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The Treaty For East African Co-Operation: Can East Africa Successfully Revive One of Africa's Most Infamous Economic Groupings
The Treaty For East African Co-Operation: Can East Africa Successfully Revive One of Africa's Most Infamous Economic Groupings
Scholarship Repository
1999
Recommended Citation
Fitzke, Susan, "The Treaty for East African Co-operation: Can East Africa Successfully Revive One of Africa's Most Infamous
Economic Groupings" (1999). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 173.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/173
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The Treaty for East African Co-operation:
Can East Africa Successfully Revive One
of Africa's Most Infamous Economic
Groupings?
Susan Fitzke
posed, no matter how different conditions in Africa of the 1990s are from those
of Europe in the 1950s." Thompson, supra note 16, at 131.
21. The members of the SADCC included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
The SADCC was "a loose association of states with a quasi-legal personality."
Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, August 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 116. The goals of the SADCC were to facilitate economic development in
the member states, ensure their independence from South Africa, and promote
the integrated development of the region. The members of the SADCC formal-
ized their relationship in a Treaty. See id. at 117. The SADCC members signed
the Treaty of the South African Development Community in 1992. See id. at
116. The Treaty created the South African Development Community (SADC),
which has replaced the SADCC. See id.
22. Id. at 117.
23. See id. at 124-25.
24. See Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Sovereignty and Regionalism, 27 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1073, 1077-78 (1996). This problem was aptly described by
Ngila Mwase:
Common [M]arkets between partner-states with geographical proxim-
ity, but differing levels of economic development, not to mention struc-
tural and ideological differences, have brought distributional problems
of benefits, with the lion's share accruing to the partner able to attract
more investments, i.e. with greater economies of scale, both internal
and external; better infrastructure both physical and social; a higher
level of industrial growth, etc.
Mwase, supra note 13, at 28.
25. See Naon, supra note 24, at 1078.
MIN. J GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 8:127
26. See Tony Hawkins, Can African Economies Sustain Their Recovery?:
The World's Poorest Continent Must Attract Global Capital to Maintain Eco-
nomic Growth, FIN. TIMES, May 14, 1997, at 9. This growth trend is likely to
taper off in the following year with a slowdown in the dollar price of oil and
unfavorable weather conditions in Southern and Eastern Africa. See id.
27. See Aggrey Awori, Seeking Regional Economic Cooperation in Africa,
46 J. INT'L AFF. 119, 120 (1992).
28. See id.
29. See Cooperation Treaty, 30 AFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. & TECHNICAL
SERIES, No. 11, Nov. 16 - Dec. 15, 1993, at 11484.
30. See P. Godfrey Okoth, The Foreign Policy of Uganda Since Indepen-
dence Toward Kenya & Tanzania, in POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN EAST AF-
RICA 359, 361 (Walter 0. Oyugi ed., 1994).
31. See id.
32. See Korwa G. Adar & Mutahi Ngunyi, The Politics of Integration in
East Africa Since Independence, in POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN EAST AF-
RICA 395, 412 (Walter 0. Oyugi ed., 1994).
33. Okoth, supra note 30, at 361.
1999] THE TREATY FOR EAST AFRICAN Co-oPEI ATioN 133
34. See Reginald Herbold Green, The East African Community: A Valedic-
tion ForbiddingMourning, 8 AvR. REV. 1, 3 (1978).
35. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, June 6, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 932.
36. See Cooperation Treaty, supra note 29, at 11484. The Preamble of the
Treaty for East African Co-operation states that in "their desire for the wider
unity of Africa [the three countries] are resolved to co-operate with one another
and with other African countries in the economic, political and cultural fields."
Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 35, 6 I.L.M. at 938. However,
despite this broad policy statement, the leaders of Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania could not reach an agreement on political federation, and nothing fur-
ther was discussed in the Treaty about how the three countries planned to inte-
grate their politics beyond the proposed economic cooperation. See Adar &
Ngunyi, supra note 32, at 401. Therefore, the Treaty for East African Co-oper-
ation really focuses on economic integration. See id.
