JANNECE C. PEÑALOSA (Petitioner) vs.

JOSE A OCAMPO, JR. (Respondent)

G.R. No. 230299, April 26, 2023
DOCTRINE/ DOCTRINE OF PRO REO: Criminal Laws are to be construed
S: strictly against the Sate and liberally in favor of the accused.
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS: Where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible to various meanings, its
correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering
the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is
associated.
NULLUM CRIMEN, NULLA POENA SINE LEGE: There is no crime
when there is no law punishing it.
FACTS:  The case at bar is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner
Jannece Peñalosa assailing the decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals regarding her libelous post against the
respondent Jose A. Ocampo, Jr. made in 2011 and before the
enactment of Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
 On August 03, 2011, petitioner Peñalosa did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with malice, compose, prepare
and post a facebook post concerning the respondent.
 The case ws raffled to Branch 212, Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City. And was docketed as Criminal Case No.
MC12-14668.
 Subsequently, petitioner Peñalosa filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration before the Office of the City Prosecutor. She
maintained that there is no “probable cause” to charge her with
libel. She as well filed for a Motion for Deferment of Proceedings
before the trial court, pending the resolution of her first motion.
 The Office of the City Prosecutor denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration; hence, she filed a Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice. She also filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings before the trial court due to the pendency of her
Petition of Review before the DOJ.
 On June 24, 2014, the trial court denied petitioner’s Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and found probable cause against her, and
issued a warrant of her arrest.
 Forwarding to September 16, 2014, the DOJ granted petitioner’s
Petition for Review and directed the Office of the City Prosecutor
to withdraw the information filed before the trial court. The DOJ
reasoned that at the time of the act of petitioner’s posting in
Facebook, there is still no law penalizing “Internet Libel”. They
added that mere insulting words posted by petitioner Peñalosa
are not necessarily libelous.
 In view of the foregoing Resolution by the DOJ, petitioner
Peñalosa on September 16, 2014, filed for a Motion to Quash
Information before the trial court. A few days after, the City
Prosecutor’s office filed a Motion to Withdraw Information.
 On January 26, 2015, the RTC declared that petitioner
Peñalosa’s act constituted internet libel. However, during the time
of her action, R.A. No. 10175 is still yet to be enacted as they
were committed on August 03, 2011. Accordingly, the RTC held
that petitioner Peñalosa’s act is not criminally liable and
dismissed the case against her. They declared that the Motion to
Withdraw Information and petitioner’s Motion to Quash
Information are already MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
 Respondent Ocampo, Jr. argued that the RTC gravely erred in
deciding the case against petitioner, hence, he filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The respondent’s petition
was granted by said court and annulled the decision of the RTC.
In their decision, the CA held that the act committed by petitioner
Peñalosa is punishable under Article 355, RPC which states that
 libel shall be punishable “by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical
exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means.
 They interpreted that under Section 4 (c)(4) of R.A. No. 10175
mean that the provision on libel in the RPC covers libelous
internet or Facebook posts.
 On November 25, 2016, the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, hence on April 11 2017, she filed for a Petition
to Review before the Supreme Court.
 Petitioner contends that respondent Ocampo, Jr. availed himself
of a wrong remedy and that instead of a Petition for Certiorari,
petitioner further contends that respondent should have filed a
notice of appeal under Rule 122, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
since RTC’s order was a final order disposing of the criminal
case. Moreover, petitioner adds that respondent has no legal
standing to file said petition with the CA, since under Book IV,
Title III, Chapter 12, Section 35(1) of the Administrative Code of
1987, only the OSG has the authority to represent the People of
the Philippines in appeals of criminal cases before the CA.
 Further, petitioner maintains that the RTC did not gravely abuse
its discretion in dismissing the libel case against her. She cited
the words of the DOJ contending that her posts are not libelous in
nature and at best, they were offensive to the respondent.
 Respondent Ocampo, Jr. counters that the petitioner in her
argument are a mere rehash of her arguments before the CA. He
gave two assertions to wit:
(1) A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of only when
“no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law is available to the private offended party”;
and in the case at bar, an appeal to the President of the Secretary
of Justice’s withdrawal of information was unavailable since the
penalty involved was neither reclusion perpetua nor death.
(2) As the “person aggrieved” by the dismissal of this case, he
has the legal standing to bring Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65, Sec. 1, Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S: 1. WHETHER THE RTC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE INFORMATION AGAINST
THE PETITIONER.
.
2. WHETHER MAKING AN ALLEGEDLY LIBELOUS FACEBOOK
POST IN 2011, i.e., BEFORE THE ENACTMENT OF R.A. NO.
10175 IS PUNISHABLE UNDER THE RPC.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in granting the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the
prosecution.
 The Court compared the case of Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank
and the case at bar, wherein in the former the trial court judge did
not properly assess the case and made a decision and dismissed
the case on the basis of the sole recommendation made by the
Secretary of Justice; whereas in the case at bar, the trial court
judge, in a four-page order, exhaustively and independently
assessed the case.
 Hence, the Supreme Court held that the trial court judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal
case for libel against petitioner Peñalosa.
NO. The Supreme Court held that Article 355, RPC does not cover
libelous contents posted in Facebook.
 The Court ruled that under Art. 355, RPC, the term “similar
means” could have not included online defamation since under
the rule of noscitur a sociis, if a particular word is ambiguous in
itself or is susceptible to various meanings, its construction may
 be made clear and specific by considering and specific by the
company of words in which it is found or with which it is
associated.
 They explained that the Congress had to legislate Article 4 (c)(4)
meant that libel done through computer systems, i.e. cyber libel,
is an additional means of committing libel that is punished only
under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
 They also stated that to make cyber libel punishable under Art.
355, RPC would make a penal law effective retroactively but
unfavorable to the accused, which would be contrary to Article 22,
RPC.
 The SC, however, stated that the respondent may file for civil
action as his recourse under Articles 19 to 21, NCC, should he
opt to file for one.
 Hence, the Supreme Court held that the libelous post on
Facebook made by petitioner Peñalosa may only be punished
under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 and not under
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code since the same post was
made a year before the effectivity of R.A. No. 10175, there was
no crime that punishes cyber libel. Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena
Sine Lege—there is no crime when there is no law punishing
it.
Additional GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The capricious and whimsical
Notes: exercise of judgement so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
: With respect to the grant of Motion to Withdraw Information, judges
are said to have gravely abused their discretion when they do not
make an independent assessment of the lack of probable cause and
the consequent withdrawal of information.
ARTICLES 19-21, NCC: Human Relations