LILJEDAHL v.

GLASSGOW
FACTS: L. D. Bailey, who was the owner of a tract of land located in the state of Colorado,
executed promissory notes in the aggregate amount of $ 6,000, with interest coupons
attached, and, to secure payment thereof, at the same time executed a mortgage upon the
Colorado land. The notes are dated and made payable to H. I. Foskett of Shenandoah, at the
Shenandoah National Bank in said city, and were shortly thereafter assigned to plaintiff, who
loaned the money to Bailey thereon. Two days later, the said Bailey sold the land to
respondent and executed a deed before a notary public in Shenandoah, describing the
Colorado land, but without the insertion of the name of anyone as grantee. Now Bailey is suing
respondent for the nullity of the deed of sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action should be filed and governed by the law of Iowa, where the
principal mortgage was entered into, or Colorado, where the subject property is located.

RULING: The law of Colorado should apply. The law is settled in this state that the equitable
title passes by the delivery of a deed blank as to the name of the grantee, to a purchaser for
a valid consideration. And that, by accepting a deed containing a clause by which the grantee
assumes and agrees to pay incumbrances, such purchaser becomes liable for the payment
thereof, the same as he would if his name were written in the instrument. Under the law of
Colorado, however, a deed blank as to grantee is a nullity, and passes no interest what-A ever
by delivery to a purchaser, until his name is written therein. He has implied authority to insert
his name therein, and by doing so he acquires title.

ASIATIC PETROLEUM v. CO QUICO

FACTS: Co Quico was a sales agent of Asiatic Petroleum. He was later in default for a certain
sum, so he left for China without rendering account to Asiatic. Asiatic sought to recover the
unremitted sum, by filing a complaint which led to the preliminary attachment of Co’s deposit
with Mercantile Bank of China. There were summons by publication, and Co was declared in
default, with judgment rendered against him. A writ of execution was issued, and levy was
made on the deposits, but this was unsatisfied because the same were transferred to Co’s
son. Co’s counsel then appeared to have the proceedings nullified on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the person of Co. This was granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to levy on Co’s deposits.

RULING: YES. Even though Co Quico was outside the Philippines when the case against him
was instituted, he possessed property within the Philippines. The law provides that, “All
property within a state is subject to the jurisdiction of its courts, and they have the right to
adjudicate title thereto, enforce liens thereupon, and subject it to the payment of the debts of
its owners, whether resident or not.” The sovereign power may lay hands on any and all
persons or property within its borders. In such case, no distinction needs to be made between
movable and immovable property. Such characterization is of no legal significance in this
connection.
HARRIS v. BALK
FACTS: Balk (plaintiff), a resident of North Carolina, owed $344 to Epstein, a resident of
Maryland. Harris (defendant), also a resident of North Carolina, owed $180 to Balk. While
Harris was travelling to Baltimore, Maryland, he was served with a writ of attachment from
Epstein for the debt that he owed to Balk. After returning to North Carolina, Harris consented
to the attachment. Shortly after this consent, Balk sued Harris in North Carolina state court for
the $180. Harris argued that he had already paid the debt and that the Maryland judgment
was entitled to full faith and credit by the North Carolina court. The North Carolina state courts
held for Balk, finding that the judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit given that Harris
was only temporarily in Maryland.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff has right to plead his payment under Maryland judgment.

RULING: YES. The garnishee's debt owed to defendant followed the garnishee everywhere.
Since Maryland had a law that would allow defendant to pursue the debt owed by the
garnishee to defendant, plaintiff could attach the debt owed by the garnishee to defendant,
even though the garnishee was not a Maryland resident. The garnishee's failure to notify
defendant of attachment was not prejudicial because defendant had the opportunity to show
that he did not owe a debt to plaintiff.

CIR v. ANGLO CALIFORNIA NATIONAL BANK

FACTS: Respondent Calamba Sugar Estate, Inc., herein represented by its trustee, the Anglo
California National Bank, is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of California, is duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. It has consistently filed
its income tax returns here through its resident attorney-in-fact. In 1956, the petitioners
Collector of Internal Revenue the corporation of an assessment for alleged deficiency income
taxes for the years 1953 to 1955, supposedly based upon capital again derived from the
respondent's sale to the Pasumil Planters, Inc., of ₱250,000 shares of the capital stock of the
Pampanga Sugar Mills (a domestic corporation) and of a promissory note, dated January 1,
1950, executed by the Pampanga Sugar Mills in the sum of $500,000.00. In an appeal by the
respondent, the CTA reversed said ruling and absolved the respondent form liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the capital gains obtained from the sale constituted income from
sources within or without the Philippines.

