TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT............................................................3

(1) Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106........................................................................................3
(2) Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300..............................................................................5
(3) BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009................................................7
(4) Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001...........................11
(5) Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 20, 2013.................................16
(6) Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa v. COMELEC, 758 SCRA 587................19
(7) Ligot v. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823.........................................................................................21
(8) Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549.................................................................................23
(9) Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703................................................27
(10) COMELEC v. Judge Quijano Padilla, et. al., G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002
...................................................................................................................................................29
(11) Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767.......................................31
(12) Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464............................................................................35
(13) Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006.......................................................37
ART. VII – EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.....................................................................40
(1) Lagman et.al. vs. Medialdea et.al., G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017................................40
(2) Lagman et.al. vs. Medialdea et.al., G.R. No. 243522, February 19, 2019.....................43
(3) Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 681 SCRA 675 (2012)........................................................46
(4) Brillantes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004...........................................48
(5) Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317......................................50
(6) Estrada vs. GMA, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001.......................................................54
(7) Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668............................................................................60
(8) Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002...................................................62
(9) Pimentel vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005...............................................65
(10) Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 5, 2000......67
(11) People vs. Patriarca, G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000........................................70
(12) Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008....................................73
(13) Clinton vs. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)............................................................................76
(14) Velicaria-Garafil vs. Office of the President, 758 SCRA 414 (2015)...........................78
(15) Boac vs. Cadapan G.R. No. 184461-62 May 31, 2011...................................................81
ART. VIII – JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.......................................................................86
(1) Casar vs. Soluren, 684 SCRA 293 (2012).........................................................................86
(2) Madriaga vs. CBC, 677 SCRA 560 (2012).......................................................................87
(3) People vs. Gutierrez, 39 SCRA 173..................................................................................89
(4) In Re: Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, August 3, 1978........................................93
(5) Maturan vs. Gutierrez-Torres, 681 SCRA 311 (2012)....................................................96
(6) Judge Caoibes vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 17, 2001..................................99
(7) Re: Derogatory News Item Charging Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria
with Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen, AM No. 00-7-09 CA, March 27,
2001.........................................................................................................................................101
(8) Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 5 U.S. 137 (1883).......................................................103
(9) Hebron vs. Garcia II, 685 SCRA 417 (2012)..................................................................105
(10) Office of the Court Administrator vs. Balut, 758 SCRA 216 (2015).........................108
(11) Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Judge Baluma, 704 SCRA 415 (2013).....110
(12) People vs. Wahiman, 758 SCRA 366 (2015)................................................................112
(13) Disini, Jr. vs. Sec. of Justice, 716 SCRA 237 (2014)....................................................114
(14) Republic vs. Sereno G.R. No. 237428 May 11, 2018...................................................128
 Page 3 of 134

ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

(1) Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106

Robert Tobias, et. Al vs Hon. City Mayor Benjamin Abalos,

G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994

TOPIC: Legislative Branch

DOCTRINE:

1. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it informs the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and
the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

FACTS:

1. Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a

petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong."
2. Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same
legislative district.
3. The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions
of the constitution.
a. It violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan
and Mandaluyong into two separate district.
b. It also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the members of the
House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution.
c. Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return
of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division
was not made pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population
requirement was attained.

ISSUE:

1. Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?

 Page 4 of 134

2. Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of
representatives?
3. Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional
requirement?
4. Should the people of San Juan have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A.
No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district?

RULING:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the
first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a
HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the
"one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple
or impede legislation.

2. The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of
representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase
in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

3. With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any
census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts,
unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due
consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative district.

4. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was
the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate
district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were
properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of
status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

5. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 Page 5 of 134

(2) Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

G.R. No. 119976; September 18, 1995

DOCTRINE: An individual does not lose her domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the
place was seven (7) months.
2. On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not
comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s
one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.
3. In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months
to since childhood under residency.
4. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
5. On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in
the First District of Leyte.
6. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number
of votes.
7. In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers.

ISSUE: Whether Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one
year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

RULING:

1. Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
2. Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining
a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required
by the 1987 Constitution.
3. An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences
in different places.
 Page 6 of 134

4. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness
as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed incurred.
5. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law
as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
6. It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC
was obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her
domicile.
7. Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s
questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside.
8. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
 Page 7 of 134

(3) BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009

BANAT v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 179271 (2009)

FACTS:

1. In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in
May 2007.
2. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
a. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI,
1987 Constitution);
b. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be
entitled to one seat;
c. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least
6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the
Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
d. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than
6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
3. The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a
party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of
the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the
2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed
by the Constitution.
4. BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is
mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be
impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also
proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this
digest).
5. On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity
of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not
major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said
elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
 Page 8 of 134

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

RULING:

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative
districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in
fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be
seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list
representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of
Seats Available to Party-List Representatives

Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be
filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to

allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat
and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold
creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The
Supreme Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat
despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list
seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if
the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as
long as the two percent threshold is present.
 Page 9 of 134

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.”

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then
it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less
than 2% to also get a seat.

But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two

percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.

ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to

the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more

than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the
first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-
percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these
two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this
case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available
for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of
the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the
votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives.
 Page 10 of 134

How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the
remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall
still be observed.

Example:

In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which
is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) =

number of additional seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is
a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or
a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will
still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3
seats.

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and
there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-
lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are
occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties
(the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either
from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that
even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major
political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a
sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno,
in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the
people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the
people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that
only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list
elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly.
 Page 11 of 134

(4) Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

BAGONG BAYANI LABOR PARTY v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147589; June 26, 2001

DOCTRINE:

1. In Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court said that
even if major political parties are allowed by the Constitution to participate in the party-
list system, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized
and under-represented.
2. The following guidelines should be followed in order that a political party registered
under the pary-list system may be entitled to a seat in the House of Representatives
(ANG BAGONG BAYANI GUIDELINES):
a. must represent marginalized and under-represented sectors;
b. major political parties must comply with this statutory policy;
c. Ang Bagong Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (as a party) must be subject to the
express constitutional prohibition against religious sects;
d. The party must not be disqualified under RA 7941;
e. The party must not be an adjunct of an entity or project funded by the
government;
f. The party and its nominees must comply with the requirements of the law;
g. The nominee must also represent a marginalized or under-represented sector;
h. The nominee must be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation.
3. Ang Bagong Bayani reiterated the formula used in the landmark case of Veterans
Federation Party for computing the additional seats which a party-list group shall be
entitled to:
a. Additional Seats = (Votes Cast for Qualified Party / Votes Cast for First Party) x
Allotted Seats for First Party

FACTS:

1. On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition
praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified
List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be
accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition
for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.
2. On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents in the two disqualification
cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on
April 26, 2001, but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During the hearing, however,
Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
 Page 12 of 134

3. Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed
as GR No. 147589, assailed COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution
dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a
non-extendible period of five days from notice.
4. On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of the
two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their
respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an
Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the COMELEC may proceed with the
counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

ISSUES: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:

1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is
there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized andunderrepresented'
sectors and organizations.
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785."

RULING:

1. WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby

DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated
in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last
party-list elections, the COMELEC is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and
organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in
the House of Representatives. The COMELEC is further DIRECTED to submit to this
Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
2. The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the COMELEC "to refrain
from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force
until after the COMELEC itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition.
3. This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
4. In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785 Petitioners attack the validity of
COMELEC Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of
2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be
brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
 Page 13 of 134

5. Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent

Commission en banc; hence,no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
6. The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the COMELEC a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. The COMELEC, however, did not act on that Petition.
7. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this
Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have
proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the COMELEC has not yet
formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality
because the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its
position on the matter quite clear.
8. In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in
the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held that
certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency."
Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme
urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
9. Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system,
which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules."
10. Finally, when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available."
11. In view of the participation of political parties
12. In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of
political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the
questioned Resolution." For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of
"major political parties."
13. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . .." Section
3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an
organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office."
14. In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented
15. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however,
that any political party — or any organization or group for that matter — may do so. The
requisite character of these parties or organizationsmust be consistent with the
purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
16. "Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular
district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to
numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
 Page 14 of 134

representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the

enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."
17. However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list
organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
18. Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally
identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
19. In the end, the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list
system, Filipino-style.
20. While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the
party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words
employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained
by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related.
Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those
in immediate association.
21. In view of OSG contention Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the
Office of the Solicitor General contends that any party or group that is not disqualified
under Section 6 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during
the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or
Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections.
22. Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers
cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two
sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly
defies reason and common sense.
23. It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the
majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-
list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger
affairs of the State.
24. In view of COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion
25. When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections,
violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-
judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-
guess it.
 Page 15 of 134

26. In view of the Courts assistance The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the
case to the COMELEC for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings,
whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections
comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay
down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the
COMELEC in its work.
27. In view of the 2 systems of representation (Mendoza, J.) Indeed, the two systems of
representation are not identical. Party list representation is a type of proportional
representation designed to give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House
of Representatives in district elections a chance to win if they have sufficient
strength on a nationwide basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered
"marginalized and underrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives are
elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast
to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners
49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat.
28. Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order
to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat
district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the
winner are represented.
29. What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved seats for
"marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, §5(2), these sectors were
given only one-half of the seats in the House of Representatives and only for three terms.
On the other hand, the "third or fourth placers" in district elections, for whom the party-
list system was intended, refer to those who may not win seats in the districts but
nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to be represented in the House.
They may include Villacorta's "marginalized" or "underprivileged" sectors, but they are
not limited to them. There would have been no need to give the "marginalized sectors"
one-half of the seats for the party-list system for three terms if the two systems are
identical.
30. In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the existing
"winner-take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters
underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were proposed:
sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional representation. The
Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system.
31. Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that the
party-list system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
32. For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic
purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of
proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all"
district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the
sectors mentioned in §5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include other sectors.
 Page 16 of 134

(5) Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 20, 2013

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

TOPIC: Legislative Department

DOCTRINE:

1. The party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties
that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives:
one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or
organization of choice.

FACTS:

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested
their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
2. The COMELEC disqualified groups and organizations from participating in the May 13,
2013 party-list elections based on jurisprudence.
3. Thereafter, fifty-two party-list groups and organizations filed 54 Petitions for Certiorari
and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition against the Commission on Election assailing
the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections, disqualifying them from
participating in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
4. The COMELEC excluded them from participating in the May 2013 party-list elections
because they allegedly did not satisfy these two criteria:
a. all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, and
b. all nominees must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the May 13, 2013 party-
list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations

RULING:
1. No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned
some principles established in the two aforestated cases.
 Page 17 of 134

2. Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed
that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to
include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the
sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As
explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the
party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."
3. Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-
list system prescribed in the Constitution.
4. Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral
partyor a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party.
Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a"political partyrefers to anorganized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941
provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions
for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each
other.
5. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party
and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941
that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who
advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.
6. The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria:
a. all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and
b. all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as
political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
7. Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have
been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors.
Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do
not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or
more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining
qualified nominee.
8. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
a. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:
i. national parties or organizations,
ii. regional parties or organizations, and
 Page 18 of 134

iii. sectoral parties or organizations.

b. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need

to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector.
c. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself
an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
e. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
f. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.

9. This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and
desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what
the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the
Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not
because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners,
but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
 Page 19 of 134

(6) Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa v. COMELEC, 758 SCRA 587

Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa v. Comelec

TOPIC: House of Representatives

DOCTRINE:

1. The petition assails COMELEC for prematurely and erroneously allocating additional
seats to certain party-list groups proclaimed as initial winners in the 2013 automated
elections.
2. The Court ruled that the COMELEC did not err in the allocation of additional seats
because it is authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the remaining
uncanvassed returns will not affect the result of the elections and COMELEC’s allocation
of additional seats was in accordance with the BANAT ruling.

FACTS:
1. Petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the respondent COMELEC for grave
abuse of discretion in prematurely and erroneously allocating additional seats to certain
party-list groups proclaimed as initial winners in the 2013 automated elections.
2. Petitioner was among the accredited candidates for party-list representative during the
national and local elections held on May 13, 2013
3. On May 24, 2013, COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list groups which obtained at least
2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system and were thus entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
4. Petitioner’s arguments:
a. COMELEC’s allocation of additional seats for those two-percenters and 38 other
groups proclaimed as initial winners greatly prejudiced its interest and those other
parties or organizations as potential winners
b. Proclamation was hasty and premature because at the time the canvassing was
still ongoing, there were still uncanvassed and untransmitted results from
Mindanao, uncanvassed overseas and local absentee votes and results from
special elections.
c. Projected figures of COMELEC were difficult and impracticable considering
there existed a considerable number of untransmitted results due to breakdown
and malfunctioning of the PCOS machines
d. Allocation of votes did not conform with Sec 11, RA 7941 and BANAT – product
of the percentage of votes multiplied by additional seats available is not an integer
5. OSG’s comment:
a. COMELEC faithfully adhered to the procedure prescribed in BANAT. Party-list
groups with products of less than one were still allocated seats depending on their
rank and availability of seats.
b. Votes yet to be canvassed did not materially affect the results of the elections

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in allocating the additional seats for
the 38 party-list candidates proclaimed as winners in the May 13, 2013 elections
 Page 20 of 134

RULING:

1. No. COMELEC is authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the remaining

uncanvassed election returns will not affect the result of the elections. Sec 233, Omnibus
Election Code – authorizes the board of canvassers to proclaim winning candidates in
cases of delayed or lost election returns if the missing returns will not affect the results of
the election
2. There was no significant change in the rankings as per the latest canvass and therefore
COMELEC had sufficient basis for proclaiming the initial winners and reserving only
five buffer seats.
3. No competent evidence had been presented by petitioner in support of its allegations on
irregularities and glitches in the POCS machines
4. Factual question of number of uncanvassed votes should have been raised before the
COMELEC because this Court is not a trial of facts.
5. COMELEC enjoys presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of
official duty.
6. COMELEC’s allocation of additional seats for party-list in accordance with ruling in
BANAT.
7. BANAT Ruling
a. “additional seats” – maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats
b. Allocation of additional seats not limited to the two-percenters
c. Two steps in the second round of seat allocation
i. Percentage x Remaining Available Seats
= whole integer party’s share in the remaining available seats Remaining
available seats
= maximum seats reserved under the party-list system (55) – guaranteed
seats of the two-percenters (17)
= 38
ii. We assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all
available seats are completely distributed.
iii. Party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet
qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats depending on their
ranking in the second round.
iv. Petitioner mistakenly assumed that the statement in BANAT disallowing
fractional seats insofar as the additional seats for the two-percenter in the
second round should also apply to those party-list groups with less than
2% votes.
 Page 21 of 134

(7) Ligot v. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823

LIGOT v. MATHAY
56 SCRA 823

TOPIC: The Three Branches of the Government

DOCTRINE:

1. This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez. In striking down Republic Act No.
3836 as null and void insofar as it referred to the retirement of members of Congress and
the elected officials thereof for being violative of the Constitution, this Court held that "it
is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is
a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office" and that "Republic Act
No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on
June 22, 1963.
2. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.
3. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, section 14 of the
Constitution."

