Edited by R. Kurt Barnhart, Douglas M. Marshall, and Eric J. Shappee - Introduction To Unmanned Aircraft Systems (2021)

i
Introduction to Unmanned
Aircraft Systems
ii
iii
Introduction to Unmanned
Aircraft Systems
Third Edition
Edited by
R. Kurt Barnhart, Douglas M. Marshall,
and Eric J. Shappee
iv
Third edition published 2021

by CRC Press
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by CRC Press
6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300, Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742
© 2021 selection and editorial matter, Douglas M. Marshall, Richard K. Barnhart,
and Eric J. Shappee; individual chapters, the contributors
First edition published by CRC Press 2011
Second edition published by CRC Press 2016
CRC Press is an imprint of Informa UK Limited
The right of Douglas M. Marshall, Richard K. Barnhart, and Eric J. Shappee to be
identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their
individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78
of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Marshall, Douglas M., 1947– editor, author. | Barnhart, Richard K., editor, author. |
Shappee, Eric, editor, author.
Title: Introduction to unmanned aircraft systems/edited by Douglas M. Marshall,
Richard K. Barnhart and Eric Shappee.
Description: Third editon. | Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2021. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020035929 (print) | LCCN 2020035930 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780367366599 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429347498 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Drone aircraft. | Drone aircraft–Automatic control.
Classification: LCC TL589.4 .I68 2021 (print) |
LCC TL589.4 (ebook) | DDC 629.133/3–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020035929
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020035930
ISBN: 978-0-367-36659-9 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-367-68608-6 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-34749-8 (ebk)
Typeset in Palatino
by Newgen Publishing UK
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Contents
Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
About the Editors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
1 History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Douglas M. Marshall and Benjamin Trapnell
2 UAS Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Mark Patrick Collins
3 The “System” in UAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Joshua Brungardt and Kurt Carraway
4 UAS Sensing – Theory and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Gabriel B. Ladd
5 UAS Regulations, Standards, and Guidance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Douglas M. Marshall
6 Human Factors in Unmanned Aerial Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Warren Jensen
7 Safety Assessments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Eric J. Shappee and Graham Feasey
8 Export Control and ITAR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Eric McClafferty and Rose Mooney
9 Unmanned Aircraft System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Robert D. Love and Brian Argrow
10 UAS Airframe Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Michael T. Most and Michael Stroup
11 UAS Propulsion System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Michael T. Most and Graham Feasey
12 UAS Subsystem Nexus: The Electrical System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Michael T. Most and Samuel Stewart
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vi Contents
13 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

Saeed M. Khan
14 Command and Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

Nathan Maresch
15 Unmanned Aircraft Subsystem Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

William H. Semke
16 Detect and Avoid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367

Dallas Brooks, Stephen P. Cook, and Brandon Suarez
17 UAS in Public Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387

Benjamin Miller and Adam Trojanowski
18 Cybersecurity Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS)

and Artificial Intelligence (AI). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Randall K. Nichols
19 Unmanned Traffic Management (“UTM”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439

Michael S. Baum
20 The Future of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443

Tom Haritos and R. Kurt Barnhart
Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
Douglas M. Marshall
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
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Preface
It is with great pleasure that we present this greatly expanded third edition of Introduction
to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) industry continues to
be a highly dynamic and constantly evolving industry with the advancement of science
and technological enablement. With that in mind, the aim of this expanded edition is to
identify and survey the fundamentals of UAS operations, which will serve both as a basic
orientation to UAS and as a foundation for further study. Content herein is suitable for
both introductory and advanced systems studies. This work was originally birthed out
of an unsuccessful search for suitable texts for such a course. As in the first two editions,
the chapters have been individually contributed by some of the nation’s foremost experts
in UAS operations from all corners of both higher education and industry; therefore, the
reader may note some variation in writing style. It was decided to leave the contributions
in this form in the interest of preserving the author’s intent, thereby improving the quality
of information contained herein.
It is the editors’ suggestion that introductory students focus on Chapters 1–7, 9, 15, 17,
19, and 20 for a total of 12 chapters. The remainder can be used at the instructor’s discre-
tion and for advanced technical study.
This publication would not have been possible without the close cooperation of all
the editors and contributors; a heartfelt thank you to all who gave of your time to make
this possible. Your feedback is welcomed as a basis for future editions of this book as the
industry continues to advance.
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Acknowledgments
As editors we would first like to thank our contributing authors for their valuable time and
expertise. Without you, this book would simply not have nearly the breadth and depth that
it does with your input.
We also would like to thank Beth Drescher, who spent many hours on first read-throughs
and working on format consistency. Beth, your expertise made the burden of such a large
text manageable.
We would also like to send out a note of thanks to our spouses, Anita, Sandi, and Lisa,
who let us give up hours of our time and in some cases helped us with syntax and flow.
We thank you!
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About the Editors
Dr. R. Kurt Barnhart is Professor and currently the Associate Dean of Research at
Kansas State University Salina, in addition to serving as the executive director of the
Applied Aviation Research Center, which established and now oversees the Unmanned
Aerial Systems program office. Most recently, Dr. Barnhart was the Head of the Aviation
Department at Kansas State University. He is a member of the graduate faculty at K-State
and holds a commercial pilot certificate with instrument, multiengine, seaplane, and glider
ratings. He also is a certified flight instructor with instrument and multiengine ratings
and also holds an airframe and powerplant certificate with inspection authorization.
Dr. Barnhart holds an AS in Aviation Maintenance Technology from Vincennes University,
a BS in aviation administration from Purdue University, an MBAA from Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, and a PhD in educational administration from Indiana State
University. Dr. Barnhart’s research agenda is focused in aviation psychology and human
factors as well as the integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace
System. His industry experience includes work as an R&D inspector with Rolls Royce
Engine Company, where he worked on the RQ-4 Unmanned Reconnaissance Aircraft devel-
opment program, as well as serving as an aircraft systems instructor for American Trans-
Air airlines. Formerly, Dr. Barnhart was an Associate Professor and Acting Department
Chair of the Aerospace Technology at Indiana State University, where he was responsible
for teaching flight and upper division administrative classes. Courses taught include
Aviation Risk Analysis, Citation II Ground School, King Air 200 Flight, Air Navigation, Air
Transportation, Instrument Ground School, and many others.
Douglas M. Marshall, J.D., is the founder and owner of TrueNorth Consulting LLC, a
UAS support and service organization founded in 2007. He enjoyed an appointment as
an Adjunct Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law, where he developed
and delivered the first drone law course in an American law school. Previously, he was
a division manager, UAS Regulations & Standards Development at the Physical Science
Laboratory, New Mexico State University, and professor of aviation at the University of
North Dakota. He has been engaged full time on UAS-related activities for over 15 years,
is the co-editor of two books related to aviation, and is the author of numerous published
articles on aviation law, regulations, and remotely piloted aircraft. He has served on RTCA
SC-203, ASTM F-38, and SAE G-10 Committees; the AUVSI Advocacy Committee; the
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program UAS Expert Group; the Small UAS Aviation
Rulemaking Committee; and the Part 91 Working Group supporting a second UAS Aviation
Rulemaking Committee. He chaired the ASTM F38.02.01 Task Group on Standards for
Operations Over People; was a member of the Steering Committee, Civil Applications of
Unmanned Aerial Systems Conference, Boulder, Colorado, and several other committees
dedicated to the development of UAS; and has delivered presentations on international
aviation regulations and airspace issues at symposia and conferences around the world.
Eric J. Shappee is a Professor of Aviation at Kansas State University Polytechnic. He has
served as the Director of Flight Operations, Acting Department Head, and Professional
Pilot Program Lead for Aviation. He is a member of the Aviation Accreditation Board
International (AABI) and has served on the Board of Trustees for the University Aviation
Association (UAA). Eric teaches numerous aviation courses, which include: Introduction
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xii About the Editors
to Aviation, Commercial Pilot Ground School, Aviation Safety, and Aviation Accident
Investigation. He holds a commercial pilot certificate with instrument, multiengine, and
glider ratings. He is also a certified flight instructor with gold seal and a Master CFI. Eric
holds two associate degrees from Antelope Valley College (Lancaster, California): a bach-
elor degree in aeronautical science and a master degree in aeronautical science and safety
from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. His main area of focus is in aviation safety. He
has developed several risk assessment tools for K-State and other aviation organizations.
Further, he is a member of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators and has
attended the NTSB Academy. He has been active in the field of aviation since 1986, and
teaching since 1995. Eric has given over 3000 hours of dual given. During his career in
aviation, Professor Shappee has also spent time working with unmanned aerial systems.
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Contributors
Brian Argrow is a professor of aerospace engineering sciences and founding director

(emeritus) of the Research and Engineering Center for Unmanned Vehicles (RECUV) at
the University of Colorado Boulder. Professor Argrow is an author or coauthor of more
than 100 journals and conference proceedings, and he received numerous teaching
and education awards. He is chair-emeritus of the AIAA Unmanned Systems Program
Committee. He received the Air Force Exemplary Civilian Service Award for service on the
Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (2003, 2005–2009) where he coauthored two reports
on UAS and served on the NASA Advisory Council’s UAS Subcommittee from 2011 to
2013. In 2014, he cofounded and now codirects the Unmanned Aircraft System and Severe
Storms Research Group (USSRG). Professor Argrow currently serves on the ASTM F38
Subcommittee for Small VTOL UAS Operations over People.
Michael S. Baum, JD, MBA, ATP, is an aviation consultant, and founder and Permanent
Editorial Board member of the Aviators Code Initiative (ACI). He contributes actively in
various fora developing manned and unmanned aviation standards and safety best
practices. He served as VP and executive committee member at VeriSign (VRSN); IT
security law and policy consultant, Independent Monitoring, LLC; Network Analyst, BBN
Technologies (now Raytheon). Prior thereto he practiced law in Boston. He was Founder
and Chair, Electronic Commerce Division and Information Security Committee, Section
of Science and Technology Law, American Bar Association (ABA); Observer, United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); Chairman, International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC Paris) ETERMS Working Party; and Vice Chairman, ICC
Electronic Commerce Commission; Board Member: ANSI ASC X12; The Jurimetrics Journal
(ABA/ASU); The PKI Forum; the Charles Babbage Foundation; and member of various
IT enterprise advisory boards. Publications include: co-author, UAS Pilots Code (ACI);
Aviators Model Code of Conduct (series, ACI); Federal Certification Authority Liability and Policy
(NIST/MITRE); co-author (with Ford), Secure Electronic Commerce (1st & 2nd Eds., Prentice-
Hall); co-author, Digital Signature Guidelines (ABA); co-author (with Perritt) Electronic
Contracting, Publishing and EDI Law (Wiley); and contributor, EDI and the Law (Blenheim).
Awards include: ABA Committee on Cyberspace Law’s Excellence Award; National Notary
Association’s Achievement Award; Journal of EDI, EDI Pioneer, and LightHawk’s President’s
Award. Baum is a graduate of Western New England University School of Law and is a
member of the Massachusetts Bar. He received his MBA from the Wharton School at the
University of Pennsylvania. He is an FAA-certificated Airline Transport Pilot in single
engine aircraft, and holds Private Pilot certification with airplane single engine sea,
multiengine land, rotorcraft-helicopter, and glider ratings. He is also an Advanced Ground
Instructor.
Dallas Brooks is the director of UAS Research and Development for New Mexico
State University’s Physical Science Laboratory (PSL). He is responsible for NMSU’s
broad spectrum of government and commercial UAS research, development, test, and
engineering (RDT&E) programs. A recognized national leader in unmanned systems
integration, he engages and coordinates with national and international regulatory,
support, and administrative agencies to help ensure that the tremendous capabilities of
unmanned systems are realized. Brooks’ aviation and technical experience spans over
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30 years, primarily in service to America’s armed forces at home and overseas. He serves
on multiple national-level boards, committees, and steering groups. He is the executive
vice chairman and the strategic planning committee chairman of the National Board of
Directors for the Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), the
world’s largest nonprofit organization devoted exclusively to advancing the unmanned
systems and robotics community. He cochairs the federal multiagency UAS Sense and
Avoid Science and Research Panel, supporting the FAA, the DoD, NASA, and DHS to
identify and solve key sense-and-avoid challenges. He is also a member of the FAA’s UAS
Aviation Rulemaking Committee and serves on the Executive Council of the FAA’s UAS
Center of Excellence.
Joshua Brungardt is the executive vice president for PARADIGMisr in Bend, Oregon. He
is also a courtesy faculty member of Oregon State University’s College of Forestry. He
has served as the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) director for Kansas State University
helping to grow one of the largest and top renowned UAS Academic programs in the
United States. Brungardt served on the Kansas Governor’s Aviation Advisory Council from
2010 to 2012 and is currently a member of the board of directors for the Oregon Aviation
Industries Board. In 2010, Brungardt attended senior officer training on the Predator UAS
at Creech AFB with the 11th Reconnaissance SQ. In his positions, and as a consultant to
numerous UAS companies, Brungardt has written over 80 approved UAS Certificates of
Authorization from the FAA. Brungardt has also been chief pilot for High Performance
Aircraft Training, EFIS Training, and Lancair Aircraft. He holds ATP & CFII ratings with
over 4000 hours, as well as having raced at the Reno National Air Races. In addition to
completing over 75 first flights on experimental aircraft, he has served as an instructor
and test pilot to the U.S. Air Force. In 2006, Brungardt founded the pilot training company
EFIS Training, which focused on pilots transitioning to glass cockpits. Brungardt received a
bachelor’s degree in airway science and an associate’s degree in professional piloting from
Kansas State University in 2002. In 2013, Brungardt was awarded the Alumni Fellow of the
Year Award from KSU’s College of Technology and Aviation.
Kurt J. Carraway, a retired Colonel with 25 years of service in the United States Air Force,
is K-State Polytechnic’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Research Executive Director.
In this capacity, he provides strategic leadership in advancing Kansas State University’s
UAS program goals. He directs the execution of research activities involving UAS through
the Applied Aviation Research Center (AARC). Carraway also directs flight operations
development and maturation of the UAS training program through direct supervision
of the flight operations staff. He manages highly skilled UAS professionals who perform
hundreds of UAS flights per year in civil airspace. He sets policies and procedures for
unmanned flight operations. He serves as Principal Investigator (PI) on UAS activities
through the AARC and is the University PI representative to ASSURE, the FAA’s UAS
Center of Excellence. In that role, Carraway also serves as the UAS training focal point
lead. He is a professor, an instructor, and a mentor to students. Before arriving at K-
State Polytechnic, Carraway was stationed at Camp Smith in Oahu, Hawaii, where he
served first as Joint Operations Director and then Division Chief of Current Operations,
both for the U.S. Pacific Command. Carraway worked with the Global Hawk UAS, as an
evaluator and instructor pilot, and later became commander of the Global Hawk squadron.
Carraway established standard operating procedures and composed technical manuals
for the military’s use of the Global Hawk. A native of St. Louis, Missouri, Carraway
received a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering at Missouri University of Science
and Technology in Rolla, prior to entering the Air Force. During his service, Carraway
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Contributors xv
also completed a Master of Science in Systems Engineering at the Air Force Institute of
Technology on the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, and a Master of Arts
in Management from Webster University in St. Louis, Missouri. He is married to Pamela
(nee) Savage and has two daughters, ages 19 and 15.
Mark Patrick Collins is an Associate Professor and Director of Unmanned Systems (UMS)
at Indiana State University (ISU). His responsibilities include instructing UMS courses to
undergraduate students, developing new courses, advising students, developing grant
opportunities, researching ways unmanned cargo aircraft (UCA) can operate in the national
airspace, and working with the community. He is a Doctoral Student at Unmanned Vehicle
University in Unmanned Systems Engineering, has a MS in Aviation & Transportation
from Lewis University, a BS in Industrial Technology from Southern Illinois University
(SIU), and A.S. in Aviation Maintenance from SIU. His FAA certifications include remote
drone pilot, private pilot, airframe, and powerplant certificates. It is his long-term goal to
start the first large unmanned cargo airline (LUCA) in the National Airspace System (NAS).
He has received international recognition from the Platform of Unmanned Cargo Aircraft
for his research in LUCA in the NAS. He is a business owner and entrepreneur. He owns a
sign manufacturing business in Elkader Iowa called Signs N Frames. He and his wife also
manage a property management business across three states and two countries. Before
starting these businesses, he worked at Atlas Air Cargo Airline from 1999 to 2003 as an
aircraft heavy check site representative and as a purchasing manager. His responsibilities
at Atlas Air included purchasing labor and fuel for 50+Boeing 747 aircraft from places such
as Singapore, Netherlands, Hong Kong, Germany, and mainland China. Before Atlas Air,
he worked at AAR Allen Aircraft in Wood Dale, Illinois as Site Representative from 1995
to 1999 and was in the Army Illinois National Guard from 1990 to 1996. Besides his career
goals, Professor Collins is happily married, is a 4th Degree Knight of Columbus member
at his church, is working on his instrument rating, and plans on purchasing a Lancair IVP
airplane someday.
Stephen P. Cook is a principal safety engineer in the Navigation and Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) Department at the MITRE Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development in McLean, Virginia. In this role he supports multiple efforts to integrate
civil and military unmanned aircraft into the National Airspace System (NAS). Dr. Cook
currently cochairs the UAS Science and Research Panel (SARP). The SARP is responsible
for identifying research gaps related to integrating UAS into the NAS, recommending
solutions, and promoting alignment of research efforts across the government agencies
represented in the UAS Executive Committee. Before joining MITRE, Dr. Cook served
as the UAS airworthiness certification lead at the Naval Air Systems Command and led
the NATO Technical Working Group charged with developing an airworthiness standard
for military fixed-wing UAS. Dr. Cook earned his PhD in aerospace engineering from the
University of Maryland in 2003, having previously earned an MS and a BS in aerospace
engineering from North Carolina State University in 1993 and 1990, respectively.
Graham Feasey is the Technical Director of Design Verification at General Atomics
Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA- ASI). Feasey is the lead Mechanical Engineering
Airworthiness Compliance Verification Engineer with authority in Propulsion Systems,
Fuel System, Landing Gear, Fire Protection, and Mechanical Systems. Since 2005, he has
worked in the field of unmanned aviation where he has worked on MQ-1 Predator A, MQ-
1C Gray Eagle, MQ-9A Predator B, and MQ-9B Sky Guardian. In addition to Airworthiness,
Feasey manages the Performance Simulation Team and the Material and Process Group.
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Feasey earned an Associate of Science in Chemistry from Saddleback Community College;

a Bachelor of Science in Chemical Engineering from California State Polytechnic University,
Pomona; and a Master of Science in Chemical Engineering from University of California
San Diego. He is a member of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
Tom Haritos is the Associate Director for Research/UAS Research Program Manager at the
Applied Aviation Research Center (AARC), Kansas State Polytechnic. Prior to assuming
this position, Dr. Haritos served as a Professor and faculty researcher for the Department of
Aeronautical Science at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach, Florida.
Dr. Haritos was one of the pioneering faculty members to establish the unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS) degree program at Embry-Riddle. Dr. Haritos’ research interests include
UAS integration, UAS Security and Security Enabled Operations, UAS Tracking and
Detection, UAS Operations, training and consulting, and much more. Dr. Haritos currently
represents Kansas State at a national level committee as a voting member for the Critical
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) under the auspices of the Department
of Homeland Security focused on UAS Security Operations and policy development for the
protection of critical infrastructure from unauthorized UAS use. Additionally, Dr. Haritos
is often involved with educational extension in terms of outreach curriculum development
and integration. Dr. Haritos holds a PhD in computer and information sciences and a
postgraduate Educational Specialist degree from Nova Southeastern University, a Master
of Science Degree in Aeronautics with a safety/management dual specialization from
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Aviation
Maintenance Management from Lewis University. Dr. Haritos is also an FAA-licensed
Aircraft Maintenance Technician.
Warren Jensen received his medical degree from the University of California, San
Francisco. He was engaged in private practice for eight years before his residency and
board certification in aerospace medicine. Dr. Jensen joined the University of North Dakota
in 1993, where he teaches human factors, aerospace physiology, and human performance
aspects of aviation and space flight. He has served as the state air surgeon for the North
Dakota Air National Guard, is an active pilot, and an FAA designated senior aviation
medical examiner. He currently consults with the Customs and Border Protection Agency
to provide human factors coursework for Predator operations.
Saeed M. Khan is a professor of engineering technology at Kansas State University
Polytechnic. He earned his MS and PhD in electrical engineering from the University
of Connecticut and a BS in electrical engineering from the Bangladesh University of
Engineering and Technology. Dr. Khan’s specialization is in antennas and electromagnetic
wave propagation. Dr. Khan has been working in stealth technology since he was a graduate
student and on smart skins for radar evasive aircraft since 1994. Since 2008, Professor
Khan has been active in various aspects of UAS research, which include sense-and-avoid
systems, multipath mitigation for UAVs in urban canyons, radar cloaking materials, and
wireless power transfer. He has more than 40 papers, book chapters, invention disclosures,
and a patent in wireless power transfer. He has received over $3.5 million in funding as
principal investigator (PI) or Co-PI. Professor Khan was honored with the 2013–2014 Rex
MacArthur Family Fellow for demonstrating teaching excellence, commitment to research,
and honorable service to the university.
Gabriel B. Ladd earned a bachelor’s degree in aerospace engineering from Boston
University and a master’s degree in environmental science from the University of
Maryland. He conducted his undergraduate research at NASA Goddard Space Flight
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Contributors xvii
Center, focusing on sensor design, testing, and building data for a UAS-based collection
system for CO2 and water vapor eddy correlation. Continuing at NASA Goddard while
working on his master’s thesis research on UAS applications in precision agriculture, he
collaborated with the AeroScience lab to design and build data collection and processing
systems for small UAS as well as ground sampling equipment. After graduate school,
Ladd worked at the Washington, DC area consulting firm Enegis, where he led the UAS
consulting efforts and developed geospatial computer models to answer national-level
policy questions for the U.S. and foreign governments. He is currently an independent
consultant, working with industry leading UAS operators to create camera systems and
data workflows to help them collect, process, and analyze UAS data. Among his clients
are industry leaders such as American Aerospace Technologies Inc. (AATI). Ladd’s work
with AATI is pioneering applications, data workflows, and automation processes for data
collected from Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAS Beyond Line of Sight
(BLOS) operations in the National Air Space (NAS).
Robert D. Love is an aircraft conceptual design engineer at General Atomics Aeronautical
Systems, Inc. (GA- ASI), focused on multidisciplinary UAS design optimization, life-
cycle cost estimation, and mission analysis. He also runs AirMorph LLC to provide
engineering consulting services. Previously, he worked as a project engineer for technology
development, as an airframe design engineer at GA-ASI, and supported F-2 composites
production at Lockheed Martin. He serves on the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA) Aircraft Design Technical Committee and has authored more than
12 reviewed papers and multiple patents. Dr. Love earned his PhD and MS in Aerospace
Engineering at the University of Florida in 2011 after obtaining his Bachelor of Science in
Aerospace & Materials Engineering from Auburn University.
Nathan Maresch is a Kansas State University alumnus, graduating summa cum laude
with a Bachelor of Science in electronic and computer engineering technology. Maresch
holds private pilot and UAS remote pilot licenses, and has industry experience in industrial
controls and automation. He served as an instructor for various electronics labs at K-State
Polytechnic before joining the Applied Aviation Research Center (AARC) full time in
2009 to begin research in avionics development and miniaturization. Subsequent research
projects include a sense and avoid project, with the creation of a two-dimensional obstacle
avoidance system, a wireless power transmission project in conjunction with engineering
technology faculty resulting in a patent granted, and an indoor UAS flight navigation
research project. Maresch oversees maintenance operations and supervises maintenance
staff at the AARC while researching new technologies, developing, integrating, and
repairing unmanned aircraft electronics systems, and tuning control systems. He is deeply
involved with RF components and performs comprehensive command and control analysis
to predict link range performance prior to flight operations in new topography. Maresch
also instructs students in advanced fixed-wing UAS labs, from the simulator experience to
real-world advanced flight and field operations flights.
Eric McClafferty is a partner and the head of the 35-person International Trade Practice
Group at the international law firm Kelley Drye & Warren LLP in Washington, DC. The
group was recognized by Law 360 as U.S. International Trade Practice of the Year in 2013
and 2014. He helps universities, large and small companies, individuals, and industry
associations comply with U.S. regulations on international trade, particularly those
relating to exports of unmanned systems. He earned a BA and an MA from the University
of Michigan and JD from the University of Virginia.
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xviii Contributors
Benjamin Miller is the Director at Colorado Center of Excellence for Advanced Technology
Aerial Fire Fighting. Ben began his public service career at Mesa County Sheriff’s Office
(MCSO). Among many accomplishments in his 15 years with MCSO, Ben founded and
served as program director of the first operational unmanned aerial system (UAS) program
for a nonfederal public safety agency in the United States. The MCSO UAS program has
been featured in prestigious print media—such as National Geographic, Time, and Smithsonian
Air & Space—and has been covered by numerous news organizations around the world,
including Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, NPR, The New York Times, and The Washington Post.
Ben has more than 500 sUAS flight hours and 700 mission deployments. He has flown
many types of unmanned operations, including flights over armed gunmen, crime scene
reconstruction missions, search and rescue, and fire operations, all within the National
Airspace System. Ben also had the opportunity to train game wardens in the African
nation of Namibia in support of their antipoaching efforts. Throughout the industry,
Ben is regarded as a thought leader on the applications of small-unmanned aircraft in
public safety. His perspective has been shared in presentations across the United States
and Canada, including testimony to the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, as well
as to other members of Congress at both the state and national levels. His expertise has
been sought by prestigious organizations—such as the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Secret Service, the
United States Department of Justice, and the FAA’s NextGen Institute—and numerous
other entities in the unmanned aircraft systems space, including academia and industry.
Over the last decade, Ben has had the great pleasure of serving on the Board of Directors for
the Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), as a voting member
of ASTM’s committee F38 on Unmanned Aircraft Systems, and as a special advisor to the
NIST response robotics working group. Ben has also held advisor positions on five start-up
UAS-related companies and spent 2 years working for Draganfly Innovations who began
building multicopters in 1999. Ben is now the Director of the Colorado Center of Excellence
for Advanced Technology Aerial Firefighting. Ben’s team is the lead UAS organization for
the Colorado Department of Public Safety. Focusing on the fire service, Ben’s team is also
solving problems for public safety UAS users by creating solutions for real-time geospatial
intelligence sharing, counter-UAS, management of airspace above wildland fires, and
numerous other public safety-related challenges.
Michael T. Most, PhD, is an academic lead of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Program
at Kansas State University, prior to which he was an associate professor and chair of the
Department of Aviation Technologies at Southern Illinois University. He has authored
numerous articles for technical and refereed journals on aviation, aircraft design, and
the use of GIS to investigate aviation-related environmental externalities and delivered
several peer-reviewed papers on these same topics. Dr. Most holds FAA private pilot and
A&P technician certificates, ASTM National Center for Aerospace and Transportation
Technologies avionics certification, and a PhD in environmental resources and policy with
an emphasis in remote sensing and geographic information systems.
Rose Mooney is an executive director of the Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership (MAAP),
which is the FAA-awarded UAS Test site in Virginia, New Jersey, and Maryland. Mooney’s
career started with developing manufacturing robots, and then progressed to medical
devices, wireless communications, and UAS. Prior to her current position, she spent over
30 years working in industry in engineering. Mooney’s interest in aviation began as a
young child living in Queens NY in the approach path of LaGuardia Airport. She spent
her nights watching the aircraft and being intrigued by flight. It seemed a natural fit when
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Contributors xix
she began working in UAS. She earned her B.A. in information systems management
from Notre Dame University of Maryland after completing studies in computer science at
University of Baltimore County.
Randall K. Nichols is Professor of Practice in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) –
Cybersecurity at Kansas State University. Nichols serves as the Director, graduate
UAS-Cybersecurity Certificate program at KSUP. Nichols is author of nine textbooks,
internationally respected, with 50 years of experience in leadership roles in cryptography,
counterintelligence, INFOSEC, and sensitive computer applications. Nichols has provided
counsel to the United States government. He is certified as a federal subject matter expert
in both cryptography and computer forensics. He created five master and certificate
programs for KSU and Utica College. To wit:
• Author/Developer: Certificate in Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) –Cybersecurity

• Retired Chair and Program Developer: MS –Cybersecurity –Intelligence and
Forensics
• Retired Chair and Program Director: BS –Cybersecurity and Information Assurance
• Co-Author/Developer: MPS –Risk Assessment and Cybersecurity Policy
• Author/Developer: MS Cyber Surveillance and Warfare
Nichols served as COO of INFOSEC Technologies, LLC, a consulting firm specializing

in Counterterrorism, Counterespionage, and Information Security Countermeasures to
support its 1700 clients. Nichols served as CEO of COMSEC Solutions, a Cryptographic/
Anti-
virus/Biometrics Countermeasures Company, which was acquired by a public
company in 2000. As part of the acquisition agreement, he served as the Vice President of
Cryptography and the Director of Research.
William H. Semke earned a PhD in mechanical engineering in 1999, an MS in engineering
mechanics in 1993 at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and a BS in physics at Bemidji
State University in 1991. He came to the University of North Dakota in 2000.
He is currently a professor of mechanical engineering at the University of North Dakota
where he conducts contemporary research in precision motion, vibration control, and
aerospace hardware design, along with instruction in the areas of mechanical design and
experimental methods. He also serves as the director of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Engineering (UASE) Laboratory within the UND Center of Excellence for UAS Research
and Education.
Samuel Stewart is a senior electrical engineer and has spent his entire career at General
Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA- ASI), since earning a Bachelor of Arts and
Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of San Diego in
2004 (Summa Cum Laude). His primary role is a subject matter expert for the flight control
computers, supporting and designing avionics for multiple unmanned aerial vehicle
platforms. He also conducts production and field failure investigations for brushed and
brushless servo drivers, airborne and ground communication networks, electrical power
generation and distribution systems, and battery charging systems. Stewart excels in
systematic troubleshooting of issues, and has authored a wide array of theory of operations
documents, hardware to software interface control documents, failure mode effects analysis
reports, component level requirements, design process documents, and system proposals.
Michael Stroup is currently a Technical Director within the Advanced Airframe
Engineering organization of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-
ASI).
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xx Contributors
He has been with GA-ASI since 1992. Recently, Stroup took roles conceptualizing UAS
configurations, aerodynamic flow paths, and airfoil, flap, and slat designs. His duties
range from external stores/ pod shape creation, overall aircraft layout, and shaping,
to Chief Engineer on subscales and small UASs. During Stroup’s 28 years, he has had
substantial roles engineering 17 GA-ASI aircraft, including exportable versions of the
GNAT-750, MQ-1 Predator A, MQ-9 Predator B, Predator C Avenger, MQ-1C Grey Eagle,
and many variations of those aircraft. Shortly, after achieving a Bachelor of Science degree
in Mathematics from Fresno State University, Stroup began employment with Leading
Systems, Inc., under Abe Karem, widely regarded as the “father of the UAV.” Mike has a
passion for flying drones and giant scale RC models in his spare time.
Brandon Suarez currently serves as the Technical Director for UAS Civil Airspace
Integration for General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI), where he leads the
company’s effort to integrate Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) into domestic,
foreign, and international airspace. Previously, at GA-ASI, Suarez led a collaborative
team of experts from the FAA, NASA, and several industry partners to bring together
the technology needed for a Detect and Avoid (DAA) system on a Predator® B RPAS.
He currently serves as the Co-Chairman of RTCA Special Committee (SC-228) and as
an advisor to the ICAO RPAS Panel. Suarez is the author or coauthor of numerous
journal and conference papers. He also served on the FAA’s UAS in Controlled Airspace
Aviation Rulemaking Committee and as the Vice Chairman of NATO Industrial Advisory
Group (NIAG) Study Group 205, which provided industry recommendations to the
NATO specialist team standardizing DAA capabilities for military forces worldwide.
Suarez holds both Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in Aerospace Engineering from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He is also an instrument-rated private pilot.
Adam Trojanowski is an economic and policy analyst for the State of Colorado’s Center for
Excellence Advanced Technology Aerial Firefighting, where he advises on complex policy
and regulatory issues related to aerial firefighting, drones, and public safety aviation.
Adam has attended a range of leadership schools and courses, including ones sponsored
by the FBI, Colorado Department of Public Safety, and International Association of Chiefs
of Police. He has also received specialized training in investigations, firearms, wildland
firefighting, incident management, tactical casualty care and first aid, contract writing,
pursuit driving, and defensive tactics and arrest control techniques. Adam is a life-long
public servant. He received a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Colorado Law
School in 2004 and began his career serving the Honorable Morris B. Hoffman as a judicial
law clerk. Adam coinstructed a practical civil procedure course for attorneys, assisted the
judge with legal research, and drafted opinions. Adam earned a POST certificate from the
State of Colorado after attending the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office Police Academy,
and served his community as a police officer and sergeant. In these roles, he trained law
enforcement officers in patrol tactics, law, and firearms, and led a motorcycle patrol team.
More recently, Adam developed state policies on public safety Unmanned Aerial Systems
and has been working with the Colorado Attorney General’s Office and the United States
Department of Justice on novel counter-UAS questions. Adam is fluent in Polish and
English, and holds a DHS Secret clearance. When not busy with public safety work, he
enjoys skiing, cycling, reading about world history and human behavior, and supporting
his children’s passion for dance and ballet.
Benjamin Trapnell is an associate professor of aeronautics at the University of North
Dakota. He holds a Bachelor of Science in physical sciences from the United States Naval
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Contributors xxi
Academy and a Master of Aeronautical Sciences degree from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical

University. He studied Aviation Safety Programs Management at the Naval Postgraduate
School in Monterey, California, and has completed the Introduction to UAS Flight Test Short
Course at the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School. Professor Trapnell has researched unmanned
aircraft systems, sense and avoid technology, and the UAS regulatory environment for the
Federal Aviation Administration. He led an interdisciplinary team that developed a Ganged
Phased Array Radar risk mitigation system for the US Air Force. In his current assignment,
he developed and implemented the first undergraduate Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Operations degree program. Professor Trapnell has also developed and implemented the
first undergraduate degree worldwide in unmanned aircraft systems operations. He has
also worked closely with the FAA and the United States Air Force via Joint Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence.
Professor Trapnell served as a carrier aircraft plane commander and a flight instructor
for the United States Navy. He holds commercial airplane and glider ratings and is a Life
Member of the Academy of Model Aeronautics where he is a Leader Member as well as a
Contest Director. Professor Trapnell serves as chairman of the Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Committee for the University Aviation Association.
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1
History
Douglas M. Marshall and Benjamin Trapnell
1.1 The Beginning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.2 The Need for Effective Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 The Radio and the Autopilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 The Aerial Torpedo: The First Modern Unmanned Aircraft (March 6, 1918) . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 The Target Drone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.6 WWII U.S. Navy Assault Drone. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.7 WWII German V-1 Buzz Bomb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.8 WWII German Mistletoe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.9 Early Unmanned Reconnaissance Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.10 Radar Decoys: 1950s–1970s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.11 Long-Range Reconnaissance Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 1960s–1970s . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.12 First Helicopter Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 1960s–1970s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.13 The Hunt for Autonomous Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.14 The Birth of the Twin Boom Pushers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.15 Desert Storm: 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.16 Overcoming the Manned Pilot Bias. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.17 Amateur-Built Unmanned Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.18 Will Unmanned Aircraft Systems Replace Manned Aircraft?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Discussion Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.1 The Beginning

Long before the first manned powered flight took place (who accomplished this and when
are still the subjects of much controversy), the history of the unmanned version of flying
devices arguably begins with Homo sapiens’ curiosity about what makes birds fly, driven by
a desire to overcome the limitations imposed by gravity. To soar with the birds, to observe
the Earth from a point of view known only to the avian class of vertebrates, has been one of
the strongest motivational forces in mankind’s history. Whether in mythology (Icarus, who
flew too close to the Sun) or in the earliest texts from the High Renaissance, visionaries and
dreamers (Da Vinci’s 1488 drawing of a flying machine) have provided glimpses of what
might be possible and, in their own ways, laid down a road map for future generations
to explore the potential for manned flight. Indeed, from centuries past when Chinese
kites graced the skies, to the first hot air balloons in the mid-18th century (the Montgolfier
1
2
2 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems
brothers), unmanned flying contrivances utilized the technologies of the day to pave a way
forward for the development of manned aircraft. The technical revolution embodied in
manned aircraft did not mean that unmanned aircraft were rendered obsolete. On the con-
trary, the modernization of systems developed for manned aircraft, coupled with advances
in electronic systems, power sources, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology, enabled
the integration of automation that refined, if not defined, the capabilities of both manned
and unmanned aircraft systems.
In modern times, the term “unmanned aircraft” has come to mean an autonomous or
remotely piloted vehicle that is used to navigate in the air. Even the name assigned to
unoccupied aircraft has changed over the years, as viewed by aircraft manufacturers, civil
aviation authorities, and the military. Aerial torpedoes, drones, pilotless vehicles, radio-
controlled aircraft, remotely controlled aircraft, remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), autono-
mous aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and
others, are but a few of the terms used to describe a flying machine operated without a
pilot onboard.
In progressing through this chapter, the perceptive reader will observe that all aircraft,
manned or unmanned, followed essentially the same iterative process involving the devel-
opment of aerodynamic forces by wings or rotors that offset the weight of the craft, allowing
it to fly. This progression involved the introduction of aircraft control, allowing the pilot
to maneuver the aircraft in pitch and bank, effecting safe, aerodynamic control. When
more than gliding was desired, the evolution of aircraft design included the creation of
suitable propulsion systems, lightweight and powerful enough to drive the craft through
the air. As the ability to fly greater distances became desirable, the need for proper navi-
gational systems arose, and the resulting development of flight and navigation automa-
tion systems reduced the pilot workloads in flight. None of these innovations were trivial
matters, as each relied upon the unique adaptation of immature existing technologies to
create the new ones that were needed. Advancements in the sciences of aerodynamics,
structures, propulsion, flight control systems, stabilization systems, navigation systems,
communications and the integration of all in flight automation systems made the nearly
parallel development of manned and unmanned aircraft systems possible. It continues
today with refinements made feasible by the advancements in computer technologies and
potential energy systems.
In the early years of aviation, the idea of flying an aircraft with no one onboard had the
obvious advantage of removing the risk to life and limb presented by these highly experi-
mental contraptions.1 As a result, several mishaps are recorded where advances were
made without injury to an onboard pilot. Although such approaches to remove people
from the equation were used, the lack of a satisfactory method to affect control limited the
use of these relatively primitive unmanned aircraft. Early aviation developmental efforts
soon turned to the employment of the first “test pilots” to fly these groundbreaking craft.
Further advances beyond unmanned gliders often had tragic results, as even pioneer Otto
Lilienthal was killed flying an experimental glider in 1896.
As seen with the current uses of unmanned aircraft, unmanned aircraft historically
often followed a consistent operational pattern, described today as the “three Ds”, which
stands for dangerous, dirty, and dull. Dangerous means that someone is either trying to
bring down the aircraft or where the life of the pilot may be at undue risk operationally.
Dirty is where the environment may be contaminated by chemical, biological, or radio-
logical hazards precluding human exposure. Finally, dull is where the task requires long
hours in the air, making manned flight fatiguing, stressful, and therefore, not desirable or
safe for the pilot.
3
History 3
1.2 The Need for Effective Control

The Wright Brothers’ success in flying the first airplane is more of a technical success
story in solving the problem of the pilot’s ability to control a heavier-than-air craft. Many
aviation pioneers either used weight shifting to control their inventions or aerodynamic
design (i.e., dihedral) to stabilize their craft, hoping that a solution would evolve during
testing. Dr. Samuel P. Langley, the heavily government-financed early airplane designer
competing with those two bicycle mechanics from Ohio, also wrestled with the problem of
how to control an airplane in flight. Dr. Langley’s attempts with a far more sophisticated
and better powered airplane, however, ended up in the Potomac River; not once, but
twice, over the issue of adequate flight control. After the Wright Brothers taught the fledg-
ling aviation world the secrets of controlled flight, namely, their wing-warping approach
to roll control, and a movable horizontal “rudder” for pitch control, aircraft develop-
ment experienced a burst of technical advancement. Yet, it took the tragedy of World
War I (WWI) and the military demands of the 1914–1918 conflict to stimulate the rapid
development of a useful tool. All aspects of aircraft design, from relatively advanced
power plants, to fuselage structures, to lifting wing configurations, and to control surface
arrangements, began to mature into what we see today as the “airplane.” It was in the
crucible of “the war to end all wars” that aviation came of age, and along with this wave
of technological advancement came the critical but little recognized necessity of achieving
effective flight control.
1.3 The Radio and the Autopilot

As is often the case with many game-changing technological advances, inventions of
seemingly unrelated items combined in new arrangements to serve as the catalyst for new
concepts. Such is the case with unmanned aircraft. Even before the first flight of Wright
Brothers in 1903, the famous electrical/mechanical engineer-inventor and futurist Nikola
Tesla proposed the idea of a remotely piloted aircraft in the late 1890s to act as a flying guided
bomb. His concept appears to have been an outgrowth of his work building the world’s
first guided underwater torpedoes, controlled by what was then called “teleautomation,”
in 1898. Tesla preceded the invention of the radio in 1893 by demonstrating one of the
first practical applications of a device known as a full-spectrum spark-gap transmitter.
Tesla went on to help develop frequency separation and is recognized by many as the real
inventor of the modern radio (Marconi’s advocates would disagree).
While the electrical genius Tesla was busy designing the first electric architecture for the
City of New York, another inventor, Elmer Sperry, the founder of the famed flight con-
trol firm that still bears his name, was developing the first practical gyro-control system.
Sperry’s work, like Tesla’s, focused initially on underwater torpedoes for the Navy. He
developed a three-axis mechanical gyroscope system that took inputs from the gyros and
converted them to simple magnetic signals, which, in turn, were used to affect actuators.
The slow speeds of water travel, and weight not being as critical an issue for seacraft,
allowed Sperry to perfect his design of the first reliable mechanical autopilot. Next, Sperry
turned his attention to the growing new aircraft industry as a possible market for his mari-
time invention, not for the purpose of operating an aircraft unmanned, but as a safety
4
device to help tame unstable manned aircraft, and to assist the pilot in maintaining his or
her bearings in bad weather. Sperry began adopting his system of control on early aircraft
with the help of airframe designer Glenn Curtiss. Together they made a perfect team of
flyer-designer and automation inventor. Following excellent prewar progress on the idea,
the demand during WWI to find new weapons to combat Germany’s battleships combined
the inventions of the radio, airplane, and mechanical autopilot to field the first practical
unmanned aircraft, an aerial (or air-dropped) torpedo.
1.4 The Aerial Torpedo: The First Modern Unmanned

Aircraft (March 6, 1918)
In late 1916, with war raging in Europe, the U.S. Navy, a military arm of a still neutral
country, funded Sperry to begin developing an unmanned aerial or airborne torpedo.
Elmer Sperry put together a team to tackle the most daunting aerospace endeavor of the
time. The Navy contract directed Sperry to build a small, lightweight airplane that could
launch itself without a pilot, fly out to 1,000 yards, guided to a target, and detonate its
warhead at a point close enough to be effective against a warship. Considering that the
airplane had just been invented 13 years earlier, the ability to even build an airframe cap-
able of delivering a large explosive payload against an armored ship, a sizable radio with
batteries, heavy electrical actuators, and a large mechanical three-axis gyrostabilization
unit, was by itself extraordinary, but then integrating these primitive technologies into
an effective flight profile was spectacular. This aircraft was thus a direct ancestor of the
modern cruise missile.
Sperry tapped his son Lawrence to lead the flight testing conducted on Long Island,
New York. As the United States entered WWI in mid-1917, these various technologies were
brought together to begin testing. It is a credit to the substantial funding provided by
the U.S. Navy that the project was able to weather a long series of setbacks, crashes, and
outright failures of the various components that were to make up the Curtiss-Sperry N-9
Aerial Torpedo. Everything that could go wrong did. Catapults failed; engines died; air-
frame after airframe crashed in stalls, rollovers, and crosswind shifts. The Sperry team
persevered and finally on March 6, 1918, the Curtiss prototype successfully launched
unmanned, flew its 1,000-yard course in stable flight and dived on its target at the intended
time and place, then recovered and landed. Thus was born the world’s first true unmanned
system, or “drone.”
Not to be outdone by the Navy, the Army invested in an aerial bomb concept similar to
the aerial torpedo. This effort continued to leverage Sperry’s mechanical gyrostabilization
technology and ran nearly concurrent with the Navy program. Charles Kettering
designed a lightweight biplane that incorporated aerodynamic static stability features not
emphasized on manned aircraft, such as exaggerated main wing dihedral, which increases
an airplane’s roll stability at the price of complexity and some loss in maneuverability. The
Ford Motor Company was tapped to design a new lightweight V4 engine that developed
41 hp and weighed 151 pounds. The landing gear had a very wide stance to reduce ground
roll on landings. To further reduce cost and to highlight the disposable nature of the air-
craft, the frame incorporated pasteboard and paper skin alongside traditional cloth. The
aircraft employed a catapult system with a nonadjustable full throttle setting.
5
History 5
FIGURE 1.1
U.S. Army Liberty Eagle (Kettering Bug).
The Kettering aerial bomb, dubbed the Bug (Figure 1.1), demonstrated impressive dis-
tance and altitude performance, having flown some tests at 100 miles distance and 10,000
ft altitudes. To prove the validity of the airframe components, a model was built with a
manned cockpit so that a test pilot could fly the aircraft. Unlike the Navy aerial torpedo,
which was never put into service production, the aerial bomb was the first mass-produced
unmanned aircraft. While too late to see combat in WWI, the aircraft served in testing roles
for some 12–18 months after the war. The aerial bomb had a supporter in the person of then
Colonel Henry “Hap” Arnold, who later became a five-star general in charge of the entire
U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II (WWII). The program garnered significant attention
when Secretary of War Newton Baker observed a test flight in October 1918. After the war,
some 12 Bugs were used alongside several aerial torpedoes for continued test flights at
Calstrom Field in Florida.
1.5 The Target Drone

Surprisingly, most of the aviation efforts in unmanned aircraft after WWI did not pursue
weapons platforms such as the wartime aerial torpedo and bomb. Instead, developers
focused primarily on employing unmanned aircraft technology as target drones. In
the interwar years (1919–1939), the manned aircraft’s ability to influence the outcome
of ground and naval warfare was recognized, and militaries around the world invested
more in antiaircraft weaponry. This, in turn, created a demand for realistic targets, and the
unmanned target drone was born. (Some have argued that target drones are the only true
“drones.” All others are called UAS/UAV/RPAS etc., because they are intended to return
home and perform missions other than being shot down). Target drones also played a
key role in testing air war doctrine. The British Royal Air Force was in a debate with
the Royal Navy over the ability of an airplane to sink a ship. In the early 1920s, General
Billy Mitchell of the Army Air Corps sank a war prize German battleship and subse-
quent older target warships, to the dismay of the U.S. Navy. The counterargument to
6
these demonstrations was that a fully manned ship armed with antiaircraft guns would
easily shoot down attacking aircraft. The British used unmanned target drones flown over
such armed warships to test the validity of the argument. In 1933, to the surprise of all, a
target drone flew over 40 missions above Royal Navy warships armed with the latest anti-
aircraft guns without being shot down. Unmanned aircraft technology played a key role
in formulating air power doctrine and provided key data that contributed to America,
England, and Japan concluding that aircraft carriers, which played such a vital role in
upcoming WWII, were a good investment.
In the United States, the target drone effort was influenced by the development of the
Sperry Messenger, a lightweight biplane built in both manned and unmanned versions as
a courier for military applications, and as a possible torpedo carrier. Some 20 of these air-
craft were ordered. The U.S. Army identified this class of aircraft in 1920 as a Messenger
Aerial Torpedo (MAT). The effort waned in the early 1920s, however, and Sperry Aircraft
Corporation withdrew from active unmanned aircraft design with the untimely death of
Lawrence Sperry, the son of the founder and victim of an aircraft accident.
As the U.S. Army lost interest in the MAT program, the service turned its attention to
target drones. By 1933, Reginald Denny, a British-born actor and an avid model aviation
enthusiast, using an aircraft obtained from aviation modeler Walter Righter, perfected a
radio-controlled airplane only 10 ft long and powered by a single-cylinder 8 hp engine.
Having been an observer/gunner in the Royal Flying Corps in WWI, Denney saw the
possibility of creating a radio-controlled target drone for the U.S. Army to allow gunners
to actually shoot at an airborne target, known as the “Dennyplane.” With this aircraft,
Denny won an Army contract and produced the target drone, as well as later models, in a
shop located in Southern California. The Army designated this craft the OQ-1 Radioplane,
and subsequent versions continued with the OQ (subscale target) designation. The Navy
bought the aircraft, designated Target Drone Denny 1 (TDD-1). Some 15,000 of all variants
were produced and they served throughout WWII as the world’s most popular target
drone. The company was eventually sold to Northrop in 1952.
In the late 1930s, the U.S. Navy returned to the unmanned aircraft arena with the devel-
opment of the Navy Research Lab N2C-2 Target Drone (Figure 1.2). This 2,500-pound
radial engine biplane was instrumental in identifying the deficiencies in Naval anti-
aircraft prowess. Much like the earlier Royal Air Force experience with the Royal Navy,
where drones survived numerous passes on well-armed warships, the U.S. Navy battle-
ship Utah failed to shoot down any N2C-2 drones that were making mock attacks on the
ship. Curiously enough, the U.S. Navy added yet another title by describing this class of
unmanned drones as No Live Operator Onboard (NOLO).2
During the same interwar years, the British Royal Navy attempted to develop an
unmanned aerial torpedo and an unmanned target drone, both utilizing the same fuselage.
Several attempts were made to launch these aircraft from ships, with little success. The
Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) finally gained a measure of success with a “Long
Range Gun with Lynx engine” called together the “Larynx.” This program was followed
by the Royal Air Force automating an existing manned aircraft as its first practical target
drone. This effort involved utilizing the Fairey Scout 111F manned aircraft converted as
a gyrostabilized radio-controlled plane, now referred to as the Queen. Of the five aircraft
built, the first four crashed on their first flight. The fifth aircraft, however, proved more
successful and succeeded in subsequent gunnery trials.
The next evolution was to take the Fairey flight control system and combine it with the
excellent, and highly stable, DeHavilland Gypsy Moth. Dubbed the Queen Bee, this aircraft
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FIGURE 1.2
Curtiss N2C-2 target drone.
proved much more reliable than the earlier Queen, with the Royal Air Force placing an
order for 420 target drones. This led to the designation of an unmanned aircraft being
described by the letter Q to denote unmanned operation. This protocol was also adopted
by the U.S. Military. Although unverified by research, the term drone is believed by some
to have originated with the Queen name as meaning “a bee or drone.” Between WWI and
WWII, almost all nations with an aviation industry embarked on some form of unmanned
aircraft research. These efforts were mainly in the form of target drones.3
1.6 WWII U.S. Navy Assault Drone

The U.S. Navy leveraged its experience with the 1930s N2C-2 Target Drone, which was
controlled by an operator from a nearby manned aircraft in flight, to develop a large-scale
aerial torpedo now reclassified as an assault drone. Initially, the assault drone effort took
the form of the TDN-1, built in a 200-unit production run in early 1940. This aircraft had
a wingspan of 48 ft and was powered by twin six-cylinder O-435 Lycoming engines with
220 hp each in a high-wing configuration (Figure 1.3). The aircraft was intended to be
employed as a bomb or torpedo carrier, in high-risk environments, to mitigate the risk to
aircrews. The groundbreaking advancement of this unmanned aircraft was the first use of
a detection sensor in the form of a primitive 75-pound RCA television (TV) camera in the
nose to provide a remote pilot better terminal guidance from standoff distances. Given the
relatively poor reliability and resolution of the first TVs, this was indeed a remarkable feat
of new technology integration. The TDN-1 was superseded by a more advanced model
called the Navy/Interstate TDR-1 Assault Drone. Some 140 clones were built. A Special
8
FIGURE 1.3
Naval aircraft factory TDN-1 “Assault Drone.”
Air Task Force (SATFOR) was organized and sent to the Pacific Theater. It used the tech-
nology against the Japanese during the Bougainville Island Campaign in 1944 with limited,
but definable, success. Operationally, a Navy Avenger Torpedo Bomber was flown as the
guiding aircraft. Equipped with radio transmitters to affect radio control, a TV receiver
was also installed that enabled an operator to guide the drone to its target from as far
as 25 miles away. Approximately 50 aircraft were thus employed against various targets,
attaining roughly a 33% success rate.
The U.S. Navy and Army Air Forces then turned to outfitting older four-engine bombers
into unmanned aircraft to be deployed in the European Theater to destroy highly defended,
high-priority targets such as V-1 Buzz Bomb bunkers in Siracourt and the heavily fortified
U-boat pens in Heligoland. Operation Aphrodite, as it was called, consisted of stripping
out Navy PB4Y-2 Privateers (the Navy version of the Consolidated B-24) and B-17s and
packing them with high explosives. They were equipped with a Sperry-designed, three-
axis autopilot for stabilization, radio control links for remote control, and RCA TV cameras
in the cockpit. The concept of the operation was for pilots in the aircraft to control it during
takeoff. Once established in remote-controlled cruising flights, these pilots would arm the
explosives and parachute from the “flying bomb” over friendly England, while the air-
craft, controlled by an operator in a nearby manned bomber, would be guided to its target.
Operations commenced in August 1944, with rather dubious results. On the first mission,
the aircraft spun out of control after the pilots left the plane. Subsequent flights ended
similarly with loss of control of the aircraft or lack of suitable visibility to fly the aircraft
accurately to the target. On August 12, 1944, a BQ-8 “robot” (converted B-24 Liberator)
aircraft with two pilots at the controls detonated prematurely, killing Navy Lieutenants
Wilford J. Wiley and Joseph P. Kennedy. The latter was President John F. Kennedy’s older
brother and son of the former U.S. Ambassador to England, Joseph Kennedy. Continued
failures with equipment and/or operational weather-related incidents, combined with
the rapid advancement of Allied forces in Europe, forced the cancellation of the program.
In retrospect, this could be considered the first use of unmanned aircraft as an offensive
weapon.
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1.7 WWII German V-1 Buzz Bomb

The most significant unmanned aircraft of WWII was Nazi Germany’s V-1 Buzz Bomb
(Vengeance Weapon-1). Based on the earlier 1930s work by inventor Paul Schmidt in
developing a practical pulse jet, the aircraft integrated an advanced, lightweight, and
reliable three-axis gyrostabilized autopilot, a radio signal baseline system for accurate
launch point data, and a robust steel fuselage that was resistant to battle damage. The
V-1 represented the first successful, mass-produced, cruise-missile-type unmanned air-
craft, and its configuration influenced many postwar follow-on unmanned aircraft designs
(Figure 1.4).
The V-1 was manufactured by Fieseler Aircraft Company in large numbers, with more
than 25,000 built. This high number makes the V-1 the most numerous combat unmanned
aircraft in history, excluding modern hand-launched platforms. The aircraft was flexible in
being capable of both ground and air-launching. It utilized a powerful pneumatic catapult
system, which is a familiar feature on many modern-day UAS. The pulse jet was a simple,
lightweight, high-thrust device that operated on the principle of cyclic compressions/
explosions at about 50 times per second. Employing closing veins to direct the gas toward
the exhaust, these cycles created the hallmark “buzz” sound made by the engines in flight.
Although not fuel efficient by traditional jet engine standards, the pulse jet was inexpen-
sive to produce, provided high thrust, was reliable, and could operate with significant
battle damage. The V-1 was also the world’s first jet-powered unmanned aircraft, weighing
about 5,000 pounds, with an impressive 1,800-pound warhead.
Operationally, the V-1 was primarily employed from ground-launch rail systems. A small
number were air-launched from Heinkel 111 bombers, making the V-1 the world’s first air-
launched unmanned aircraft as well. Some 10,000 V-1s were launched against Allied cities
and military targets, killing some 7,000 people.
Though the V-1’s guidance system allowed it to maintain heading and altitude, it was
unable to provide the capability of in-flight navigation. Accurate weather forecasts, pri-
marily wind direction and speed, were necessary to allow the operators to launch the air-
craft in the right direction. At a predetermined time in the flight, a device would close the
FIGURE 1.4
Fieseler FI 103 (V-1) German Buzz Bomb.
10
fuel valve, thereby terminating powered flight. The aircraft would then assume a nose-
down attitude, with the warhead detonating on contact with the ground. It was neces-
sary therefore to have accurate intelligence to determine where these bombs landed so
that proper preflight preparation would allow for some modicum of accuracy. Though
a meager 25% were considered successful, when compared to its fairly low cost, and the
reportedly devastating effect it had on public morale, the V-1 was considered to be an
effective weaponized unmanned aircraft. Mass produced, and employing many firsts for
autonomously flown aircraft, it influenced future designs and provided the historical con-
text to fund many more sophisticated unmanned programs during the following Cold
War.4 The U.S. Navy built a reverse-engineered copy for use in the invasion of Japan and
launched improved versions from submarines on the surface, gaining yet another title as
the world’s first naval-launched, jet-powered, unmanned cruise missile.
1.8 WWII German Mistletoe

The teaming of manned and unmanned aircraft was not the exclusive domain of the Allies
in WWII. In addition to the V-1, the Germans, built a significant number of piggyback air-
craft configurations known as Mistletoe Bombers. The main issue with the effectiveness of
the V-1 was that it was not very accurate in flying to its desired target. Mistel (Mistletoe) was
an attempt by the Germans to deal with this problem. The concept was for an unmanned
bomber, usually a twin-engine JU-88, being modified to carry a manned fighter, supported
by struts, on its upper surface. The pilot of the manned fighter would guide the bomber
to its target, and then, release it allowing an onboard stabilization system to allow the
explosive-laden bomber to glide to the target. Though about 250 such examples were built,
the concept had marginal success, due primarily to operational challenges rather than
technical issues.
The German Mistletoe concept could be termed more of a guided bomb than an
unmanned aircraft, and several gliding guided bombs were developed by the Germans
with limited success. The lines between guided missile and unmanned aircraft are not
always clear, and in WWII, the V-1 assault drones, explosive-packed, radio-controlled
bombers, and the piggyback Mistletoe configuration all involved forms of an airplane,
which places them in the category of unmanned aircraft. This distinction is far less clear in
the view of future cruise missiles, which are more closely related to their ballistic cousins
than airplanes.
1.9 Early Unmanned Reconnaissance Aircraft

As we have seen from the beginning of the first successful unmanned aircraft flight in 1918
to WWII, unmanned aircraft have been employed mainly in the target drone and weapons
delivery roles. Unmanned aircraft development in the follow-on Cold War years shifted
dramatically toward reconnaissance and decoy missions. This trend has continued today,
where nearly 90% of unmanned aircraft are involved in some form of data gathering in mili-
tary, law enforcement, environmental monitoring and aerial inspections applications, and
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more recently, commercial payload delivery.. The main reasons unmanned aircraft were
not employed in WWII for reconnaissance had more to do with the imagery technology
and navigation requirements than the aircraft platforms themselves. Cameras in the 1940s
required relatively accurate navigation to gain the desired areas of interest, and navigation
technology of the day could not compete with a trained pilot with a map. This changed in
the postwar years with the advent of radar mapping, better radio navigation, Loran-type
networks, and global and inertial navigation systems, all enabling an unmanned aircraft to
fly autonomously to and from the target area with sufficient accuracy.
One of the first reconnaissance high-performance unmanned aircraft to be evaluated
was the Radio Plane YQ-1B high-altitude target drone modified to carry cameras, sub-
sequently GAM-67. This turbojet-powered aircraft was primarily air launched from B-47
aircraft and was proposed to be used in the suppression of enemy antiaircraft destruction
(SEAD) role. Cameras were also proposed, but the program was canceled after only about
20 aircraft were built. Poor range and high cost were given as the reasons for cancellation.
1.10 Radar Decoys: 1950s–1970s

The Vietnam War of the 1960s and early 1970s created a high demand for countermeasures
to Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) used by the North Vietnamese. The missile
threat relied extensively on radar detection of American aircraft. Jamming of these radars
was attempted with mixed results. However, even under the best of circumstances,
jamming ground-based radars with airborne systems was problematic in that the ground
system probably had access to more power, enabling the radar to overcome the jamming
emitter. A more effective solution was to fool the radar into believing that it has locked on
to a real aircraft and having it waste its expensive missiles on a false target. The U.S. Air
Force embarked on such a solution by developing a series of unmanned aircraft to decoy
enemy SAM batteries.
To deceive a radar operator into believing a decoy resembles a B-52 Bomber, for example,
the decoy aircraft does not need to be built to physically resemble the actual aircraft. Only
minor radar reflectors are needed to create a return radar signal that mimics the intended
target. The addition of radios that mimic the electronic signatures of such aircraft enhances
the illusion. As a result, the unmanned Air Force decoys were small in size but had the
desired effect. The most frequently used radar decoy was the McDonnell ADM-20 Quail,
which could be carried inside the bomb bay of a B-52 and air launched prior to the bombing
run. The Quail weighed about 1,000 pounds, had a range of 400 miles, and could mimic
the speed and maneuvers of a B-52. As radar resolution improved, the decoys became less
effective and most were out of service by the 1970s.
1.11 Long-Range Reconnaissance Unmanned Aircraft

Systems: 1960s–1970s
The U.S. Air Force pioneered the first mass-produced, long-range, high-speed unmanned
aircraft designed to conduct primarily reconnaissance missions, but these systems evolved
12
FIGURE 1.5
AQM Lightning Bug.
into supporting a wide array of tasks, from suppression of enemy air defenses to weapons
delivery. The Ryan model 147, later renamed the AQM-34 Lightning Bug and Firebee
series, has the longest service record for an unmanned aircraft. Designed as an initiative of
the Ryan Aircraft Company in the late 1950s from an earlier target drone, the aircraft was
powered by a turbojet, employed low drag wing and fuselage configuration and could
reach altitudes in excess of 50,000 ft and speeds of 600 knots (high subsonic).
The “Bug,” as it was called by its operators, had a long career and flew in a wide range
of highland low- altitude profiles performing electronic signal- gathering intelligence,
camera reconnaissance, and various decoy radar signal transmissions. A frequent violator
of hostile airspace, many were shot down, but sufficient numbers successfully completed
their missions to justify their use. The aircraft underwent many modifications over its
operational life spanning the early 1960s to 2003. Many unique and groundbreaking
technologies were employed in the Bug unmanned aircraft, including air launch from
the wing store of modified DC-130 aircraft to midair parachute snag recovery from H-
2 “Jolly Green Giant” helicopters. The AQM-34 performed high-priority missions of great
national importance, such as reconnaissance missions during the 1960s Cuban Missile
Crisis, to relatively mundane tasks as a target drone for fighter aircraft air-to-air missiles
(Figure 1.5).
1.12 First Helicopter Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 1960s–1970s

The U.S. Navy’s QH-50 Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH), developed in the early
1960s, established several firsts for unmanned aircraft. This unusual stacked, counter-
rotating rotary wing aircraft was the first unmanned helicopter and the first unmanned air-
craft to take off and land on a ship at sea. The requirement for the DASH was to extend the
delivery range of antisubmarine homing torpedoes. A typical destroyer in the early 1960s
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History 13
could detect a submarine at ranges of over 20 miles, but could only launch weapons at less
than 5 miles from the target. This small, compact, unmanned helicopter only needed to fly
off to the maximum detection range and drop its homing torpedoes over the submerged
submarine. The QH-50 DASH used remote control via a pilot on the fantail of a ship to
take off and land, and then employed a gyrostabilizer autopilot to direct the aircraft to
a location that was tracked by the launching ship’s radar. More than 700 DASH aircraft
were built and were used from 1960s to the mid-1970s, when they finished up their career
as towing targets for antiaircraft gunnery. Several countries, including France and Japan,
operated the DASH aircraft.
1.13 The Hunt for Autonomous Operation

