tym
aegis
Ie intrest rte
Fall in relation (
{ssuming th
ie abies, the co
Rmmption 5008s
Poy telcne bonds,
Brevi so wit nase
Bltnetworperod osu
fe
Pi a lovee densnd to
Pieris isan inverse
Pietoecs: the deena to
{s the excess demands in the
fet in this model. It therefc
Boods markets, since @ ch
Vor supply in’those markets
the money and bond markets
}model therefore contains nc
price level is determinate in
F 12, for a divergence in the
lum, ‘ceteris paribus, causes
FS create excess demands or
i therefore create forces 10
Mhis occurs even though, as a
Peal balances are identically
Even when both money and
Img issued only by firms and
(Bt thelr effect on the house
ta In that case, the
alte of ageregate financial
range invariant. A model of
Haan’ St (1960) and is
CHAPTER
SIX
THE PRE-KEYNESIAN QUANTITY THEORY
TRADITION
The crude version of the Quantity T 4 is nowadays
often accepted as the Quantity Theory as it existed before Keynes. This is
regrettable since the Crude Quantity Theory is a complete misrepresentation
of the work of the Classical and Neoclassical economists. So total a mis.
epresentation is it that we can even state that no Quantity Theorist ever put
forward the unqualified Crude Quantity Theory. At most, in the rare cases
where it was used, it was presented as an abstraction that summarized the
simplified relation between money and prices when important complications
are left in the background. The recl meat of the Quantity Theory tradition lay
Precisely in the consideration that the Quantity Theorists gave to these
complications. Moreover, the problem that Patinkin has formalized—the
inconsistency between Say's Identity and the Crude Quantity Theory—cannot
be said to have existed in general within the Classical Quantity Theory
tradition. The Classical Quantity Theorists not only did not put forward the
Crude Quantity Theory; they also did not generally advance the proposition
that we have called Say's Identity (although some Neoclassical writers did
suffer from confusion, in particular in their use of the Homogeneity Pos
tulate),
To understand the Quantity Theory tradition, we must go back to the
sources and examine the literature of Classical and Neoclassical economics
The difficulty of this exercise and the possibility of misinterpretation arise
because of the imprecise and frequently self-contradictory manner in which
the writers expressed their arguments. In consequence, an understanding of
y employed in CI92 QUANTITY THEORY TRADITION
any particular quotation extracted from these writings requires careful con-
sideration of the context from which the quotation is drawn. In this chapter
we shall follow this procedure to examine whether any of the particular
components of the Crude Quantity Theory—the hypotheses concerning M°,
k, and y—do have a basis in the Quantity Theory tradition. In this way, we
shall gain an overall picture of the nature of this tradition.
In Section 6.1 we shall examine the idea that real income and output,
are always at their full-employment level. Did the Quantity Theorists support
the proposal that the aggregate demand for goods ensures that goods supplied
with full employment of resources could always be sold? Did they support
Say’s Identity, in other words? In Section 6.2 we shall consider whether the
Quantity Theorists did maintain that k, the relationship between nominal
income and the demand for nominal money balances, is constant. In Section
6.3 we shall discuss whether MS, the money supply, was regarded as being
determined exogenously. Finally, in Section 6.4 we bring together the con-
clusions of the preceding sections and consider the work of, Wicksell, the
most sophisticated of Quantity Theorists. Before embarking on this survey, it
should be remembered that, whereas in Chapters 4 and 5 we were concerned
with an exchange economy where the goods in the model arrive from heaven,
the Quantity Theorists were, in general, concerned with the real world where
goods have to be produced,
6.1 SAY’S IDENTITY AND SAY’S LAW
There is no doubt that the Classical economists with few exceptions adopted
the law that is generally ascribed to Jean-Baptiste Say. His work was
published at the beginning of the nineteenth century (although, as Sowell
[1974] points out, versions of the law can be found in the works of earlier
writers). The question we have to consider is: Precisely what was meant by
Say's Law, for it was interpreted in different ways by different Quantity
Theory writers? Specifically, we are concerned with whether Say's Law is to
be interpreted as Say's Identity, the proposition employed in the preceding
chapters.