FACTS:

1. Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the

Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from
December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
2. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 “fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government” was
enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964.
3. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under
said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that
said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
4. Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for
retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at
least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis
therein provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of
elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.”
5. HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so
issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same.
6. The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the
basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which
was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while
the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only
 Page 22 of 134

for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969)
should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased
salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was
already P32,000.00 per annum.

ISSUE: Whether Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

RULING:

1. To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum
would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of
achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly.
2. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly
situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple
reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview
of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other emoluments” to
their salary as provided by law.
3. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December
30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which
they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office)
would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond
that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency.
4. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner’s
colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, “(S)uch a scheme would contravene the
Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative
authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”
 Page 23 of 134

(8) Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549

ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA v. SALVADOR MISON, in

his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

TOPIC: Executive Department | Appointing Power

DOCTRINE:

1. It is the clear and expressed intent of the framers of the Constitution that presidential
appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, are
not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

FACTS:

1. In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin
the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of
Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having
been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
2. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's
appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments

ISSUE: Whether all appointments made by the president require approval of the Commission on
Appointments to be valid?

RULING:

1. No. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which
force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional
provisions themselves.
2. The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance
with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in
accordance with what they say and provide.
3. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
 Page 24 of 134

captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions
or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of the Congress.

4. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there
are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.

5. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
a. First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
b. Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
c. Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
d. Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.

6. The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
7. The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should
they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and
statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in
the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
8. In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be
presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and
existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people
adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects
to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in
its adoption.
9. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
10. On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in
which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power
of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
 Page 25 of 134

11. Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the
1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987
Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of
appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of
other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth
group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
12. In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes
proposed and approved by the Commission. These were
a. the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
b. the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence of the section from
the same requirement.
13. As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
there are officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers
whose appointments have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under
the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII.
14. But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention
and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those
officers whose appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by
express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers
are left to the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
15. Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character.
Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them.
Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it
is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that
appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of
the Commission on Appointments.
16. It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head)
is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out,
while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose
appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987
Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus"
from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
17. Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937,
otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted
by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:

601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one
chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner
(hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of
 Page 26 of 134

Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the
rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall
be appointed by the proper department head.

18. Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential
Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as
thus amended, now reads as follows:

Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of

Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as
the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy
Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in
accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines (Emphasis supplied.)

19. Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
20. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No.
34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the
appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the
President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment,
however, no longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
21. Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional
authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and
functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
 Page 27 of 134

(9) Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703

PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION v. PRADO

227 SCRA 703, November 11, 1993

TOPIC: Legislative

PRINCIPLE:

1. Presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of
the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully
studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted.
2. If the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
3. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on
all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults.
What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each
other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

FACTS:

1. The petitioners are members of the lower courts.

2. Sec 35 of R.A. No. 7354 withdrew the franking (term used for the right of sending letters
or postal packages free of charge) privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.
3. They assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the following grounds:
a. its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes;
b. it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed
copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before
its passage; and
c. it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

ISSUE: Is Sec 35 of RA 7354 discriminatory?

RULING:

1. YES. The Supreme Court annulled Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1,
of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of
laws.
2. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
 Page 28 of 134

3. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the
title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the
act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
4. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a
more efficient and effective postal service system. By virtue of its nature as a repealing
clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
5. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD
26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No.
4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition,
violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of
the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the
House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference
committee of both chambers.
6. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also
binding on the Supreme Court.
7. Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of
each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to
which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
8. Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is not a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under
the police power. Its repealing clause is a discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly
situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege.
9. This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is
a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
 Page 29 of 134

(10) COMELEC v. Judge Quijano Padilla, et. al., G.R. No. 151992, September 18,
2002

COMELEC v. Judge Padilla

G. R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002
TOPIC: Legislative

DOCTRINE:

1. Section 46 of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that “No contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor,
the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the
proposed expenditure” while Section 47 states “no contract involving the expenditure of
public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the
proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer
entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and
that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is
available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor
concerned”

FACTS:

1. On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the
supply and installations of information technology equipment and ancillary services for
its Voter’s Registration and Identification System Project or VRIS Project.
2. Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and
was allowed to participate as one of the bidders.
3. After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA’s bid in the amount of P6.588
Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared the winning
bidder.
4. Thus, on September 28, 2000, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3252 approving the
Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA, which, in turn, immediately accepted the same.
5. The parties then proceeded to formalize the contract, with Commissioner Mehol K.
Sadain and Atty. Rodrigo D. Sta. Ana, acting as negotiators for the COMELEC and
PHOTOKINA, respectively.
6. However, under Republic Act No. 8760 the budget appropriated by Congress for the
COMELECs modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual
available funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief
Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.

ISSUE: Whether a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it
notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project?

RULING:
 Page 30 of 134

1. No. PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to
formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINA’s bid is beyond the amount appropriated by
Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC
and is considered void.
2. Section 46 of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that “No contract involving the
expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor,
the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the
proposed expenditure” while Section 47 states “no contract involving the expenditure of
public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the
proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer
entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and
that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is
available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by the auditor
concerned”
3. It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of
appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or
conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts
 Page 31 of 134

(11) Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR. v. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS
MEMBERS
G.R. No. 89914; November 20, 1991

TOPIC: INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION

FACTS:

1. This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee
from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the
alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in 36) or
thirty-nine (39) corporations.
2. On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No.
0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
3. On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile
delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged
"take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL
Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by
Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law
in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act."
4. Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter.
Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and
testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging
to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
5. Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice"
the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify invoking his constitutional right to due process,
and averring that the publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could
adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-
defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
6. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and
required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess
of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and
that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief. 1. ISSUE: Whether the SC cannot
properly inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative
investigations, much less can it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and special
 Page 32 of 134

committees from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation
of powers.

RULING:

1. NO. The Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation.
2. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
3. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them.

ISSUE: Whether the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose,
i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation;

RULING:

1. YES. The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
2. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution.
3. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
4. It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's
self.
5. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations specifically provided for in Sec.
1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such
inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection
with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also
extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate
alone.
6. As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the
 Page 33 of 134

exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a

member.
7. Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or
committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires
an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or
nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an
inquiry is proposed to be made.
8. Here, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation;
he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No.
3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In other words,
the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to
find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa,
had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be,
therefore, no intended legislation involved.

ISSUE: Whether the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a "purely private
transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into;

“Respondent Committee's argument: The questioned inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to

Senate Resolution No. 212.

The pertinent portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows: That the activities of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government be investigated by the appropriate Committee in
connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.”

RULING:

1. YES. It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the
privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile is to be conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and,
secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the petitioners are connected with the
government but are private citizens. It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry
by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a
purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find
out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of
the courts rather than of the legislature.
2. When respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the
complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. Since the
issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective
answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Committee is one
over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had
been pre-empted by that court.
3. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already
before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments
 Page 34 of 134

between legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment
were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being
made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted.
4. In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the inquiry violates their right to due process.

RULING:

1. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all
relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the
relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'."
2. One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against
self-incrimination. However, this doctrine is not applicable in this case because the
questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of
government, ordained by the Constitution. Thus, petitioners may not be compelled by the
respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it. WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED.
 Page 35 of 134

(12) Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464

FELIPE EVARDONE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)

G.R. No. 95063 December 2, 1991

DOCTRINE:

1. All existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until
amended, repealed or revoked

FACTS:

1. Evardone is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected
to the position during the 1988 local elections. On Feb. 4, 1990, Apelado et al. filed a
petition for recall of Evardone. Thereafter, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 90-0557,
which approved the recommendation of the Election Registrar of Sulat, Eastern Samar to
hold and conduct the signing of the petition for recall on Jul. 14, 1990. COMELEC also
has a prior resolution on recall proceedings, Resolution No. 2272 (based on the Const.
and Secs. 54 to 59) dated May 23, 1990.
2. On Jul. 10, 1990, Evardone filed before SC a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer
for TRO, which SC issued on Jul. 12. However, it was only on Jul. 15 that the field agent
of COMELEC received the telegraphic notice of the TRO—a day after the completion of
the signing process. So, the signing process pushed through.
3. COMELEC thereafter nullified the signing process. Apelado et al. filed an MR, but
COMELEC denied the same.
4. Evardone now challenges the constitutionality of Resolution No. 90-0557, asserting that
Art. X Sec. 3 of the1987 Const. repealed BP 337.
5. EVARDONE’S CONTENTION: Art. X Sec. 3 provides that the Congress shall enact a
LGC which shall provide for mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum. His theory
is that since there was, during the period material to the case, no local LGC enacted by
Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Const., there is no law which will serve as basis
for the COMELEC Resolution.
6. COMELEC’S REBUTTAL: The constitutional provision does not refer only to a LGC
which is in futurum but also in esse. The adoption of the 1987 Const. did not abrogate the
provisions of BP 337, unless a certain provision thereof is clearly irreconcilable with the
1987 Const. In this case, there is no inconsistency, thus both are operative.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the adoption of the 1987 Constitution abrogated the provisions of BP 337, and
therefore, COMELEC indeed has no basis in conducting the recall.
2. Whether the TRO issued by the Court rendered the signing process of the petition for
recall null.

RULING:
 Page 36 of 134

1. No. Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing
laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended,
repealed or revoked. RA 7160 providing for the LGC 1991, approved by the President on
10 October 1991, specifically repeals BP 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said
Act. But the LGC 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old
LGC (BP 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the
new LGC, the effectiveness of BP 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Thus, the COMELEC was vested the power to
promulgate the questioned resolution.

2. No. The records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or
about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not
vigilant in following up and determining the outcome of such notice. Evardone alleges
that it was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the Resolution of the
COMELEC setting the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his
urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for prohibition only
on 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the
petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the
COMELEC and Apelado. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the
Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of
the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about
2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the
petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary there is no turning back the
clock.

The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included

in the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct
and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a
public office is "burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the people
holding public offices are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers
and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective
offices. Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor
is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the
judge. "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a
person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same
electorate. The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall Evardone has
already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing
process held last 14 July 1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said
municipality is valid and has legal effect.

However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation

provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized
national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in
Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on
recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative
of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code
Page 37 of 134
 Page 38 of 134

(13) Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

Senate v. Ermita
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

DOCTRINE:

1. The requirement for Cabinet Members to secure Presidential consent under Sec. 1 of E.O.
464, which is limited only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. It
cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary, acting
for the President.

2. (SIDE-NOTE DOCTRINE) Executive Privilege. It has been defined as “the right of

the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately, the public”. Thus, presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings, like the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of
either House of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot
be pried open by a co-equal branch of government [Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777,
April 20, 2006], The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
subject of the inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as in the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution,
the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others [Neri v. Senate
Committees, G.R. No. 180843, March 25, 2008],

3. However, the privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information (in this case to Congress), the necessity for withholding the information must
be of such a high degree as the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential
to limit to the President (and to the Executive Secretary, by order of the President) the
power to invoke the privilege [Senate v. Ermita, supra.].

FACTS:

1. This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with
the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity
of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
2. The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date
arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a
postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample time and
 Page 39 of 134

opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten
the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.
3. On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among
others, mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the
Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since
the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both
faced court marshal for such attendance.

ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

RULING:

1. To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two
different functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour.
2. Question Hour:
a. The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6,
Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
i. “The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules
of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on
any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.”
b. The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on
how department heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued, the
department heads’ appearance is merely requested.
c. The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the
appearance of department heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to
Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
3. In aid of Legislation:
a. The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly
recognized in Article 6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
i. “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in,
or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”
 Page 40 of 134

b. The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A

legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
c. But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
“executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only
to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise
its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this
power -- the President.
d. Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) should secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an
official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must
be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is
privileged.
e. The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly
invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being
requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the
lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.
The letter assumes that the invited official possesses information that is covered
by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the
executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to
merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined
that it is so.
f. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is
thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing
precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled
with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.
g. When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded
reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible
need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the
Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed
calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time,
neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress
is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress
and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
4. Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared
void. Section 1(a) are however valid.
Page 41 of 134
 Page 42 of 134

ART. VII – EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

(1) Lagman et.al. vs. Medialdea et.al., G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al. v. HON. SALVADOR C.

MEDIALDEA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al.
G.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017

TOPIC: Executive Branch; President vis-à-vis Martial Law

DOCTRINE:

1. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, accurate,
and precise, rather it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had
sufficient factual basis. Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the
information at hand during the declaration or suspension.
2. The President is not subject to any condition to obtain a recommendation of, or
consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense or other high-ranking officials. The
President can declare martial law as long as the following requirements are present:
invasion or rebellion, and when public safety requires it. The power to impose martial
law is vested solely on the President as the Commander-in-Chief, subject to the
revocation of Congress and the review of the Court.
3. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial
Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

FACTS:

1. On September 4, 2016, Proclamation No. 55, declaring a state of national emergency on

account of lawless violence in Mindanao, was issued.
2. On May 23, 2017 at 10:00pm, after the ISIS-backed Maute Group took over a hospital in
Marawi City, established several checkpoints, set ablaze government and private
facilities, inflicted casualties on the part of the government forces, and hoisted the flag of
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas. President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216, “declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao,” in pursuant to Section
18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
3. On May 25, 2017, within the 60-days timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, President Duterte submitted a written report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216. After the submission of the report, the Senate issued P.S.
Resolution No. 388 expressing full support to the proclamation of martial law as they
deemed it to be satisfactory, constitutional, and in accordance with the law. The House of
Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 1050 expressing their full support
to the same.
 Page 43 of 134

4. Nevertheless, several persons filed a petition (Cullamat Petition, Mohamad Petition, and
Lagman Petition) under the Paragraph 3, Section 18 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, claiming that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis
because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It
argues that acts of terrorism do not constitute rebellion, since there is no proof that its
purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from its allegiance to the Philippines.