From the very first unmanned aircraft, designers strived to gain as much independent
flight operation from manned ground control as possible. Military requirements called for
maximum standoff distance, long endurance, and significant data streams from onboard
sensors. The demand for data competed with bandwidth for flight control transmission,
further driving the need for self-flight or autonomous operation. Enemy jamming may
delay sensor transmission, but disrupting required flight control information might cause
the loss of the aircraft. Cognizant of Britain’s ability to jam its signals, the German V-1
Flying Bomb of WWII employed a crude, fully autonomous flight control and navigation
system based on mechanical gyros, timers, and some primitive preprogramming involving
fuel shutoff to initiate the termination dive. It was not until the advent of small, light-
weight digital computers, inertial navigation technology, and finally the global positioning
system (GPS) satellite network, that autonomous unmanned aircraft operation gained
flight autonomy on a par with a human-piloted vehicle.
Lightweight computer technology developed in the 1970s, which led to the worldwide
explosion in personal computers and the digitalization of everyday items from wristwatches
to kitchen appliances, played the most significant role in unmanned aircraft autonomy.
With each advance in computing power and cache memory retrieval, unmanned aircraft
gained greater flexibility in addressing changes in winds and weather conditions as well
as new variables affecting the mission equipment payloads. Mapping data could now be
stored aboard the aircraft, which not only improved navigation but also enabled more
accurate sensor camera imagery.
1.14 The Birth of the Twin Boom Pushers

The U.S. Marine Corps’ groundbreaking work in the late 1960s with the “Bikini” drone,
built by Republic Aviation, laid the foundation of what was to become the most popular
UAS configuration, the AAI RQ-7 Shadow, which is the most widely deployed military
UAS outside of the hand-launched AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven. The Bikini drone, which
did not receive any official military designation, was a small, lightweight aircraft, with a
fuselage focused on providing the camera payload with a nearly unobstructed field of view
attained by placement in the nose section. This evolved into a pusher engine arrangement
14
further simplified by a twin boom tail (such as the RQ-7 Shadow). Although “delta pusher”
designs were attempted, most notably the Lockheed MQM-105 Aquila UAS, this aero-
dynamic configuration made weight and balance a more challenging proposition, since
the elevator moment arms were generally fixed, whereas the twin booms could be easily
extended.
In the late 1970s, capitalizing on the Marine Corps Bikini configuration, the Israelis
developed a small tactical battlefield surveillance UAS called the “Scout,” built by Israel
Aerospace Industries (IAI). The Scout was accompanied by IAI Decoy UAV-A and the
Ryan-built Mabat. The decoys were designed to be flown against SAM batteries to fool
their radar into activating early or even firing a missile on the drone itself. The Mabat
was designed to collect antiaircraft radar signals associated with SAM batteries. Finally,
the Scout was designed to exploit the actions of the other two in order to put eyes on the
SAM batteries for targeting information and damage assessment after a strike. In addition,
the Scout provided close-up battlefield imagery to maneuvering ground commanders, a
first for unmanned aircraft. This approach differed greatly from all the previous recon-
naissance UAS platforms, in that their imagery was more operational and strategic, with
film being developed afterward or even electronically transmitted to a collection center
for analysis. The advances in small-sized computers enabled this real-time bird’s-eye view
to a maneuvering leader on the ground directly influenced the decision process on small
groups of soldiers or even individual tank movement.
Israeli forces made significant advances in battlefield situational awareness during the
June 1982 Bekaa Valley conflict between Israeli and Syrian forces. “Operation Peace for
Galilee,” as it was called by Israel, involved an Israeli ground offensive against Hezbollah
terrorists occupying southern Lebanon. Syria, allied with Hezbollah, occupied a large
portion of the Bekaa Valley with a sizable ground force consisting of large numbers of new
Soviet tanks and heavy artillery. Syrian forces were supported by sophisticated Soviet-
built SAM batteries. Israel used a combination of jet-powered decoys and Mabat signal-
gathering UASs to detect and identify the Syria SAM battery-operating frequencies, and
then using the Scout with other manned assets quickly destroyed most of the SAM threat,
enabling the Israeli ground forces to maneuver with close air support. The Scout UAS,
with its twin boom pusher configuration, flew along the sand dunes of the Bekaa Valley
and identified Syrian tanks with near real-time data feed to maneuvering Israeli small-unit
commanders. This eye-in-the-sky advantage enabled a smaller force to move with greater
speed, provided excellent targeting data to Cobra attack helicopters, and directed very
effective artillery fire. The Scout UAS was too small to be picked up and tracked by Syrian
Soviet-designed radar and proved to be too difficult to observe by fast-moving Syrian jet
fighters. The 1982 Bekaa Valley experience initiated a worldwide race to develop close-
battle unmanned aircraft.
1.15 Desert Storm: 1991

While the short 1982 Israeli–Syrian Bekaa Valley campaign represented the first use of close
battle UASs, Desert Storm in 1991 represented the first wide-scale deployment of those
systems. The United States and its allies used unmanned aircraft continuously from Desert
Shield through Desert Storm. The most frequently employed system was the now-familiar
twin boom pusher configuration of the AeroVironment FQM-151 “Pointer” and the AAI
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History 15
FIGURE 1.6
AAI RQ2 Pioneer.
RQ-2 “Pioneer” (Figure 1.6). The Pioneer aircraft, essentially an upgraded “Scout,” was a
joint Israeli–U.S. effort that was powered by a 27 hp snowmobile engine, flew via a remote
control joystick on the ground, had a range of about 100 miles, and required an altitude
of 2,000 ft to maintain a line-of-sight transmission data link. Fully autonomous flight was
technically possible, but operators of these aircraft opted to have a manned pilot remotely
piloting the aircraft to achieve more responsive battlefield maneuvering at a desired point
of interest. GPS and computer power were not yet sufficiently integrated to enable ground
operators to simply designate waypoints on short notice. Also, imagery feeds via satellite
links were not sufficiently developed at that small dimension to affect transmission of data.
During Desert Storm, U.S. forces flew some 500 UAS sorties. The Pointer and Pioneers
guided artillery, even directing the heavy 16-inch gunfire from the battleship Iowa. There is
a documented case in which a group of Iraqi soldiers attempted to surrender to a Pointer
flying low over the desert.
After the Desert Storm experience most militaries around the world concluded that
UAS platforms did indeed have a role to play in spotting enemy locations and directing
artillery fire. Conversely, many military analysts concluded that the vulnerable data links
precluded UAS use across the board as a replacement for most manned aircraft missions
and roles. This opinion was based in part on the limitations of the line-of-sight data link of
the Pointer and Pioneer, and a deep-seated cultural opposition from manned aircraft pilots
and their leadership. A large segment of a nation’s defense budget is dedicated to the pro-
curement of military aircraft and the training and employment of large numbers of pilots,
navigators, and other crew members. Most air forces choose their senior leaders after years
of having proved themselves in the cockpit flying tactical aircraft. The very idea of cheaper,
unmanned aircraft replacing manned platforms ran against what President Eisenhower
warned as the self-fulfilling “military–industrial complex.”
1.16 Overcoming the Manned Pilot Bias

From the 1990s to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, unmanned aircraft made slow progress,
leveraging the increases in small, compact, low-cost computers and the miniaturization
16
of a more accurate GPS signal. However, the barrier to widespread acceptance laid with
manned aircraft platforms and the pilots who saw UAS technology as replacing their
livelihoods. When 9/11 occurred, the U.S. Army had only 30 unmanned aircraft. By 2010,
that number grew to more than 2,000. The argument against unmanned aircraft had finally
given way to the low cost, the reduced risk, and the practicality of a drone, as the press,
the regulators and the general public still call them today, performing the long, boring
missions of countless hours of surveillance in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With a person
still in the loop of any lethal missile leaving the rails of an Air Force Predator UAS, the
“responsibility” argument has for the time being been addressed.
1.17 Amateur-Built Unmanned Aircraft

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Nikola Tesla pioneered the development of a means
for successfully controlling an object from a remote location. It should not be difficult, then
to see from a military standpoint that such a device would have a significant impact on
the nature of armed conflict. It should also be obvious that inquisitive amateurs would
also be interested in investigating the possibilities of utilizing this technology for control-
ling model aircraft that had thus far been flown by line control or as free-flying models. In
the 1930s, the British developed the “Queen Bee” remotely piloted aerial drone. Reginald
Denny, the British actor and avid aeromodeler, like many enthusiasts who look to make a
career out of their hobby, used his aircraft modeling passion, and a desire to incorporate
the new methods for radio control, to develop aircraft to be sold to the government as
target drones. The control systems of the time were large, heavy, and very crude compared
to modern radio-control (RC) systems. Proportional control, the idea of providing incre-
mental flight control displacement that matches what a pilot could do in the cockpit, was
but a dream to the early RC pilots. But, as with many dreams, persistence on the part of
passionate pioneers, the development of faster and cheaper computer technologies, the
creation of microelectric mechanical systems (MEMS), GPS navigation on a computer chip,
miniature power plants, and advanced radio systems, have created an environment con-
ducive to a rapid transformation of a toy into a viable tool. It can be argued that the rapid
advancements in the hobbyist radio-controlled aircraft and the development of miniature
automated stability and navigation systems are creating the commercial revolution of a
technology that is rivaled only by computers and the mobile phone. The revolution has
happened so quickly that regulatory entities such as the Federal Aviation Administration
of the United States have had difficulty controlling its proliferation in many commercial
industries. Predictably, the “military industrial complex” presses for the development of
unmanned aircraft from one side, while the hobbyists and legions of entrepreneurs push
for the commercial use of unmanned aircraft from the other.
1.18 Will Unmanned Aircraft Systems Replace Manned Aircraft?

The spectrum of unmanned aircraft control runs from a completely autonomous flight
control system independent of any outside signals to one that employs a constant data
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link enabling a pilot to remotely fly the aircraft with, of course, any number of variations
in between. A fully autonomous aircraft could, in theory, fly without the effects of signal
jamming and carry out a variety of complex missions. The disadvantage is that a fully
autonomous flight control system can be simulated in a computer, enabling a hostile actor
to develop counters to the system much in the same way that video gamers do with autono-
mous opponents. Once the program flaws are identified, defeating the autonomous system
becomes a simpler task. Additionally, fully autonomous systems would most likely not be
allowed to employ lethal force in a military or law enforcement setting, since the chain of
responsibility is nearly nonexistent (someone has to initiate the mission, but after that all
bets are off). At the other end of the spectrum, an aircraft that depends on an outside signal,
no matter how well it is encrypted, has the potential to be jammed, or worse, directed by
the enemy through a false coded message. Even if true artificial intelligence is developed
enabling an unmanned aircraft to act autonomously with the intuitiveness of a human
being, the responsibility factor will prevent the UAS from fully replacing manned aircraft.
This is even more true with civil applications of passenger travel where at least one “con-
ductor” on board will be required to be held accountable for the actions of the aircraft
and to exercise authority over the passengers. A truly autonomous passenger aircraft, one
without a pilot on board or “in the loop” is now science fiction, but as computers become
more capable and other improvements are made in the fields of structural dynamics, air-
space management, and human-machine interfaces, it would be foolish to declare that
such a concept will never happen.
It becomes clear, then, that all of the limitations and risks that are manifest in military
applications of unmanned systems are no less significant when applied to non-military,
law enforcement, governmental, civilian, and commercial uses of autonomous or semi-
autonomous UAS. Hacking, misdirection, spoofing, system disruptions or failures, oper-
ator error, and a multitude of other potential mishaps are all factors that must be addressed
by regulators, developers, manufacturers, end users and recipients of services when con-
templating the substitution of UAS for other forms of consumer services. These challenges
and issues are the subjects of the following chapters in this book.
Discussion Questions
1.1 Sir George Caley, Otto Lilienthal, Samuel Pierpont Langley, and the Wright Brothers: All
used unmanned aircraft in the development of their concepts of manned aircraft. What
might their reasoning have been and what might some of the advantages have been in
so doing?
1.2 Some have argued that the Wright Brothers’ greatest accomplishment was figuring out
how to provide a method to control an aircraft about the lateral axis. The Kettering Bug
did not use wing warping or Curtiss’ ailerons for such control. How might this have
facilitated or hindered the early unmanned aircraft’s success?
1.3 Replacing the human in the manned aircraft with a suitable mechanical system proved
to be a daunting problem in the past, and even, in some ways, to this day. How did the
efforts of Tesla and Sperry serve to pave the way to an automated system?
1.4 What was the most significant unmanned aircraft of WWII? What influenced your
choice?
18
1.5 A lack of accuracy in automated navigation systems prevented nearly all militarized
unmanned aircraft from being effective strategic weapons prior to the Gulf War. What
technological advancements changed this situation?
1.6 Many can point to myriad reasons that allowed the successful development of UAS.
Which technologies played a major role in the development of commercial UASs?
What technology advancements will provide the next great leap in the capabilities
of UAS?
Notes
1 The German aviation pioneer Otto Lilienthal, circa 1890s, employed unmanned gliders as experi-
mental test beds for main lifting wing designs and the development of lightweight aerostructures.
So, too, did the Wright Brothers, flying their first gliders as kites, to unlock the mathematics of
lift and drag, and working out the details of aircraft control, all the while remaining safely on the
ground.
2 The Navy target drone program of the late 1930s developed the technique of controlling an
unmanned aircraft from a manned aircraft in flight. Used with some success during WWII, the
technique was rediscovered and used in Vietnam and too [no! “to” is the correct word]much
greater effect in the Iraq conflict.
3 Germany, however, was an exception. Paul Schmidt, who pioneered the pulse jet as a low-cost,
simple, high-performance thrusting device in 1935, found his work being considered by Luftwaffe
General Erhard Milch, who recommended the new pulse jet be adapted to unmanned aircraft,
which later took the form of the Fieseler Fi 103 flying bomb; better known to the Allies as the
“Buzz Bomb.”
4 The operational capabilities of the V-1 and its ability to carry a large weapon across international
borders unmanned are [should probably be “were”] likely the impetus for the inclusion of the
following statement in the initial charter of the International Civil Aviation Organization’s
Chicago Convention of 1944: “No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown
without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that State
and in accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each contracting State undertakes to
insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall be so
controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft.” Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art.
8. Chicago, 1944.
19
2
UAS Applications
Mark Patrick Collins
2.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Basic Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.1 Control Methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.1.1 Manual Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.1.2 Stabilized Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.1.3 Automated Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Payloads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.1 Remote Sensing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.2 Passive Electro-Optical Sensors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.2.1 Electro-Optical Imaging System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.2.2 Visible RGB Sensors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.2.3 Full-Motion Video Sensors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.2.4 IR/NIR/SWIR Sensors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.2.5 MWIR/LWIR Sensors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.3 Active Sensors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.3.1 LiDAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.3.2 Radar and Synthetic Aperture Radar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4 UAS Software for Commercial Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.1 UAS Fleet Management Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.2 Autopilot Software. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.3 Sensor Data Asset Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.4 Analytical Photogrammetry Software. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.5 Change Detection and Machine Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.6 Computer Vision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.6.1 Autonomous Flight Path Algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 Commercial Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5.1 Building and Roof Inspections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5.2 Aircraft Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.3 Oil, Gas, Power Lines, and Nuclear Power Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5.4 Industrial Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5.5 Civil Infrastructure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5.6 Electric Power Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5.7 Wind Turbine Inspection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5.8 Tower/Antenna Inspection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5.9 Oil and Gas Inspection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5.10 Photogrammetric Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
19
newgenprepdf
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2.5.11
Aerial Mapping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.12
Aerial Surveying. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5.13
Volumetrics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5.14
Precision Agriculture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5.15
Natural Resource Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5.16
Aerial Filming and Photography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5.17
Filmmaking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5.18
Real Estate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5.19
Marketing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5.20
News Reporting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5.21
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Emergency Response. . . . . . 45
2.5.22
Law Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5.23
Search and Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5.24
Signals Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.5.25
Communications Relay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.26
Atmospheric Information Collection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.27
Meteorology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.28
Hazardous Material Detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5.29
Radioactive Material Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5.30
Applications Requiring Physical Interaction with Substances,
Materials, or Objects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5.31 Aerial Chemical Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5.32 Water Sampling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.33 Small Unmanned Cargo Aircraft Delivery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.34 Large Unmanned Cargo Delivery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.6 Additional Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.6.1 Mission Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.6.2 Data Processing and Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.7 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.1 Introduction
Unmanned technology, and robotics in general, is a revolutionary technology that has
applications in nearly every industry. There are new unmanned systems applications
discovered on a daily basis that can improve the efficiency or safety of countless tasks. This
chapter will provide an overview of some of the most common applications for unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) at various stages of maturity. Additionally, the basic technology that
differentiates applications and operational considerations will be explored.
The UAS applications range from simple video capture to precise scientific measure-
ment. The knowledge UAS operators need to complete their missions varies dramatic-
ally from very few prerequisites to extensive specialized training in a scientific discipline.
This range in expertise is a clear demonstration that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are
tools used to collect specific information for a particular application. Outside of the flight
training environment, the operation of an unmanned system is rarely conducted solely for
21
UAS Applications 21
the purpose of flying an aircraft. Therefore, it is critical to know the purpose of the mission
and the type of data collection required prior to the actual launch of the UAS.
The applications discussed in this chapter all have their own set of challenges and
variables. The best practices associated with each application could cover an entire book.
This chapter provides only a broad cross section of the industries and missions.
2.2 Basic Technology

Before launching into a discussion of the many and varied uses for UASs, some founda-
tional information on methods of vehicle control, stabilization, and sensor design may
prove beneficial, particularly for those with limited exposure to unmanned technology.
The topics included in the next few subsections will provide a fundamental understanding
of basic platform control and sensor technology.
2.2.1 Control Methods

To begin the discussion, the various methods of aircraft control and methods of conducting
missions must be considered. The operation of the aircraft ranges from full manual control
to stabilized or “remote control” and to automated flight profiles without direct flight path
control. The level of automation in the flight mission is dependent upon several factors
that include, but are not limited to, the amount of repetitious aircraft movement required,
the aircraft’s proximity to other objects, and the dynamic nature of the mission.
2.2.1.1 Manual Control

Under manual control the operator has direct, unassisted control of the aircraft’s flight
path. The control input is typically applied through a handheld console that allows the
operator to make fine changes in aircraft pitch, roll, yaw, and throttle (see Figure 2.1).
The console can be configured to provide exponential control depending on the degree of
input applied. Fine adjustments can be made with small inputs and large inputs can cause
exponentially larger effects. The operator may also have direct control over other aircraft
subsystems such as flaps, landing gear, and brakes.
Manual aircraft control provides a skilled operator with precise control over the aircraft’s
flight path and predictable outcomes to control inputs. However, safe and effective manual
control requires extensive operator training and experience. Because of the difficulty of
manually controlling an aircraft, many operators have spent a lifetime developing the
flying skills they need to be capable of full manual control.
2.2.1.2 Stabilized Control

Under stabilized control, the operator has direct, assisted control of the aircraft’s flight
path. This type of aircraft control typically routes the operator’s inputs from a handheld
console through an autopilot onboard the aircraft that translates the direct inputs into
desired outputs. Stabilized control allows the operator to maintain control of the aircraft’s
position, but reduces the fine control needed to ensure that a fixed-wing aircraft returns to
22
FIGURE 2.1
Example of an external pilot (EP) console that can be used to manually control the aircraft. (Courtesy of Kansas
State University Polytechnic.)
wings level or a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft returns to hover. Some VTOL
aircraft are equipped with a magnetometer that designates a single direction as “away”
from the operator so that away, left, right, and toward the operator remains constant,
regardless of the aircraft’s orientation. Stabilized control greatly reduces the level of skill
required for the operator to effectively and safely control the aircraft while still providing
dynamic control of the flight path. Most VTOL systems are capable of stabilized control.
This ease of aircraft operation has resulted in significant growth in the VTOL market.
However, stabilized control means that the operator must be able to see the aircraft clearly
enough to determine the precise orientation of the aircraft in relation to the object(s) being
observed. Applications that require repetitive, precise positioning of the aircraft over an
area of interest, such as aerial mapping, are difficult to conduct from the ground-level per-
spective of an operator.
2.2.1.3 Automated Control

Under automated control, the operator has indirect, assisted control of the aircraft’s flight
path. This type of control is typically conducted through a graphical software interface that
provides an overhead view of the aircraft’s position overlaid on aerial or satellite imagery
(see Figure 2.2). The operator can usually plan the mission in advance with the software’s
planning tools, which upload commands to the aircraft during flight to alter the flight
path. The aircraft’s autopilot determines the control surface and throttle inputs to position
the aircraft on the desired flight path in a three-dimensional (3-D) space, and the operator
observes the behavior of the aircraft to ensure that the mission is conducted as desired.
Automated control requires the least amount of direct operator skill for aircraft control;
however, the many software interfaces for UASs vary greatly in complexity. Some interfaces
are designed to provide only basic functionality, especially if they are custom-tailored to a
specific aircraft and only need high-level inputs from the operator. Other interfaces require
23
UAS Applications 23
FIGURE 2.2
The Mission Planner software is an example of a graphical interface used for automated missions. (Courtesy of
Kansas State University Polytechnic.)
operator input for every possible variable in the mission and can take a significant time
to learn. Regardless of the interface, automated control can greatly increase the efficiency
and reduce the workload required for a particular mission. Repetitive flight paths, such as
orbits and mapping missions, are particularly well suited to automated control.
2.3 Payloads
Payload is defined as the total weight a drone or UAV can carry. It does not include the
weight of the drone, but is anything that can be added to the drone. This includes cameras,
sensors, military armament, packages for delivery, or even passengers. Larger payloads
over longer distances give more commercial operational capability. One example is light
detection and ranging (LiDAR) technology with infrared (IR), RGB, and video cameras on
large unmanned cargo aircraft (LUCA) to deliver cargo. However, larger payloads require
larger UAVs and have greater power requirements.
Varying factors must be considered to decide which payload is needed. The most
important variants are the mission goals and customer requirements, which set the
parameters for the payload and aircraft type. This allows the operator to calculate the
total payload weight and power requirements and choose the optimal equipment for each
mission. When a mission requires that multiple types of payloads be combined on one
UAV, the available space, mounting hardware, overall peak power requirements, shared
data links, stabilization requirements, and other factors must also be taken into account.
The most common types of payload currently used on small UAS (sUAS) are electro-
optical (EO) and IR referred to as EO/IR. The EO/IR sensors are operated on gimbals and
turrets or can be laid flat with the nadir pointing down.
24
2.3.1 Remote Sensing

Remote sensing is defined as “the science of gathering data on an object or area from a con-
siderable distance, as with radar or infrared photography, to observe the earth or heavenly
body” (Dictionary.com, 2015). This definition is purposefully broad and it encompasses
many common UAS applications. While it is not possible to list every remote-sensing appli-
cation of UASs in the context of this chapter, it is worthwhile to note a few key examples.
The common thread of these examples is that they involve the remote observation of the
earth in order to measure some characteristics thereof. These measurements can range from
plant health to the topography of a given area. Most remote-sensing applications require
careful control of how the data are collected in order to make precise measurements, thus
making remote sensing one of the more challenging applications to conduct accurately.
2.3.2 Passive Electro-Optical Sensors

EO sensor types are passive, meaning that they collect reflected light energy or heat
(thermal) energy emitted from objects. EO sensors refer to those sensor types that can
collect and process visible and nonvisible electromagnetic (EM) energy. Many texts refer
to EO sensors as measuring only the visible EM spectrum but this is not true. Technically,
an EO sensor can operate in any part of the ultraviolet (UV), visible, or IR portion of the
EM spectrum. It is common industry practice to differentiate the types of sensors with the
designations RGB (visible), UV, IR, near-infrared (NIR), short wave infrared (SWIR), or
middle wavelength infrared (MWIR). Table 2.1 details the sensor types and commercial
applications for various passive electro optical wavebands. Figure 2.3 shows the electro-
magnetic spectrum based on wavelength. Table 2.1 shows the infared section of the spec-
trum broken out in microns from NIR to LWIR.
6,400°F 2,150°F 850°F

.76 um 2 um 4 um 103 um
In general, discussions on
Short Medium Long infrared wavelengths are
wave wave wave categorized as either short,
medium and long. A more
precise description of these
wavelengths is in Microns,
a unit of measure that is
th
1000 of a millimeter.
Gamma X Rays Ultraviolet Infrared Microwave Radio

Rays Rays Waves
1 pm 1 nm 1 um 1 mm 1m 1 km
10–4 um 10–3 um 103 um 104 um 105 um
Visible
light
FIGURE 2.3
The electromagnetic spectrum describes the various types of electromagnetic energy based on wavelength
(Protherm, n.d.).
25
UAS Applications 25
TABLE 2.1
Passive Electro-Optical Sensor Chart
Sensor Electromagnetic Commercial
Acronym Meaning Waveband Applications
Visible (RGB) Daytime imaging using charged 0.4–0.75 µm Filming, photography, construction,
coupled device detector (CCD) engineering, inspection,
arrays, Provides the friendliest navigation, scientific and medical
image to the human observer. research, surveillance, search, and
Dependent on reflected light rescue.
energy Mapping, surveying,
military
UV Measures the intensity of UV 0.4–0.001 µm Scientific and medical research,
radiation. archeology, geology, artistic
photography
NIR Most NIR sensors will see out to 0.75–1.1 µm Agriculture, forestry, infrastructure
1 µm. Can enable visible sensors inspection, construction,
to see better at dawn and dusk or engineering, research,
poor visibility. Example devices military, geology, search and rescue,
include night vision, image mapping, surveying
intensifiers, low light level TV, etc.
SWIR EO sensors operating in this region They operate Agriculture, forestry, infrastructure
will produce quality images between 1.1 µm inspection, engineering,
using reflected light. It has some and about 2.5–3 construction, research, geology,
capability to see temperature µm (author-/ search & rescue, surveillance,
emission. This enables SWIR to text-dependent) military
penetrate haze and poor visibility
conditions much better than MWIR
& LWIR
MWIR Temperature thermal emissivity They operate Agriculture, forestry, infrastructure
capture is dominant in these sensor between 3 and5 inspection, engineering,
types; reflected light energy is less µm construction, research, geology,
dominant. search & rescue, surveillance,
military
LWIR Temperature thermal emissivity They operate Agriculture, forestry, infrastructure
between 8 and inspection, engineering,
12 µm construction, research, geology,
search & rescue, surveillance,
military
2.3.2.1 Electro-Optical Imaging System

An EO imaging system is a system of electronics and optics that can remotely sense the
optical frequency EM energy, collect the sensed optical EM frequency data, convert the
sensed optical signals to electrical signals, amplify and process the signals, use the signals
to run algorithms, and display the results for human observers to see and use.
2.3.2.2 Visible RGB Sensors

Visible sensors operate in the 0.4–0.75 µm range of the EM spectrum. They require an
external source of illumination such as the sun, moon, stars, or artificial light to capture
data, and provide the most user-friendly image for a human observer. The number of com-
mercially available digital visible light sensors on the market today is large. They are often
26
used for surveillance or to take pictures and video of infrastructure or agriculture. Many
visible RGB sensors are able to capture both still pictures and full-motion video (FMV).
These pictures can be used to create 2-D or 3-D representations with photogrammetry
programs like Pix4dMapper or Drone Deploy.
2.3.2.3 Full-Motion Video Sensors

FMV sensors collect continuous imagery that can be played back in real time or after
collection. FMV captures the dynamic motion of objects and/or persons and is used in a
variety of applications to understand the scenario that is unfolding within the imager’s
field of view. FMV is particularly well suited to active environments such as cinematog-
raphy and law-enforcement applications. However, most FMV imagers are of significantly
lower resolution than still imagers. Even 1080p “high-definition” video only contains
about 2 million pixels per image. Still, imagery might contain over 30 million pixels in
each image, which means that 1080p high-definition video has only 1/15th the resolution
of high quality still imagery. FMV can be used with visible or IR sensor types.
Similar to still imagery, FMV can be tagged with metadata describing the imagery.
Certain software can “exploit” the imagery to its fullest extent by using this metadata.
Typically, the metadata are used to graphically display the location of the camera, the
location of the object that the camera is viewing, or to automatically adjust the imagery
to remove distortion or other artifacts. The operator must be aware of the metadata
requirements prior to the flight mission to ensure that the desired information is captured
for the application.
2.3.2.4 IR/NIR/SWIR Sensors

NIR operates from 0.075 to 1.1 µm on the EM spectrum. NIR is reflected light that is not
visible to humans. It enables night vision devices, image intensifiers, and low light level
TV. It is currently used for a variety of purposes including agriculture, forestry, military,
and law enforcement.
SWIR operates between 1.1 and about 3 µm. This is also reflected light that is not vis-
ible to humans. SWIR can penetrate haze and poor visibility conditions much better than
MWIR and long wave infrared (LWIR).
2.3.2.5 MWIR/LWIR Sensors

Midwave infrared (MWIR) sensors operate between 3 and 5 µm. LWIR operates between 8
and 12 µm. The MWIR and LWIR cameras can sense both reflected light and heat emitted
from objects (thermal energy).
UAV light amplification sensors, sometimes called image intensification sensors, typ-
ically do not work in the daytime because there is too much light. Light amplification
requires only a small amount of ambient light or a manmade light illuminator to work
properly, but an external illumination source is required. Some examples of light amplifi-
cation EO sensors are night vision devices and low light level TV cameras.
Thermal imaging devices (Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) cameras) detect thermal
(heat) emissions and do not need an external source of illumination. Thermal sensors
primarily operate in the MWIR (3–5 µm) or the LWIR (8–12 µm) portions of the EM
spectrum.
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UAS Applications 27
2.3.3 Active Sensors

Active sensors provide their own energy (EM radiation) to illuminate the object or scene
they observe. They send a pulse of energy from the sensor to the object and then use the
reflected radiation, or backscatter, from that object to measure distances or generate 3-D
maps. The two most common types of active sensors are synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
and LiDAR. LiDAR can be used to map and maintain pipelines and other infrastructure
more easily than the traditional method, which requires expensive manned airplanes
to fly over the target areas. Pilots and observers with binoculars look for land erosion,
land encroachment, water shedding, new construction, spills, or other hazards to critical
infrastructure. Unfortunately, these surveys are limited by human capabilities, and can
be inaccurate or incomplete. Using UAS and LiDAR mapping techniques can reduce the
expense and increase the accuracy of the data used to determine infrastructure hazards.
2.3.3.1 LiDAR
YellowScan and Velodyne LiDAR are manufacturing commercial LiDAR sensors for UAS
use that are lightweight and are built to withstand extreme environments. One example
is the Velodyne HDL-32E LiDAR sensor pictured in Figure 2.4. It is small, lightweight,
ruggedly built and features up to 32 lasers across a 40° vertical field of view. The power
consumption is typically 12 W, including the interface box and regulated power supply.
The HDL-32E is rated to operate in temperatures from –10 to +60 °C. It measures only 5.7″
high × 3.4″ in diameter, weighs less than 2 kg, and was designed to exceed the demands of
the most challenging real-world autonomous navigation, 3D mobile mapping, and other
LiDAR applications. The HDL-32 E generates a point cloud of up to 695,000 points per
second with a range of up to 100 m and a typical accuracy of ±2 cm (Velodyne Lidar, n.d.).
FIGURE 2.4
Velodyne Lidar HDL-32E Lidar Sensor for UAS applications (Velodyne Lidar, n.d.).
28
2.3.3.2 Radar and Synthetic Aperture Radar

Operationally, SAR has several striking advantages. First, with a small physical antenna
that operates at wavelengths suitable for long-range mapping, SAR can provide azimuth
resolutions as fine as a foot. Second, by increasing the length of the array in proportion
to the range of the area to be mapped, the resolution can be made independent of range.
Third, since the array is formed in the signal processor, the basic SAR technique can con-
veniently be adapted to a wide variety of operational requirements (Stimson, 1998). For
example, it can generate terrain maps during the day or night through smoke, haze, fog, or
clouds. However, one of the major disadvantages of this sensor is called shadowing, which
occurs when something on the ground blocks the radar signal from producing an echo
return. Instead of seeing the ground, a dark area is displayed in the SAR image. A good
example is when a mountain is in the way of the transmitted radio wave. Because of the
slant range of the radar and the mountain’s position, the backside of the mountain will be
a shadow. The size of the shadow depends on the angle of the SAR and the position of the
mountain. The lower the angle, the longer the shadow will be.
2.4 UAS Software for Commercial Applications

In the past decade, the commercial drone industry has seen dramatic advances in UAS tech-
nology and software programs. This includes software developed by National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) and industry leaders for unmanned traffic manage-
ment (UTM), fleet management, flight planning, airspace safety, autopilots, analytical soft-
ware, change detection, machine learning, and computer vision programs. This section
will go over basic software programs used by commercial operators to operate its drone
fleets safely within the National Airspace System (NAS).
2.4.1 UAS Fleet Management Software

As organizations expand their UAS portfolios, they require a method to control their fleets,
the missions they operate, the people who operate them, and the data they collect. This
includes being able to supervise multiple simultaneous UAS missions while ensuring
airspace regulatory compliance and safety of all the missions the organization operates.
Companies such as Measure Ground Control, Kittyhawk, and Skyward are starting to
develop what is being called UAS Fleet Management Software (UFMS). The purpose of
this type of software program is to help manage organizational UAV fleets, accessories,
operators, safety, checklists, maintenance schedules, missions, telemetry, analytics, and all
the data the organization collects; and to store all of this data in one secure location within
a cloud environment. This software improves project coordination by allowing teams to
oversee live or postoperations with an Internet browser. Remote pilots can create and fly
missions, while other users can see telemetry data from the drone missions, including live
video feeds from remote pilot’s mobile devices. This allows organizations to be more trans-
parent with their information, track team efficiency, and record data to comply with FAA
regulations. Stakeholders can even replay entire missions from takeoff to landing. The real-
time updating of flight logs allows the organization to track equipment usage, pilot flight
time, and pilot training. This allows users to have more proactive versus reactive safety
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UAS Applications 29
and UAS maintenance programs. Users are also able to generate reports showing incidents
and historical graphs of previous missions.
The amount of data that are being collected and stored is immense. Traditionally, the
information was stored on individual computers that were not accessible to every user.
This made it difficult to transfer files, maps, or reports to users of the system. Fortunately,
the UFMS can generate mission analytic reports that are easy to access, read, and use.
These programs are now using machine learning and change detection to enhance the
safety of the missions and make it easier for human users to identify areas of interest.
One other significant advantage of using UFMS is that stakeholders can grant user
permissions based on their role in the company. Administrators oversee the entire oper-
ation and the fleet by assigning roles for each user; pilots, pilot training, pilot certifications,
data analysts, data administrators, asset managers, resource managers, and captains.
Users can schedule flight missions and assign drone assets to individual teams or remote
pilots. This allows companies to manage numerous flight teams, resources, maintenance
processes, and share sensor data with all the stakeholders of the company in locations
throughout the world. This enables more people to access the data as they need it to make
informed decisions about the missions they operate.
2.4.2 Autopilot Software

One key technology enabler is the ability of UFMS to support commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) drones, as well as custom built ones that use open-source and COTS autopilot
software and hardware. Open-source autopilot systems such as PX4 and ArduPilot work
with the MAVLink communication protocol developed by an open-source project called
Dronecode. This project was started in 2008 by Lorenz Meier, cofounder of Auterion.
Dronecode is one open-source project that is helping supply the drone industry with
state-of-the-art software and hardware. PX4 is the autopilot software that operates on the
PixHawk hardware platform. The Dronecode project hosted under the Linux Foundation
serves as the vendor-neutral home for PX4, MAVLink, QGroundControl, and Dronecode
SDK (DroneCode, n.d.). These systems have become the industry standard over the last
decade because they have hundreds of developers contributing to the technology. This
enables the technology to come to market faster than it would have otherwise. Consequently,
many COTS drones use open-source autopilot and hardware available for free through the
DroneCode project. This allows companies to invest their resources in airframe, propulsion,
or sensor system development instead of flight control systems. One such example is the
new U.S.-based drone start-up manufacturer Impossible Aerospace. They have developed
a lightweight all electric quadcopter that can go 45 mph with 1.5 pounds of payload for 1
hour and 18 minutes using PX4 ecosystem and MAVLink communication protocols. This
drone manufacturer in Silicon Valley, California, is on a mission to assemble the highest
performance electric aircraft, the Impossible US-1 (Cozzens, 2019). The performance and
capability of the Impossible US-1 pictured in Figure 2.5 is a big improvement over DJI,
which has dominated sUAS market for the last few years.
2.4.3 Sensor Data Asset Management

Although sensor data are extremely useful for a multitude of applications, users con-
tinue to struggle with how to handle the enormous quantity of data that needs to be
stored, processed, and transformed into usable products such as digital terrain models
(DTMs), digital surface models (DSMs), and 3-D point cloud models. The basic customer
30
FIGURE 2.5
Impossible Aerospace US-A with FLIR sensor (Cozzens, T., 2019).
requirement is for users to be able to access the data that are needed, when and where it
is needed, and to be sure that the data integrity is maintained or guaranteed in the pro-
cess. The two main processes for sharing sensor data are through the web or through a file
system.
The Geospatial Intelligence Standards (GIS) group has helped to establish important
standards that are used to record imagery. Each image collected contains unique (GIS)
metadata about that image that may include time of collection, platform, Geo-location,
speed, altitude, roll, pitch, yaw, and other important data specific to where and when the
picture was taken. This information helps provide context and meaning to the image and
is sometimes called ancillary data. The ancillary data are extremely useful for managing,
analyzing, and distributing the data.
2.4.4 Analytical Photogrammetry Software

Photogrammetry software is expanding users’ ability to create highly precise two-
dimensional (2-D) and 3-D maps. In large areas, the drone is flown in a grid pattern with
its camera facing straight down (nadir) taking a series of overlapping photographs every
100–400 feet. Since the photographs have the unique GIS data embedded in each picture,
they can be stitched together so that the pixel elements in each picture are tied to the
identical pixel elements in other photos. Depending on the map size, identifiable features
on the ground, and the amount of picture overlap, there may be 100 or more pictures that
can have the same pixel element. To map vertical terrain or building facades, remote pilots
fly a multicopter UAS in a grid pattern with the camera in an oblique position. See Figure
2.7 façade scanning software tool from UgCS for a visual illustration of what a vertical
flight plan for a building façade might look like.
2.4.5 Change Detection and Machine Learning

UAS applications that have incorporated change detection and machine learning have
exploded over the last few years. AI and machine learning are changing the funda-
mental way companies are looking at their operations. Companies like PrecisionHawk
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UAS Applications 31
are capitalizing on this by pivoting their businesses away from just manufacturing drones
to providing enterprises with on-demand aerial intelligence. They collect information in
five main areas: construction, insurance, energy, government, and agriculture markets
(PrecisionHawk, 2017). PrecisionHawk is taking the data collected and merging it with
data science, 2-D and 3-D modeling, deep learning, computer vision, and automation to
provide its customers with actionable intelligence. For example, PrecisionHawk partnered
with Florida Power and Light (FPL) to help inspect its power lines. They use UAS to fly
precisely programmed flight plans along its power line infrastructure, which makes the
data they collect more consistent in terms of height and flight path than is possible from a
helicopter (Skylogic Research, 2019).
One recent problem that has come up in recent years is how to handle the volume of
pictures, data points, and video collected. FPL Project Manager Eric Schwartz said at AUVSI
Xponential keynote address, “This data represents thousands of miles of inspections and
millions of pictures just sitting on multiple share points across multiple locations of its com-
pany. This data is the true gold that has yet to be mined.” The value of using drones with
machine learning, image recognition, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) is that the enhanced
system can help notify the human user that something has changed in a specific area over
a certain time period. This saves companies the cost of hiring trained image experts to
review all the images and videos for defects and, since human errors are generally greater
than AI errors, it increases accuracy. Image recognition software can help identify and cat-
egorize machines, parts, and infrastructure –another way to conserve resources.
2.4.6 Computer Vision

For UAS to be fully autonomous, they need to be able to adjust their flight plans so that
they do not hit anything. Computer vision, a relatively new term for the commercial UAV
industry, allows the UAV to use its exteroceptive sensors to detect and avoid objects in
much the same way as humans do with their eyes and brain. Exterceptive sensors include
high-definition visible RGB depth cameras, NIR, FLIR, LiDAR, and SAR cameras. One
example of an RGBD camera is the Intel RealSense Tracking Camera T265 (Figure 2.6).
FIGURE 2.6
Intel RealSense Tracking Camera T265.
32
It is a stand-alone simultaneous localization and mapping device for robots, drones,

and more. It can operate safely in the most difficult and dangerous locations, including
poorly mapped areas, indoors, or in dynamically moving environments. Examples
include urban environments, construction sites, warehouses, factories, forests, remote
locations, places with other UAS operating in close proximity, or GPS-denied areas.
Because of the computational requirements of running path-planning algorithms to
avoid objects, a companion computer like raspberry pi is needed to process the UAV
onboard sensor data. Some stakeholders use MAVROS to run the algorithms and the
MAVLink communication protocol to send command output signals to the flight con-
troller. Computer vision integrates 3-D data from the sensors to help the UAV map
dynamic environments in real time and determine distances, speeds, and vectors of all
moving objects. This allows the UAV to avoid obstacles and navigate around them to
reach the mission destination.
2.4.6.1 Autonomous Flight Path Algorithms

Two popular path-planning algorithms used for UAV computer vision are the Enhanced
VFH+ and VFH* algorithms, which have been proven to track and avoid objects while
navigating in complex environments. The VFH* is an improvement to the VFH+ and uses
the A* search algorithm to minimize the cost and heuristic functions. This is especially
advantageous for fast-moving UAVs in areas where other manned aircraft or UAVs may
be operating. The VFH* planning algorithm was enhanced by Johann Borenstein and Iwan
Ulrich in 2000 to help calculate trajectory and flight path of robotic vehicles. It is a suit-
able algorithm for UAVs because it takes into account the kinematic limitations (turning
radius of the UV) and also develops real-time polar histograms of obstacles within the
sensor’s field of view. Siegwart, Nourbakhsh, and Scaramuzza (2011) describe using
the polar histogram to help calculate the flight path of UAVs. A polar histogram shows
the probability that an obstacle is in the UAV flight path. All flight paths identified by the
sensors as large enough for the UAV to pass through are listed as possible paths. After this
is done, a heuristic cost function is applied to every possible flight paths. The cost function
G has three heuristic terms. G = target direction (a) + the aircraft orientation (b) + the pre-
vious direction (c). The aircraft orientation (b) = the difference between the new direction
and the current direction. The previous direction (c) = the difference between the previ-
ously selected direction and the new direction. The calculations are structured so that a
large deviation from the goal direction leads to a high cost for the “target direction.” The
parameters a, b, and c in the cost function G guide the UAV’s behavior. A strong bias is
expressed for values that keep the aircraft closest to the target direction (a). The passage
with the least cost that is closest the direction of flight and clear of all objects is the one that
is chosen (Siegwart et al., 2011).
The quality of current sensors coupled with increased computing power has enabled
these algorithms to start detecting even the smallest of objects, including birds, branches
on tree, and wires in an urban environment. If GPS is not available during operation of a
UAV in a complex urban environment, indoors, or under a thick forest canopy, a method is
needed to keep the UAV safely on mission and in control. Multiple exteroceptive sensors
with onboard flight planning algorithms like VFH* Computer Vision are not dependent on
GPS to navigate autonomously; they are using the information collected from the sensors
to develop their own map to navigate safely to the destination. This is also true when
landing a UAV without access to global positioning data. The computer vision onboard the
UAV is able to land safely or continue its mission safely as needed.
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UAS Applications 33
2.5 Commercial Applications

The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of the use of unmanned aircraft as
sensor platforms to acquire data. Subsections will discuss the concept of remote sensing,
metric and mapping applications, and imaging for a variety of applications that include
inspection of structures and infrastructures, news gathering, cinematography, commercial
promotion, law enforcement, emergency management, cargo delivery, search and rescue,
commercial agriculture, and reconnaissance among others. Nonvisual applications will
also be covered. The section will conclude with a discussion of relevant factors critical to
the successful acquisition of remotely sensed data.
2.5.1 Building and Roof Inspections

The construction, engineering, real estate, and insurance communities have a strong interest
in using UAS for building and roof inspections. Building facade inspection programs are
mandated by many cities in the United States to proactively identify unsafe conditions
that may present a risk of injury or damage to property. While the specific requirements
of each city’s ordinances differ, all regulations stipulate that inspections be performed at
regular intervals. For example, in Chicago buildings, 80 feet tall or more must be inspected
every 4–12 years, based on the assigned category of the building (Vertical Access, n.d.).
These types of visual inspections are costly and dangerous when performed by highly
trained inspectors on a rope or scaffolding. However, stakeholders can now complete these
inspections much more safely with UAVs without the need for a waiver from the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). Since the FAA nationwide deployment of Low Altitude
Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) and 14 CFR Part 107 went into effect,
stakeholders can now obtain approval to operate inspection missions in urban environ-
ments even with multiple airports or helipads nearby. However, performing this type of
job by flying manually would be extremely difficult even for the most experienced remote
pilot, so stakeholders are using autonomous operations to perform these flights safely and
accurately. Many use advanced mission planning software programs like UgCS to plan
and fly complex missions where hazards or no fly zones might exist. Users create a flight
plan vertically across each facade of the building, setting the distances from the building
and the overlap. The UgCS automatically calculates the optimal flight path for the vertical
grid pattern using either an RGB or thermal camera. The camera is placed at an oblique
FIGURE 2.7
UgCS Façade scanning software tool (UgCS, n.d.).
34
angle to the vertical or horizontal axis of the building. Each picture is georeferenced so
that users can create 2-D or 3-D orthomosaic maps of the building in much the same way
as for surveying and mapping missions. Postprocessing of the data can include object
identification software to count and identify objects on the building, and change detection
algorithms to identify what has changed over time. The drones that would be best suited
for this type of inspection would be the Yuneec H520, DJI Mavic 2 Enterprise, DJI M200,
DJI Inspire 1 or 2, DJI Matrice 600, Lockheed Martin Indago UAS, or a Mavlink compatible
multicopter. An advantage of the DJI Mavic 2 is the spotlight that can light up shadowed
architectural recesses for a more thorough inspection.
2.5.2 Aircraft Inspections

Drones are being used today to inspect large aircraft for damage, and to deliver parts to
line mechanics repairing aircraft on the flight line. Situation where risk to humans can
be mitigated, time saved, and resources conserved is where drone operations are most
prevalent. For example, FedEx is using drones at their Memphis, Tennessee, hub to detect
icing on the cowling and empennage of the MD-10 and MD-11 number two engines. These
engines are located at the base of the vertical stabilizer, where line mechanics would have
to use bucket trucks to inspect them in person. Using drones in this manner has many
benefits to FedEx, including reduced risk for people and equipment, reduced inspection
time, and reduced line maintenance expenses.
Another example of drones being used for aircraft inspection is at ST Engineering
Aerospace, a Part 145 repair station performing heavy maintenance checks in Singapore
on Air New Zealand Boeing 777s. The inspection drones take a series of high-definition
pictures on a planned route around the aircraft’s exterior. The photos are processed by
software called DroScan that can detect and classify defects. “We’ve trialed using DroScan
on a number of our aircraft undergoing maintenance inspections in Singapore now and
believe using a drone will also help improve inspection quality. In future, there may be an
opportunity to use the device in New Zealand, for example to conduct ad hoc inspections
after lightning strikes,” said Air NZ chief ground operations officer Carrie Hurihanganui
(Chua, 2019).
2.5.3 Oil, Gas, Power Lines, and Nuclear Power Plants

The oil and gas industry has been using manned aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) to
inspect oil and gas pipelines for decades. The frequency of the inspections depends on
the age of the pipelines, location, and contents. Some require daily monitoring, while
others are monitored once every couple of months (Whittaker, 2014). Traditionally
manned aircraft fly close to the ground, between 300 and 1,000 feet, with a crew of two
to three people (spotters) who perform a nondestructive visual inspection of the pipe-
line infrastructure. They use airborne sensors, write down what they see from the air,
and report deficiencies to the oil and gas companies. Trained staff analyze the data and
then disseminate it to other company stakeholders. This manual method of inspection is
expensive, dangerous, and ineffective. It is estimated that the industry spends about $50
billion annually to monitor their infrastructure (Whittaker, 2014). Consequently, com-
panies like Marathon Pipeline LLC (MPL) are increasingly using drones for regular pipe-
line maintenance inspections.
The company started using drones to inspect pipeline areas where high water was
feared, and have now moved to more advanced inspection methods like mapping and
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UAS Applications 35
emergency response. They use drones to inspect areas that are difficult or hazardous to
access on foot, for project and pre-bid planning, and for emergency response to areas
affected by weather or flooding. MPL integrates video and images with its GIS software to
create 2-D and 3-D maps that provide immediate information, plus an historical look at its
flights, pictures, and video. The latest addition to the MPL fleet is a SwellPro SplashDrone,
a waterproof drone that can be used in wet weather for quick data access during floods
(Kezdi, 2018).
Oil and gas companies are starting to use drones to locate traces of hydrocarbon or
methane emission, track land owner property encroachment (right of way monitoring),
search out damage to the pipeline or infrastructure that is above ground, find hazardous
spills, identify unauthorized machinery parked or operated near pipeline areas, and look
for water shedding and land erosion issues. Areas where the pipeline crosses above or
below a river or culvert require special attention; land erosion in these areas is more likely
and may be severe.
The GIS software used for these tasks makes stakeholder access to the data easy
and fast. The data are stored on the World Wide Web in one location in a standardized
format. Stakeholders can log-in from anywhere to access all the LiDAR data, SAR
data, video and image data that have been collected, and the 2-D and 3-D maps that
were produced from the data analysis. This system also makes it much easier to export
reports and files.
2.5.4 Industrial Inspection

Industrial inspection is a relatively new application for unmanned systems and is becoming
one of the more frequent uses for small UASs. There are numerous applications in different
industries, but all share the common goal of inspecting equipment, infrastructure, or hard-
ware for defect identification. Items that might be inspected range from highway bridges
to flare stacks and each application has its own set of challenges.
2.5.5 Civil Infrastructure

Civil infrastructure is composed of the fundamental facilities and structures that enable our
everyday lives, including roads, bridges, tunnels, sewers, and the like. This infrastructure
wears out over time from vehicle traffic, weather, and other forces; eventually structures
degrade and become unsafe or unusable. Routine inspection of civil infrastructure is cru-
cial for defect identification before the loss of infrastructure integrity.
The techniques for infrastructure inspection vary greatly, depending on the type of struc-
ture being inspected. UASs can remotely sense defects, but have little ability to interact
with the object being inspected. This limits UAS to visual, IR, or other imagers that can
sense defects, which are often cracks or deformation of structural components. A few
examples of civil infrastructure inspection include:
• Bridge inspection: Small VTOL UASs can fly underneath and beside bridge structures
to look for cracks in structural members, excessive weathering, loose hardware, or
other defects. Most bridge inspections use FMV or a combination of FMV and still
imagery. UASs are much safer than in-person bridge inspections, significantly redu-
cing the risks generated when a person is hoisted and suspended high above the
ground during an inspection. Additionally, UASs can often inspect more quickly and
cost-effectively than other methods currently available.
36
• Road condition monitoring: UASs are effective for identifying deteriorating road
conditions on both paved and unpaved surfaces (Zhang, 2011). Paved road deteri-
oration in the form of cracks, cupping, or potholes leads to further surface failures
and hazards for drivers. Unpaved roads also deteriorate and become hazardous,
often more dynamically than paved roads. Fixed-wing and VTOL aircraft can be
used to map road condition with visual or LiDAR sensors. Typically, VTOL aircraft
are used in applications where a short stretch of road needs an extremely detailed
inspection and fixed wings are used for longer road lengths that do not require as
much resolution. One challenge with road inspection is the potential safety hazard of
flying a UAS over a road that is concurrently being travelled by motorists. U.S. avi-
ation regulations require that no traffic be on the roads during an inspection, which
necessitates the shutdown of the road. This limits some of the utility of a UAS for this
application.
• Levee and dam inspection: As the levee and dam system ages across much of the globe,
there is an increasing need to monitor the deterioration of these structures. UASs are
particularly effective at mapping levees for erosion (USACE, 2015) and inspecting
dam faces for cracking. Levee erosion detection requires significant terrain modeling
precision that is difficult to obtain from a manned aircraft that flies at higher altitudes
than most UASs. Additionally, a VTOL aircraft flying close to the face of the dam to
inspect it for cracks is much less risky than a human rappelling down the dam face
for the same purpose.
2.5.6 Electric Power Industry

The electric power industry provides a valuable resource to homes and businesses, but is
subject to a host of natural and man-made adverse conditions. Inspecting and monitoring
electric power infrastructure is also inherently dangerous. The combination of adversity
and danger has caused the electric power industry to be the focus of many early start-ups
in the commercial UAS sector that have attempted to reduce the cost and risk associated
with maintaining this infrastructure.
There are many applications in the electric power industry, including, but not
limited to:
• Detailed structure inspection: Small UASs are capable of delivering extremely high-
quality, close-up imagery of electric power structures hardware components such
as transmission poles, transformers, and insulators. Loose hardware, damaged
insulators, and reduced structural integrity can all be detected by a small UAS flying
with an FMV or still imagery payload. A UAS has the unique ability to get a “top
down” view of energized transmission components without the hazards associated
with a lineman climbing the pole or using a bucket truck. This means that a detailed
UAS inspection can be completed faster and with less human risk than traditional
inspection methods.
• Long distance transmission line inspection: Many UASs, including small gas-powered
aircraft, are capable of extraordinarily long endurance. This long endurance makes
the UAS ideal for flying long distances over transmission lines to quickly reveal any
major damage to structures or lines. Some UASs can fly for 8+ hours and inspect
hundreds of miles of line in a single flight. However, the current U.S. regulatory
environment prohibits most Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS) operations, which
prevents this application from being fully exploited. Also, receiving streaming video
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UAS Applications 37
or imagery from a low-flying aircraft that is many miles from the ground control
station may be a challenge because of terrain obstruction of the radio link.
• Right- way encroachment and management: Electric power companies must con-
of-
tinuously monitor the right- of-
way (ROW) around their transmission lines for
encroachment of vegetation or man-made structures. Falling objects in the ROW of
a transmission line have the potential to cause damage if they are near or on the
lines or poles. Private landowners may build structures on an ROW that can hinder
access for the electric power company maintaining the lines. The UAS can rapidly fly
down an ROW and map encroachments to assist with the electric power company’s
ROW management. It also provides documentation of ROW encroachments that may
become contentious issues with landowners.
• Corona inspections: Electrical coronas can waste large amounts of transmission grid
energy and have been known to ignite devastating fires. Special cameras that are sen-
sitive to the UV light spectrum are able to detect the “corona discharge” that occurs
when there is a significant ionization of the air around an arcing electric power com-
ponent. A corona camera sees a corona discharge as a flash of light that is often over-
laid on visual imagery. Recent developments in sensor technology have reduced the
size of corona cameras to the point where they can be mounted on a small UAS and
used for routine inspections.
2.5.7 Wind Turbine Inspection

As the demand for “clean energy” grows, wind turbines are an increasingly common sight
across the continental United States. Wind turbines can stretch as high as 400 feet above the
ground, which poses a significant challenge to the maintenance of these complex mechan-
ical devices. Wind turbines are exposed to harsh environmental forces, lightning strikes,
airborne particles, and bird strikes that erode or damage the turbine blades over time.
Routine inspections of the blades, hub, and tower of wind turbines are necessary to keep
them in continual operation.
Small UASs have proven to be very effective at detecting blade erosion and damage with
both FMV and still imagery. Instead of having a human inspector rappel from the top of a
wind turbine tower, a UAS operator can stand on the ground and fly a VTOL aircraft along
the stationary turbine blades to look for defects. Often, a damaged blade will “whistle” as
it travels through the air; a strong indicator that the turbine needs immediate inspection.
Unfortunately, there is currently no proven technology that can remotely identify subsur-
face blade defects like delamination. This type of inspection still requires physical contact
from a human inspector.
2.5.8 Tower/Antenna Inspection

In much the same manner as electric power and wind turbine inspections, radio, cell phone,
and other types of towers can be rapidly inspected by a UAS for damage or loose hard-
ware (see Figure 2.6). Any time that a human has to climb to great heights, there is a risk of
falling, even with appropriate protective equipment. For many of these inspections, VTOL
UASs are able to reduce risk and increase efficiency by keeping inspectors on the ground.
However, high-power transmitters can cause a communication link failure between the air-
craft and ground control station. The UAS operator must be aware of the potential effects
from transmitters prior to inspecting a tower and take appropriate measures to ensure that
control of the aircraft can be maintained (see Figure 2.8).
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FIGURE 2.8
Radio towers are one example of infrastructure benefiting from UAS inspection methods. (Courtesy of Kansas
2.5.9 Oil and Gas Inspection

The oil and gas industry is one of the largest industries in the world, with over 30 billion
barrels of oil consumed globally each year (CIA, 2013). The infrastructure required to
support this industry is massive, and since uncontrolled oil leakage can cause tremendous
environmental damage, it is critical that this infrastructure is properly maintained. UASs
are used for multiple applications in the oil and gas industry, including:
• Pipeline patrol and inspection: Similar to electric power transmission line inspection,
pipelines can be patrolled by a UAS to identify leaks or damage to the pipeline.
Pipeline inspection is still primarily conducted using low-flying manned aircraft, but
there is increasing pressure to perform these patrols with unmanned aircraft. A low-
flying UAS can detect leaks or damage by looking for the effects of a leak on the
surrounding vegetation. The visible browning of nearby vegetation will often be the
first indication of a leak in a buried gas pipeline. Oil leaking from an above-ground
pipeline will have similar detrimental effects on vegetation. Therefore, inspection of
pipelines is often conducted using either FMV or still imagery that is streamed back
to an operator or processed into an aerial map.
• Flare stack inspection: Flare stacks are used to burn off the excess gas that accumulates
during oil extraction or refinement. These stacks are often mounted on tall towers to
mitigate the risk of an open flame burning close to the ground. Historically, inspec-
tion of flare stacks for deterioration and damage has required that the stack and the
extraction or refinement process be shut down while a human climbs up to visually
inspect the hardware. Unmanned aircraft can inspect flare stacks without shutting
them down and without risking human life to accomplish the inspection. The
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UAS Applications 39
operation of a UAS as a sensor platform significantly increases efficiency and safety

of this operation.
• Oil and gas exploration: The location of petroleum deposits across the globe is an ongoing
effort that requires many types of data. UASs give geologists and geophysicists a
new tool to detect the surface characteristics that indicate the presence of subsurface
oil and gas deposits. UASs use aerial mapping and surveying techniques to iden-
tify these characteristics and indicate areas where ground-based crews should per-
form further analysis. They can also remotely collect data from ground-based seismic
sensors when seismic tests are used to map the subsurface geology of an area.
2.5.10 Photogrammetric Applications

Photogrammetry is defined as “the science of making reliable measurements by the use of
photographs and especially aerial photographs” (Merriam-Webster.com, 2015). The science
of photogrammetry has existed for decades with many early methods being developed
during World War II. Photogrammetry allows 3-D measurements to be made from 2-D
images using the same technique that allows human eyes to see in 3-D. By collecting over-
lapping images from different perspectives, the shape of an object can be mathematically
determined with great accuracy. Photogrammetric principles lie at the core of numerous
UAS applications, three of which are discussed here: aerial mapping, aerial surveying, and
volumetric calculations.
2.5.11 Aerial Mapping

Aerial mapping is the process of building a map from aerial imagery. An aerial photo-
graph is inherently deformed by camera lens distortion, angle of view, and the topog-
raphy of the imaged area, and cannot be used as a map without correction. The aerial map
is corrected to account for deformation through a process known as orthorectification,
which then allows the map to be used to measure distances and scales. This is important
for UAS applications for aerial surveying, precision agriculture, and natural resource
management, which use aerial mapping as the baseline process. These applications
often start with a basic aerial map generated from any number of different sensors, and
then analyze it to interpret what the map data means for the particular application (see
Figure 2.9).
The process of creating an aerial map with unmanned aircraft begins with the collection
of aerial imagery of the geographic area of interest. Simply joining consecutive images
together can form a basic 2-D “mosaic” of the area, but the distortion in the images from
the camera and the angle of view prevents this mosaic from being accurate. To create an
accurate aerial map, a photogrammetric process is used to correct the deformation in
individual images and to understand the 3-D shape of the terrain. The photogrammetric
process commonly used for UAS aerial mapping is based on “Structure from Motion”
principles that use multiple perspectives of a single object to determine the object’s shape.
When applied to aerial mapping, this means that the imagery must be collected so that
each image overlaps another one in the forward direction and consecutive strips of images
overlap other strips, typically by at least 2/3rds (or 66%). This allows multiple perspectives
of each single point to be captured.
After the aerial imagery is collected, advanced software performs the structure from
motion calculations to generate a 3-D model of the targeted area. The general process used
by this software is:
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FIGURE 2.9
A 3-D model of a corn field as generated from a point cloud. (Courtesy of Kansas State University Polytechnic.)
• Identify key points (or features) in each image.

