PEOPLE vs.

DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL

KEY WORDS: Tricycle, gunshot, robbery, conspiracy, irresistible force
TOPIC: IRRESISTIBLE FORCE AND UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR
DOCTRINE: A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because
he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against
my will is not my act.
RECIT READY SUMMARY:
• On the evening of May 13, 1996, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita’s Drugstore in
Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him while appellant’s tricycle was parked one and a
half meters in front of him. Alonzo saw two men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag.
One of the two men ran after a man who tried helping the woman when they took hold of the bag
while the other kicked the woman sending her to the ground. After returning, the man shot the
woman on the head while she was still on the ground. The bag was then received by a man inside
the tricycle of appellant Del Rosario and the armed men sat behind the driver. Alonzo chased after
the vehicle and got the plate number of the tricycle and recognized the driver as well. He went to
the nearest police station and reported the incident.
• According to the appellant’s version, he was hired that same day by “Boy” Santos, his co-accused.
They agreed that he would drive him to a cockpit at Blas Edward Coliseum. However, Santos directed
him to proceed to a market place to fetch “Jun” Marques and “Dodong” Bisaya to which he acceded.
He was then asked to proceed to a stop at the corner of Burgos and Gen. Luna Sts. where Bisaya
alighted to buy a cigarette. Bisaya aggressively approached Virginia Bernas (victim) and grappled
with her bag and Marques went to help Bisaya. He tried helping Bernas but was threatened by
Santos that he would shoot Del Rosario if he leaves. After the shooting and Marques and Bisaya
boarded the tricycle, he was instructed by Marques to drive towards Dicarma.
• After the three alighted the tricycle, they threatened Del Rosario not to inform the police, otherwise
he and his family would be harmed.
RTC: Del Rosario was found guilty as co-principal with the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
• The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the trial court and exempted appellant from criminal
liability under Art. 12, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force.
• The Court in so ruling explained that at that time of the perpetration of robbery and killing of
Bernas, appellant Del Rosario was unarmed and was only forced to help Bisaya, Marques and Santos
escape after the commission of the crime. Further, they disagreed with the trial court’s reason that
appellant’s fear was only speculative, fanciful and remote, thus could not be considered
“uncontrollable” and that the gun pointed at him did not amount to “irresistible force” as it failed
short of the test required by law. According to the Supreme Court, a person who acted under the
compulsion of irresistible force, like one who acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An
act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to
reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress,
force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat
of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. It was normal for people to
be seized by fear when threatened with a weapon, like in the case at bar.
• In the instant case, the appellant was threatened with a gun. The Court said that he could not be
expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger as he would be more concerned with his personal
welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day.
• Hence the Supreme Court held that appellant Del Rosario be acquitted of the crime of robbery with
homicide and reversed the trial court’s ruling since he was exempted from criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
• On the evening of May 13, 1996, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita’s Drugstore in
Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him while appellant’s tricycle was parked one and a
half meters in front of him. Alonzo saw two men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag.
One of the two men ran after a man who tried helping the woman when they took hold of the bag
while the other kicked the woman sending her to the ground. After returning, the man shot the
 woman on the head while she was still on the ground. The bag was then received by a man inside
the tricycle of appellant Del Rosario and the armed men sat behind the driver. Alonzo chased after
the vehicle and got the plate number of the tricycle and recognized the driver as well. He went to
the nearest police station and reported the incident.
• According to the appellant’s version, he was hired that same day by “Boy” Santos, his co-accused.
They agreed that he would drive him to a cockpit at Blas Edward Coliseum. However, Santos directed
him to proceed to a market place to fetch “Jun” Marques and “Dodong” Bisaya to which he acceded.
He was then asked to proceed to a stop at the corner of Burgos and Gen. Luna Sts. where Bisaya
alighted to buy a cigarette. Bisaya aggressively approached Virginia Bernas (victim) and grappled
with her bag and Marques went to help Bisaya. He tried helping Bernas but was threatened by
Santos that he would shoot Del Rosario if he leaves. After the shooting and Marques and Bisaya
boarded the tricycle, he was instructed by Marques to drive towards Dicarma.
• After the three alighted the tricycle, they threatened Del Rosario not to inform the police, otherwise
he and his family would be harmed.

ISSUE: WHETHER APPELLANT DEL ROSARIO’S CONVICTION BY THE TRIAL COURT BE REVERSED AS HE IS
EXEMPTED FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER PARAGRAPH 5 OF ART. 12, RPC—YES
RULING:
• The Court in so ruling explained that at that time of the perpetration of robbery and killing of
Bernas, appellant Del Rosario was unarmed and was only forced to help Bisaya, Marques and Santos
escape after the commission of the crime. Further, they disagreed with the trial court’s reason that
appellant’s fear was only speculative, fanciful and remote, thus could not be considered
“uncontrollable” and that the gun pointed at him did not amount to “irresistible force” as it failed
short of the test required by law. According to the Supreme Court, a person who acted under the
compulsion of irresistible force, like one who acted under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An
act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to
reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress,
force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat
of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. It was normal for people to
be seized by fear when threatened with a weapon, like in the case at bar.
• In the instant case, the appellant was threatened with a gun. The Court said that he could not be
expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger as he would be more concerned with his personal
welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day.
• Hence the Supreme Court held that appellant Del Rosario be acquitted of the crime of robbery with
homicide and reversed the trial court’s ruling since he was exempted from criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.