ISSUES:

1. Is the President, in declaring martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus:
a. required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
b. required to obtain favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National
Defense; or
c. required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation,
even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported;
2. Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus

RULING:

1. On the first issue:

a. NO. Due to the urgency of the situation, the President cannot be able to verify the
accuracy and veracity of all the facts and information reported to him. In case of
actual invasion or rebellion, there is a need for immediate response and time is
paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is
correct, accurate, and precise, rather it only needs to determine whether the
President's decision had sufficient factual basis. Court's review is confined to the
sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the declaration or
suspension.

b. NO. According to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President
is not subject to any condition to obtain a recommendation of, or consultation
with, the Secretary of National Defense or other high-ranking officials. The
President can declare martial law as long as the following requirements are
present: invasion or rebellion, and when public safety requires it. The power to
impose martial law is vested solely on the President as the Commander-in-Chief,
subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of the Court. Therefore, lack
of recommendation even from the Secretary of National Defense will not
compromise the sufficiency of the declaration’s factual basis.

c. YES. The President is required to take into account only the situation at the time
of the proclamation. In reviewing the sufficiency of the proclamation’s factual
basis, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President
 Page 44 of 134

prior to or at the time of declaration, which can be found in the proclamation as

well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. Past events may be
considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as these
are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time of the
declaration.

2. Yes. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension,
the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at
the time of the declaration. The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual
basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and
Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only
has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived
solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the
sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled,
news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative
value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. The
alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along
with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more
likely than not, actual rebellion exists.
 Page 45 of 134

(2) Lagman et.al. vs. Medialdea et.al., G.R. No. 243522, February 19, 2019

Lagman et al. v. Medialdea et al.

GR No. 243522, February 19, 2019

TOPIC: Executive Department; Powers of the President under Article VII, Sec. 18 as to the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

DOCTRINE:

1. The Constitutional safeguards found in Section 18, Article VII does not demand that a
city be first taken over or people get killed and billions of properties go up in smoke
before the President may be justified to use his options under Section 18.
2. What the Constitution asks is only that there be actual rebellion, an existing rebellion in
the territory where Martial rule is to be imposed.

FACTS:

1. President Duterte issued a Proclamation declaring a state of martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao to address the
rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), for a
period not exceeding 60 days.
2. Thereafter, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives his
written Report, citing the factual events and reasons that impelled him to issue the said
Proclamation. Both Houses expressed their full support to the Proclamation finding no
cause to revoke the same.
3. Afterwards, President again asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to
extend the Proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for another year which was likewise declared
constitutional.
4. Before the expiration of the second proclamation, DND Secretary, PNP Director-General,
and AFP Chief of Staff recommended the further extension of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for
another year to fully contain the continuing rebellion in Mindanao and to prevent it from
escalating to other parts of the country, and to ensure complete rehabilitation and
reconstruction of the most affected areas, as well as to attain lasting peace and order, and
to preserve the socio-economic growth and development of the entire Mindanao, which
the President requested to the Senate and House of Representatives. Private sectors,
Regional and Provincial Peace and Order Councils, and local government units in
Mindanao were also clamoring for a further extension of the proclamation.
5. Petitioner’s Argument
a. Petitioner argued that the Court is mandated to independently determine the
sufficiency of factual bases of the extension of martial law and it must not limit its
review on the basis of the declaration presented by the Executive and Legislative
branches of the government. The present factual situation of Mindanao no longer
 Page 46 of 134

calls for a third extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. And that, Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in
approving the third extension hastily despite the absence of sufficient factual
basis. The third extension violates the constitutional proscription against a long
duration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. The constitutional limitations on the period of martial law must be for a
short or limited duration, which must not exceed sixty (60) days, and should the
third extension be granted, the martial law regime would have lasted 951 days.
The third extension of martial law will lead to further violation of citizens'
political, civil, and human rights.
6. Respondent’s Argument
a. Respondents contended that The Court's power of judicial review under Section
18, Article VII is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the extension of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The President and both Houses of Congress found that there is
probable cause or evidence to show that rebellion persists in Mindanao. The
events happening in Mindanao strongly indicate that the continued
implementation of martial law is necessary to protect and insure public safety.
Congress has the sole prerogative to extend martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus since the 1987 Constitution does not limit
the period of extension and suspension, nor prohibit further extensions or
suspensions. Congress has the absolute discretion in determining the rules of
procedure with regard to the conduct and manner by which Congress deliberates
on the President's request for extension of martial law, and therefore is not subject
to judicial review.

ISSUE: Whether Congress has the prerogative to determine its own rules of proceedings in
conducting the joint session under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution including the
extension of proclamation of Martial law law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus

RULING:

1. YES. The Congress has the prerogative to extend the martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the Constitution does not limit the period for
which it can extend the same.
2. Citing the case of Lagman v. Medialdea, it was explained that the only limitations to the
exercise of congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension:
a. the extension should be upon the President's initiative;
b. it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the
demands of public safety; and
c. it is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the
petition of any citizen.
3. The Constitutional limits/checks set by the Constitution to guard against the whimsical or
arbitrary use of the extra ordinary powers of the Chief Executive under Section 18,
Article VII are well in place and are working. At the initial declaration of the martial law,
 Page 47 of 134

the President observed the 60-day limit and the requirement to report to Congress. In this
initial declaration as well as in the extensions, the President's decision was based on the
reports prepared by the different specialized agencies of the Executive branch charged
with external and internal security of the whole country. These were the same reports
submitted to Congress which were deliberated on, no matter how brief the time allotment
was for each of the law makers' interpellations. Yet the evidence or basis to support the
extension of martial law passed through the scrutiny of the Chief Executive and through
several more of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Court must remember
that We are called upon to rule on whether the President, and this time with the
concurrence of the two Houses of Congress, acted with sufficient basis in approving
anew the extension of martial law.
 Page 48 of 134

(3) Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 681 SCRA 675 (2012)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO, et al
G.R. No. 183533 September 25, 2012

DOCTRINE:

1. Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-

Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life,
liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had
exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had
failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary
investigations required under the rules.

FACTS:

1. Saez filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and
production of documents where he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed;
hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court.
2. He had specifically detailed the violation of his right to privacy as he was placed in the
Order of Battle and promised to have his record cleared if he would cooperate and
become a military asset.
3. He prayed for the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring
of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the Order of Battle and other
government records connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
4. The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate his
petition for habeas data and writ of amparo.
5. CA likewise dropped as respondent Pres. GMA on the ground of her immunity from suit.

ISSUE: Whether the President should be dropped as respondent due to immunity from suit

RULING:

1. No, the President cannot be automatically dropped as a respondent pursuant to the

doctrine of command responsibility.
2. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as
superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
 Page 49 of 134

3. The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine.
4. On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals
apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be
established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is
adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is
buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the
Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government
Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other
Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226).
5. Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the
doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be
committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others
within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive
or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission.
Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a)
the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts
have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c)
members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved.
6. Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively
command, control and discipline the military.
 Page 50 of 134

(4) Brillantes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., et.al, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004

TOPIC: EXECUTIVE Department

DOCTRINE:

1. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive
authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President

FACTS:

1. On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting,
counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections. It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines
(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and adopt new electoral forms and
printing materials.
2. The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation during the May 11,
1998 presidential elections, particularly in counting the votes collected from the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of the
machines to correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued its
implementation.
3. Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003, allocating the
sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004
elections. On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing the release of a further
supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the COMELEC.
4. The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting and
counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with companies
Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the computerized voting/counting machines)
were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC nevertheless continued the
electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for national,
provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."

ISSUE: Whether Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC in
authorizing the use of election funds in consolidating the election results for the May 10, 2004
elections should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional.

RULING:
 Page 51 of 134

1. YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712 preempts the
sole authority of the Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns for the
President and the Vice-President.
2. Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive authority vested
in the Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. It is
a grave error on the part of the respondent to have ignored the misapprehensions
addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin
Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would be in violation of the Constitution
(section 4 of Article VII):
a. "any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in
effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President, which
not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would also be
lacking of any constitutional authority."
3. The existence of an accredited Citizen’s arm: Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the
accredited citizen’s arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a
copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes,
whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including the respondent
COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of
conducting an "unofficial" count.
4. In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be
delivered to the COMELEC under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking an
"unofficial" count. The said copies are archived and unsealed only when needed by to
verify election results in connection with resolving election disputes that may be
established.
 Page 52 of 134

(5) Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 83896; February 22, 1991

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T. REYES v.

PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al.
G.R. No. 83815; February 22, 1991

TOPIC: EXECUTIVE

DOCTRINE:

1. Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government
during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity.
2. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of
holding multiple government offices or employment.
3. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation.
4. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to
wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par.
(2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars.
(2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

FACTS:

1. Petitioners maintain that Executive Order No. 284 which, in effect, allows members of
the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation
therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. It is alleged that Section 13, Article VII prohibits public respondents, as members of the
Cabinet, along with other public officials from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure.
3. Then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez, construing Section 13, Article VII in relation
to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered Opinion No. 73, declaring that Cabinet
members, their deputies and assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including
membership in the boards of government corporations:
a. when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of
Justice who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council; or
b. if allowed by law; or
c. if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions.
 Page 53 of 134

4. Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion No. 73 and
Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly "lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and
the general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which provides:
a. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
5. The Solicitor General stated that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ
Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently constitutional.
6. In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by
petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII
other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely:
a. The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section
3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and
b. the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

ISSUE: Whether the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as
Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made
for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB.

RULING:

1. NO. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and
the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is
to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
that purpose.
2. The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as
members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, became
prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority.
3. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to
abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes
of self-enrichment.
4. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent
with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the
overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
convened as it was after the people successfully unseated former President Marcos,
should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration which are
 Page 54 of 134

envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple
governmental offices and employment.
5. But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I-XB already
contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in
the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13,
Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
6. Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional
provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other
offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
7. It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or
employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is
the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure."
In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase
"in the Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is
therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.
8. Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or
employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and
members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter
prohibitions.
9. This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said
qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the
government during their tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII
admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the
distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking
officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one
hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below Assistant
 Page 55 of 134

Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the
government during their tenure.
10. In order that additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied
in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions
must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the
same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor. An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by
virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.
11. In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23,
1987 is unconstitutional.
12. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
 Page 56 of 134

(6) Estrada vs. GMA, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

TOPIC: Executive (Vacancy during the term- Death, permanent disability, removal from office,
or resignation of the President: vice President shall become the President.

DOCTRINE:

1. The Supreme Court declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be
doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacanang.
2. In the press release containing his final statement,
a. he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
b. he emphasized he was leaving the palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of
disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears);
c. he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
d. he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the
same service of the country; and
e. he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
3. The Court declared that the elements of a valid resignation are:
a. intent to resign; and
b. act of relinquishment.
4. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.)

FACTS:

1. This case involves petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada who alleges that he is the President
on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President.
2. During the May 1998 election, petitioner Estrada was elected President while respondent
Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner
was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity.
3. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a long time friend of the
petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage.
4. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment
signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-
judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained
evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the
 Page 57 of 134

streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their
support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant
secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.
5. On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a
press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order
to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he
signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise
the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the
Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker
Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day. After his fall from the
power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
6. Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term
of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Petitioner also filed a Quo
Warranto case, praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution.”

ISSUES:

1. Whether the cases at bar involve a political question.

2. Whether the petitioner resigned as President.
3. Whether the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
4. Whether the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
5. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity.

RULING:

1. First Issue
a. In the leading case Tanada v. Cuenco where the Court, through former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great
degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou
 Page 58 of 134

shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In
sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution
trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section
18 of Article VII which empowers the Court in limpid language to "x x x review,
in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
b. The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues
likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They
also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been
laid down that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is . . .”
c. The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People
Power II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which
overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it
cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and
the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the
Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented
political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

2. Second Issue

a. The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides:
i. "Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or
resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President
to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice
President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until
the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
b. The Court stated that, resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a
factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It
 Page 59 of 134

can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is

clear, it must be given legal effect.
c. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January
20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or
not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the
issue.
d. Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.
i. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not
be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the
presidency even at that time.
ii. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period
promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his
name.
iii. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a
given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after transition period.
iv. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the
press release containing his final statement,
1. he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of
the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality;
2. he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears;
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President;
4. he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the
president which he has given up; and
5. he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
e. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained
if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

3. Third Issue
a. The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11 of Article VII:
i. “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.”
 Page 60 of 134

b. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No.
l76 which states:
i. “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY
VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS
PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE
ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.”
c. The House of Representative passed House Resolution No. 178 which states:
i. “RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES”
d. On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the
existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such
vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on
May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr.'
e. Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent
Arroyo as President.
f. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of
inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and
the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

4. Fourth Issue
a. The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit. The Supreme Court rejected
petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first
be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events
that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed
Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus
Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before
he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that
when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.
b. The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
 Page 61 of 134

incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance
that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua
non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings.
c. Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.
The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as
any other trespasser.

5. Fifth Issue
a. Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial. Pervasive publicity is not per
se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of
appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove
that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the
case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented
during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
 Page 62 of 134

(7) Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668

Marcos v. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

DOCTRINE:

1. EXTENT OF THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

a. As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not
define what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches
on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the
power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the
budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].
b. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government
and whatever powers inherent in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that
the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants
the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of
law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
c. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power
is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. [Marcos vs. Manglapus,
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989]
2. RESIDUAL POWERS
a. The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of
the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
b. Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not
mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in
drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the
Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and
adhere to them.
 Page 63 of 134

c. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also
his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the
needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by
the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be
viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author
advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any
government and is best lodged in the President. [Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R.
No. 88211, September 15, 1989]

FACTS:

1. On October 1989, motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners raising the
following major arguments among others:
a. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country.
b. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.

ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.

RULING:

1. YES. The Supreme Court held that it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant
of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution.
2. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the
article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
3. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under
the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power.
 Page 64 of 134

(8) Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

Matibag v. Benipayo
GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002

TOPIC: Module 4 – The Three Branches of Government (Executive)

DOCTRINE:

1. The power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by

her in her sound judgment.
2. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on
Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume
office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments.
3. Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend an ad
interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because the
Constitution grants her that power.
4. The Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the President in the
exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on her part.

FACTS:

1. In the year 1999, Ma. Angelina Matibag was appointed as Acting Director IV of the
Comelec’s EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity.
2. In the year 2001, Alfredo Benipayo was appointed COMELEC Chairman together with
other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim
appointment, Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address
transferring Matibag to the Law Department.
3. Their appointments were renewed thrice by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(PGMA), the last one during the pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the
Commission of Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their appointments.
4. Matibag requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 7 stating that “transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the
election period.” Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration citing COMELEC
Resolution No. 3300 exempting COMELEC from the coverage of the said Memorandum
Circular.
5. Matibag appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.
She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against
Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment is violative of several laws.
6. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, Matibag filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
Matibag claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate
the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
 Page 65 of 134

ISSUES:

1. Whether ad interim appointments made by the President were prohibited under the
Constitution.
2. Whether ad interim appointments made by the President were temporary in character.