• Match key points from each image with similar key points from other images.
• Develop a “cloud” of key points that were found in multiple images (the “point
cloud”).
• Scale the point cloud using ground control points or camera GPS locations.
• Increase point cloud density by finding additional key points after the scale and
model shape are generally known.
• Connect the points in the cloud to create a solid surface, or “mesh.”
• Overlay the image texture onto the mesh to create a solid, textured 3-D model.
• The resulting 3-D model can be exported in many formats, both 3-D and 2-D.
The model that results from the structure from motion process is often exported to other
software suites for further processing or analysis depending upon the type of applica-
tion. For example, a precision agriculture application that utilizes NIR or multispectral
imagery might use additional software to calculate a vegetation index assessing crop
health. Regardless of the application, aerial mapping relies on proper collection of aerial
imagery. Poorly collected imagery, blurry images, or inadequate image overlap will result
in low-quality maps that may contain significant inaccuracies or holes in the data.
2.5.12 Aerial Surveying

Aerial surveying is often confused with aerial mapping, and sometimes, the terms are
used interchangeably. However, the term “surveying” is differentiated from mapping by
the reference to measurement of physical characteristics. ESRI (2015) defines surveying as
“measuring physical or geometric characteristics of the earth. Surveys are often classified
by the type of data studied or by the instruments or methods used. Examples include
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UAS Applications 41
geodetic, geologic, topographic, hydrographic, land, geophysical, soil, mine, and engin-
eering surveys.” Many aerial surveys begin with an aerial map of an area of interest, but
the process of surveying implies that characteristics are being measured beyond simple
aerial imagery.
Topographical maps are a good example of an aerial map that is actually a type of
survey. The process of creating a topographical (elevation) map from UAS data begins
with the collection of imagery as described in Section 2.3.1, which is then processed into
a 3-D model. This 3-D model can then be exported into Geographic Information System
(GIS) software to create contour lines for elevation changes. The contour lines can either be
overlaid on top of the imagery or they can form their own map, often with shading to indi-
cate elevation or reliefs. A topographic map allows for rapid identification of the elevation
of any point on the map.
2.5.13 Volumetrics
Measuring the volume of physical objects or empty spaces is critical to numerous indus-
tries, particularly those that rely on knowing the quantity of stockpiled materials or
the amount of material removed from an area. The same 3-D model derived by aerial
surveying applications can be used to measure the volume that lies below or above objects
in the model. This is especially useful for the mining industry, which must know precisely
how much material is removed from a mine to ensure regulatory compliance and assess
productivity. A coal power plant that must maintain a certain number of burn days in
stockpiled coal must know exactly how much coal is stored on site. Topographical land
surveys have traditionally been used to calculate the amount of stockpiled coal, but a UAS
can fly over stockpiles and mines in a relatively short time, build a 3-D model of the area,
and estimate the volume. The process of creating this volume calculation is the same as
discussed earlier, although volumetric surveys are particularly sensitive to errors in the
3-D model. Even small errors can result in significant differences in the calculated volume.
2.5.14 Precision Agriculture

A March 2013 report from the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International
(AUVSI) stated that agriculture is expected to be the largest market application for UASs
by a wide margin (AUVSI, 2013). As the largest industry in the world, agriculture is pre-
sent in nearly every country and employs millions of people around the globe. As the
global population continues to rise, so must global food production. For this reason, new
methods for increasing production efficiency and decreasing costs are essential. Many
of these operations are turning to a new1 technique known as “precision agriculture.”
Precision agriculture is a farm management system that uses information and technology
to enhance the production of the farm. Applications of UASs in precision agriculture are
numerous and include the following:
• Crop health assessment: Every crop is capable of producing a certain yield when it is
100% healthy, so farmers must carefully manage their crop’s health to ensure max-
imum yields. This includes supplying the crops with adequate nutrients and water
and limiting the harmful effects of pests and weeds. However, it is common for nat-
ural and man-made factors to reduce the crops’ health and subsequent yield potential.
UASs can assist in the assessment of crop health by remotely sensing the photosyn-
thetic activity of the plants. One way to determine this photosynthetic activity is by
42
calculating the vegetation index, which is a relative index of plant “greenness,” or

health. There are a variety of vegetation indices that can be used to assess crop health,
but the most common index is the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI)
(see Figure 2.10). The NDVI is calculated by comparing the difference between visible
light and NIR light reflected by the plant. Since plants absorb visible and NIR light at
different rates based on their photosynthetic activity, NDVI can indicate the relative
health of the plant. A farmer or an agronomist can view an NDVI map of a field and
rapidly determine which parts of the field are more productive than others. This is
very useful information that can inform farm management decisions.
• Stand counts: Most agricultural operations sow a desired number of plants per acre
to achieve the maximum yield that the nutrients and soil of the particular field can
support (i.e., 25,000 plants per acre). However, many factors will affect how many of
these plants emerge and grow into healthy crops. Understanding early in the growing
season how many plants actually emerged can help the farmer make decisions about
whether or not to replant certain areas, and can assist in the development of a rea-
sonable expectation for the field’s yield. A UAS can be flown during the early season,
before the plants’ leaves start to overlap each other, to provide accurate stand counts
of the crop. This process involves the creation of an aerial map with sufficient reso-
lution to see individual plants and then using a software algorithm to count them.
• Crop damage assessments: Natural events, such as hailstorms or droughts, may cause
significant loss of large quantities of crops. Many farmers purchase crop insurance
that protects them in the event of such a loss. Insurance companies will reimburse the
farmer for lost yield based on a comparison of the reduced actual yield on a field that
has suffered significant damage, and the typical yield on the same field in a normal
year. A UAS can verify the extent of widespread crop damage so that insurance com-
panies can reimburse the farmer for the proper amount of yield loss. This is especially
important for claims that are filed as 100% losses.
FIGURE 2.10
An example of an NDVI analysis done on a corn field. (Courtesy of Kansas State University Polytechnic.)
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UAS Applications 43
2.5.15 Natural Resource Management

The protection of the world’s natural resources is vital to the sustainability of the planet. In
the United States, agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS), and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) are tasked with managing the
nation’s natural resources. These agencies, among others, must continuously monitor the
health of our natural resources and make management decisions that ensure that these
resources thrive. For several years, the USGS and BLM have been flying surplus military
UASs to assess a variety of natural resources. UAS natural resource applications range
from aerial surveys to wildlife monitoring and utilize a host of different technologies. Two
examples include:
• Impact of the Elwha dam removal: In the summer of 2012, the USGS collaborated with
the Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service to assess the impact of
the Elwha dam removal in the state of Washington. An AeroVironment Raven UAS
was flown over the site during and after the removal of the dam. The Department
of Interior used the subsequent 3- D models to evaluate sediment distribution
throughout the river basin and the effects it may have on wildlife and the environ-
ment (USGS, 2012).
• Census of ground-nesting pelicans: The USFWS and USGS tested UASs as a means for
collecting population data for pelicans nesting in south-central North Dakota in
Summer 2014. Manned aircraft had been used previously for this application, but
they often delivered sub-par image resolution and were flown at potentially haz-
ardous low altitudes. The test showed that small UASs could deliver accurate bird
population counts without disturbing the animals and provide the documentation
needed to assess population trends over time (USGS, 2014).
2.5.16 Aerial Filming and Photography

For the purposes of this chapter, “aerial filming” applications refer to operations that pri-
marily utilize FMV for the sole purpose of providing a moving picture of some scene (see
Figure 2.11). Aerial photography refers to still images that are acquired of a scene from an
airborne perspective. These terms are used to differentiate applications that may not be as
scientifically defined as aerial mapping and remote sensing.
2.5.17 Filmmaking
The filmmaking industry captured headlines in the latter part of 2014 as it received the
first approved commercial application for small UAS under the FAA’s exemption process
in Section 333 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. Filmmakers have long
used aerial video from manned helicopters and airplanes to capture unique perspectives
for a movie scene. UASs enable aerial shots to be taken from lower altitudes than ever
before, even to the extent of flying a camera into or out of a building. They can produce
stable, “movie quality” video without the complications of cranes and jibs or the risk of
low altitude helicopter flight. Most filmmakers have chosen to fly large multirotor air-
craft with professional cameras mounted on stabilized gimbals. These aerial shots are
often conducted with the UAS operator flying the aircraft in a stabilized control mode,
while a camera operator controls the camera through a live video feed to obtain the shot
desired.
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FIGURE 2.11
Aerial views of scenes can now be captured using low-cost, relatively easy-to-use UAS. (Courtesy of Kansas
2.5.18 Real Estate

In an increasingly competitive real estate industry, realtors are constantly looking for new
ways to show off properties. The advent of the small UAS has made it possible for the
average realtor to obtain high-quality aerial images of both residential and commercial
properties so that prospective buyers can easily see the layout of the property that is for
sale. There has been a surge of realtors operating low-cost small UASs to obtain this aerial
perspective in almost every major urban and rural real estate market.
The urban real estate industry is an especially challenging environment for UAS
operations. The UAS operator must protect the safety of people who may not be aware
an aircraft is operating over their heads, and the risk of losing sight of the aircraft behind
urban structures is very real. Realtors must be cautious when operating a UAS, especially
in urban areas, to ensure that they are following the FAA’s guidance and policies for these
operations.
2.5.19 Marketing
UASs are now being used to market everything from cars to homes to concerts. The adver-
tising and marketing industry has quickly learned that an aerial perspective can be a strong
persuader to consumers of their products. Marketing with a UAS can range from aerial
filming to banner towing. In June 2014, a start-up company flew a 3-foot × 12-foot adver-
tising banner from a multirotor aircraft on the Las Vegas strip (Velotta, 2014). It is possible
that banner towing that is currently done by manned aircraft may someday be conducted
almost entirely by UASs.
2.5.20 News Reporting

Major news outlets across the globe are interested in using UASs to provide live video
reporting of a wide variety of events as they unfold. News stations in large cities often have
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UAS Applications 45
their own manned helicopters that they use to report on live events, but UASs bring this
same capability closer to earth and at a cost that almost every news station could afford.
However, by their very nature, most events reported by news stations routinely have many
people at the scene. This poses a problem since the FAA has yet to establish protocols for
operation of unmanned systems over large groups of people. If even a small UAS were to
fall out of the sky into a crowd, there is a substantial risk of injury to those on the ground.
Therefore, most of these operations are not currently permitted.
2.5.21 Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Emergency Response

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions have historically referred
to military operations where an enemy is located and monitored in support of ongoing
or future combat missions. However, this same term can be applied to other types of
applications in the civil and commercial markets that are not related to the observation of
an enemy. Instead, ISR can be used to refer to the collection of information about some-
thing or someone.
2.5.22 Law Enforcement

The military origin of UASs used to collect intelligence about enemy combatants creates
a natural connection to law-enforcement applications of unmanned systems. The ability
of a small UAS to collect real-time, on-demand video in a covert manner is viewed by
many as the primary application of “drones” in law enforcement. However, there are
many other uses beyond covert surveillance that can benefit law enforcement. Two of these
applications include:
• Accident and crime scene reconstruction: The same photogrammetric process that is used
in aerial surveying can be applied to accident and crime scenes to create accurate 3-
D models of the scene for later analysis. Determining the causal factors behind an
automotive accident can be extremely challenging, but the aerial perspective of a
UAS image and/or a 3-D model of the scene can help investigators identify where
the accident first began and who may have been responsible. Additionally, there has
been some initial work using 3-D models derived from UAS data to reconstruct crime
scenes and use them to figure out what occurred during the crime (Miller, 2013).
• Tactical operations support: Conducting a tactical operation is both stressful and dan-
gerous for law-enforcement officers (see Figure 2.12). Circumstances like an active
shooter in a shopping mall or a hostage taker require police to assess the situation
rapidly and precisely. A UAS provides another tool that can be used to enhance situ-
ational awareness during these events. They could potentially save lives by identi-
fying dynamics in the scene that cannot be seen or understood from a ground-based
perspective. Tactical operations support applications typically require live-streaming
FMV that is distributed to those on the scene who need to make rapid decisions to
support the mission.
2.5.23 Search and Rescue

There is perhaps no other application of UAS that has more potential to save human lives
than search and rescue. Depending on the situation, minutes can make the difference
between saving and losing a life. UASs, particularly small UASs, can be launched rap-
idly and cover more ground than rescuers on foot. A thermal IR sensor can locate victims
46
FIGURE 2.12
Obtaining an aerial perspective provides a strategic advantage. (Courtesy of Kansas State University
Polytechnic.)
quickly by sensing their body heat in the ambient surroundings. Manned aircraft can also
cover ground rapidly during a search and rescue mission, but it often takes significant
time for them to be dispatched from a local airport and fly to the scene. Small UASs can
be deployed immediately by those on the scene, saving precious time that may make the
difference between rescuing a victim or recovering a body.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police demonstrated a vivid example of the lifesaving
capability a UAS provides when they utilized a small UAS in May 2013 to save the life of
a driver who was injured in an automotive accident and then stranded in the cold. In this
instance, the officers responding to the accident were unable to locate the driver, although
they were able to communicate with him via a cell phone. The officers obtained a GPS
location from the driver’s phone, but still could not locate him. They ultimately launched
a small multirotor aircraft and were able to identify the driver’s heat signature within
minutes. They found him unresponsive but alive at the base of a tree (RCMP, 2013).
2.5.24 Signals Intelligence

Signals intelligence, often abbreviated as SIGINT by the military, refers to the collection of
intelligence through electronic and communications signals. In a military context, SIGINT
is used to help determine the location of an enemy and potentially their intentions. In
some cases, all that is needed to locate someone of interest is to discover the location of a
signal source. In other instances, it may be necessary to intercept the signal in a manner
that allows the content of the signal to be interpreted. There is strong potential for SIGINT
to be used in civilian applications, primarily for search and rescue purposes. It may not be
possible for a lost person to directly contact rescuers, but SIGINT can be used to identify
signals radiating from the lost person’s electronic devices to triangulate the individual’s
position and locate the person quickly. The use of SIGINT for nonmilitary purposes must
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UAS Applications 47
be conducted with caution to ensure that there is no intrusion on a person’s reasonable

right to privacy.
2.5.25 Communications Relay

In the aftermath of a major disaster, one of the major challenges faced by first responders
is communicating with each other and with potential victims. Cell phone towers are often
overwhelmed with call volume or destroyed, and radios cannot reach far enough to ensure
consistent communications. As an example, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005
left many first responders and families with no way of communicating with victims or
each other (AP, 2005). One potential application to ensure that communications can con-
tinue in such situations is to use a UAS as a communications relay for cell phones or radio
networks. In this application, an unmanned aircraft is equipped with a payload that can
serve as a temporary cell phone or radio repeater is positioned in a long-term orbit over the
affected area. The U.S. military has been using UAS as communications relays with signifi-
cant success for several years, primarily in the Middle East theaters (Carr, 2009). However,
operating an unmanned aircraft over a civilian disaster area poses some challenges to air
traffic control when there may be numerous rescue aircraft flying in the same airspace. It
therefore requires substantial coordination with the governing aviation authority before
flight.
2.5.26 Atmospheric Information Collection

Atmospheric sampling is one of the few applications for UAS that does not relate directly to
imaging or interacting with ground-based objects. Instead, atmospheric sampling involves
the sensing or collection of airborne particulates or gases to identify the characteristics of
the atmosphere. Atmospheric sampling has been performed for many years using manned
aircraft and balloons, but UASs bring a new capability. They can sample air more effect-
ively and in regions that were previously more challenging to sample, such as extreme low
and high altitudes. UASs can also help understand weather patterns and make forecasts by
providing information about the temperature, wind speeds, humidity, and other variables
at multiple altitudes.
2.5.27 Meteorology
In 2010, NASA conducted the first unmanned flights over a tropical cyclone as part of their
research on new ways to predict the path and strength of tropical storms (NASA, 2010). This
is a prime example of how UASs are being used to further the understanding of weather,
including dangerous weather conditions. The information collected from NASA’s Global
Hawk UAS provided much higher resolution data than is obtainable from satellite-based
sensors. Other meteorological applications capture data variables such as temperatures,
wind speeds, and ozone content to better understand how weather patterns may be chan-
ging. The primary benefit of a UAS versus manned aircraft and balloons is its ability to be
launched quickly, operate for long durations, and maintain precise control of the sensors’
positioning. A UAS can also fly into weather phenomena, like tornados, which are too dan-
gerous for other aircraft. For example, the University of Colorado Boulder’s Research and
Engineering Center for Unmanned Vehicles (RECUV) has performed significant research
into the use of UASs to understand tornado development and prediction (Elston, 2011).
48
2.5.28 Hazardous Material Detection

Another type of atmospheric sampling is the detection of airborne hazardous materials.
Detecting toxic substances in the air is critical to the identification of events that may be
hazardous to humans or the environment. Gas is most common hazardous substance that
may become airborne. Locating these leaks can be challenging because the gas may be
odorless and colorless. However, it is still hazardous. Because no humans are onboard,
UASs are ideal for this application; the aircraft can be flown into hazardous areas to iden-
tify and quantify the substance and potentially locate the source. Gas leaks from chem-
ical plants, petroleum pipelines, or other sources can be found using this method. Early
research indicates that multirotor aircraft can enhance currently available sensors when
the rotors increase the airflow over the sensors (Gerhardt, Clothier, & Wild, 2014).
2.5.29 Radioactive Material Detection

Nuclear radiation can be detected from an unmanned aircraft in much the same way as
other hazardous materials. Sensors that can detect radioactive particles are installed on
the aircraft, which is then flown through an area where radioactive material is suspected.
Information about the quantity and location of the radioactive particles can be gathered to
help responders deal appropriately with the material (Pöllänen et al., 2009). Reducing the
exposure of humans to potentially harmful levels of radiation is the primary advantage of
using an unmanned aircraft for this application. On March 11, 2011, a tsunami caused the
meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. The area remains too radio-
active for humans to enter, even years after the disaster, but robots and unmanned aircraft
have been able to successfully assess the damage and levels of radioactivity (Siminski,
2014). It is possible that a UAS could also be used to detect and prevent potential nuclear
terrorist activities by locating the radioactive sources before they are detonated.
2.5.30 Applications Requiring Physical Interaction with Substances,

Materials, or Objects
All of the applications previously discussed in this chapter have involved remotely sensing
something, collecting samples of airborne gases and particulates, or intercepting some
type of signal. There are several UAS applications in development that would require
some type of physical interaction with objects. Physical interaction is very challenging for
unmanned aircraft since they can normally operate in an unconstrained 3-D environment,
and physical interaction places limits on how the aircraft may be operated. A few examples
of applications that interact with objects are listed here.
2.5.31 Aerial Chemical Application

Commonly called “crop dusting,” aerial application of chemicals, primarily for agricul-
tural purposes, has long been conducted using manned aircraft. In largely agrarian regions,
such as the U.S. Midwest, a considerable number of aerial applicators fly extremely close
to the ground at high speeds to apply fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides to vast agricul-
tural operations. These flight operations are inherently dangerous due to the proximity of
the aircraft to ground objects and their high speeds. Recent developments, especially in
Japan, have shown that UASs can be effectively used for aerial application of chemicals. In
fact, the Yamaha RMAX sprays much of Japan’s rice crop. One Yamaha business planner
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UAS Applications 49
notes that “in Japan more than 2,500 RMAX helicopters are being used to spray 40 percent
of the fields planted to rice—that country’s number one crop” (UC Davis, 2013). These
aircraft are much larger than the current “small UAS” category for which the FAA has
promulgated regulations in the United States. Larger UASs will likely require some type
of certification under regulations similar to those that currently apply to manned aircraft.
Without additional regulations, integration of large UASs into the National Airspace is not
likely to be viable in the United States.
2.5.32 Water Sampling

Water quality and availability are becoming increasingly major public concerns, as
evidenced by recent droughts and significant reductions in aquifer volumes. UASs are
already being used to improve water management at multiple universities. Research
underway at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL) has focused on the collection of
water samples from bodies of water to determine water quality or to identify harmful
algal blooms (UNL, 2015). UNL created a multirotor UAS system to assist with rapid
collection of water samples that can pump water from a lake or stream through a tube to
onboard collection bottles. Kansas State University researchers have successfully shown
that small UASs can identify and characterize harmful algal blooms (Van der Merwe &
Price, 2015), an important precursor to the actual sampling of water with active algal
blooms. As this technology progresses out of the university research environment, it is
likely that water quality management will be greatly improved by both remote sensing
and physical sampling.
2.5.33 Small Unmanned Cargo Aircraft Delivery

The small unmanned cargo aircraft (sUCA) delivery industry has expanded over the last
few years because of initiatives by Congress, NASA, DOT, FAA, individual states, uni-
versity research, advisory groups, ASSURE, AUVSI, commercial industry partners like
AIRMAP, Amazon, UPS, Wing, and many others not mentioned. Results of this research
have developed the tools necessary to safely allow sUCA into the NAS. NASA teams have
been researching UTM that will eventually allow sUCA to operate safely in densely packed
metropolitan areas. In August 2019, NASA tested these systems in Reno, Nevada, and
Corpus Christi, Texas, as part of the UTM TCL4 project. These were the final tests for the
UTM project that began in 2015. Results of this research, in the form of airspace integration
requirements, have been incrementally transferred to the FAA in 2020 for its implementa-
tion of sUCA in the NAS (NASA, 2020).
On October 1st, 2019, the UPS drone airline announced that it received full Part 135 certi-
fication from the FAA to deliver packages using sUCA beyond visual line of sight. UPS has
partnered with Matternet Drone to design and operate a quadcopter sUCA that carries a
small, quickly attachable/detachable brown box to transport medical supplies across med-
ical campuses in the United States. They proved this concept by flying thousands of sUCA
flights at the WakeMed medical campus in Raleigh, NC. The current Part 107 remote pilot
certification does not allow pilots to operate more than one sUCA at a time, but this unique
certification is the first time that the FAA has granted approval to airline pilots to operate
multiple sUCAs at a time. This is a revolutionary advancement in sUCA package delivery
business in the United States. UPS uses air-and ground-based detect and avoid technology
to ensure safety, which enables them to go beyond the visual line of sight to deliver med-
ical samples without jeopardy.
50
The only other company so far to receive Part 135 drone airline certification is Wing.
However, Wing can only operate with one pilot and one sUCA in the United States so far
(Garcia, 2019). Wing is a company within Alphabet, Google’s parent company. Alphabet’s
Wing spokesperson, Jonathan Bass, says that Wing expects to share its key project findings
publicly. In a mature market, Wing estimates delivery by drone could increase sales in
metropolitan areas by up to 27.4% per year for participating businesses. There are also
environmental benefits. Assuming a high adoption rate across the metropolitan area, Wing
estimates that replacing cars with drones for delivery services could reduce carbon dioxide
emissions by 40 tons per year (Sondgeroth, 2020).
2.5.34 Large Unmanned Cargo Delivery

The U.S. military have been operating LUCA in the NAS for over two decades. Despite this
long history of use, commercial use of LUCA in the NAS is relatively new in the commer-
cial aviation industry. Consequently, only a few aircraft types exist today, and only a few
new ones are being developed.
Through the efforts of the Platform for Unmanned Cargo Aircraft (PUCA), an organ-
ization based in the Netherlands, the aviation community is just beginning to understand
the commercial possibilities of LUCA. PUCA is trying to generate stakeholders’ interest in
LUCA. However, without an existing design, the potential market is unrealized. Without a
potential market, the design might never get built. “Everyone is waiting for everyone else;
shippers and operators are saying ‘show us the aircraft,’ manufactures are saying ‘tell us
if you want it, and we’ll build it’ and governments are saying ‘we can look at if the market
asks for it’ (Heerkens, 2017).” PUCA is urging potential operators, shippers, IT companies,
and logistics companies to get involved in the project (Collins, 2017).
According to the PUCA website, UCA will be an improvement over manned cargo air-
craft in many different areas. The duty length of the crew will not be an issue, so cruising
speed can be optimized, most likely around 450 km/h, to consume less fuel. The low
cruising speed will make it possible to use small unpaved runways. LUCA do not need a
pressurized cabin so that they can be made lighter and simpler. Because the cross section
of the fuselage does not need to be circular, as is the case with a pressurized cabin, it can
be shaped efficiently to fit, for example, square cargo containers. The cargo area can be
relatively small because no humans need to be accommodated. This gives designers the
opportunity to use shapes like a Blended Wing Body (BWB) or flying wing as seen in
Figure 2.13, which is 15–20% more aerodynamically efficient than a conventional aircraft
shape. The future LUCA concept aircraft was provided by PUCA and developed by the
students of the Technical University of Delft Netherlands.
As detailed by Collins (2017), the main issue with the integration of LUCA in the NAS is
the lack of safety regulations by the FAA. Safety is the FAA’s most important responsibility
in the pursuit of integrating LUCA into the NAS. For the public to have a favorable opinion
toward LUCA, the safety standards should be equal to or more stringent than those that
regulate commercial FAA Part 121 aircraft operators. LUCA operators should be required
to have operating certificates to fly in the NAS. LUCA manufacturers should be required to
have Type Certificates to sell their LUCA. LUCA remote pilots should be aircraft type rated
and instrument rated, and LUCA equipment should be maintained by FAA-certified air-
frame and powerplant technicians. Also, it is important that safety management systems
(SMS) be required for LUCA operators just as they are with commercial airlines. These
proven processes have been shown to decrease accidents, improve safety, and increase
51
UAS Applications 51
FIGURE 2.13
LUCAuture LUCA concept by students of the Technical University of Delft (PUCA, 2017).
public confidence in manned airplanes; it is crucial that the integration of LUCA abides by
the same regulations.
2.6 Additional Considerations

A few brief, though relevant, comments regarding mission planning and data processing
and analysis comprise the final section in this chapter. These factors are critical to the
successful completion of any mission regardless of the application used.
2.6.1 Mission Planning

The methods for conducting the applications described in this chapter vary dramatically
in the means used to control the aircraft, the types of payloads used, and the type of infor-
mation that is collected. Some of the applications, such as wind turbine inspection, must
be conducted almost entirely under manual or stabilized control, while others may be
fully automated. The payloads may vary from simple off-the-shelf consumer cameras to
specialized radioactive particulate samplers. Prior to conducting a UAS mission for any
application, the following items must be considered:
1 What type of data is to be collected?

The type of data that are going to be collected on a UAS mission must be carefully
defined before any further plans can be made. This may be as simple as deter-
mining whether basic FMV will be adequate to determine the location of a missing
person or as complicated as defining the ground sampling distance needed for
aerial imagery to determine the difference between a gull and a pelican. Flight
missions that are conducted without understanding the data requirements often
result in failed completion of the mission’s goals.
52
2 What type of sensor/payload is needed?

Once the type of data is known, the sensor/payload that will be flown on the
aircraft can be selected. There is often a disparity between the data desired and
the payload that can be carried by the aircraft, or will fit the mission’s budget
parameters. This is the stage where compromises must be made and the viability
of the mission determined.
3 What type of aircraft must be used?
If possible, the aircraft should not be selected until the payload is known since the
data requirements may drive the type of aircraft to either a VTOL or fixed-wing
platform. Selection of the aircraft before the sensor and data parameters are known
can result in unusable end products.
4 Will the flight environment enable the desired results to be achieved?
The natural, airspace, and regulatory flight environment may hinder the ability of
the mission to achieve the desired results. Careful consideration must be given to
all of these factors before conducting the operation.
2.6.2 Data Processing and Analysis

Many applications require data collected from the UAS to be processed into usable infor-
mation and analyzed or interpreted. Simple forms of data processing may only locate
where the data came from geographically, while complex data processing may be needed to
derive accurate products like volumetric surveys. As new applications arise for unmanned
systems, the methods for processing and analyzing the data that support the application
will continue to be an area of significant development in the UAS industry. In some cases,
new methods of data analysis will drive entirely new applications that have not yet been
imagined.
2.7 Conclusion
The applications presented in this chapter are only a small sample of the multitude of
uses for UAS. New applications are developed every day that demonstrate the poten-
tial for UAS to affect almost every industry around the globe. With time and use, many
applications will become commonplace, while others will prove to be less useful in the
long run. The rapid development of advanced aircraft systems, improved sensors, and
favorable regulations are likely to increase the value of UAS in everyday life.
2.1 Describe the three basic methods of control discussed in this chapter and discuss
how the mission, application, and type of data to be acquired may determine
which method is used.
2.2 Describe each of the sensors discussed in this chapter and list the various
applications for which each would be used.
53
UAS Applications 53
2.3 Discuss in detail each of the applications covered in this section. What do you
believe is the best platform design and payload package for each one? Support
your answer.
2.4 Operations known as 3-D missions are discussed in this chapter. Give examples
of applications that would be considered 3-D operations.
2.5 Provide examples of applications requiring physical interaction with substances,
materials, or objects.
2.6 List and describe in detail those items that must be considered prior to conducting
any UAS mission. Mention why you believe each is significant.
2.7 Reflecting on the types of applications discussed, which do you believe would
be most likely rely on extensive data processing? Which would likely to be the
least data dependent?
2.8 List the EM spectrum wavebands for EO sensors and discuss the commercial
applications of each available type.
2.9 Discuss the pros and cons of using UAS fleet management software for both civil
and commercial applications. Describe the software systems available for this
purpose and how they are different from each other.
2.10 Describe how to safely plan and operate an UAV mission that will be autono-
mously operated, beyond visual line of sight, in an urban environment, and
where a GPS signal would not be guaranteed.
Note
1 According to Oliver (2010, 4) the term, “precision agriculture,” was first used in 1990, a quarter
century ago, “… as the title of a workshop held in Great Falls, Montana.” When viewed in the his-
torical context of the evolution of the art, science, and practice of farming, which has been funda-
mental to the maintenance of civilization for millennia, the use of precision agriculture is, indeed,
a very recent development.
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57
3
The “System” in UAS
Joshua Brungardt and Kurt Carraway
3.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.1.1 What Makes Up an Unmanned Aircraft System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 UAS/RPA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.1 Fixed Wing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.2 Vertical Takeoff and Landing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.3 Hybrid Platforms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Command and Control Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3.1 Autopilot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3.2 Ground Control Station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4 Communication Data Link. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4.1 Radio Line-of-Sight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4.2 Beyond Radio Line-of-Sight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5 Payload. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.1 Electro-Optical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5.2 Thermal Infrared. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5.3 Spectral. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5.4 Laser. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6 Launch and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7 Human Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 What Makes Up an Unmanned Aircraft System
In this chapter, we will briefly discuss the elements that combine to create an unmanned
aircraft system (UAS). Most unmanned systems consist of an unmanned aircraft (UA) or
remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), human pilot, payload, control elements, and data link
communication architecture. Figure 3.1 illustrates a common UAS and how the various
elements are combined to create the system.
57
58
Human
element
Launch and Command

recovery and control
element element
Unmanned
system
Unmanned
Payload
aircraft
Communication
data link
FIGURE 3.1
Elements of the unmanned aircraft system (UAS).
3.2 UAS/RPA
The term “UA” means an aircraft that is operated without the possibility of direct human
intervention in or on the aircraft. In more recent years in some sectors, particularly in some
branches of the military, there has been a push to change the term UA to RPA or remotely
piloted vehicle (RPV). UA is really a misnomer considering how much human involve-
ment is crucial to the operation of the system.
UASs are categorized into five groups by the U.S. Department of Defense as seen in
Table 3.1. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has traditionally differentiated small
UAS (sUAS) (under 55 lbs) from other larger UASs. In the future, the FAA will likely clas-
sify UAS into risk-based classifications depending on their potential impact on public
safety. The sUAS will be the first to be integrated into the National Airspace System (NAS),
a process that is underway now.
3.2.1 Fixed Wing

Fixed-wing sUAS have many commercial applications. Because of the efficiencies in their
design, they generally have better endurance than their vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL)
counterparts. Many fixed-wing sUAS are made up of simple polystyrene foam and/or 3-D
printed parts. These aircraft often offer relatively high capability and durability and have
proven very popular with many users for their ease of deployment.
In the military, fixed-wing UAS conduct many missions, including intelligence gathering,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Some military fixed-wing UASs, such as the General
Atomics Predator series of aircraft, have been adapted to joint missions that combine ISR
and weapons delivery. The Predator™ was originally designed for an ISR mission and had
an aircraft designation of RQ-1. In the military aircraft classification system, the R stands
59
The “System” in UAS 59
TABLE 3.1
U.S. Department of Defense UAS Classification System
UAS Category Max Gross Takeoff Weight Normal Operating Altitude (feet) Airspeed
Group 1 < 20 pounds <1,200 above ground level (AGL) <100 knots
Group 2 21–55 pounds <35,00 AGL <250 knots
Group 3 < 1,320 pounds <18,000 mean sea level (MSL)
Group 4 > 1,320 pounds Any airspeed
Group 5 >18,000 MSL
Note: If a UAS has even one characteristic of the next higher level, it is classified in that level.
for reconnaissance and the Q classifies it as an unmanned aerial system. In recent years,
however, the Predator’s designation has been changed to MQ-1, with the M standing for
multirole. This means that it can complete ISR missions, and may also be used to deliver
Hellfire missiles.
Fixed-wing UAS platforms are often capable of long flight durations that can maxi-
mize their time in the air and their range. Northrop Grumman’s RQ-4 Global Hawk™ has
completed flights of more than 30 hours covering more than 8200 nautical miles. Fixed-
wing platforms also offer the ability to conduct flights at much higher altitudes; high
enough that the vehicle is not visible from the ground with the naked eye.
The disadvantages of fixed-wing UAS platforms are that the logistics required for launch
and recovery (L&R) can be very substantial (known as a large logistical “footprint”). Some
require runways to land and take off, and others require takeoff catapults to reach flying
speed and are recovered with a net or capture cable. Not all aircraft have complicated L&R
procedures, though. Some small fixed-wing platforms like AeroVironment’s Raven™ are
hand-launched, and are recovered by stalling the aircraft over the intended landing spot
or by deploying a parachute.
3.2.2 Vertical Takeoff and Landing

At the time of this writing, the majority of the sUAS market consists of multirotor aircraft
capable of performing VTOL. The primary reasons for this are the existing FAA Regulations
for commercial UAS. The typical endurance of these systems is approximately 25 minutes,
with some claiming to fly for as much as 90 minutes. These systems commonly have an
autopilot installed, making them very easy to learn to fly.
In addition to the sUAS platforms, there are other designs that are more like traditional
manned aircraft, including helicopters and tilt-rotors. The Northrop Grumman MQ-8
Fire Scout™ or the Bell Eagle Eye™ tilt-rotor are examples of VTOL UAS. Other notable
examples include the Aerovel Flexrotor, the DJI Inspire, the Aeryon SkyRanger, and the
Aibotix X6. These UAS platforms have the advantage of small L&R footprints. This means
that most do not need runways or roads to take off or land and do not require any type of
equipment. Unlike fixed-wing platforms, VTOL UAS require only a small space to operate
because they can monitor activity from a fixed position. An added advantage of VTOL air-
craft is their inherent ability to observe objects in very close proximity for missions such
as inspection or low-altitude mapping. sUAS can be very rapidly deployed, making them
ideal for search and rescue and disaster relief.
60
3.2.3 Hybrid Platforms

An emerging trend in the sUAS industry is the development of hybrid systems. Hybrid
systems often feature multirotors to enable VTOL operations, but also feature a fixed-
wing design so that the aircraft can transition into forward flight and garner the fixed-
wing aerodynamic efficiencies. Some designs feature multirotors that are fixed in the
vertical position and another engine dedicated to forward flight. Others may be tilt-rotor
designs.
3.3 Command and Control Element

3.3.1 Autopilot
The concept behind UAS automation is the ability of an unmanned system to execute
its mission following a set of preprogrammed instructions without operator interven-
tion. A fully autonomous UAS is able to fly without operator intervention from takeoff to
touchdown. The amount of autonomy in a UAS varies widely from none to full autonomy.
On one end of the spectrum, the aircraft is operated completely by remote control with
constant operator involvement (an external pilot). The aircraft’s flight characteristics are
stabilized by its autopilot system; however, if the human pilot were to be removed from
the controls, the aircraft would eventually crash. These concepts will be covered in greater
detail in a subsequent chapter.
On the other end of the spectrum, a vehicle’s onboard autopilot can control everything
from takeoff to landing, requiring no pilot intervention. The autopilots for these vehicles
guide them along a designated path using predetermined waypoints. However, the pilot-
in-command can intervene in case of emergencies to override the autopilot and change the
flight path or avoid a hazard if necessary.
Many sUASs commercial autopilot systems have become available in recent years. These
small autopilot systems can be integrated to existing radio-controlled (hobby) aircraft or
onto custom-built sUAS platforms. Commercial autopilot systems (often referred to as
COTS for commercial-off-the-shelf systems; COTS is a widely used acronym for many
different technologies) for sUAS have become smaller and lighter in recent years. They
offer many of the same operational advantages that large UAS autopilots offer and are
far less expensive. For example, the Cloud Cap Technology’s Piccolo series of autopilots
(see Figure 3.2) offers multivehicle control, fully autonomous takeoff and landing, VTOL
and fixed-wing support, and waypoint navigation. Increasingly, open-source autopilots
are being used for many applications. The utility and functionality of this technology is
quite good for many sUAS operations. A brief Internet search will yield numerous current
and emerging examples of open-source programmable automated controllers for a variety
of unmanned vehicles that are not limited to aircraft.
Autopilot systems for UASs are programmed with redundant technology. As a safety
feature, most UAS autopilots perform a “lost-link” procedure if communication is severed
between the ground control station and the air vehicle. There are many different ways
that these systems execute this procedure. Most create a profile where the mission flight
parameters (altitudes, flight path, and speeds) are loaded into the memory of the system
prior to aircraft launch. This mission or lost-link profile can be modified as long as the UAS
and ground station are connected, even during flight. Once the aircraft is launched, the
61
FIGURE 3.2
Piccolo™ SL autopilot unit. (Copyright Cloud Cap Technology, a UTC Aerospace Systems Company.)
autopilot will fly the mission profile as long as it remains in radio contact with the ground
control station. If contact with the ground station is lost while the aircraft is in the air, the
autopilot will execute its preprogrammed lost-link profile.
The lost-link procedures for the vehicle can include:
1. Proceed to a waypoint where signal strength is certain in order to reacquire

connectivity.
2. Return to the first waypoint and loiter or hover for a predetermined time in an
attempt to reacquire the signal, and then return to landing waypoint to land if this
is unsuccessful.
3. Remain on the current heading for a predetermined amount of time. During this
time, a secondary means of communication can be attempted with the aircraft.
4. Climb to reacquire link.
Most commercially available technology default procedures require that the aircraft return
to the starting point and land immediately if the link is not reestablished within a given
time frame.
3.3.2 Ground Control Station

A ground control station (GCS) is a land-or sea-based control center that provides facilities
for the human control of unmanned vehicles in the air or in space (Figure 3.3). GCSs vary
in physical size and can be as small as a handheld transmitter (Figure 3.4) or as large as
a self-contained facility with multiple workstations. Larger military UASs require a GCS
with multiple personnel to operate separate aircraft systems. One of the foremost goals for
future UAS operation is for one crew person to be able to operate multiple aircraft from
one GCS. However, many challenges remain before this concept can be safely integrated
into the NAS.
For larger military UASs, a GCS usually consists of a pilot station and a sensor station. The
pilot station is for just that: the pilot-in-command who operates the aircraft and its systems.
The sensor station is for the operation of the sensor payload and radio communications.
More workstations can be added to control more operations, depending on the complexity
of the UAS. For smaller, less complex UASs, these workstations may be combined so that
only one operator is needed.
62
FIGURE 3.3
General Atomics MQ-1 Predator GCS. (Copyright General Atomics.)
3.4 Communication Data Link

Data link is the term used to describe how the UAS command and control information
is sent and received by both the GCS and autopilot. There are may also be separate data
links for some payload systems. UAS operations can be divided into two categories: radio
frequency line-of-sight (LOS) and beyond line-of-sight (BLOS). This is different from
beyond-visual-line-of-sight (BVLOS), which merely refers to that distance that is farther
than the naked eye can detect an aircraft, which is a much shorter distance than radio
frequency BLOS.
3.4.1 Radio Line-of-Sight

Radio line-of-sight (RLOS) operations refer to operating the UAS with direct radio waves.
In the United States, civilian LOS operations are usually conducted on the 915 MHz,
2.45 GHz, or the 5.8 GHz radio frequencies. These frequencies are unlicensed indus-
trial, scientific, and medical (ISM) frequencies that are governed by Part 18 of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) regulations. Other frequencies such as 310– 390,
405–425, and 1350–1390 MHz are discrete LOS frequencies requiring a license on which
to operate. Depending on the strength of the transmitter and receiver and the obstacles
in between, these communications can travel several miles. Signal strength can also be
improved by using a directional tracking antenna. The directional antenna uses the loca-
tion of the UAS to continuously adjust the direction it is pointed, so its signal is always
directed at the UAS. Some larger systems have directional receiving antennas onboard the
aircraft, which improves the signal strength even further.
63
FIGURE 3.4
(a) Piccolo™ Command Center GCS. (Copyright Cloud Cap Technology, a UTC Aerospace Systems Company.)
(b) AeroVironment handheld GCS. (Copyright AeroVironment.)
64
ISM frequency bands are widely used. This makes them susceptible to frequency con-
gestion and signal interference, which can cause the UAS to lose communication with the
ground station. Rapid frequency hopping has emerged as a technology that minimizes
this problem. Frequency hopping is a basic signal modulation technique that spreads the
signal across the frequency spectrum. With this technology, the transmitter operates in
synchronization with the receiver, so both are tuned to the same frequency at the same
time. During frequency hopping, a short burst of data is transmitted on a narrow band,
then the transmitter tunes to another frequency and transmits again, and the process
repeats. The hopping pattern can be from several times per second to several thousand times
per second. The FCC has allowed frequency hopping on the 2.45 GHz unlicensed band. It is
this repeated switching of frequencies during radio transmission that minimizes the effect-
iveness of unauthorized interception or jamming.
Current sUAS commercial operations are primarily operated with RLOS systems. This
has been driven by FAA regulations that restrict the aircraft to the VLOS of the pilot or a
designated visual observer. This form of link is the most affordable.
3.4.2 Beyond Radio Line-of-Sight

Beyond radio line-of-sight (BRLOS) operations refer to operating the UAS beyond the
limits of a radio. As the FAA begins to issue waivers to VLOS operations, aircraft original
equipment manufacturers are beginning to explore alternative link technologies. Cellular
technologies, including 5G and Long-term Evolution (LTE), hold promise for affordable
options. Commercial sUAS may also use satellite technologies, as on the Iridium satellite
system that is owned and operated by Iridium LLC. For reference, LTE is the 4th generation
wireless broadband mobile communication standard. 5G is the 5th generation wireless
broadband mobile communication standard known for much greater and much faster
bandwidth capability.
Military BLOS operations are conducted by satellite on an encrypted Ku band in the
12–18 GHz range. Some UASs in the market operate almost continuously through Ku
band; they launch using an LOS data link, which is transferred to a BLOS data link once
they are in the air. Communications are often then transferred back to LOS for vehicle
recovery. One drawback of BLOS operations is that there can be several seconds of delay
time after a command is sent to the aircraft before it responds. This delay is caused by
the many relays and systems the command must travel through. However, technological
improvements over the past several years have now made it possible to conduct L&R of
the aircraft through the BLOS data link.
3.5 Payload
Outside of research and development, most UASs are aloft to accomplish a mission and
most missions require an onboard payload. The most common payload for the commer-
cial industry is some form of optical sensor, which may include a COTS camera, electro-
optical (EO) camera, or thermal infrared (IR) camera. Some platforms offer dual sensor
options that allow the integration of both an EO and IR sensor. These may be operated in a
coordinated fashion, or may be controlled independently.
65
Optical sensor packages can be permanently mounted on the UAS aircraft, giving the
sensor operator a fixed view only; or they can use a mounting system called a gimbal or
turret (Figure 3.5). A gimbal or turret mounting system gives the sensor a predetermined
range of motion, usually in three axes. The gimbal or turret receives input either through
the autopilot system or through a separate receiver. Some gimbals are also equipped with
vibration isolation, which reduces the amount of aircraft vibration that is transmitted to
the camera (image stabilization) and produces a clearer image or video. Vibration isolation
can be performed by an elastic/rubber mounting, or with an electronic gyrostabilization
system.
Other types of payload sensors can include hyperspectral sensors, synthetic aperture
radars (SARs), or light detection and ranging sensors. For military platforms, laser range
finder/designators are also common.
The payload can used for surveillance, weapons delivery, communications, aerial
sensing, cargo, or many other applications. UASs are often designed around the intended
payload(s) they will carry; the size and weight of payloads are two of the largest con-
siderations for UAS design. Most commercial application sUAS platforms have relatively
small payloads, generally less than 5 lbs. Some sUAS are designed to have interchangeable
payloads that can be quickly removed and replaced.
3.5.1 Electro-Optical
EO cameras are so named because they use electronics to pivot, zoom, and focus the image.
These cameras operate in the visible light spectrum and the imagery they yield can be in
the form of full-motion video, still pictures, or even blended still and video images. Most
sUAS payload EO cameras use narrow-to mid-field-of-view (FOV) lenses. Larger UAS
camera payloads can also be equipped with wide or ultrawide FOV (WFOV) sensors. EO
sensors can be used for many types of missions and can be combined with different types
of other sensors to create blended images. They are most frequently operated during day-
light hours for optimal video quality.
3.5.2 Thermal Infrared

Thermal IR cameras operate in the IR range of the electromagnetic spectrum (~700–
1 mm). These sensors, sometimes called FLIR for “forward-looking infrared,” form an
image using IR or heat radiation. The two types of IR cameras used for UAS payloads
are cooled and noncooled. Modern cooled cameras are cooled by a cryo-cooler that
lowers the sensor, typically located in a vacuum sealed case, to a temperature below
150 °C. These systems can produce images in the mid-wave IR (MWIR) band of the
spectrum where the thermal contrast is high, and can also be designed to work in the
longwave IR (LWIR) band. Even though cooled cameras produce a higher quality image
than uncooled cameras, they are often more expensive and heavier, and require extra
power to operate.
Noncooled cameras use sensors that are at or just below ambient temperature. They
work through the change of resistance, voltage, or current created when they are heated
by the IR radiation that they detect. Noncooled sensors are designed to work in the LWIR
band from 7 to 14 μm in wavelength, where terrestrial targets emit most of their IR energy.
This discussion of payloads is only an overview; payload systems are discussed in
greater depth in Chapter 4.
66
FIGURE 3.5
(a) Multispectral Targeting System-B (MTS-B) sensor pod. (Copyright Raytheon Co.) (b) General Atomics MQ-9
Reaper (formerly called “Predator B”). (Copyright General Atomics.)
67
3.5.3 Spectral
One class of payloads has become particularly useful for missions that involve plant growth.
A myriad of multi-and hyperspectral imaging payloads can detect energy wavelengths
that exist outside of visible light as detected by the naked eye (visible light = 400–799 nm
on the electromagnetic spectrum). The energy spectra most often needed for plant-based
analysis applications are the blue/green/red band (450–690 nm) or the IR band (700 nm–
1 mm). The IR band can be further divided into near-IR (NIR, 800 nm–2.5 μm), short-wave
IR (SWIR, 0.9–1.7 μm), medium-wavelength IR (MWIR, 3–8 μm), LWIR (8–15 μm), and far-
IR (FIR, 15–1,000 μm). Ultraviolet light (UV, 100–400 nm) can also be useful in these types
of applications, and there are other bands that can also be studied. Scientists involved in
agricultural and plant-based applications often study the amount of the target energy that
is either absorbed or reflected by plant vegetation. This information is then analyzed to
make plant health and status determinations, depending on the specific type of informa-
tion that is needed. One much-used formula is the normalized-difference vegetation index
(NDVI): NDVI = (NIR -RED)/(NIR + RED). Knowing the NDVI, scientists can make deter-
minations about the need for crop chemical application, plant drought and disease stress,
and overall plant health.
3.5.4 Laser
A laser range finder uses a laser beam to determine the distance to an object, whereas a
laser designator uses a laser beam to designate a target. The laser designator sends a series
of invisible coded pulses that reflect back from the target and are detected by the receiver.
There are, however, drawbacks to using a laser designator on an intended target. The laser
may not be accurate if atmospheric conditions are not clear due to rain, clouds, blowing
dust, or smoke. The laser can also be absorbed by special paints, reflect incorrectly, or not
reflect at all on materials like glass.
3.6 Launch and Recovery

The L&R element (LRE) of the UAS is often one of the most labor-intensive aspects of the
UAS operation. Some UASs, especially large systems, have very elaborate LRE procedures
that require dedicated personnel to prepare, launch, and recover the UAS. Runway lengths
of up to 10,000 feet and support equipment including ground tugs, fuel trucks, and ground
power units or GPUs are needed for these large UASs. Small VTOL UASs tend to have the
least complex LRE procedures and equipment, needing only a suitable takeoff and landing
area. Other UASs, such as the Raven manufactured by AeroVironment Inc, can be hand-
launched and recovered by an onboard parachute (Figure 3.6).
There are many ways to conduct L&R operations for current UASs. Some of the most
common involve using a catapult system to get the aircraft to flight speed in a very short
distance. The ScanEagle™ manufactured by Insitu, a Boeing company, uses a catapult for
takeoff and an arresting cable (Insitu calls it the SkyHook™) for its recovery (Figure 3.7).
In this system, the vehicle uses a very precise dual global positioning system to fly into
the suspended cable, where hooks on the end of its wing tips allow the vehicle to be
recovered.
68
FIGURE 3.6
Soldier hand-launching a Raven RQ-11. (Copyright AeroVironment.)
The Aerosonde Mark 4.7 is manufactured by Aerosonde, a Textron Inc. company.

Depending on the variant model, there are different types of LRE equipment that can be
used. To get the UAS to flying speed, it can be launched with a car-top launcher, or with
a catapult system (Figure 3.8). It can “belly land” on grass or hard surfaces, or it can be
recovered by a moving net.
3.7 Human Element

Although covered in much greater depth in a subsequent chapter, the most important
element of the UAS is the human element. This element consists of a pilot, a sensor, and
supporting ground crew. As previously mentioned, some of these positions can be combined
into one depending on the complexity of the system. Like the commercial airliners of the
past, less human interaction is needed as UAS technological capabilities and automation
competence increase. However, the UAS pilot in command will always be responsible for
the safe operation of the aircraft. This element is described in greater detail in Chapter 11.
3.1 Why have some elements of the military gravitated away from using the term
“unmanned?”
69
FIGURE 3.7
(a) Insitu ScanEagle™ catapult launcher. (b) Insitu ScanEagle™ arresting cable the “SkyHook™.” (Copyright
Insitu Inc. a Boeing Company.)
3.2 What are some advantages and disadvantages of VTOL UAS?

3.3 What are some advantages and disadvantages of the fixed-wing UAS?
3.4 Research some commonly used open-source UAS autopilot technologies and dis-
cuss their relative strengths and weaknesses.
3.5 Refer to the differences discussed in this chapter between the terms BLOS and
BVLOS. When and how might the term BVLOS be important? BLOS?
70
FIGURE 3.8
AAI Aerosonde vehicle-top launch cradle. (Copyright AAI Aerosonde a Textron Systems Company.)
71
4
UAS Sensing –Theory and Practice
Gabriel B. Ladd
4.1 Why We Fly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

4.2 Introduction to Sensing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2.1 In Situ Sensing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2.2 Remote Sensing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2.3 Platform Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3 Remote Sensing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.1 Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.2 Sensor Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3.2.1 Spot Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.2.2 Imaging Sensors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.3 Common Sensors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.3.1 Visible Spectrum Cameras and Near-Infrared Cameras . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.3.2 Long-Wave Infrared Cameras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.3.3 Hyperspectral Imagers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.3.4 LiDAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.3.5 Synthetic Aperture Radar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4 Geospatial Data Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.1 Raster Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.2 Vector Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5 Image Processing Concepts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5.1 Structure from Motion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5.1.1 Point Clouds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.6 Data Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.6.1 Data Security (Cloud Security). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6.2 Long-Term Data Storage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.7 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.7.1 Motion Imagery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.7.2 Emergency Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.7.3 Map (Background) Imagery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.7.4 Infrastructure Inspection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.7.5 Vegetation Health Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.7.5.1 Vegetation Index: An Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.7.5.2 UAS in Agriculture-Vegetation Indices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.7.5.3 Thermal Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
71
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72
4.7.5.4 Broader Vegetation Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

4.7.5.5 Airframes for Vegetation Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.8 Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.1 Why We Fly

When you are planning to fly, you should always keep the purpose of the flight in mind.
That simple action allows you to judge and make correct decisions about data collection
and aircraft operation that will keep your data useful. The purpose of this chapter is to
ground you in the broad concepts behind why we fly. The hope is that you can take the
information you need from this chapter to build upon what is presented here and in gen-
eral to make productive decisions about aircraft and sensors that enable you to collect
useful data. The assumption is, of course, that you are flying and operating the aircraft
safely, with due regard for others and the law.
4.2 Introduction to Sensing

In this age of computer centric systems, society is driven by the concept of data. These bits
for pieces of information have come to have huge importance in both our endeavors and
our daily lives. It is for the creation of these pieces of data that we fly unmanned aircraft
system (UAS). Almost exclusively we send our robotic aircraft into the skies to collect data.
While bouncing and jouncing around in the skies, these vehicles collect all sorts of infor-
mation about a wide range of topics using an equally wide range of sensors. The data
collected can be broken down into two general categories: in situ and remote sensing. These
two methods are used to collect vast amounts of information about our world and what is
going on in it in the hope that it will help improve our understanding of our environment.
4.2.1 In Situ Sensing

The phrase in situ comes from the Latin for “in place.” Merriam Webster’s Dictionary
defines it as “in the natural or original position or place” (Staff 2015b). In the case of in situ
sensing with UAS, the aircraft is brought into the location where the measurements are to
be made. There are two general purposes for doing this; either to force the air vehicle to
respond to some sort of environmental parameters, or to measure some specific environ-
mental attribute at a location of interest. If the former, this can run the gamut from testing
the air vehicle’s response to control input as measured by the onboard systems, to forcing
the air vehicle through adverse environmental conditions such as storms to measure the
vehicle’s response, assuming it survives the encounter. In either of these cases, the point is
to measure the air vehicle’s performance and its responses to the environment. The other
major form of in situ sensing is to measure attributes about the environment or medium
through which the air vehicle is moving. These attributes range from temperature, to gas
composition, and type. In many applications, both forms of in situ measurements are used
73
UAS Sensing – Theory and Practice 73
in concert to achieve the overall goal of the flight. For example, aircraft dynamics may be
used in conjunction with the gas analysis to allow researchers to account for the motion of
the vehicle and the air in their analysis.
4.2.2 Remote Sensing

Remote sensing is the process of measuring an object or phenomenon from a distance. This
is done by detecting and measuring the effects of said object or phenomenon on the phys-
ical universe, usually in the form of emitted or reflected particles and/or waves.
In general, there are three broad categories of remote sensing: terrestrial, airborne, and
space based. What is covered in this chapter is not all of remote sensing, but an overview
of the subset “airborne remote sensing from UAS.”
Airborne remote sensing as a discipline has a wide for large range of sensor options from
large multiarrays to single sensor pickup systems. There are four broad classes of remote
sensing sensors: framing, pushbroom, scanner, and receiver systems. These sensors work
on most of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. As a rule of thumb, it is easiest to think
of the UAS subset of airborne remote sensing as basically the same as manned aircraft
remote sensing, but just constrained to smaller platforms. The notable exceptions to this
are large UAS like the ones operated most frequently by governments, e.g., Global Hawk
and Predator. One can argue that if all of the hobby and toy “drones” in the world now
FIGURE 4.1
UAS (Drone) Silhouette chart for scale comparison (Griffiths 2013).
74
are counted, the majority of UAS are small (weighing less than 55 lbs.). An idea of scale of
choices for different UAS platforms can be found in Figure 4.1.
The emitted or reflected particles or waves most often associated with airborne remote
sensing are sunlight or what is called on the EM visible light spectrum (VIS). For the
purposes of this discussion, we are working within a paradigm where its behavior is well
known, so we will leave the debate on the nature of light as a particle or wave to the
physicists.
To illustrate how light works in remote sensing, consider what happens when you
take a photograph outside on a sunny day. Perhaps you use your phone or a point and
click camera or even an “old fashioned” film camera; in any case, you are capturing and
recording sunlight. In the case of electro-optical (EO), or digital cameras, as the consumer
market calls them, the light comes through the lens and strikes a sensor. In the case of film
cameras, light strikes a thin piece of sensitive material commonly referred to as film. For
most applications, this film is a thin piece of plastic with a light sensitive coating (Wolf and
Dewitt 2000). By pointing the camera at the individual, you are, in fact, turning the light
receiving lens toward the individual and collecting the sunlight they are reflecting. The fact
that you are capturing and measuring the reflected light for the purpose of understanding
what is going on with the distant person is the critical difference between remote sensing
and in situ measurement methods.
In the example of a digital picture of a person taken outside, the light entering the
camera is measured by an array of light-sensitive sensors. These sensors react to the light,
and that reaction is measured and stored as the fundamental building block of the image.
The digital image you are used to seeing on your phone or computer screen is constructed
by the image sensor based upon the array’s reaction. Not enough reaction and the image
is too dark; too much reaction and the image is washed out. The sensor reaction can be
modified and adjusted in many ways, which can be broken down into two general cat-
egories: physical and software. The physical modification methods are what most people
would think of as traditional photographic methods, such as aperture, focus, and ISO
(or light sensitivity). The software modifications include what would have been done in
the darkroom when developing the film, but digital image manipulation can go much
beyond that. It should be noted here that the UAS remote sensing community has almost
exclusively embraced digital imaging, and thus, film-based remote sensing will not be
discussed further here.
4.2.3 Platform Considerations

The combination of high- efficiency electric motors, powerful small computers, and
improved battery technology that has allowed for the consumer explosion of UAS also
enabled a new age of airframe experimentation. The proliferation of unique designs lever-
aging on these technologies has brought about what is arguably the fourth great age in
airframe experimentation. In this period, when the lines between traditional airframes are
becoming blurred, it is important to understand the basic pros and cons of different aircraft
configurations when evaluating an aircraft as a sensor platform. See Chapters 9 and 10 for
discussions of aircraft morphology, flight characteristics, and UAS sizing.
All the aircraft types have different advantages and disadvantages as sensor platforms.
These pros and cons must be weighed and examined when considering an aircraft for
a project. As one goes about designing a UAS system, the task quickly becomes one of
pairing the best sensor to collect the data with an airframe to give your sensor the wings it
needs to answer the overarching question for which you are flying.
75
TABLE 4.1
EM Spectrum and What Is Measured
Spectrum Wavelength Radiation Source Property Measured
Visible (VIS) 0.4–0.7 µm Solar Reflectance

Near infrared (NIR) 0.7–11 µm Solar Reflectance
Short-wave infrared (SWIR) 1.1–1.35 µm Solar Reflectance
1.4–1.8 µm
2–2.5 µm
Midwave infrared (MWIR) 3–4 µm Solar, Thermal Reflectance
4.5–5 µm Temperature
Long-wave infrared (LWIR) 8–9.5 µm Thermal Temperature
or thermal infrared (TIR) 10–14 µm
Microwave---Radar 1 mm–1 m Thermal (passive) Temperature (passive)
Artificial (active) Roughness (active)
Source: Schowengerdt (2007).
4.3 Remote Sensing

4.3.1 Overview
The systems used for remote sensing can be divided into two general categories: active and
passive. The active sensors are those that emit some form of EM radiation that is directed
at a target and measures the reflected signal. Passive sensors do not emit EM radiation,
instead measuring what is emitted by other sources after it is reflected or as the target
emits it. In the technique of remote sensing, especially the subset of UAS remote sensing,
the external EM source is almost always the sun.
Active sensors provide an EM source. The analog to this that most people have
experienced goes back to your digital camera. Most digital cameras have a built-in flash,
which emits light just prior to the picture being taken. The light goes out into the space in
front of your camera and bounces into anything in front of you before being bounced back
at you. The goal of this is to create enough light reflecting back at the camera so that what
light bounces back into the camera will create an image of the target. Active sensors do this
with very selective sections of the EM spectrum.
The EM spectrum is broken down into bands. EM Bands are segments of energy
grouped together by a common property and defined by a specific range of vibrational
wavelengths. In remote sensing, the bands most dealt with are outlined in Table 4.1.
As seen in this table, different spectrums have different sources and different surface
properties of interest that are measured by the wavelength. These surface properties can
seem a bit abstract until you think about what it means from a fundamental physics per-
spective. Think about any digital picture you have taken, and you will see the surface
properties manifest in the color of the object. As we discussed above, this color, as we
think about it day today, is actually the light reflected by the object. What appears white
is the reflectance of all colors of light, while anything appearing black is the absorp-
tion of all colors of light. Hence, black objects get hotter in the sun quicker than white
objects.
The imaging sensor responds to the specific wavelength of incoming EM radiation. This
response can be measured and calibrated. This calibration process is called radiometric
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calibration. Once a sensor is calibrated for a band of the EM spectrum, the sensor response
can be tied directly to a small range of the EM spectrum being reflected by the object.
The ability to determine the spectral reflectance of an object can be very powerful,
but depending on your application, it may not be required. Knowing the range of the
sensor’s EM sensitivity may suffice to answer the question without pinning down specific
wavelengths.
One of the most powerful aspects of remote sensing is spatial continuity, which is the
ability to know what is going on at an individual location and every surrounding location
for a substantial distance. Spatially contiguous data enable all sorts of analyses not pos-
sible without the perspective provided by continuous coverage. Going back to the example
of a picture you have taken, it is possible, even without the camera being radiometrically
calibrated, to tell that the person in the picture is wearing a red knit winter hat and a wind-
breaker. The nature of both objects you can guess at from the texture of the object and the
fact that it is being worn as an article of clothing. This is done by observing the subtle
variation, or lack thereof, in the material texture, along with the overall context derived
from having the spatial continuity of the image. Thus, the image can provide a lot of infor-
mation, in some cases more than a thousand words of information. There is an underlying
assumption of resolution. The assumption is that the person in the picture is close enough
to have the sensor record the level of detail needed to express the texture. If the image
were of too low a resolution or the person is too far away, you might be able to tell they
are wearing a red cap and some sort of jacket, but you may not have enough contextual
information to say more.
Another important advantage to spatial data is the complete or nearly complete sam-
pling. This is illustrated very clearly in crop monitoring. When an agronomist goes
out into a cornfield to pick corn ears and use them to predict crop yield, they will look
at between 10 and 100 individual ears from a small number of individual locations
across a field. This is a very small fraction of the ears of corn growing in the field.
The agronomist then predicts what the rest of the plants are doing based upon some
assumptions of what a statistically normal population of corn would do. When you use
remote sensing, data will be collected on every plant. The downside to this is that by
collecting information on literally every plant in the area of interest (AOI) and beyond,
you must develop ways of excluding things you are not interested in analyzing. An
additional wrinkle in remote sensing analysis is that you measure analogs, not the
actual value you are trying to calculate. The agronomist uses a handful of sample points
to project yield across the AOI. Remote sensing uses reflectance to project yield and
capture all the spatial variation in the field. Nonetheless, reflectance must be converted
into yield based upon some assumptions. It also means the analyst has to use a different
form of analysis. Rather than doing analysis from a position of having measured a small
subset and making assumptions of population normalcy, one must approach the ana-
lysis with an understanding of what is representative and what is not, which leads very
quickly into spatial statistical analysis.
4.3.2 Sensor Types

There are two general types of remote sensing sensors: those that build images and those
that do not. Imaging sensors are the predominant sensor type in the remote sensing world,
especially the UAS subset, but the spot sensors can be very useful tools.
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4.3.2.1 Spot Sensors

Spot sensors are sensors that measure single locations and do not attempt to create
imagery. They forgo spatial continuity in one measurement cycle, instead opting for sim-
plicity. These systems can still provide useful data and are often used in conjunction with
imaging sensors to help inform the imagery. NASA’s Micro Spectrometer Instrument Suite
system flew over the Arctic Ocean in 2009 on the NASA Sierra UAS as a prototype system
that used spot sensors to inform VIS imagery. The Microspectrometer Instrument Suite
was designed to identify surface melt water on sea ice using point measurement from
spectrometers. The 2009 mission was to validate the technique by comparing the spectrom-
eter data to the VIS spectrum images collected (Ladd et al. 2011).
4.3.2.2 Imaging Sensors

There are three basic methods of generating images from remotely sensed data: line
scanners, pushbrooms, and array sensors. Line scanners are sensors that move a single
sensing element, or a very small number of sensor elements, back and forth rapidly to
build up a picture of what is below the aircraft. What this means is that the width of the
image is dictated by how far the element can be pivoted and how quickly the sensor can
collect a reading. In many ways, this is effectively a spot sensor being swung back and
forth across the aircraft’s path fast enough to generate a picture. Pushbroom sensors are
sensors that have a fixed array of sensors that are the width of the final image product
across the aircraft’s path but are only one element tall. This means that they are continually
sampled, and the height of each pixel along the aircraft’s direction of travel is dictated by
the aircraft’s speed and how long it takes for the sensor array to collect a sample. Array
sensors are made up of a two-dimensional (2D) array of sensors. These sensors are used to
collect an image simultaneously. Array sensors are very similar, if not identical to what you
are used to using in consumer digital cameras, in that when they are triggered, the sensor’s
value is recorded for all individual sensors in the array at once. Thus, the data that make
up an individual image are collected all in one exposure. There is usually some lag time
associated with collecting and saving all the data (Schowengerdt 2007).
4.3.3 Common Sensors

