLIC. The management issued
a temporary occupancy permit to ASSOCIATION.

A new custodian was then designated to manage the O’RACCA building. Renewal of lease was
entered into by RODIL and the new management for the building for 10 years. RODIL filed an
action of unlawful detainer against the members of ASSOCIATION. MTC ruled in favor of
RODIL, and this was affirmed by the RTC. CA, on appeal, reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the renewal contract between Rodil and the Republic is valid.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled for RODIL. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of
a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of
disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The
REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease
contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has
the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required for relief in
an action for unlawful detainer are present.

Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with the REPUBLIC
and that their continued occupation of the subject property was merely by virtue of acquiescence.
Since the occupation of respondents was merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of
possession of the latter remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it
chose. Unfortunately for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises to
RODIL by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992.
ISAGUIRRE VS DE LARA

FACTS: Felicitas De Lara is indebted to Cornelio M. Aguirre. When the former had financial
difficulty in the year 1953, she approached the latter for assistance. On February 10, 1960, a
document denominated as "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" was executed
by respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of Lot No. 502,
together with the two-story commercial and residential structure standing thereon, in favor of
Isaguirre, for and in consideration of the sum of P5,000.

Originally, a 2,324 sqm portion of Lot 502 was applied for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent filed with
the Bureau of Lands on January 17, 1942 by the original applicant claimant Alejandro De Lara.
Upon his death, he was succeeded by his wife, Felicitas, as claimant.

The area was reduced to 1000 sqm after a decision was rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and a survey was made. On this lot stands a two-story residential-
commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent's sons Apolonio
and Rodolfo. Sometime in May, 1968, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against
petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the two-story building. However, the case
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

On August 21, 1969, petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property on the basis of
the deed of sale. His application was approved on January 17, 1984, resulting in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-11566 on February 13, 1984, in the name of petitioner.
Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over the entire 1,000 square meters of subject
property (including the 250 square meter portion claimed by petitioner) was also given due course,
resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-13038 on June 19, 1989, in the name
of respondent.

They had then two Original Certificates of Title. One is for the entire 1000 sqm and another for its
250 sqm meter portion. The former is in the name of the De Laras and the latter in the name of
Isaguirre. These two OCTs are overlapping titles.

ISSUE: Wheter or not Isaguirre have the right to possess the property in issue while the debt is
not yet payed?

RULING: No. The Supreme Court found that the contract between Isaguirre and Felicitas was
actually an equitable mortgage. His remedy shall be the foreclosure of the property in the case that
he cannot collect the debt. Without such foreclosure, he has no right to possess the property but he
can make annotations on its title to protect his interest on it against third persons.
CUSTODIO V. CORRADO

FACTS: Corrado filed an ejectment case against Custodio in RTC Calatagan, Batangas. Corrado
is the registered owner of the lot in dispute. He claims that more than one year prior to his
complaint, Custodio demolished his old residential house and constructed a 2-bedroom bungalow
where Custodio and his family lives now.

Custodio alleged that he is a legitimate tenant of Corrado’s father since 1961 and his father
consented the construction 30 years ago. MTC dismissed the complaint; RTC reversed MTC’s
decision and declared Corrado as the true and absolute owner, ordering Custodio to vacate the
premise; CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Corrado is bound by his father’s action?

RULING: No, Corrado is not bound by his father’s action in allowing Custodio to construct a
house on the lot and occupy the same. Corrado acquired the land in 1970 from the government and
not from his father. His father never acquired any right over the said land hence he has no right to
alienate the land to anyone.

The court concluded that since Corrado is the absolute owner of the property, he should not be
barred from recovering possession based on the authority granted by a third party who is not an
owner.
ABEJARON V. NABASA, GR NO. 84831, JUNE 20, 2021

FACTS: Pacencio Abejaron and Felix Nabasa were involved in a legal dispute over a 118-square
meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in Silway, General Santos City. Abejaron claimed
that he had been living on and improving the land since 1945, while Nabasa claimed to have been
residing on a separate 180-square meter public land since the same year.