RULING:

1. NO. Ad interim appointments made by the President are not prohibited under the
Constitution.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this
provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim
appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission
on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume
office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments.

This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President to be

exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in
appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. First, while Congress is in session, the President may nominate the
prospective appointee, and pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the
nominee cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the
President may extend an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to
immediately qualify and assume office. Whether the President chooses to nominate the
prospective appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within the
prerogative of the President because the Constitution grants her that power. This Court
cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the President in the exercise of
her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the instant case.

2. NO, ad interim appointments made by the President are not temporary in character.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided

by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be
withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting
appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of
 Page 66 of 134

appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three
independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
 Page 67 of 134

(9) Pimentel vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005

Pimentel v. Ermita
G.R. No. 164978; October 13, 2005

TOPIC: Appointment by the President

DOCTRINE:

1. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
2. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited
to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office.

FACTS:

1. The Senate and the House of Representatives commenced their regular session on July
26, 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives
was constituted on August 24, 2004.
2. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of
their respective departments.
3. Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries.
4. On September 8, 2004, the petitioners to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued
by the president.

ISSUE: Is the appointment of President Arroyo to the respondents as acting secretaries without
consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session constitutional?

RULING:

1. YES. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a

stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego
of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
2. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her
alter ego should be.
3. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session.
Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the
office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person
 Page 68 of 134

of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the
permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting
appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
4. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17,
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that "the President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch." Thus, the President may even
appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.
5. WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed.
 Page 69 of 134

(10) Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 5, 2000

IBP v. Zamora

DOCTRINE

1. As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is

appropriate for court review. It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of
being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not
automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even
in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to
rule on are “political questions.” The reason is that political questions are concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being
assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers,
the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless
the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the
Constitution
2. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution
itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or
substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power
was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give
the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally
bereft of factual basis.
3. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three
powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it
may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. That the intent of
the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e.,that the power to call is fully
discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission

FACTS:

1. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
2. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are
merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the
situation shall have improved.
 Page 70 of 134

3. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null
and void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review
2. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the
civilian character of the PNP

RULING

1. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is
no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s
action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a
different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification.
a. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the
power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
b. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power
to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out
the armed forces.
2. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian
task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
a. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since
 Page 71 of 134

none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there
can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of
the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of
the PNP.
b. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence
to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed
forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse
was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to
violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the
performance of this Court’s duty of “purposeful hesitation” before declaring an
act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President’s judgment.
To doubt is to sustain.
 Page 72 of 134

(11) People vs. Patriarca, G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000

People of the Philippines v. Jose Patriarca, Jr.

G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000

TOPIC: Amnesty

DOCTRINE:

1. "Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
2. while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress,
is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one
after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may
be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
3. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of
which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no
case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by
the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code).
4. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released
by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense."

FACTS:

1. Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo before
RTC Sorsogon docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged with murder
for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. The RTC found him guilty
in Criminal Case No. 2773 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. Patriarca appealed the decision to the Supreme Court assigning this error:
a. The trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder, an
offense committed in pursuance or in furtherance of rebellion.
3. Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending
Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels,
Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against
Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations
of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission."
4. 'After a careful verification and evaluation on the claims of the applicant, the Local
Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political
beliefs. It thus recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty.
5. 'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to
approve the recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board.
 Page 73 of 134

6. 'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA under
Proclamation No. 724 is hereby GRANTED for rebellion constituted by the acts detailed
above, provided they were committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June
1988. Let a Certificate of Amnesty be issued in his favor as soon as this Resolution
becomes final. It shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from
receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission
by any party within said period.'
7. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter to the National Amnesty Commission,
requested information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by any
party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC.
8. In his reply, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there has been no
motion for reconsideration filed by any party.
9. Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No.
724 dated May 17, 1996.

ISSUE: The effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant.

RULING:

1. Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:

a. "Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who
shall apply therefor and who have or may have committed crimes, on or before
June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political beliefs, whether punishable under the
Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited to the following:
rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees;
inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition;
inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect
assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such
person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of
publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to,
or in connection with the crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of
Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68
(failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of
War; Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other
crimes for personal ends."
2. Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
 Page 74 of 134

3. Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.
4. This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N.
Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the
appeal.
 Page 75 of 134

(12) Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

TOPIC: Executive Privilege

DOCTRINE:

1. The bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters
relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

FACTS:

1. The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract

with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People's Republic of China.
2. In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate.
At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of
three (3) pending bills in the Senate.
3. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain
personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner, Romulo L.
Neri was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on three separate
hearings however he attended only the one hearing, claiming he was "out of town" during
the other dates.
4. In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several
high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially
approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA
acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be financed through
a loan from the Chinese Government.
5. On September 26, 2007, petitioner Neri testified before the respondents Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate Committee on
Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security for
eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the
NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner Neri refused to answer,
invoking "executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer the questions on
a. whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
 Page 76 of 134

b. whether or not she directed him to prioritize it and

c. whether or not she directed him to approve.
6. Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner
Neri, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. In the Letter dated
November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent
Committees to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
7. On November 20, 2007, petitioner Neri did not appear before respondent Committees.
Thus, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring Neri to explain why he should not
be cited in contempt. Neri then replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was
not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining
questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. In addition, Neri
submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among
others that:
a. his non-appearance was upon the order of the President; and
b. his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national
security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal
involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign
investors and lenders in the Philippines.
8. Respondent Committees found Neri's explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to
his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the
order citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony.
9. Neri moved for the reconsideration of the Order. In view of respondent Committees'
issuance of the contempt Order, Neri filed a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With
Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to restrain the
implementation of the said contempt Order. The Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order
a. enjoining respondent Committees from implementing their contempt Order,
b. requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the issuance of
the assailed order, and
c. requiring respondent Committees to file their comment.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by
executive privilege.
a. Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b. Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c. Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told
about the alleged bribe?

RULING:

1. Yes, the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by
executive privilege.
 Page 77 of 134

2. The Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of
presidential communications privilege, to wit:
a. The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power."
b. The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the President.
c. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may
be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought
"likely contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
3. Using the elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e.
the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the
"operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
4. The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica, where it was held that
presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can
be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to
conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political
branches of the government "in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each
Branch." Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent
Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3)
questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise
of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21
of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the "the oversight function of Congress
may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit
of legislation." It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in aid
of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this
regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is
conducted.
 Page 78 of 134

(13) Clinton vs. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)

CLINTON v. JONES
520 U.S. 681 (1997)

DOCTRINE:

1. The principal rationale for affording certain public servants’ (i.e. The President)
immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to
unofficial conduct.

FACTS:

1. Respondent sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and Arkansas law to recover
damages from petitioner, the current President of the United States, alleging, inter alia,
that while he was Governor of Arkansas, petitioner made "abhorrent" sexual advances to
her, and that her rejection of those advances led to punishment by her supervisors in the
state job she held at the time.
2. Petitioner promptly advised the Federal District Court that he would file a motion to
dismiss on Presidential immunity grounds, and requested that all other pleadings and
motions be deferred until the immunity issue was resolved. After the court granted that
request, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice and to toll any applicable
statutes of limitation during his Presidency.
3. The District Judge denied dismissal on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery could
go forward, but ordered any trial stayed until petitioner's Presidency ended. The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial, but reversed the trial postponement as the
"functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity to which petitioner was not
constitutionally entitled.
4. The court explained that the President, like other officials, is subject to the same laws that
apply to all citizens, that no case had been found in which an official was granted
immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, and that the rationale for official immunity is
inapposite where only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue. The court also
rejected the argument that, unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference
with the Executive Branch would violate separation of powers.

ISSUE: Whether the President is immune from civil damages litigation arising out of events that
occurred before he took office

RULING:

1. No, the President is not immune from civil damages litigation arising out of events that
occurred before he took office.
2. Petitioner's principal submission--that “in all but the most exceptional cases”, the
Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation
arising out of events that occurred before he took office--cannot be sustained on the basis
of precedent
 Page 79 of 134

3. The principal rationale for affording Presidents immunity from damages actions based on
their official acts to enable them to perform their designated functions effectively without
fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability. This reasoning provides
no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. Moreover, immunities for acts clearly
within official capacity are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed it.
4. The separation of powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private
actions against the President until he leaves office. Even accepting the unique importance
of the Presidency in the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that the doctrine of
separation of powers would be violated by allowing this action to proceed. The doctrine
provides a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
of the three co equal branches of Government at the expense of another.
5. But in this case, there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to
perform any function that might in some way be described as "executive." Respondent is
merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and
controversies, and, whatever the outcome, there is no possibility that the decision here
will curtail the scope of the Executive Branch's official powers.
6. The Court rejects petitioner's contention that this case--as well as the potential additional
litigation that an affirmance of the Eighth Circuit's judgment might spawn--may place
unacceptable burdens on the President that will hamper the performance of his official
duties. That assertion finds little support either in history, as evidenced by the paucity of
suits against sitting Presidents for their private actions, or in the relatively narrow
compass of the issues raised in this particular case.
7. Of greater significance, it is settled that the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive
Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct, and may direct
appropriate process to the President himself. It must follow that the federal courts have
power to determine the legality of the President's unofficial conduct. The reasons for
rejecting a categorical rule requiring federal courts to stay private actions during the
President's term apply as well to a rule that would, in petitioner's words, require a stay "in
all but the most exceptional cases."
 Page 80 of 134

(14) Velicaria-Garafil vs. Office of the President, 758 SCRA 414 (2015)

Velicaria – Garafil v. Office of the President

758 SCRA 414 (2015)

TOPIC: Executive Department; Section 15, Article VII; SECTION 15

DOCTRINE:

1. The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be
understood as both complete and effective) appointment:
a. authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; The President's
exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and
laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of appointment.
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power
necessarily exercises a discretion.
b. Transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; It is not
enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence
that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen
that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months
before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his
term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act
that signifies the President's intent of its issuance.
c. A vacant position at the time of appointment; and
d. receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

FACTS:

1. Four consolidated petitions question the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2 (EO
2) for being inconsistent with Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Prior to the conduct of elections, then President issued more than 800 appointments to
various positions in several government offices.
3. The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
reads:
a. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
4. Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight
appointments only "temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety." None of the
petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.
5. To summarize, the pertinent appointments of the four petitions, dates for each petitioner
are as follows:
G.R. No. Date of Date of Date of Date of Assumption
 Page 81 of 134

Appointment Transmittal Receipt Oath of of Office

Letter Letter by MRO Office
203372 5 March 2010 8 March 2010 13 May 22 6 April 2010
(Atty. 2010 March
Velicaria- 2010
Garafil)
206290 23 February 9 March 2010 12 March 15 15 March
(Atty. 2010 2010 March 2010
Venturanza) 2010
209138 3 March 2010 4 May 13 April
(Villanueva) 2010 2010
209138 5 March 2010 13 May 18
(Rosquita) 2010 March
2010
212030 1 March 2010 25
(Atty. March
Tamondong) 2010
and
6 July
2010

6. President Aquino III took his oath of office as President of the Philippines and issued EO
2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Arroyo which
violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitutional hence EO 2 voiding such appointments is constitutional

RULING:

1. YES. All of petitioners' appointments are midnight appointments and are void for
violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional.
2. This ponencia and the dissent both agree that the facts in all these cases show that "none
of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal letters) have
been issued (and released) before the ban." The dates of receipt by the MRO, which in
these cases are the only reliable evidence of actual transmittal of the appointment papers
by President Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during the appointment ban.
Thus, this ponencia and the dissent both agree that all the appointments in these cases are
midnight appointments in violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a process that
takes several steps to complete. Any valid appointment, including one made under the
exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of
the President signing an appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the official
transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the
appointment paper by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office.
 Page 82 of 134

4. The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need to
differentiate the exercise of the President's appointing power outside, just before, or
during the appointment ban. The Constitution allows the President to exercise the power
of appointment during the period not covered by the appointment ban, and disallows
(subject to an exception) the President from exercising the power of appointment during
the period covered by the appointment ban. The concurrence of all steps in the
appointment process is admittedly required for appointments outside the appointment
ban. There is no justification whatsoever to remove acceptance as a requirement in the
appointment process for appointments just before the start of the appointment ban, or
during the appointment ban in appointments falling within the exception. The existence
of the appointment ban makes no difference in the power of the President to appoint; it is
still the same power to appoint. In fact, considering the purpose of the appointment ban,
the concurrence of all steps in the appointment process must be strictly applied on
appointments made just before or during the appointment ban.
 Page 83 of 134

(15) Boac vs. Cadapan G.R. No. 184461-62 May 31, 2011

LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO AND LT. FRANCIS
MIRABELLE SAMSON v. ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEÑO
G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEÑO v. GEN. HERMOGENES

ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO,
(RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE
ANOTADO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 184495 – THIS IS THE CASE RELATED TO EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEÑO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-

ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.)
GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO
BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, DONALD CAIGAS, A.K.A. ALAN OR ALVIN,
ARNEL ENRIQUEZ AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON
G.R. No. 187109

TOPIC: Presidential immunity from suit.

DOCTRINE:

1. In Boac v. Cadapan (G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31, 2011), the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for writ of Amparo filed
against then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo owing to her Presidential Immunity
from suit.
2. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law.
3. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government.