The most common remote sensing sensor for UAS is what is conventionally thought of
as a camera. A camera is defined by Merriam and Webster’s Dictionary as “a device that
consists of a lightproof chamber with an aperture fitted with a lens and a shutter through
which the image of an object is projected onto a surface for recording” (Staff 2015a). The
current trend in modern digital cameras is to move away from mechanical shutters. This
is in part to simplify the system. Because of this trend, anything with a lens and a sensor
in a radiation proof chamber is considered a “camera.” There are four general types of
cameras in widespread use in UAS remote sensing community: visible spectrum, near-
infrared (NIR), IR, and hyperspectral.
Beyond the common “cameras,” there are also a few other less common remote sensing
sensors that bear mentioning: light detection and ranging (LiDAR) and synthetic aperture
radar (SAR). These two types of sensors are considered active sensors in that they emit
energy that is bounced off of their target and received back at the sensor. The time it takes
for the energy to be sent and come back and the direction from which it returns are used to
build up a dataset of what the sensor is looking at.
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4.3.3.1 Visible Spectrum Cameras and Near-Infrared Cameras

The VIS and the NIR cameras operate on essentially identical principals, the only diffe-
rence being that the NIR camera sensor is sensitive to the NIR wavelengths of the EM
spectrum (see Table 4.1). A VIS spectrum image generally consists of three different pri-
mary colors combined to make one full color image. In digital parlance, this is referred to
as a three-band image, or an RGB after the three primary colors red, green, and blue, from
which the full color image is created.
Because of the proximity of the NIR portion of the spectrum to the VIS spectrum, film
used during World War II was able to capture green, red, and NIR reflectance. To address
the inability of the human eye to see NIR, the image had to be printed with the NIR spec-
trum shifted to another color visible to the human eye. Each band had to take a primary
color, so NIR became red, red became green, and green became blue (Wolf and Dewitt
2000). This false color standard became known as color infrared (CIR) and is widely used
in vegetation applications (Schowengerdt 2007) to this day.
4.3.3.2 Long-Wave Infrared Cameras

Infrared sensors are those that measure the EM spectrum wavelengths between 0.7 µm
and the microwave band of the EM spectrum, which starts at 1,000 µm. This section is
discussing the long-wave infrared (LWIR) and thermal infrared (TIR) sections of the spec-
trum (8–14 μm). In practice, the terms are synonymous because the current small UAS
cameras respond to both spectrums.
Thermal imagers work by having individual mechanical elements in the 2D array
respond to the incoming heat radiation. This is called a microbolometer because it is a
reduced size version of Langley’s bolometer. A bolometer of any size uses two thin pieces
of material: one exposed to a heat source and the other shielded from all heat. The exposed
metal changes resistance due to the heat influx and this difference is what allows the tem-
perature to be measured (Rogalski 2002). Because of the need to have two different pieces
of metal and for one to heat up or cool down, LWIR sensors as a rule tend to have lower
resolution (smaller sensors arrays) and take longer to respond to changes in their field of
view than VIS cameras.
There are two types of microbolometers on the market currently: cryogenic and room
temperature. The cryogenic sensors utilize cryogenic cooling systems and therefore are
much more expensive. Not surprisingly, the room temperature systems tend to be more
popular for their simplicity and lower cost.
The thermographic image created by a room temperature array is effectively a wide
spectrum monochromatic image, representing the thermal emission intensity of what the
camera is seeing. This is manifested in either black and white imagery, or false color imagery
where color is assigned by pixel value. These sensors effectively respond to the intensity
of the heat striking the sensors array, which means a very hot object can wash out much of
the image. A similar photographic analogy would be the appearance of reflective material
such as that on traffic cones or motorcycle apparel when a picture is taken at night using
a flash. In both cases, a bright spot can wash out much, if not all of the surrounding area.
4.3.3.3 Hyperspectral Imagers

Hyperspectral imagers utilize several data collection techniques, which are very similar to
the cameras we have already discussed. The primary difference is that they collect pixels
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that are spatially aligned in many spectrums. Instead of one three-band color image (red,
green, blue), you end up with a many-channel image. According to the ASPRS Manual
of Photogrammetry, Fifth Edition Chapter 5 pg. 404, to be a truly hyperspectral imager,
a system must have 100 or more spectral channels per image (McGlone et al. 2004). This
results in a highly multiband image, also called a “hypercube,” which can be thought
of as many pictures all taken at the same time with each pixel in spatial alignment. The
large number of spatially aligned but spectrally different pixels is what differentiates a
hyperspectral imaging system from a normal VIS spectrum camera or even a many-band
multispectral camera (McGlone et al. 2004). The requirements for spectral resolution tend
to drive the weight and price of the hyperspectral imagers above cameras with fewer spec-
tral bands, even the multispectral cameras.
The power of hyperspectral imaging systems lies in their spectral, not spatial resolution.
A hyperspectral data cube can be analyzed in the 2-D image-based analyses discussed
above or by looking at the spectral signature of each band for each pixel position on the
ground. Per pixel spectral signature produces a unique response in each spectral band, and
thus, each pixel can be used to uniquely identify material by spectral signature. Depending
on the spectral resolution, hyperspectral image analysis can differentiate between real and
fake vegetation, or go so far as to identify specific materials and/or soil types (Landgrebe
2002, Exelis 2015). The problem with hyperspectral cameras on UAS is the required size
and vibrational sensitivity. Because of the need to address so many different spectral bands,
the camera has to have additional components, which add to size and weight. To reduce
the unit size, manufactures either keep the sensor array size small or they use a pushbroom
design (Resonon 2015, Rikola 2015). Either option is a viable solution, but they affect how
the system is operated to collect data and how much it costs. The small size of the array
affects how much spatial resolution each image has, which, in turn, means that the camera
system and thus the aircraft needs to be flown at very different altitudes depending on
desired ground resolution in the image or application. A pushbroom hyperspectral camera
can potentially have the same resolution issues, coupled with the additional need of very
high-precision position and orientation system (POS) data to align the individual single-
pixel tall image slices. Past work in this area has revealed that autopilot orientation and
positioning data were not good enough for seamless image creation (Hruska et al. 2012).
The need for high-precision POS data means a substantially increased cost, additional
weight, and power consumption, which on the medium and large UAS can be justified.
It will be some time until that level of complex hardware is operated on the entry-level
quadcopters.
4.3.3.4 LiDAR
LiDAR has changed the face of remote sensing since its wide acceptance in the 1990s.
LiDAR uses a laser beam and a receiver to measure the distance to the ground. A simple
way to think of LiDAR is to imagine what happens when you take a laser pointer into a
dark room and rapidly shine it back and forth in front of you. You can quickly build up
an idea of where all the furniture is and how far away it is. The actual sensor systems
are more complex and can discriminate between multiple return reflections of a single
light pulse. There are several ways of doing this. The early systems used a line scanner
method with optically coupled laser and receiver that sent pulses out over a fixed arc and
waited to see a return reflectance from the ground (Wehr and Lohr 1999). Later systems
used separate scanners and emitters. The latest evolution of sensors uses a single instant
point source emission variant called flash LiDAR (Gelbart et al. 2002). The technology has
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currently settled into two types: Geiger-mode LiDAR (GML) and single-photon LiDAR
(SPL). Both types have different advantages and are being rapidly developed. Both GML
and SPL are mechanically simpler, but potentially spatially less accurate (Higgins 2017).
The technology is evolving rapidly.
As one might expect, all these systems require a very accurate measurement of time,
sensor pointing angles, and sensor spatial location. LiDAR sensor ground resolution is
dependent on attitude and point density. The higher a system is flown, the further apart
the individual pulses are spaced on the ground, which reduces the data resolution. The
lower the power of the LiDAR system, the shorter the range. Power is a limiting factor
for UAS systems. The midsized and large UAS systems running combustion or turbine
engines can produce their own electrical power, so they are less limited than the small
systems using electric motors, which are dependent upon their battery packs.
The manned aircraft LiDAR systems can operate at altitudes of 10,000 m above ground
level. The smaller units used for the midsized UAV systems over the last few years have a
useful range of a few hundred meters or less. For example, the Regal VUX-1UAV specifies
an operational ceiling of 1,000 ft. or about 333 m (Regal 2015). The smallest systems can be
deployed on small multirotor systems (Wallace 2012) and have a still shorter range, usually
on the order of 100 m (Velodyne 2019).
4.3.3.5 Synthetic Aperture Radar

SAR systems are radar systems that map. These systems use a band of the EM spectrum
in the range of 1 m–1 mm (Schowengerdt 2007). They send out a radar pulse and use
the reflected radar signal and the receiver’s motion to construct a 2D or 3D image of the
returning echoes. The resolution is dependent upon the wavelength of the EM spectrum
being used, but in airborne SAR, the ground resolution is usually less than a meter and
more often in the centimeter range (McGlone et al. 2004).
A simple way to think of SAR is to imagine standing at the bottom of a narrow canyon
yelling loudly and hearing the yell echoed back several times, each time a little softer and
perhaps a little more distorted. The return sound is altered by how far way the object is
that reflects it. Now imagine you were to yell repeatedly while walking across the canyon
floor and each yell was different. Eventually, if your ears were good enough and your voice
held out, you would probably get a pretty good idea of where the first and loudest echo
had been returned. SAR works in a very similar way, the major difference being that SAR
works on every echo, and determines, from the myriad of echoes it picks up, where in the
distance each object is located relative to the moving receiver. This is very computation-
ally intensive and requires a high degree of precision in timing and positional orientation
information.
One of the major advantages to SAR is that it utilizes long wavelengths that can pass
through most cloud layers, smoke, and dust in the atmosphere. It is also able to achieve
high spatial resolution and to pick up on surface features such as waves and other textures.
This capability enables some very interesting scientific and commercial applications
(Jackson and Apel 2004).
There have been relatively few commercial applications of small SAR technology on
UAS since the widely publicized flights in 2008 on the Boeing/Insitu ScanEagle™ system
(Microsystems 2015) (see Figure 4.2). General Atomics has created an SAR system that
operates on Predator-sized aircraft, but that system, which is specified as having a range of
80 km and weighing between 80 and 120 pounds, depending on which variant is used, is
only viable on larger UAS (Atomics 2015)
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FIGURE 4.2
NANO SAR Circa 2008 (Microsystems 2015).
The area of SAR remote sensing from UAS is unique in UAS remote sensing now because
technology exists, but there is little published work about it being used in the academic
fields, and even less in the commercial fields. Assuming the systems are being employed
by the world’s militaries as advertised by their vendors, it is unclear why the UAS research
community and commercial sectors are not using the technology more. Still, it remains a
powerful data collection technique, and as UAS utilization increases, one can only assume
that the use of such systems will likewise grow.
4.4 Geospatial Data Types

To get the best results when using a drone to collect data and answer questions, it is best to
understand some basics about the data you are collecting and working with. There are two
fundamental types of geospatial data: raster and vector. Raster data are stored as a set of
values stored in a contiguous grid; the spatial data are defined for the grid. Vector data are
data stored as a mathematical representation of geometry and value; in most cases, this is
in the form of an expression of location in space and time, along with an associated value.
4.4.1 Raster Data

The most common form of raster data is imagery. There are three general types of geospa-
tial imagery: geotagged, georeferenced, and orthographic. Geotagged imagery is imagery
taken at a known location. These can only be placed on a map as points because there
is no additional pointing information to allow them to be placed on the ground. When
images are placed on the ground, they are called “georeferenced.” Literally, they have been
referenced to a geographic coordinate system. This can be done manually by comparing
imagery to background imagery or through the more rigorous methods of aerial triangu-
lation. An orthographic image is an image that has been orthorectified or straightened to
remove camera lens distortion and terrain derived perspective distortion. This is important
because it takes out the “fisheye” effect common in wide-angle lenses on drones and helps
correct the other distortions that would make measurements made on the images directly
incorrect.
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4.4.2 Vector Data

Vector data can represent almost anything. Fortunately for us, vector data are only made
up of three types of data: points, lines, and polygons. A point is a single exact position in
space and time, for which there can be associated data such as temperature. A line is, math-
ematically speaking, a series of points treated as a set, about which there can be associated
data such as elevation. A polygon is a line-enclosed area about which data can be stored,
such as water depth.
4.5 Image Processing Concepts

4.5.1 Structure from Motion
The primary data processing method of still images from small UAS is known as structure
from motion (SFM). Its final product is orthographic mosaic images which is constructed
from high overlap geotagged or georeferenced images. The process finds common points
in overlapping images and creates a mosaic much in the same way your smartphone
creates a panorama photo. The key difference is that the images the SFM program has to
work with are taken from many different locations, which means there are many different
angles from which any one object is seen. This allows the program to go beyond just a
mosaic and create an orthorectified image. This is done by using the different views of
the same object to calculate a three-dimensional (3D) model of the area being mapped.
The 3D model is called a “point cloud.” Using some basic assumptions, the point cloud is
turned into a surface model, which is then used to create an orthomosaic from the input
images. This orthomosaic is corrected for distortion caused by the camera lens, underlying
buildings, and terrain, as well as color balanced to take out differences in image exposure.
A good overview can be found in Westoby et al. (2012).
4.5.1.1 Point Clouds

The creation and exploitation of the 3D point clouds started as a LiDAR source, but with
the advent of the photogrammetric point cloud as part of the data processing work flow
for so many UAS data processing programs, it has become a desired data product of many
orthomosaic work flows. The 3D point cloud can be used for a wide range of applications,
regardless of its source. The 3D point cloud’s power lies in the ability to work in the three
dimensions. It may appear strangely self-evident to the uninitiated in the GIS fields, but
the vast majority of the GIS data is 2D, so the advent of 3D data in abundance is changing
how most GIS professionals set up and plan analyses.
The UAS platform not only allows for very high-resolution 3D data. This enables detailed
analysis of small areas; for example, being able to accurately calculate the volume of small
buildings allows for analyses of heated volumes and estimation of what upgrades will do
to such facilities. It is now possible to calculate with some level of precision the volume
of small dirt piles at construction sites, and to estimate how much of the reserves remain
on site or how much will be spent in dirt removal costs. The high-resolution nature of the
UAS imagery also allows for much more detailed creation of surface models from imagery
(Hugenholtz et al. 2013). Another advantage of detailed 3D models derived from UAS
data is the ability to generate more detailed calculations of biomass volumes (Zarco-Tejada
et al. 2014).
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4.6 Data Management

A data management system is vital for managing and utilizing data, particularly over time.
It is effectively good organization so that you can find things later. Often, given the size
of data collected, it is unpractical to retain collected data with other data pertaining to
contracts or clients. This is especially true for recurring projects, which may stretch over
longer periods of time. It becomes impractical to try and keep terabytes worth of data on
local machines used by the administrators, operators, or even a central local server. In
some cases, it may not be even practical to keep the data on a cloud storage system for cost
reasons. In this day and age, often data may not be useful to anyone to keep.
No matter how long you intend to keep the data collected, it is highly recommended to
have a standard data management system in place. This will allow you to build standard
processes and practices and grow collection and processing operations. A data manage-
ment system does not have to be complex, just standard. The purpose is to help product-
ivity by creating an organization structure that you can use to store all data collected on a
flight and all data derived from that raw data. It should also be something you can check
on to see where the processing stands and easily find data delivered to clients. Flying a
UAS for creation and possible processing of data lends itself to a data abstraction storage
structure. This is a method of storing things by levels of processing. Each level represents
a step of processing further away (more abstract) from raw all the way up to the fully
analyzed, and can support an infinite number of levels. Ideally, a standard project struc-
ture should produce a unique filename for every piece of data collected that contains all
the information needed in a human readable format to identify the client, purpose, when
the data were collected, and with what tool. To that end, there is a general project structure
you can follow outlined in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.
It is recommended that you avoid special characters in file naming conventions such
as spaces and dashes. Time and date everything in UTC, which is what your data will
be tagged with by the GPS. This will help you if you run into a processing system that
does not like spaces and special characters. It also helps make transfer between storage
FIGURE 4.3
Example file structure.
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FIGURE 4.4
Data file structure template.
systems and operating systems simpler. In place of spaces, use underscores or camel case
if underscores do not work.
4.6.1 Data Security (Cloud Security)

Data security in the drone and remote sensing world is treated as an IT problem. Large
companies have experienced IT professionals who may even be certified in the security
system they manage. Smaller firms can be a bit more haphazard with who and how data
security is done. Based on experience and an informal survey of colleges in the field, it
is rare for any security requirements to be placed upon a data collection contract. When
they are, it is often a blanket “no cloud data” requirement, which means all data must
be kept on local company networks. Many of the larger companies, especially those who
have sensitive infrastructure like power plants and oil refineries, will require that data
be turned over to them and via their network, usually a secure transfer method such as
a password-protected upload portal or even by sending them a hard drive. Fortunately,
most remote sensing data are highly temporal and lose value quickly after collection. For
small drone data, this is especially true, as projects such has infrastructure inspection or
building monitoring are really ways of gaining greater situational awareness.
Data security is a matter of access restriction. This is done either by encrypting the data
so that it cannot be read or by restricting access, or a combination of the two. Most commer-
cial applications and civilian standards are primarily designed to restrict access and make
the data inaccessible without approval from the owner.
Cloud storage works this way: A good example is the well-publicized failure to cor-
rectly configure the Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud storage system called Simple
Storage System (S3) in the past. The S3 system is designed to be highly accessible by many
platforms and individuals around the world. Ease of use is a selling point for the system.
This ease of use was a double-edged sword until the system changed its default security
state. There was a series of data security breaches reported in the news in 2016–2018 until
Amazon changed its default security preferences to make the system default to fully secure
(Cimpanu 2018). Once that became the norm, security breaches on S3 due to the system
design went down drastically.
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Cloud storage is a highly useful tool for both large data storage and collaboration.
If done right, it can meet all common industry standards and often many government
ones as well. Treat cloud storage as you would any other Internet accessible system: Use
strong passwords, change them frequently, use multifactor authentication, make sure
you set up the system correctly, and understand how interesting the data you are
storing there is to others. Strong passwords are at the root of what makes your system
secure; if your password is easily guessed, someone will, and you only have yourself to
blame. Changing those passwords completely, not just changing one number at the end,
makes them harder to guess. Make them as different as possible. Multifactor authentical
(MFA) is a process that uses more than the username and password to authenticate the
person trying to log in. Often this is a text sent to your phone. This is more secure. The
12-year-old kid who correctly guesses your password was 12345 is probably not also
going to have access to your phone (you hope). Spend the time to learn about your
cloud storage system. All systems have basic primers that will tell you about how to
make them secure, and most are defaulting to no access to anyone other than the creator
unless granted, but how you grant that access and to whom you are granting it varies
based on service and your needs. Spend the few hours it will take to learn enough to do
it correctly.
A study on proposals to a multistate cloud GIS services contract RFI showed that data
access and security were important considerations, but suggested that alignment with the
Federal Information Security Management Act and the Random Antiterrorism Measures
Program mitigated such issues. The report specifically cited the use of access restriction
such as “customer isolation through VLANs and containers and intrusion detection/
prevention” (Montana et al. 2011, p. 15). Having some idea of the value of your data to
a hacker is important. Most of the malicious hacking is geared toward either disrupting
something or making money for the hacker. Odds are the people hacking out there on the
Internet have no interest in Farmer Joe’s cornfield where you flew last week. Industrial
infrastructure, such as power lines, power plants, cell phone towers, oil fields, refineries,
etc., have a national security value and that data should be secured. Any contract you sign
should specify how the data would be secured.
4.6.2 Long-Term Data Storage

It is recommended that you set up a standard policy to delete data past a certain point of
time. Holding on to data forever can quickly become expensive. Cloud storage systems
have data archiving and deletion options that allow you to step down storage costs and
delete data after it has reached a certain age. What exactly this time period is depends on
your customer’s needs. As a rule of thumb, 30 days after payment gives them time to have
looked at your product and asked any questions they may have about it. Just make sure
you specify that to the client as part of the contract.
4.7 Applications
There are many applications to which UAS remotely sensed data can be put. The usability
of the data is highly dependent on the airframe, and on how the sensors are configured. It
86
is generally true that anything that is built is designed for a primary purpose, and if it is
used for some other purpose, it does not work as well as was intended. This seems to be
doubly true for small UAS, which are more often than not sensors with wings as much as
they are aircraft. In designing and/or using a UAS, it is imperative to keep in mind what it
is meant to do, and why it is flying. This will make operations and data processing much
easier.
What follows is an overview of UAS applications, largely derived from academic research
and the writer’s personal experience. It is not all-inclusive, nor is it meant to be.
As a trend, what we are seeing from UAS remote sensing is an expansion of the discip-
line into new niches, rather than a radical change in the capability of the technology. This
means, as a rule, if you think an operation can be done conventionally, odds are there is a
way to collect your remote sensing data with a UAS. The only remaining question is, given
current technology and regulations, is it economical?
FIGURE 4.5
TASE 500 Gimbal with VIS, MWIR, and LWIR cameras. (CloudCap 2015.)
FIGURE 4.6
TASE 400 Gimbal with VIS, LWIR, and slot for laser range finder on an Aerosonde. (Keller 2011.)
87
FIGURE 4.7
Small UAS Gimbal. (Staff 2012.)
4.7.1 Motion Imagery

What many people envision when they think of drones is live video streamed somewhere,
so a government agent or military commander can see what is going on in real time. These
applications are usually accomplished using a gimbaled system, which allows an operator
to point a camera in virtually any direction. This allows for continuous observation of an
object or target on the ground. The limitations of these systems tend to come in to play
when the observer attempts to look at the target through objects on the ground like trees
and/or parts of the aircraft. Trying to look through the aircraft is less than informative and
is usually avoidable with a well thought out integration of the system into the airframe and
good flight planning.
Many of the UAS gimbal systems on the market are designed for military applications
(see Figures 4.5–4.7). This means they are designed with intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) purposes in mind. To that end, they are built with a range of sensors,
which tend to be less useful outside of ISR applications.
There are increasing numbers of commercial gimbals being built for the small UAS
market, specifically targeted at the entry-level hobby market up through the cinematog-
raphy sector. These gimbals, unlike the military application gimbals, tend to be of two
types: integrated camera system or are designed to support a range of commercial cameras.
They are often not capable of as large a range of motion when compared to the military
models. Instead, they rely on positioning the aircraft to enable the shot. They also tend to
be lighter weight and more fragile than the military grade systems. An example of a GoPro
gimbal on an entry-level quadcopter can be found in Figure 4.8.
4.7.2 Emergency Response

Emergency response is an interesting type of operation for UAS in the commercial sector.
It can be divided into two subsets: search and rescue (SaR) and disaster response. SaR
is an application with many of the same ISR requirements pioneered by the military,
so the technology is available and actively being used by law enforcement and civil author-
ities around the United States and the world (Dukowitz 2019). Recent studies show that
there is still work to be done to optimally integrate the drone systems into SaR (ENNA
et al. 2018). Current methods have yielded a marginal improvement in the US operations.
Research also indicates that the inherent limitations are not always being understood by
88
FIGURE 4.8
Entry-level quad copter with gimbal. (Staff 2015c.)
the teams (Rohde, 2018). Several attempts have been made to integrate sensing systems
beyond the initial ISR applications (Choi and Lee 2011), but few have come into wide-
spread use. It is expected that the results will improve rapidly as the community finds the
best ways to utilize the platform and sensing systems for SaR.
Disaster response is about determining the current situation after some catastrophic
event and communicating it to supporting teams to improve responses initially, then shifts
to smaller area specific tasks like evaluating the conditions of an infrastructure or indi-
vidual houses. This is a rapidly changing field, with applications for small-and mid-sized
drone systems depending on what event is being responded to. The area assessment tasks
on small-scale events like tornados lend themselves to small platforms, while larger events
like hurricanes and fires are often covered by larger drones (Mahoney 2016). After the
assessment phase is over and detailed inspection commences, small-scale platforms are
used, as detailed in the other sections of this chapter.
4.7.3 Map (Background) Imagery

The demand for high-resolution current imagery data for maps has increased dramatic-
ally with the advent of Geographic Information Systems (GIS), especially with their intro-
duction into daily life through applications such as Bing Maps™ and Google Earth™.
The use of small format camera systems employed in small UAS and for area mapping is
something that has been enabled by the remote sensing and computer vision communities
through the development of automated systems that combine the many images required to
cover an area into one seamless orthorectified mosaic (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.11). These
mosaicked images are a critical element in making imagery of all spectrums from small
format cameras on UAS viable data products for GIS analysis (Liu et al. 2006, Grenzdörffer,
Engel, and Teichert 2008). The single most common use is as an updated background map
to inform the user about what is going on in the target area. This allows the GIS operator/
analyst to quickly and easily determine what has changed since the last set of images.
4.7.4 Infrastructure Inspection

Infrastructure inspection is a growing field of unmanned remote sensing. Infrastructure in
this application is defined as structures utilized by commercial system, such as cell phone
towers, power lines, water towers, and oil holding tanks. These structures are increasingly
being inspected by drones because of the safety in not having to have an individual scale
the structure. Depending on the client (usually the owner or operator of the infrastruc-
ture), the inspection is accomplished by collecting 2D data and then creating a 3D model
89
FIGURE 4.9
Monopole light.
using an SFM software package. The model is used to perform an overall assessment and
find detailed areas to investigate, using the raw imagery tied to the 3D model. Most SFM
packages allow you to click on a spot in the model and then quickly find that location in
the collected imagery. This allows for analysis of native resolution in the spatial context of
the model (see Figure 4.9).
4.7.5 Vegetation Health Measurements

4.7.5.1 Vegetation Index: An Overview
Biomass, crop health, crop yield, and other plant characteristics can be estimated from
remotely sensed data using a vegetation index (VI) (Jang et al. 2006). VIs are created by
using different bands of the EM spectrum captured by remote sensing systems (Stark et al.
2000). The most common bands used in vegetation analysis applications are the NIR, the
red, the green, and the blue (Pinter et al. 2003). The most common VI used to measure plant
stress is the Normalized Difference Vegetative Index (NDVI). Manipulating the red and the
NIR bands as shown in Equation (4.1) creates the NDVI. The second most common VI used
in plant health analysis is the Green Normalized Vegetation Index (GNDVI). This is made
by manipulating the green and the NIR bands as described in Equation (4.2) (Vygodskaya,
Gorshkova, and Fadeyava 1989).
NDVI equation:
( NIR − Re d)
NDVI = (4.1)
( NIR + Re d)
90
GNDVI equation:
( NIR − Green)
GNDVI = (4.2)
( NIR + Green)
Once created, the VI maps can be analyzed and used to develop a variety of data
products. The NDVI and GNDVI are health analogs. As such they can be used to inform
many types of analyses such as prescription maps for fertilizing and seeding crops, as well
as crop yield estimates, so that farmers can maximize their profits (Ladd 2007, Prasad et al.
2006). In forestry, they are used for, among other things, change detection and biomass esti-
mation (Vogelmann 1990, Spruce et al. 2011, Sader and Winne 1992).
4.7.5.2 UAS in Agriculture-Vegetation Indices

In a 2013 report, the Association for Unmanned Vehicles International (AUVSI) estimated
that agriculture was likely to be the biggest growth sector for UAS through 2025 (Jenkins
and Vasigh 2013). The concept of precision agriculture (PA) is one where previously
unused or unavailable data are brought into play to better understand and manage crops
in increasing detail.
UAS have the potential to change agriculture operations. The concept of farmers being
able to employ aircraft to collect and analyze their own data has been around for a long
time (Nagchaudhuri et al. 2005, 2006). The technology for flying UAS and collecting data
has evolved more recently. The current challenge for farmers is that the skill set required
to operate and maintain an aircraft system is not one most farmers already possess. This
is forcing the UAS industry to develop highly intuitive, highly automated, and easy to
maintain aircraft systems. The UAS industry is still working on some aspects of aircraft
operations and collection of data for larger areas or highly complicated terrain. As Zhang
and Kovacs pointed out in their 2012 survey article, the largest stumbling block at the pre-
sent time is the processing of the large amount of individual frames captured into a mean-
ingful analysis (Zhang and Kovacs 2012). The companies who create the image processing
software are working hard to reduce the technical skill level required to run this software,
but there still exists a large gap between the technology-savvy research scientists, or their
students, and the average farmer. Consequently, there is a proliferation of features that
create VIs from the imagery collected automatically. These VIs are often mistaken for a
final result, which in agriculture or any plant assessment is usually not the case.
The concept of VI health assessment has been used in many different crop types. The
general premise is to capture CIR imagery or multiband imagery, which can be utilized to
create the VI. Based upon the spectral bands, either NDVI or GNDVI can be used as health
predictors; both are good general indicators, though they perform differently, depending
on the crop (Moges et al. 2005). Once the VI has been calculated, it can be used for many
applications, including vegetation identification and general health mapping, as shown in
Figures 4.10–4.12.
One fact that is often overlooked by those not in the agriculture community is that most
crop analysis requires more than just aerial imagery and its derivative products such as an
NDVI. The data product created from a VI is by definition relative, giving relative health of
the crop area at the time collected. Crop modeling and prediction takes input from other in
situ sources such as soil type, soil chemistry, soil moisture, and daily temperature, to name
91
FIGURE 4.10
Multi-spectral images of the Monteboro vineyard (left) false color image at 5 cm of spatial (Primicerio
et al. 2012).
FIGURE 4.11
CIR image made from bands NIR, green, and blue (Hunt et al. 2010).
92
FIGURE 4.12
GNDVI Ccreated from NIR, green, and blue image (Hunt et al. 2010).
a few (Sadler et al. 2000). It seems only logical that UAS will feed data into the PA systems
to help inform the predictive models, and this has been a matter of academic study for
some time (Ladd et al. 2006, Nagchaudhuri et al. 2006), but the large-scale adoption prob-
ably will not happen until the major agricultural equipment manufactures start making
turnkey systems that incorporate data from multiple sources. Even then, odds are there will
be a human in the loop for some time to adjust and modify the model recommendations,
as many agronomists do now.
The AUVSI report (Jenkins and Vasigh 2013) projects, from the proliferation of com-
panies targeting this market sector, and the wide range of applications across almost all
vegetation types (Barnes 1996, Pinter et al. 2003, Sullivan 2005, Lehmann et al. 2015) that
this industry will rapidly move toward the automation that enables widespread UAS use
beyond the university.
4.7.5.3 Thermal Mapping

A growing subset of UAS for PA is the use of LWIR cameras to identify plant stress. The
fundamental biological concept being exploited by thermal imaging is that, if the plants
are stressed, they will not uptake water from the soil as much a healthy plant, and thus
will be hotter. At first it may seem counterintuitive that plants can run a fever, but there
has been an increasing amount of study of this phenomenon with improvement of small
commercial thermal cameras (Chaerle et al. 2004). This has logically moved into the realm
of small UAS, where the ability to operate the aircraft at low altitudes for increasing time
periods has enabled the creation and evaluation of systems to make thermal maps of crops
(Bendig, Bolten, and Bareth 2012).
93
4.7.5.4 Broader Vegetation Management

Beyond PA, the use of UAS to create VI for vegetation management and monitoring has
been increasing over the years. Today airborne vegetation sensing techniques are seeing
applications in a wide range of areas across disciplines and subject matters. A good
example is the use of UAS in forestry, particularly the management of deciduous forests
where pest infestation research is actively ongoing (Lehmann et al. 2015, Grenzdörffer,
Engel, and Teichert 2008)
Not all vegetation management utilizes VIs. Andrea Laliberte and her team in New
Mexico had very good luck using object detection algorithms to identify individual plants
in the arid rangeland of New Mexico (Laliberte et al. 2007). While this approach prob-
ably would not work with high-density vegetation situations like forests because the
similar leafy textures can be hard for the algorithms to differentiate, there are some logical
extensions into research where object differentiation can be useful, such as orchard man-
agement, where one is trying to pick out fruit trees on a background that is very different
in texture and appearance.
Spectral signature analysis using hyperspectral image analysis is an established discip-
line within the remote sensing field. Its use can be seen with both satellite and airborne
platforms. Hyperspectral imagers are complicated and difficult to integrate into aircraft
and still maintain precision. The majority of them are “pushbroom” sensors, which in turn
means that they lack the overlap between image slices that has enabled the multiframe
mosaic boom in UAS imagery discussed in Section 4.5.1. Consequently, they require much
more sophisticated POS systems, which currently cannot be integrated on the smaller
foam or multirotor systems. There is potential on the largest size multirotor systems.
Work with these systems is now being done using larger fixed wing aircraft with 4–5 m
wingspans. The teams at the Idaho National Lab (Mitchell et al. 2012) and the Instituto de
Agricultura in Córdoba, Spain (Calderón et al. 2013) have had good results using different
hyperspectral sensors, leveraging the spectral discrimination of hyperspectral sensors
with image classification and object classification, respectively. While both studies were
confined to relatively small research areas, there is clearly potential for much larger areas
and wider applications.
In the United States, one of the research areas where LiDAR sensors carried on UAS have
been successfully utilized is in forestry. The ability to accurately measure canopy height
and properties is of great importance to forestry management. Canopy data such as height
and crown diameter are analogs or enablers for several other indicators, such as diameter
at breast height, biomass, age, and health (Dubayah and Drake 2000; Popescu, Wynne, and
Nelson 2003). The use of LiDAR on commercial UAS system has been slower to be adapted,
particularly for the small UAS systems where the higher end POS systems are unsuitable.
Larger UAS platforms are capable of carrying bigger systems such as the Army’s Buckeye
Project (Fischer et al. 2008). Smaller UAS are showing good results in forestry applications
such as calculating tree height and crown size (Wallace 2012). An advantage to the small
UA systems is their ability to fly close to the target to achieve high point density. The point
density affects the sensor’s ability to discriminate target height and details, as illustrated
in Figure 4.13.
One interesting thing to note is that the smaller airframes such as the multirotor systems
used by Wallace and his team at the University of Tasmania are range limited and need
to be within about 50 m of the ground (Wallace, Lucieer, and Watson 2014) due to return
signal degradation, while the larger systems such as the BuckEye or VUX-1 are not so
limited. If history is any guide, the smaller systems improve with time.
94
FIGURE 4.13
Decreasing point density affects tree height measurements. Point density changes from 70 points per meter for a
to 10 points per meter in (c). (L. O. Wallace 2012.)
4.7.5.5 Airframes for Vegetation Applications

The literature describing the earlier work in UAS for PA and vegetation mapping reveals
that the work initially was done with fixed wing platforms and has since progressed to
multirotor systems. This is attributable to the recent proliferation of commercially avail-
able multirotor systems with their inherent stability and camera pointing accuracy. The
downside of the multirotor system is short endurance. It is foreseeable that small area
applications, for certain farm sizes and crop types, along with Research & Development
efforts, will continue to utilize the multirotor system. Large-area monitoring will most
likely require the use of fixed wing platforms, which are either on the large end of the small
category, or on the small end of the medium-sized UAS category. The endurance provided
by such platforms will help reduce operating costs if the regulatory environment allows
them to be used at long range.
4.8 Conclusions
UAS sensing as a subset of airborne remote sensing is still in its adolescence. The range of
choices of operational airframes is so large (see Figure 4.1) that on the large end of the spec-
trum, the technology used in manned aircraft can be directly integrated into unmanned
airframes, while on the smallest end, systems can carry only the smallest of sensors. The
large airframes can carry a payload nearly to the edge of space, while the smallest scale
quadcopters fly out of range after a few hundred yards.
Advances in manufacturing processes have allowed for miniaturization of sensors
and alternate methods for making measurements. Microelectricalmechanical systems
(MEMS) technology has enabled the smaller, higher resolution microbolometer arrays.
95
Improvements in printed circuits have enabled advances in MEMS, complementary metal-

oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) and avalanche photodiode arrays at the core of VIS cameras,
LWIR cameras, and the newer LiDAR sensors. These advances point toward smaller pay-
load weights and power use, which, coupled with advances in battery and motor tech-
nology, will enable longer duration flight operations, ultimately culminating in the greater
flight range and multisensor capability for smaller airframes.
Since the turn of the century, we have seen an explosion of digital technology that
has been the foundation for the growth of the UAS market as a whole and of the remote
sensing segment in particular. The advent of the compact high-resolution digital camera
has enabled small UAS remote sensing. What we are seeing now is a confluence of cap-
abilities in sensors, software, and airframes. The large airframes can cover the spectrum of
passive and active sensors, whereas the midsized airframes have only been able to fly the
complete spectrum in the last few years. The small airframes can fly almost all the passive
sensors, and new active sensors are continually being released.
As fast as new sensors become available, they are being used for new applications and,
as often as not, unimagined or designed for applications. What is still being worked out
by the industry is how to make these systems commercially viable. We know that they
work for the military and research scientists. They also work for some scales in agriculture
and plant/vegetation management. They are fun and useful platforms for hobbyists. The
entertainment industry has been a leader in adopting the technology. What has not been
definitively proven is how and where they fit into the economics of commercial remote
sensing and data collection. We know that they have opened new niches and are com-
peting with existing technologies in others, but they simply have not been in commercial
use long enough for any final evaluation. The next 10 years will be a very interesting time
to be involved with the UAS industry in general and remote sensing and applications in
particular.
4.1 Does the following definition apply to LiDAR, SAR, both, or neither? Please
explain your reasoning. “An instrument capable of measuring distance and
direction to an object by emitting timed pulses of electromagnetic energy in a
measured direction and converting to equivalent distance the measured interval
of time between when a pulse was emitted and when the echo was received.”
4.2 Unmanned or manned, the aircraft has proven its viability as a platform for
remote sensing time and time again. Given the myriad issues one faces when
attempting to utilize unmanned aircraft in non-segregated airspace, discuss
reasons why a research team would choose an unmanned aircraft platform over
its manned counterpart?
4.3 When an agronomist evaluates images of a particular section of land (one square
mile), noting the reflectance of a particular wavelength of EM can yield a measure
of emergence of a desired crop. Explain how just using the percent presence of
reflected EM might lead to errors in an accurate percentage of emergence of a
desired crop.
4.4 Near Infrared and Infrared EM are both outside the visible band of the EM spec-
trum. Though they sound similar in name, they are very different with respect to
96
the nature of the data they collect. Discuss how they are both similar and different
while differentiating between the useful natures of the collected data of each.
4.5 Emissivity is the measure of the amount of long-wave radiation given off by a
particular material at a specific temperature. How might an object’s emissivity
make it more difficult to see even if it is hot?
4.6 In order for radar systems to distinguish between two objects in close prox-
imity to each other, the wavelength of the transmitted signal needs to be rela-
tively short. SAR, however, can use very long wavelengths and get remarkable
“photolike” images. In simple terms, try to explain how this capability of SAR
might be possible.
4.7 Still imagery and video—both are common forms of data collection used on
small unmanned aircraft. Compare and contrast both collection methodologies
and describe situations where each might be more appropriate than the other.
4.8 A gimbal camera mount usually allows a camera to be moved in the vertical dir-
ection while stabilizers maintain the camera level with the ground. Explain why
it might not be necessary to provide a pan function on a gimbal mount when
affixed to a quadrotor.
4.9 Prior to the use of unmanned aircraft to gather aerial imagery, satellite imagery
was used by agronomists to help determine plant health. What might some of
the benefits be in using unmanned aircraft systems to gather this imagery versus
satellites?
4.10 Explain the surface-level differences between the “multi-frame mosaic” systems
and the “pushbroom” systems concentrating which type of system is most likely
to be found on small UAS and why.
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5
UAS Regulations, Standards, and Guidance
Douglas M. Marshall
5.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

5.2 U.S. Aviation Regulatory System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2.1 History of U.S. Aviation Regulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2.2 Federal Aviation Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2.3 Enforcement and Sanctions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3 Current U.S. Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.4 How the Process Works. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.5 Standards and Guidance versus Regulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.6 International Aviation Regulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.7 Other Nations’ Domestic Regulatory Efforts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.8 The Way Forward: The Future of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Regulations . . . . . . 130
5.9 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Discussion Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the developing system of laws, regulations, standards, and guidance
that has evolved since the introduction of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) in the United
States and elsewhere around the world. Starting with the creation of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) at the Chicago Convention of 1944, and stimulated by
technological advances that were, until recently, largely the result of efforts by government
military organizations, developers of affordable and user-friendly unmanned systems have
put unprecedented pressure on National Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) to respond to
the onslaught of small UAS (sUAS) consumers and to take measures to protect the public
from reckless and irresponsible uses of those systems. All 193 Member States of ICAO have
developed aviation regulations to manage manned aviation activities in their respective
sovereign airspaces, while honoring their commitments to ICAO to avoid creating rules
that are in conflict with ICAOs Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). This
chapter introduces the reader to the history and structure of the aviation regulatory system
in the United States, the methods by which the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
makes and enforces those rules, followed by a discussion of community-based standards
and the standards development process, and then pivots to the international arena with
an analysis of international rulemaking and standards making bodies, focusing on a
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102
selection of representative countries and how they have dealt with the introduction of UAS
or Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) into their territories. Lastly, a look into the
future is offered with commentary on where these regulatory efforts are going or should be
going, with a word of encouragement to those wishing to enter this dynamic and exciting
field of aviation technology. At the risk of creating confusion, the terms “UAS,” “sUAS,”
“UAV,” “UA,” “RPAS,” and “drones” are used interchangeably throughout the chapter,
as different nations and regulatory bodies prefer different terminology. They all basically
mean the same thing: a small unmanned aircraft, a UAS, or a remotely piloted aircraft
(RPA). These terms necessarily include the support systems that enable the aircraft to fly
without a pilot on board.
5.2 U.S. Aviation Regulatory System

Aviation regulations in the United States have existed nearly as long as the technology
that is being regulated. All levels of government in civilized countries impose various
regulations on their citizens and their activities. Regulations take many forms, but the
effect is generally the same: creating order in society, reducing hazards in daily activities,
keeping workers safe, and preventing harm from business and industrial practices. As
societies and technologies become more complex, regulations evolve to ensure that people
are not exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm, be it physical, financial, or existential.
Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and operators typically drive or motivate
regulations in any technical environment such as aviation. As users experience incidents,
problems, or anomalies, those events may be reported to regulatory agencies such as
the FAA. Some regulations require such reporting, and the agency depends on proper
reporting to efficiently manage the nation’s aviation activities. Should the number of
anomalous events reach a certain critical mass or the outcome is sufficiently severe (fatal-
ities, injuries, or property damage), the data generated may prompt a review of the rele-
vant regulation, if any, or the promulgation of a new regulation if a regulatory gap is
identified. The best example of that phenomenon is in the area of UASs. For all intents
and purposes, there were no U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations or even policy statements
directed to unmanned aircraft, save for one Advisory Circular (AC) in 19811 until a policy
statement was issued in 2007,2 and a full set of regulations was published in 2016.3 In the
interim, the U.S. Congress stepped in and passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act
(FMRA) of 2012,4 which provided, for the first time, specific mandates to the Department
of Transportation setting forth a system of overlapping deadlines for the integration of
sUAS into the national airspace over the subsequent three years. It should be noted that
the FAA failed to meet most of those deadlines. And it should also be noted, as evidence of
the snail’s pace of regulatory treatment in the U.S. system, that the FAA created an Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (ARC) in April of 2008 to make recommendations for a new set
of rules for sUAS. Those recommendations were delivered to the administrator on April
1 of 2009, but the final sUAS rules were not published in the Federal Register until June
28, 2016, and did not become effective until August 29, 2016. The FAA received over 4,600
comments to the proposed rule. The U.S. system for administrative agency rulemaking
is dictated by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),5 which establishes a multistage
process that includes internal drafting and review, publication of the draft rules in the
Federal Register, a period of public comment, revisions based upon the comments, and
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UAS Regulations, Standards, and Guidance 103
publication of a final rule. A five to seven year journey to create a new or amended rule
in aviation is therefore not unusual. Emergency rules can be implemented in a few days
or weeks, as circumstances warrant. Similar processes are found in other countries, to be
discussed in Section 5.7. Some proposed rules can take significantly less time if they are not
controversial and do not generate many adverse comments from the public. Why is this
process apparently so cumbersome? The short answer is found in the U.S. Constitution
and its Amendments, and a more comprehensive treatment is beyond the scope of this
discussion, but essentially, Americans are guaranteed participation in all aspects of gov-
ernment, and have a fundamental right to have their voices heard when it comes to laws,
rules, and regulations that may affect them. For example, as this chapter was being revised
and updated for the Third Edition, the FAA published a draft new rule for Remote ID
describing the framework for identifying ssUAS and model aircraft in flight by requiring
them to transmit a serial number or alphanumeric code and position data to ground
surveillance systems via the Internet. Different equipment requirements are proposed,
depending upon the type and use of the sUAS. When the comment period closed, the draft
rule had provoked over 45,000 comments. Under the rules set forth in the APA, all of these
comments must be adjudicated and resolved, which is a complex and lengthy process.6
The introduction of a new technology or procedure into the National Airspace System
(NAS) requires a comprehensive safety analysis before the FAA can allow the change.
The safety analysis includes a review of the relevant regulation and supporting ACs or
Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFARs) to determine whether the proposed tech-
nology or procedure can comply with current regulation. The FAA may grant exceptions
in particular cases after performing the safety review as a way to manage unique, perhaps
nonrecurring circumstances, or when the event that led to the review is determined to be
unlikely to recur.
These circumstances may lead to the rulemaking process described above, which
provides the mechanism for the FAA to fulfill its statutory mandate to ensure the safety
of the aviation environment. The rest of this chapter examines the history of domestic
U.S. and international aviation regulations; the structure of those statutes and regulations;
the purpose and intent of the rules; how rules are made, changed, and enforced; the
differences between rules and standards; how this system affects the development of UAS
technologies and operations; examines how other countries and international regulatory
bodies promulgate rules and regulations; and concludes with a look into the future of UAS
regulations.
5.2.1 History of U.S. Aviation Regulations

Aviation regulations in the United States have enjoyed a long and colorful history, begin-
ning with the commencement of airmail operations by the U.S. Post Office in 1918, only
15 years after the first manned powered flight. Three years before that, President Woodrow
Wilson signed a bill that created a National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, which
was intended to oversee a scientific study of the “problems” of flight. No fewer than six
federal statutes enacted to regulate various aspects of aviation followed these early efforts.
Most were directed toward safety concerns and the perceived need to bring some order
to commercial aviation. The issues that generated the greatest concern were the number
of accidents, the need for a regulated civil airport network, the lack of a harmonized
or common system of air navigation, and demand for a civil aviation infrastructure
that would support growth and stability of the industry, both for military and civilian
applications.
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5.2.2 Federal Aviation Administration

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 created the FAA.7 The statute was enacted in response to
a series of fatal accidents and mid-air collisions involving commercial passenger aircraft.
The FAA is part of the Department of Transportation and derives its rulemaking and regu-
latory power from Title 49 of the United States Code, Section 106. The Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 8) grants Congress broad authority to “regu-
late commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states.” The U.S. government
therefore has exclusive power to regulate the airspace of the United States.8 A citizen of the
United States has a public right of transit through the navigable airspace.9 Among other
powers, the statute confers upon the Administrator of the FAA is the mandate to develop
plans and policies for the use of the navigable airspace and assign by regulation or order
the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of
airspace.10 The Administrator may modify or revoke a regulation, order, or guidance docu-
ment when required in the public interest. The Administrator shall prescribe air traffic
regulations on the flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes) for navigating,
protecting, and identifying aircraft; protecting individuals and property on the ground;
using the navigable airspace efficiently; and preventing collision between aircraft, between
aircraft and land or water vehicles, and between aircraft and airborne objects.11
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority, the FAA has promulgated the standards for the
operation of aircraft in the sovereign airspace of the United States.12 Commonly known
as the FARs, these regulations are the “rules of the road” for certification of all civil air-
craft,13 airmen,14 and airspace;15 certification and operations for air carriers and operators
for compensation or hire;16 air traffic and general operating rules;17 and schools and other
certificated agencies,18 airports,19 and navigational facilities.20 The FARs are codified under
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs).21
The first section of 14 CFR Part 1.1 lists the definitions and abbreviations to be observed
in the ensuing parts and subparts of the FARs. Of more than passing interest to the
unmanned aircraft community is the fact that the terms UAV or UAS or unmanned system
or unmanned aircraft or any other term referring to RPA were excluded from the FARs and,
for that matter, any other federal regulation or statute, until passage of the FMRA of 2012.22
The term aircraft is defined as “a device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the
air.”23 Similarly, “airplane means an engine-driven fixed-wing aircraft heavier than air, that
is supported in flight by the dynamic reaction of the air against its wings.”24 “Air traffic
means aircraft operating in the air or on an airport surface, exclusive of loading ramps and
parking areas.”25 Unmanned aircraft means an aircraft operated without the possibility of
direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft.26
The FAA regulates aircraft, airmen, certain categories of employees of airlines and com-
mercial or common carrier operations, airports, and the national airspace. The FAA’s
“toolbox” is the system of regulations, rulemaking processes, certifications, circulars, spe-
cial authorizations, orders, and directives that the agency uses to carry out its regulatory
functions of rulemaking, surveillance, compliance, and enforcement.
Three of the tools that the FAA uses to administer the FARs are ACs, Airworthiness
Directives (ADs), and policy statements. An AC or AD may be issued in response to a
safety-related event or system anomaly, or a Technical Standards Order (TSO) could be
developed to remediate a technical problem. An AC provides guidance to owners or
operators of aircraft or systems to facilitate compliance with the applicable regulations.
An AD is a notification to owners and operators of certified aircraft that a known safety
deficiency with a particular model of aircraft, engine, avionics, or other system exists and
105
must be corrected. A TSO is a minimum performance standard for specified materials,

parts, and appliances used on civil aircraft. An authorization to manufacture a material,
part, or appliance to a TSO standard is referred to as “TSO authorization.” Issuance of a
TSO authorization constitutes both design and production approval. However, issuance of
a TSO authorization is not an approval to install and use the article in the aircraft. It simply
means that the article meets the specific TSO and the production entity is authorized to
manufacture it.
ACs are utilized to advise the aviation community on issues pertaining to the regulations,
but are not binding on the public (in other words, they do not have the same legal force and
effect as a regulation for enforcement purposes). The exception would be when an AC is
specifically referenced in a regulation.27 The ACs are issued in a numbered subject system
corresponding to the subject areas of the FARs.28 The AC that initially created the most con-
troversy in the unmanned aviation world was AC 91-57, which will be discussed in more
detail later. That circular references 14 CFR Part 91 (Air Traffic and General Operating
Rules), which contains the airspace regulations.
Another advisory tool is the policy statement. Administrative implementation (as
announced or documented by a published policy statement) of a particular statutory pro-
vision may be accorded deference by the courts when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law and that the
agency’s interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.
Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power
to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication
of a comparable congressional intent.29 The FAA has issued a number of policy statements
pertaining to unmanned aircraft, including AFS-400 UAS Policy Statement 05-01; a clari-
fication published in the Federal Register February 6, 2007, entitled “Unmanned Aircraft
Operations in the National Airspace System”; and “Interim Operational Approval Guidance
08-01,” which likewise references 14 CFR Part 9130.31 In addition, the FAA has published
policies regarding Inspection and Maintenance Program requirements for Airworthiness
Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Operating Under 55 Pounds, Aviation-Related Videos
or Other Electronic Media on the Internet,32 UAS Temporary Flight Restrictions for Sporting
Events,33 Education, Compliance, and Enforcement of Unauthorized Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Operators,34 as well as no fewer than seven orders, two additional ACs,35 three
Guidance documents, multiple legal interpretations on a wide variety of issues, and one
special Rules Interpretation since 2007. These documents are all readily accessible on the
FAA’s website.36
5.2.3 Enforcement and Sanctions

No system of rules regulations can be effective without a means to enforce them. The FARs
are no exception. The FAA’s mandate from Congress is to conduct surveillance of avi-
ation activities, inspect aviation systems, investigate violations of the aviation regulations,
and take appropriate measures to enforce the regulations in the event of a violation. The
agency’s investigative power extends to all provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958;
the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act; the Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970; the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982; the Airport and Airway Safety and
Capacity Expansion Act of 1987; all subsequent federal aviation legislation (to be discussed
later) and any rule, order, or regulation issued by the FAA. The FAA’s central mission,
pursuant to its own Order 2150.3C (Compliance and Enforcement Program), is to promote
adherence to safety standards, but the agency recognizes that, due to the nature of aviation
106
itself, it must largely depend upon voluntary compliance with the regulatory standards.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution require that the FAA
enforcement process provides “due process” in the procedures for ensuring compliance
with the regulations. This means that no one shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.”37 Thus, the FAA may not act arbitrarily or inconsistently in its
efforts to enforce the regulations.
The enforcement process established by the FAA is designed to be fair, reasonable, and
perceived to be fair by those who are subject to the regulations. It is a complex process that
provides a number of decision points that allow the FAA and the party being investigated
to arrive at an informal resolution rather than taking the matter to a fully litigated trial. The
FAA’s national policy is compliance before enforcement.38 The range of possible outcomes
progresses in severity from an administrative action being abandoned by the FAA after it
investigates an alleged violation, to a formal charge and trial, an outcome, and an appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals or even to the U.S. Supreme Court (a rare event indeed). Trials
are conducted like any other civil trial (but without a jury), and the FAA generally has the
burden of proof in establishing a violation. Short of a civil penalty or certificate revoca-
tion or suspension, the FAA may issue warning letters or letters of correction, which are
intended to bring the alleged offender into compliance with the regulations for violations
that are not deemed sufficiently serious to warrant more severe sanctions. A constructive
attitude of cooperation by the certificate holder often goes a long way toward resolving
inadvertent or nonflagrant violations by first-time offenders. Civil penalties of up to $50,000
per violation are possible in cases where there is no certificate to suspend or revoke, where
revocation would impose an undue hardship, where qualification is not at issue, or where
the violation is too serious to be handled administratively by use of remedial action. It is
important to remember that the lack of a Part 107 Remote Pilot’s certificate or other FAA-
issued airman’s certificate does not immunize a person or entity from an FAA enforcement
action backed up by imposition of a civil penalty. Civil penalties can be assessed against
someone who merely interferes with a flight or flight crew or otherwise violates FARs. The
offender does not have to be in control of an aircraft or aviation facility to be subject to a
civil penalty.
The U.S. Congress upped the enforcement ante with the passage of the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018,39 in “§ 39B. Unsafe Operation of Unmanned Aircraft.” The Act
amends Chapter 2, Title 18 of the United States Code to define certain offenses involving
the unsafe operation of unmanned aircraft in close proximity to other manned aircraft and
airports, and proscribes severe penalties for violations of those restrictions by imposing
substantial fines and imprisonment for a term of up to 10 years for some violations or
for life for actions causing serious bodily injury or death or conspiring to commit such
offenses.
The Secretary of Transportation (or the Administrator of the Transportation Security

Administration with respect to security duties and powers designated to be carried out
by the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Administrator
of the Federal Aviation Administration with respect to aviation safety duties and powers
designated to be carried out by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration)
may bring a civil action against a person in a district court of the United States to enforce
this part [49 U.S.C. § 46106] or a requirement or regulation prescribed, or an order or any
term of a certificate or permit issued, under this part. The action may be brought in the
judicial district in which the person does business or the violation occurred.40
107
The FAA thus has two issues to face with respect to its enforcement authority over UAS
operations. First, it must determine what it can regulate, and, second, it must decide what
it will regulate. The answer to the second challenge largely depends upon the resolution
of the first.
The FAA issues six types of regulations: mandatory, prohibitive, conditionally manda-
tory, conditionally prohibitive, authority or responsibility, and definition/explanation.41
Mandatory and prohibitive regulations are enforceable. The other four types represent
exceptions or conditions. A thorough analysis of the applicability of a regulation to a par-
ticular situation will include answering the following questions: (1) To whom does the
regulation apply? (2) What does it say in its entirety? (3) Where must the regulation be
complied with? (4) When must it be accomplished? (5) How does it apply to the situation
in question? and (6) Are there are any special conditions, exceptions, or exclusions?42
Since unmanned aircraft are now defined by statute as “aircraft,” and there is no excep-
tion found elsewhere in the regulations that excludes UASs from the definition (recre-
ational or hobby aircraft are now included in the definition, but may be exempt from some
regulatory requirements),43 the most current statutory interpretation holds that the FAA
has full regulatory authority over all aircraft that are capable of and do fly in the national,
navigable airspace. “Navigable airspace means airspace at and above the minimum flight
altitudes prescribed by or under this chapter, including airspace needed for safe take-off
and landing.”44 Minimum safe altitudes are prescribed at 1,000 feet above the ground in a
congested area, with a lateral separation from objects of 2,000 feet, and an altitude of 500
feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In those cases,
the aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or struc-
ture.45 The exception is when it is necessary for takeoff or landing, in which case the navig-
able airspace goes to the surface (and along a designated approach path or airport landing
pattern).46 The 400-foot AGL altitude limit for model aircraft contained in the original AC
91-57 was probably an observance of the 500-foot minimum safe altitude for manned air-
craft operating anywhere except in Class G (uncontrolled) airspace,47 providing a 100-foot
“buffer,” in addition to the recommendation to not operate within close proximity to an
airport. The actual FAA policy history of AC 91-57 is not available for confirmation, but the
foregoing is the commonly held belief of FAA officials and individuals familiar with the
history of model aviation.48
The vast majority of the FARs are intended to provide for safe operations of aircraft that
carry people, both for the protection of the crew and passengers, and for people and prop-
erty on the ground. Although unmanned aircraft have been on the aviation scene for over
90 years, there is no evidence in any of the preambles to regulations or other historical
documents currently available for review that the authors of any regulation before about
2005 contemplated application of a specific regulation to unmanned, remotely piloted air-
craft. Moored balloons and kites,49 unmanned rockets,50 and unmanned free balloons,51
categories of objects or vehicles that are intended to occupy a place in the airspace and are
unmanned, are specifically covered by existing regulations, but there was nothing similar
for other types of unmanned aircraft.
The FAA has long maintained that it has enforcement authority under existing airspace
regulations 14 CFR §§ 91.111 and 91.113, which require that an operator of an aircraft be
able to safely operate near other aircraft and observe the right-of-way rules, but the more
difficult issue is whether such aircraft must meet certification requirements for the systems
and the qualification standards, with appropriate certificates, for pilots, sensor operators,
mechanics, maintenance personnel, designers, and manufacturers.
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As of the publication of the First Edition of this book, there had been no formal
legal challenges to the FAA’s enforcement authority over unmanned aircraft and their
operations. Government contractors, Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. military
establishment, and other public aircraft operators had, for the most part, followed the
guidelines of AFS-400 UAS Policy 05-01, Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08-01
and AC 91-57. Likewise, there was no anecdotal evidence that the FAA had initiated any
enforcement activity against anyone who was, or was perceived to be, operating a UAS
outside of these guidelines. Until a robust set of regulations that specifically addressed
the unique characteristics of unmanned aircraft was implemented, there was always the
chance that someone would operate a commercial UAS in such an open and notorious
manner that the FAA would be compelled to respond with more than a friendly warning
letter or telephone call.
The FAA’s public position on this issue, as evidenced by the February 13, 2007, policy
statement published in the Federal Register, was that any unmanned aircraft to be operated
in the national airspace, with the exception of radio-controlled models, must comply with
the requirements for a Certificate of Authorization or Waiver (COA) if a public aircraft, or
for a special airworthiness certificate if a civil aircraft. Thus, the agency had consistently
answered the second question (what it will regulate) with a broad statement of policy that
it had the responsible authority over all of the national airspace and aviation activities
therein.
The next question, until the federal statutory responses changed things beginning in
2012, was even if the FAA exercises its declared authority over airspace and aviation and
attempts enforcement against an operator of a “small” (model size) UAS who is using the
system for some arguably commercial purpose, without an airworthiness certificate or a
licensed pilot in control, just what regulation would be enforced, and what sanction would
be appropriate to deter further violations?
There were many entrepreneurs and developers around the world whose presence and
activities in the civil small UAS market (the UASs were small, the market was not) were
putting pressure on the FAA to take the lead in UAS rulemaking. If a farmer or other com-
mercial agriculture concern were to acquire a small system and fly it over fields in what
could be characterized as “sparsely populated” areas, at an altitude where possible con-
flict with manned aircraft could occur, was there in place a regulatory mechanism to stop
this activity? Or, if a commercial photographer was to operate an ssUAS equipped with a
camera over a similar area for the purpose of photographing the land for advertising or
some similar purpose, could the FAA prevent the operation? Congress answered those
questions and mandated a regulatory response with the enactment of Public Law 112–95,
FMRA of 2012, as discussed above.
The issue for the FAA in the foregoing scenarios, and many others too numerous to name
that have since evolved, is identifying the tools in the FAA’s toolbox to allow enforcement
of any regulations the agency may deem enforceable. The vast majority of these unmanned
systems still do not have airworthiness certificates, which are required for nearly all
manned aircraft (with some exceptions). The FAA’s central mission is to promote compli-
ance with safety standards.52 FAA Order 2150.3C acknowledges that civil aviation depends
primarily upon voluntary compliance with regulatory requirements, and only when those
efforts have failed should the agency take formal enforcement action.
A certificate holder cannot be deprived of “property” (the certificate) without due pro-
cess.53 Congress has given the FAA authority to not only make the rules54 but also to enforce
them through a number of methods, including issuance of “an order amending, modi-
fying, suspending, or revoking” a pilot’s certificate if the public interest so requires.55 Any
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other certificate issued by the FAA can be “amended, modified, suspended or revoked” in
the same manner. The problem with the aforementioned scenarios is that the “pilot” in all
likelihood would not have been an FAA-certificated pilot, because that was not required
for such operations, and the aircraft and its systems would not be certified as airworthy,
again because it was not required. As long as the operator/pilot did not interfere with the
safe operation of a manned aircraft or otherwise enter a controlled airspace (such as in an
airport environment) without permission, there arguably may not have been a violation of
any then existing regulation.
Taking the scenario a step further, if the pilot/operator inadvertently allowed the UAS to
come close enough to a manned aircraft to force the latter into an evasive maneuver (not an
unlikely event even in a sparsely populated agricultural region), a possible violation of 14
CFR §91.111 (Operating Near Other Aircraft) could ensue. In this situation, the FAA has no
certificate to revoke, and thus no statutory or regulatory authority to proceed with a formal
enforcement proceeding pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §44709(b).
This left one other mechanism: the civil penalty the administrator may impose against
an individual “acting as a pilot, flight engineer, mechanic, or repairman.”56 The FAA is
authorized to assess a civil penalty for violations of certain regulations, up to $400,000
against large entities or companies and up to $50,000 against individuals and small
businesses.57 The relevant section of the U.S. Code defines pilot as “an individual who
holds a pilot certificate issued under Part 61 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.”58
Again, an argument could be made that a noncertificate holder would not even be subject
to the civil penalty provisions of the U.S. Code, thus leaving the FAA with no effective or
realistic enforcement power over “unauthorized” civil unmanned aircraft operations.
These questions all came to a convergence with an enforcement action initiated by the
FAA in 2013 against an aerial videographer. The FAA’s “Order of Assessment” sought to
assess a civil penalty in the amount of $10,000 for the unauthorized operation of a powered
glider aircraft in the vicinity of a university campus. The allegations stated that the videog-
rapher did not have a pilot’s certificate, that he operated the flight for compensation, and
that he operated the aircraft at excessively low altitudes over vehicles, buildings, people,
streets, and structures between 10 and 400 feet AGL, all in a careless and reckless manner
so as to endanger the life or property of another, and many more details set forth in 11
charging paragraphs. The specific FAR that was allegedly violated was 14 CFR § 91.13(a),
which states that no person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as
to endanger the life or property of another.59
The videographer retained counsel and opposed the Order of Assessment. In a hard-
fought legal standoff before a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) administra-
tive law judge (ALJ), the videographer filed a Motion to Dismiss the Order, essentially on
the grounds that there was an absence of a valid rule for application of aviation regula-
tory authority over “model” aircraft flight operations. The FAA contested the motion, and
the ALJ assigned to the case ruled in the videographer’s favor on the grounds that the
aircraft was a “model aircraft” to which § 91.13(a) did not apply. Other arguments were
proffered with regard to the FAA’s policy-making process, and whether published pol-
icies, in this case one in particular (the 2007 Policy Memorandum referenced in endnote
30), were enforceable as rules or regulations. The FAA appealed the ALJ’s order to the full
NTSB (the first step in the appeal process from an FAA enforcement order), and the NTSB
reversed the decision, finding in favor of the FAA on the narrow issue of whether the plain
language of 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) and 14 C.F.R § 1.1 definitions of “aircraft” include any
aircraft, manned or unmanned, large or small. The Full Board found that the prohibition
on careless and reckless operation in § 91.13(a) applies to the operation of any aircraft, in
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addition to those set forth in parts 101 and 103. The case was remanded to the administra-
tive law judge for a further factual hearing on whether the videographer actually violated
§ 91.13(a), and the parties thereafter settled their differences for a penalty reportedly sig-
nificantly less than the original $10,000 assessment.
That case, although interesting for the factual and legal issues it presented, provides
offers no binding legal authority to anyone other than the parties to that particular case,
and since the FAA essentially prevailed on the legal argument regarding its enforcement
authority, the agency continues to invoke § 91.13(a) and other relevant FARs to deal with
alleged violators of the FARs.
This history, however, has been overtaken by events, as a result of a series of federal
statutes and FAA rulemaking efforts that clearly apply to all aspects of unmanned air-
craft operations and activities in the United States. The first of the federal statutes was
the FMRA of 2012.60 The current U.S. statutes and FAA regulations are discussed in the
following section.
5.3 Current U.S. Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft

