AISPORNA VS CA

April 12, 1982| De Castro | How must legislative intent be ascertained

PETITIONERS: Mapalad Aisporna
RESPONDENTS: The Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines

SUMMARY
The case involves Mapalad Aisporna, who was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for
violating Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Aisporna was found guilty and sentenced to pay a
fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance
Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal
Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to Ana M. Isidro for P50,000. The insured
died by violence during lifetime of policy.

Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued with her
active participation, which is not allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to
act as agent from the office of the Insurance Commission.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the City Court of Cabanatuan.
Aisporna then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that she may not be
considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Aisporna's argument was that
she was not acting as an insurance agent, sub-agent, or broker, but merely as a helper of her
husband who was the licensed insurance agent. She argued that she did not receive any
compensation for the issuance of the policy and that her husband was the one who received the
pay. However, the Supreme Court found that Aisporna was acting as an agent in the solicitation
or procurement of an application for insurance by soliciting therefor the application of one
Eugenio S. The Court also found that Aisporna received the pay for her services, and that her
defense that she was only acting as a helper of her husband could no longer be sustained

Whether or not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is
governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph.

HELD
Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner cannot be convicted of violating the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.
The Court found that the definition of an insurance agent found in the second paragraph of
Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and second paragraphs
of the same section. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the lower courts and acquitted
the petitioner of the charges against her. The basis of the Court's decision was that the petitioner
was not acting as an insurance agent, sub-agent, or broker, but merely as a helper of her husband
who was the licensed insurance agent. The Court found that the petitioner did not receive any
compensation for the issuance of the policy and that her husband was the one who received the
pay.

FACTS:
- First paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. This paragraph prohibits any person
from acting as an agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation or procurement of
applications for insurance, or receiving any commission or other compensation from any
insurance company without first procuring a certificate of authority to act from the
insurance commissioner. The Supreme Court ruled that the definition of an insurance
agent found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent"
mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the same section. Therefore, a person
cannot be convicted of violating the first paragraph of Section 189 without reference to
the second paragraph of the same section.
- The petitioner, Mapalad Aisporna, was accused of violating the Insurance Act for acting
as an insurance agent without a certificate of authority.
- The information filed against her alleged that she acted as an insurance agent, sub-agent,
or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first
procuring a certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner.
- The information did not allege that she had obtained the insurance for compensation,
which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the Insurance Law in its 2nd paragraph.
- The petitioner argued that she was not acting as an insurance agent, sub-agent, or broker,
but merely as a helper of her husband who was the licensed insurance agent.
- The petitioner did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the policy, and her
husband was the one who received the pay.
- The Supreme Court later ruled that the petitioner cannot be convicted of violating the first
paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph
of the same section.
- The Court found that the definition of an insurance agent found in the second paragraph
of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs of the same section.
- Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the lower courts and acquitted the petitioner
of the charges against her.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is
governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph.
HELD:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and declared that the marriage
between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. The Court held that the alleged
personality traits of Reynaldo were not constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the
time of marriage celebration. The failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. The Court also emphasized that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.