FACTS:

1. Armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeño (Karen) and Manuel
Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded
onto a jeep that sped towards an undisclosed location.
 Page 84 of 134

2. Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their respective
families scoured nearby police precincts and military camps in the hope of finding them
but the same yielded nothing.
3. Spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed a petition for habeas
corpus before the Court, impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan
(Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis
Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution, the Court issued a writ
of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.
4. By Return of the Writ, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the Return were attached
affidavits from the respondents, except Enriquez, who all attested that they do not know
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; that they had inquired from their subordinates about the
reported abduction and disappearance of the three but their inquiry yielded nothing; and
that the military does not own nor possess a stainless steel jeep.
5. Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court.
6. Witnesses were presented to describe the appearances of the abducted individuals by the
armed men.
7. Lt. Col. Boac, the then commander of Task Force Malolos, a special operations team
tasked to neutralize the intelligence network of communists and other armed groups,
declared that he conducted an inquiry on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino but
his subordinates denied knowledge thereof.
8. While he denied having received any order from Gen. Palparan to investigate the
disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, his assistance in locating the missing
persons was sought by the mayor of Hagonoy.
9. Lt. Mirabelle testified that she did not receive any report on the abduction of Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino nor any order to investigate the matter. And she denied knowing
anything about the abduction of Ramirez nor who were Ka Tanya or Ka Lisa.
10. Gen. Palparan testified that during a debate in a televised program, he mentioned the
names of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya as the ones involved in revolutionary tax activities; and
that he ordered Lt. Col. Boac to conduct an investigation on the disappearance of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. When pressed to elaborate, he stated: "I said that I got the
report that it stated that it was Ka Tanya and Ka Lisa that, I mean, that incident happened
in Hagonoy, Bulacan was the abduction of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya, Your Honor, and
another one. That was the report coming from the people in the area."
11. Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition in this wise:
a. As Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino are indeed missing, the
present petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy since the main
office or function of the habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one’s
detention which presupposes that respondents have actual custody of the persons
subject of the petition. The reason therefor is that the courts have limited powers,
means and resources to conduct an investigation. x x x.
b. It being the situation, the proper remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but
criminal proceedings by initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a
crime punishable by law.
c. WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED, there being
no strong evidence that the missing persons are in the custody of the respondents.
 Page 85 of 134

d. The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on
Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National
Police for separate investigations and appropriate actions as may be warranted by
their findings and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on the outcome
of their investigations and the actions taken thereon.
12. Respondents moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision. They also
moved to present newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion
Paulino, Sherlyn’s mother-in-law who was allegedly threatened by soldiers; and
Raymond Manalo who allegedly met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the course of his
detention at a military camp.
13. During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo. The
petition impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the
addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the
Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil. National Police (PNP)
Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado)
and Donald Caigas.
14. Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her
immunity from suit while in office.
15. In G.R. No. 184495, petitioners (ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E.
EMPEÑO) posit as follows:
a. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that this was not the command coming
from the highest echelon of powers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Philippine Army and the Seventh Infantry Division of the Philippine Army to
enforcibly disappear [sic] the aggrieved parties.
b. The Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as
party respondent in this case;
c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo had command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and
continued detention of the three aggrieved parties; and
d. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Armed Forces Chief of Staff
then Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff as having command
responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three
aggrieved parties.

ISSUE:

1. PRIMARY ISSUE: Whether President Arroyo is immune from suit during her tenure as
President of the Philippines;
2. SECONDARY ISSUE: Whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the
Philippine Army, as well as the heads of the concerned units had command responsibility
over the abduction and detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

RULING:
 Page 86 of 134

1. YES. Preliminarily, the Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the petitions against
then President Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas
corpus and amparo petitions were filed.
a. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law.
b. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if
he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
c. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions.
d. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive
branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many
great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government.
e. Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President
Arroyo permitted, condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three
missing persons.

2. FOR ADDITIONAL READING:

a. On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of
his subordinates in an amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of
command responsibility and its application insofar as amparo cases already
decided by the Court is in order.
b. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
"command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form
of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a
superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby
the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for
failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
c. An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal
liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or
administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified
courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to
life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.
d. [An amparo proceeding] does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
 Page 87 of 134

disappearance…for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the

disappearance.
e. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against
the responsible parties in the proper courts.
f. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should
be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance
and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.
g. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary
goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his liberty and security are restored. (emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
h. Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to
identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively
implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application,
the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the
superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the
aggrieved party.
i. Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a
preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to
further investigation by the appropriate government agency.
j. Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 9851 (RA 9851) to
include command responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimes
against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes. RA 9851 is
thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those
superiors who, despite their position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts
or to submit these matters to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.
k. The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name
the respondents that it found to be responsible for the abduction and continued
detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records, it appears that the
responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen.
Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus be
made to comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
l. The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed
for lack of merit as there is no showing that they were even remotely accountable
and responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino.
Page 88 of 134
 Page 89 of 134

ART. VIII – JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

(1) Casar vs. Soluren, 684 SCRA 293 (2012)

Cesar v. Soluren
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2333, (684 SCRA 293) October 22, 2012
(Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 11-3721-RTJ)

TOPIC: JUDICIARY

DOCTRINE:

1. This Court has consistently enjoined judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct
but even the mere appearance of impropriety because the appearance of bias or prejudice
can be damaging as actual bias or prejudice to the public’s confidence on the Judiciary’s
role in the administration of justice.

FACTS:

1. Complainants, who were the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors charged Judge Soluren
with Gross Misconduct. They averred that on June 20 and 22, 2011 and July 19, 2011,
Judge Soluren went to the Aurora Provincial Jail and conferred with the inmates
including those who had pending cases before her sala. This was in contravention of
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 03-2010, dated January 12, 2010,
which suspended the conduct of jail visitation and inspection by Executive Judges and
Presiding Judges pending results of the re-examination of the provisions of A.M. No. 07-
3-02-SC.
2. According to complainants, the purpose of Judge Soluren’s visit was to persuade the
prisoners into signing a letter addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, calling
for the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against her by Atty. Juliet M.
Isidro-Reyes, District Public Attorney, Baler, Aurora, and for the removal of Judge
Evelyn Atienza-Turla as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 6, Baler, Aurora.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Soluren can be held liable for Simple Misconduct

RULING:

1. YES. Judge Soluren opened herself to charges of impropriety when she went to the
Aurora Provincial Jail to solicit the sympathies and signatures of the prisoners, especially
those who had pending cases in her sala.
2. The Court has consistently enjoined judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct
but even the mere appearance of impropriety because the appearance of bias or prejudice
can be damaging as actual bias or prejudice to the public’s confidence on the Judiciary’s
role in the administration of justice. To say the least, using detention prisoners who had
cases before Judge Soluren cannot be countenanced.
Page 90 of 134
 Page 91 of 134

(2) Madriaga vs. CBC, 677 SCRA 560 (2012)

Madriaga v. China Banking Corporation

677 SCRA 560 (2012)

TOPIC: Judicial Department; Judicial Power; (Art. VIII, Sec 1.) Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

DOCTRINE:

1. Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. Where
there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render
any ruling or make any pronouncement.

FACTS:

1. Spouses Trajano were the original registered owners of the properties in dispute. They
agreed to sell the properties to the petitioner’s father, Madriaga, Sr. payable on
installment basis. Upon completion of payment, Sps. Trajano executed in Madriaga, Sr.’s
favor a Deed of Absolute Sale. Spouses Trajano, however, failed to deliver the lot titles,
so Madriaga, Sr. sued for specific performance. The parties later entered into a
compromise agreement.
2. Spouses Trajano, however, failed to comply with their obligation under the compromise
judgment. RTC issued a writ of execution several properties of Spouses Trajano were
levied upon, including the disputed properties, in favor of Madriaga, Sr. After the lapse of
the one-year redemption period, he was issued a final deed of sale.
3. Spouses Trajano obtained a loan from China secured by a mortgage, which is the
property in dispute. They defaulted on their loan. China Bank filed an ex parte petition
for writ of possession impleading Sps. Trajano, served upon Madriaga Sr. Madriaga, Sr.
filed an opposition to the writ wherein he asserted that he was the true owner of the
properties, having obtained them at an earlier execution sale, and that his titles were
subsisting.
4. Madriaga filed a "Motion to Quash/Abate the Writ of Possession," 1 which was denied by
the RTC ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the parties’ contending claims of
ownership which was already pending before RTC Branch 12 of Malolos. The RTC also
noted that the petitioner’s motion had been mooted by the satisfaction of the writ per the
Sheriff’s return.
5. Petitioner insisted that he was deprived of due process because he was not served with
notice of China Bank’s ex parte petition for writ of possession, and that he came to know
of its separate titles only when he was served the writ of possession.
6. CA ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Madriaga,
Sr.’s motion to quash or abate the ex parte writ of possession for the reason that the
motion had already been rendered moot and academic after the writ was satisfied
 Page 92 of 134

ISSUE: Whether there exist no more live subject of controversy

RULING:

1. Yes. The case has been rendered moot and academic by the full
implementation/satisfaction of the writ of possession.
2. The trial court took note of the Sheriff’s return stating that the writ of possession it issued
to China Bank had been satisfied after the petitioner had been successfully removed from
the subject premises, prompting the court to declare that the petitioner’s Motion to
Quash/Abate the Writ of Possession has been rendered moot and academic.
3. Indeed, with the writ of possession having been served and satisfied, the said motions had
ceased to present a justiciable controversy, and a declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value.
4. Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. Where
there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render
any ruling or make any pronouncement. Courts generally decline jurisdiction on the
ground of mootness – save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised
requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the
public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review, which are
not extant in this case.
 Page 93 of 134

(3) People vs. Gutierrez, 39 SCRA 173

PEOPLE v. HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur
G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970

DOCTRINE:

1. The Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon
it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the
trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to
another Court of First Instance within the same district whenever the interest of justice
and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by
the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and
impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice; and
2. The general rule is that criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where the essential
ingredients occurred. However, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality
where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery
of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been
established. Since the rigorous application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section
14 (a), would result here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of
the case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice demand that the general rule
relied upon by accused respondents should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there
are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest
injustice — "summum jus, summa in juria."

FACTS:

1. On June 10, 1970, two information (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with homicide and
48-V for arson) charging 17 private respondents, together with 82 other unidentified
persons for, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to be burned several
residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied" and belonging to certain
persons in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur.
2. On June 15, the Secretary of Justice issued AO 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of
the Circuit Criminal Court (CCC) of the Second Judicial District, with official station at
San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur. The Secretary further
issued AO 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V
and 48-V to the CCC, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to RA 5179, as implemented
by AO 258 and 274" of the DOJ.
3. The prosecution then moved for the transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the CCC pursuant
to the AOs and calling the attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the
instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San
Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety
considering that one of the private respondent (Vincent Crisology) is the son of the
 Page 94 of 134

Congressman of Ilocos Sur. Judge Gutierrez declined the transfer on the ground that AO
258 only provided for transfer of cases to the CCC where the interest of justice required it
for the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had
already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain
a change of venue from the SC under Section 4 of RA 5179 the same should have been
done right at the very inception of these cases.
4. The CCC then resorted to the SC for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of
discretion and praying this Court to set aside the order of denial of the transfer and to
compel the respondent Court of First Instance to remand the cases to the CCC of the
Second Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-V)
at either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.

ISSUES:

1. Whether RA 5179 creating the CCC authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto
specified and individual cases;
2. Whether the SC possesses power and jurisdiction to decree the transfer of trial and
disposition of a case pending in a CFI to another CFI; and
3. Whether there is sufficient reasons for the transfer of the hearing to the CCC of the
Second Judicial District, in the interest of justice.

RULING:

1. NO. The SC agree with respondents that the RA 5179 do not confer upon the Secretary of
Justice power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such power, even
in the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the time-
honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not directly depriving
the courts of their independence, it would endanger the rights and immunities of the
accused or civil party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means of
predetermining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony
with the Administration's preferences.

The creation by RA 5179 of the CCC for the purpose of alleviating the burden of
the regular CFI, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed
therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases
to the circuit courts. Neither do AO Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any such intention;
particularly since AO No. 258, as confirmed by AO No. 274, provides that the transfer to
CCC of cases pending in the regular CFI should be effected by raffle, chance here
operating to nullify any executive arbitration of what particular cases should be
apportioned to either tribunal. The very terms of AO 226, issued by Secretary of Justice
Makasiar, relied upon by the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing Judges
Arciaga and Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V and 47-V to the CCC of the
Second Judicial District, reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety
of imperatively directing transfer of specified cases. Respondent Judge Gutierrez,
therefore in construing AO No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the
limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the EO heretofore mentioned.
 Page 95 of 134

2. YES. The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial
power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an
effective administration of justice. The courts "can by appropriate means do all things
necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an
effective institution of government" (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322).

One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the
trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the
imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice,
so demands.

3. YES. Although the SC agree with the respondent judge that the Secretary of Justice does
not have the authority to transfer cases, it is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to
consider Department AO 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory, Judge Gutierrez
failed to act upon an impending miscarriage of justice in view of the refusal of the
prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt
their lives would be endangered (buttressed by the affidavits of the injured parties and
prosecution witnesses, reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify in cases 47-V
and 48-V and expressing their willingness to testify if the cases are heard outside of
Ilocos Sur, where they can be free from tension and terrorism.)

The fear expressed can not be considered fanciful and unfounded when the
informations filed in the CFI of Ilocos Sur show that of the 100 armed participants in the
burning of the houses at barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, 82 are still unidentified and at
large; that one of the accused, Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influential family in the
province, being concededly the son of the Congressman for the first district of Ilocos Sur
and of the lady Governor that the reluctant witnesses are themselves the complainants in
the criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be made to
silence them; that it is not shown that the Executive branch is able or willing to give these
witnesses full security during the trial and for a reasonable time thereafter, that even if
armed security escorts were to be provided, the same would be no guarantee against the
possibility of murderous assault against the affiant witnesses, as recent events have
proved; that Constabulary reports show that between 1 January and 31 May 1970 no less
than 78 murders have been reported committed in said province, of which number only
21 were solved; and, finally, that the promotion and confirmation of respondent Judge
Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Second
Judicial District, Branch III, was actively supported by Congressman and Governor
Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent Crisologo.

This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining witnesses,
who had on a previous occasion freely given evidence before the investigators in Manila,
renders manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside
 Page 96 of 134

of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of
truth and justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.
 Page 97 of 134

(4) In Re: Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, August 3, 1978

In Re: Atty. Marcial Edillon

A.C. No. 1928, August 3, 1978

FACTS:

1. Atty. Edilion, a practicing attorney refuses to pay membership dues to the IBP. The core
of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUES:

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel
him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the
Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate).
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule
requiring payment of a membership fee is void.
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of
his constitutional rights.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:

1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared
by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
 Page 98 of 134

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a

member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State.

2. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which
power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class,
such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation
of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration.

3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles
the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length,
as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. It is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and

reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion.

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board
of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment
ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to
regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional
or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court —
appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that
this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the
legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real
because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and
traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and
fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused
or prostituted. ..."
 Page 99 of 134

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it
explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...
(Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of
the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that

the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is
hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
 Page 100 of 134

(5) Maturan vs. Gutierrez-Torres, 681 SCRA 311 (2012)

Atty. Maturan v. Former MTC Judge Gutierrez-Torres

681 SCRA 311, A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1606-MTC, Sept. 19, 2012

TOPIC: Art. VIII - Judicial Department

DOCTRINES:

1. Section 15(1), Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires that all cases or matters filed
after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
(24) months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months (12) for all lower collegiate courts, and three (3) months
for all other lower courts. Thereby, the Constitution mandates all justices and judges to be
efficient and speedy in the disposition of the cases or matters pending in their courts.
2. A judge must exert every effort to timely rule upon a case submitted for decision. If she
thinks that she would need a period to decide a case or to resolve an issue longer than
what the Constitution prescribes, she may request an extension from the Court to avoid
administrative sanctions.