Recall that Say’s Identity can be expressed algebraically as
2
6)
But what exactly does this expression imply? We can interpret it as a general
statement saying that “the demand for goods equals the supply of goods," but
such a statement is too general. It is the kind of statement that Quantity
‘Theorists frequently made, and its generality and vagueness have given rise to
controversy over precisely what they meant. The interpretation of Say's
Identity (Eq. 6.1) is more specific than that statement. First, because it is an
identity, it says that the demand for goods always equals the supply of goods.
THE PRE-KEYNESIAN QUANTY
Therefore the quantity of goods produced and sup
employment of labor and the means of production, ¢
for goods. Second, Say's Identity says that it is
demand for goods that equals the planned supply
demand over planned supply for goods as a whole i
the supply of goods planned by producers is such th:
employ all resources, buyers will choose to buy pr
there is no reason why national production and the
from it, y, should diverge from the full-employmer
ositions of Say’s Identity combine, therefore, to
income is always at the full-employment level, since
of goods is always matched by demand.
That is Say's Identity. Is that how the Quant
Say’s Law? In order to consider this question, one
Say’s Identity has several corollaries and that a Qua
of any of these corollaries could potentially be inte
Say’s Identity. One such is the idea that no one 1
instant. That this is a corollary of Say's Identity cam
opposite, or what actually happens in capitalist, 0
real-life process of exchange of goods in such ecor
GS -M—pG?
‘An individual exchanges (sells) goods for money
transaction, exchanges money for (buys) goods. We
planned supply and the purchase as planned dema
the most important aspect of this process is th
separated in time. Thus, the individual
period of time; money is a temporary
sequence, the individual's planned supply of
individual's planned demand. At the in
example, the person has a planned
demand that is zero. But what about
Surely, if the individual at the first
individuals must plan to buy them?”
other individuals may in thee tansaeti
holding money, rather than at the poit
possibility arises from the very
individual's purchases and sales
for the intervening period. The
supply is mea
{formulation of those eh
entity equation referred 0 #15
Fraw
Fany o!
theses C0
Bee nhs
& output
TFincome and outP¥
Fprity Theorists SUPP
Fes that 2oods supplied
tid? Did they suppor
[reonsider whether th
[ship between nomi:
Fis constant. I
was regarded 3s bein
Fring together the con
work of Wicksell, t
biking on this su
145 we were concerned
Helarrive from heaven
Hh the real world where
f the pa
few exceptions adopted
& Say. His work was
V (although, as Sowell
im the works of earlier
PLY what was meant by
Eby different Quantity
(hether Say's Law is
oyed in the prec
Aically as:
interpret it
Esupply of
fatement
Frese nae, Quant
Petbretation of ‘Says
Fine to of Say’s
Pithestopiyorsana
a
QUANTITY THEORY TRADITION 93
herefo
the quantity of goods produced and supplied, wh
employment of labor and the means of production, always equals the demand
there is full
for goods. Second, Say’s Identity says that it is the planned, or ex ante
demand for goods that equals the pl
demand over planned supply for goods as a whole is zero. In other words, if
the supply of goods planned by producers is such that its production will fully
employ all resources, buyers will choose to buy precisely that output, Thus
there is no reason why national production and the national income deri
ie from the full-employment level. These two prop-
ssitions of Say's Identity combine, therefore, to assert that real national
income is always at the full-employment level, since the corresponding supply
of goods is always matched by demand,
ed supply:' the excess of planne
from it, y, should diver
That is Say's Identity. Is that how the Quantity Theorists interpreted
Say's Law? In order to consider this question, one must first appreciate that
Say's Identity has several corollaries anc that a Quantity Theorist’s sta
of any of these corollaries could pot
Say's Identity. One such is the idea that no one holds money even for an
instant. That this is a corollary of Say's [entity can be seen by considering its,
opposite, or what actually happens in capitalist, monetary economies. The
real-life process of exchange of goods in such he form of:
ntially be interpreted as a state
sconomies takes
PGS M pG?