As discussed earlier, until recently, there was no specific reference in any of the FARs to
unmanned aircraft, pilots/operators of unmanned aircraft, or operations in the national
airspace of unmanned aircraft. A literal reading of the definitions listed in the original
14 CFR Part 1, sec. 1.1, would include all unmanned aircraft in the description of aircraft,
but since the 2015 amendment to that section now includes, for the first time, definitions
of “small unmanned aircraft” and “unmanned aircraft,” the point is moot.61 There was
no case authority, nor was there a rule or regulation that said that unmanned aircraft of
any size or capability were not regulated. This conceivably would include radio-controlled
model aircraft. In recognition of the reality that radio-controlled aircraft are aircraft, but not
of the type that the FAA was inclined to regulate, AC 91-57 was published in 1981. This AC
encouraged voluntary compliance with safety standards for model aircraft operators. The
circular also acknowledged that model aircraft might pose a safety hazard to full-scale air-
craft in flight and to persons and property on the ground.62 Modelers were encouraged to
select sites that are sufficiently far away from populated areas so as to not endanger people
or property, and to avoid noise-sensitive areas such as schools and hospitals. Aircraft
should be tested and evaluated for airworthiness and should not be flown more than 400
feet above ground level. If the aircraft is to be flown within 3 miles of an airport, contact
with local controlling authorities should be initiated. And, above all, model aircraft should
always give way to, or avoid, full-scale manned aircraft, and observers should be used
to assist in that responsibility.63 This AC was updated on May 31, 2019, to conform with
language in Title 49 U.S.C. § 44809 that created statutory exceptions to certain unmanned
aircraft regulations for recreational flyers, to be discussed below.64
FAA’s policy statement AFS-400 UAS Policy 05-01 was issued on September 16, 2005, in
response to dramatic increases in UAS operations in both the public and private sectors.
The policy was intended to provide guidance to be used by the FAA to determine if ssUASs
could be allowed to conduct flight operations in the U.S. NAS. AFS-400 personnel were to
use this policy guidance when evaluating each application for a Certificate of Waiver or
Authorization (COA). Due to the rapid evolution of UAS technology, this policy was to be
subject to continuous review and updated when appropriate.65 The policy was not meant
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to be a substitute for any regulatory process, and was jointly developed by, and reflected
the consensus opinion of AFS- 400, the Flight Technologies and Procedures Division,
FAA Flight Standards Service (AFS); AIR 130, the Avionics Systems Branch, FAA Aircraft
Certification Service (AIR); and ATO-R, the Office of System Operations and Safety, FAA
Air Traffic Organization (ATO).66
The 05-01 policy recognized that if UAS operators were strictly held to the “see and
avoid” requirements of 14 CFR Part 91.113, “Right-of-Way Rules,” there would be no UAS
flights in civil airspace.67
The right-of-way rule states: “…when weather conditions permit, regardless of whether
an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance
shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other
aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall
give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.”68
The FAA’s policy supports UA flight activities that can demonstrate that the proposed
operations can be conducted at an acceptable level of safety.69
Another collision avoidance rule states “no person may operate an aircraft so close to
another aircraft as to create a collision hazard.”70 The FAA also recognizes that a certifiable
“detect, sense, and avoid” system, an acceptable solution to the see-and-avoid requirement
for UAS, is many years away.71
Through the implementation of this policy, the FAA gave civil UAS developers and
operators two choices: (1) they could operate their systems as public aircraft and apply for
a COA that will permit operation of a specific aircraft in a specific operating environment
with specific operating parameters and for no more than one year at a time; or (2) they
could follow the normal procedures set forth in the CFRs to obtain a special airworthi-
ness certificate for their aircraft,72 operate the aircraft in strict compliance with all airspace
regulations set forth in 14 CFR Part 91, and have them flown by certificated pilots.73 The
policy also referenced AC 91-57, Model Aircraft Operating Standards, published in 1981, as
it applied to model aircraft, and stated “UA that comply with the guidance in AC 91-57 are
considered model aircraft and are not evaluated by the UA criteria in this policy.”74
The FAA furthermore declared in this policy that it would not accept applications for
civil COAs, which means that only military or public aircraft were eligible.75 A public air-
craft is defined in 14 CFR Part 1.1 as follows:
“Public aircraft means any of the following aircraft when not being used for a commercial
purpose or to carry an individual other than a crewmember or qualified non-crew member:
1. An aircraft used only for the U.S. government; an aircraft owned by the govern-
ment and operated by any person for purposes related to crew training, equipment
development, or demonstration; an aircraft owned and operated by the govern-
ment of a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United
States or a political subdivision of one of these governments; or an aircraft exclu-
sively leased for at least 90 continuous days by the government of a State, the
District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States or a political
subdivision of one of these governments.
i For the sole purpose of determining public aircraft status, commercial purposes
means the transportation of persons or property for compensation or hire, but
does not include the operation of an aircraft by the armed forces for reim-
bursement when that reimbursement is required by any Federal statute,
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regulation, or directive, in effect on November 1, 1999, or by one government

on behalf of another government under a cost reimbursement agreement if
the government on whose behalf the operation is conducted certifies to the
Administrator of the FAA that the operation is necessary to respond to a sig-
nificant and imminent threat to life or property (including natural resources)
and that no service by a private operator is reasonably available to meet the
threat.
ii For the sole purpose of determining public aircraft status, governmental function
means an activity undertaken by a government, such as national defense, intel-
ligence missions, fire fighting, search and rescue, law enforcement (including
transport of prisoners, detainees, and illegal aliens), aeronautical research, or
biological or geological resource management.
iii For the sole purpose of determining public aircraft status, qualified non-crew
member means an individual, other than a member of the crew, aboard an air-
craft operated by the armed forces or an intelligence agency of the U.S. gov-
ernment, or whose presence is required to perform, or is associated with the
performance of, a governmental function.
2. An aircraft owned or operated by the armed forces or chartered to provide trans-
portation to the armed forces if—
i The aircraft is operated in accordance with title 10 of the United States Code;
ii The aircraft is operated in the performance of a governmental function under
title 14, 31, 32, or 50 of the United States Code and the aircraft is not used for
commercial purposes; or
iii The aircraft is chartered to provide transportation to the armed forces and the
Secretary of Defence (or the Secretary of the department in which the Coast
Guard is operating) designates the operation of the aircraft as being required
in the national interest.
3. An aircraft owned or operated by the National Guard of a State, the District of
Columbia, or any territory or possession of the United States, and that meets the
criteria of paragraph (2) of this definition, qualifies as a public aircraft only to the
extent that it is operated under the direct control of the Department of Defense.”76
In summary, the FAA mandated that one intending to operate an unmanned aircraft in
the national airspace must do so either under the permission granted by a COA (available
only to public entities, which includes law enforcement agencies and other government
entities), or with an experimental airworthiness certificate issued pursuant to relevant
parts of Title 14 of the CFRs. Specifically proscribed were operations that were of a com-
mercial nature, without the protection of a COA, but ostensibly under the guidelines set
forth in AC 91-57.
In recognition that some commercial for-hire UAS operators were flying their systems in
national airspace under AC 91-57 guidelines, the FAA published a second policy statement
on February 13, 2007.77 This notice was a direct response to increasing efforts by U.S. law
enforcement agencies and some ssUAS manufacturers to introduce systems into oper-
ational service on the back of model aircraft guidelines. The policy stated that the FAA
would only permit UAS operations under existing certificates of authorization and experi-
mental aircraft arrangements. This policy stated:
The current FAA policy for UAS operations is that no person may operate a UAS in
the National Airspace System without specific authority. For UAS operating as public
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aircraft the authority is the COA, for UAS operating as civil aircraft the authority is spe-
cial airworthiness certificates, and for model aircraft the authority is AC 91-57.
The FAA recognizes that people and companies other than modelers might be flying
UAS with the mistaken understanding that they are legally operating under the authority
of AC 91-57. AC 91-57 only applies to modelers, and thus specifically excludes its use by
persons or companies for business purposes.
The FAA has undertaken a safety review that will examine the feasibility of creating a
different category of unmanned “vehicles” that may be defined by the operator’s visual
line of sight and are also small and slow enough to adequately mitigate hazards to other
aircraft and persons on the ground. The end product of this analysis may be a new flight
authorization instrument similar to AC 91-57, but focused on operations which do not
qualify as sport and recreation, but also may not require a certificate of airworthiness.
They will, however, require compliance with applicable FAA regulations and guidance
developed for this category.
The gap that was created by these policies was an inconsistent definition of “model air-
craft,” and, as discussed in previous sections of this chapter, some individuals and agencies
took advantage of this gap to operate small (and not-so-small) UASs with cameras and
other sensing equipment on board, clearly for either a commercial or law enforcement pur-
pose, without having applied for a COA or a special airworthiness certificate.78
This era of uncertainty was brought to a close as a result of two significant developments
in governmental policy regarding unmanned aircraft. The first was the passage of the
FMRA of 2012, signed into law by President Obama on February 14, 2014.79 The second
was the release of the aforementioned Notice of Proposed Rule Making for Operation and
Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems” on February 15, 2015.80
The FMRA firmly stated Congress’ intention to create (or recognize) a new class of air-
craft that was to be regulated by the FAA, and offered three definitions of unmanned
aircraft, small-unmanned aircraft, and public UASs.81 The Act mandated a timetable for
integration of civil UASs into the national airspace,82 and specifically exempted aircraft
flown strictly for hobby or recreational use from regulation.83 The Act further mandated
establishment of six test ranges, approval of commercial operations in the Arctic, coordin-
ation of operational approvals with public agencies, the creation of regulations, standards
and requirements for civil unmanned system operations, and a number of other methods
to achieve full integration of UASs into the national airspace.84 The statute requires the
Secretary of Transportation (parent agency of the FAA) to determine if certain UASs may
operate safely in the NAS before the completion of the plan and rulemaking required in
Section 332.85
Section 333 of the Act literally opened the floodgates for civil commercial UAS operators
and entrepreneurs to petition the FAA for authority to conduct a wide variety of com-
mercial operations, including aerial photography, precision agriculture, power line and
pipeline infrastructure inspection, news gathering, building inspections, insurance
adjusting, and many more, in low-risk, controlled environments. “333 Petitions,” as they
became known, spawned a cottage industry in the legal profession whereby law firms
and practitioners holding themselves out as experts in the field inundated the FAA with
petitions. As of September 28, 2016, the last date the FAA posted these statistics, 5,551
section 333 petitions had been granted, and 1,780 had been “closed” (meaning rejected or
withdrawn). This process was intended, by the words of the Act, to be an interim path to
operational approval for civil UAS operators pending the finalization of the ssUAS rule,
which became effective on August 29, 2016.86 The criteria for approval are stringent, and
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the proponents are expected to demonstrate that they can safely fly their UASs in a manner
that follows all applicable operational rules in the FARs and does not endanger the safety
of persons or property in the air or on the ground. Section 333 was repealed and replaced
word for word in 49 U.S.C. § 44807.87
Civil operators also have the option of obtaining a Special Airworthiness Certificate in
the experimental category for civil aircraft performing research and development, crew
training, and market surveys, or may go through the UAS type and airworthiness certifi-
cate in the restricted category process under 14 CFR § 21.25(a)(2) and § 21.185 for a special
purpose, or a type certificate for production under 14 CFR § 21.25(a)(1) or § 21.17(b).
The other significant event was the long-awaited release of the Small UAS NPRM
(Notice of Proposed Rule Making) for the Proposed Part 107, released on February 15,
2015, as previously noted. The comment period closed on April 24, 2015, and the FAA
received approximately 4,700 comments that had to be resolved and published before the
rule became effective on August 29, 2016.88 At the same event where the new rule was
announced by FAA Administrator Michael Huerta, the FAA announced three “Pathfinder”
initiatives wherein the FAA would work with industry partners on three focus areas: visual
line-of-sight operations in urban areas, with CNN; extended visual line-of-sight operations
in rural areas, with PrecisionHawk; and beyond visual line-of-sight in rural/isolated areas,
with BNSF rail system.
The key elements of the final UAS rule89 require that the aircraft must weigh less than
55 lbs, operate within visual line-of-sight of the pilot in command or visual observer, not
operate directly over people, operate in daytime only, yield right-of-way to other aircraft,
observe maximum airspeed of 100 mph (87 kts), stay below a maximum altitude of 500
feet AGL, only fly with minimum weather visibility of 3 miles, not operate in Class A air-
space, and only in other classes except Class E with ATC permission, and must only be
operated by a person holding a valid remote pilot certificate, which has some testing and
qualifications requirements., Numbering 44 subsections in all, the current rule includes
Parts 107.200 & 107.205, which create a waiver process wherein applicants can seek per-
mission from the FAA to waive the nine specified regulations that are subject to waiver.
On June 21, 2016, the FAA issued AC 107-2, which was intended to provide guidance for
conducting UAS operations in the NAS in accordance with Title 14 C.F.R. Part 107.
As of March 17, 2020, 3,960 Part 107 waiver requests have been granted, the vast majority
of which were for Part 107.29 (daylight operations), seeking waivers to fly at night.
Since the FMRA of 2012 was enacted, the U.S. Congress has passed two more compre-
hensive statutes dealing with unmanned aircraft. The FAA Extension, Safety and Security
Act of 2016,90 in “Subtitle B-UAS Safety,” amended the FMRA of 2012 and ordered the
FAA and the Department of Transportation to undertake a number of tasks intended to
enhance the safety of UAS operations in the NAS. These mandates include, among others,
developing consensus standards for remote identification of UAS; setting requirements
for UAS manufacturers to include safety literature for customers at the point of delivery
of a system; facilitating cooperation among firefighting and public utility organizations to
support restoration of services after a disaster or catastrophic event; sanctions for inter-
ference with wildfire suppression efforts; creating a pilot project for airspace hazard miti-
gation around airports; setting up an emergency exemption process for civil and public
operators responding to a disaster or emergency; developing a research plan for UAS
traffic management (UTM) development and deployment; creating an application process
for designating a fixed site facility for prohibition of flights around critical infrastructure;
development of a UAS research and development roadmap; setting up a testing and mod-
eling protocol focused on collisions between unmanned and manned aircraft; and finally
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to conduct a probabilistic metrics research and development study assessing the risks of
integrating UAS into the national airspace.
The last major legislation was the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.91 This Act extends
the FAA’s funding and authorities through FY 2023, and was the first five-year reauthor-
ization since 1982. The FAA website states that:
The bill includes important legislative changes related to increasing the safety and
pace of UAS integration, expediting the financing and development of airport cap-
ital projects, directing the FAA to advance leadership in the field of international
supersonic aircraft policies, addressing aircraft noise, and ensuring safe lithium
battery transport. Furthermore, the bill directs FAA to promote U.S. aerospace-related
standards globally and allows the Agency to work with foreign partners to stream-
line certification processes for U.S. aircraft. The legislation also streamlines the FAA
certification process to ensure that U.S. aviation manufacturers can compete globally
and get their products to market on time, and fosters collaboration with industry
stakeholders to streamline certification and regulatory processes and establish clear
FAA performance objectives and metrics.92
In addition to federal legislation and the implementation of the Part 107 UAS rule, the FAA
has created a number of initiatives to promote research and development of commercial
UAS products and operations, all oriented toward integrating UAS into the NAS in a safe
manner. These initiatives include a mobile application called “B4UFLY” for recreational
flyers to show where they cannot fly their UAS; the establishment of a Drone Advisory
Committee; creation of an FAA UAS Data Exchange and Manufacturer’s Toolkit; as well as
standing up the UAS Integration Pilot Program, the UTM Pilot Program, and the UAS Test
Site Partnerships.93
Following the passage of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, the FAA proposed four
rules dealing with unmanned aircraft: “Safe and Secure Operations of Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems,” “Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People,”
“External Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft,” and “Exception for
Limited Recreational Operations of Unmanned Aircraft,” all but the last one published on
February 13, 2019, and the last on May 17, 2019. Comment periods closed on all but the last
NPRM, but no new rule has been finalized for any of these efforts except for the External
Marking Interim Final Rule, which was effective on February 25, 2019, before the closing
date for comments.
The most recent NPRM addresses Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,94
published December 31, 2019. The proposed rule would implement system(s) for the
remote identification of certain UASs. The FAA declared that a requirement for remote
identification of UASs in the NAS would further address security and law enforcement
concerns regarding the further integration of these aircraft into the national airspace while
also enabling greater operational capabilities by these same aircraft. Comments were to
be submitted on or before March 2, 2020. The FAA denied a request to extend the time to
comment. As of the close of the comment period, the FAA had received 53,039 comments,
far more than the agency received after publication of the first sUAS proposed rule. To state
that this proposed rule is controversial would be a gross understatement.
In summary, the prudent entrepreneur or UAS business owner is best served by working
with experts well versed in the intricate maze of FAA rules, regulations, and policies before
launching any size or configuration UAS for commercial purposes. The FAA’s website95
offers a current look at all relevant regulations and guidelines, and the Section 333 (now §
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44807) petitions are all online, with some proprietary elements redacted or excluded from
public view. A person or entity with the time and motivation to actually have an impact
on rulemaking can, at the very least comment on proposed rules, and may also have the
opportunity to serve on one or more ARCs or join a Standards Development Organization
(SDO) and help develop the standards that support the rules, as discussed below.
5.4 How the Process Works

The sUAS ARC, and the subsequent NPRM (leading to the Part 107 Rule) discussed earlier,
is an example of one of the FAA’s processes for creating the rules, regulations, circulars,
directives, and orders that it employs to bring some order to the aviation industry, which
is one of the most heavily regulated industries in the United States and elsewhere. The
FAA’s rulemaking authority is derived from either executive order (from the Office of the
President) or the U.S. Congress, through specific mandate or by delegation of Congress’
law-making powers as conferred by the U.S. Constitution (Article 1, Section 8). The FAA
relies on those two sources, as well as recommendations from the National Transportation
Safety Board, the public, and the FAA itself to initiate rulemaking. Ultimately, the FAA
makes rules to serve the public interest and to fulfill its mission of enhancing safety in the
aviation environment.
Other Aviation Advisory and Rulemaking Committees dealing with UASs since the
sUAS ARC include: The UAS in Controlled Airspace ARC (amended charter on November
20, 2017); the Micro Unmanned Aircraft Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC
Recommendations Final Report issued April 1, 2016); and the Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) Registration Task Force (RTF) ARC (Task Force Recommendations Final Report
Issued November 21, 2015). All of these ARCs and their reports may be accessed on the
FAA website.96
The APA of 1946 and the Federal Register Act of 1935 govern the process of rulemaking.
These two statutes combined were intended to ensure that the process is open to public
scrutiny (that federal agencies do not make rules or impose regulations in secret or without
full transparency). This is accomplished by procedural due process and publication
requirements. This “informal rulemaking” is a multistep process that follows what often
involves months or even years of industry rulemaking committee effort, internal FAA
review and analysis, and interagency negotiation. Once the proposed rule has achieved
a sufficient level of maturity, it will be published in the Federal Register97 as a “Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking.” The notice provides an opportunity for the general public to
comment on the proposed rule within a certain period of time. The comments from the
public must be resolved (“adjudicated”) in some fashion before the final rule is published,
which should respond to the comments and provide an explanation of purpose and basis
for rule as well as the way in which the comments were resolved. The last step is imple-
mentation, and the effective date must be at least 30 days after publication of the final rule
unless it is interpretive, a direct rule, a general policy statement, an emergency rule, or a
substantive rule that grants an exemption to an existing rule or requirement. Some agency
rules or policies may be exempted from this process, such as interpretive rules or general
policy statements, or if the agency can demonstrate that the notice-and-comment process
would be impractical, unnecessary, or contrary to public interest (showing “good cause”).
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Rules that have gone through this informal rulemaking process have the same force and
effect as a rule or regulation imposed by an act of Congress. Thus, the FAA is empowered
to enforce those rules as if they were laws enacted by Congress. The rules are generally
referenced to or codified in the CFRs. There are exceptions to this, however. Direct final
rules are implemented after a final rule is issued while still providing for a period of notice
and comment. The rule becomes effective after the specified period if there are no adverse
comments. The difference in this process from the notice of proposed rulemaking pro-
cedure is that there is no proposed rule published before the final rule is released. This
is used for routine rules or regulations that are not anticipated to generate comment or
controversy. Interim rules are usually effective immediately and are issued without prior
notice, often in response to an emergency. A final rule may be issued based upon the
interim rule after a period of comment. The status of an interim rule as final or amended
or withdrawn is always published in the Federal Register. Lastly, interpretive rules may
be issued to explain current regulations or its interpretation of existing statues or rules.
This tool is not commonly used by the FAA, but may be useful when a rule is repeatedly
misinterpreted, resulting in chronic compliance issues.
The point of this complex, sometimes cumbersome, and time-consuming process of
rulemaking is to advance the cause of safety and harmonization so that all users and others
affected by the aviation environment are protected from undue risk of harm. Further, it
is to ensure that all entities operate under the same set of rules and regulations and have
abundant opportunities to engage in the process so that the outcomes may be influenced
by multiple points of view. Each step of the process requires a series of reviews by other
agencies of the federal government, such as the Office of the Secretary of Transportation,
the Department of Transportation, the Office of Management and Budget, the General
Accountability Office, and the Office of the Federal Register. A flowchart of the aviation
regulatory process would demonstrate at least a 12-step process, with multiple interim
steps embedded in most of the broader categories. If a proposed rule were to be subjected
to each and every possible review step, the list would include no fewer than 35 stops along
the way. For example, due to the many and equally influential stakeholders that could be
involved in an effort by the Department of Defence to create a new restricted area for UAS
operations, testing, and training, it was generally estimated that it would take five years
to accomplish the goal, until the FAA put a stop to the debate and declared that military
restricted areas are to be used only for military activities, not civilian UAS research and
development.98 In another example, the implementation of an aviation safety device for air
transport aircraft known as traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) required
over 15 years from inception to implementation, and it took an act of Congress to mandate
the use of TCAS in commercial airliners.
In addition to formal rules and regulations, the FAA issues orders, policies, directives,
and guidance documents. The FAA routinely issues policy statements and guidance
documents to clarify or explain how the FAA interprets and enforces the regulations.
A policy statement gives guidance or acceptable practices on how to comply with a spe-
cific CFR section or paragraph. These documents are explanatory and not mandated. They
are also not project specific. Practically speaking, this means that they are not enforceable
in formal compliance proceedings, but they do provide guidance to users and the public
on how best to comply with the FARs. Guidance documents are similar in nature and are
likewise explanatory rather than mandatory.
The FAA’s website99 contains links to all historical and current policy statements,
guidance documents, orders, directives, circulars, and regulations. Binding orders and
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regulations are published in the Federal Register and are accessible on the Electronic CFRs
(e-CFRs) government website.100
As discussed in Section 5.2.3, the overarching policy of the FAA with respect to compli-
ance with the regulations is compliance before enforcement.101
5.5 Standards and Guidance versus Regulations

The FAA exercises its statutory mandate by making rules and regulations. Those efforts
are often supplemented or enhanced by published standards that are created by industry
organizations and approved by the FAA. Standards Development Organizations (SDOs)
work with engineers, scientists, and other industry personnel to develop nonbiased
standards or specification documents that serve industry and protect the public. These
developers can be private concerns, trade organizations, or professional societies.
Standards providers are distributors of codes, standards, and regulations. They may also
provide access to a database of standards. The supplier may or may not be the developer
of the standards distributed.
These organizations are professional societies made up of industry representatives,
engineers, and subject matter experts who provide advisory support to federal agencies
such as the FAA. They make recommendations that may become a formal rule by adoption
or reference. Once a consensus standard has been fully developed and ready for publica-
tion, the FAA may publish a Notice of Availability (NOA) in the Federal Register, wherein
the agency declares that the standard is acceptable for certification of a product or pro-
cedure. The notice may invite public comments, which then must be adjudicated like any
other proposed rule.102 Engineering codes, standards, and regulations all serve to ensure
the quality and safety of equipment, processes, and materials. The three most prominent of
those advisory organizations playing a role in the evolution of unmanned aviation are the
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
(RTCA), and American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) International. Other SDOs
that are playing significant roles in standards development related to UASs are American
National Standards Institute (ANSI), International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
Consumer Technology Association (CTA), European Organization for Civil Aviation
Equipment (EUROCAE), ICAO, Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Joint
Authorities for Rulemaking of Unmanned Systems (JARUS), Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), and International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Standards supporting
organizations (those that do not necessarily create standards, but provide subject matter
expertise to the industry or are regulatory bodies) include SESAR-JU (Single European
Sky ATM Research Joint Undertaking), European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA),
and Global UTM Association (GUTMA). The cellular industry has more recently become
involved in unmanned aircraft technology, as cell phones and cellular connectivity have
become integral components of remote identification and tracking and beyond Visual line
of sight (BVLOS) operations. Industry groups that also engage in standards development
include 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project) and GSMA (Groupe Speciale Mobile
Association).
Aeronautical engineering codes are enforced by the FAA and are critical to developing
industry practices. While engineering regulations, such as those found in the FARs, are
government-defined practices designed to ensure the protection of the public, as well as
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uphold certain ethical standards for professional engineers, engineering standards ensure
that organizations and companies adhere to accepted professional practices, including
construction techniques, maintenance of equipment, personnel safety, and documentation.
These codes, standards, and regulations also address issues regarding certification, per-
sonnel qualifications, and enforcement.
Manufacturing codes, standards, and regulations are generally designed to ensure the
quality and safety of manufacturing processes and equipment, and aviation regulations
are no exception. Manufacturing standards ensure that the equipment and processes used
by manufacturers and factories are safe, reliable, and efficient. These standards are often
voluntary guidelines, but can become mandatory by reference in the FARs. Manufacturing
regulations are government-defined and usually involve legislation for controlling the
practices of manufacturers that affect the environment, public health, or safety of workers.
Aircraft manufacturers in the United States and European Union are required by law to
produce aircraft that meet certain airworthiness and environmental emissions standards.
The FAA has supported and sponsored four domestic committees dedicated to developing
standards and regulations for the manufacture and operation of unmanned aircraft. RTCA’s
Special Committee 203 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SC-203) began developing minimum
operational performance standards (MOPS) and minimum aviation system performance
standards (MASPS) for UASs in 2004: “SC-203 products will help assure the safe, efficient
and compatible operation of UAS with other vehicles operating within the NAS. SC-203
recommendations will be based on the premise that UAS and their operations will not
have a negative impact on existing NAS users.” SC-203’s efforts ended in 2013, and a new
Special Committee, SC-228, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems, was created shortly thereafter, also in 2013. Its task is to develop MOPS
for detect-and-avoid technology, as well as command-and-control (C2) data link MOPS
seeking L-Band and C-Band solutions. This committee’s work in part builds upon earlier
standards published by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, STANAG 4586, “Standard
Interfaces of UAV Control System (UCS) for NATO Interoperability, 4th Ed.”
ASTM’s F- 38 Committee on Unmanned Aircraft Systems addresses issues related
to design, performance, quality acceptance tests, operations, and safety monitoring for
UASs. This committee consists of three subcommittees: F38.01 Airworthiness, F38.02 Flight
Operations, and F38.03 Personnel Training, Qualification and Certification. F38 collaborates
with other ASTM committees and, as an international SDO, ASTM participates in standards
development efforts around the world. ASTM stakeholders include manufacturers of UASs
and their components, federal agencies, design professionals, professional societies, main-
tenance professionals, trade associations, financial organizations, and academia.
SAE’s G- 10U Unmanned Aircraft Aerospace Behavioral Engineering Technology
Committee was established to generate pilot training recommendations for UAS civil
operations and propose a standard that provides an approach to the development of
training topics for pilots of UASs for use by operators, manufacturers, and regulators. The
E-39 “Unmanned Air Vehicle Propulsion Systems” committee was chartered on January
23, 2018, with responsibility to develop and maintain standards for unmanned air vehicle
propulsions systems and all their various components and subsystems.
By Order 1110.150, signed on April 10, 2008, the FAA created an sUAS ARC according to
the FAA administrator’s authority under Title 49 United States Code (49 U.S.C.) § 106(p)
(5). The committee’s term was 20 months and was made up of representatives of aviation
associations, industry operators, manufacturers, employee groups or unions, the FAA and
other government entities, and other aviation industry participants, including academia.
The committee delivered its formal recommendations to the FAA associate administrator
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on April 1, 2009. The FAA’s Air Traffic Organization simultaneously convened a safety
risk management committee that was charged with describing the UAS systems under
review, identifying hazards, analyzing risk, assessing risk, and treating risk to arrive at
a safety management system (SMS) for UASs that would be coordinated or integrated
with the ARC’s recommendations. This process follows a number of FAA policies that
require oversight and regulation of aeronautical systems that may impact safety in the
NAS (FAA Order 8000.369B Safety Management System (SMS); FAA Order 1100.161 CHG
1 Air Traffic Safety Oversight; FAA Order 8000.365 Safety Oversight Circulars; FAA Order
JO 1000.37B Air Traffic Organization Safety Management System; Air Traffic Organization
Safety Management System Manual April 2019; Order 8040.4B Safety Risk Management
Policy; and AC 150/5200–37 Introduction to SMS for Airport Operations). The FAA web-
site also identifies three system safety guidance documents that are for the FAA only and
requires permission from the U.S. Department of Transportation to access.103
The ARC’s recommendations for regulations pertaining to ssUASs were adopted in
part and led to a published notice of proposed rulemaking for a new Part 107, Operation
and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, released on February 15, 2015. As
discussed above, the final rule went into effect August 29, 2016, and was the first set of
FARs dealing specifically with UASs.
One previous attempt to address a narrow category of RPA was the previously
mentioned AC 91-57, published in 1981. This AC was in reality an effort to regulate by
not regulating the recreational modelling community, outlining and encouraging vol-
untary compliance with safety standards for model aircraft operators. This controver-
sial document was later taken off the FAA’s website as the FAA attempted to manage
the surge of commercial UAS operators who were attempting to do business in reliance
on the circular, but was amended on May 31, 2019, so the current version remains as the
operative standard for model aircraft operations within certain designated areas and
under the authority of a voluntary organization, the Academy of Model Aeronautics
(AMA). The AMA created its own set of standards and restrictions for its members,
compliance with which is a prerequisite for the group insurance coverage for which its
members are eligible.
Although AC 91-57 was specifically directed toward recreational modelers, the circular
was often relied upon by commercial UAS operators and developers to claim that they
could fly their ssUASs under 400 feet AGL without communicating with the FAA and
running afoul of the FARs. Policy Statement 05-01 and Guidance Document 08-01 both
referred to AC 91-57 as the official policy with respect to recreational and hobbyist aero-
modeling, which is that those activities did not fall under the intent of FARs and were thus
excluded. However, by inference, the FAA believed that it had the statutory power to regu-
late recreational models because they fell under the definition of airplane found in 14 CFR
1.1, but chose not to do so as a matter of policy. Section 336 of the FMRA superseded that
policy.104 Subsequently, AC 91.57B was issued on May 31, 2019, that clarified FAA policy
with regard to recreational operations of unmanned aircraft.105
5.6 International Aviation Regulations

As early as 1919, an international agreement (the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial
Navigation, created by the Aeronautical Commission of the Peace Conference of 1919,
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otherwise known as the Versailles Treaty) recognized that the air above the high seas was
not as “free” as the seas below. In that Convention, the contracting states acknowledged
exclusive jurisdiction in the airspace above the land territory and territorial waters of the
states, but agreed to allow, in times of peace, innocent passage of the civil aircraft of other
states through their sovereign airspace, so long as the other provisions of the Convention
were observed. Nation states still retained the right to create prohibited areas in the interests
of military necessity or national security. During the global hostilities of the 1940s, the
United States initiated studies and later consulted with its major allies regarding further
harmonization of the rules of international airspace, building upon the 1919 Convention.
The U.S. government eventually extended an invitation to 55 states or authorities to attend
a meeting to discuss these issues, and in November 1944, an International Civil Aviation
Conference was held in Chicago. Fifty-four States attended this conference, at the end of
which the Convention on International Civil Aviation was signed by 52 of those States. The
convention created the permanent ICAO as a means to secure international cooperation
and the highest possible degree of uniformity in regulations and standards, procedures,
and organization regarding civil aviation matters. The Chicago Conference laid the foun-
dation for a set of rules and regulations regarding air navigation as a whole, which was
intended to enhance safety in flying and construct the groundwork for the application of a
common air navigation system throughout the world.
The constitution of the ICAO is the Convention on International Civil Aviation that was
drawn up by the Chicago conference, and to which each ICAO Contracting State is a party.
According to the terms of the Convention, the organization is made up of an assembly,
a council of limited membership with various subordinate bodies, and a secretariat. The
chief officers are the President of the council and the Secretary General. ICAO works in
close cooperation with other members of the United Nations family, such as the World
Meteorological Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, the Universal
Postal Union, the World Health Organization, and the International Maritime Organization.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that also participate in ICAO’s work include
the International Air Transport Association, the Airports Council International, the
International Federation of Airline Pilots’ Associations, and the International Council of
Aircraft Owner and Pilot Associations.106
ICAO’s objectives are many and are set forth in the 96 articles of the Chicago Convention
and the 18 annexes thereto. Additional standards and guidelines are found in numerous
supplements (SARPS) and Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS), which are
under continual review and revision. Contracting States are free to take exceptions to any
element of the annexes, and those exceptions are also published. Contracting States are
also responsible for developing their own aeronautical information publications (AIPs),
which provide information to ICAO and other States about air traffic, airspace, airports,
navaids (navigational aids), special use airspace, weather, and other relevant data for use
by aircrews transiting into or through the State’s airspace. The AIPs also contain informa-
tion about a State’s exceptions to the annexes and any significant differences between the
rules and regulations of the State and ICAO’s set of rules.
The annexes cover rules of the air, meteorological services for international air naviga-
tion, aeronautical charts, measurement units used in air and ground operations, operation
of aircraft, aircraft nationality and registration marks, airworthiness of aircraft, facilitation
of border crossing, aeronautical communications, air traffic services, search and rescue, air-
craft accident investigation, aerodromes, aeronautical information services, environmental
protection, security- safeguarding international civil aviation against acts of unlawful
interference, and the safe transportation of dangerous goods by air. The only reference in
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any ICAO document to unmanned aircraft is found in Article 8 of the Convention, which
states that:
No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot over
the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that State and in
accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each contracting State undertakes to
insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall
be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft.
ICAO’s rules apply to international airspace, which is typically defined as the airspace
over the high seas more than 12 miles from the sovereign territory of a State (country), as
well as some domestic airspace by virtue of incorporation into a Contracting State’s own
regulatory scheme. The rules apply to all Contracting States (numbering 193 at present),
so any nation that elects not to become an ICAO member is not entitled to the protection
of ICAO’s rules. However, ICAO is a voluntary organization, and there are no provisions
for enforcement of the regulations or standards such as those found in the FARs. As a prac-
tical matter, a nation that opts out of being an ICAO Member State will find that foreign air
carriers will not be allowed to land in that nation’s airports, except in an emergency, and
that nation’s airlines, if any, will not be permitted to operate in the airspace of a Member
Nation. As a founding member of ICAO and a nation that has a substantial interest in pre-
serving harmony in international commercial aviation, the United States enforces ICAO’s
rules against U.S. operators to the extent that the ICAO rule has been incorporated into
the FARs and does not conflict with domestic regulations. In 2012, ICAO created an RPAS
Panel, designed to deliver standards for unmanned aircraft to ICAO’s governing council
in 2018. The panel’s focus was and is on the development of SARPs for adoption by the
ICAO Council regarding airworthiness, operations, and licensing of remote pilots. The
first edition of the “Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems” was released in 2015.107
Also, in 2015, ICAO established the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Advisory Group (UAS-
AG) to support the Secretariat in developing guidance material and to expedite the devel-
opment of provisions to be used by Member States to regulate UASs. The Advisory Group
has continued to respond to ICAO’s Requests for Information (RFI) in 2017, 2018 and 2019
by holding industry symposia to showcase submissions by interested parties responding
to the RFIs. The next scheduled symposium, “Drone Enable/4,” was set for September
2020 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and was postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The sym-
posium, renamed “Drone Enable 2021,” will now be held from 13 to 15 April 2021, still in
Rio de Janiero, and may be conducted virtually.
Additional international aviation organizations in Europe that exercise some level
of regulatory powers include European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL), EASA, and European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment
(EUROCAE). EUROCONTROL is an intergovernmental organization that acts as the core
element of air traffic control services across Europe and is dedicated to harmonizing and
integrating air navigations services in Europe and creating a uniform air traffic manage-
ment system for civil and military users. The agency accomplishes this by coordinating
efforts of air traffic controllers and air navigation providers to improve overall perform-
ance and safety. The organization is headquartered in Brussels and has 38 member states.
The European Commission created an Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) ini-
tiative in 2001 and has delegated portions of the underlying regulatory responsibility to
EUROCONTROL. EASA was established as an agency of the European Union in 2003
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and has regulatory responsibility in the realm of civilian aviation safety, assuming the
functions formerly performed by the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA). In contrast to JAA’s
role, EASA has legal regulatory authority, which includes enforcement power. EASA has
responsibility for airworthiness and environmental certification of aeronautical products
manufactured, maintained, or used by persons under the regulatory oversight of European
Union member states. EUROCAE reports to EASA, although it was created many years
before EASA was formed, and deals exclusively with aviation standardization (with ref-
erence to airborne and ground systems and equipment). EUROCAE is not a regulatory
body, but its standards and related documents are required for use in the regulation of
aviation equipment and systems. Its membership is made up of equipment and airframe
manufacturers, regulators, European and International CAAs, air navigation service
providers, airlines, airports, and other users. EUROCAE’s Working Group 73 is devoted
to the development of products intended to help assure the safe, efficient, and compatible
operation of UASs with other vehicles operating within nonsegregated airspace. WG-73
makes recommendations to EUROCAE with the expectation that those recommendations
will be passed on to EASA.
More recently, EUROCAE WG-105, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS),” was tasked
with developing standards and guidance documents for the safe operation of UAS in all
types of airspace, at all times and for all types of operations. WG-105 originally consisted of
six Focus Teams working in specific focus areas, identified as Sub Groups (SG): UAS Traffic
Management (UAS); Command, Control, Communications (C3); Detect and Avoid (DAA);
Design and Airworthiness Standards; Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA); and
Enhanced RPAS Automation (ERA). Subsequently, the number of WG-105 subgroups was
expanded:
• SG-0 (Steering Committee);

• SG-10 (Detect and Avoid Focus Team);
• SG-11 (DAA against conflicting traffic for UAS operating under IFR in Class A-C
airspaces);
• SG-12 (DAA against conflicting traffic for UAS operating under IFR and VFR in all
airspace classes);
• SG-13 (DAA for UAS operating in VLL);
• SG-20 (C3 and Security Focus Team);
• Sg-21 (RPAS C2 Data link);
• SG-22 (Spectrum);
• SG-23 (Security);
• SG-30 (WG-105 UTM Focus Team);
• SG-31 (UTM-General);
• SG-32 (UTM-E-Identification);
• SG-33 (UTM Geo-fencing);
• SG-40 (WG-105 Design and Airworthiness Focus Team);
• SG-41 (RPAS System Safety Assessment Criteria);
• SG-42 (Remote Pilot Stations);
• SG-50 (WG-105 ERA Focus Team);
• SG-51 (ERA –Automatic Take-off and Landing;
• SG-52 (ERA – Automatic Taxiing);
• SG-53 (ERA –Automatic and Emergency Recovery);
• SG-60 (WG-105 SORA Focus Team);
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• SG-60 (SORA);
• SG-62 (GNSS for UAS);
• SG-63 (Automatic protection function for UAS
WG-105 works in coordination with RTCA SC-228 (discussed in Section 5.3) for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems.
On March 13, 2020, EASA published Opinion 01/2020 on “High-level regulatory frame-
work for the U-Space.”108 EASA stated that this document has as its purpose to create and
harmonize the necessary conditions for manned and unmanned aircraft to operate safely
in the U-space airspace, to prevent collisions between aircraft, and to mitigate the air and
ground risks. Therefore, the U-space regulatory framework, supported by clear and simple
rules, should permit safe aircraft operations in all areas and for all types of unmanned
operations.
This EASA document further declares: “Opinion 01/2020 proposes an effective and
enforceable regulatory framework to support and enable operational, technical and
business developments, and provide fair access to all airspace users, so that the market
can drive the delivery of the U-space services to cater to airspace users’ needs. This
Opinion is, therefore, a first regulatory step to allow immediate implementation of the
U-space after the entry into force of the Regulation and to let the unmanned aircraft
systems and U-space technologies evolve.” U-space is a set of new services and specific
procedures designed to support safe, efficient, and secure access to airspace for large
numbers of drones.109
In addition to ICAO and the three European organizations just discussed, any nation’s
CAA is free to promulgate its own aviation rules and regulations for operations within
their sovereign airspace, and until ICAO has created an overarching set of rules for UAS
operations among its member states, operators of UASs must be sensitive to the rules and
regulations of the contracting state that is providing air traffic services in international air-
space. Another cross-national organization, the JARUS, is made up of a group of experts
from National Aviation Authorities (NAA) of 61 countries,110 regional safety organizations,
EASA, and EUROCONTROL. This group’s task is to recommend a single set of technical,
safety, and operational requirements for the certification and safe integration of UASs into
airspace and aerodromes. Their objective is to provide guidance material to facilitate each
NAA’s efforts in writing their own requirements and to avoid duplicate efforts.111 JARUS
developed and published its “JAR doc 06 SORA” package, which is a set of guidelines
on Specific Operations Risk Assessment.112 The SORA process is intended to be the go-to,
most robust method for evaluating the hazards and risks of complex UAS operations, and
is arguably the most comprehensive document of its type with regard to operational risk
assessment for UAS.
5.7 Other Nations’ Domestic Regulatory Efforts

Overlapping the European and international regulatory processes are the efforts of
domestic CAAs of many Member States. The States that are part of EUROCAE and EASA
strive to conform their regulations to those organizations’ standards, as well as ICAO’s for
larger UAS that may operate outside of the mass, speed, and altitude restrictions of those
States.
125
EUROCONTROL is an intergovernmental organization with 41 Member States,

committed to the European Union’s vision for a Single European Sky. The organization
provides high-altitude air traffic control services over the European Union states, pro-
viding support to national authorities, air navigation service providers, civil and mili-
tary airspace users, airports, and other aviation-related organizations. All EU countries
are EUROCONTROL members. EUROCONTROL plays a “…. pivotal role in developing
European and global concepts, providing support to development of regulations for inte-
grating manned and unmanned air vehicles, both civil and military, in the airspace and
keeping a close eye on the wider UAS development landscape.”113 Coordinating with
EASA, EUROCONTROL has developed a UAS ATM Integration Operational Concept,
developing safety cases and running simulations intended to assess the safety of UAS
operations and the complexities of airspace integration. EUROCONTROL is also involved
with development of a traffic management system for UAS (ATM) in what is characterized
as “U-space” (“the European eco-system of services and functionalities to support drone
operations”).
Many countries outside of the United States have implemented their own UAS
regulations, some rather sparse, and others more complex and patterned in part on the
U.S. approach to regulation. Operations of large civil drones exceeding 150 kg (330 lbs)
in EU Member States are regulated by EU law and monitored by EASA. Smaller drones
are largely unregulated at the EU level, and thus are regulated by the Member States. As
mentioned above, EUROCONTROL provides air traffic control services across Europe for
flights above 24,500 feet MSL. All other flights are controlled by the Member States.
Countries use different terminology in regulating drones. The most commonly used
terns are “UAS,” “UAVs,” and “RPAs.” Most countries surveyed in this chapter regulate
UAS operations according to their weight or type of use, or both.
A brief summary of a selection of the regulations of 16 of those countries follows:
Australia: The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) sets regulations that cover safety,
operating rules, drone accreditation, remote pilot licensing, exclusions for very small UAS
and flying over one’s own property, operations over open air collections of people, drone
registration and markings, RPA operator’s certificates, and certified training providers,
among others. CASA adheres to Australian government requirements for rulemaking in an
eight-step process: Initiation and Planning; Initial Consultation; Formal Consultation; Legal
Drafting; Application of Regulatory Best Practices; Legislative Approval; Implementation;
and Project Closeout and Review. Public engagement, collaboration, and consultation are
required at all stages. Aviation Safety Rules are contained in Civil Aviation Act of 1988,
Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (CAR), and Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR).
All aviation regulations may be accessed on the Australian Government Federal Register
of Legislation.114
Brazil: Brazil’s CAA (Agéncia Nacional de Aviaçāo Civil) implemented Brazilian Civil
Aviation Regulation No. 94/2017 Special (RBAC-E No. 94/2017)115 in 2017 as a supplement
to drone operating standards established by the Department of Airspace Control (DECEA)
and the National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL). The rules create two categories
of UAS: model airplanes and RPA. Remote pilots of Class 1 or 2 RPA, or anyone intending
to fly above 400 feet AGL must have a valid license and license issued by ANAC. ANAC
also issues Special UAS-CAER Airworthiness Certificates. The authority oversees pilot
licensing and qualifications, project authorizations, registration of aircraft and experi-
mental airworthiness certificates, and design authorizations. The essential rule for model
aircraft and RPAs is to keep the required distance from third parties (30 m), only operate
126
one aircraft at a time, and follow the rules established by DECEA and ANATEL. The
Brazilian Aeronautical Code (CBA) Law No. 7565 is the overarching aviation legislation
that controls all the subcategories, including drones. Brazil recognizes the authority of
ICAO Doc 10019 Manual on RPAS (discussed in Section 5.6 above).
Canada: Canadian aviation regulations (CARs-SOR/96–433) are managed by Transport
Canada.116 The Canadian rules and rulemaking process are patterned in part on
U.S. regulations, but some were promulgated and implemented years before the FAA put
a set of rules in place in the U.S. Remotely Piloted Aircraft Regulations are found in Part
IX (sections 900.01–903.01) and Standards (sections 921–922). An SFOC (Special Flight
Operations Certificate) may be required depending upon whether the flight is recreational
or commercial, the drone’s weight, and if particular exemptions may apply. Recreational
UAS under 35 kg in weight do not require a certificate, whereas all aircraft heavier than
35 kg require a certificate regardless of use. sUAS (between 250 g and 25 kg) may be
exempted if the operator is able to follow strict safety conditions. The classification system
is based upon risk, and closely resembles U.S. drone regulations.
China: China’s national CAA is the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC).117 All
permissions to operate unmanned aircraft in China are granted by the CAAC. Licensing
is required for commercial operations. Any drone weighing more than 250 g must be
registered with the CAAC.118 Drones weighing more than 116 kg require a pilot’s license
and UAV certification. Operational restrictions are similar to other nations (no BVLOS
operations, no flights above 120 m AGL, no flights in densely populated areas, no flights
around airports, military installations or other sensitive locations, all flights subject to
designated No-Fly-Zones, and no flights in controlled areas without CAAC approval). All
drone operators are required to carry third-party liability insurance.
France: The French Transport Ministry and the Ministry of the Ecological and Inclusive
Transition119 control drone policy and practice in France. Fox AlphaTango®120 is the new
name for the portal set up by the DSAC for users of piloted aircraft to register their air-
craft, obtain training certificates, and secure permission to operate commercial UAS.
France follows European Union regulatory guidance. The Ministry publishes a guide (in
French) for all users of unmanned aircraft in France (Aéronefs Circulant Sans Personne
A Bord: Activitiés Particulières). Generally, the same basic operational rules apply as found
elsewhere: No BVLOS flights stay under 150 m AGL, daytime only, no urban flights, no
flights over people, no flights in restricted areas, respect privacy of others, no commer-
cial use of images without permission, mandatory liability insurance, aircraft registration,
remote pilot certification (private pilot, or ultralight or glider license), and no flights in air-
port environments. French law describes seven different categories of aircraft, based upon
mass, and four different operational scenarios. BVLOS flights and flights over congested
areas may be permitted for aircraft weighing less than 4 kg. Commercial operations require
a licensed civil pilot and permission to operate. All UAS weighing more than 800 grams
must be registered and must carry audible warning devices and navigation lighting.
Penalties for violations of the regulations may include imprisonment for up to one year
and a $90,000 fine.
Germany: Germany’s UAS regulations went into effect April 7, 2017.121 The Federal
Aviation Office (LBA) is responsible for the issuance of certificates of proof of sufficient
knowledge and skills for the operators of unmanned aerial vehicles. Inquiries on details of
the requirements may be sent to AST@lba.de. The regulations are not currently available in
English on the official LBA website. Highlights include UAS weighing less than 5 kg may
127
be flown without a permit, but those weighing more than 2 kg require a licensed remote
pilot. UAS may only be flown above 100 m AGL with LBA permission and UAS over 5 kg
require a permit to fly at night. UAS weighing more than 250 g must be registered and
marked with a fireproof data plate. A certificate of knowledge is required to operate a UAS
heavier than 2 kg. UAS may not be flown over crowds, industrial areas, disaster areas, and
other designated sensitive locations. Liability insurance is required. It should be noted that
Germany is a federal republic with 16 states, and there is nothing in the regulations that
prevents any of those states from enacting their own drone regulations so long as they do
not conflict with LBA rules.
Ireland: The Irish Aviation Authority (IAA)122 promulgated drone regulations in “Small
Unmanned Aircraft (Drones) and Rockets Order S.I. 563 of 2015.” All drones continue to be
regulated under national legislation pending implementation of the new European Union
rules, but operators are encouraged to make themselves familiar with EU Regulation
2019/947. Ireland’s national drone regulations mirror those of most other European coun-
tries: Avoid hazardous operations, no flights over assemblies of people (12 or more), no
flights beyond 300 m from the operator, no flights above 400 feet AGL, no flights in urban
areas, no flights near airports or restricted or sensitive areas, and no flights in controlled
airspace. Specific Operating Permission (SOP) is required to deviate from any of the
limitations, and the operator must receive training from an approved training facility and a
Pilot Competency Certificate is required. All drones over 1 kg in maximum takeoff weight
(MTOW) and operated above 15 m AGL must be registered. No permission is required
to operate a drone commercially. Model aircraft are treated the same way as commercial
drones.
Italy: Italy has not produced any domestic regulations relating to drones. The Italian
Civil Aviation Authority (ENAC)123states that it is following the lead of EASA and
EUROCONTROL in working on operations in critical areas (ATZ) and operations BVLOS
in nonsegregated airspace. Procedures for drone activities are included in ATM-5 circular
of July 23, 2013, which is only available in the Italian language.124
Japan: Article 87 of Japan’s Civil Aeronautics Act is a two-paragraph treatment of pilotless
aircraft, and merely states that the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
(MLITT) must grant permission for UAS flights, and may impose flying restrictions on the
aircraft when “he/she deems it necessary to prevent dangerous effects on other aircraft.”
An amendment to the Aeronautical Act setting new rules for unmanned aircraft went into
effect on December 10, 2015.125 The new rules define the airspace into which drone pilots
must seek permission to enter from the MLITT (around airports, airspace above 150 AGL,
and above densely inhabited districts [DIDs]). As of September 18, 2019, new rules prohibit
operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs, require a preflight “action” (presumably
checklist and system validation), operating so as to prevent collisions with airplanes and
other UAs, and not to operate in a careless and reckless manner. Nighttime operations,
BVLOS operations, operating within 30 m of persons or objects on the ground, operating
over event sites or gatherings of people, transporting hazardous materials, and dropping
objects require approval from the Regional Civil Aviation Bureau in advance. Permissions
must be sought 10 days in advance of operations from the MLITT. Violators may be liable
for a fine of up to 500,000 yen (about $4,591 USD), and up to one year of imprisonment if
operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
Mexico: The Ministry of Communications and Transportation (SCT), through the General
Directorate of Civil Aeronautics (DGAC), updated their drone regulations in April of 2015
128
with circular CO AV 23/10 R2.126 This circular establishes weight categories, as well as the
usual operational limitations (no night flights, no flights near airports or sensitive areas, no
flights over people and BVLOS, maintain minimum distances from people and objects on
the ground, fly below 400 feet AGL, fly when visibility is good, no dropping of objects, and
no flights in restricted areas). RPAs weighing less than 2 kg can be operated without author-
ization from the DGAC, but if operated commercially, they must have third-party liability
insurance. RPAs heavier than 25 kg have more limitations, may only be operated with per-
mission from DGAC, and the operator must have a pilot’s license. Drones weighing more
than 250 g must be registered with Mexican civil aviation authorities.
Netherlands: The Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT or ILENT) is the govern-
ment agency charged with regulatory compliance and oversight of RPAS activities.127 The
agency website is in Dutch and requires English translation. Any commercial RPAS oper-
ation requires an exemption from the ILT.128 The exemption rules require a certificate of
registration, an airworthiness certificate, proof of insurance and competency of the pilot,
a Safety Management System for the organization, restrictions on where the RPAS can
operate, and a two-person crew (pilot and camera operator or supervisor).
Norway: Norway’s CAA has jurisdiction over all RPAS activities.129 Relevant sections
of the Aviation Act, as amended in 2016 and 2018, apply to all aircraft without a pilot
on board. Commercial operations require permits from the CAA as well as the National
Security Authority (if aerial photography is contemplated). All rules that apply to manned
aircraft apply equally to RPAS. Recreational flying rules are similar to those contained in
U.S. regulations. Restrictions and limitations for all RPAS operations are divided into three
categories: RPAS with a maximum takeoff mass (MTOM) of 2.5 kg and maximum speed of
60 kts (RO1); RPAS with MTOM of up to 25 kg and maximum speed of 80 kts (RO2); and
RPAS with MTOM of more than 25 kg or maximum speed of 80 kts, or operated by turbine
engine, or to be used for BVLOS operations higher than 120 m, or operating in controlled
airspace of more than 120 m, or will be operated in urban airspace or over crowds of people
(RO3). Each category has organizational and SMS requirements that are more stringent as
the capabilities and mission of the RPAS increase in complexity. The Norwegian approach
to regulation is more comprehensive than most countries in nearly all respects from air-
craft certification and airworthiness to pilot qualifications, to organizational safety culture,
and to registration and marking. Beyond line of sight and extended visual line of sight
operations may be performed if the license issued by the Norwegian CAA covers those
types of operation. The common requirements found elsewhere also apply in Norway,
such as lighting, night flights, flying in controlled airspace, and operating over disaster
sites. The regulations also cover state operations (police, customs, fire, search, and rescue),
but exempt those activities from the strict liability requirements imposed on all other com-
mercial or recreational operations. Infringement fines may be imposed for violating any
regulation.
New Zealand: Part 101.201–215 (Remotely Piloted Aircraft, Control Line Model Aircraft,
and Free Flight Model Aircraft)130 and Part 102 (Unmanned Aircraft Operator Certification)
CAA Consolidation131 set forth the RPAS rules administered by the CAA of New
Zealand.132 Part 101 is focused on aircraft weighing more than 15 kg and recreational mod-
eling, although not specifically saying so, as the rules pertaining to approved persons or
organizations, operations around aerodromes, airspace restrictions, visual line of sight
restrictions, night operations, right of way rules, and aircraft mass limits generally contem-
plate aircraft operations in that category. Part 102 is specifically directed toward unmanned
129
aircraft operator certification, and again, without directly stating so, is clearly intended for
commercial RPAS operations. Generally, however, RPAs weighing less than 15 kg can fly
in uncontrolled airspace below 400 feet AGL during daylight hours and within visual line
of sight, in clear meteorological conditions, well clear of other aircraft, not within 4 km of
an aerodrome, and outside of restricted areas without obtaining permission from the CAA.
South Africa: The South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) makes and enforces
the UAS regulations, which came into effect in May and June of 2017.133 Civil Aviation
Regulations Part 101 (RPAS) is divided into six subparts: General provisions; Approval
and Registration; Personnel Licensing; RPAS Operating Certificate; RPAS Operations; and
Maintenance.
The regulations do not apply to model and toy aircraft or autonomous unmanned air-
craft that cannot be managed real-time during flight. Recreational aircraft can only be flown
above one’s own property or over property whose owner has granted permission. All com-
mercial and nonprofit operations are covered. Aircraft are grouped in four classes, with
each class having subclasses, depending upon type of operations (LOS, VLO, EVLOS),
impact kinetic energy (in kJ), height (altitude), and MTOW. The Director of the SACAA
must issue an RPAS Letter of Approval (RLA) before any RPAS can be flown commercially.
All RPAS must be registered and marked. A remote pilot license is required, preceded
by training and a skills test, and a logbook must be maintained. Operating certificates
are issued by the SACAA. Operations are specifically controlled, like other nations, and
continued maintenance is required along with documentation. Many of the operational
requirements mimic manned aviation regulations (such as preflight checklists, duties of
the pilot, right of way rules, time management, power reserves, radio communications,
and the like). All in all, South Africa’s RPAS regulations are comparatively comprehensive
and leave little room for deviation from the rules.
Sweden: The Sweden Transport Agency134 has jurisdiction over all RPAS operations and
provides an English translation of their Statute Book entitled TSFS 2009:88.135 All commer-
cial UAS operations, research or tests for commercial operations, and all beyond line of
sight operations require permission from the Agency. UAS activities are divided into four
categories (1A, 1B, 2, and 3), based upon MTOW, impact kinetic energy, and whether the
flight is to be BVLOS. Organizational oversight, insurance, and registration and markings
are required in all categories. Each category has its own specific set of requirements and
limitations. The expected operational limitations for all categories are included (flights
above crowds or urban areas, established safety zones, flights beyond line of slight of the
pilot, flights above 400 feet AGL, and flights in controlled airspace). Pilot qualifications,
flight manuals, flight preparation and planning, meteorology, fuel and battery capacity,
equipment requirements, reporting, communications, airworthiness certification, main-
tenance and documentation, quality control, and organizational integrity are all covered in
detail. The Swedish UAS/RPAS regulations are as comprehensive as in any of the nations
surveyed in this chapter, if not more so.
United Kingdom: The UK CAA published the latest (seventh) edition of CAP722A & B
in 2019.136 CAP722 is split into three separate documents: CAP722 “Unmanned Aircraft
System Operations in UK Airspace – Guidance and Policy,” CAP722A “Unmanned
Aircraft System Operations in UK Airspace –Operating Safety Cases,” and CAP722B
“UAS Operations in UK Airspace –The UK Recognised Assessment Entity.” These three
documents are equal to or exceed in scope of any set of RPAS regulations enacted in any
other nation.
130
CAP722, in its seven editions, was and is intended to provide guidance to those
involved with the development, manufacture, or operation of UAS to ensure that oper-
ational authorizations may be obtained and the required standards and practices are met.
Although intended for nonrecreational users, the guidelines do overlap into the recre-
ational category of activity. The document also outlines the safety, airworthiness, and oper-
ational requirements that have to be met. These comprehensive regulations cover all of the
expected topics that are found in other nations’ UAS regulations.
CAP722A provides guidance for those involved in creating a safety case for supporting
an application to the CAA for operational approval. This would involve a hazard and risk
assessment that reduces or mitigates risk to a “Tolerable” and “As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP)” level. This document is not strictly regulatory, but provides guidance
and requirements for compliance with the regulations.
CAP722B is intended to harmonize UK regulations with European Union Regulations
that went into effect on July 1, 2020. The term “National Qualified Entity” has thus been
changed to “Recognised Assessment Entity.” The document describes the requirements,
administrative processes, instructions, and guidance related to the Recognised Assessment
Entity (RAE) scheme within the UK. The RAE is an organization approved by the CAA to
submit reports and/or issue certificates on the CAA’s behalf with regard to remote pilot
competency. In other words, organizations that train and certify remote pilots, such as
flight schools, and the list of approved RAEs is also published on the CAA’s website.
In summary, this survey of UAS/RPAS regulations from a select few nations around the
globe reveals many recurring themes. Common elements include aircraft weight and/
or impact kinetic energy categories; speed and altitude restrictions; visual line of sight
requirements; pilot qualifications and training; exclusions from restricted or sensitive areas;
prohibitions from flying over gatherings of people; daytime/nighttime restrictions; registra-
tion and markings; CAA approval for certain types of commercial operations; exemptions
for recreational model aircraft; maximum weight and altitude restrictions; maintenance
requirements; airworthiness standards; SMS and organizational criteria; licensing of pilots,
entities, or operations; operational rules of the air; lighting of aircraft; dropping of objects
and carrying hazardous materials; and third-party liability insurance requirements.
The ICAO RPAS Manual, the EASA U-Space initiative, and the JARUS SORA documents,
all works in progress, will go a long way toward globally harmonizing basic UAS safety
and operational criteria, while still allowing for ICAO Member States to promulgate their
own variations of domestic UAS regulations. Although EASA and JARUS are directly
concerned with European aviation safety, representatives from the FAA participate in their
efforts to facilitate open dialog between the U.S. and its European partners.137 As UAS
become more capable and approach manned aviation airworthiness and safety standards,
global harmonization of the essential system integrity and operational rules becomes an
essential component of the growth of the technology and its many humanitarian and
utilitarian uses.
5.8 The Way Forward: The Future of Unmanned Aircraft