FACTS:

1. On Aug. 12, 2004, Atty. Arturo Maturan (Maturan), counsel for private complainant in
People v. Ventanilla, filed a complaint against then Mandaluyong MTC Judge Elizabeth
Guiterrez-Torres (Former Judge [FJ]Torres). Maturan charged FJ Torres with
unjustifiably delaying the rendition of the decision in his client’s criminal case. Maturan
stated that the criminal case remained pending and unresolved despite having been
submitted for decision since June 2002.
2. Court Record showed that:
a. April 10, 2002 – Last hearing day. Atty. Wong (defense counsel in People v.
Ventanilla) manifested in open court that he has no more documentary exhibit to
offer and accordingly rested his case. FJ Torres then ordered the parties to file
their respective Memorandum after which, the case was ordered submitted for
decision.
b. June 3, 2002 – Prosecution filed its Memorandum and defense counsel did not file
any.
c. December 9, 2002 – Prosecution filed a Motion to Decide case. FJ Torres simply
sat on the motion and did nothing.
d. July 10, 2003 – Prosecution filed a Second Motion to Decide case. FJ Torres
denied it.
e. Feb. 4, 2004 – Prosecution filed a Third Motion to Decide case.
f. Aug. 11, 2004 – Maturan reviewed the court records and discovered that FJ
Torres had not taken any action on the motion.
3. Maturan stated that FJ Torres’ failure to render the judgment within the 90-day period
from submission of the case for decision violated the Constitution and the Code of
Judicial Conduct (Canon 3, Rule 3.05) as well as constituted gross inefficiency. The
 Page 101 of 134

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed FJ Torres to submit her comment and
show cause why she should not be disciplined for her violation of her professional
responsibility as a lawyer.
4. On Sept. 24, 2004, FJ Torres requested the OCA to grant her a 20-day extension to
submit her comment. Despite her request being granted, she still failed to submit her
comment. FJ Torres sought four (4) more extensions to submit her comment which were
all granted. The SC likewise granted her request to photocopy relevant documents in
connection with the complaint against her. Despite her multiple extensions, she still failed
to submit her comment.
5. The OCA found FJ Torres not only guilty of insubordination and gross inefficiency, but
also grave and serious misconduct, having violated the Code of Judicial Conduct
(Cannon 3, Rule 3.05) and the Constitution (Sec. 15[1], Art. VIII).
6. Several administrative cases against FJ Torres for gross misconduct and inexcusable
inefficiency are still pending before the SC in connection with her failure to decide cases
or resolve pending incidents for excessively long periods of time. In similar lazy fashion,
FJ Torres ignored the orders of the SC directing her to comment on said complaints. She
has likewise been penalized with fines and suspensions. Unfortunately, FJ Torres has not
shown any sign of remorse, even as the administrative complaints against her piled up.
And worse, hundreds of criminal and civil cases submitted for decision and/or resolution
remained untouched and unresolved in her sala.
7. On Nov. 23, 2010, the SC finally dismissed FJ Torres from service with forfeiture of all
her retirement benefits except earned leave and vacation benefits, with benefits, with
prejudice to employment in any branch of the government or any of its instrumentalities
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
8. With numerous findings, the OCA recommended that FJ Torres be found guilty of
insubordination, gross inefficiency, and grace and serious misconduct.

ISSUE: Is FJ Torres liable for insubordination, gross inefficiency, and gross and serious
misconduct?

RULING:

1. Yes. A judge must exert every effort to timely rule upon a case submitted for decision. If
she thinks that she would need a period to decide a case or to resolve an issue longer than
what the Constitution prescribes, she may request an extension from the Court to avoid
administrative sanctions.
2. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires that all cases or matters filed
after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
(24) months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months (12) for all lower collegiate courts, and three (3) months
for all other lower courts. Thereby, the Constitution mandates all justices and judges to be
efficient and speedy in the disposition of the cases or matters pending in their courts.
3. To fix the time when a case is pending before a court is to be considered as submitted for
decision, the Court has issued Administrative Circular No. 28 dated July 3, 1989, whose
third paragraph provides:
 Page 102 of 134

a. A case is considered submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of
the parties at the termination of the trial. The ninety (90) day period for deciding
the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision without
memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be
considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon
the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript of
stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the period
for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not
the deciding judge in which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90)
days for the completion of the transcripts within which to decide the same.
4. The gross inefficiency of former Judge Gutierrez-Torres warranted the imposition of
administrative sanction against her. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious
charge punishable by either: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P 10,000.00
but not exceeding P 20,000.00. The SC adopted the OCA’s recommendation as to the
fine in the maximum of P 20,000.00, considering that she had already been dismissed
from the service due to a similar offense of unjustified delay in rendering decisions.
5. WHEREFORE, the Court finds former MTC Judge Gutierrez-Torres guilty of gross
inefficiency, and imposes on her a fine of P20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued
leave credits, if any. The Court orders Gutierrez-Torres to show cause in writing within
ten days from notice why she should not be suspended from membership in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for her act of insubordination towards the Court.
 Page 103 of 134

(6) Judge Caoibes vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 17, 2001

Judge Jose Caoibes, Jr. v. The Honorable Ombudsman and Judge Florentino Alumbres
G.R. No. 132177, July 19,2001

TOPIC: Judiciary

DOCTRINE:

1. The Constitution, particularly Article VIII, section 6, provides that the Supreme Court is
vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.
Ombudsman cannot determine for itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge , or
court employee involves an administrative matter.
2. No other branch of government may intrude into this power without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

FACTS:

1. Judge Alumbres is the judge of Branch 255 of the RTC of Las Pinas while Judge Caoibes
is the judge of Branch 253 of RTC of Las Pinas.
2. It all started when Judge Alumbres asked Judge Caoibes to return an office table which
he borrowed. However , the request was ignored by Judge Caoibes and so he reiterated
the request. But before he could finished talking, Judge Caoibes blurted “Tara taco ito
ah” and boxed Judge Alumbres at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw. He had the
incident blottered with the Las Pinas Police Station. He prayed that a criminal case be
filed before the Sandiganbayan.
3. Judge Alumbres filed another complaint , an administrative case with the Supreme Court
on the ground of grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a judicial officer based on
the same facts filed with the office of the Ombudsman.
4. The Ombudsman required Caoibes to file his counter affidavit, but instead of filing, he
file a motion for referral of the case to the Supreme Court , through the office of the
Court Administratorwho is already conducting an investigation on the matter. He
contended that the Supreme Court has the authority to make preliminary determination of
the respective culpability of petitioner and that both of them are members of the bench,
are under the exclusive supervision and control of the Court.
5. The Ombudsman deny the motion for referral and so, Judge Caoibes filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also later denied.
6. Hence, Judge Caoibes filed a petition for Certiorari seeking reversal of the assailed order
and issuance of the writ of injunction or temporary restraining order directing the
Ombudsman to refrain from taking any further action in implementing the challenged
orders.

ISSUE: Whether the office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case?

RULING:
 Page 104 of 134

1. YES, the office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case. Under Article VIII,
Section 6 of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which has exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel.
2. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge
or court employee, involves an administrative matter.
3. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed
before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative
aspect is involved therein.
4. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case is based on the act
subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court.
5. For aside from the fact that Ombudsman would not know of this matter, unless he is
informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative
authority of the Court because in determining whether an administrative matter is
involved therein, the Court passes upon not only administrative liability but also other
administrative concerns as clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs Vasquez.
6. The Constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s
compliance with all laws, and take proper action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
 Page 105 of 134

(7) Re: Derogatory News Item Charging Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio
Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen, AM No. 00-7-09
CA, March 27, 2001

IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF APPEALS

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE ON
BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN:
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA
A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA, March 27, 2001

TOPIC: JUDICIARY

DOCTRINE:

1. Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness,
prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair and impartial. They
should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their
influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost
prudence and discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of preserving the independence,
impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
2. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency."1 The slightest form of interference cannot be countenanced.
Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the regular course of a legal or
judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the parties therein, public confidence
in the judicial system is diminished, if not totally eroded.

FACTS:

1. The national dailies, The Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine
Daily Inquirer and Today on its July 21, 2000 issues collectively reported that Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected
Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to
play in a Manila casino.
2. On the same day Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., issued a Memorandum to Justice
Demetria directing him to comment on the derogatory allegations in the news items.
Justice Demetria submitted his Compliance.
3. Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having interceded for Yu
Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed visited the DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went
there to "visit old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not know until
that time was purely accidental. Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP
Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng Kok about the case" without ever
specifying the kind of "help" that he requested. He averred that it was purely on the basis
of erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP Formaran III that he impliedly
asked him to withdraw the motion "because that is what Mr. Go Teng Kok was appealing
 Page 106 of 134

and requesting." Respondent claimed that the "help" he was requesting could well be
"within legal bounds or line of duty."
4. Investigating Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino found respondent Justice Demetria
"guilty of violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct" and recommended
that "appropriate disciplinary action be taken against him by this Honorable Court."

ISSUE: Whether Justice Demetria violated the code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:

1. Yes, while Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the criminal case, his
denial cannot stand against the positive assertions of CSP Zuño and SP Formaran III,
which are consistent with natural human experience. To accept the testimony of the
defense witnesses that it was Atty. Paas who telephoned CSP Zuño, and not Justice
Demetria, and that the "help" the respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran III was
something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than the withdrawal of the motion
is to strain too far one's imagination.
2. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy of responsibility. His at all times
must be characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion. His must be free of
even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial
duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual.
3. Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed to live up to this expectation.
Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high
office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of
his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and
interfering with her prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.
4. Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High
ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith
of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved.41
There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting
standards of judicial conduct and integrity.
 Page 107 of 134

(8) Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 5 U.S. 137 (1883)

Marbury v. Madison
1 Cranch 5 U.S. 137 (1883)

DOCTRINE:

1. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution prescribed that the "judicial power of the United
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior Courts" as Congress saw
fit to establish. It made no provision for the composition or procedures of any of the
courts, leaving this to Congress to decide.
2. The Judiciary Act (Section 13) The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States
authorizes the Supreme Court "to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the
principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the United States."

FACTS:

1. Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the presidential election of 1800. Before
Jefferson took office on March 4, Adams and Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801,
which created new district courts, expanded the number of circuit courts, added more
judges to each circuit, gave the President more control over appointing federal judges,
and reduced the number of Supreme Court Justices from 6 to 5.
2. This law essentially was an attempt by Adams and his political party to frustrate the
incoming opposition, since he used his new power to appoint 16 new circuit judges and
42 new justices of the peace, a group known as the "Midnight Judges."
3. The incoming appointees were approved by the Adams Senate, but their appointments
were not valid until each of their commissions was delivered by John Marshall in his
capacity as acting Secretary of State. One of the new appointees was William Marbury
who received the position of justice of the peace in the District of Columbia.
4. Marshall failed to deliver Marbury's commission before Adams left office and was
succeeded by Jefferson.
5. With the change in administration, Marshall also left his position as Secretary of State
and was succeeded by James Madison.
6. However, Jefferson ordered acting Secretary of State Levi Lincoln to cease delivering the
commissions, thus preventing the new appointees from taking their positions.
7. He assumed that they could be considered void, since they were not delivered on time.
8. The Jefferson Congress proceeded to replace the Judiciary Act of 1801 with a new
Judiciary Act of 1802 that essentially restored the initial Judiciary Act of 1789.
9. It also sought to delay the Supreme Court in hearing the inevitable challenge to the
constitutionality of Jefferson's maneuver by canceling its term in June 1802.
10. Marbury then filed a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court, asking it to order the
executive branch to deliver his commission.

ISSUE: Whether the Judiciary Act of 1789 that granted additional powers to the U.S SC should
be upheld
 Page 108 of 134

RULING:

1. NO, The Judiciary Act of 1789 was a United States federal statute adopted on September
24, 1789, in the first session of the First United States Congress.
2. It established the federal judiciary of the United States. Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution prescribed that the "judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and such inferior Courts" as Congress saw fit to establish.
3. It made no provision for the composition or procedures of any of the courts, leaving this
to Congress to decide.
4. The Judiciary Act (Section 13) The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States
authorizes the Supreme Court "to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the
principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the
authority of the United States."
5. The Court found that Madison’s refusal to deliver the commission was illegal but did not
order Madison to hand over Marbury’s commission via writ of mandamus.
6. Instead, the Court held that the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 enabling Marbury
to bring his claim to the Supreme Court was itself unconstitutional, since it purported to
extend the Court’s original jurisdiction beyond that which Article III, Section 2,
established.
7. Marshall expanded that a writ of mandamus was the proper way to seek a remedy but
concluded the Court could not issue it.
 Page 109 of 134

(9) Hebron vs. Garcia II, 685 SCRA 417 (2012)

Hebron v. Garcia II
685 SCRA 417 (2012)

TOPIC: Judiciary

DOCTRINE:

1. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who
may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be
bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary
power. The Courts interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of paramount concern.
2. A judge cannot be held administratively liable for the alleged wrongful rulings that he
made in the Civil Cases.
3. Errors attributed to judges pertaining to the exercise of their adjudicative functions should
be assailed in judicial proceedings instead of in an administrative case.

FACTS:

1. This case stems from the administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) by complainant Ernesto Hebron (Hebron), charging Judge Garcia)
with gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, abuse of authority and abuse of
discretion.
2. Hebron was the complainant in a Criminal Case case for falsification of public document
which he filed against Aladin Simundac (Simundac) relative to the latter's application for
free patent over a property situated in Carmona, Cavite.
3. When Simundac's motion to suspend proceedings was denied by the MTC where the
criminal case was pending, Simundac filed with RTC a petition for certiorari with prayer
for issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction
raffled to respondent Judge Garcia. Hebron filed a motion for Judge Garcia's inhibition,
citing his perceived bias and partiality who had earlier dismissed Civil Case also filed by
Hebron against Simundac.
4. Respondent Judge Garcia granted Simundac's application for preliminary injunction,
which led to the suspension of the proceedings in the Criminal Case.
5. Thereafter Hebron filed the administrative complaint with the OCA.
1. In his Comment, Judge Garcia said that the delay was not deliberately and maliciously
motivated as the Court is swamped with thousands of cases.
6. The OCAs held that Judge Garcia be found guilty of undue delay in rendering an order,
and accordingly be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
7. Before the Court could have acted upon the OCAs Report, Hebron filed with the OCA a
Letter withdrawing his complaint against Judge Garcia.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Garcia is guilty of undue delay in rendering an order?