Despite Abejaron's possession and improvement of the land, Nabasa successfully applied for and
received a free patent over the entire Lot 1, including the disputed 118-square meter portion.
Abejaron filed an administrative protest, but due to absenteeism, it was dismissed. In 1982,
Abejaron took legal action against Nabasa, filing an action for reconveyance with damages seeking
to regain his 118-square meter portion of the land.

After trial, the court ruled in favor of Abejaron, declaring his possession and occupancy of the land
in good faith and deeming Nabasa's claim over the disputed portion a mistake. However, the Court
of Appeals denied Abejaron's motion for reconsideration, stating that there was no proof of actual
fraud or irregularity in the issuance of the title to Nabasa. They also noted that Abejaron had not
adduced any evidence of title to the disputed land and therefore could not maintain an action for
reconveyance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has acquired title over a disputed land.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Pacencio Abejaron. The court
declared his possession and occupancy of the disputed 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block
5, Psu-154953 in Silway, General Santos City as in good faith. The court also deemed the claim
of Felix Nabasa, the respondent, over the same portion of land as a mistake.

Under the law, the possessor shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the necessary
conditions for a government grant and is entitled to a certificate of title. Therefore, confirming the
possession and granting title through registration is merely a formality to recognize a title that is
already vested. However, in order to acquire title to the land, the possession must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious for the required period of time. In the specific case of
Pacencio Abejaron and Felix Nabasa, Abejaron failed to provide well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence to prove his possession and occupation of the disputed land for the required period,
thereby preventing him from maintaining an action for reconveyance.
JAVIER V. VERIDIANO, G.R. NO. L-48050, OCTOBER 10, 1994

FACTS: A case for forcible entry was instituted by the herein plaintiff-petitioner, Felicidad Javier
before the city court of Olongapo sometime on December 12, 1970. Ben Babol who was the
defendant and appellee in the complaint for forcible entry had sold the property he was occupying,
including the portion of about 200 square meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. Thus,
petitioner demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly
refused to comply with the demand. Plaintiff having filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for
Lot NO. 1641, TS-308 Of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision on January 25, 1963 was granted
the same in 1973, On 29 June 1977, plaintiff, filed a complaint for quieting of title and this is four
(4) years after the finality of dismissal of the case for forcible entry. Rosete, instead of filing a
responsive pleading, filed a motion to dismiss and was granted on the ground of res jusdicata.

ISSUE: Whether or not the identity of the causes of action in a case of forcible entry and quieting
of title being one of the requisites of res judicata to effect a case dismissal?

RULING: No, there is none. No identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil
Case No. 2203-0. A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on
the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect
the ownership of the land or building. Thus, "the only issue in an action for forcible entry is the
physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de
jure.
BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC. V. DANTE ANDO, ET AL.

FACTS: Petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer and damages against herein respondents before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Mandaue City.

BUCCI failed to comply with the requirement on the certification against forum shopping, so the
MTCC ordered it to show cause why its complaint should not be dismissed for its failure to comply
with such requirement. Another case for recovery of ownership involved the same parcel of land
subject to the unlawful detainer case. MTCC dismissed the unlawful detainer case with prejudice
for BUCCI’s failure to comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping.

The RTC held that BUCCI was guilty of forum shopping because it failed to certify under oath
that there was another action involving the same parties and the same lot still pending before
another court.

ISSUE: Whether or not BUCCI committed forum shopping.

RULING: No, BUCCI did not commit forum shopping when it failed to disclose in the
certification on non-forum shopping of the unlawful detainer case a complete statement of the
status of the action for recovery of ownership of property then pending before the RTC of Mandaue
City. There is only identity of parties between the summary action of unlawful detainer and the
land ownership recovery case. However, the issues raised are not identical or similar in the two
cases.

The issue in the unlawful detainer case is which party is entitled to, or should be awarded, the
material or physical possession of the disputed parcel of land, (or possession thereof as a fact);
whereas the issue in the action for recovery of ownership is which party has the right to be
recognized as lawful owner of the disputed parcels of land.