Systems Regulations
Exponential growth and technological advancements since the publication of the Second
Edition of this book have dramatically changed the landscape for entrepreneurs, developers,
131
operators, and regulators as they struggle with staying abreast of the changes and trying
to evolve or enforce existing regulations. As market forces create greater opportunities for
developers and entrepreneurs to invest capital into more sophisticated systems and bring
the industry closer to solving the sense-and-avoid, autonomy, and air traffic management
problems, there is ever-increasing pressure on the FAA and other global CAAs to put into
place regulatory structures that will allow these authorities to reclaim their “ownership”
of the airspace. This necessarily includes implementing reasonable operational, licensing,
and engineering standards through the rulemaking process that will allow the industry to
grow while not negatively affecting the overall safety of the aviation environment.
The first task is to define the scope of what the FAA and other CAAs can and should
regulate. Now that there is a definition of model aircraft that is precise enough to give notice
to the public of the exact nature of the aircraft that will remain unregulated or lightly
regulated, no longer can the clever entrepreneur claim to legally fly a commercial UAS
under the authority of the canceled AC 91.57 in the United States or a lack of specific
prohibitions elsewhere. The typical definition of “model aircraft” includes such factors as
size, weight, speed, performance capability, and kinetic energy, but is now also dictated by
operational intent. A commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) and popular multirotor
drone that anyone can purchase off the Internet or at a local retail store and learn to fly
in a few hours can be “recreational” one day (video recording the family dog romping
through the forest) and a commercial flight the next day while taking photos of homes for
compensation from a real estate business. A “size, weight, etc.” approach describes the
physical attributes of the aircraft and its systems but now there are precise descriptions of
the locations and altitudes where model aircraft can be flown. The FMRA of 2012 did not
specifically set forth design criteria other than a weight limit of 55 pounds and otherwise
invoked “community-based safety guidelines” for operations, merely requiring coord-
ination with ATC if flown within 5 miles of an airport. If modeling enthusiasts want to
create increasingly larger and faster models that could easily overtake and possibly bring
down a small general aviation aircraft, they must know where those aircraft can be legally
operated and under what conditions.
The civilian UAS community needs to have standards by which admission to the air-
space can be assessed and authorized. Current U.S. and foreign regulations provide work-
able definitions of a “commercial” UAS operation, so that there should be no confusion
about flying a commercial UAS mission with a model aircraft.
The only reasonable alternative left for the FAA and other CAAs is to continue the
rulemaking process, subject to the inevitable lengthy comment and revision schedule, and
those efforts are ongoing as this book goes to press. The outcome of this “sausage making”
process is not clear or readily predictable, as there are many competing interests seeking
influence over the standards and rulemaking processes. Manned aviation (both general
and commercial) has legitimate concerns about UAS intrusions into airport environments
and unsegregated airspace by irresponsible operators, many feeling that it is only a matter
of time before a rogue UAS brings down a manned aircraft, with catastrophic results.
Severe penalties and prison time have not deterred some actors who are either ignorant
of the regulations or choose to flout them in the misguided belief that they would not get
caught. There are many potential gaps in the proposed rules published by the FAA, as
evidenced by the sheer number of comments to NPRMs with which the FAA is presently
dealing. Arguably, the safest approach would be to require that all UASs be fully certified
as airworthy, that their pilots and operators be properly certificated and rated, and that all
airspace regulations be fully complied with, which is essentially the state of affairs in the
United States, Europe, and the Southern Hemisphere. The global system of certification
132
is already in place under the auspices of ICAO’s authority, and all that is lacking are the
standards and guidelines that must be met in each applicable category of regulation.
A second approach in the United States would be to systematically dissect each and every
part and subpart of Title 14 of the CFRs and amend them as necessary, again through the
rulemaking process, as required, to incorporate all known characteristics of unmanned air-
craft. This was also considered and apparently abandoned in favor of chartering the sUAS
ARC in 2008. Many regulations clearly would have no application to UASs (such as those
under Part 121 pertaining to passenger seat restraints or flight attendant requirements),
while a large portion of the remainder could have application by interpretation, and thus
would be candidates for amendment. This process could conceivably take years, but if
undertaken, the most logical place to start would be 14 CFR Part 91, Air Traffic and General
Operating Rules; Part 71, Airspace; on to Part 61, Pilot and Crewman Certificates; and then
to the aircraft design standards found in Parts 21 through 49.
The third alternative is to create an entirely new part to 14 CFR devoted exclusively
to UASs, which would incorporate all the issues of “see-and-avoid” technology, airspace
access, pilot qualifications, manufacturing standards, and airworthiness certification. 14
C.F.R. Part 107 was the first step towards that solution, although as currently written it
does not deal with design and manufacturing standards or airworthiness certification.
Those standards should evolve out of the efforts of ASTM’s F-38 committee, and that was
the recommendation of the sUAS ARC. The FAA delegated the standards development
process for ssUASs to ASTM, and the F-38 Committee and its subcommittees released 23
approved standards, with another 18 in development. Part 107 makes no reference to ASTM
or community-based standards, so the status of the standards that have been developed
remains uncertain pending further clarification from the FAA or issuance of an Notice of
Availability (NOA) of a particular standard.
In the meantime, anticipating the full integration of UASs into the aviation world, the
FAA requires a mechanism to enforce its authority over the airspace and to carry out its
mandate to promote public safety and to do no harm to the current system through lack
of oversight or misguided supervision. This is best accomplished by a rule or statute that
reinforces the FAA’s authority over the airspace and provides for sufficient sanctions
against violators who do not possess certificates to be revoked or suspended, or who are
otherwise immune from civil penalty. Those tools have been provided by the series of
federal statutes enacted since 2015 that specifically address the FAA’s authority over the
national airspace and provide severe penalties for violators of those laws. It is the hope of
this author that the final outcome of the FAA’s rulemaking efforts and the activities of the
various SDOs, combined with future rules that may evolve out of the statutory mandate
of the FMRA, will be a comprehensive, yet user-friendly regulatory scheme for all UASs
in all categories and sizes that can serve as a model to the rest of the world. This vision is
necessary to promote and facilitate the extraordinary economic engine that has evolved in
the few short years since the introduction of small multirotor and fixed-wing sUASs into
the marketplace, while preserving the outstanding record of aviation safety that the United
States has enjoyed for many decades.
5.9 Conclusion
The aviation environment is complex, dynamic, and littered with pitfalls, landmines, and
blind alleys, to mix several metaphors, and the designer, developer, operator, or user of
133
a UAS seeking access to the NAS or international airspace must proceed with caution to
ensure that the rules of engagement are fully understood. The rulemaking and standards
development processes for UASs are underway and are sure to be so for the foreseeable
future. Active involvement by the industry and the user community in the process is not
only encouraged but also absolutely mandatory for the industry to grow and evolve in an
orderly fashion. The opportunities for technological advancement for unmanned systems,
many of which will have a positive impact upon the rest of the world of aviation from a
safety and efficiency perspective, are virtually unlimited. The greatest challenge for the
FAA and its counterparts around the world is to arrive at coherent, rational, and enforce-
able policies, procedures, rules, and regulations governing the operation of RPA, regard-
less of where they are deployed or for what purpose.
5.1 Discuss the FMRA of 2012. How did the Act change the regulation of UAS?
5.2 What is the FAA’s “toolbox?”
5.3 List and discuss the three tools the FAA uses to administer the FARs.
5.4 The FAA has supported and sponsored four domestic committees dedicated
to developing standards and regulations for the manufacture and operation of
unmanned aircraft. List and discuss each committee.
5.5 Discuss the relationships between the FAA, EASA, JARUS, and ICAO. Do they
work together or independently?
Notes
1 AC 91.57.
2 Dep’t. of Transp., Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, Docket No.
FAA-2006–25714 (2007).
3 14 C.F.R. Part 107.
4 Pub. L. No. 112–95, 126 Stat. 11 (2012).
5 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5 §§ 500–596.
6 5 U.S.C. § 553.
7 Public Law 85–726, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess.; 72 Stat. 731; 49 U.S.C § 1301, as amended.
8 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (a)(1).
9 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (a)(2).
10 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (b)(1).
11 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (b)(2).
12 14 CFR Part 1.1 et seq.
13 14 CFR Parts 21–49.
14 14 CFR Parts 61–67.
15 14 CFR Parts 71–77.
16 14 CFR Parts 119–135.
17 14 CFR Parts 91–105.
18 14 CFR Parts 141–147.
19 14 CFR Parts 150–161.
20 14 CFR Parts 170–171.
134
21 www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/faa_regulations
22 Public Law 112–95, 112th Congress, 126 Stat. 11.
23 14 CFR 1.1.
24 14 CFR 1.1.
25 14 CFR 1.1.
26 14 CFR 1.1.
27 Advisory Circular 00-2.11 (1997).
28 Advisory Circular 00-2.11 (1997).
29 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218; 121 S. Ct. 2164; 150 L. Ed. 2d 292.
30 72 FR 6689, Vol. 72, No. 29, February 13, 2007 (Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08-01).
31 FAA Notice 8900.291.
32 Notice 8900.292.
33 FDC NOTAM 4/3621.
34 Notice 8900.268.
35 AC 21-12 and AC 45-2D.
36 www.faa.gov.
37 U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5 and Amendment 14.
38 FAA National Policy Order 2150.3C, FAA Compliance and Enforcement Program, effective 01/
24/20; and Order 8000.373 FAA Compliance Oversight effective 6/26/15; found on Internet
at: http://rgl.faa.gov
39 Pub. L. 115–254.
40 49 U.S.C. § 46106.
41 Anthony J. Adamski and Timothy J. Doyle, Introduction to the Aviation Regulatory Process, 5th ed.
(Plymouth, MI: Hayden-McNeil, 2005), 62.
42 Adamski and Doyle, Introduction.
43 Advisory Circular 91.57B; 49 U.S.C. § 44809 (which seems to acknowledge that recreational
unmanned aircraft are aircraft, but are exempt from regulatory oversight if they are operated
under specific guidelines).
44 14 CFR 1.1.
45 14 CFR 91.119.
46 14 CFR 91.119.
47 14 CFR Part 71.
48 Interview with Benjamin Trapnell, Assistant Professor, University of North Dakota, Lifetime
Member of the Academy of Model Aeronautics.
49 14 CFR 101.11 et seq.
50 14 CFR 101.21 et seq.
51 14 CFR 101.31 et seq.
52 FAA Order 2150.3C.
53 Coppenbarger v. FAA, 558 F. 2d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 1977).
54 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a).
55 49 U.S.C. § 44709 (b); Garvey v. NTSB and Merrell, 190 F. 3d 571 (1999).
56 49 U.S.C. §46301 (d)(5)(A).
57 49 U.S.C. §46301 et seq.
58 49 U.S.C. §46301 (d)(1)(C).
59 Docket No. 2012EA210009 “Order of Assessment.”
60 Public Law 112–95, 112th Congress, 126 Stat. 11.
61 14 C.F.R. § 1.1; 80 Fed. Reg. 78,594 (December 16, 2015)
62 AC 91-57.
63 FAA AFS-400 UAS Policy 05-01, September 16, 2005.
64 AC 91.57B, effective May 31, 2019.
67 14 CFR 91.113.
135
68 14 CFR 91.113(b).
69 FAA AFS-400 UAS Policy 05-01, Supra Note 43.
70 14 CFR 91.111(a).
72 14 CFR 21.191.
75 FAA AFS-400 UAS Policy 05-01, Supra Note 43, § 6.13.
76 14 CFR 1.1.
77 72 FR 6689, Supra Note 30.
78 For example, see website for Remote Controlled Aerial Photography Association:
www.rcapa.net/.
79 Public Law 112–95 126 Stat. 11.
80 Docket No.: FAA-2015-0150; Notice No. 15-01.
81 FMRA Sec. 331 Definitions.
82 FMRA Sec. 332 Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems Into National
Airspace System.
83 FMRA Sec. 336.
84 FMRA Sec. 332 and 334.
85 FMRA Sec. 333 Special Rules for Certain Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
86 14 C.F.R. 107
87 Pub. L.115–254, FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
88 Comments by FAA Administrator Michael Huerta at AUVSI Press Conference,
Atlanta, Georgia, May 6, 2015.
89 14 C.F.R. Part 107
90 Pub. L. 114–190, 130 Stat. 615
91 Pub. L. 115–254,
92 https://www.faa.gov/about/reauthorization/
93 www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships
94 Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Vol. 84 Fed. Reg.
72,438, FAA Docket No: FAA-2019-1100,
95 www.faa.gov/uas/advanced_operations/section_333/how_to_file_a_petition/
96 www.faa.gov/uas/resources/public_records
97 www.federalregister.gov
98 www.uasvision.com/2014/04/03/faa-rules-out-use-of-military-airspace-for-uav-
tests/
99 https://faa.gov/uas
100 Electronic Code of Federal Regulations: http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?&c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfr-browse/Title14/14tab_02.tpl.
101 FAA Order 2150.3C, effective January 24, 2020.
102 See, for example, 83 Fed. R. 49,971 “Consensus Standards, Light-Sport Aircraft”
(October 3, 2018)
103 https://fast.faa.gov/EMP_System_Safety_Management.cfm
104 Public Law 112–95 (see note 15, and discussed below).
105 FAA Advisory Circular 91.57B Effective May 31, 2019
106 International Civil Aviation Organization: www.icao.int/
107 https://store.icao.int/products/manual-on-remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-rpas-
doc-10019
108 www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/opinions/opinion-012020
136
109 www.Sesarju.eu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/U-space Blueprint bro-

chure/final.pdf
110 As of August 2019: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta,
Montenegro, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Serbia, Republic
of Moldova, Republic of Slovenia, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovak
Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and United
States of America.
111 www.jarus-rpas.org.
112 www.jarus-rpas.org/content/jar-doc-06-sora-package
113 www.eurocontrol.int/unmanned-aircraft-systems
114 www.legislation.gov.au/Series/C2004A03656
115 www.anac.gov.br/assuntos/paginas-tematicas/drones
116 www.tc.gc.ca/en/services/aviation/drone-safety.html
117 www.caac.gov.cn
118 www.caac.gov.cn/XZSPYSL/en/index.jsp (in English)
119 www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/alphatango
120 https://fox-alphatango.aviation-civile.gouv.fr/en
121 www.lba.de/ D E/ L uftfahrtpersonal/ U nbemannte_ F luggeraete/ U AV_
Vorbereitung_node.html
122 www.iaa.ie/general-aviation/drones
123 www.enac.gov.it/ e n/ a ir- s pace/ a irspace- m anagement/ a irspace- m anagement-
for-drones-activites
124 www.enac.gov.it/la-normativa/normativa-enac/circolari/serie-atm/atm-05a
125 www.mlit.go.jp/en/koku/uas.html
126 www.sct.gob.mx/despliega-noticias/article/regula-la-sct-el-uso-de-aeronaves-no-
tripuladas-drones/
127 https://rijkoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/drone
128 www.droneregulations.info/Netherlands/NL.html#country-search
129 https:// l uftfartstilsynet.no/ e n/ d rones/ c ommercial- u se- o f- d rones/ a bout-
dronesrpas/regulations-of-drones/
130 www.aviation.govt.nz/rules/rule-part/show/101
131 www.aviation.govt.nz/rules/rule-part/show/102
132 www.aviation.govt.nz/
133 www.caa.co.za/Pages/Default.aspx
134 http://transportstyrelsen.se/en/aviation/Aircraft/UAS/
135 https://transportstyrelsen.se/globalassets/global/luftfart/luftfartyg/the-swedish-
uas-regulation-tsfs-2009–88.pdf (In English)
136 http:// p ublicapps.caa.co.uk/ m odalapplication.aspx?appid=11&mode=detail
&id=415
137 www.faa.gov/ r egulations_ p olicies/ r ulemaking/ m edia/ FAAandEASA.pdf
(Rulemaking Cooperation Guidelines for the Federal Aviation Administration and
the European Aviation Safety Agency)
newgenprepdf
137
6
Human Factors in Unmanned Aerial Systems
Warren Jensen
6.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

6.2 The Enormity of the Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.3 A Caution Regarding Hindsight Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.4 Human Perception and RPA Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.5 Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.6 Selective Attention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.7 Focused Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.8 Divided Attention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.9 Sustained Attention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.10 Human Error. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.11 Threat and Error Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.12 Crew Resource Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.13 Situation Awareness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.13.1 Vigilance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.13.2 Diagnosis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.13.3 Risk Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.13.4 Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.14 Human–Machine Interfacing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.15 Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.16 Compatibility Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Recommended Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.1 Introduction
While remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) are often referred to as “unmanned,” it is clear that
the humans involved and their actions are critical elements to safe operations. The goal of
human factors is to provide operators and support personnel with the necessary know-
ledge, skills, and abilities and to achieve the overall goal of safe, effective, and efficient
operations. The human has a great capacity to learn, perceive, integrate information, and
execute complex decision-making at a high-skill level. Conversely, humans can be vul-
nerable to saturation, fatigue, spatial disorientation, and communication failures, among
other issues. The challenge in the field of human factors is to address these issues through
awareness of human traits and limitations, training programs, proficiency and currency,
137
138
teamwork skill development, and effective workstation design. On the surface, it appears
that the goal of human factors training is simply to minimize or eliminate errors. The overall
goal is to optimize efficiency and effectiveness of humans managing RPA operations.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a working discussion of some common issues
seen when transitioning to and working with unmanned systems. This chapter must
approach a wide range of operators and their experiences, operating equipment that
can vary in its capabilities, and flying very different missions and conditions. In light of
this concept, this chapter will focus on human performance challenges and strategies to
approach those challenges.
6.2 The Enormity of the Scope

The large variety of remotely operated vehicles creates physical and cognitive demands on
human operators, as well as their capabilities. The aim of this chapter is to provide a broad
discussion of human factors’ concepts and their application to the field of RPA operations.
The topics are not specific to a single aircraft system or mission, as changes in systems and
procedures are frequent. Many of these concepts are common to manned systems, or other
professions operating in complex, dynamic settings (e.g., medicine and law enforcement).
6.3 A Caution Regarding Hindsight Bias

During the training phase of any career such as aviation, medicine, and stock trading, case
studies provide excellent discussions for practitioners. Accident reviews and discussions
are often a central part of aviation safety meetings. In these discussions, human factors-
based errors are valuable learning opportunities, but they can be subject to hindsight bias
on the part of the presenter and student. Hindsight bias can interfere with the ability to
identify vulnerabilities in ourselves and our organizations, resulting in a failure to appre-
ciate the risks and take appropriate corrective measures.
Hindsight bias is defined as the “belief that an event is more predictable after it becomes
known than before it became known” (Roese and Vohs, 2012). In other words, once an error
occurs, the reviewer can incorrectly surmise that event should have been more easily iden-
tified and prevented, but in reality, it is only due to the fact that the outcomes of the actions
are known. For example, a pilot who lands an aircraft with the landing gear retracted will
often face the question “What were you thinking?” or the statement “I would have never
done that!” In a field that carefully examines mishaps for the purpose of shaping new
training, designs, or strategies, hindsight bias of personnel can impede progress toward
more safe and efficient operations.
Several traits seen in hindsight bias are important to understand as an individual
embarks on a safety-related career. First of all, individuals with hindsight bias feel that
the events that occurred were more easily predictable than could be reasonably explained.
It can often be associated with an oversimplification of the events, with an emphasis on
the error that occurred. Other events that influenced the error may be omitted from the
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Human Factors in Unmanned Aerial Systems 139
discussion, due to memory distortion or desire to only select what we see as the salient
events that contributed to the mishap.
The concern about hindsight bias stems from the fact that individuals, when transitioning
to new aircraft, systems, or procedures, may look at the case files in a way that does not
consider all the factors that can influence operations. As humans, we prefer to link singular
actions to outcomes, hoping to solve problems with a linear relationship. Even this warning
for hindsight bias is likely to be ineffective. In an article by Paul Goodwin, the author states
that the danger of hindsight is that we “can hinder our learning from … past forecasting
errors, limiting the extent to which we can improve our forecasting skills through experi-
ence” (Goodwin, 2010). Successful strategies to counteract hindsight include working to
gain knowledge about the event and understand how an individual in the situation may
think that their choice was reasonable. It is important to realize that accident reports and
operator-based insights from such events provide excellent learning experiences. The goal
is to use them effectively and keep hindsight bias in check.
6.4 Human Perception and RPA Operations

Aircraft pilots transitioning to become RPA operators quickly note how the two systems
differ in the perceptual inputs they receive during operations. The imaging technologies
used in some RPA operations can provide valuable images of the nature of their operations
(crop sensors, wildlife tracking, traffic management, etc.), but these images may have
limited value for aircraft control and/or navigation. In addition, onboard RPA imaging
systems (optical, infrared, etc.) may not provide protection in sensing and avoiding
hazards, whether fixed or moving. The challenge is to understand how humans use visual
systems to assess their surroundings and risks and how we attempt to compensate for the
change in our perceptions and their assessments.
Currently, small RPAs must be flown within line of sight of the operator (which may also
include ground observers). Normal visual acuity (20/20 for distant vision) of the operators
will provide them with the ability to detect an object 2.3 m in size 1 mile away. This ability
to detect an object is dependent upon several factors, including contrast, color, shape,
movement across the visual field of the observer, and the area (measured in angle) of sky
the observer must search for the object (Williams and Gildea, 2014, pp. 6–7).
Visual displays from the RPA to guide operators for in-flight maneuvers can also be diffi-
cult to assess due to distortion (as compared to direct visualization) and loss of peripheral
vision cues. Some systems using boresight visual displays for the assessment of landing
performance require pilots to monitor visual image changes that differ from their prior
experience. In addition, the changes they must monitor appear to be much more subtle in
the critical phase of landing. These changes in perception can result in operators providing
faulty control inputs that may result in mishaps.
Relative motion issues occur when an object does not move across an individual’s per-
ipheral vision. Motion in our peripheral vision is an attention cue, much like a car passing
in a driver’s peripheral vision on the highway. Objects that do not move across the per-
ipheral vision are not easily detected. An example would be a small RPA flying toward
a ground observer who is looking 30° to the right of the incoming RPA. Lack of motion
across the peripheral vision may not draw the observer’s attention to the incoming RPA.
140
Individuals scanning an “empty sky” in search of an RPA or airborne threats may focus
their vision to a point closer than the distance to the vehicle or threat. This altered focus
can impair the detection of those objects. In order to counter those effects, ground obser-
vers are advised to use short, fixed scans to areas of the sky, consciously pushing their focal
length to the threat area. This strategy is used to counter the effect of relative motion and
near-focus anomalies.
6.5 Attention
Charles Wickens’ multiple resource theory was developed to explain human cognitive
challenges of performing simultaneous and/or difficult tasks (Wickens, 2008). The theory
describes brain resources as the brain’s ability to perform tasks (e.g., visual perception,
spatial processing, and motor skills) and also identifies the challenge of sharing a single
resource for two separate tasks. For example, reading a book while driving a car would
share visual perception resources and impair performance of one or both tasks. Attention
is defined as the management of these resources. The resources can be managed several
ways referred to as attention types. An understanding of the attention types can be valu-
able to understand each type’s vulnerabilities, as well as strategies to optimize attention
performance.
6.6 Selective Attention

Pilots, air traffic controllers, and RPA operators are required to monitor a number of infor-
mation sources, such as aircraft attitude, speed, and position. When an operator gathers
information through a sequential sampling of information sources (instruments, controls,
or actual physical environment such as aircraft on runways), these operators are using
selective attention. This process utilizes a systematic visual scan of information sources
and involves the operator’s skill to select and process these information sources. Pilots
involved in instrument flying demonstrate a selective attention process, using a sequential
scan to determine their speed, altitude, attitude, and other information.
The number of information sources the operator samples is referred to as load stress.
With practice and proficiency, an individual’s ability to manage load stress will improve.
Currency, experience, and effective scan patterns improve performance in selective
attention settings. Design of the information systems, to place instruments closer together,
will also improve performance.
A key strategy in the management of selective attention is crew coordination of
monitoring duties or for performing actions needed for operations. RPA operators may
be able to coordinate team members to monitor aircraft position and/or alert others in
a high load stress condition. For example, using an RPA in a lost child scenario would
allow team members to monitor video images, RPA position, obstructions, and potential
airborne conflicts simultaneously, while the demand of monitoring all these information
sources could overwhelm a single operator.
141
6.7 Focused Attention

Directing brain resources to a single task is considered focused attention. A common
example of focused attention would be an individual intently reading a book while unaware
of his surroundings. Directing attention to an emergency checklist to the exclusion of
other information is a similar situation known as channeled attention. Common problems
experienced by individuals using focused, or channeled, attention are distractions and loss
of situation awareness.
Watching a movie is more difficult with cell phones ringing, people talking, or other
distractions. While some distractions, such as emergency alarms, are necessary for safe
operations, they do interrupt the operators’ ability to perform that task. The process of
operating RPAs involves several settings in which focused attention is likely. The actions
of an operator to look at the sensor operator’s display, talk with onsite individuals, or refer
to a manual may be necessary duties, but the operator must be aware of the negative effect
a distraction can have on the performance of the primary task, such as airborne threat
monitoring or manual RPA control.
Another issue of focused attention is the lack of situation awareness due to attention
directed to only one aspect of the environment. Famous accidents have resulted when the
crew turned to focused attention and lost overall situation awareness of the flight (NTSB).
When one individual needs to use focused attention on a task, crew coordination is needed
to divide tasks, such as monitoring aircraft systems and threats, for the crew to remain
situationally aware. The primary concerns during focused attention are distraction man-
agement and loss of situation awareness prevention strategies.
Distraction management strategies include limiting the number of sources who commu-
nicate with vehicle operators during critical phases of flight and developing strategies to
filter or prioritize information to curtail unnecessary distraction. Crew coordination would
involve assigning tasks to team members during times when an individual must be in
focused attention during an operation. This could include monitoring for airborne threats
or systems malfunctions, during operations that would require operators to be using
focused attention.
6.8 Divided Attention

Divided attention is the concept of performing two tasks simultaneously, such as talking
to another individual while manually controlling an aircraft. Many tasks are done in this
way in a very safe manner, but interference between these tasks can increase safety risks.
Divided attention tasks are more difficult to perform when the tasks share resources. As
mentioned earlier, resources are the cognitive skills we have to perform tasks. An example
of sharing a single resource for two separate tasks would be seen when an operator is
manually maneuvering a small RPA near obstructions while they are also observing visual
displays for the optical images. If the operator cannot see the obstructions through the
optical system, the process of alternating their visual focus between the RPA obstruc-
tion clearance task and the screen monitoring task, performance is likely to be negatively
affected. In this case, the demand for visual monitoring of both tasks can be overwhelming.
142
Even tasks that do not share resources, but are demanding of the operator, can have
negative consequences. An example of this concept would be asking an individual to
perform an unpracticed flight maneuver while engaging in conversation. While this com-
bination of activities does not appear to share resources, it can affect performance if the
cognitive demands of these tasks are high. Effective crew management involves assigning
tasks that do not share resources.
6.9 Sustained Attention

Sustained attention is an attention process that monitors the environment for changes,
which may or may not be foreseen. Examples of sustained attention would include an indi-
vidual monitoring the progress of a flight or operation, looking to identify abnormalities or
findings in which the operator must further investigate. This could be thought of as “guard
duty” in which operators must maintain a high level of awareness. An example would be
an RPA operator, monitoring an automated system for failures, flight performance, and
navigation, all for the purpose of identifying performance that is out of pre-established
parameters.
A common problem experienced during sustained attention is degraded monitoring
skills after 20–30 minutes. Strategies described to improve sustained attention performance
consider the design of monitoring tasks and alarm systems (proximity warnings for air
traffic control), work–rest cycles, and motivation and comfort of the operators. Increasing
the engagement of the operator in the monitoring task is also beneficial.
The above description is simplistic to the complex nature of cognitive function in com-
plex, dynamic settings, where operators change attention types rapidly and without
awareness. The point is that awareness of strategies can be beneficial to users to improve
performance, as well as to understand vulnerabilities for the purpose of avoiding common
errors.
6.10 Human Error

What is an error? Most individuals will agree that many events happen when driving a car,
but what events are considered an error? All drivers tend to agree crossing the centerline
to oncoming traffic is an error, but crossing over the centerline of a deserted highway is not
held in the same level of agreement, as the likelihood of a negative outcome is decreased.
Most people identify an error is an event where a negative consequence is likely to occur.
Can the same action be an error in one setting and not another? If errors are only considered
due to their consequence, this may be true.
Senders and Moray defined an error as an act that was “not intended by the actor, not
desired by a set of rules or an external observer; or that led the task or system outside its
acceptable limits” (Senders and Moray, 1991). Errors occur when an action results in an
outcome that was not intended, even if the actions performed were intended. This author
believes that identifying error for the purpose of improving performance should not be
dependent upon the consequence related to the single occurrence. The saying “No harm,
143
no foul” may not apply to RPA operations, in that the same error in the future may have
significant consequences. To only identify and correct errors when negative consequences
occur is inefficient at best and would more likely delay the identification and management
of unacceptable risks.
It is evident that well-trained and current operators commit errors. The nature of human
error involves a wide range of activities, from overall strategy and planning errors, to
inadequate monitoring of information systems, to poor technical execution of a skill. Some
errors are inconsequential, which means that there is no negative outcome if they are not
identified and corrected. Many errors are identified and corrected through monitoring
actions of operators or other individuals. Anticipating, monitoring, identifying, and
correcting errors are common tasks in the aviation industry.
Why can errors be difficult to manage? What reasons could explain our resistance to
identify and effectively manage errors in ourselves and others? Part of this issue may be
in the emotional responses we have to errors, whether they are due to the actions of others
or ourselves.
When trained and qualified individuals commit errors, it is seen as an unexpected event.
The operators may be unaware of their error, especially during routine actions. The unex-
pected nature of error can impair in an individual’s recognition, acknowledgment, and
correction of the error. In reality, errors are common and should be expected. Defensive
driving strategies are based on the expectation of errors being committed by other drivers,
and through anticipation of the error and immediate application of correction strategies,
further errors or consequences of those errors can be avoided. Air traffic controllers are
trained to expect errors in communication or understanding, for the purpose of immediate
recognition and corrective action. Training professionals in RPA operations should include
active monitoring and expectation of errors. Anticipation of errors can be crucial for timely
correction as illustrated in the following interview.
Following takeoff and climb-out from an uncontrolled airport, I radioed to the area that
I was departing the airport traffic pattern to the east of the town, climbing through 3,000
feet to a cruise altitude of 5,500 feet. I received a call from another aircraft approaching
that airport, who identified their position (location) to be “west of the town at 3,500
feet, over the high school, inbound for an GPS (global positioning system) approach.”
I recalled there was only one high school in the town and it was on the east side of town,
directly under me. I immediately leveled the aircraft at 3,200 feet and saw the other air-
craft pass overhead. I was fortunate to identify the error—they were east of town, not
west—and avoid a collision.
(Interview with a pilot, 2011)
We can expect to experience distrust of other individuals who commit errors, which is
likely to impair coordination and teamwork. The key is to manage errors as an expected
event, with monitoring and correction strategies in place. Operators should be trained in
error correction strategies.
Negative transfer is a common error when transitioning to new systems with similar
layouts. Negative transfer is using a previous, well-established skill in a new setting in
which the action is incorrect. Transferring from an aircraft to an RPA that uses the same
joystick control, but has different functions for the buttons, would likely lead to an indi-
vidual to perform incorrect actions. A driver who uses manual transmissions, now con-
trolling an automatic transmission, may reach for controls in the wrong location in their
new setting.
144
6.11 Threat and Error Management

Safety-based organizations have developed strategies to address human errors since the
beginnings of aviation. Initially, rules and regulations were used to provide guidance to
aircrews and air traffic controllers. Checklists aided operators to prevent memory errors.
The 1970s saw the beginning of “Cockpit Resource Management” (CRM) to assist crew
interactions with regard to communication, crew coordination, team building, and
decision-making (Helmreich et al., 1993). CRM training has been carefully evaluated and
continues to evolve in its design and extent. The concept has extended beyond its original
intent, with training involving cabin crews, maintenance teams, air traffic controllers, and
individuals in law enforcement and medical fields.
The work of James Reason, Douglas Wiegmann, Thomas Shappell, and others fur-
ther identified ways to classify errors and contributing causes, with the intent to identify
trends and develop effective countermeasures. James Reason identified a model to identify
defense strategies to manage errors (Reason, 2008, pp. 97–100).
In Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), Shappell and Wiegmann
(2000) provided a framework to identify and classify errors and contributing factors. Their
overall goal was to develop a tool to create error management strategies based on the
data obtained from the incident. The four layers of defenses were described as adminis-
trative procedures, supervisory controls, preconditions, and operator actions (Figure 6.1).
Each layer uses designs or strategies to stop errors and, conversely, ineffectiveness of a
defense layer may allow an error to continue. Several publications noted in the reference
section of their work provide a thorough discussion of their assessment system, as well as
applications to several aviation fields.
Organizational influences can range from formal policies, regulations, laws, and oper-
ating manuals. These documents provide guidance to the organization to properly con-
duct operations, similar to traffic laws influencing the safety and flow of traffic. Guidance
from the administrative level can also lead to problems, such as an organization curtailing
safety training for cost-cutting purposes.
Supervisory influence is the actions of other individuals to monitoring operators for
the purpose of providing guidance and corrections. This aspect usually refers to a chain
of command and appropriate monitoring and controls applied to an organization. First
officers asserting themselves to correct errors would be considered an effective use of
supervisory influence. On the other hand, some supervisory influence can be provided by
other individuals, outside the operational group. Bystanders pointing out an obstruction
or airborne threat can provide input to the operators as well.
Preconditions are considered any influence that would increase the risk of error. Gusty
winds, poor visibility, and approaching darkness are some of the common environmental
preconditions in aviation operations. Other aspects of preconditions would be distraction,
fatigue, or poor information and control display designs.
Operator actions include errors, such as decisional, skill-based, and perceptual errors.
Positive aspects of operator actions can also be seen, such as persistence, bravery, and
highly developed skills to manage problems.
The arrows on the side of the diagram indicate that the model is dynamic and actions can
modify other defense layers. Operators can be influenced by policies of the administrative
level and inputs and/or corrections from the supervisory level. Policies may be altered as
a result of input from operators or supervisors. For example, would increasing frequency
of airspace violations by RPAs influence the changing of administrative policies regarding
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Organizational influences
Example: Laws, policies, and rules
Supervisory influence
Example: Monitoring others’ actions
Preconditions
Examples: Fatigue and lighting conditions
Operator actions
Examples: Decisions and skill sets
FIGURE 6.1
Layered error defenses. (Modified from Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000. The Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System—HFACS, DOT/FAA/AM-00/7.)
operations? Would new policies on crew duty days decrease fatigue? Would decreasing
medical certification requirements for operators result in a change of operator reliability?
The defense layers can be changed (for better or worse) by influences at other levels.
The HFACS model presented in the literature identifies further factors to more clearly
classify the issues related to each defense layer. The purpose for these evaluations is to
identify factors and trends that could be corrected and/or studied further.
6.12 Crew Resource Management

Crew Resource Management was defined by John K. Lauber of the National Transportation
Safety Board as “using all available resources—information, equipment, and people—to
achieve safe and effective flight operations” (Lauber, 1984). The concept of developing
strategies to improve group performance through better coordination, communication,
and decision effectiveness was fostered following a series of crew coordination incidents in
the 1970s (NTSB) (Eastern Airlines, 1972) . Since that time, coursework for the purpose of
improving team management continued to expand, including cabin crews, airport ground
personnel, air traffic controllers, as well as other industries such as medicine and law
enforcement. A discussion of the history and development of this process is beyond the
scope of this text, but a discussion of best practices, as they relate to unmanned systems,
is appropriate.
Team concept principles stem from manned aviation operations, where the goal is to
train pilots and other crewmembers to work together in a coordinated fashion, sharing
information, decision-making, and actions (Weiner et al., 1993). In RPA operations, there
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are likely to be others outside the operations team that would provide input or direct
operations. The fire chief at the site of major fire may suddenly need specific information
that prompts a change in flight. Law enforcement and search and rescue personnel are
likely to have changing needs for the RPA operators as well. The ability to clearly com-
municate needs and capabilities among these users will have an impact on the safety and
effectiveness of the operation. Crew coordination training is an important component of
effective RPA operations.
The initial goals of CRM training involved increasing participative management
and assertiveness in the crews. While a clear chain of command is important in RPA
operations, participative management refers to leaders who involve other crew members
in the decision-making and actions of the team. Assertiveness was advocated to team
members who were not in charge, but needed to clearly advocate their concerns to the
group leader. Both skills are important in the development of teams and should be an
integral part of training. This is especially important for teams who have never trained
together previously.
Effective team management involves other attributes that contribute to the success of
teams. A discussion of these cultural attributes can provide insight to groups regarding
their interactions. This discussion involves the use of power distance, effective commu-
nication, ambiguity resolution, distraction management, and negative transfer. These are
a few of the topics in advanced crew coordination coursework but are considered central
issues in safe operations of unmanned systems.
Power distance is defined as the leader’s consideration of opinions or concerns of indi-
viduals who are not in a position of authority (Hofstede et al., 2010). Leaders who do not
ask for, or consider, others’ opinions would be considered to have a high-power distance.
Conversely, leaders with low-power distance allow others to provide their inputs to con-
duct of the operation. Low-power distance is considered optimal for information exchange
and effective decision-making.
Effective communication within a group supports situation awareness, decision-making
effectiveness, and error management. The use of standardized terminology is an important
component of effectively transferring ideas. Directional guidance, position reporting, and
requests for maneuvers all depend upon terminology that correctly and efficiently conveys
concerns of the operator and support teams. The process of clearly encoding messages and
providing unambiguous inquiries should go beyond classroom discussions to practice in
simulations and operations.
Ambiguity is defined as a finding that can have two interpretations or two indications
whose interpretations conflict (O’Brien and O’Hare, 2007). For example, is the image on
the screen a fugitive with a rifle or a gardener with a rake? The other form of ambiguity
would be an oil pressure alarm sounding, but the oil pressure gauge conflicts this finding,
showing normal operational pressures. The state of uncertainty created by both forms of
ambiguity is a challenge to situation awareness and safe operations.
Sometimes, ambiguity is created by limitations of the mechanical systems (lighting, reso-
lution of the optical system, etc.) or by crew interpretations or expectations of the infor-
mation (engine noise, reflection of sound). Ambiguity may be apparent or unknown to the
operators.
Ambiguity resolution involves strategies to improve situation awareness by gathering
more information from sources, focusing to identify the issues or causes of the ambiguity,
and evaluating the situation to determine the future implications of chosen actions. For
instance, gathering more information regarding the position of a small RPA may involve
asking other ground observers for information, utilizing global positioning information or
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referring to onboard camera output. Often, ambiguity can be due to faulty assumptions
made by team members. Everyone has a responsibility to identify and resolve ambiguity.
Distraction management involves identifying information or actions not pertinent to the
operation, so as to prevent their influence on the operations. In commercial aviation, some
noncritical alarms are silenced during critical phases of flight, such as takeoff and landing.
Increasing workload with nonrelevant issues is considered a threat. The challenge is to
understand what information is noncritical and, when in high workload operations, when
distraction management strategies should be used.
For example, during launch procedures and obstacle avoidance procedures, it is wise to
limit conversation unrelated to the mission or information that is not needed for that phase of
the operation. Certain information, such as an engine performance abnormality, needs to be
communicated even in a critical phase of flight. The difference can also be skills and experi-
ence of the operator to manage independent channels of information. Be mindful that high
workload periods are not always predictable, nor is it simple to know whether incoming
information is needed or if it creates a distraction. Careful observation and discussions with
experienced operators are important training tools for distraction management.
6.13 Situation Awareness

Many professions (aviation, law enforcement, and medicine[This isn’t an exhaustive list,
so the “and” infers that it is. Suggest not adding the “and.” ]) share the common challenge
of maintaining awareness of the state of the operations, trends of changing conditions,
and the identification and realistic appraisal of risks to the operators and the mission. The
number of issues an operator can manage, while guarding against unnecessary distrac-
tion, can be a challenge and a skill worth developing. Situation awareness is critical in
unmanned aircraft operations. In spite of the diversity of professions involved in situation
awareness training, common cognitive processes are used.
Mica Endsley defined situation awareness as “an internalized mental model of the
current state of the flight environment” (Garland et al., 1999). Delta Air Lines training
programs state that it is “the ability to recognize events occurring to you and around you
then reacting correctly to those events” (Captain Art Samson, personal communication,
2002). There are four aspects of situation awareness, seen as common steps in decision-
making processes.
6.13.1 Vigilance
The task of vigilance requires an individual to direct their attention to information (e.g., air-
craft position, instrument readings, airspace conflicts, structures) that has the most imme-
diate impact on safety. Vigilance is not only managing the appropriate type of attention
but also requires knowledge of the operations to identify and correctly assess the risks
involved. For example, obstructions or low-contrast backgrounds could result in the loss
of RPA visual contact during ground observation operations. Knowledge of this risk assists
the ground observer’s vigilance, allowing them to identify that potential problem prior to
movement in that area.
Vigilance is commonly degraded by distractions. When using focused attention to pro-
vide inputs to the control systems, even momentary distractions can lead to significant
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problems. Distraction management strategies are designed to improve vigilance of tasks.

These strategies include limiting conversation to operational issues during critical phases
of flight. What about a police RPA operator who has risk to their own safety? Working in
focused attention compromises an individual’s ability to maintain situation awareness for
the reason they can have difficulty in monitoring their surroundings while engaged in the
focused attention task.
6.13.2 Diagnosis
When working in complex systems, correctly identifying and understanding a developing
situation can be challenging. While we may be carefully observing the information systems
we have, coming to a correct diagnosis of the situation can be dependent upon our training
and familiarity with the issues, the nature of the human–machine interface, clarity of com-
munication, ambiguous findings, our problem solving skills, and our bias in interpreting
information. Spatial disorientation is a well-known accident cause in aviation and cases
exist where pilots communicate their inability to interpret the instrument indications,
even when the instruments are providing correct indications. This refers to an aspect of
achieving a correct diagnosis of a problem.
Achieving the correct diagnosis involves many skills. As described by Gary Klein, the
recognition-primed decision model depends upon the user’s prior experiences and their
ability to correlate their current situation (Klein, 1993). This process also requires the oper-
ator to ask questions or make observations to clarify the diagnosis. Klein describes the pro-
cess as creating a story to explain the findings, using experience to shape the explanation.
An individual’s story will also lead them to consider successful alternatives to the problem
and likelihood of success of each alternative.
For example, operators, flying piston-powered RPAs, are trained to recognize loss of
power and quickly identify conditions or malfunctions that are responsible. Information
is gathered and compared to patterns developed during training and experience. RPA
trainees can spend a significant amount of time learning systems (fuel, electrical, etc.) and
training with failure simulations to prepare for these contingencies. The goal is to develop
mental models that can be recalled during the event, such as the loss of power. The oper-
ator, using this prior experience, can quickly identify what information is needed and
create a story to explain the findings.
One challenge to make a correct diagnosis can lie in the clarity of the information
presented to the operator. Incomplete, inaccurate, misleading, or conflicting information
can impair this process. Klein describes an anomaly as a finding or information that does
not fit our explanation (Klein, 1993). For example, when an engine tachometer shows
decreasing performance, but there is no other confirming evidence and the vehicle is oper-
ating normally, the abnormal reading is considered an anomaly. The natural human reac-
tion is to disregard the anomaly because it cannot easily be explained. As professionals,
training emphasizes the need to consider abnormal readings that cannot be explained.
6.13.3 Risk Analysis

While this term has many meanings and applications, with regard to situation awareness,
risk analysis asks “What is the likelihood and consequence of failure of each option I am
considering?” Individuals who choose options that have a high likelihood of failure and/
or significant consequences of failure may be demonstrating a loss of situation awareness.
(However, it can be argued that heroic actions often have one or both of these aspects.)
149
Granted, risk analysis of options we have not performed in the past can be difficult; our
past experience of success in high-risk actions may also mislead us when analyzing risk.
Vicarious learning is defined as an individual whose prior poor choices and safety risks
have not resulted in negative outcomes and, as a result, the individual does not have a real-
istic assessment of the risk they are taking. For example, drivers who use excessive speed,
but have no consequences such as accidents, speeding tickets, or negative comments from
their passengers, may underestimate risks of driving at those speeds. Through their flawed
risk analysis, they may develop a sense of invulnerability in those situations.
6.13.4 Action
Individuals who appropriately monitor their surroundings and correctly diagnose
their situation may still fail to correct the problem appropriately. Students with writing
assignments may delay beginning their work due to complacency. Individuals who commit
errors may not be willing to identify and correct the error, as this will bring attention and
possibly blame and liability. The hesitancy in both these examples would be considered a
loss of situation awareness due to a lack of action.
6.14 Human–Machine Interfacing

The goal when designing workstations (control modules, information displays, etc.) is to
create a system the operators can use efficiently and effectively. Often, the control systems
are analogs of previously designed control systems, such as video gaming, aircraft controls,
or computer keyboards.
6.15 Compatibility
In man–machine interfacing, compatibility refers to the consistency of the information
and control systems to the operator’s expectations. There are clear advantages to working
with systems consistent with our prior experience. Laptop computers with similar layouts,
commands, and software programs will result in faster learning, fewer errors, faster reac-
tion times, less mental workload, and greater user satisfaction. Poor compatibility with
inconsistent layouts can result in negative transfer errors. When transitioning to a new
workstation, attention to compatibility can identify aspects that need modification or add-
itional training to achieve compatibility.
6.16 Compatibility Types

Conceptual compatibility is the effective use of symbols, colors, sounds, or other indicators
to convey information. Some symbols we see are cultural or related to specific profession,
150
and their meaning may not be clear without specific training. Numbers on runways indi-
cate magnetic heading rather than some other numbering strategy. Do the operators
understand the meaning of the colors, symbols, or alarm sounds associated with their
workstations? Are the keystrokes used for commands consistent with the operator’s
expectations?
Spatial compatibility refers to the organization of the information and control systems.
Are the information systems located where the operator would expect them? Are the layers
of menus consistent with expectations? New computer operating systems often challenge
users when the organization is changed. Newer flat panel displays are easier for users to
transition to when the locations are consistent with their prior experiences and therefore
expectations.
Movement compatibility refers to the direction and sensitivity of the movement.
Information systems can have movement compatibility with the deflection of instrument
needles. A fuel gauge needle, for example, that moves in a direction opposite of the user’s
expectation can lead to an error in interpretation. The direction and sensitivity of controls
can also lead to operator error.
Controlling a small, radio-controlled RPA through direct visual observation is a good
example of movement compatibility challenges. While the aircraft flies directly away from
your vantage point, the roll command of the control system consists of roll of the aircraft
in the same direction. Control of the aircraft coming toward you may be more difficult to
translate until you have a greater compatibility with the system.
Operators can learn systems (and become highly skilled) using systems that are ini-
tially poorly compatible. Be aware that systems that are poorly compatible will increase
demands on the users.
Summary of points to be considered as follows:
1. Human error is common. Your job as a safety officer is to identify and manage error.
Be alert and inquisitive to the activities occurring and anticipate errors. Learn and
apply error management strategies in activities for the purpose of incorporating
those actions as a natural process.
2. Consider the complete situation of another individual’s error (as well as your
own). Be insightful of factors that can lead to poor performance, such as lack of
currency, poor communication, and distraction. Do not let hindsight bias interfere
with the effectiveness of incident and accident reviews.
3. Situation awareness is difficult and fragile, at times. We need to work to achieve
and maintain it. All four aspects of situation awareness discussed—vigilance,
diagnosis, risk analysis, and action—need to be actively processed to attain it.
Distraction management strategies should be discussed and implemented with
your team.
4. RPA operations can be perceptually challenging. Recognizing perceptual
limitations to identify threats or the correct orientation of your RPA are necessary
to correctly manage an operation. Spatial disorientation is a common concern in
RPA operations due to the altered perceptions operators receive.
5. Attention is the ability to manage the inputs, processing, and outputs of your brain.
The attention type will change rapidly and, at times, to the detriment of safety and
effectiveness. Key strategies for improving task performance are to understand the
challenges and employ corrective strategies of each attention type. For example,
when operators are in focused attention while the RPA is negotiating obstacles,
distraction management actions should be used.
151
6. Crew resource management development has included many useful team actions
to identify and resolve problems in real-time operations. CRM training is highly
recommended for RPA teams and groups in which they interact.
7. Human– machine interactions can be challenging. Proficiency, currency, and
developing correct mental models of the systems you are using cannot be
overemphasized.
Recommended Readings
A Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Accident/ Incident Data: Human Factors
Implications, Kevin Williams, USDOT, 2004.
Documentation of Sensory Information in the Operations of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, Kevin Williams, FAA, USDOT, 2008.
Defensive Flying for Pilots: An Introduction to Threat and Error Management, Merritt
and Klinect, FAA, Human Factors Division, 2006.
The Human Contribution, James Reason, Ashgate Publishing, 2008.
6.1 Describe the traits that can be seen in hindsight bias situations. Provide an example
of one or more of these traits in a real life aviation mishap and discuss how that
behavior could have affected the judgment or assessment of the event by the
person or persons involved.
6.2 Traditionally, UAS/RPA operations in most countries have required the services
of a Visual Observer (VO) for Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) flights. More
recently some civil aviation authorities are permitting BVLOS operations without
a VO. Describe the human factors that could impact the need or lack of need for
VOs in the BVLOS environment. What limitations, either operationally or tech-
nically, or both, should be imposed for BVLOS flights in non-segregated (mixed
manned and unmanned aircraft) airspace?
6.3 What is “negative transfer”? Discuss how that phenomenon could impact the ability
of a manned aircraft pilot to safely and competently serve as pilot in command of
a remotely piloted aircraft. Give eamples and possible or likely outcomes of nega-
tive transfer.
6.4 Describe the fundamentals of crew resource management. Give examples and dis-
cuss CRM challenges in the aviation environment and how failure to meet those
challenges can lead to a mishap or tragecy.
References
Eastern Airlines, Inc, L-1011, N310EA, Miami, Florida, December 29, 1972, NTSB report AAR-73/14.
152
Garland, D.J., Wise, J.A., and Hopkin, V.D. (Eds). 2010. Handbook of Aviation Human Factors, second
edition, Taylor & Francis, Boca Raton, FL.
Goodwin, P. 2010. Why hindsight can damage foresight. International Journal of Applied Forecasting, 17,
5–7. www.forecasters.org/foresight, retrieved 5/29/2015.
Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G.J., and Minkov, M. 2010. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind,
third edition. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Klein, G.A. 1993. A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid Decision Making (pp. 138–147).
Ablex Publishing Corporation.
Lauber, J. 1984. Resource management in the cockpit. Air Line Pilot, 53, 20.
O’Brien, K.S., and O’Hare, D. 2007. Situational awareness ability and cognitive skills training in com-
plex real-world task. Ergonomics, 50(7), 1064–1091.
Reason, J.T. 2008. The Human Contribution. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Burlington, VT.
Roese, N., and Vohs, K. 2012. Hindsight bias. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(5), 411–426.
Senders, J.W., and Moray, N.P. 1991. Human Error: Cause, Prediction and Reduction. Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, p. 25.
Shappell, S., and Wiegmann, D. 2000. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System—HFACS.
DOT/FAA/AM-00/7, Office of Aerospace Medicine, Washington, DC.
Shappell, S., Detwiler, C., Holcomb, K., Hackworth, C., Boquet, A., and Wiegmann, D. 2006. Human
Error and Commercial Aviation Accidents: A Comprehensive Fine-Grained Analysis Using HFACS.
Springfield, Washington, DC.
Weiner, E., Kanki, B., and Helmreich, R. 1993. Cockpit Resource Management. Academic Press,
London, UK.
Wickens, C. 2008. Multiple resources and mental workload. Human Factors, 50(3), 449–455.
Williams, K.W., and Gildea, K.M. 2014. A Review of Research Related to Unmanned Aircraft System Visual
Observers. DOT/FAA/AM-14/9, Office of Aerospace Medicine, Washington, DC.
newgenprepdf
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7
Safety Assessments
Eric J. Shappee and Graham Feasey
7.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

7.2 Hazard Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.2.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.2.2 Preliminary Hazard List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.2.3 Preliminary Hazard Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
7.2.4 Operational Hazard Review and Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.2.5 Change Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.3 Risk Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.3.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.3.2 Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.3.3 Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.4 Safety Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.4.1 Risk Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.4.2 Flight Test Cards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.4.3 Airworthiness Certification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.5 Accident Investigation Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.5.1 Software and Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.5.2 Human Factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.5.3 Suggestions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.6 Conclusion and Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.1 Introduction
For years, the aviation field has been rapidly advancing in technology. With all the change,
aviation organizations and manufacturers have found themselves faced with new safety
issues and ever-changing safety requirements. The unmanned aerial system/remotely
piloted aircraft (UAS/RPA) field is no different. In fact, safety in this arena is more of a
concern. With no onboard pilot, complex operating systems, ever-changing avionics, and
continuous software updates, safety appears to be one of the major hurdles for integrating
UAS/PRA into the National Airspace System.
In this chapter, several safety tools and techniques, such as the hazard analysis and its
various forms, will be explored. The risk assessment process will be examined and some
153
154
guidance will be provided to develop a risk assessment tool. And finally, safety evaluations
will be discussed, and some thoughts on UAS/RPA accident investigation considerations
will be shared.
7.2 Hazard Analysis

Hazard analysis can take several forms. In this section, several common types of hazard
analysis will be explained. The purposes and functions of the hazard analysis are all
predicated on the stage of the operation for which they are applied.
7.2.1 Purpose
Hazard analyses are common tools found in the system safety arena. Generally, these
tools are used throughout the various stages of a product life cycle. In his book System
Safety for the 21st Century, Richard Stephens identifies the various stages of a product life
cycle. These stages or phases are concept, design, production, operations, and disposal.
Although in UAS/RPA operations, the development of a product throughout its life cycle
is not specifically targeted, the operational phase is of importance. The UAS/RPA oper-
ational phase can be subdivided into several general stages: Planning, Staging, Launch,
Flight, and Recovery. Applying the appropriate hazard analysis tool within each stage will
allow for early identification and, ultimately, early resolution of safety issues.
7.2.2 Preliminary Hazard List

The preliminary hazard list (PHL) is just what it sounds like, a list. Simply put, it is a brain-
storming tool used to identify initial safety issues early in the UAS/RPA operation. To get
the most out of the PHL, a variety of input from the people familiar with each stage of the
UAS/RPA operation and its phases is necessary. Figure 7.1 is an example of a PHL that can
be used to aid in the safety process.
To use the PHL tool, an in-depth understanding of the stage to be evaluated is neces-
sary. At the top of the form, the stage is selected (Planning, Staging, Launching, Flight,
or Recovery). Using this procedure helps to keep the various sheets from team members
organized in proper categories for ease of review. The next step is to list a tracking number
(1, 2, 3, etc.) and potential hazards seen in the selected stage. For example, in the Staging
phase, the list may include nearby terrain features (trees, power lines/poles, and antennas).
After listing the hazards, the probability and severity of each hazard must be determined.
In the probability column, Frequent, Probable, Occasional, Remote, or Improbable is
entered. These probability levels are listed and defined in MIL-STD-882D/E and in Table
7.1 (DOD 2000).
The next column is severity. In this column, the categories of Catastrophic, Critical,
Marginal, or Negligible are used. Like the probability levels, the severity categories and
definitions are also listed in MIL-STD-882D/E and in the Appendix. The last column
of the hazard list is the risk level (RL). This is the point at which an initial RL value is
established, based on the probability and severity that have been identified. For instance,
if it is determined that the probability of impacting a tree while launching the UAS/RPA
at a field that has trees nearby is Remote, and the severity is Critical, then using the risk
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Safety Assessments 155
PRELIMINARY HAZARD LIST/ANALYSIS (PHL/A)
DATE: PREPARED BY: Page OF
Operational Stage: Planning Staging Launch Flight Recovery
TRACK # HAZARD PROBABILITY SEVERITY RL MITIGATING ACTION RRL NOTES
RL = Risk Level, RRL = Residual Risk Level Probability, Severity, and Risk Levels defined in MIL-STD- 882D/E
FIGURE 7.1
Preliminary hazard list/analysis (PHL/A).
matrix in MIL-STD-882D/E, it can be determined that the risk RL for that hazard is a 10.
Note that the higher the number, the lower the risk. While developing a custom PHL/A, be
careful. Not all risk matrices are alike, and some will be organized so that a lower number
signifies a lower risk.
7.2.3 Preliminary Hazard Analysis

Once the initial RLs have been identified, it is time to move into the analysis phase and
look at ways to mitigate listed hazards. This is a fairly simple process that asks what can
be done to reduce or eliminate the hazard. When looking at mitigation, probability and
severity must be considered. To establish probability, ways to eliminate or reduce the pos-
sibility of occurrence are determined. This is better known as exposure. For example, the
field from which the operation will be conducted has trees at the approach and departure
end of the runway. In the Mitigating Action column, several potential solutions can be
listed. The first could be to relocate to another field with no trees, and the second possible
action could be to remove the trees. The third, and probably the most reasonable, would be
to establish or modify the launch and recovery procedures.
The next column is the residual risk level (RRL). This time the question is whether the
risk can be lowered by implementing these mitigating actions. Just as when the RL is
determined, probability and severity must be considered. It is possible that one or both
(probability and severity) may have changed, and a change in any one of these factors can
156
lower or increase the RL. Obviously, if the RL has increased, then that particular mitigating
action should not be implemented.
The last column is labeled as Notes. This is fairly self-explanatory. If there are any spe-
cial concerns or instructions needed for the implementation of the mitigating actions, they
should be listed in this column in some detail. Keep in mind that the completed PHL/A
worksheet is an initial hazard identification tool. Once the UAS activity is underway, an
operational hazard analysis should be performed to evaluate the hazards after the miti-
gating action has been applied. The main purpose for using the hazard analysis tool is
to provide the user with a systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and mitigating
hazards early in the UAS/RPA operational cycle.
7.2.4 Operational Hazard Review and Analysis

Just like the PHL/A tool is used to identify initial safety issues early on in the UAS/
RPA operation, the operational hazard review and analysis (OHR&A) is used to identify
and evaluate hazards throughout the entire operation and its stages (Planning, Staging,
Launching, Flight, and Recovery). This is a crucial part of the ongoing and continuous
evaluation of hazards and provides the feedback necessary to determine whether the miti-
gating actions employed have worked as expected.
Obviously, monitoring should continue for the hazards listed on the PHL/A, but there
may be other hazards that appear during the UAS/RPA operation/activity that were not
foreseen. Items that should always be considered during the OHR&A are human interface
with the equipment and operating systems, and crew resource management (CRM). This
can get complicated quickly, depending on the number of crew members and their specific
tasks. Both human factors and CRM will be covered in more depth in later chapters but
human factor issues and CRM must be continuously monitored.
The use of the OHR&A (Figure 7.2) tool is very similar to the PHL/A. The main diffe-
rence is the Action Review column. In this column, the identified mitigating actions
implemented from the PHL/A are listed and evaluated to see if they were adequate. If
the actions were not adequate and the hazard has not changed, the hazard is listed again.
If the actions have modified the hazard, then the modified hazard is listed. The rest of the
OHR&A tool works like the PHL/A. To keep things organized, it is suggested that separate
worksheets be used for hazard review and for the evaluation of new operational hazards.
It is also good practice for the tracking numbers on the OHR&A sheet to correspond with
the ones listed on the PHL/A. Doing this will help keep all the safety analysis and review
information organized. Just as before, the probability levels, severity categories, and risk
matrix are listed in MIL-STD-882D/E and in Table 7.1.
7.2.5 Change Analysis

The change analysis serves a crucial role in the ongoing review and analysis of safety. It
allows for review and examination of any changes that have been made to the operation.
For example, if there is a UAS/RPA system software change, like an upgrade for the UAS
computers or operating systems, it will be necessary to assess the changes and evaluate
how these changes affect the overall operation. Another example would be a procedural
change; if the launch procedure was modified to get the vehicle in the air faster, then an
assessment of the changes made would need to be completed. To assess the change, the
OHR&A worksheet is used. All hazards associated with the changes are listed in the Action
Review column and the worksheet is completed as described above.
157
OPERATIONAL HAZARD REVIEW & ANALYSIS (OHR&A)
DATE: PREPARED BY: Page OF
Operational Stage: Planning Staging Launch Flight Recovery
TRACK # ACTION REVIEW PROBABILITY SEVERITY RL MITIGATING ACTION RRL NOTES
RL = Risk Level, RRL = Residual Risk Level Probability, Severity, and Risk Levels defined in MIL-STD- 882D/E
FIGURE 7.2
Operational hazard review and analysis (OHR&A).
7.3 Risk Assessment