An individual exchanges (sells) goods for money and then, in a separate
transaction, exchanges money for (buys) goods. We can interpret the sale as
planned supply and the purchase as planned
the most important aspect of this process is
separated in time. Thus, the individual necessi
period of time; money is a temporary abode of purchasi
the individual's planned supply of goods does not always equal the
individual's planned demand. At the instant of the first transaction, for
example, the person has a planned sugply of goods that is positive and a
demand, and for our purposes
hat the two transact
ly holds money for some
power. In con-
nd that is zero. But what about aggregate planned demand and supply
Surely, if the individual at the first irstant plans to supply goods, other
individuals must plan to buy them? \t true. At that first instant, the
other individuals may in their transactions be at the point, M, where they are
holding money, rather than at the point where they choose to buy goods. This
possibility arises from the very fact that in a monetary economy, each
individual's purchases and sales are separated in time and each holds money
for the intervening period. The length of time for which a person holds money
is the subject of personal choice: one may, for example, choose to sell goods
This is n
"in the exchange economy con
Identity equation
he concent of planned
plans. Therefore, in. the
a the Say's
there re94 QUANTITY THEORY TRADITION
‘and build up a hoard of money over a substantial period, rather than use the
proceeds to buy goods. It follows that in a monetary economy, the existence
of money holdings for a period of time (however short) ensures that there i
no guarantee that aggregate planned demand always, at every instant, equals
planned supply. For the two to be always equal, as Say’s Identity states,
money must never be held even for an instant. Therefore, a corollary or
statement of Say’s Identity could take the form: “Money is never ckosen to
be held for an instant.”
Another corollary of Say’s Identity would be the statement: “There is
never a general glut of unsold goods.” Goods willingly produced, desired
supply, are always willingly bought, since they equal planned demand,
Underlying this idea there may be an idea of the direction of causation.
Common to many interpretations of Say's Identity is the idea that causality
runs from supply to demand: planned supply instantly creates an exactly
equal planned demand—indeed, Say himself saw causality in this way. This,
then, implies a strong statement of the neutrality of money: “Since planned
demand for goods always equals and is determined by planned supply, an
‘exogenots change in the supply of money cannot affect for an instant the real
demands and supplies of goods."
‘Now, having established these versions, implications, and corollaries of
Say’s Identity, we can consider whether the Classical and Neoslassical
Quantity Theorists included it as a component of their theories.
Statements of Say’s Identity
Jean-Baptiste Say himself certainly appears to have done so. As well as
being an original thinker in his own right, he was a popularizer cf Adam
‘Smith's general propositions. In combining these two functions, he also saw
his task as systematizing the ideas advanced by Smith, setting out the basic
propositions that must lie at their foundation, and criticizing what he con-
sidered to be errors in Smith's work. Like Smith, Say was an apologist for the
new economic system, capitalism, which was in its infancy at tre time,
although, again like Smith, he had a social conscience and was a critic of
some of the social conditions that accompanied the development of capi-
talism. As an apologist, Say was concerned to demonstrate that capitalism had
limitless possibilities of expansion if only the barriers to trade were eli-
minated. In the process, he wrote his Treatise of Political Economy, first
published in 1803, which became a best-seller and went through many
Note that such a statement implies an assumption that the supply of money cannot directly
affect the supply of goods. It can affect supply only if itis able fist to affect demand (and this is
precluded by Say’s Identity). This assumption that money does not directly affect supply is
Permmon in the Quantity Theory tradition (which, 2s we shall se, is not based on Say's Identity
Ss expresied here), It also common in modern Keynesian and monetary theory,
THE PRE-KEYNESIAN QUANTITY TE
editions.’ The book contained proposition that has be
‘aw of markets” and made it especially clear in its sec
editions. This is now known as Say's Law and some
Say's Identity
If we examine an English translation we find a clea
Identity
See. |
eer, ea
Parievancte eae
We must, however, ask whether Say was st
proposition or merely as a polemical point.
home, in his role as an apologist, the idea that
itless, since the expansion of produetio
be halted in the long run by an oversupply of
the affirmative, for the passage quoted
preceded by the much weaker sta
with a view to hoard or bury it, the
purchase of some kind” (emphasis add
that in a monetary economy there
purchase, and the emphasis on the
in the previous quotation is merely
‘Since we can find no other
‘emphasize the immediacy of th
we must conclude that the int
second paragraph of this
Quantity Theorist. They’ el
explained in Chapter 1) tin
‘money allows a real sep:
‘An explicit statement
Although he who sels
he sells: and he doet
commodity when he 2
Separated, it may
inclination to sell i
ination to deterther than use the
sures that there is
ery instant, equals
s Identity. states,
e, a corollary oF
ever chosen to
produced, desired
planned demand.