37. See Okoth, supra note 30, at 364.
38. See Green, supra note 34, at 3.
39. See id.
40. See Okoth, supra note 30, at 364.
41. See Green, supra note 34, at 3.
42. See id.
43. See id.
134 Mi~zv. J GLoBA TRADE[ [Vol. 8:127
its overall position within the region and achieve more equality
in the distribution of benefits from trade and industry within the
region.44
54. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 35, art. 20, 6
I.L.M at 949.
55. See id. art. 20 subd. 3, 6 I.L.M. at 950.
56. See id. art. 20 subd. 4, 6 I.L.M. at 950.
57. See id. art. 20 subds. 6-7, 6 I.L.M. at 950-51.
58. See Mwase, supra note 13, at 38. Under the Treaty, Kenya was not
afforded the right to impose a transfer tax on goods coming from Tanzania or
Uganda. To be afforded the right to impose a transfer tax, the partner state
was required to have a trade deficit in manufactured goods with the other two
states, and Kenya always had a large trade surplus. See id.
59. See id.
60. Article 21 of the Treaty for East African Co-operation established the
East African Development Bank, and Article 22 provided that the charter of the
bank would be set out in Annex VI. Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra
note 35, arts. 21-22, 6 I.L.M. at 956.
136 MINN J GLOBAL TD[.z [Vol. 8:127
3. Decentralization
The Treaty for East African Co-operation contained provi-
sions relating to the decentralization of Community corporations
and provided for several common services to be administered by
the Community. 6 5 Treaty members argued that moving some of
the Community's institutional headquarters out of Nairobi 66
would aid in achieving an equitable distribution of gains.
Thus the Treaty directed that the headquarters of the East Afri-
can Railways and East African Airways corporations would be
located in Kenya, 6 7 while the East African Harbors corporation,
as well as the headquarters of the EAC, were to be located in
Tanzania. 68 Finally, the East African Telecommunications cor-
poration and the East African Development Bank were to be lo-
cated in Uganda. 6 9 In addition to the major corporations, there
was to be an East African Customs and Excise department, an
East African Income Tax Department, a Directorate of Civil Avi-
70
ation, and an East African Meteorological Department.
C. A POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY?
77. See Arthur Hazlewood, The End of the East African Community: What
are the Lessons for Regional IntegrationSchemes?, in THE FUTURE OF REGIONAL-
ISM IN AFRICA 172, 177 (Ralph I. Onwuka & Amandu Sesay eds., 1985).
78. For a detailed description of trade flows within the EAC, see Adar &
Ngunyi, supra note 32, at 403-09.
79. See id. at 404.
80. See id.
81. See Mwase, supra note 13, at 32.
82. See Okoth, supra note 30, at 372.
83. See id.
84. See Mwase, supra note 13, at 42.
85. See Hazlewood, supra note 77, at 179.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
1999] THE TREATY FOR EAST AFRICAN Co-oPERA4TION 139
89. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 35, arts. 46 & 48,
6 I.L.M. at 965-66.
90. See id. art. 47, 6 I.L.M. at 965.
91. See Adar & Ngunyi, supra note 32, at 402.
92. See Treaty for East African Co-operation, supra note 35, Annex XI, 6
I.L.M. at 1036.
93. Adar & Ngunyi, supra note 32, at 402.
94. See id. at 401.
95. See Green, supra note 34, at 19.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. "Kenya's capitalism became more elitist.... Uganda's decision
makers [were] increasingly viewed by Tanzania and Kenya as a band of erratic,
technically incompetent, 'security' payment collectors. Tanzania - like Kenya -
has tended to pursue the trends evident in 1967, thus... widening the Kenya/
Tanzania divergence of ideology...." Id. 19-20.
140 MINN J GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 8:127
Presidents Moi and Museveni. See East Africa Tries Again, FOREIGN REP., No.
2447, May 15, 1997, at 6.
117. See SecretariatLaunched, 33 AMFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. & TECHNI-
CAL SERIES, No. 3, May 14, 1996, at 12511.
118. See Draft Treaty Launched to Revive East African Community, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, May 15, 1998.
119. See East African Countries Work for Closer Integration,XINHUA NEWS
BULL., August 29, 1997.
120. See id.
121. See CooperationTreaty, supra note 29, at 11483.
122. See The Test of Practicality,E. AFR., Sept. 25, 1997.
123. See East Africa Launches Economic Plan, ALL AFRICAN PRESS SERVICE,
May 6, 1997.