According to Maguire (2006), “Public perception of risk is the key to safety” (p. 47).
Indeed, in the unmanned aircraft world, the public perception of risk is the first key to
airspace integration and acceptance. The second key is privacy concerns. How these risks
are approached and managed is critical. One type of tool that has been used by mili-
tary, airlines, and some flight training schools is a basic risk assessment matrix. The risk
assessment tool in Figure 7.3 is a derivative of one that was developed for a flight training
program. Risk assessment can best be defined as the evaluation of common operational
hazards in terms of severity and probability.
7.3.1 Purpose
The risk assessment tool serves two purposes. First, it provides the UAS/RPA operator with
a quick look at the operation before committing to the flight activity (a go/no-go decision).
The second is that it provides the safety and management real-time information needed to
continually monitor the overall safety of the operation. This tool should be completed by
the UAS/RPA operator before each flight and briefed to the crew. The briefing should, at
the least, consist of a review of the risks, hazards, and concerns associated with the activity.
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sUAS RISK ASSESSMENT
Crew/Station: / /
/ /
Mission SUPPORT TRAINING PAYLOAD CHECK EXPERIMENTAL

type 1 2 3 4
Hardware NO YES
changes 1 4
Software NO YES
changes 1 4
Airspace Special use Class C Class D Class E, G
of operation 1 2 3 4
Has PIC flown YES NO
this type aircraft 1 4
Flight DAY NIGHT
condition 1 4
Visibility ≥10 MILES 6–9 MILES 3–5 MILES <3 MILES
1 2 3 4
Ceiling ≥10,000 3,000–4,900 1,000–2,900 <1,000
in feet AGL 1 2 3 4
Surface winds 0–10 KTS 11–15 KTS >15 KTS
2 3 4
Forecast winds 0–10 KTS 11–15 KTS >15 KTS
2 3 4
Weather NO YES
deteriorating 1 4
Mission altitude <1,000 1,000–2,900 ≥3,000
in feet AGL 2 3 4
Are all crew YES NO CURRENCY FLIGHT
members current 1 3 REQUIRED
Other range/ NO YES
airspace activity 1 4
Established lost YES NO
link procedures 1 NO FLIGHT
Observation Line of sight and chase Chase only Line of sight only
type 1 3 4
UAS GROUP I GROUP II GROUP III GROUP IV
grouping 1 2 3 4
Total
RISK LEVEL
20–30 31–40 41–50 51–64
LOW MEDIUM SERIOUS HIGH
Aircraft number: Aircraft type:
Flight released by: Date Time
FIGURE 7.3
Small UAS risk assessment.
159
This tool is meant to be an aid in the decision-making process and should not be the only
means used to make a go/no-go decision.
7.3.2 Development
The risk assessment tool shown in Figure 7.3 was designed for small UAS/RPA operations
and is meant to be an aid in the decision-making process. Each risk assessment tool should
be tailored for the specific operation it will assess. To get started, those involved directly
with the operation are assembled to discuss operational factors such as weather, crew
rest, and airspace, and consider the items listed on the PHL/A that would change in each
flight cycle.
Once the list is developed, the next step is to identify how each factor can change in
terms of probability and severity. At this point, a decision must be made about whether or
not to use a numerical ranking scale. If not, that is fine; but be aware that a nonnumerical
system may not provide an easy way to identify the overall total RL (low, moderate, ser-
ious, and high). Whichever method is chosen, it is recommended that some type of ranking
system be used. The one in Figure 7.3 is a numeric system with a total value scale listed at
the bottom of the sheet. Attached to each total value scale is a total RL category (low, mod-
erate, serious, and high). These categories, along with an example risk index, are listed in
MIL-STD-882D/E and in the Appendix. The numerical scale makes computer tracking and
monitoring of overall operational risk easier. The overall risk category aids in briefing team
members and gives them a meaningful RL for the operation.
Periodic review of the risk assessment tool is needed to determine the effectiveness of
the tool and to update it as necessary when some of the identified factors have changed
(Shappee 2006). This could be due to a platform change or because the operational factor
or hazard was eliminated. It is also a good idea to review the OHR&A and change analysis
to determine if any of the newly identified hazards need to be considered.
7.3.3 Use
To use the risk assessment form in Figure 7.3, start by listing the crew and their position
or station. Next, move to the matrix and start with the left-hand column where the first
operational factor, Mission Type, is located. Move right to reach the type of mission. The
choices listed are “Support,” which covers a broad range of activities like disaster response;
“Training,” which may include instruction for a new UAS/RPA operator; “Payload Check,”
which covers upgrades to a payload or new payloads; and “Experimental,” which would
involve a new vehicle or vehicle type, or a new UAS/RPA operation.
In the first row, if the mission is a training mission, the associated risk number is 2, which
should be entered in the far-right column. An experimental mission is 4, and other types of
missions have different risk numbers. Whichever mission type is chosen, the risk number
should be placed in the far-right column. Continue down the operational factors list in the
left column and move right to the associated RL that fits the planned flight, and place that
number in the far-right column. As can be seen, the farther right, the greater the associated
RL. Once the RL is determined for each operational factor, the numbers in the far-right
column are added to determine the total risk value.
Once the total risk value has been calculated, the MIL-STD-882D/E range (low, medium,
serious, and high) can be identified. For instance, a total value of 26 means that the risk is
low. Below the RLs, there are spaces for aircraft number, aircraft type, flight released by,
date, and time. All are self-explanatory except the “flight released by.” This space should
160
be reserved for someone with management authority, such as the Chief Pilot and Mission
Director. The idea behind this is to have management review each evaluated operational
factor and the total overall risk value, and sign for risk acceptance. Remember that this is
just a tool to help assess the risk and safety of the operation and should not be the only
means of determining a mission go or no-go.
In the matrix section, a few of the operational factors listed in the left column warrant
further explanation. Hardware changes are items such as wing sets and engines. Items like
operating system updates or new versions of software would fall under software changes.
Under the operational factor of airspace of operation, there is a category for special use.
A good example of special use would be for restricted areas or in an area with temporary
flight restrictions (TFRs). In the same row are Class C, D, E, and G airspaces. As the involve-
ment of air traffic control is decreased, the RL values increase. Currently, the two predom-
inant airspaces for civil UAS/RPA operations are restricted areas and E and G—providing
that the operation has some type of authorization or waiver such as a certificate of author-
ization (COA). When it comes to other range/airspace activities, there is a choice of yes
or no. The idea behind this operational factor is that if other aircraft are in the vicinity/
airspace or restricted area, they could constitute a hazard and should be considered. The
last item is UAS grouping. Detailed information on these groups can be found on the FAA
website. In general, these groupings address a variety of items, including weight limits,
speed limitations, and altitude restrictions.
7.4 Safety Evaluation

A major key to integrating UAS/RPV into the national airspace is its safety evaluation. The
FAA recognizes that UAS/RPV will need to meet an acceptable level of risk, but doing this
can be very challenging. The safety evaluations for UAS/RPV focus primarily on the loss
of controlled flight and its impact on people on the ground and in civilian airspace. This
section will examine several ways to aid in the evaluation process of operational safety.
Items that will be discussed will be risk assessments, flight tests, and airworthiness.
7.4.1 Risk Assessment

A System Safety Assessment (SSA) formalizes the aircraft risk assessment. It is composed
of two types of analyses: a failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA); and a
fault tree analysis (FTA). Formalizing the risk assessment provides structure to the analysis
to ensure that all safety related risks are addressed.
An FMECA is a systematic postulation of potential failure modes and an evaluation of
the effect they may have on safety critical functions of the aircraft. The FMECA is a sub-
jective assessment of the aircraft risks. The engineers developing the aircraft walk through
the components within each system and ask the question, “What happens to the system
when this component fails that way?” They use engineering judgment to assess how that
particular failure mode will affect the rest of the system. Special consideration is given to
component failures whose effects have a high level of criticality, such as loss of aircraft
control.
An FTA is a quantitative assessment of critical failure rate. Critical failure rate (λ) is the
inverse of the reliability number, mean time between critical failures (MTBCFs). The FTA
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is a Boolean logic tree that rolls all of the known failure modes and their rates into a single
aircraft reliability number. The known failure modes are derived from the FMECA. Clearly,
the lower the assessed aircraft reliability, the higher the risk assessment.
The component-level failure rates may be produced from actual field data, vendor data,
or commercially available failure rate tables. The best data come from similarly designed
parts operating in a similar environment. The further the usage environment deviates, the
less useful the data become. For example, the reliability data for a fielded component are
more accurate than data obtained in a laboratory environment that cannot easily simulate
all of the overlapping factors.
As stated earlier, the purpose of risk assessment is twofold. First, it provides the UAS/
RPA operator with a quick look at the operation before committing to the flight activity (a
go/no-go decision) and should be completed before every flight activity. Second, it allows
safety and management that means to review operational risks and continually monitor
the overall safety of the mission. It is this review and continuous monitoring, plus the
completed risk assessment tools that provide the needed data to show an acceptable level
of risk for the flight operation.
7.4.2 Flight Test Cards

Another key element of the safety evaluation is the flight test card. A flight test card is a
set of tasks or functions that the UAS/RPA vehicle and/or ground station must be able to
perform. These test cards are usually performed in some type of special use airspace, such
as a restricted area where an FAA authorization or waiver (i.e., COA) is not required. After
all, the whole purpose of the safety evaluation is to develop good safe practices and gain
the needed safety data for FAA authorization to fly in the national airspace.
The test card shown in Figure 7.4 is the final flight test card that should be completed
before the responsible organization will endorse the airworthiness certification.
When developing test cards for airworthiness, auto land, or payload specific tests, an
understanding of the equipment being used and its limitations is essential. Familiarity
with the FAA requirements for UAS/RPA operations is also required. If test cards are
developed properly, they are a great complement to risk assessment. These two tools go a
long way toward providing operational safety data for airworthiness certification.
7.4.3 Airworthiness Certification

The airworthiness authority grants an airworthiness-type certificate for the aircraft system.
To be able to “file and fly” within civilian airspace, an aircraft system must receive an
airworthiness- type certification from the civilian airworthiness authority. Military
applications require a separate airworthiness safety evaluation.
Each airworthiness authority uses its own airworthiness code, which is a collection of
requirements that the aircraft system must meet to be determined airworthy. In the United
States, the FAA is the civilian airworthiness authority. Small fixed wing aircraft fall under
the 14 CFR Part 23 airworthiness code. Large fixed wing aircraft must comply with 14 CFR
Part 25 airworthiness code. U.S. Military Aircraft are subject to MIL-HDBK-516 airworthi-
ness code. There are other airworthiness codes in use around the world, although there
is quite a bit of standardization across the different codes. Most airworthiness codes are
tailored to manned aircraft. With the advent of UAS/RPV, airworthiness authorities and
industry standards groups are creating new standards that address the unique attributes
of these aircraft (FAA 2009).
162
AIRWORTHINESS TEST CARD
ITEM STANDARDS/CONDITIONS EVAL
Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) Ops

Aircraft:
1 Develop and load flight plan
10
8
7
5&6
11
4 2&3 12
2 Take off (Auto) Comments

3 Hover test (Auto) ≤ ALT 50 ft AGL (+/− 10 ft)
4 Maximum climb rate Aircraft at Max Gross Wt.
5 Level off at assigned altitude (+/− 25 ft)
6 Maximum forward speed Level Flight
7 AVO Intervention Aircraft tracks to moved point
8 Holding Pattern/Hover Minimum two circuits (Pattern)
9 Last link
10 Re-establish link Continue flight plan
11 Descent rate ≤ 600 ft/min (50 ft in 5 Sec)
12 Landing (Auto) Designated location
II External Pilot (EP) OPs (if applicable)
13 Take off Comments

14 Hover/Landing pattern ≤ ALT 50 ft AGL (+/− 10 ft)
15 Landing
FIGURE 7.4
Airworthiness test card.
Standard aircraft airworthiness code is generally divided into seven major sections:
General; Flight Characteristics; Structure; Design and Construction; Powerplant Installation;
Equipment; and Operating Limitations and Information. Engines and propellers are cer-
tified separately from the aircraft. UAS/RPV differ from standard aircraft because of the
separation of the aircraft from the flight controls. Additional consideration is given to how
the aircraft responds to a lost link when the ground control station is no longer able to com-
municate with the aircraft.
The procedure for obtaining airworthiness approval is similar, regardless of the air-
worthiness authority. First, the aircraft manufacturer and the airworthiness authority agree
on the airworthiness code that will be the basis of certification and on which requirements
apply. For example, MIL-HDBK-516 covers both fixed wing and helicopter requirements
Second, the manufacturer and airworthiness authority agree on the means of compliance.
There are four basic means of compliance in rank of increasing significance: inspection,
analysis, demonstration, and test. Some airworthiness authorities break these categories
down even further. There are prescribed, acceptable means of compliance for many air-
worthiness requirements which the FAA provides in the aircraft circulars (AC). While
these are the generally accepted ways of showing compliance, the manufacturer may show
compliance with an alternate means with the airworthiness authority’s approval.
163
Third, the aircraft manufacturer develops the compliance artifacts in accordance with the
negotiated means of compliance. An internal airworthiness reviewer, familiar with gener-
ally accepted practices, reviews the artifacts prior to submission to the authority to help
ensure approval. The airworthiness authority may accept or reject the compliance artifacts
provided; but the aircraft manufacturer has the opportunity to readdress the rejected
artifacts. Finally, once the airworthiness authority is satisfied, airworthiness approval is
granted and the aircraft is certified.
Changes to the aircraft after certification require airworthiness reassessment. These
modifications may be design improvements, vendor changes, or even changes in the
manufacturing plant where a component is made. Even a simple change may introduce
unforeseen interactions that adversely affect the overall aircraft airworthiness. Only those
portions of airworthiness code affected by the change are readdressed.
Continuing airworthiness is a set of instructions used to maintain an aircraft in safe
working condition throughout its life. Before an aircraft can obtain an airworthiness certi-
fication, the aircraft must have certain Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information
(MCAI) that includes maintenance manuals, replacement intervals for life limited parts,
inspection procedures, requirements for modification of the aircraft, and requirements for
amending the operating limitations and procedures. The aircraft operator is required to
follow the MCAI to maintain the aircraft airworthiness.
7.5 Accident Investigation Considerations

One subject about which there is very little information available is UAS/RPA accident
investigation. Although many of the tools and techniques traditionally used in the manned
aircraft-type investigations will work in unmanned, there are some unique differences.
Table 7.1 provides some insight into how the military categorizes risk and accident severity.
7.5.1 Software and Hardware

Most of us are fairly familiar with how to operate the programs that are installed on our
home computers or laptops. But are we really familiar with the software? Do we really
know all the features of the programs that we use? Unless you are a computer guru, the
answer is probably no. When it comes to software many safety professionals, especially
those who specialize in system safety, know that incompatible software can cause serious
problems. Stephans (2004, p. 53) states, “A software specification error, design flaw, or
the lack of generic safety critical requirement can contribute to or cause a system failure
or erroneous human decision.” When it comes to investigating UAS/RPA accidents, it is
important to take a close look at the software. Someone who is very familiar with the spe-
cific operating system, such as the software engineer or a programmer, will need to do this.
Like software, hardware is a critical area in accident investigation. The hardware
components can be divided into two different categories. First is the hardware config-
uration of components such as transmitters, backup power supplies, and antenna. The
question should be asked: “Have all components been connected and physically checked
for proper configuration?” The second category, and the one that could be the most prob-
lematic, is the interface between the hardware and software. The question for this compo-
nent is “Are the hardware and software compatible?” Again, someone who is very familiar
164
TABLE 7.1
Excerpts from MIL-STD-882D/E
Example Mishap Probability Levels
Description1 Level Specific Individual Item Fleet or Inventory2
Frequent A Likely to occur often in the life Continuously experienced

of an item, with a probability of
occurrence greater than 10−1 in
that life
Probable B Likely to occur several times Will occur frequently
in the life of an item, with a
probability of occurrence less
than 10−1 but greater than 10−2 in
that life
Occasional C Possible to occur sometime in the Will occur several times
life of an item, with a probability
of occurrence less than 10−2 but
greater than 10−3 in that life
Remote D Unlikely but possible to occur Unlikely, but can reasonably be
in the life of an item, with a expected to occur
probability of occurrence less
than 10−3 but greater than 10−6 in
that life
Improbable E So unlikely, it can be assumed Unlikely to occur, but possible
occurrence may not be
experienced, with a probability
of occurrence less than 10−6 in
that life
Example Mishap Severity Categories
Description Category Environmental, Safety, and Health Result Criteria
Catastrophic I Could result in death, permanent total disability, loss exceeding $1M,
or irreversible severe environmental damage that violates law or
regulation
Critical II Could result in permanent partial disability, injuries, or occupational
illness that may result in hospitalization of at least three personnel,
loss exceeding $200 K but less than $1 M, or reversible environmental
damage causing a violation of law or regulation
Marginal III Could result in injury or occupational illness resulting in one or
more lost work days(s), loss exceeding $20 K but less than $200 K,
or mitigable environmental damage without violation of law or
regulation where restoration activities can be accomplished
Negligible IV Could result in injury or illness not resulting in a lost work day,
loss exceeding $2 K but less than $10 K, or minimal environmental
damage not violating law or regulation
Example Mishap Risk Assessment Matrix (MRAM)

Severity Probability Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible
Frequent 1 3 7 13
Probable 2 5 9 16
Occasional 4 6 11 18
Remote 8 10 14 19
Improbable 12 15 17 20
Designed out 21 22 23 24
1 Definitions of descriptive words may have to be modified based on the quantity of items involved.
2 The expected size of the fleet or inventory should be defined prior to accomplishing an assessment of the
system.
165
with the specific operating software and components will be needed to evaluate these
categories.
It is an advantage to have someone with these special skills in this area on the team
responsible for conducting UAS/RPA accident investigations. Another benefit to having
members who are very familiar with the software and hardware of the system is that most
of the UAS/RPA systems record flight and operational data. With the expertise of these
individuals, data can be extracted and interpolated from the flight. The type of information
that is extracted is similar to the information that is retrieved from a flight data recorder.
They can also help simulate a reconstruction of the entire flight.
7.5.2 Human Factors

Although the effect of human factors is covered in another chapter, it warrants a special
note. This section includes information about several areas to consider during an investi-
gation. The first is crew coordination. Many UAS/RPA operations have just the pilot and
copilot, who in many cases are also the payload operators to manage the mission. If the
system is not equipped with auto land or takeoff system, an external pilot with a control
box (RC remote) must be added to the crew and there may be an observer or a chase plane
with a pilot. Every added person adds another level of complexity to crew coordination.
System complexity, or user-friendliness, is another issue to consider. Many of the oper-
ating systems and associated software were designed by computer engineers with no avi-
ation experience. What is simple for them may not be simple for the nonexpert, and may
not flow well into a checklist for the UAS/RPA operator. A system that is not designed with
human factors in mind could cause a high increase in operator error. This error can occur
at any step from mission planning and programming, to an in-flight situation where time
is critical (i.e., making a quick decision to avoid a collision or other disaster).
7.5.3 Suggestions
If tasked with investigating a UAS/RPA accident, here are several suggestions that might
help. First, do not try to tackle the investigation alone. Experts who are familiar with the
field will be needed to help acquire and analyze the information. Second, have a plan to
get organized and know the major areas of the investigation. One tool that may help is the
investigation roster, as shown in Figure 7.5. This roster lists the major areas of focus on an
investigation, and provides space to assign team members to specific tasks.
7.6 Conclusion and Recommendations

The information provided in this chapter is a good starting point for UAS/RPA safety
and safety evaluations. The tools discussed in this chapter are tools that the author has
developed over the past several years and has used during the evaluation of UAS/RPAs
that have been flown and have obtained COAs. As the world of RPA grows, so will the
need for safety. Those who are interested in broadening their knowledge of safety and
jumping into this field with both feet may benefit from several suggestions. First, take
some safety courses in the areas of safety management, system safety, and safety manage-
ment systems. These courses are invaluable when developing safety tools and evaluating
166
sUAS INVESTIGATION ROSTER
llC Case # Start Date
Section chair
Operations
Pilot/maintenance
Safety assessments
Human factors
Software/Hardware
ATC (if applicable)
Weather/Airfield
Structures/Perf
Witnesses
Other
FIGURE 7.5
Investigation roster.
the safety of operations. Second, spend some time reviewing the references listed for this
chapter.
7.1 List and discuss each of the UAS/RPA operational phases.
7.2 Define probability and severity.
7.3 Discuss the differences between the PHL/A and the OHR&A.
7.4 What are the two purposes of the risk assessment?
7.5 What is the purpose of the safety evaluation?
7.6 Discuss some of the differences between manned and unmanned accident
investigations.
References
DOD. 2000. MIL-STD-882D Standard practice for system safety.
167
FAA. 2009. Small unmanned aircraft systems aviation rulemaking committee. Comprehensive set of
recommendations for sUAS regulatory development.
Maguire, R. 2006. Safety Cases and Safety Reports. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub Co.
Shappee, E. 2006, March. Grading the go. Mentor, 8(3), 12.
Stephans, R. 2004. System Safety for the 21st Century. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-IEEE.
168
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8
Export Control and ITAR
Eric McClafferty and Rose Mooney
8.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

8.2 Glossary of Terms for Export Control Understanding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
8.3 The Sources of Export Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
8.4 What Is Export Control? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
8.5 Where Do Export Controls Come From? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
8.5.1 Export Control Reform Act and UAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
8.6 Export Administration Regulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8.6.1 Commerce Control List (CCL). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8.6.2 Missile Technology Control Regime Annex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
8.7 International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.8 How Do Export Control Issues Come Up in Real Life?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.9 How to Protect Export-Controlled Products and Information (“Know How”)? . . . 186
8.10 What Are Export Control Violations?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
8.11 How Do We Perform Work Outside of the United States?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
8.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on U.S. export control regulations relating to unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS), components of UAS, launch systems, payloads, and related equipment.
Export controls regulate the movement of many physical goods associated with UAS from
the United States to other countries, and they also cover releases of software and “know
how” outside the United States that occur through a variety of mechanisms, including
emails, phone calls, and the use of shared databases. Surprisingly to some, the rules cover
releases of certain information to non-U.S. persons completely inside the United States.
The regulations also apply to U.S. person activities worldwide, such as when a U.S. citizen
travels to another country.
Violations of these rules undermine U.S. national security (NS). Violations can also lead
to criminal penalties, including jail time in some circumstances, to high dollar civil pen-
alties, denial of export privileges, and a prohibition on selling to the government, not to
mention reputational damage. Moreover, while U.S. export controls are enforced much
more energetically than other countries’ programs, because most of the controls discussed
in this chapter originate in international agreements, many countries have the same basic
rules in place.
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170
U.S. export controls require specific U.S. government export licenses for many exports of
commercial and virtually all military UASs and certain vehicle control software. Specific,
case-by-case export approvals are also required for releases outside the United States and
inside the United States of a good deal of “know how” to non-U.S. persons, especially
of information related to product development. This chapter will provide you with an
understanding of the basic rules regarding export controls on military and commercial
UASs, and it will familiarize you with the two principal U.S. government agencies that
administer those rules. We will review the real-world consequences of not complying with
the rules, and describe how to develop a system to help avoid violations.
Export controls and economic sanctions have been around for thousands of years, such
as when the city of Athens refused to trade with Megara in 432 b.c.1 U.S. history is full of
examples of export controls and embargoes. For example, on October 20, 1774, during the
first meeting of Congress in Philadelphia, the adopted Articles of Association stated that
if Britain’s Intolerable Acts were not repealed, the United States would boycott British
products, and plans were also outlined for an embargo on exports to England.2 In 1917,
Congress passed the Trading With the Enemy Act, which was designed to restrict certain
types of exports and activities during World War I. Certain parts of this law are still in
effect.3 The Export Control Act of 1940 was passed to address concerns that led to World
War II, and it was amended over time.4
More recently, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA) created additional authority
to control the import and export of defense articles and defense services, which includes
certain types of unmanned vehicles.5 Executive Order 11958 delegated the administra-
tion of the AECA to the U.S. Department of State, and its Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls (DDTC) works closely with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other
government agencies to establish policies, issue licenses, and agreements, and enforce the
regulations, as described in more detail below.6 The AECA, which is implemented in the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) at 22 C.F.R. § 120–130, requires overseas
parties that receive defense articles from the United States to use them for legitimate self-
defense and not transfer those articles without permission from the U.S. government. The
U.S. State Department’s export licensing decisions under the ITAR must consider whether
the proposed shipments would help trigger an arms race, contribute to the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, support terrorism, increase armed conflict, or under-
mine arms control and nonproliferation agreements, among other goals. These statues and
regulations are the basis for controls on military UAS and associated items.
Nonmilitary export controls on “dual-use” items (commercial items that could also be
used for a military, terrorist, or weapons proliferation purpose) are administered principally
by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), principally
under the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) of 2018.7 BIS uses the Export Administration
Regulations8 (the EAR [properly pronounced “E” “A” “R”, not the thing you use to hear])
to administer dual-use exports, including exports of certain UASs, software, know how,
and numerous payloads, among other items. The dual-use controls emphasize protecting
NS, while also trying to ensure that legitimate commercial activity is allowed to proceed
without undue disruption. We will see that this is quite challenging because the level of
export controls on dual-use UAS is higher than you might expect, and as a result, many
exports of commercial systems require formal export licenses issued by BIS for shipments
to specific customers for approved end uses.
Please remember that this chapter is an overview regarding this complex topic that
should be treated as an introduction and not an endpoint. Export control rules are varied
and detailed, so the specifics of any “real-world” activity that has any international twist to
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Export Control and ITAR 171
it need to be evaluated carefully under the applicable rules to be sure you and the people
you are working, researching, and studying with do not violate the law. In addition, export
control laws are dynamic and are revised regularly, so the regulations cited in this book
need to be checked for continued applicability.
8.2 Glossary of Terms for Export Control Understanding

The technical definitions of the following terms, which can be lengthy and complex, can
differ between the ITAR and the EAR. To fully understand the meaning of the terms
described informally below, you must consult the specific language of either the ITAR or the
EAR regulatory definition (depending on whether you are shipping a military or a com-
mercial/dual-use item).9 We provide the following informal glossary to help you get at the
heart of how to think about key terms in the special world of export regulation.
Export –Think about a product, software, or know how (e.g., a drawing, an email with
instructions on how to make something) crossing the U.S. border on its way to another
country. That is a classic export and it can occur with the shipment of a product on a boat
or for know how, it can occur via an email, or in many other ways. Another type of export
occurs when a person or organization in the United States releases know how to a non-
U.S. person inside the United States That is “deemed” to be an export of that know how
to that person’s home country, since they are assumed to actually or potentially take that
know how back to their country or send it there.
Export license or agreement –Virtually, all-military items controlled by the ITAR require
an export license from the Department of State for shipment outside the United States.
Many exports of commercial/dual-use UAS require export licenses from the Department
of Commerce under the EAR. Exports of military know how, whether outside the United
States or to a non-U.S. person in the United States, can require individual export licenses or
Technical Assistance Agreements (TAA). Sharing commercial/dual-use technology subject
to the EAR, can also require export license approval. Also, in limited circumstances, certain
license exceptions are available from commerce or state.
Import – Think about a military item that comes permanently from another country
across the U.S. border into the United States. We will not focus on these imported items in
this chapter, but it is important to know that these items are also controlled. The Department
of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (sometimes known as
ATF) regulates the import of certain military items under its own regulations.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) –An informal multilateral agreement
among 35 countries seeks to limit the export and proliferation of missiles, software, and
technology. Some UAS fit into the MTCR definition of missiles and so are covered by these
rules. The MTCR guidelines express an export policy that is applied to a list of items,
the MTCR Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex. The Annex is has two parts –
Category I and Category II, and it also addresses certain end use controls.
“Category I items include complete rocket and unmanned aerial vehicle systems
(including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missiles,
target drones, and reconnaissance drones), capable of delivering a payload of at
least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km, their major complete subsystems (such as
rocket stages, engines, guidance sets, and re-entry vehicles), and related software and
172
technology, as well as specially designed production facilities for these items. Pursuant
to the MTCR Guidelines, exports of Category I items are subject to an unconditional
strong presumption of denial regardless of the purpose of the export and are licensed for
export only on rare occasions. Additionally, exports of production facilities for Category
I items are prohibited absolutely.”10
“Category II items include other less- sensitive and dual- use missile related
components, as well as other complete missile systems capable of a range of at least 300
km, regardless of payload. Their export is subject to licensing requirements taking into
consideration the non-proliferation factors specified in the MTCR Guidelines. Exports
judged by the exporting country to be intended for use in WMD delivery are to be
subjected to a strong presumption of denial.”11
Products –Think about a physical object, such as an entire UAS, or an imaging system that
will become part of the payload for a UAS. Certain cameras and imaging systems are con-
trolled under the ITAR. Others are principally designed for commercial end uses, but they
may be sophisticated and potentially useful for military or terrorist end uses. If these com-
mercial/dual-use items meet specific control criteria listed in the Commerce Department’s
EAR, they may require a license for shipment to certain countries.
Software –Software can be controlled for export on its own or while integrated with a
physical product. Software that contains encryption functionality, as so much does these
days, is subject to export control.
Re-export – Think about a U.S.-made product that is shipped from the United States
under an export license naming ABCD Company in Germany as the end user. After the
product has been used by ABCD Company for six months, the president of the company
sells the product and ships it to EFGH Company in South Africa. This U.S. product has
been re-exported from Germany to South Africa. U.S. export control laws are different
from most other country’s laws because that second shipment is generally still controlled
by U.S. licensing authorities and it may require a U.S. re-export license.
Technical Assistance Agreement (TAA) –This is an agreement between a university,
company or individual, and the U.S. government (specifically the U.S. Department of
State, DDTC) about what military know how (technical data) may be shared with non-
U.S. entities or persons as part of a project. Note that the Department of State also issues
technology export licenses that are typically more specific than the broader project-based
subject matter typically covered by a TAA.
Technology (EAR) or Technical Data (ITAR) –Think about “know how” that is required
to develop, produce or, sometimes, even use an export-controlled item. Sending one
export-controlled item outside the United States without a license can create a serious vio-
lation of the law, but what about exporting the know how required to produce thousands
of those items? Enforcement agencies are very worried about exports of controlled know
how, which can occur in so many forms these days –in computer files, email attachments,
phone conversations, and in many other forms.
Transfer –Think about that product that went from the United States to ABCD Company
in Germany. Instead of sending it to South Africa, what if the president sold it to GHIJ
Company in another town in Germany? That would be a transfer. Such transfers can also
be controlled under U.S. export control rules.
Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) –The Commerce Department’s regulation on commer-
cial/dual-use items (15 C.F.R. Part 772) defines a UAV as “any ‘aircraft’ capable of initi-
ating flight and sustaining controlled flight and navigation without any human presence
on board.”
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In addition, according to section 744.3 of the EAR, unmanned air vehicles, which are
the same as “unmanned aerial vehicles,” include, but are not limited to, cruise missile
systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones.12
8.3 The Sources of Export Controls

While the United States has certain U.S.-only, unilateral export controls, many of the items
controlled for export from the United States are also controlled for export by our allies
and by other countries. In resolution 1540 (2004), the United Nations Security Council
decided that member states should not provide support to nonstate actors attempting to
use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular
for terrorist purposes.13 The resolution requires UN member countries to adopt and
enforce appropriate export control laws.14 Other multilateral agreements with U.S. allies,
including the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement,15 both of which address UASs,
establish an international framework for a common set of export controls that are then
expressed in each member country’s legislation and regulations. Many people assume
incorrectly that the United States stands alone in implementing export controls and
placing the burden of complying with these complex regulations on its citizens and com-
panies. But this is not accurate. As demonstrated by the 35 countries that implement
MTCR controls and the 41 that implement the Wassenaar Arrangement controls on UAS,
many countries have rules very similar to those in the United States, including the spe-
cific rules that apply to UAS.
8.4 What Is Export Control?

Export control is a key method that the U.S. government uses to protect sensitive
equipment, software, and technology. This is done to promote U.S. foreign policy and NS
interests in cooperation with certain other countries by regulating manufacturing, sales,
and distribution of these items. Specifically, export controls regulate the transfer, shipment,
or movement of defense articles, including data, outside of the United States. In 22 C.F.R.
§ 120.17, for example, ITAR defines export as:
Sending or taking a defense article out of the United States in any manner, including
data on a device or carried, except by mere travel outside of the United States by a
person whose knowledge includes technical data; or
Transferring registration, control or ownership to a foreign person of any aircraft,
vessel, or satellite covered by the U.S. Munitions List (USML), whether in the
United States or abroad; or
Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring in the United States
any defense article to an embassy, any agency or subdivision of a foreign govern-
ment (e.g., diplomatic missions); or
Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring technical data to a for-
eign person, whether in the United States or abroad; or
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Performing a defense service on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a foreign person,
whether in the United States or abroad.16 (As discussed, the ITAR definition is a bit
different from the EAR definition.)
Do not forget that data are exported when you carry a laptop, smartphone, and any other
electronic device that has export-controlled data stored in it. You might need an export
license to export that data or device, or you might be able to use a license exception to carry
the item with you on overseas travel.
Traditionally, there has been an unconditional strong presumption of denial (Category
I) or a presumption of denial (Category II) for license applications for most military UAS,
in line with multilateral obligations under the MTCR (see the section on MTCR in the
glossary above). That policy was loosened somewhat in February 2015, when the U.S. State
Department opened the door to allow additional exports of these items to certain allies
under specified conditions. The new policy was implemented to provide enhanced “oper-
ational capabilities and capacity of trusted partner nations, increasing U.S. interoperability
with these partners for coalition operations, ensuring responsible use of these system, and
easing the stress of U.S. force structure for these capabilities.”17 In addition, the new policy
is designed to align with developments in the UAS industry, such as wider availability
of systems and the emerging commercial UAS market. This will be discussed further in
the following sections. The U.S. government has examined further loosening of military
unmanned vehicle exports to U.S. allies to expand opportunities for overseas military
sales by the United States and to blunt development and sales by foreign competitors of
U.S. defense contractors. In support of that effort, on May 21, 2019, the State Department
released a fact sheet on the U.S. Policy on the Export of UAS, which outlines five primary
objectives to UAS transfers as follows: Increase trade opportunities for U.S. companies, bol-
ster partner security and counterterrorism capabilities, strengthen bilateral relationships,
preserve U.S. military advantage, and prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion delivery systems.18
If you wish to export a UAS that qualifies as a defense article, or share know how
relating to how to develop or produce that article, you must get an ITAR license or a
special agreement from DDTC. DDTC has been delegated ultimate authority to decide
what items it controls under the ITAR and which are under BIS jurisdiction. Exporters are
still permitted to self-classify their products as ITAR or EAR items so long as they do so
strictly in line with the control language in the regulations. But they can also seek written
guidance from DDTC in the form of a Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) if they wish. This is
done through the State Department website using the DS-4076 CJ Determination form.
When filing: describe the product, why it should or should not be classified as a defense
article, and provide evidence to support your assertions as to why it is within or outside
the legal requirements of the USML. So, if someone it not sure whether to classify their
UAS as a military or dual-use item, they can ask DDTC for a written answer in a CJ appli-
cation. The determination provided can be relied on by the applicant and can be used
as a proof of the government-approved classification with potential customers, vendors,
suppliers, and others.
Because both the ITAR and the EAR are “strict liability” regimes, exporters are respon-
sible for getting their classifications right. If they misclassify their products and ship
without a required export license, they can be subject to substantial penalties, whether
they knew exactly what the rules were or not. If an item is not under ITAR jurisdiction,
that almost always means that it is a dual-use item and BIS, after consulting with other
175
FIGURE 8.1
Export control agency responsibility.
U.S. government agencies, is responsible for issuing export licenses and enforcing the rules
related to those shipments.
As shown in Figure 8.1, in addition to the state (DDTC) and commerce (BIS) controls
on exports, the United States implements certain very strict trade embargoes and eco-
nomic sanctions, which are also part of the U.S. export control regime. For example, with
very narrow exceptions for certain informational materials (e.g., a newsletter) and certain
humanitarian items such as food, medicine, and medical equipment, U.S. persons cannot
conduct financial transactions or made exports to Cuba, the Crimea region, Iran, North
Korea, or Syria without an export license from the Department of Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Those licenses are very difficult, or impossible, to obtain.
Exports of military items are administered by the U.S. Department of State, which
works closely with the Department of Defense to administer export controls on mili-
tary UAS’s through the ITAR (22 C.F.R. 120 et seq.), which implements U.S. controls and
international controls like those in the MTCR. Exports of commercial/dual-use UAS’s
176
and associated items are administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce through
the EAR (15 C.F.R. 730 et seq.), which again implements U.S. and international controls
on commercial/dual-use items included in the MCTR and the international Wassenaar
Arrangement. Licensing is determined at both agencies by the characteristics of the UAS
and its function, who is receiving the item, and what they intend to do with it, among
other factors. Both agencies also have lists of countries, companies, and individuals that
are prohibited or severely restricted from obtaining products and know how from the
United States. In summary, commercial/dual-use items are regulated through EAR and
its classification system called the Commerce Control List (CCL). Defense-related articles
and services are regulated through ITAR and its classification system called the United
States Munitions List (USML).
8.5 Where Do Export Controls Come From?

A multitude of complicated, interwoven statutes, executive orders, and regulations
establishes the U.S. export control system. The AECA mentioned above is important
because it establishes the framework for exports of military items and it is the foundation
for the ITAR. On August 13, 2018, the relatively new ECRA replaced the old foundation
for the dual-use controls found in the Commerce Department’s EAR covering dual-use
products and know how. The Missile Technology Controls Policy (50 U.S.C. app. 2402
(note)) is also relevant to UAS exports, as are a number of other statutes. Fortunately,
for those who have to deal with the alphabet soup of statutes passed by Congress, with
provisions spread out in a variety of laws passed at different times, the key export control
agencies, State and Commerce, each administer regulations that implement most of the
statutes. Not surprisingly, given the involved legal background, the EAR and the ITAR are
complicated. The next section breaks down some key components of the EAR and ITAR as
they relate to UAS.
8.5.1 Export Control Reform Act and UAS

Export controls are complex and there have long been calls to simplify the system to make
it easier for exporters. The Obama administration took several steps to move products
from ITAR control to Commerce control, which eased the burden on exporters. Commerce
implemented certain steps to relax exports of these former USML items, including
implementing a new license exception to permit exports to allies. One goal of reform
was to get a new statute on the books to implement the Commerce Department dual-use
export controls more directly, since they had been kept in force with a patched-up system
involving an expired statute and the use of Executive Orders and a statute designed to
address international emergencies. On August 13, 2018, the ECRA was put in place. This
Act codified BIS policies without requiring major changes to the EAR. The Act requires
the BIS to take the lead in reviewing and updating export control policies and deter-
minations for new and emerging technologies, including UAS.19 Commerce has recently
been active issuing guidance for forthcoming controls on both foundational and emerging
technologies.
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8.6 Export Administration Regulations

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the EAR were developed to implement the Export
Administration Act of 1979, which deals with controls on commercial/dual use items. The
Unites States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) administers
the EAR to control certain exports, reexports, certain U.S. person activities, and end uses
for items exported from the U.S. If an item is not controlled as military under the ITAR, it
likely is subject to the jurisdiction of the EAR. The EAR are hundreds of pages long, but for
our limited purposes here we will focus just on a few sections that directly affect UAS. As
described below, anyone who wants to export commercial/dual use products, software or
know how from the U.S. needs to know what parts of the EAR affect their activities.
The EAR consists of a list of controlled items that are assembled on the CCL,20 a country
chart that shows where CCL listed controlled items can be shipped,21 a set of general pro-
hibitions that indicate what exporters cannot do,22 prohibitions on certain activities by
U.S. persons,23 end use restrictions that apply to all items subject to the regulations, and a
variety of other instructions. Not all parts of the EAR can be explained, or even referenced,
in this short chapter. We will focus on some of the CCL categories that cover UAS, UAS
software, and UAS technology and some of the other EAR controls. Other issues are neces-
sarily left for the reader to research.
8.6.1 Commerce Control List (CCL)

The CCL is a classification system used to identify commercial items that are controlled
for export as dual use items under the EAR. It is divided up into 10 sections, the most
relevant of which for UAS’s are category 9 (Aerospace and Propulsion), 7 (Navigation
and Avionics), 6 (Sensors and Lasers) 5 (Telecommunications and Information Security),
4 (Computers), 3 (Electronics), 2 (Processing Equipment), and 1 (Materials –e.g. com-
posite materials). Other categories also come into play from time to time. Within the
CCL are entries called Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCN), which provide
technical control criteria. If a product, software, or technology meets the control criteria
in an ECCN, it is controlled for export under that ECCN category. If an ECCN applies,
the question then becomes what is the reason for export control assigned by the ECCN?
Certain reasons for control create licensing requirements for certain countries. Knowing
how a product is classified –Is it an ITAR item or a CCL item? What ITAR or CCL cat-
egory does it fit into? –is absolutely critical for export control purposes. Without that
information, you simply don’t know how to behave. If you don’t know the ECCN of
a dual use item, you don’t know if you need an export license to send that product to
Country A or not. And you don’t know if you need a license to release information to
an engineer from Country Y who is in the U.S. on a work visa. Even product discussions
beyond what is available as public knowledge may require an export license.
CCL categories are broken up into five sections that contain ECCNs with different numbers.
The “product” sections are A (systems, equipment, and components), B (test, inspection,
and production equipment), and C (material). Section D covers software and E covers tech-
nology (know how). Within each of these sections are the ECCNs.
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As an example, here is an edited, simplified version of the principal ECCN for unmanned
aircraft on the CCL (there are many other relevant ECCNs, but this one is particularly
important to understand). Because so much of this entry has been removed to help readers
understand it more easily, it is important to review the full entry for any “real life” issues:
ECCN 9A012 Non-military “UAVs,” unmanned “airships”, related equipment, and

“components”, as follows:
Reasons for control: national security (NS), missile technology (MT), and
antiterrorism (AT). NS and MT are two of the highest levels of control under the EAR.
MT controls apply to nonmilitary UAVs and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) that are
capable of a maximum range of at least 300 km.
a. “UAVs” or unmanned “airships,” designed to have controlled flight out of

the direct “natural vision” of the “operator” and having any of the following:
a.1. Having all of the following:
a.1.a. A maximum “endurance” greater than or equal to 30 minutes but
less than 1 hour; and
a.1.b. Designed to take-off and have stable controlled flight in wind
gusts equal to or exceeding 46.3 km/h (25 knots); or
a.2. A maximum “endurance” of 1 hour or greater;
Technical Notes: 1. For the purposes of 9A012.a, “operator” is a person
who initiates or commands the “UAV” or unmanned “airship” flight.
2. For the purposes of 9A012.a, “endurance” is to be calculated for ISA
conditions (ISO 2533:1975) at sea level in zero wind. 3. For the purposes
of 9A012.a, “natural vision” means unaided human sight, with or
without corrective lenses.
b. Related systems, equipment and “components”, as follows:
b.1. Equipment “specially designed” for remotely controlling the “UAVs”
or unmanned airships”, controlled by 9A012a.
b.2. Systems for navigation, attitude, fuidance or control, other than those
controlled in Category 7,”specially designed” to provide autono-
mous flight control or navigation capability to “UAVs” or unmanned
“airships”, controlled by 9A012.a.
In order to determine if a UAS you are considering exporting needs a license, first you
need to be sure that it is not controlled by the ITAR, then you need to determine if it meets
the criteria described in one of the 9A012 subcategories (or another ECCN category). If it
does, then you need to determine the “reason for control,” listed in the ECCN. As indicated
above, in ECCN 9A012, two of the listed reasons for control are NS1 (for national security
column 1) and MT1 (a MTCR control). Once you determine the reason for control that
applies to the items qualifying for classification under 9A012, you take that reason for con-
trol to the Commerce Country Chart found in the EAR and see if a license is required for
that reason for control for the country you would like to ship the product to. See Figure 8.2.
For example, say we wanted to ship an ECCN 9A012 UAS to Algeria. You see in the
figure below, which is a part of the Commerce Country Chart that comes from Supplement
1 to Part 738 of the EAR and that there is an “X” in the NS1 box and the MT1 box after
Algeria. That means the NS1 and MT1-controlled UAS needs a Commerce Department
license before it can be shipped to Algeria (see Table 8.1).
Before you apply for a license, however, it is smart to search for a license exception in
the EAR (none are listed as available in the ECCN category itself, but you can also look
179
FIGURE 8.2
Export control flowchart.
in part 740 of the EAR for others). Almost no license exceptions are available for UASs,
however. If a license is required and no license exception is available, then you must apply
for a Commerce Department export license. There is no government fee for the applica-
tion process. Organizations may not, repeat not, ship the UAS without a required export
license. Doing so could subject the organization or individuals who are involved to crim-
inal charges and other severe penalties.
In addition to ECCN 9A012, certain UAS that come with or are designed for certain
aerosol dispensing systems are controlled in ECCN 9A120. In addition, 9B010 controls
“Equipment “specially designed” for the production of “UAVs” and associated systems,
equipment, and “components,” controlled by 9A012.”24 UAS component and payload
controls are spread throughout the CCL, such those that control guidance systems, com-
posite materials, controllers for motors and other components, cameras, lasers, sensors,
etc. One also finds cross references in the EAR-to ITAR-controlled items, such as those
in ECCN 9A115, which controls “apparatus, devices and vehicles, designed or modified
for the transport, handling, control, activation and launching of rockets, missiles, and
newgenrtpdf
180
180
TABLE 8.1
CCL Overview and Country Chart
Commerce Country Chart Reason for Control
Chemical and Nuclear Regional Firearms
biological weapons nonproliferation National security Missile tech stability convention Crime control Antiterrorism
Countries CB 1 CB 2 CB 3 NP 1 NP 2 NS 1 NS 2 MT 1 RS 1 RS 2 FC 1 CC 1 CC 2 CC 3 AT 1 AT 2
Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Afghanistan x x x x x x x x x x x
Albania2,3 x x x x x x x
Algeria x x x x x x x x x x
181
unmanned aerial vehicles capable of achieving a ‘range’ equal to or greater than 300 km.
(These items are ‘subject to the ITAR.’ See 22 CFR parts 120 through 130.)” In short, you
need to review the ITAR’s USML and the EAR’s CCL before exporting items to determine
if you need a license or not.
Also, as part of the export reform process introduced by state and commerce over the
last few years, several parts and components of UAS have been moved from the ITAR
to the EAR, including, but not limited to the following items that fall under the newly
created 9A610:
t. Composite structures, laminates and manufactures thereof “specially designed” for

unmanned aerial vehicles controlled under USML Category VIII (a) with a range equal
to or greater than 300 km.
u. Apparatus and devices “specially designed” for the handling, control, activation
and non-ship-based launching of UAVs or drones controlled by either USML paragraph
VIII (a) or ECCN 9A610.a, and capable of a range equal to or greater than 300 km.
v. Radar altimeters designed or modified for use in UAVs or drones controlled by
either USML paragraph VIII (a) or ECCN 9A610.a. and capable of delivering at least 500
kilograms payload to a range of at least 300 km.25
w. Hydraulic, mechanical, electro-optical, or electromechanical flight control systems
(including fly-by-wire systems) and attitude control equipment designed or modified
for UAVs or drones controlled by either USML paragraph VIII (a) or ECCN 9A610.a. and
capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms payload to a range of at least 300 km.
In addition, a variety of complex control provisions exist in ECCNs 9D and 9E for soft-
ware associated with MTCR-controlled UAS and for 9A012-controlled UAS. For example,
9D004.e controls “software” “specially designed” or modified for the operation of “UAVs”
and associated systems, equipment, and “components,” controlled by 9A012.26 It is there-
fore vitally important that software and know how related to UAS also be classified care-
fully under either the ITAR or the EAR and that a full licensing analysis be conducted
before any exports occur across U.S. borders or before software or know how are released
to non-U.S. persons in the United States.
The point here is not to memorize the specifics of these control categories. Nobody
really does that unless they work with a few of these categories on a day-to-day basis.
What we want you to understand is that more UASs and UAS components, software,
and know-how than you might expect are controlled for export from the United States.
Moreover, when you are dealing with these issues in the real world, whether that is in an
internship or job with a UAS manufacturer, at a university lab, or in your own UAS start-
up, you need to know that it is necessary to get out the rules and figure out these details
to keep yourself in compliance with federal law (and out of jail, or well clear of a money
penalty).
Remember, many UAS items that are subject to control under the EAR are subject to NS1
(National Security 1) or MT1 (Missile Technology 1) controls. Other than the controls on
sanctioned countries, these are the most severe export controls that exist under the EAR. It
means there is a license requirement for virtually every country in the world.
Perhaps counterintuitively, under export reform, certain items that transferred from the
ITAR to CCL category 9A610 are eligible for a new, but complex license exception Strategic
Trade Authorization (shortened in the regulations to STA) found in 15 C.F.R. § 740.20. Items
in 9A610 may in some cases be exported without a license to countries that are eligible to
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receive products under this license exception, so long as all of the requirements of the
license exception and the EAR are satisfied in full.
If your item is a commercial/dual-use item (not ITAR), but it is not called out in a spe-
cific ECCN category on the CCL, it is still under the jurisdiction of EAR, but it may be
classified as an EAR99 item. A validated EAR99 classification that is definitely not in a
controlled ECCN category means that the commercial item generally does not require
a license to be exported or re-exported. Except that EAR99 items may not be exported
from the United States to sanctioned countries (including, but not limited to Cuba, the
Crimea region, Iran, North Korea, and Syria), and they may not be exported for prohibited
end uses (e.g., certain missile, nuclear, chemical/biological weapons, or nuclear propul-
sion end uses),27 and they may not be sent to “denied persons,” such as U.S. government-
listed terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and others. Few commercial UAS items currently fall
under EAR99, unless those items are for hobby purposes or they fall outside of the con-
trol category.28 Given recent NS tensions with Russia and China, there are many export
controls on products and technology proposed for export to those countries. Employment
of nationals of those countries in jobs that require access to export controlled information
related to unmanned vehicles has also proven challenging in recent years.
Key export control policies on UAS are described in part 742 of the EAR, which addresses
“Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) of any type, including sensors for guidance and con-
trol of these systems, except model airplanes.” The end use controls referenced above are
not based on the CCL and ECCN categories. Virtually, any item proposed for export from
the United States that fits into one of the prohibited end uses described in part 744 for
UAS (there are several) requires an export license issued prior to shipment. For example, a
pencil that is proposed for export from the United States for the listed prohibited end uses
in certain countries would require a Department of Commerce export license based solely
on the proposed end use. Individuals who are overly focused on ITAR and EAR CCL-level
item controls often overlook the end use controls. If you are ever involved with exporting,
researching, or studying UAS and/or working with non-U.S. persons on UAS issues, please
read parts 742 and 744 of the EAR in addition to knowing the CCL controls described above.
8.6.2 Missile Technology Control Regime Annex

“The MTCR was originally established in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom and the United States. Since that time, the number of MTCR partners
has increased to a total of thirty-four countries all of which have equal standing within
the Regime.”29 The countries and the year they joined can be seen in Table 8.2. The prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction initiated the MCTR to be formed to protect peace
and provide security. The MCTR has an elected chair who is currently Ambassador Roald
Naess of Norway.30
The entire MTCR Annex is listed in part 121.16 of the ITAR. That section states, “Some
of the items on the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex are controlled by both the
Department of Commerce on the Commodity Control List and by the Department of State
on the United States Munitions List.” See 22 C.F.R. 121.16. Other MTCR items are on either
the CCL or the ITAR. As it applies to UAS, Category I includes complete systems “capable
of carrying a payload of 500 kg to a distance of 300 km and come with a strong presump-
tion of denial for export.”31 Category II is “capable of a range of 300 km and may contain
less sensitive components and items regardless of their payload”.32 For more details on the
categories, refer to the glossary section of the chapter.
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TABLE 8.2
MCTR Countries as of March 2019
• Argentina (1993) • Greece (1992) • Portugal (1992)
• Australia (1990) • Hungary (1993) • Republic of Korea (2001)
• Austria (1991) • Iceland (1993) • Russian Federation (1995)
• Belgium (1990) • India (2016) • South Africa (1995)
• Bulgaria (2004) • Ireland (1992) • Spain (1990)
• Brazil (1995) • Italy (1987) • Sweden (1991)
• Canada (1987) • Japan (1987) • Switzerland (1992)
• Czech Republic (1998) • Luxembourg (1990) • Turkey (1997)
• Denmark (1990) • Netherlands(1990) • Ukraine (1998)
• Finland (1991) • New Zealand (1991) • United Kingdom (1987)
• France (1987) • Norway (1990) • United States of America (1987)
• Germany (1987) • Poland (1998)
8.7 International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)

The AECA, which passed on July 5, 1940, forbids the export of minerals, chemical, and
aircraft parts without a license. Three weeks later the ban added aviation fuel, iron, and
scrap metal. Fear of Japanese expansion and possible German cooperation with Japan
was heightened when the Japanese occupied the Indonesia and Chinese coast.33 “22
U.S.C. 2778 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) provides the authority to control
the export of defense articles and services, and charges the President to exercise this
authority. Executive Order (EO) 11958, as amended, delegated this statutory authority
to the Secretary of State”.34 EO 11958 was issued on January 18, 1977. The EO states
“Coordination. (a) In addition to the specific provisions of Section 1 of this Order, the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in carrying out the functions delegated
to them under this Order, shall consult with each other and with the heads of other
departments and agencies, including the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the
United States International Development Cooperation Agency, and the Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, on matters pertaining to their responsibilities.
(b) In accordance with Section 2(b) of the Act and under the directions of the President,
the Secretary of State, taking into account other United States activities abroad, shall be
responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of sales and exports
under the Act, including but not limited to, the negotiations, conclusion, and termin-
ation of international agreements, and determining whether there shall be a sale to
a country and the amount thereof, and whether there shall be delivery or other per-
formance under such sale or export, to the end that sales and exports are integrated
with other United activities and the foreign policy of the United States is best served
thereby.”35
The following ITAR categories deal with UAS:
Category VIII –Aircraft, Space, and Associated Equipment

A few highlights of the very broad scope of Category VIII export controls on military UAS
include, but are not limited to:
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“(a)(5) Unarmed military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (MT if the UAV has a range
equal to or greater than 300km);
(a)(6) Armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (MT if the UAV has a range equal to or
greater than 300km);
(a)(13) Controls Optionally Piloted Vehicles (OPV) (i.e., aircraft specially designed to
operate with and without a pilot physically located in the aircraft) (MT if the OPV has a
range equal to or greater than 300km);
(d) Controls “Ship-based launching and recovery equipment specially designed for
defense articles described in paragraph (a) of this category and land-based variants
thereof (MT if the ship-based launching and recovery equipment is for an unmanned
aerial vehicle, drone, or missile that has a range equal to or greater than 300 km).”
(h)(12) Controls “Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight control systems and vehicle
management systems with swarming capability (i.e., UAVs interact with each other to
avoid collisions and stay together, or, if weaponized, coordinate targeting).”
Associated technical data and software are included in this category as well, as
indicated in the sections above.
Category XI –Military and Space Electronics

A wide variety of electronic items and associated technical data for UASs potentially fit
into this category. Examples include Category XI (a)(3) covering certain radar equipment,
(a)(4), which includes electronic combat parts and components (e.g., sensors that detect
weapons launches); and (a)(5) command, control, and communications (C3); command,
control, communications, and computers (C4); command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) items. This complex
section covers many other electronic items for UAS.
Category XV –Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment Aircraft

A number of potentially relevant UAS articles and associated items can also be found in
Category XV.
Other USML Categories Also Have the Potential to Include Items

Relevant to USML Controls
Here is a full listing of the USML categories with a few examples of where UAS-related
items might appear:
IV (Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs
and Mines) (certain armed vehicles would have these), V (Explosives and Energetic Materials,
Propellants, Incendiary Agent and Their Constituents) (some UAS or UAS armaments use
USML-listed propellants), VI (Surface Vessels of War and Special Naval Equipment), VII
(Ground Vehicles), VIII (Aircraft and Related Articles), IX (Military Training Equipment
and Training) (military training related to military UASs is often controlled under the ITAR), X
(Personal Protective Equipment), XI (Military Electronics), XII (Fire Control, Range Finder,
Optical and Guidance and Control Equipment), and XIII (Materials and Miscellaneous
Articles), XIV (Toxicological Agents), XV (Spacecraft and Related Articles), XVI (Nuclear
Weapon Related Articles), XVII (Classified Articles, Technical Data, and Defense Services
185
Not Otherwise Enumerated), XVII (Directed Energy Weapons), XIX (Gas Turbine Engines
and Associated Equipment (certain UAS use gas turbine engines, turbine components and
equipment to make or repair components that are controlled under the ITAR (or in some cases the
EAR)), XX (Submersible Vessels and Related Articles), and XXI (Articles, Technical Data,
and Defense Services Not Otherwise Enumerated).36
A number of other USML categories are also relevant to UAS and payloads, but those
categories must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
ITAR is administered by the DDTC through licenses or special agreements.
8.8 How Do Export Control Issues Come Up in Real Life?

A story:
The ink still was not dry on the undergrad degree, and it was an hour into Pat’s first day
on the job at ABCDE UAS Corp., a small UAS manufacturer (which was completely made
up for this story). Pat was hired to be the director of engineering and there was a lot to
learn. In fact, Pat’s head was already swimming with new information, while Kelley, the
boss, gave a tour of the production facility and the offices. “About 50% of the company’s
products are exported, and that includes full systems, autopilots, cameras, and software,”
Kelley explained. “Aside from the manufacturing operation here in the U.S., there’s a
second production and engineering facility in India, and we’re working with the team
there to develop a radically improved design. One thing we don’t have a great grasp on,
however, are the export control rules,” Kelley declared. “I don’t look good in stripes Pat,
if you know what I mean, so make that priority one –and make sure you get it right,
ok?” Kelley was smiling when saying this, but Pat could see the underlying anxiety in
Kelley’s eyes.
It was pretty clear that the products were not military items, but they were designed
to fly out of the operator’s visual range using a camera system and a tablet controller
and they had over 90 minutes flight capability in normal operation because of excellent
batteries and a lightweight design. Even with just that basic information, Pat was already
pretty sure that the products were controlled for export under the EAR, and that turned
out to be a good first impression. It meant that BIS export licenses were needed to ship the
product to every country except Canada, but Kelley had said that the company was not
getting any export licenses. That was a problem because each shipment was a violation of
federal law. Also, if the product under development with India was controlled for export
under the EAR (which it turned out to be), a license was needed to share information with
the India facility about how to develop it. That project involved exports of controlled tech-
nology/know-how.
Another problem: Pat thought that the first step would be to make absolutely sure how
the products were classified under the BIS CCL. If licenses were indeed needed for exports,
the company would have to apply for them starting now and there could be no support of
any kind for prior exports that violated the law unless the government said that was OK.
There were probably 30 steps after that, but those could be addressed in logical fashion
without too much panic … hopefully. This job was going to be more interesting, dramatic,
and busier than Pat had thought at 8 am.
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8.9 How to Protect Export-Controlled Products and Information

(“Know How”)?
The most important part of protecting export-controlled products and information, or
“know how,” is to understand what is controlled by classifying it, train your personnel
to recognize controlled know how, and set up a systematic compliance program. Whether
an entity is dealing with ITAR or EAR items, software, or information, compliance is
important. A compliance program should include the following: a written corporate
commitment and policy statement from senior management, a clear organizational con-
trol structure that identifies responsible personnel and contact information in the event
an issue is spotted, classification, identification (e.g. labeling), receipt and tracking of con-
trolled items, a technology control plan to deal with know how, a licensing program to
obtain approvals for exports, re-exports/transfers, solid recordkeeping for a specified
period, internal monitoring and auditing, customer screening, regular training tailored
to fit assigned responsibilities, a plan to address potential violations and penalties, and a
plan to address contacts by regulating agencies and enforcement personnel, among other
steps.37
A good place to start in developing an ITAR-specific export compliance program is with
the with the DDTC’s publication Getting Started with Defense Trade. This publication will
help answer the question “Does Defense export control apply to me?” It does this with the
following steps:
1. Check to see if the item to export is on the USML that is found in 22 CFR 121
in ITAR.
2. Unsure if the item is covered, then file a Commodity Jurisdiction request.
3. If it is on the USML, then you must be registered with the DDTC.
4. After registration then apply for an export license. This can be done through
D-Trade. D-Trade is an electronic export licensing system in DDTC.
5. For basic questions, call the DDTC Response Team.38
Once an item is determined to be export-controlled, there are different types of approvals

that may be required before a certain technical discussions can be had with a potential
overseas customer or before product can be exported. Under the ITAR, for example, there
are basic export licensing approvals, and there are also marketing, brokering, and product/
software/data export licenses. There are also warehousing and technical data exchange
agreements for certain foreign manufacturing and technology exchanges. There are also
a complex set of export license exceptions, approvals for Foreign Military Sales that the
DoD helps organize, and other types of licensing depending on what is being exported and
to whom. The US Department of Commerce has a similar export license application and
review process, but it has fewer license types. See Figure 8.3. Commerce also has a variety
of license exceptions, but it is critically important to be sure that all conditions of a license
exception (ITAR or EAR) are met perfectly before using one at either agency.
Once it is determined that the item is export-controlled, it is essential to protect the item
and associated know how. It is often confusing how to do that most effectively and in
compliance with the regulations. It is important to develop a comprehensive export com-
pliance program, but here are some basic tips to keeping protected materials safe. Do not
permit foreign nationals any access to controlled information including through emails,
presentations, conversations, viewing of computer screens, printed materials, or in any
187
FIGURE 8.3
Department of Commerce license review process.
other way. The following are a few helpful example tips that can be incorporated into your
compliance program:
• Do not discuss export-controlled projects in group meetings unless every one is

cleared to participate.
• Do not leave workstations with export-controlled data visible; set screens to lock
within a short time period if the computer is unattended.
• Monitors should face away from doors and windows.
• All data should be locked up when not in use.
• Shred all export-controlled materials before disposing of them.
• Only discuss export-controlled projects in protected areas.
• Isolate data files on secure media and servers, avoiding non-U.S. person information
technology system access to the data (especially administrative access).
• Qualify other universities and subcontractors on export-controlled projects.39
8.10 What Are Export Control Violations?

Violations of the ITAR or the EAR can create serious criminal liability for organizations or
for individuals. People have gone to jail for violating the ITAR and EAR and there have
been many criminal cases involving UAS and associated equipment. In testimony before
Congress, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration at the Department of Commerce
Kevin J. Wolf stated that:
188
“BIS’s Export Enforcement team, along with the Department of Homeland Security’s
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, enforce controls on dual- use exports. These agencies, through
investigations of suspected violations of law and regulations, and the interdiction of
suspected illicit shipments, have provided the necessary evidence to successfully pros-
ecute both criminal and civil cases on export violations. Our multilateral controls also
provide a strong framework for cooperative enforcement efforts overseas when such
efforts call for an international approach.”40
He highlighted several UAS enforcement cases, including:
Aviation Services International

On September 24, 2009, Aviation Services International BV (ASI), an aircraft supply com-
pany in the Netherlands, Robert Kraaipoel, Director of ASI, Neils Kraaipoel, sales man-
ager of ASI, and Delta Logistics pled guilty in U.S. District Court in Washington, DC to
charges related to a conspiracy to illegally export aircraft components and other U.S.-
origin commodities to entities in Iran, via the Netherlands, the United Arab Emirates and
Cyprus. Between October 2005 and October 2007, the defendants received orders from
customers in Iran for U.S.-origin items, including video recorder units for end use in
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, then contacted companies in the United States and negotiated
purchases on behalf of the Iranian customers. The defendants provided false end-user
certificates to U.S. companies to conceal the true end-users in Iran. The defendants caused
U.S. companies to ship items to ASI in the Netherlands or other locations in the United
Arab Emirates and Cyprus, which were then repackaged and transshipped to Iran. In a
related case, ASI, Robert Kraaipoel and Niels Kraaipoel settled administrative charges
with BIS that included, in part, ASI and Robert Kraaipoel being placed on BIS’s Denied
Persons List for seven years. Niels Kraaipoel agreed to a three-year denial of his export
privileges that would be suspended pending no future export violations.
ARC International
On February 3, 2010, Harold Hanson (Hanson) and Nina Yaming Qi Hanson (Qi) were
sentenced in U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia. Qi was sentenced to 105 days
in jail with credit for time served, placed on one year of supervised release, ordered to pay
a fine of $250 and a $100 special assessment fee and ordered to attend a U.S. Department
of Commerce sponsored export education training program. Hanson was sentenced to
24 months’ probation, required to pay a fine of $250 and a $100 special assessment fee,
ordered to perform 120 hours of community service, and also ordered to attend a U.S.
Department of Commerce sponsored export training program. On November 13, 2009,
Hanson and Qi pleaded guilty to making false statements. On March 12, 2009, a federal
grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging Qi, her husband
Hanson (an employee at Walter Reed Army Medical Center), and a Maryland company,
ARC International, LLC, with illegally exporting miniature Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) Autopilots controlled for national security reasons to a company in the People’s
Republic of China.
Mayrow General Trading

In September 2008, a federal grand jury in Miami, FL, returned a Superseding Indictment
charging eight individuals and eight corporations in connection with their participa-
tion in conspiracies to export U.S.-manufactured commodities to prohibited entities and
189
to Iran. They were charged with conspiracy, violations of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act and the United States Iran Embargo, and making false statements
to federal agencies in connection with the export of thousands of U.S. goods to Iran.
Charges against defendant Majid Seif, also known as Mark Ong, and Vast Solutions
alleged that Seif and Vast exported radio control devices and accessories used in
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles from a Singapore firm to Malaysia. The radio control devices
were then shipped to Iran.
Landstar/Yi-Lan Chen
On February 3, 2010, Yi-Lan Chen, also known as Kevin Chen, was arrested on charges
of illegally exporting commodities for Iran’s missile program. According to the affidavit
filed in support of the criminal complaint, Chen caused dual use goods to be exported
from the U.S., including P200 Turbine Engines, which the investigation revealed were
for end users in Iran. “The P200 Turbine Engines are designed for use as model airplane
engines but can also be used to operate Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and military target
drones.”41
Bright Lights USA Case

In September 2017 the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls settled a case with Bright
Lights USA involving a fine of $400,000 for allegedly exporting ITAR controlled data,
without a license, to a foreign supplier including China and India, exporting defense art-
icles to persons in UAS, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and U.K without a license, and violation
of ITAR record keeping requirements. Small and medium companies are equally respon-
sible as big companies to understand and comply with ITAR and EAR requirements.42
Do not be lulled into a sense of complacency by these serious criminal cases. There are
any number of other serious civil penalty cases involving releases of a wide variety of
commercial/dual-use know how or product exports that caused companies, univer-
sities, and individuals many headaches and a lot of money. Even though the rules are
very complex, the U.S. government puts the obligation on all U.S. persons to know and
apply them properly. If you play any part in the UAS industry, you need to be familiar
with export control rules to protect yourself and your organization from a violation.
Moreover, as noted before, export controls are a strict liability regime. You can be punished
severely even if you do not know the rules. So, it is no defense to bury your head in the sand
and say that the subject is too complex or hope that someone else will deal with it. This is
critically important to understand, because when dealing with UAS, as you have seen from
above, even the simplest commercial system, payload item, or data file can be controlled
by the EAR, not to mention the ITAR. As an example, the civil penalty for a violation of the
EAR can be approximately $300,000 per shipment or per data release to the wrong non-
U.S. person, or twice the value of the item subject to the violation, whichever is higher!
8.11 How Do We Perform Work Outside of the United States?