tion of causation
idea that
exactly
his way. This,
Since planned
aned supply, an
n instant the real
izing what he con-
aan apologist for the
fancy at the time,
ind was a critic of
Yelopment of
ment of capi
$ that capital
capitalism had
{leat Econom
Fent throug
first
THE PRE-KEYNESIAN QUANTITY THEORY TRADITION 95.
tions. The book contained a proposition that has been translated as the
n its second and subsequent
law of markets” and made it especially
editions. This is now known as Say’s Law and s ied as
Say's Identity
If we examine an English translation,‘ we find a clear statement of Say’s
Identity
has put the finishing hand (0 his p
le should diminish in his h
sin the purchase of
We must, ho’ ask whether Say was sating this as a strict theoretical
proposition or merely as a polemical point. Was it put forward only to drive
home, in his role as an apologist, the idea that the opportunities for capitalism
are limitless, since the expansion of production that capitalism entails cannot
be halted in the Io ly of goods? The answer must be in
he affirmative, for the passage quoted here is (as Patinkin notes) imme:
preceded by the much weaker statement tha: “even when money is ob
with a view to hoard or bury it, the ultimate object is always to employ it in a
purchase of some kind” (emphasis added). Cearly, therefore, Say understood
that in a monetary economy there is a break in time b
chase, and the emphasis on the immediate link between p
evious quotation is merely polemi
Since we can find no other quotations from the Quantity Theorists that
emphasize the immediacy of the disbursement of money received from sales,
we must conclude that the interpretation of Say’s Identity, presented in the
graph of this section, is too extreme to be attributed to any
recognized, at least implicitly, that (as
ween sale and
chase and sale
second para
Quantity Theorist. They
explained in Chapter 1) tim
money allows a real separation in time of purchases and sales.
An explicit statement of this was made by John Stuart Mill (1844):
is of the essence for the existence of money;
Although he who sels, really sells ony to buy. he need not buy at the same moment wi
he sels: and he does not therefore necessarily 10d 10 the inimediate demand for one
mmodity when he adds to the supply of snatver. The buying and selling being.96 QUANTITY THEORY TRADITION
But we can modify the concept of time that we have employed so far to
arrive at a version of Say’s Identity that is formally unchanged. That is, we
can arbitrarily divide time into discrete periods, a short run, and « long run
which is a succession of such short runs. We can then state Say’s Mentity as
the proposition that the planned supply of goods over the short-run period (a
flow concept) is identically equal to the planned demand over that period,
Money is held between the transactions occurring within the period but not
from one short-run period to the next;’ individuals are eager to spend money
balances within some such period, and they want to do it as quickly as
possible, so the period. is as short as possible. This seems to be Patinkin's
interpretation of Say’s Identity, since he quotes as examples of it passages
that make no mention of immediate disbursement of money or syn-
chronization of planned purchases and sales at every instant
Quotations from Classical economists that appear to support Say's Iden-
tity in this modified form are legion. For example, they are to be found in the
writings of James Mill. In his Commerce Defended (1808), he proviced a more
explicit statement of the law than Say had offered at that time, and in his
Elements of Political Economy (1821), we find:
‘When a man produces a greater quantity of any commodity than he desires for himself, i
can only be on one account; namely that he desires some other commodity
And:
No man wants money but in order to lay i ou, ether in articles of productive or articles of
‘unproductive constimption.
We can also find in Ricardo’s writings statements of Say’s Law in the form of
an identity—or, as Ricardo called it, “Mr. Mill's theory.” They are found not
so much in Ricardo’s great Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
(1817), where the main reference is a laudatory remark in the preface, but in
his correspondence with, and comments on, Malthus. For example, Ricardo
writes:
Whoever is possessed of a commodity is necessarily a demander, ether he wishes to
consume the commodity himself, and then ao purchaser is wanted: or he wisnes {0 sell it
tnd purchase some other thing withthe money.