124. See id.
125. See Capital Markets Development, 34 AFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. &
TECHNICAL SERIES, No. 3, MAY 6, 1997, at 12959.
126. See Convertible Currencies, 33 AFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. & TECHNI.
CAL SERIES, No. 6, Aug. 8, 1996, at 12615.
1999] THE TREATY FoR EAST AFRICAN Co-oPER-4TION 143
ters are trying to coordinate their budgets, and they are harmo-
nizing their banking policies and taxation schemes. 1 27 The EAC
is also in the process of reviving the Court of Appeals of East
Africa. 128 In addition, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania reached
an agreement on transportation that will improve the condition
of the roads and synthesize the laws and practices of the three
countries regarding market access and ports of entry.1 2 9 The
EAC is also currently considering an agreement relating to com-
munications systems.1 30 On the social front, the EAC is discuss-
ing a common school curriculum for East Africa, 13 1 a regional
woman's organization, 1 3 24 and cooperation in health care,' 33 in-
3
cluding AIDS research.'
144. See AEC Treaty, supra note 138, art. 6, 30 I.L.M. at 1254.
145. See id. art. 8, 30 I.L.M. at 1256.
The Assembly is the supreme organ of the AEC: it determines and im-
plements general AEC policy, issues directives, and coordinates and
harmonizes the economic, scientific, technical, cultural, and social poli-
cies of member countries. It also oversees the functioning of AEC's
other organs .... Assembly decisions are adopted by consensus (or,
failing that, by the vote of two-thirds of the AEC members) and become
automatically enforceable thirty days after they are signed by the As-
sembly's president. Assembly decisions are binding on both member
countries and AEC organs.
Naon, supra note 24, at 1129.
146. See AEC Treaty, supra note 138, art. 13, 30 I.L.M. at 1258.
The AEC Council is composed of the ministers of the member countries
and is responsible for the functioning and development of the commu-
nity. The Council makes recommendations to the Assembly on any ac-
tion necessary to attain AEC objectives. It acts by issuing regulations
that are binding on member countries, subordinate organs of the AEC,
and regional economic communities after having been approved by the
Assembly. If the Assembly has delegated its decision-making powers
in a given area to the AEC Council, regulations issued by the AEC
Council become binding immediately. Regulations are automatically
enforceable thirty days after they are signed by the chairman of the
Council. Regulations proposed by the [Clouncil are adopted by consen-
sus (or, failing that, by a two-thirds majority of the member countries).
Naon, supra note 24, at 1129-30.
147. Id. at 1130.
148. Id.
MN J GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 8:127
149. See Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa, Nov. 5, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1067 [hereinafter COMESA Treaty]. The origi-
nal parties to the COMESA Treaty included Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Dji-
bouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Id. Preamble, 33 I.L.M. at 1072.
Mozambique, Lesotho, and Namibia have since withdrawn from the Treaty.
See Secretary-GeneralSuspension, 34 AFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. & TECHNI-
CAL SERIES, No. 1, March 10, 1997, at 12880.
150. See COMESA Targets African Free Trade Area by Year 2000,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, May 13, 1997.
151. See Executive Secretary Dismissed, 34 AFR. RES. BULL.: ECON., FIN. &
TECHNICAL SERIES, No. 4, June 2, 1997, at 12993.
152. See COMESA Treaty, supra note 149, art. 56, 33 I.L.M. at 1084.
153. See id. See also supra note 21.
1999] THE TREATY FOR EAST AFRICAN Co-oPERATIoN 147
C. CONCURRENT MEMBERSHIP
found some initial success. 176 However, the EAC still faces sev-
eral formidable challenges that must be addressed if it is to be a
successful and enduring trade regime.