RULING: It is hardly disputable that although shares of stock of a corporation represent

equities may consist of real as well as personal properties therein, they are considered under
applicable law and jurisprudence as intangible personal properties. Section 24 of the NIRC
levies income taxes on foreign corporations only on income derived from sources within the
Philippines; and with respect to capital gains on the sale of personal properties, section 37 (e)
of the same Tax Code deems the place of sale as also that place or source of the capital gain.
Construing the same provision of law, US courts are in accord in disallowing the imposition of
income taxes by its government on capital gains where the sale takes place outside its
territorial jurisdiction. It is likewise the prevailing view that in ascertaining the place of sale, the
determination of when and where title to the goods passes from the seller to the buyer is
decisive. In this case, it is admitted that the negotiation, perfection and consummation of the
contract of sale were all done in California. It follows that title to the shares of stock passed
from vendor to vendee at said place, from which time, incidents of ownership vested on buyer.
PHILIPS EXPORT B.V. v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Philips Export B.V. (PEBV) filed with the SEC for the cancellation of the word “Philips”
the corporate name of Standard Philips Corporation in view of its prior registration with the
Bureau of Patents and the SEC. However, Standard Philips refused to amend its Articles of
Incorporation so PEBV filed with the SEC a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, however this was denied ruling that it can only be done when the corporate names
are identical and they have at least two (2) words different. This was affirmed by the SEC en
banc and the Court of Appeals thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Standard Philips can be enjoined from using “Philips” in its corporate name.

RULING: YES. According to Sec. 18 of the Corporation Code, no corporate name may be
allowed if the proposed name is identical or deceptively confusingly similar to that of any
existing corporation or to any other name already protected by law or is patently deceptive,
confusing or contrary to existing law. As to the first requisite, PEBV adopted “Philips” part of
its name 26 years before Standard Philips. As regards the second, the test for the existence
of confusing similarity is whether the similarity is such as to mislead a person using ordinary
care and discrimination. Standard Philips only contains one word, “Standard”, different from
that of PEBV. The companies’ products cover the same line of products. Although PEBV
primarily deals with electrical products, it has also shipped to its subsidiaries machines and
parts which fall under the classification of “chains, rollers, belts, bearings and cutting saw”, the
goods which Standard Philips also produce. The use of “Philips” by Standard Philips tends to
show its intention to ride on the popularity and established goodwill of PEBV.

EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: In 1981, private respondent H.D. Lee Co., Inc. filed with the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks & Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Petition for Cancellation of Registration for the
trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" used on skirts, jeans, blouses, socks, briefs, jackets, jogging
suits, dresses, shorts, shirts and lingerie, issued in 1980 in the name of petitioner Emerald
Garment Manufacturing Corporation. Private respondent averred that petitioner's trademark
so closely resembled its own trademark, 'LEE' as previously registered and used in the
Philippines cause confusion, mistake and deception on the part of the purchasing public as to
the origin of the goods. The Director of Patents as well as the CA rendered a decision granting
private respondent's petition for cancellation. Using the test of dominancy, declared that
petitioner's trademark was confusingly similar to private respondent's mark because it is the
word 'Lee' which draws the attention of the buyer and leads him to conclude that the goods
originated from the same manufacturer. It is undeniably the dominant feature of the mark.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals is correct.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court considered that the trademarks involved as a whole and
ruled that Emerald Garment’s “STYLISTIC MR. LEE” is not confusingly similar to H.D. Lee’s
“LEE” trademark. The trademark “Stylistic Mr. Lee”, although on its label the word “LEE” is
prominent, the trademark should be considered as a whole and not piecemeal. The
dissimilarities between the two marks become conspicuous, noticeable and substantial
enough to matter especially in the light of the following variables that must be factored in,
among others, (1) expensive and valuable items are normally bought only after deliberate,
comparative and analytical investigation; and (2) the average Filipino consumer generally
buys his jeans by brand.