Similarly, McCulloch, a rather crude defender of Ricardo's system of thought,
argued (1844):
It is... the acquisition of [other goods) ..and not of money, that isthe end which every
‘man bas in view who certes anything to market
This concept of time is clearly analogous to the market day in Hicks's (1967) monetary
model, discussed in Chapter I.
x
THE PRE-KEYNESIAN QUANTITY
Finally, we have the well-known statement of John S
ciples of Political Economy (1848):
All sellers are inevitably... buyers. Could we suddenly double
country, we should double the supply of commodities in ever:
the same stroke, double the purchasing power. Everybody wou
well as supply; everybody would be able to buy twice as mus
have twice as much to offer in exchange
Say and Ricardo in Context
Although we can find these, and more, statements by
that appear to support Say’s Identity, reading them in
that these writers most certainly did not support the p
of the context is the intellectual climate at the time th
wrote. They were engaged in a fierce battle with those
of Keynes in a sense, who argued that a general glut
Chalmers, Sismondi, and others emphasized that sup
‘own demand, that a general overproduction of goods
inadequate aggregate demand for goods as a whole, at
will depress production. One way to clarify the debate
and the followers of Say’s Law emphasized that thy
determine aggregate output, whereas Malthus and the»
emphasized demand as the determining factor.
noted, argued that crises, slumps, and une
general, however, followers of Say's Law
location of resources—too few being used i
demand and too many being used in sectors
‘general glut theorists argued that crises
general,
It would be untrue to say, however»
followers of Say’s Law denied the existe
‘each of the writers we have quoted. AS
himself admitted the possibility of
the general glut theorists, Say eve
cession” to their views in preparing
edition, we find him arguing that t
and that recognition of this is
political economy” rather than ®
Ricardo, too, recounizs
His difference with the get
fact that he worked at a level
the long-run potential fOr
have believed that in the
the long run, the limits
which depends on thebe Patinki'
"seems 10
Bibb eramles or i rss
ERement of 0
Fevers stant i
Pi ete snort say's ten.
Piya tobe four inte
Brite, ne povided» more
Vleet at tat tine, a in hs
k
[foi than he desires for hms
bom otter commodity
Finartctes of productive or
HS0f Say’s Law in the form of
[Stheory.” They are found not
litical Economy and Taxation
Wtemark in the preface, but in
Malthus. For example, Ricardo
BE demande, either he wis
Het it wanted; or he wishes
PERicatdo's system of thought
PIR eta is the end wich
PR Heke 557 sone
x
TRADITION 97
Finally, we have the well-known statement of John Stuart Mill in his Prin
ciples of Political Economy (1848):
ime stoke, double the purchssig power, Everybody would brn
Say and Ricardo in Context
Although we can find these, and more, statements by Classical economists
that appear t Say’s Identity, reading them in their context indicates
that these writers most certainly did not support the proposition. One aspect
of the context is the intell
wrote. They were engaged in a fier
of Keynes in a sense, who argued that
tual cimate at the time that the Classical writers
attle with those writers, the precursors
Ithus
c its
eral glut was possible. M
Chalmers, Sismondi, and others emphasized that supply
own demand, that a g
inadequate a
eral overproduction of goods is possible because of
regate demand for goods as a whole, and that such a situ
will depress production. One way to clarify the debate is to si
and the followers of Say’s Law emphasized that the conditions of supply
determine aggregate output, whereas Malthus and the “general glut” theorists
emphasized demand as the determining factor. Neither side, it should be
noted, argued that crises, slumps, and unemployment are impossible. In
general, however, followers
misallocation of resources—t
demand and too many being used in s
of Say’s Law argued that they stem from a
10 few being used in sectors where there is high
rs with low d
feneral glut theorists argued that crises reffect an inadequacy of demand in
general
It would be untrue to say, however, that in the
followers of Say's Law denied the existe:
each of the writers we have quoted. As S
himself admitted the possibility of general gluts. In his correspondence with
he general glut theorists, Say eventually revealed that he had made a “con.