One of the biggest problems facing the EAC today is the re-
cent behavior of Tanzania where "a listless bureaucracy contin-
ues to constrain growth."' 7 7 Tanzania is the poorest of the EAC
members, and there is an increasingly prevalent belief amongst
Tanzanians that the country is being marginalized and becom-
ing a dumping ground for Kenyan goods.' 7 8 In July 1997,
Tanzania suspended all COMESA preferential tariffs, including
those on imports from Kenya and Uganda.179 This angered offi-
cials in Kenya who worry that without preferential tax breaks,
Kenyan products cannot compete in Tanzania. 8 0 Kenyan offi-
cials also worry that, even if the preferential tariffs are rein-
stated, it may take a long time for Kenya to regain its
competitive advantage in Tanzania. 1 8 ' Tanzanian officials
maintain that this measure is only a means of eradicating
abuses and strengthening its tax collection structure. 8 2 Fur-
thermore, they contend that all future COMESA preferential
tariffs will be the result of bilateral agreements between the
member country, the individual companies within that country,
and the Tanzanian government.' 8 3 This is not the method by
which preferential trade agreements are to be instituted under
COMESA or the EAC, where preferential tariffs are created
within the context of multilateral negotiations between member
countries. Although this move by Tanzania was taken under the
guise of COMESA, it has noticeably affected the EAC. It has
been viewed as a significant obstacle to the EAC's goal of elimi-
nating all tariff and non-tariff barriers by the year 2000.184 The
recent actions taken by Tanzanian leaders cast doubt on their
commitment to integration, for the leaders appear more con-
cerned with self-protection than with regional promotion.
185. Citing massive corruption, the IMF suspended its $215 million aid
package to Kenya in June 1997. See Michael Holman, Kenya Faces 'Lost Year'
in Growth and Investment: Drought, Flood, and Economic Mismanagement
Point to Tough Time in 1998, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1997, at 4. This came amidst
rashes of election violence during which more than one hundred people died.
See Rift Valley Troubles, 35 AFR. RES. BULL.: POL., Soc. & CULTURAL SERIES,
Mar. 20, 1998, No. 2, at 13015. The presidential elections were finally held on
December 29-30, 1997, and President Moi, who has ruled Kenya for the past
nineteen years, won the election, but not without controversy. Voting in Kenya
takes place largely along ethnic lines, and there were reports of ethnic violence
which forced several tribes from their homes at the time of the election, thereby
disenfranchising them. See Close Shave, 39 AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, No. 1, Jan. 19,
1998, at 4. Kenyan law allows its citizens to vote only in their home district, so
the displacement of these tribes enabled key districts to go to Moi. See id.
There were also problems with voter registration which prevented many
Kenyan citizens from exercising their right to vote. See December Election
Date, 34 AFR. RES. BULL.: POL., Soc. & CULTURAL SERIES, No. 11, Dec. 31, 1997,
at 12894. Moreover, there were widespread claims of vote rigging and reports
that some polls did not open at all. See Close Shave, supra at 4.
It must be noted that, even without the fraud and irregularity, Moi would
still likely have won the election due to favorable election laws and because the
opposition candidates were too ethnically divided for any one of them to have
garnered a majority of the votes. See December Election Date, supra at 12894.
Following the elections, the violence that had plagued Kenya over the previous
year did not quickly cease. The most notable was the sweeping ethnic violence
that occurred in the Rift Valley Province, where the Kalenjin Tribe attempted
to "cleanse" the area of the Kikuyu living there.
In addition to the political mayhem, 1998 is projected to be a bleak eco-
nomic year for Kenya. It is unlikely that Kenya will experience even a 2%
growth in GDP in 1998, while the budget deficit is expected to almost double.
See Holman, supra at 4. Part of the reason for this dim outlook is that Kenya
has been struggling to recover from severe flooding caused by the weather phe-
nomenon known as El Nifio, which devastated the country's agricultural sector.
In addition, Kenya is still struggling to recover from the loss of tourism it exper-
ienced last year when ethnic conflicts swept Mombassa during the height of the
tourist season. See id.
186. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Afr. of the House Comm. on Interna-
tional Aff., 105th Cong. 11 (July 30, 1997)(Testimony of U.S. Ambassador Wil-
liam Twaddell).
MiNN. J GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 8:127
government is continually spreading the message that political parties are evil.
See id. Perhaps in recognition that the referendum is likely to fail, multi-party
advocates have been calling for a boycott of the referendum, stating that "polit-
ical parties represent a fundamental right of association." Ayebare, supra.
189. The international community is ever mindful of Uganda's checkered
political past and therefore is especially apprehensive to pressure Uganda into
a political system that the county may not yet be equipped to handle. See Del-
lios, supra note 188.