 Page 110 of 134

RULING:
1. Hebron's withdrawal of his complaint against Judge Garcia does not necessarily warrant
its dismissal.
2. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who
may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be
bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary
power. The Courts interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of paramount concern.
3. Given this doctrine, the Court has resolved to allow the administrative case to proceed,
especially after taking due consideration of the nature of the offense.
4. The Court fully agrees with the OCAs report that Judge Garcia cannot be held
administratively liable for the alleged wrongful rulings that he made in the Civil Cases.
Errors attributed to judges pertaining to the exercise of their adjudicative functions should
be assailed in judicial proceedings instead of in an administrative case.
5. Even assuming arguendo that respondent Judge made an erroneous interpretation of the
law, the matter is judicial in nature. Well-entrenched is the rule that a party’s remedy, if
prejudiced by the orders of a judge given in the course of a trial, is the proper reviewing
court, and not with the OCA by means of an administrative complaint. As a matter of
policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. The
Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.
6. However, Judge Garcia's undue delay in resolving Hebron's motion for reconsideration is
a wrong of a different nature which warrants a different treatment.
7. Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "all cases or matters filed
after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the SC, and, unless reduced by the SC, twelve
months for all collegiate courts, and three months for all other courts."
8. In relation thereto, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 provides that "judges shall
observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the
Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their
courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from
date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a
period of three months to do so."
9. Judge Garcia failed to meet this three-month deadline. He explained his delay by saying
that "the Motion for Reconsideration was inadvertently not acted upon by the Court for
an unreasonable length of time," because it noticed its pendency only when it conducted
an inventory of its cases in July 2011.
10. Unfortunately for Judge Garcia, such poor excuse merits no weight for his exoneration
from the charge. For such error, even Judge Garcia has admitted that the delay in
resolving the motion to reconsider has dragged on for an "unreasonable length of time."
rνll He should have been prompted to take immediate action by the two motions to
resolve that were filed by Hebron, yet even these two motions remained unacted upon.
11. To the Court, the volume of Judge Garcia's pending cases did not justify the delay.
Judges must decide cases and resolve matters with dispatch because any delay in the
administration of justice deprives litigants of their right to a speedy disposition of their
 Page 111 of 134

case and undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary. Indeed, justice delayed is justice
denied.
The failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period of
ninety (90) days constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring judge. This is not only a blatant transgression of
the Constitution but also of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enshrines the significant
duty of magistrates to decide cases promptly.
12. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, delay in rendering a decision or order
is considered a less serious offense that is punishable by either (1) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or (2)
a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
13. The sheer volume of Judge Garcia’s work may, at most, only serve to mitigate the
penalty to be imposed upon him, as in the case of Angelia where the fine was reduced to
P5,000.00 given therein respondent judges 800 pending cases before his sala.
14. In the present case, we deem a fine of P2,000.00 sufficient, after considering Judge
Garcia's caseload of more than 3,700 pending cases. It is also our view that his delay in
resolving Hebron's motion for reconsideration was not prompted by bad faith or malice,
that even his complainant had later filed with the OCA a letter that sought the withdrawal
of the charges. Finally, the court noted of the OCAs observation that the delay committed
by Judge Garcia involves a single motion, and that this is his first administrative offense.
15. All told, the Court adopts the OCAs recommendation for the Court to hold Judge Garcia
guilty of undue delay in rendering an order, but the recommended fine of P5,000.00 is
reduced to P2,000.00, still with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
 Page 112 of 134

(10) Office of the Court Administrator vs. Balut, 758 SCRA 216 (2015)

Office of the Court Administration v. Judge Alexander Balut

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426 June 16, 2015

FACTS:

1. On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administration conducted a judicial audit and
judicial audit and physical inventory of cases at the MTCs of Bayombong and Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander Balut was the acting presiding judge in both courts.
Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs of
Bayombong and Solano as well as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.
2. In the MTC Bayombong, where Judith Salimpade was the Clerk of Court II, the audit
team found unremitted amounts of the Judiciary Development Fund collection, the Clerk
of Court General Fund collection, and the Fiduciary Fund. In sum, the shortages in the
various funds incurred as of August 2003 totaled to Php2,057,378.59. When asked about
the shortages, Salimpade explained that Judge Balut have been getting money from the
JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of Judge Balut out of fear of him. She
also admitted that she lent her co-employees money which she took from her collections.
3. In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court,
succeeded Eduardo Esconde without proper turnover of accountabilities. An amount of
Php 846,710.00 was unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos.Both denied that
the shortages incurred were of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as
the offender. Before the final report on the court’s shortages was completed, various
amounts totaling P802,299.82 were deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and Ramos in the
court’s LBP Account No. 3251-0544-51., as restitution/payment of part of the shortage of
P846,710.00.
4. The Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut to pay a fine for his failure to
decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly requesting for an extension.The Court,
howver, did not rule on the administrative liability of Judge Balut with respect to the
result of the financial audit for the reason that he was not given a chance to present his
side on the matter. The Court, in its October 9, 2007 resolution, directed Judge Balut to
comment on the audit report and upon the recommendation of the OCA, referred the
matter to the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter
the CA, recommended the dismissal of the charges against Judge Balut for failure to
substantiate and prove the participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the
courts. On his admission that he borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA opined
the Judge Balut could no longer be penalized as he was previously fine by the Court in its
previous resolution.

ISSUE: Whether the recommendation of CA is correct.

RULING:

1. The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.
 Page 113 of 134

2. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to
believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.
3. A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court
collections. The three clerks or court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC
Aritao-Sta. Fe categorically stated the Judge Balut borrowed money from the court funds
and executed certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge Balut had
been borrowing money from the various funds of the court collections. The court stresses
that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of Judicial Conduct. Because of the
sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of
honesty and integrity and to observe exacting standards of moralit, decency and
competence. He should adhere to the highest standards of public accountability lest his
action erode the public faith in the judiciary.
4. Judge Balut fell short of if the standard of borrowing money from the collections of the
court. He knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the
proper administration of court funds. He miserably failed to become a role model of his
staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and
decency, both in his official and personal conduct.
5. The act of misappropriating court funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct,
punishable by dismissal from the service even on the first offense. For said reason, the
respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This Court has never tolerated
and will never condone any conduct which violates the norms of public accountability,
and diminish, or even tend to diminish the faith of the people in the justice system.
 Page 114 of 134

(11) Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Judge Baluma, 704 SCRA 415 (2013)

Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Judge Baluma

704 SCRA 415 (2013)

TOPIC: Judiciary

DOCTRINE:

1. Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three
months within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution.
In SC Administrative Circular No. 3-99, it requires all judges to scrupulously observe the
periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to comply
therewith is considered a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to
speedy disposition of their cases.
2. Justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period
is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. At the same time, however, the Court is
also aware of the heavy case load of trial courts. The Court has allowed reasonable
extensions of time needed to decide cases, but such extensions must first be requested
from the Court. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding
cases beyond that authorized by law.

FACTS:

1. Judge Baluma, Branch 1 of Tagbiliran City, Bohol, availed himself of optional retirement
on July 22, 2011. According to the Certification of Clearance of Judge Baluma, there
were 23 cases (19 criminal cases and 4 civil cases) submitted for decision/resolution
which were left undecided by Judge Baluma. All 23 cases were already beyond the
reglementary period for deciding them.
2. The processing of Judge Baluma’s Application for Clearance has then been put on hold
pending clearance from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
3. Judge Baluma’s son averred that his father was suffering from depression and requested
for early release of the retirement pay and other benefits.
4. OCA recommended that the matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; that
Judge Baluma be fined P46,000; and considering that Judge Baluma is suffering from
depression, the equivalent value of his terminal leave be released pending resolution of
the administrative matter.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Baluma is guilty of undue delay in rendering decisions/resolutions.

RULING:

1. Yes. Court agrees with the findings of OCA on the basis that Article VIII, Section 15(1)
of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months within which to
decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon 3,
 Page 115 of 134

Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business
promptly and decide cases within the required period. In addition, this Court laid down
guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 which provides, inter alia, that "[j]udges
shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the
Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their
courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from
date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a
period of three months to do so." The Court has reiterated this admonition in SC
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the
periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to comply
therewith is considered a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to
speedy disposition of their cases.
2. The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every
judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in
the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and
confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.
Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes
gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting
judge.
3. At the same time, however, the Court is also aware of the heavy case load of trial courts.
The Court has allowed reasonable extensions of time needed to decide cases, but such
extensions must first be requested from the Court. A judge cannot by himself choose to
prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.
4. Under the new amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a
decision or order is a less serious charge, for which the respondent judge shall be
penalized with either (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than ₱10,000.00, but not
more than ₱20,000.00.
5. Nonetheless, the Court noted in Re: Cases Submitted for Decision Before Hon. Teresito
A. Andoy, Former Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Cainta, Rizal, that it has imposed
varying amounts of fines for the same offense depending on the circumstances of each
case.
6. In the present case, the Court takes into account the aforequoted survey of cases; together
with the number of cases Judge Baluma failed to decide within the reglementary period
(23 cases upon his retirement) and the lack of effort on his part to proffer an explanation
or express remorse for his offense; but considering as well that he is suffering from
depression and that he has no prior infraction, the Court finds that a fine of ₱20,000.00 is
adequate.
 Page 116 of 134

(12) People vs. Wahiman, 758 SCRA 366 (2015)

People v. Wahiman
G.R. No. 200942, June 16, 2015

TOPIC: The Supreme Court shall have the following powers to review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in “All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher”.

DOCTRINE: Since appellant is guilty of murder and was imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, he is not eligible for parole

FACTS:

1. Appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos (appellant) was charged with the crime of murder for
the death of Jose Buensuceso (Buensuceso).
2. During trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial confession of
appellant taken during the preliminary investigation of the case, admitting to the killing
of Buensuceso. However, when it was appellant’s turn to testify, he narrated that at the
time of the killing, he was at Landing Casisang, Malaybalay City attending the birthday
celebration of his brother-in-law.
3. The RTC rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder.
4. On appeal, which the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, appellant argued that when his
supposed extrajudicial confession was being taken, the lawyer who supposedly assisted
him, was not around. He arrived only when appellant was about to sign the extrajudicial
confession.

ISSUE: Whether the guilt of the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

1. Yes. it must be stressed that appellant’s conviction was not based solely on his
extrajudicial confession. The prosecution likewise presented the eyewitness.
2. Moreover, Atty. Dumlao testified that he ably provided legal assistance to appellant all
throughout the proceedings and carefully explained to him the ramifications of his
admission. He informed appellant of his rights and that anything he says may be used in
evidence against him. Notwithstanding, appellant insisted on giving his extrajudicial
confession.
3. WHEREFORE, the assailed October 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR H.C. No. 00830-MIN finding appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that
appellant is not eligible for parole; the award for lost earnings is reduced to
P9,878,100.00; the award of actual damages is deleted; in lieu thereof, appellant is
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000.00 as temperate damages; he is likewise
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00;
 Page 117 of 134

and all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of this resolution until full payment.
 Page 118 of 134

(13) Disini, Jr. vs. Sec. of Justice, 716 SCRA 237 (2014)

Disini v. The Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 203359

DOCTRINE:

1. The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized as a facet of the
right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right to
privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself deserving of
constitutional protection.
2. Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. It provides that any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued
by civilized men,” but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy” and “every has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.”
3. In an “as applied” challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional
right must assert his own right, not that of third persons, A petitioner may for instance
mount a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no
violation of his own right under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on the
grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. the exception is if a petitioner may for
instance mount a “facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims
no violation of his own right under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on
the grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.

FACTS:

1. The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
the constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Act
No. 10175.
2. The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the government’s platform in
combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21 separate sections of the Act violate their
constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression and access to
information.
3. In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a temporary restraining
order against the government to halt enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the
issues.
4. The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 for the
purpose of regulating access to and use of cyberspace. Several sections of the law define
relevant cyber crimes and enable the government to track down and penalize violators.
5. Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act
as unconstitutional.
 Page 119 of 134

6. Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic

communications, commonly known as spams, that seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale
of products and services unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or when the purpose
of the communication is for service or administrative announcements from the sender to
its existing users, or “when the following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial
electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to
reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same
source; (bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic communication
does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the message in order to
induce the recipients to read the message.”
7. The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications amount to both
nuisance and trespass because they tend to interfere with the enjoyment of using online
services and that they enter the recipient’s domain without prior permission.
8. The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails their civil liberties and set
the stage for abuse of discretion by the government. They also claimed that this
provision violates the right to privacy and protection from the government’s intrusion
into online communications.

ISSUE: WHETHER CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT

ARE CONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS THEY REGARD CERTAIN ACTS AS CRIMES
AND IMPOSE PENALTIES FOR THEIR COMMISSION.

RULING:

1. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access is NOT unconstitutional.

2. Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required
of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck
down.
3. The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional
construct, useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of
things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. Later, the strict
scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection.
4. Strict Scrutiny Standard not applicable in Illegal Access provision.
5. The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing
what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another
without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.
6. Engagement of ethical hackers requires an agreement, therefore, insulating him
from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
 Page 120 of 134

7. Petitioners fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals
who employ tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the
target systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target system’s security
and report back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for
how these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors
who come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records.
8. Besides, the client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between
them as to the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested.
This is referred to as the “get out of jail free card.” Since the ethical hacker does his job
with prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the
coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
9. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference is NOT unconstitutional.
10. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
11. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject
to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject
broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not
encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of
vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in
this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act
has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s
computer systems and private documents.
12. Petitioners fail to discharge the burden of proving that the provision is invalid
under the Overbreadth Doctrine.
13. All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in
terrorem effect or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who
are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from
legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state
powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. Here, the chilling effect
that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it
seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s
constitutional rights.
14. Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that
under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid. Petitioner has failed to
discharge this burden.
15. No Equal Protection violation under Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting
16. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection
clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to
suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody,
or any other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well-known
billionaire-philanthropist named “Julio Gandolfo,” the law would punish for cyber-
squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-
name and another who registers the name because it happens to be his real name.
Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law
should recognize the difference.
 Page 121 of 134

17. But there is no real difference whether he uses “Julio Gandolfo” which happens to be his
real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name
that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain
name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-
motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.
18. Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft is NOT unconstitutional
19. Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and
to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
20. The right to privacy
21. The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987
Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in
Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification
with liberty; it is in itself deserving of constitutional protection.
22. Zones of Privacy
23. Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form
of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary
legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued
by civilized men,” but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy” and “every has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.”
24. Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b)
the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. In assessing the challenge
that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so,
whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
25. No showing how the provision violates the right to privacy and correspondence as
well as the right to due process of the law.
26. The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship,
his residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his
spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or
use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners
simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft
violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of the
law.
27. Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not
hold water since the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms
like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions, the acquisition, use,
misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right
to acquire another’s personal data.
28. Section does not violate freedom of the press
 Page 122 of 134

29. Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that
journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in
the news to secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the
essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of
identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring
and disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a
form of theft.
30. The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through
the overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on
the part of the perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or
social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate
intent to gain which is required by this Section.
31. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex does NOT violate freedom of expression
32. Petitioners claim that the section violates freedom of expression. They express fear that
private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting
adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as
crimes when done “for favor” in cyberspace. In common usage, the term “favor” includes
“gracious kindness,” “a special privilege or right granted or conceded,” or “a token of
love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously.” This meaning given to the term “favor”
embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement
agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.
33. The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of
“engaging in a business” necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually
seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and
consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.
34. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography committed through a computer system is
NOT unconstitutional
35. The section merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
(ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the
government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child
pornography using a computer system.
36. The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in
cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a
legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty. The potential
for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in
the cyberspace is incalculable.
37. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications or SPAM is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating freedom of expression
38. The section penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also
known as “spam.” The term “spam” surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive
fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a
“spam.” The term referred to a Monty Python’s Flying Circus scene in which actors
would keep saying “Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam” when reading options from a menu.
39. The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited
commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network
 Page 123 of 134

capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and

technology, and interferes with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out
spams enters the recipient’s domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that
commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
40. But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads
reduce the “efficiency of computers.” Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of
computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never
been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is
that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with
spams. Their recipient always have the option to delete or not to read them.
41. Commercial speech still entitled to protection
42. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to
read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech
is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that
given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled
to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
43. Section 4(c)(4) on Cyber-Libel insofar as it penalizes the author of the libelous
statement or article is NOT unconstitutional
44. Petitioner lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions
of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when
the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as
a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the
accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on
his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
45. Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down
as unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring “actual malice” could
easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People even where the offended
parties happened to be public figures.
46. Elements of libel: (a) allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
(b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of
malice.
47. There is “actual malice” or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory
statement with knowledge that is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published.
Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.
48. Prosecution bears the burden of proving actual malice in instances where such
element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when
the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public
official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the
Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal
code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the
 Page 124 of 134

Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the
author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s
interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs.
49. Where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the
presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the
defamatory character of the assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show
that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
50. Cybercrime Prevention Act does not violate the Philippines’ obligations under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
51. General Comment 34 of ICCPR does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement
should constitute an all-encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes
truth as a defense but under the condition that the accused has been prompted in making
the statement by good motives and for justifiable ends.
52. Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not
be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against government employees
with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.
53. In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be
acquitted.
54. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting the Commission of Cybercrime should be permitted
to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception,
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section
4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-Squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on
Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)
(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex.
55. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any
person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerate as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on protected expression.
56. Aiding and abetting certain cybercrimes must be distinguished between the actors
57. In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed
statement; b) the blog service provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like
PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet café that may have provided the computer
used for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and
f)the person who posts a link to the blog site.
58. The question is: are online postings such as “Liking” an openly defamatory statement,
“Commenting” on it, or “Sharing” it with others, to be regarded as “aiding or abetting?”
In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster
that says, “Armand is a thief!,” he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing
the poster, writes on it, “I like this!,” that could not be libel since he did not author the
poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, “Correct!,” would that
be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the statement on the poster. He still
is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a
crime.
59. But suppose Nestor posts the blog, “Armand is a thief!” on a social networking site.
Would a reader and his Friends or Followers, availing themselves of the “Like,”
 Page 125 of 134

“Comment,” and “Share” reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel? And, in the
complex world of cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding
or abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?
60. Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like,
Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little
or haphazardly of their response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or
abetting? And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds of thousands of
responding “Friends” or “Followers” in the criminal charge to be filed in court, who will
make a choice as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?
61. Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” cyber-libel,
unsolicited commercial communications and child pornography is a nullity for
being UNCONSTITUTIONAL
62. Cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his
relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental
purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to
protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will
unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms.
63. If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments
await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues.
Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace
posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that
punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
64. When void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable
65. When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded
on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. Generally, the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrine is inapplicable in ‘facial” challenges to penal statutes not involving
free speech. In an “as applied” challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his
constitutional right must assert his own right, not that of third persons. This rule is also
known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
66. But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a “facial”
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own
right under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on the grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.
67. The rationale for this exception is to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his
speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself
from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law
thus chills him into silence.
68. Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises
apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the
freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the
actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out,
formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of
 Page 126 of 134

legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in
other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography,
cannot stand scrutiny.
69. Section 6, which imposes a higher penalty on crimes penalized under the Revised
Penal Code if committed through information and communication technologies, is
NOT unconstitutional.
70. Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction
between crimes committed through the use of information and communications
technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in
question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or
cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for
cybercrimes.
71. Section 7, which allows prosecution both under the Cybercrime Law and the
Revised Penal Code, is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as cyber-libel and cyber
child pornography is concerned.
72. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is
again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two
separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the
same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims
that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished
under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another
means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation
of the proscription against double jeopardy.
73. The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely
expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As
previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already covers the
use of “electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means.” Thus,
charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
74. Section 8 which imposes penalties for cybercrimes is NOT unconstitutional
75. The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative
prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it
regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear appropriate to the evil sought to be
punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly
wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of
another offense or might just have been connected with another crime. Judges and
magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise
their range as determined by the legislative department.
76. Section 12, authorizing law enforcement to collect real-time traffic data, is TOO
SWEEPING AND LACKS RESTRAINT
77. Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record
traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for
official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages come from, what
 Page 127 of 134

kind they are, and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or
recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual
to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into messages or information
that they send to one another.
78. The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a
law may require the disclosure of matters normally considered private but then only upon
showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose of the law, that there
is compelling State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly
drawn. In assessing regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance the
legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional guarantees.
79. Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there
is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. To do
this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor traffic
data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
80. Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is
part, aims to provide the law enforcement authorities with the power they need for
spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace. Crime-fighting is
a state business.
81. Those who commit the crimes of accessing a computer system without right, transmitting
viruses, lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration, and producing child pornography could easily evade detection and
prosecution by simply moving the physical location of their computers or laptops from
day to day. In this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually
anywhere: from internet cafes, from kindred places that provide free internet services,
and from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones under pre-
paid arrangements and with unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can
neither be located nor identified. There are many ways the cyber criminals can quickly
erase their tracks. Those who peddle child pornography could use relays of computers to
mislead law enforcement authorities regarding their places of operations. Evidently, it is
only real-time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-
issued search and seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting them out.
82. Two categories of right to privacy
83. In Whalen v. Roe, the United States Supreme Court classified privacy in two categories:
decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to
independence in making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers
to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right – the right to
informational privacy – that those who oppose government collection or recording of
traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
84. Informational privacy and its two aspects
85. Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. In determining
whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down a two-
fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or
legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test,
where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable.
 Page 128 of 134

86. Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact
87. Computer data – messages of all kinds – travel across the internet in packets and in a way
that may be likened to parcels of letters or things that are sent through the posts. When
data is sent from any one source, the content is broken up into packets and around each of
these packets is a wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic data: information
that tells computers where the packet originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS,
voice call, video, internet chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the
packet is going, and how the packet fits together with other packets. The difference is that
traffic data sent through the internet at times across the ocean do not disclose the actual
names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their
coded internet protocol (IP) addresses. The packets travel from one computer system to
another where their contents are pieced back together.
88. Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the
messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.
89. ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one another
over cyberspace except through some service providers to whom they must submit
certain traffic data that are needed for a successful cyberspace communication. The
conveyance of this data takes them out of the private sphere, making the expectation of
privacy in regard to them an expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as
reasonable.
90. “Due Cause” under Section 12 has no precedent in law or jurisprudence
91. Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, “with due cause,” to collect or record
by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time. But the cybercrime law, dealing
with a novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase “due cause.”
Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable
commission of a particular crime. It just says, “with due cause,” thus justifying a general
gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution
prohibits.
92. The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks
restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content
data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement
agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or
receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked
information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.
93. Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those “associated with
specified communications.” But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since,
evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target
communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to
engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified communication they want.
This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.
94. This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred
institutions to monitor individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that have
previously been impractical or even impossible. “All the forces of technological age x x x
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between
a democratic and totalitarian society.” The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take
 Page 129 of 134

advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure

respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.
95. Section 13 on preservation of computer data and Section 17 on destruction of
computer data do not constitute undue deprivation of right to property
96. The contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or
recipients and are to be considered private communications. The data that service
providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to
users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not
unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.
97. It is unclear that the user has demandable right to require the service provider to have that
copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them
preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or
received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.
98. Section 14 on disclosure of computer data does not violate privacy of
communications and correspondence
99. The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of subpoena.
Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory
powers. Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued
court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to
carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not
constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of
communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial
intervention.
100. Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data does not
supersede existing search and seizure rules
101. On its face, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement
authorities that would ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer
system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these
duties does not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken.
Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely
supplements them.
102. Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
103. Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware,
as well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to
go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that
computer data, produced or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal
property. Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures,
whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.
104. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure
in one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the
Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for
judicial search warrant.
 Page 130 of 134

105. The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case,
Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace.
Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional
bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize
content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to
be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him
judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.
106. Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three
tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and
present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be
found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6
into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It
does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.
107. Section 20, punishing non-compliance with any order issued by law
enforcement agencies under Chapter IV, is NOT unconstitutional
108. Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The
argument is that mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without
regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.
109. But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of P.D. 1829,
Section 20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein.
Thus, there must still be judicial determination of guilt, during which, defense and
justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it
applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck by the Court.
110. Sections 24 and 26, which provides the creation and powers of the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordination Center, are VALID
111. Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it
gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to
formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for
it to follow.
112. In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the
Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
113. Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to
formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of
the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided
a definition of cybersecurity.
114. Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of
the law to “prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection,
investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by
providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation.” This policy is
 Page 131 of 134

clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient
standard.
115. Summary of Decisions:
116. The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial speech, which does
not receive the same level of protection as other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression,” but is nonetheless entitled to protection.” It ruled that the prohibition on
transmitting unsolicited communications “would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.” Accordingly, the Court
declared Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional.
117. Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant “to
collect or record traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system.” Traffic data under this Section includes the
origin, destination, route, size, date, and duration of the communication, but not its
content nor the identity of users.
118. According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private
communications, it must survive the rational basis standard of whether it is narrowly
tailored towards serving a government’s compelling interest. The Court found that the
government did have a compelling interest in preventing cyber crimes by monitoring
real-time traffic data.
119. As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first recognized
that the right at stake concerned informational privacy, defined as “the right not to have
private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and
intrusion.” In determining whether a communication is entitled to the right of privacy,
the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the person claiming the right has a
legitimate expectation of privacy over the communication, and (2) whether his
expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable in the society.
120. The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of
privacy over their communications transmitted online. However, it did not find the
expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent through internet “does not
disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the
recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.”
121. Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not
enjoy the objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data may
reveal the personal information of its sender or recipient, against which the Section fails
to provide sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed the law as “virtually limitless,
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing
whatever specified communication they want.”
122. Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and
definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.
123. Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a
computer data found to be in violation of the Act. The Petitioners argued that this section
also violated the right to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
124. The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal property,
entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the Philippines’
Constitution requires the government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to
 Page 132 of 134

seize a personal property or to block a form of expression. Because Section 19

precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found it unconstitutional.
 Page 133 of 134

(14) Republic vs. Sereno G.R. No. 237428 May 11, 2018

Republic v. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018

TOPIC: Judiciary

DOCTRINE:

1. The Supreme Court has the constitutional mandate to exercise original jurisdiction over
quo warranto petitions.

FACTS:

1. The Supreme Court on May 11, 2018 granted the Petition for Quo Warranto against
Maria Lourdes Sereno. She was found disqualified from and adjudged guilty of
unlawfully holding and exercising the Office of the Chief Justice.
2. Sereno filed Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration. She alleged, among others, that
the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto.
Accordingly, she can only be removed exclusively by impeachment.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition filed against an
impeachable officer; and
2. Whether quo warranto is an improper remedy to remove Chief Justice Sereno.

RULING:

1. YES. The Supreme Court’s authority to decide a quo warranto action is expressly
conferred under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution which states that:

a. Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

i. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiotari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

b. This is not the first time the Court took cognizance of a quo warranto petition
against an impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of Estrada v.
Macapagal-Arroyo and Estrada v. Desierto, the Court assumed jurisdiction over a
quo warranto petition that challenged Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's title to the
presidency.
c. The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers also finds basis
in paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which designates it as
the sole judge of the qualifications of the President and Vice-President, both of
whom are impeachable officers.
 Page 134 of 134

d. The authority to hear quo warranto petitions against appointive impeachable

officers emanates from Section 5(1) of Article VIII which grants quo warranto
jurisdiction to this Court without qualification as to the class of public officers
over whom the same may be exercised (elected or appointed). As such,
impeachable officers are not immune to quo warranto actions.

2. NO. Quo warranto is proper in this case.

a. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's

right or title to a public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is the
proper action to inquire into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his
appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding
involves a judicial determination of the right to the use or exercise of the office.
b. Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the
legislature to determine whether the public officer committed any of the
impeachable offenses, namely, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. It does
not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or election, or challenge the
legality of his assumption of office. Conviction for any of the impeachable
offenses shall result in the removal of the impeachable official from office.
c. In this case, the OSG's quo warranto petition challenged Sereno's right and title to
the position of Chief Justice. He averred that in failing to regularly disclose her
assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court, Sereno could not be said to
possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member
of the Judiciary. The OSG thus prayed that Sereno's appointment as Chief Justice
be declared void.
d. Clearly, the OSG questioned the respondent's eligibility for appointment as Chief
Justice and sought to invalidate such appointment. As the Court previously held,
"where the dispute is on the eligibility to perform the duties by the person sought
to be ousted or disqualified a quo warranto is the proper action."