sion" to their views in preparing the fifth edition of his Trea
edition, we find him arguing that there are limits to production in t
and that recognition of this is necessary when “we are studying pra
political economy” rather than “abstract
Ricardo, too, recognizes the possibility of general gl
His difference with the general glut theorists appears to stem partly from th
fact that he worked at a level of abstraction where he fixed his eyes firmly on
the long-run potential for capitalist accumulation and growth. He appears to
have believed that in the short rua, supply may be limited by demand, but in
the long run, the limits to production are determined by the rate of profit
which depends on the distribution of national income among workers’ wages,
mand—whereas the
uurse of this debate, the
.¢ of general gluts. Consider in turn
ywell (1974) demonstrates, even Say
uantities
ts in the short run98 QUANTITY THEORY TRADITION
landlords’ rent, and capitalists’ profits. As he said in a letter (1966, Vol. 7) to
his adversary Malthus:
It appears to me that one gre cause of our difference in opinion, on th subjects which we
have so often discussed, i that you always have in your mind the immediate and temporary
effects of particular changes—whereas I put these immediate and temporary effects quite
side, and fix my whole attention on the permanent state of things wtich will result from
them
Similarly, in Ricardo's notes to James Mill, dated December 18, 1821
(1966, Vol. 9}, there is a clear distinction between the possibility of a general
glut in the short run and its impossibility in the long run:
If every man was intent on saving, more food and necessaries... would be produced than
could be consumed. The supply above the demand would produce sucha glu, that with the
increased quantity you could command no more Isbour than before [that i, prices of goods
‘would fal,
So a fall in the absolute price level comes through a short-run excess supply
in the goods markets (as is the case with Patinkin’s real balance effect). But
matters are different in Ricardo’s long run. For the fall in the prices of goods
involves an increase in real wages, a redistribution to workers, as a result of,
which “all motive to save would cease,” the excess supply would be eradi
cated, and, moreover, it would not have permanently hindered accumulation
because the rise in real wages evokes an increased labor supply, which lowers
real wages to their initial level.
Ricardo, like most Classical writers, is not always consistent. We can,
therefore, find places where he denies the possibility of a general glut in the
short run, but even there he does not support the Say's Identity proposition
that supply creates its own demand. Instead, in such places he argues that in
the short run, supply is determined by demand and a fall in demand can push
supply below the full-employment level. But he contends that supply falls
instantaneously in response to this decrease in demand, so that excess supply
is immediately eradicated. For example, in a letter to Malthus dated July 9,
1821 (1966, Vol. 9), Ricardo wrote:
If you had said “after arriving at «certain limit there will inthe actual czcumstances be 90
use to try to produce more-—the end cannot be accomplished, and if it could, instead of
‘more, less would belong to the class which provided the capital.” I shoald have agreed with
‘But it is clear that a difference between concentrating onthe short run snd on the long run is
not the sole souree of the difference between Ricardo and Malthus, since Malthus wrote, in his
Definitions in Political Economy: “The question of 2 glut is exchsively whether it may be
‘general, as well as particular, and not whether it may be permanent as well as temporary.”
Malthus, unlike Ricardo, clearly considered that long-run stagnation, with excess supply of goods
arising from inadequate demand, wat possible. The important point that te passtge suezest,
however is that Ricardo thought excess supply. a general glut, t0 be possible in the short run,
.
THE PRE-KEYNESIAN Qué
Ricardo followed this with an emphasis on the j
because a limit on demand immediately ensures
that demand and supply remain in balance:
acknowledge there may not be adequate motives for
not be produced, but T eannot allow... that with these
be produced”
Finally, and in the same vein, we find in Ricard
‘a Low Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock” (I:
the effects of a government's restricting exp
Ricardo recognized that a fall in demand cau:
wrote: “No interruption could be given tot]
without the most extensively ruinous commer
the fall in supply is preceded by a short-run exc
‘The immense capital which would be employed or
suddenly, and under such cicumstances without iat
orn in their markets, which would affect their whole
Caleulation... would occasion a scene of wide spread
From our consideration of Say and Ricardo
quite wrong to suppose that they believed it
Jong-run proposition that enabled them to is
distribution, prices, and values, that determine |
as a short-run proposition cannot be pinned ont
for Keynes, who was primarily (but not who
analysis, to write (1936): “From the time of
economists have taught that supply creates its +
McCulloch, Mill, and Marshall
Moreover, it is not only Say and Ricardo
are qualified so as to make them read like
context. We have quoted McCulloch a5
Identity, but that statement is imi
clear that he is thinking of the Tong
possible:
"although Sowell (1974) interprets tlt
that demand influences suppl is
the motives for production #8
motive to he profit and showed Bom