The United States has faced a lot of criticism for its current policy toward
Uganda, which supports Museveni but places little or no pressure on him to
democratize his country. The official United States stance is that, while it still
advocates democracy, it recognizes that Uganda is fragile, and the United
States is pleased by the peace and stability that Museveni has brought to his
nation. See id.; James C. McKinley, Clinton in Africa: The Region; A New
Model for Africa: Good LeadersAbove All, N.Y. TIMES, March 25, 1998, at A14.
One American official stated that as long as Uganda shows a willingness to
keep working toward democracy, America can live with them. See McKinley,
supra at A14. He said that it was not a double standard, but a different stan-
dard based on historical context. See id. Critics of this American policy have
disagreed and stated that a double standard is exactly what it is. Those critics
suggest that the United States and the rest of the international community
have continued to support Museveni, not because he is making progress to-
wards democracy, but because he believes in free markets and cooperated with
the World Bank in restructuring the Ugandan economy. See Dellios, supra note
188, at C1. The critics also point out that on President Clinton's recent visit to
Africa, he visited Uganda, not Kenya, despite the fact that Kenya has a much
more advanced democracy and is a traditional Western ally. See McKinley,
supra at A14. They argue that this decision was made on economic grounds
because President Moi has done a poor job managing Kenya's economy, which is
rampant with corruption. See id. These critics are left questioning just how
deep America's commitment to democracy really runs. See id.
190. While the United States has been complacent and has allowed
Museveni to run his country unilaterally with little criticism in the past, it has
intimated that this arrangement will not be indefinitely acceptable. See Del-
lios, supra note 188, at C1.
191. In November 1991, the IMF suspended a large portion of Kenya's one
billion dollars a year in foreign aid. See SIMON BAYNHAM, KENYA: PROSPECTS
FOR STABILITY 2-3 (1997). In order to get the aid reinstated, Kenya moved to a
multi-party system of democracy. See id.
MINN J GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 8:127
200. See James Tumusiime, Museveni Slams Ministers for Meddling in LC-
V Elections, THE MONITOR, April 22, 1998. In the wake of the election results,
President Museveni was quick to point out that Kampala has always been a
weak spot for the NRM. See id.
201. See Michela Wrong, Party Spirit Seems to be Returning, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1998, at 3.
202. See Sharma, supra note 9, at 166.
203. Since 1987, the Ugandan economy has sustained an impressive annual
growth rate; it has been growing six percent annually, and it grew over eight
percent in the year ending June 1996. See Michael Holman, Recovery is Contin-
uing Apace: After its Remarkable Revival, Uganda Needs to Expand its Export
Base, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1996, Special Section, at 3.
204. See Holman, supra note 116, at 47.
205. See Dellios, supra note 188, at Cl.
MiNN. J GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 8:127
206. See Holman, supra note 116, at 47; see also supra notes 81-83 and ac-
companying text.
207. Holman, supra note 116, at 47.
208. Holman, supra note 116, at 47.
209. See id.
210. See Sub-SaharanAfrica, supra note 113, at 29.
211. See Holman, supra note 116, at 47.
212. Awori, supra note 27, at 120.
213. See supra notes 115-18 & 123-34 and accompanying text.
158 MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 8:127
V. CONCLUSION
The EAC is an ambitious integration proposal, but it has
the potential to be a great success whether or not it meets its
goal of eliminating all internal tariffs by the year 2000. The
original version of the Treaty confronted civil war and the polit-
ical imperatives of trying to accommodate the wishes of a capi-
talist, a communist, and a militant dictator. The EAC exists
today in a very different political climate, as Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanzania are all relatively peaceful, sharing a market-ori-
ented form of government and promoting similar economic poli-
cies. As a result, a meaningful dialogue has been possible
between these three countries for the first time in two decades.
This dialogue has led not only to the revival of the EAC but also
to the agreements that have been reached under its auspices.
In essence, "[by co-operating the three nations could boost
2 16
their share of world trade. Competing, they may all lose."
The members of the EAC are currently on the right track toward
achieving many of their ambitious goals. They will be aided in
this endeavor if they view other regional organizations, such as
the AEC and COMESA, as allies in their quest, rather than com-
petition. The ultimate success of the EAC will depend heavily
on the events of the next ten years. If the Treaty administration
is able to deal effectively with the unequal levels of development
among the three countries, and the region remains peaceful, the