With all the complexities surrounding export controls, some people in the industry or
in academia who deal with UAS might be tempted to throw their hands in the air and
just focus on domestic sales or activities. Even if they do, they still have to be worried
190
about domestic data releases to non-U.S. persons. Do not make the mistake, however, of
restricting hiring in your program just to U.S. persons without taking further compliance
steps. That could lead you into a claim of discrimination on the basis of national origin.
You must carefully ensure that you are complying with labor and employment rules, and
with U.S. export control rules.
All is not lost in pursuit of international business and international academic cooper-
ation. In fact, many companies in the industry are looking outside the United States
for sales because of the many restrictions on flying even small commercial UASs in the
U.S. national airspace, notwithstanding the FAA’s recently started rulemaking process in
that area. Many companies, universities, and others effectively deal with export control
regulations that affect their day-to-day activities. In addition to getting products, software
and technology classified properly, in almost any situation where you are dealing with
UASs, you need to put a written export control policy and compliance program in place.
DDTC has a short guide to what is needed in a compliance system that can be found at this
link: www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/documents/compliance_programs.pdf.
While you need to adapt these basics to your organization’s specific circumstances and
products, this basic approach is a good starting spot for organizations dealing with both
military and commercial items. As indicated in the guidance, the best approach is to create
a written policy and guidelines, identify responsible individuals, and conduct regular
training, audits, proper recordkeeping, and a standard approach to dealing with poten-
tial violations. These are all effective steps described in the DDTC guidance. Another best
practice is to create and require the use of systematic procedures (e.g., checklists) that help
people identify and react properly to export control issues in relevant situations. That way
people do not have to rely on their memory of these complex rules. This is critical as ignor-
ance is not an accepted excuse when it comes to export control. Building export control
steps into existing business or academic practices is a smart way to attack compliance.
For example, including a line in the checklist used for all international shipments that
determines whether a license has been obtained would be an effective step to help prevent
violations.
It is also vitally important to have the right message from leadership –“these are
important rules and we are going to comply.” And it is critical to have a point person
who is responsible for the program that people can contact with questions. If that person
needs some help, which is common because of the complexity of this area, they should
have access to the regulations and be able to seek expert guidance from time to time.
Violations need to be handled intelligently. In our experience, the best approach is to be
honest and bring violations you spot to your export control officer or superior. Of course,
the best option is to avoid violations in the first place and seek help and guidance when-
ever you have a question, and certainly before the item in question is exported. When in
doubt, ask!
8.1 What is the purpose of export controls? What is the underlying purpose or jus-
tification for enacting export control regulations? What is the purpose of the
export control license? Who must obtain an export control license? Which fed-
eral agency issues such licenses? Describe in a very general way, AECA and ITAR
191
regulations. Do these apply to UASs and associated technologies? Generally,

describe the differences between ITAR and EAR regulations? Which agency
controls exports under the latter regulation?
8.2 Are EAR and ITAR terms currently harmonized? Explain your answer. Review
and discuss the terms and definitions provided in Section 8.2 and tell how you
believe these might apply to UASs and associated components, subsystems, and
intellectual properties.
8.3 Is it true that the United States is one of only a handful of countries that restrict
trade through export control regulations? Explain your answer.
8.4 Describe what is meant by the term, “export” under ITAR regulations. What was
the justification for the U.S. State Department loosening export controls some-
what in February 2015? What two options exist if you wish to export a UAS that
qualifies as a defense article or share information related to development or pro-
duction of that article?
8.5 Where do export controls come from?
8.6 Describe in detail EAR regulations. List and describe those UAS technologies
which have been removed by the Departments of State and Commerce from
EAR and ITAR control. Why are export controls described as “strict liability”
laws? Describe the MTCR and corresponding annex in detail.
8.7 Describe, in detail, ITAR, including those categories and sections that refer
to a UAS.
8.8 Describe what is meant by a compliance program and tell why it is important.
What should such a program include?
8.9 List and discuss examples of export control violations. What could have been
done differently to avoid these problems?
8.10 Individuals working in industry or in academia who deal with UASs should
focus exclusively on domestic sales or activities to avoid the complications
associated with performing work outside the United States. Do you agree with
this statement? Support your answer with a convincing explanation.
8.11 How would you perform work outside the United States?
Notes
1 www.ancient.eu/Peloponnesian_War/
2 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776–1783/continental-congress.
3 www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title50/USCODE-2011-title50-app-tradingwi.
4 www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title50/USCODE-2011-title50-app-exportati-
other.
5 www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title22/html/USCODE-2010-title22-chap39.htm.
6 www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/11958.html.
7 www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5040/text?format=txt (last visited
September 23, 2019).
8 15 C.F.R. § 730 et seq., www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/regulations/export-administration-
regulations-ear.
9 The ITAR definitions are found in 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 and the EAR definitions are found in 15 C.F.R.
Part 772.
10 www.mtcr.info/english/FAQ-E.html.
192
11 www.mtcr.info/english/FAQ-E.html.
12 www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/838-772 page 42
13 United Nations, www.un.org/en/sc/1540/.
14 United Nations, www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/1540/.
15 www.wassenaar.org/.
16 22 C.F.R. § 120.
17 State Department, www.state.gov, Diplomacy in Action, U.S. Export Policy for Military
Unmanned Aerial Systems
18 www.state.gov/u-s-policy-on-the-export-of-unmanned-aerial-systems/
19 50 USC Chapter 58
20 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supplement 1.
21 Id. at § 738, Supplement 1.
22 Id. at §  736.
23 Id. at §  744.
24 C.F.R § 744, Supplement 1.
25 C.F.R. § 774, Supplement 1., ECCN 9A610
26 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supplement 1.
27 15 C.F.R. §  774.
28 The consolidated denied persons list can be found on the Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Industry and Security websiteL www.bis.doc.gov/indes.php/policy-guidance.lists -of-parties-
of-concern.
29 www.metr.info/english
30 www.metr.info/english
31 Department of Commerce, www.bis.doc.gov. Commerce Control List (CCL)
32 Department of Commerce, www.bis.doc.gov. Commerce Control List (CCL)
33 The History Channel –This Day in History WWII US Passes Exprot Control Act
34 Gerald R. Ford Executive Order No. 11958, 3 C.F.R. 66 (January 18, 1977)
35 Gerald R. Ford Executive Order No. 11958, 3 C.F.R. 66 (January 18, 1977)
36 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 The United States Munitions List
37 Department of State, www.pmddtc.state.gov, Compliance Programs
38 Department of State, www.pmddtc.state.gov, Getting Started with DDTC
39 National Contract Management Association
40 Department of Commerce, www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/
730-testimony-by-assistant-secretary-wolf-before-the-national-security-and-foreign-affairs-
subcommittee\
41 Department of Commerce, www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/
730-testimony-by-assistant-secretary-wolf-before-the-national-security-and-foreign-affairs-
subcommittee\
42 www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sysparm_referring_url=tear_off&view=true&sys_
id=745d7205db15df00d0a370131f9619a3
newgenprepdf
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9
Unmanned Aircraft System Design
Robert D. Love and Brian Argrow
9.1 Introduction: Mission Capability-Derived Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

9.2 The UAS Design Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
9.2.1 Design Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
9.2.2 Design Automation and Optimization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
9.3 Unmanned Aircraft Subsystems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
9.3.1 Airframe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
9.3.2 Propulsion System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
9.3.3 Flight Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
9.3.4 Control Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
9.3.5 Payloads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
9.3.6 Communications, Command, and Control (C3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
9.4 Standards for UAS Design, Construction, and Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
9.5 UAS Design Verification and Mission Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
9.6 Design Characteristics for UAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
9.1 Introduction: Mission Capability-Derived Design

The mission capability needed from an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) drives all system-
level requirements. The mission profile and system-level requirements are determined
early in UAS development with input from customers to define how to best provide each
capability. A market opportunity pull or an innovative technology push may incentivize a
UAS product to be developed.
Since their inception in the early twentieth century, and their use in the first few years
of the twenty-first century, the design and development of UAS has been driven primarily
by military missions. Military concept of operations (CONOP) or concept of employment
(CONEMP) are described by capability gap assessments and war gaming to determine
which key capabilities and characteristics are needed to effectively and efficiently perform
the mission. Most UASs are built to accomplish many missions, so prioritization should
ensure that the highest priority requirements drive the UAS design, but that lower priority
mission requirements are not compromised.
UASs have been traditionally used for missions that are too “dirty, dangerous, or dull”
for a human to be physically present in the aircraft. However, advances in communications
193
194
and control systems have enabled increased autonomy of operations, thus enabling more
specific mission-driven UAS designs. The purpose is not to physically remove a human
pilot from the aircraft, but to directly design the aircraft as a platform or tool for specific
applications. This explains the growth in UAS designs where habitation of the aircraft is
impossible. The absence of humans aboard the aircraft opens the design space, compared
to that of manned aircraft. This affects all the design choices, from the airframe materials
and construction techniques, to the quality of servos, to system redundancies, and to
recovery systems (e.g., no landing gear).
In addition to risk reduction, it is anticipated that uninhabited aircraft will signifi-
cantly reduce system cost compared to manned aircraft that perform the same or similar
mission(s). At a scale where replacing a pilot with an autopilot can reduce weight or oper-
ational cost, UASs do provide opportunity for cost savings against competing manned air-
craft. However, the view that UASs are competing against manned systems often ignores
the broader complementary or supplementary role that the UAS might provide in mission
design.
Military customers continue to drive UAS development, but the emergence of civilian
demand for small UAS (sUAS) over the past decade has created a market pent-up by a
worldwide regulatory environment that was unprepared to integrate any UAS, particu-
larly sUAS, into the airspace system. The FAA and NASA are working to clarify airspace
regulations for UAS with each passing day. However, registration efforts and on-demand
notifications available through the UAS Data Exchange and Low Altitude Authorization
and Notification Capability (LAANC) are helping. On-demand payload delivery and
sensing to inform decision-making will continue to motivate the proliferation of commer-
cial sUAS. The ability to provide urban and suburban advanced air mobility (e.g., UBER
ELEVATE) may harness the systems developed for UAS over the past decade to transform
society when there is a supportive regulatory environment and community acceptance.
Several fixed-wing UASs shown in Figure 9.1 represent performance characteristics
across the spectrum of size, speed, endurance, and range of systems in operation today.
Bard College’s Drone Databook [BARD1], Armada’s Drone Compendium [AMRADA1],
and Janes’ All The World’s Aircraft: Unmanned [JANE1] provide broader surveys of the
UAS industry. Multicopters have had such a major impact on the public perception of sUAS
that when someone speaks about a “drone” today, they are referring to a small multicopter
rather than the large military UASs that were originally referred to as drones.
In the following sections, the discussion will focus on how these UASs are designed
and the typical UAS subsystems. Considering the incredible range of size, performance,
and applications of UASs, it might be surprising to consider that most UASs are made up
of the same subsystems. However, these subsystems obviously vary tremendously in the
number, size, weight, power requirements, and complexity of the components.
9.2 The UAS Design Process

The design process for a UAS starts by defining the mission requirements needed to pro-
vide a capability, which lead to the mission capability-derived design. The overview of the
UAS design process shown in Figure 9.2 illustrates its iterative nature, where each of the
maturation steps might result in a return to one or many of the steps previously visited.
195
Unmanned Aircraft System Design 195
FIGURE 9.1
UAS airframes.
(a) NASA Global Hawk [www.nasa.gov/centers/armstrong/aircraft/GlobalHawk/],
(b) NASA Ikhana [www.nasa.gov/centers/armstrong/multimedia/imagegallery/Ikhana/ED14-0341-09.html],
(c) RECUV Tempest UAS (University of Colorado/NOAA), and (d) DJI Phantom 2 Vision Quadcopter
(Amazon) [http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/61x8yJcesfL_SX425_jpg].
FIGURE 9.2
A typical conceptual UAS design process can iterate at any step.
196
Key performance parameters that guide UAS requirements are derived from a descrip-
tion of the mission. Subsystem requirements are then derived from the UAS requirements.
Aircraft configurations are evaluated by their match to the capability and mission. Roskam
notes that 65% of the product life-cycle cost is decided in the concept design phase and 95%
prior to acquisition, emphasizing the importance of wise decision-making during this time
of maximum uncertainty [ROSKAM1]. Businesses commonly assess what parts or tech-
nologies they can reuse (e.g., avionics, tools, wings) to minimize the development cost and
accelerate development. Key technologies needed for the UAS to effectively and efficiently
perform the mission are identified, a risk assessment is completed, and the development
schedule and budget are estimated to be sure that the UAS can be developed with available
resources and constraints.
Many UAS designs have a starting point in previous manned aircraft designs used for
similar purposes. Some actually convert manned aircraft into UAS (e.g., Boeing/Aurora
Autonomous Aerial Cargo Utility System & Centaur). As a result, current UAS designs
range from those for which the airframe might appear externally similar to a comparably
sized manned aircraft, to the multicopter designs that have no conventional counterpart.
Even in the case of UASs that are the size of a conventional manned aircraft, there are
usually features that make them obviously uninhabitable, such as no obvious cockpit or
windows. The few exceptions are when the UAS airframe is actually a repurposed manned
airframe, or are “optionally piloted” aircraft (where there is an option to have a human
pilot on board, e.g., Northrop Grumman Firebird).
UASs built for the military follow the acquisition path described by the Defense
Acquisition Guidebook [DAG1]. Commercial UAS may follow a similar development
path, but the design is tuned to efficiently meet a commercial market need and its
associated mission, and guided by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations.
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE)’s systems engineering
handbook [INCOSE1] and the systems engineering diagram shown in Figure 9.3 provide
guidance important for UAS product development to be successful. They help guide the
design process to ensure that the UAS meets increasingly complex requirements. MIL-
SPEC-881D [MIL1] provides a work breakdown structure (WBS) useful to organize pro-
ject scheduling, budgeting, and execution.
9.2.1 Design Tools

Raymer [RAY12], Nicolai [NICOLAI1], Torenbeek [TORENBEEK1], and Gundlach
[GUNDLACH1] provide methods and data used to configure and size the UAS and
subsystems. Although computationally efficient empirical relations like those in Digital
DATCOM [PDAS1], Advanced Aircraft Analysis [DARAAA1], and PaceLab [PLAB1]
remain useful for early trade-space exploration, designers are leveraging increased com-
putational power to push physics-based analyses earlier in the design process. Analysis
reduces reliance on empirical relations. Design automation also continues to increase for
unmanned aircraft (UA) design, building on the legacy of manned layout and design ana-
lysis tools. Multidisciplinary and multifidelity tools are leading to digital engineering
that moves beyond just computer-aided design. It computationally links all stages of the
UAS life cycle from the requirements to the conceptual design and analysis and to the as-
manufactured aircraft. Linking the digital twin of the UAS across the life cycle is the foun-
dation of the physics-based model-based systems engineering that is necessary to reduce
cost and deal with the increasing complexity of modern UASs. The use of RAND’s DAPCA
197
FIGURE 9.3
The systems engineering “V” diagram guides UAS development. (https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/
seitsguide/section3.htm.)
model [RAND1], SEER [SEER1], or Price True Planning [PTP1] is vital to ensure that a UAS
program establishes reasonable cost estimates early in its development.
Although the methods for aircraft design layout and design analysis used in the industry
tend to be proprietary and highly computerized [RAY12], software proliferation enabled
by internet-based configuration control is democratizing many aspects of UAS tool devel-
opment. Many open-source or freely available tools for aircraft design have enabled
smaller companies to thrive in the UAS market. NASA Open Source Software [NASAOSS1]
including OpenVSP, NDARC, and FLOPS; Public Domain Aerospace Software [PDAS1];
and software in online configuration-controlled repositories like GitHub provide many of
the tools needed to move beyond the empirical methods that had been used in the concep-
tual and preliminary design phases. These tools are powerful when used to inform multi-
disciplinary quantitative trades, but remain heavily dependent on user experience. They
may also require additional validation to ensure that the in-house manufacturing capabil-
ities are represented correctly. Distributed and cloud computing are enabling multidiscip-
linary tools to be combined into design architectures as shown by the Design Structure
Matrix [XDSM1] in Figure 9.4, and higher fidelity analysis to be performed at an earlier
stage in the design process.
Empirical methods and tools developed for conventional, large aircraft design are not
directly applicable to the design of UAS aircraft. This is particularly true for tools based
on the databases of manned aircraft, since UAS generally operate at flight speeds and
Reynolds numbers much lower than for manned aircraft, and are often constructed from
composites instead of metallics. In addition, many UASs use electric propulsion systems
powered by batteries, fuel cells, or solar cells, which rely on energy storage or conversion
systems not typically modeled in conventional aircraft design tools.
Aerodynamic databases, such as the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign’s (UIUC)
Airfoil Data Site [UIUC15], have expanded wind-tunnel airfoil data to include Reynolds
198
number values that are of interest to model airplane hobbyists and sUAS airframe designers.
The emergence of high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) tools, such as those
included in commercial multiphysics modeling packages, enables “virtual wind-tunnel”
testing of airframe components as well as entire airframes. These packages include ANSYS
Fluent [ANS15], Star-CCM+ [CCM15], and COMSOL [COM15]; and open-source tools
like OpenFOAM [OFOAM] or SU2 [SU2]. Simpler panel method-based tools such as AVL
[AVL15] can compute stability derivatives as well as aerodynamic forces and moments
on simplified geometries. They are particularly useful for preliminary airframe design.
These stability derivatives can be used to drive a 6-degree simulation like RealFlight
[REALFLIGHT1], or help tune gains for autopilots like the Piccolo [PICAUTO1], or
Pixhawk [PIXHAWK1]. They can also be used for more sophisticated certified autopilots,
for subscale model development, or to fly full-scale UAS.
High-fidelity analysis tools remain mostly proprietary, but their accuracy and com-
putational efficiency is improving rapidly as cloud computing has expanded access
to high-performance computing resources. The Department of Defense provides validated
high-fidelity tools for fixed and rotary-wing design, and analysis to contractors with the
high-performance computing CREATE program [CREATE1] software suite.
9.2.2 Design Automation and Optimization

Commercial process integration and design optimization (PIDO) tools such as ModelCenter
[MCOPT1], ModeFrontier [MFOPT1], ISIGHT [ISOPT1], OPTISLANG [www.dynardo.
de/en/software/optislang.html] and HEEDS [HEEDSOPT1] tie together varying fidelity,
physics-based tools, and transfer data between the tools to enable a digital transformation in
UAS engineering. These architectural tools are rapidly expanding to provide web-based col-
laboration interfaces (e.g. VOLTA) [www.esteco.com/volta] to cloud-computing resources
that enable geographically distributed teams to design and analyze efficiently. Open-source
tools like NASA’s OpenMDAO [OPENMDAO1, OPENMDAO2] provide a Python-based
library of optimization solvers that can be used to run codes like OpenAeroStruct [OAS1].
The input/output process flow is visualized with an N2 diagram [XDSM1] in Figure 9.4.
An N3 diagram may be used to combine insights from analysis results at multiple fidelity
levels for each discipline where a higher fidelity analysis reduces the uncertainty for a part
of the design space. Leveraging gradient-based and nongradient-based optimizers, curve
fitting with response-surface methods in addition to machine learning and deep learning
tools, will continue to enable better designs of UAS. They exploit the benefits of being able
to address a larger number of design variables with multidisciplinary and multifidelity
architectures. Outputs from these PIDO tools may validate compliance of the UAS design
to system requirements that are systematically organized within model-based systems
engineering tools such as TeamCenter [TCREQ1], DOORS [DREQ1], or JAMA [JREQ1].
The digital transformation is completed by communicating data to product life-cycle man-
agement tools that are already well integrated with computer-aided design tools.
9.3 Unmanned Aircraft Subsystems

9.3.1 Airframe
Materials for a manned aircraft airframe are generally selected to provide maximum
strength and stiffness with minimum weight. Strength and stiffness, and knowledge of
199
5
Major Iteration: 51 0
Twist
−5
−10
−1 0 1
7.5 Elliptical
Lift 5.0
2.5
0.0
−1 0 1
0.2
Thickness 0.1
0.0
−1 0 1
1e7
Failure limit
2
Von mises
Fuelburn: 68685.73 1
0
−1 0 1
FIGURE 9.4
The N2 Diagram generated with pyXDSM [XDSM1] (top) shows the input and output flow through various
solvers within the Python-based OpenAeroStruct [OAS1] code. The output results (bottom) demonstrate the
ability to simultaneously optimize aerodynamics and wing structural geometry.
how those properties vary in the material undergoing structural loading and deform-
ation, are required to maintain aerodynamically optimized shapes for maximum design
efficiency; or simply to anticipate shape changes so that reliable control laws for aircraft
stability can be designed. The materials for UAS airframe construction are typically those
used for a range of aircraft from manned aviation to hobby aircraft. They range from
aerospace-grade metals and composites, supported by a vast database of material proper-
ties and construction standards for certified manned aircraft like those provided by NIAR
and MIL-Handbooks 5 and 17, to balsa and Monokote (a thin plastic film used for the outer
skin of many hobby aircraft). The databases for hobby construction materials that might
be used for sUAS airframes are sometimes only supported by the shared knowledge and
goodwill of the user community, and the material properties that manufacturers choose to
200
make public. As a result, drone cargo delivery provided by Amazon or Google Wing are
just gaining access to the certified airspace.
Figure 9.5a shows the payload weight capability for a range of large-to-small UASs
compared to the overall per-airframe cost (airframe cost includes the communication and
control systems) for a representative selection of legacy U.S. military systems. The trend
line that fits these data shows that the airframe cost is a bit over U.S.$ 1M per hundred
pounds of payload. While it is no surprise that larger payloads require larger, more expen-
sive airframes, it shows that sUAS airframes continue to be sized according to the payload,
and do not reach the threshold of airframe size necessary to safely carry a human pilot.
Figure 9.3b shows the fractional cost of subsystems for three high-performance legacy
UASs, categorized by airframe empty weight (the data are from the year 2003). Figure 9.5b
shows that the cost of the high-performance sUAS is dominated by the specialized propul-
sion system, and for the large UAS, the largest fraction of the cost is for the sensor package.
The purpose of Figure 9.5 is to illustrate trends that are only notional compared to the
civilian systems in development today.
9.3.2 Propulsion System

Figure 9.6 illustrates the range of performance of several contemporary UASs. These are
primarily military systems [OSD05] with data supplemented by the 2009 UVS Yearbook
[VBL09] and product brochures.
UA performance is most clearly defined by the propulsion system, with the greatest cap-
ability provided by gas turbine engines, followed by internal-combustion (IC) engines,
and then battery-powered electric motors. Similar to manned aircraft, UAS propulsion
systems are chosen based on the mission requirements, where excess power required for
subsystems and payloads might be an important driver for the selection of a specific pro-
pulsion system.
Equations to estimate the range and endurance performance of aircraft propelled by
piston-driven, that is, IC, engines, or gas turbines, are well established (e.g., [AND99],
[MCC95], [RAY12], [NICOLAI1]). Traub [TRA09] developed equations for estimating the
range and endurance performance of battery-powered aircraft, which includes the effects
of discharge rate and voltage drop on the effective battery capacity. A team in Europe has
developed methods to reflect performance of hybrid-electric propulsion architectures, and
compared their operational capabilities [FINGER1]. Tools such as MotoCalc [MOTO15],
originally developed for hobbyists, are readily applicable for preliminary propulsion
system design for battery-powered sUAS. These tools can be useful to leverage the ability
of electric propulsion to efficiently distribute thrust across the airframe.
9.3.3 Flight Control System

The autopilot is one key to aircraft that can be reliably controlled without a human pilot
on board. Elmer Sperry is generally credited with the development of the first true auto-
pilot used in a UAS. Building on his experience in developing gyrostabilizer systems for
submarines and then manned aircraft, he worked with Glen Curtiss, another aviation
pioneer, to produce the first controlled UA. The flight of the Curtiss–Sperry Aerial Torpedo
on March 6, 1918, marked the first successful flight of a powered UA, and was unmanned
aviation’s counterpart to the Wright Brothers’ flight 14 years earlier [NEW04].
201
(a) 3000
RQ-4A Global Hawk blk 20
2500
2000
Payload weight (lb)
RQ-4A Global Hawk blk 10
1500
106 lb payload/$M
RQ-5A Hunter
1000
MQ-9A Predator B
MQ-1B Predator
500
RQ-7A Shadow 200
RQ-2B Pioneer Aerosonde mark-4.4
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Airframe cost ($M)
(b) 1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
Cost fraction
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
30 lb 1130 lb 9200 lb
Airframe empty weight
Comm subsys Propulsion subsys Sensor subsys Air vehicle-propul
FIGURE 9.5
(a) Trend for airframe cost relative to payload capacity for representative legacy systems. (b) Fraction of system
cost versus airframe empty weight for three representative legacy systems.
202
100,000 RQ-4B Global Hawk

RQ-4A Global Hawk
MQ-9A Predator B
10,000 Turbines
MQ-1B Predator
RQ-5 Hunter
Empty weight (lb)

1000 RQ-2B Pioneer
RQ-7 Shadow 200 IC engines
100
Tempest
Pointer
10
Desert hawk Aerosonde mark 4.4
Dragon eye ScanEagle
1
Electric motors
Black widow
0.1
1 10 100 1000 10,000 100,000
Operational range (nm)
100,000
RQ-4B Global Hawk
MQ-9A Predator B
10,000
MQ-1B Predator Turbines RQ-4A
RQ-5B Hunter Global Hawk
Empty weight (lb)
1000
RQ-2B Pioneer
RQ-7B Shadow200
100 IC engines
ScanEagle
Aerosonde mark 4.4
Tempest
10 Pointer
Desert hawk
Dragon eye
1
Electric motors
Black widow
0.1
0 100 200 300 400
Cruise speed (kt)
100,000
RQ-4B Global Hawk
RQ-4A Global Hawk
RQ-5 Hunter
10,000
RQ-9A Predator B Turbines
RQ-2B
Pioneer MQ-1B Predator
Empty weight (lb)
1000
IC engines
100
RQ-7A
Tempest Shadow 200
10 Desert hawk Aerosonde mark 4.4
Pointer
Dragon eye ScanEagle
1
Electric motors
Black widow
0.1
0 10 20 30 40
Endurance (hr)
FIGURE 9.6
Illustration of the performance of representative UASs over a range of sizes.
203
Today, most sUASs operating within close visual range are still typically flown through
full wireless remote control (RC) although beyond-line-of-sight-operations are on the
increase. Additionally, many small rotorcraft employ some type of stability augmentation,
such as gyros, to assist with the RC pilot’s control of the aircraft. Other UASs are generally
flown with some level of automation or autonomy, particularly if they are flown beyond
visual range. This includes large UASs such as the General Atomics Predator family of
UASs, and the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk, as shown in Figure 9.1. In the case of the
Predator, the pilot controls the aircraft with a joystick. There is a variable amount of direct
joystick control, depending on the mission segment (e.g., takeoff, cruise, and landing).
The Global Hawk is operated at an increased level of autonomy, with automated takeoff
and landing. The autopilot system uses flight plans to control the trajectory of the aircraft
between waypoints. In this case, the role of the remote pilot is primarily to monitor the air-
craft and to potentially update the flight plan or to handle contingencies.
For the UAS that is not flown in RC mode or stability-augmented RC mode, a flight con-
trol system (often referred to as an autopilot, which is the term that will be used here) is
employed to control the aircraft. The autopilot system is typically composed of a micropro-
cessor or computer that runs algorithms designed to control the aircraft over a preplanned
flight path. It is also used to augment control of the aircraft that is receiving steering
commands (commands not associated with maintaining stability, such as heading changes)
from a remotely located pilot. Typically, an inner control loop receives high-frequency
sensor data to manage the aircraft attitude, while an outer-loop controller manages the
aircraft position while following a flight plan.
In some UASs, a separate flight computer might run independently from the autopilot
computer, with algorithms that issue high-level commands to the autopilot outer control
loop. The degree to which such commands are based on “decisions” made by the flight
computer algorithms without direct human interaction is often a measure of the system’s
level of autonomy.
9.3.4 Control Station

The ground control station (GCS), or more simply the control station (CS), is the part of the
UAS that provides the control interface to the UA through which the pilot/operator steers
the UA or otherwise manages the mission. Commands issued through the CS may range
from a pilot manually flying the UA with real-time joystick altitude-control commands in
RC mode, to an operator monitoring and interfacing with a highly autonomous system
through high-level commands. Figure 9.7 contrasts the STANAG-4671-compliant advanced
cockpit CS for the SkyGuardian (Figure 9.7a) with a version of the expeditionary command
and control (XC2) CS for the MQ-1C Gray Eagle (Figure 9.7b) where the operator interface
is through a tablet computer. Commercial drones commonly use a laptop to provide way-
point navigation for beyond line of sight operations, and video game or RC controllers are
used to provide manual guidance. First-person view (FPV) headsets have enabled fast-
paced competitions like the Drone Racing League to provide entertainment and advance
multicopter technologies.
The most important feature of the CS is the interface that enables the human pilot/oper-
ator to interact with the UAS flight control system. The sensory inputs available to the
pilot/operator through the CS interface make it difficult to replicate the experience the
pilot would have on board the UA. Therefore, it is no surprise that a CS “cockpit,” based
on the design of a manned aircraft cockpit, might not provide the optimal interface for
204
FIGURE 9.7
(a) GA-ASI Certifiable Block 50 Ground Control Station for MQ-9B SkyGuardian UAS (www.ga.com/
ga-asi-certifiable-ground-control-station-makes-its-first-flight) and (b) GA-ASI XC2 laptop used
for MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAS pre-flight, automatic takeoff, navigation, and landing (www.ga.com/
ga-asi-demonstrates-satcom-launch-recovery-for-mq-9b-using-expeditionary-command-control-xc2).
205
remotely operating a UAS. It is important for CS interface design to consider the “human
factors” that produce a different experience than that encountered in an onboard cockpit.
GCS maturation has reduced pilot and sensor operator tasking. Laptop-based CS form
factors have been used for auto-takeoff and landing operations of the MQ-1C Gray Eagle,
demonstrating that attention to human factors can consolidate many of these functions into
even an expeditionary product. Increasing levels of manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T)
operations demonstrated that CS functions, like sensor control or weapons release for a
Gray Eagle, can be given as commands from a manned AH-64 helicopter. The CS may be
airborne; multiaircraft control from a single airborne CS is under active development for
implementation with the F-35 joint strike fighter.
9.3.5 Payloads
Figure 9.5b shows the fractional cost breakdown of three representative high-performance
UASs. In the case of the two larger UASs, the payload (sensor subsystem) is a more sig-
nificant part of the total cost than on the sUAS. This reflects the trend that sUASs are more
likely to be used to lower costs, but commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) payloads (cameras,
meteorological sensors, etc.) are not necessarily less capable. The larger airframes are gen-
erally designed for higher reliability and used to carry the more expensive, more power-
demanding sensors for military and specialized civilian applications. Some of these sensors
include electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR), light detection and ranging (LIDAR), synthetic
aperture radar (SAR), and multifunction active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar
sensors.
Miniaturization of sensor packages and increasing reliability of small airframes and
subsystems has enabled some mission capabilities, originally only achievable by relatively
large and expensive UASs, to be scaled to smaller UASs. Again, the flexibility of not having
to design the airframe to include human occupation enables more specific mission-derived
design, so that the aircraft size and performance can be optimized to meet the mission
requirements. The DJI Phantom Quadrotor with an integrated video camera, as shown in
Figure 9.1d, is an example of how sensor miniaturization combined with small airframes
and advanced battery technologies has led to the proliferation of sUAS designs available
to the general public and professionals alike.
9.3.6 Communications, Command, and Control (C3)

When writing “C3”, the order of the words “communications, command, and control” in
the definition is important. For current UAS design, the requirements for safe operations
in the NAS dictate that design starts with the communications system. This enables the
operator to remain on the control loop as a monitor or in the control loop to carry out
manual tasks. Commands can then be sent to the aircraft through the uplink, while the
downlink allows telemetry to report the UAS health and status or delivers sensor data
through a payload link. Commands issued from the CS by the operator over the uplink
might enable direct control of the aircraft. The frequency (how often updates are required)
of these commands determines the requirements for availability and latency in the wireless
C3 links.
Figure 9.8 shows a schematic of the RECUV Networked UAS Communications,
Command, and Control (NetUASC3) architecture that was developed to support
operations of the Tempest UAS for the second Verification of the Origins of Rotation
in Tornadoes Experiment (VORTEX-2) [ELS11]. The various arrows show the lines of
206
FIGURE 9.8
Schematic of the RECUV Networked UAS Communications, Command, and Control (NetUASC3). (From
Elston, J. et al. 2011. Journal of Field Robotics, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 461–483.)
communication that link the aircraft and CS and also simultaneously enable communica-
tion with various data servers and other clients sending and receiving data. This diagram
clearly illustrates how, in this case, the aircraft is only one of many components that can
make up an UAS.
9.4 Standards for UAS Design, Construction, and Operations

While many large UASs might be designed to incorporate components used in type-
certified manned aircraft, as previously discussed, even these aircraft do not yet meet the
requirements for FAA-type certification. Currently, airworthiness standards are in devel-
opment, however, industry standards through bodies such as ASTM (American Society
for Testing and Materials). Note that due to the rigor of these standards, many if not most
sUAS designed with components manufactured for the RC hobby community will never
meet FAA standards for type certification.
207
Several engineering standards organizations are working develop standards for UAS
design and operations. The ASTM International Committee F38 on UASs is developing
one of the most comprehensive sets of UAS design and operations standards and guidance
materials. Their scope, as stated by the Committee, is to develop technical publications that
include [ASTM15]:
1. Minimum safety, performance, and flight proficiency requirements.

2. Quality assurance—to install manufacturing controls that will assure vehicles con-
form to design criteria.
3. Productions acceptance test and procedures to assure that the completed vehicle
systems meet the reported performance as demonstrated in the prototype vehicle
system. This includes limits such as empty weight and center of gravity; perform-
ance specifications; controllability and maneuverability trim, stability, stall speed,
and handling characteristics; engine cooling and operation characteristics; pro-
peller limits; systems functions; and folding or removable lifting surfaces.
4. A baseline plan for continued airworthiness, including methods for monitoring
and maintaining continued operational safety, and processes for identifying,
reporting, and remedy of safety-of-flight issues.
The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) is chartered by FAA as a Federal
Advisory Committee. The RTCA Special Committee 203 (SC-203), UASs, was established
in 2004 (terminated in 2013) to develop standards and certification criteria; procedures for
sense-and-avoid systems; and protocols to be used for the certification of command, con-
trol, and communications systems [RTCA203]. The RTCA SC-228, Minimum Operational
Performance Standards (MOPS) for UASs, was established in 2013 and is developing MOPS
for detect-and-avoid equipment, and command and control (C2) data link MOPS estab-
lishment of L-Band and C-Band solutions [RTCA228]. One of the earlier UAS standards
that was published is “Standard Interfaces of UAV Control System (UCS) for NATO
UAV Interoperability, 3rd Ed” [NSA07]. Other organizations that are developing UAS
standards include the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) and the American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA).
9.5 UAS Design Verification and Mission Validation

Decades of academic and industrial investment in modeling and simulation (M&S) tools
have not only facilitated the design process, but have also led to M&S tools that can be
used in the verification of a UAS design, and in the preparation for mission validation.
Depending on the level of autonomy designed into the UAS, software testing and verifica-
tion can be the major cost, as measured in schedule time and development costs.
Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing is widely used for the verification of the aircraft
control system, sensor/payload integration, and the CS interface. Typically, a simulation
creates a synthetic flight environment, and then simulated sensor inputs are sent to the
autopilot to create a telemetry stream to the CS that is identical to what is measured in flight.
This allows the CS interface to exactly replicate what the UAS operator would see or experi-
ence in an actual flight. From an observer’s point of view, an HIL test can be interesting to
observe, since one might see the control surfaces moving on the stationary aircraft exactly
208
as they would move to control the aircraft in a real flight. Therefore, this type of testing puts
the autopilot and flight computer software through their paces, and may also verify the
function of the servos and control surfaces prior to an actual flight. In some cases, the con-
trol software of the autopilot might run separately on the simulation computer or another
computer, and not on the actual autopilot hardware. In this case, any latency that might be
associated with running the algorithms on the autopilot hardware must also be simulated
for a realistic replication of the autopilot function. For an sUAS, a flight simulator for HIL
testing is included with most COTS autopilot systems. In some cases, they are designed to
integrate with high-fidelity graphical interfaces originally developed for video games.
After systems verification, the simulated environment might be used to prepare for
mission validation, or for pilot/operator training, where the tasks of an actual mission
might be simulated. Depending on where the remote pilot/operator is located, it might
be impossible for that person to distinguish between a simulated mission and an actual
mission.
9.6 Design Characteristics for UAS

Books and codes addressing aircraft survivability are useful to establish UAS signature
early in the design cycle. These consider both susceptibility (inability to avoid being “hit”
by a damage mechanism) and vulnerability (inability to withstand any “hits” that do
occur) [SURV01]. Radar, IR, acoustic, visual, electromagnetic, and cyber signatures of the
UAS must be understood and designed. Shaping, treatments, and methods developed for
manned aircraft are useful for UAS, although UASs also have unique demands. UAS must
have access to a secure data link, so survivability impacts must be considered in the design
and installation of sensors and antennas. Analytical tools such as XPATCH [XPR1] to assess
radar signature and AFSIM [AFSIM1] to analyze the mission effectiveness of various sur-
vivability approaches are widely used, but the dissemination of most toolsets to assess
UAS survivability and mission effectiveness is restricted.
UAS programmatic success is characterized by the ability to provide a needed cap-
ability efficiently and a reliable system with reduced operations and support (O&S) costs.
Identifying sources of low system reliability and addressing concerns that increase main-
tenance man hours per flight hour (MMHFH) are important. Emerging technologies such
as condition-based health monitoring and maintenance will be important to reduce O&S
costs. Designing the UAS with a fault tree analysis to determine system reliability will con-
tinue to be used to ensure adequate system availability (typically >70%), establish using
metrics like MTBF (Mean Time Between Failure) and MTTR (Mean Time To Repair) UAS
design service life, and reduce mishap and mission failure rates.
9.1 In the introductory paragraphs, the author makes several statements. Answer the
following questions based on that passage. What factors have caused the “pent-
up” global demand for UASs? Why have UAV per-unit costs remained high? What
209
entities have carried out the most civilian sUAS operations and why? What design
opportunities are attributable to the lack of a pilot on board the UAS?
9.2 Generalize the design process. Describe tools currently available to designers of
UAS and tell how these tools influence the design process.
9.3 What are the functions of the autopilot? What is the difference between the auto-
pilot inner and outer control loops? Who does the author identify as the developer
of the first successful flight of a powered, unmanned aircraft?
9.4 Describe the purpose of the GCS or CS. How does the CS of the General Atomics
Predator differ from the pilot interface (i.e., cockpit controls) typically found on
complex, high-performance manned aircraft?
9.5 What is meant by C3? Describe the difference between operator “in the loop” and
operator “on the loop.”
9.6 What is meant by aircraft certification standards? List organizations involved in
developing UAS standards and the corresponding areas that each organization is
addressing.
9.7 Describe hardware-in-the-loop operation. What is the difference between UAS
design verification and mission validation? In which instance would HIL be most
useful? Why?
9.8 Propose your own architecture for UAS design by selecting a combination of open-
source tools. What disciplines must be included? What analytical tools offer the
most value?
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10
UAS Airframe Design
Michael T. Most and Michael Stroup
10.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

10.2 A Few Observations Regarding UAS Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
10.2.1 Form Follows Function: The Best Place to Begin the Design Process. . . . . . . 216
10.2.2 Economic Influences on the Design Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
10.2.3 Exogenous Factors Affecting the Design of UASs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
10.2.4 Selected Preliminary Comments Relevant to UAS Flight
Dynamics and Physics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
10.3 Airframe Designs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
10.3.1 Fixed-Wing Designs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
10.3.1.1 Factors in UAS Tail Designs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
10.3.1.2 Conventional Wing, Inverted-T-Tail Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
10.3.1.3 Conventional Fuselage, Aft Engine Designs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
10.3.1.4 Twin-Boom, Pusher-Propeller Designs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
10.3.1.5 Flying Wings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
10.3.1.6 Canard UASs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
10.3.2 Rotating-Wing or Rotary-Wing Designs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
10.3.2.1 Helicopter UAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
10.3.2.2 Multirotors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
10.3.2.3 Other Rotating-Wing UASs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
10.4 Launch and Recovery Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
10.5 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
10.1 Introduction
Of necessity, the design of any given unmanned aircraft system (UAS) will correspond
directly to the intended mission of the platform—in the case of unmanned aircraft (UA),
form truly follows function. Any UA that does not conform to this basic principle will
fail to optimize mission goals. For example, infrastructure inspections (e.g., bridges,
monuments, flue gas stacks, wind turbine blades, and towers) may demand stable, low-
vibration platforms to obtain the high-resolution images necessary to ensure the integ-
rity of the structure under examination. In these applications, a high degree of endurance
and range may not be a major requirement, and a multirotor (quad-, hexa-, or octocopter)
UA, powered by an electric motor, may be best suited to the mission. On the other hand,
213
214
while covering larger areas searching for pipeline failures, abandoned mine shafts, or a lost
hiker may not require high-definition imagery, the mission will dictate greater range and
endurance. In this latter example, a conventionally configured fixed-wing aircraft, having
a high fineness ratio fuselage and wings of high aspect ratio powered by a gasoline, recip-
rocating engine may be best suited to the mission. In the civilian world, for the foreseeable
future, obtaining remotely sensed data as one step in delivering a finished data product is
often the very reason for the development of a particular UA platform and its associated
systems. Thus, the mission is currently a significant factor in determining the selection or
configuration and design of a UAS.
Due to the multifaceted functionality of UASs and the diversity of operations suited
to the application of this technology (as documented throughout this book), UA run
the design gamut between small UAs that fit in the palm of one’s hand (e.g., IAI Malat
Mosquito and the Prox Dynamic Black Hornet Nano, which weighs approximately 16 g,
or just over one-half ounce) to large fixed-wing aircraft, such as the Boeing SolarEagle,
designed by the Phantom Works to incorporate a wing spanning more than 120 m, and the
General Atomics Avenger with internal weapons bay and a GTOW over 7,700 Kg (17,000
pounds), and beyond. Between these design extremes are small UASs (sUAS), such as the
vectored thrust, ducted fan vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) craft, the Honeywell RQ-16
T-Hawk (named for the Tarantula Hawk, a waspish insect found in the Southwest desert),
helicopters, multirotors, and fixed-wing aircraft comparable in size to corporate jets (at
about 16.8 m, the wingspan of a General Atomics Gray Eagle approaches that of many
Learjets, Citations, etc.), or even larger aircraft (the wingspan of a Northrop Grumman
Global Hawk/Euro Hawk7 surpasses that of a Boeing 727 or Airbus A320). The choice of
UAS powerplants is similarly diverse, ranging from pure turbine, turbofan, turboprop,
two and four stroke gasoline and heavy fuel engines (HFEs), Wankel, hybrid electric and
typical of smaller UASs, and pure electric utilizing lithium chemistry battery technology
(see Table 10.1).
Given such diversity, providing an in-depth, detailed discussion of all design consid-
erations is far beyond the scope of this chapter, or even of a book of this size. Rather, the
author’s intention is to outline design considerations as influenced by mission goals and
performance and payload constraints, while providing a general overview of common
designs and the reasons behind the decisions resulting in the selection of these over others
in a diverse field of alternate platforms.
10.2 A Few Observations Regarding UAS Design

What factors should most influence the process of UAS design or the selection, for a particular
mission, of an existing platform? Useful load? Maximum sustainable speed? Airframe sta-
bility? Freedom from vibration? Safety? Though not possible to remove all risk from flight
operations, attempts to completely eliminate it are often counterproductive, excessively
restrict operations, research, and development, and can produce a catatonic state wherein
paralysis inhibits innovation and impedes progress. We can expect, at least for the larger
Group 3, 4 and 5 UAS, FAA regulations anomalous to FAR 23, 25, etc., to become a reality
when National Airspace Systemaccess becomes a reality. Reliability? Maintainability?
Expected life cycle? Endurance and range? (It should be noted, parenthetically, that these
215
UAS Airframe Design 215
TABLE 10.1
Generally Accepted UAV “Groups”
Maximum Gross Normal
Takeoff Weight Operating
Category Size (MGTW) (lbs) Altitude (ft) Airspeed (knots) Representative UAS
Group 1 Small 0–20 <1,200 AGL* <100 Raven (RQ-11),

WASP
Group 2 Medium 21–55 <3,500 <250 Scan Eagle
Group 3 Large <1320 <18,000 MSL** <250 Shadow (RQ-7B),
Tier II/STUAS
Group 4 Larger >1320 <18,000 MSL Any airspeed Fire Scout (MQ-8B,
RQ-8B), Predator
(MQ-1A/B), Sky
Warrior ERMP
(MQ-1C)
Group 5 Largest >1320 >18,000 Any airspeed Reaper(MQ-9A),
Global Hawk
(RQ-4), BAMS
(RQ-4N)
last two characteristics are closely related, but the terms are not strictly interchangeable.
For example, if an aircraft flies very, very slowly while consuming small amounts of power,
it may exhibit limited range, but high endurance. Conversely, an aircraft that flies very fast
while consuming large amounts of power may have great range, but limited endurance.)
The answer to the question posed at the outset of this paragraph is that the consideration
of each of these design attributes is certainly important, but none, by itself, is substantially
overriding. Trading various combinations of these requirements with customer involve-
ment can help focus the design on the intended mission thereby helping the customer
understand the cost of each requirement in terms of its effect on other requirements, par-
ticularly cost and endurance. For example, carrying an anti-/de-icing system on every
flight for the entire life of a UA will add 2%–7% of the weight and add 5%–10% to the air-
frame cost, when perhaps most missions will rarely if ever occur during icing conditions.
In this case, perhaps, only a portion of the aircraft, such as the engine inlet/s, need to be
protected from ice accumulation.
However, two preeminent factors do exist. As previously mentioned, the nature of the
intended mission should take precedence above all other factors in a ground-up design
or in the decision to select an existing platform for a particular application. The second
factor of paramount importance is cognitive and it lies at the heart of the design process.
It is the realization that any UAS platform should be chosen or designed according to the
rule of interdependent synergism, a phrase which means that the interrelationship of all
subsystems and components function together in a way that maximizes system perform-
ance. Only when the entire design is considered as a synergistic construction of individual
components with sometimes competing system demands and often diametric operational
constraints, can it be realized that the design of any given UA system is a trade-off; similar
to a linear programming problem wherein the optimization of the entire system may
only result from the sometimes-suboptimal performance of individual components and
subsystems that are integrated to form the UA system.
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For example, perhaps the endurance of an electric aircraft is insufficient to complete its
intended mission of surveying an area of specified dimensions. Increasing the size of the
battery (in terms of ampere-hour capacity) will allow the aircraft to stay aloft longer, but
doing so will also diminish useful load, and therefore, decrease the choice of payloads
available to gather data for the mission. This situation could then necessitate the installa-
tion of a smaller, lighter, but disproportionately more expensive sensor package. Installing
a larger, heavier battery may also alter the center of gravity (CG) and negatively affect
other performance and aerodynamic characteristics. Or, perhaps, a hand-launched electric
airplane is difficult to get airborne on a windless day. Choosing a more powerful motor
and installing a larger propeller having less blade angle may improve launches, but will
also reduce endurance unless a higher capacity (larger and heavier) battery is installed,
which will, again, reduce flexibility in payload selection, and alter other performance
characteristics as the domino effect associated with a simple alteration manifests itself.
This effect applies to all aircraft regardless of method of propulsion. The point is, and it is
an important one, that the aircraft platform and all subsystems and components should
function as a complete system to achieve optimal overall operational capability of the
UAS in achieving mission goal. Maximizing mission effectiveness, however, is often only
achieved at the expense of suboptimal performance at the component level. Maximizing
overall design capability can be an extremely complex process, often, at once, both art and
science. Humorously, the conceptual engineer might have a sense that they are close to an
optimal design when they have achieved equal displeasure from each subsystem subject
matter expert (SME).
10.2.1 Form Follows Function: The Best Place to Begin the Design Process
Because “form follows function,” the most likely “best place” to begin the design pro-
cess is to consider the intended mission of the UA. Keep in mind that the UAS is exactly
that—a systemic entity composed of components and subsystems, and any design
change to any element of the system has the potential to affect the entire system. At the
most basic level, the UA exists only as a platform to carry the payload necessary to suc-
cessfully accomplish the intended mission. The mission, in turn, will determine factors
such as the type of payload (number, weight, and configuration of sensors), endur-
ance, and possibly aircraft structure/configuration. Payload will, in turn, influence
the vehicle weight, powerplant selection, and structural design among other factors.
Endurance requirements will affect design choices such as fuselage/wing design (i.e., to
minimize aerodynamic drag), fuel load (and consequently gross weight), powerplant,
etc. The amount, type, and cost of UA ground support equipment (GSE) as well as the
choice and design of launch and recovery subsystems will also be affected by the overall
UA design as determined by the mission. Consequently, because the mission affects
every aspect of airframe, powerplant, and system architecture and integration, the most
fundamental design consideration is how to best configure the UA for its intended pur-
pose. The entire engineering team must, at the outset of the design process, monitor and
police weight estimates, and additionally hold back a certain percentage of available
takeoff weight with an understanding that the manifestation of “Mystery Mass” invari-
ably materializes. In other words, an aircraft when first built, often gains weight from
its intended design. Going into an aircraft design with the understanding that every air-
craft over time is tasked with carrying heavier loads can help influence design choices.
A weight increase of 20% or more is not uncommon over the production life of a UA, so
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accommodating for that early in the design process, will add value to the UA and help
extend the life cycle.
10.2.2 Economic Influences on the Design Process

As a rule of thumb, the design process should begin with consideration of the type of
mission that is to be flown, but economic factors cannot be ignored. In general, as the
size of the platform increases, so do the costs associated with both manufacturing and
operations (e.g., those expenses associated with maintenance, support, and operation). For
example, the cost of operating a UAS not requiring substantial logistical support, invest-
ment in GSE, or a large, mobile ground control station (GCS) may be only 20%–40% of
that necessary for a manned aircraft performing a similar mission, whereas, associated
expenses will double for larger UA performing the same mission (Austin 2010). In fact,
although affording definite advantages of not needing to carry people on board, the add-
itional investment in technology and the extra operational and personnel costs associated
with operating larger UASs (e.g., a Reaper or Global Hawk) may approach those associated
with manned aircraft.
If the UA is to be more than a “one-off,” mission-specific design (i.e., produced in quan-
tity, particularly for commercial distribution), life-cycle costs become significant. Broadly,
these fall into one of two categories: (1) nonrecurring costs (testing, research and devel-
opment [R&D], tooling, start-up costs, etc.), which must be recouped over the anticipated
life of the UAS, and (2) recurring costs over the life of the product. Life-cycle costs may be
viewed from the perspective of either the manufacturer or the operator. The manufacturer’s
life-cycle costs are those encountered during the production life of the platform, including
costs that are nonrecurring, whereas those incurred by the owner/operator are associated
with the fulfillment of mission requirements during the life of the UAS and do reoccur.
The design of both manned and UA must achieve some necessary threshold of perform-
ance and reliability while minimizing life-cycle costs. From the operator’s perspective,
life-cycle costs derive not only from operating costs, but also include the initial purchase
price of the platform, GSE, training, and ultimately the disposal of the aircraft and ground
systems. The two perspectives on life cycle are related through acquisition costs, which
include a portion of the manufacturer’s initial development and design costs. The two
perspectives on life-cycle costs are further associated through operating costs. If reliability
is low and maintenance, support, and fuel costs are high, then the manufacturer will likely
sell fewer units over the production run that will, in turn, increase the operator’s life-cycle
costs. Thus, efficiency, which affects endurance, range, reliability, and maintainability, is
important design consideration.
Frequently, the aircraft customer will have “threshold” (minimum acceptable perform-
ance) and “objective” (ideal) requirements. This can create quite the dilemma. Objective
requirements will generally add to the cost. Achieving the threshold requirements with a
UAS may be necessary, but each objective requirement must clearly add significantly and
disproportionally more value to the system to outweigh the lowest bidder reflex of the
customer.
10.2.3 Exogenous Factors Affecting the Design of UASs

The builder or manufacturer cannot control all factors influencing design. Those design
factors falling outside the designer’s purview of control authority and yet which must
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be incorporated into the UA platform are referred to as exogenous design factors, that is,
attributes dictated by other than economic, intended mission, aerodynamic, airframe, or
propulsions system considerations, but rather by requirements outside the immediate
design process. Examples of exogenous design influences include industry standards that
frequently inform, or even drive, FAA regulations. Sources of such standards, which pro-
vide guidance for all aspects of UAS operation, construction, maintenance, and design,
are manifold and include private entities (ARINC, ASTM, RTCA), trade organizations
(AUVSI), professional organizations (SAE), and ad hoc committees of industry leaders.
As part of the regulatory process, the FAA solicits input and recommendations from
representatives of these organizations who constitute either full (ARAC) or partial (ARC)
membership of the respective rulemaking committees; thus, the influence of these groups
can be very significant. Just as occurred in manned aviation, increasing regulation of UAS
flight is inevitable and without foreseeable end. Additional examples might include aes-
thetic details such as wing tips, winglets (even though performance does not warrant
inclusion), or a particular tail configuration as that might be regarded as a “Brand” of the
company, etc.
Although industry influence of the design (and operation) of UASs is closely bound
to the regulatory process, the influence of industry standards may be strong without the
undergirding force of the federal government. An example from manned aircraft is the
adoption of the Air Transport Association (ATA) system of organizing technical and main-
tenance data for complex and turbine-powered aircraft. Although the ATA-100 coding
system was never enacted as a regulation, the adoption by airlines, manufacturers, cor-
porate flight departments, and maintenance operations has been complete. Because the
major airframe and powerplant manufacturers providing parts, spares, components, and
aircraft to the operators of corporate and transport category aircraft began using the ATA
system, all entities in any way affiliated with the industry were forced to adopt and inte-
grate these into all relevant aspects of their operations. In this way, the industry-developed
standard of ATA coding came to carry the weight of regulation without regulatory action.
It is not unlikely that a similar form of pervasive adoption of certain industry standards, as
exogenous design influences, will also occur in the UA industry as it evolves and matures.
10.2.4 Selected Preliminary Comments Relevant to UAS Flight

Dynamics and Physics
Editor’s note to reader: This section of the chapter is focused on a more detailed discussion of aero-
dynamics and may not be of interest to all readers.
Regardless of size or configuration, that is, whether fixed wing or rotary wing, UASs
share most design features associated with their manned counterparts. (Occupant safety
is an obvious distinction as UA have no occupants.) The reason is that UA are subject to
the same physical laws and flight dynamics as manned aircraft. Both manned and UA
operate in the viscous fluid of the atmosphere. The same four forces, the gravitational
pull of the earth on the mass of the aircraft (weight), aerodynamic drag, thrust, and lift,
all affect both manned and UA in flight. These forces are interrelated. Lift acts opposite
(counteracts) aircraft weight. An increase in weight reduces range and endurance while
increasing drag and the amount of thrust necessary for a desired level of performance
(Hurt 1965). Thrust opposes drag, which, in part, develops from the creation of lift and
from the production of thrust, and, yet, the generation of thrust contributes to total drag
(e.g., nacelles, cowls, propeller components, and powerplant cooling systems are sources
of parasite drag).
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FIGURE 10.1
Skunk Works® 3 + Mach D-21 under development. (Image courtesy of Lockheed Martin Skunk Works®.)
Drag is the sum of all forces opposing movement of an aircraft through the viscous
medium of the atmosphere. Total aircraft drag develops from multiple sources. As stated,
creating lift produces induced drag, the result of tip vortices. High-pressure air spills from
under lower wing surface, curling around the wingtips into the low-pressure area above
to create a swirl of air, or vortex, trailing off the tip and behind and below the aircraft. The
dissipation of energy in these vortices is the source of drag attributable to a wing gener-
ating lift. The horizontal tail can also contribute induced drag. The remainder of total drag
is referred to as parasite drag. Components of parasite drag include skin friction, form
drag, base drag, interference drag, cooling drag, leakage drag, and the strong influence
of compressibility effects, sometimes referred to as compressibility drag or wave drag.
Because airflows may pass through the speed of sound (Mach) as it accelerates over the
cambered surfaces of airfoils and other curved surfaces of the airframe (e.g., the canopy)
when the airspeed of the aircraft is around 75% of Mach (or, 0.75M), compressibility drag
is a factor in the design of a very few UA (e.g., the Lockheed Martin QF-16, the 3+ Mach
D-21 developed at Lockheed’s Skunk Works® and Boeing’s scramjet-powered, hypersonic
X-51 Waverider) (Figures 10.1 and 10.2).
The remaining sources of parasite drag, to some extent, all affect the performance
(e.g., range, endurance, useful load, and required thrust) of a UAS. Skin friction drag
develops from the shearing stresses that dissipate energy in the thin boundary layer
above the surfaces of the aircraft. Trim drag resulting from typically forward CG
conditions requiring tail lift downward, resulting in added induced drag from the hori-
zontal tail and increased induced drag from the main wing having to compensate for
this down force with additional lift (possible reduced elevator pitch control authority
as a consequence).
Leakage drag, which is generally associated with fixed-wing aircraft and accounts for
1%–2% of total drag (Sadraey 2009), results from the change in momentum of the air
flowing through the gaps between fixed and moveable surfaces (e.g., ailerons, flying wing
flaperons, elevators, rudders, flaps, ruddervators). Based on the frontal area presented to
the airstream, form drag (aka, pressure drag or flat plate drag) results from the unbalanced
pressure distributions across the area of the projected shape presented to the viscous flow
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FIGURE 10.2
Artist’s illustration of the X-51 Waverider. (Image courtesy of NASA.)
and the turbulence it creates. Thrust must overcome this pressure differential in order to
move the aircraft forward. Interference drag results from the energy losses resulting from
the interaction of airflows at the juncture of various components. When stabilizers join
empennage and wings mate to the fuselage, the flows converge and interact to produce
turbulence, shearing, and separation of the boundary layers—all of which are wasteful of
energy—creating interference drag. The presence of a fuselage, in fact, disrupts the other-
wise elliptical lift distribution a wing typically creates adding to drag and for the same
loads can increase bending moments. The existence of interference drag explains why total
drag is actually greater than the sum of all the drag acting on all components of the air-
craft (see Figure 10.3). Finally, cooling drag results from the loss of momentum and total
pressure in the air flowing over the powerplant and/or heat exchangers to carry away heat
(Sadraey 2009).
Increased drag translates into reduced payload, range, and endurance—all important
design considerations. Features intended to reduce drag are apparent in the design of all
UASs, but these are generally a more important consideration in fixed-wing aircraft where
mission goals require the ability to stay aloft for extended periods. For example, consider
the following: Elliptical wingtips and high aspect ratio (AR) wings reduce induced drag.
(In its simplest form, for a symmetrical, Hershey-bar wing, the aspect ratio is simply a
comparison of the length of the wing to its chord. For tapered wings, where the chord
varies from root to tip, AR is expressed as the square of the wingspan compared to the sur-
face area of the wing. B^2/S)
The drivers of L/D (lift divided by drag) are fundamentally the wing span and wetted
area (the surface area that is in contact with the external airflow). This is called the “wetted
aspect ratio” and defined as the span^2/total wetted area. This parameter, like aspect
ratio, is to be maximized for increased L/D until other physical constraints dominate the
design (Raymer 1992). High aspect ratio wings are long and narrow. Think about it this
way: An infinitely long wing would have no tips, produce no vortices, and induce no drag.
As the span of the wing goes to infinity so, too, does the aspect ratio. Just as high aspect
ratio wings decrease induced drag, so, too, does a high fineness ratio fuselage reduce form
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FIGURE 10.3
Elliptical Lift Distribution interrupted by fuselage. (Image courtesy of GA-ASI.)
drag. The fineness ratio is a comparison of the length of the fuselage to its width. A short
wide fuselage has a low fineness ratio; a long narrow one exhibits a high fineness ratio.
When one carefully examines the design of the fixed-wing UAS, high aspect and fineness
ratios are frequently very apparent (examples include the Aeromapper EV2, the Hi Aero
Gabbiano, General Atomics MQ-9 series, and the IDETEC Stardust). A high-wing aircraft
suffers less interference drag than a mid-wing design as the adverse pressure gradient over
the aft top region of the wing has no interfering fuselage boundary layer. However, the
presence of the fuselage, as mentioned above, impairs upwash, downwash, and thus lift.
See Figure 10.3 (High-wing UASs include several Israeli Aerospace Industry [IAI], designs,
e.g., Heron, Searcher, Mastiff, and Hunter, and the designs they influenced, e.g., the RQ-2
Pioneer and the RQ-7 Shadow.) Control surface hinges of sUAS are sometimes nothing
more than an extension of the airframe material (e.g., carbon fiber cloth) or covering; these
surfaces are attached by a thin skin of plastic film or composite and run the length of the
surface, thus completely eliminating leakage drag. Larger UASs tend to employ hinge and
actuation schemes similar to manned aircraft. Additional characteristics will subsequently
be discussed, but the necessity to minimize drag will always be among the factors to be
given careful consideration in the design of any UAS, but most particularly those of fixed-
wing configuration.
Heavier-than-air craft, whether manned or unmanned, whether fixed-or rotary-wing,
must develop lift to fly. Lift is the force opposing the gravitational pull of the earth on
the aircraft, weight. All heavier-than-air craft, whether manned or unmanned, develop lift
according to the same laws of physics. External aerodynamic forces acting on the surfaces
of an airfoil (i.e., a wing) are attributable to two forces: air pressure (or pressure differen-
tial) and air friction. Of these two forces, friction, which occurs in a very thin fluid layer
existing at the wing surface, is much the lesser, and, for most considerations, can be ignored
to produce an idealized condition for study (Hurt 1965). Thus, in this generalized, or ideal
state, lift acting on an airfoil, whether it be a wing, propeller, or rotor blade, can be said
to develop as a function of pressure differentials acting across opposing airfoil surfaces in
conjunction with Newton’s 3rd law of motion (action/reaction) as the air is acted upon by
the shape of the airfoil.
A distinguishing characteristic of subsonic flow is that changes in velocity and pressure
occur with relatively minor changes in density—for most purposes, these can be considered
222
negligible. This is another simplifying assumption, and is the reason subsonic airflow is
said to be “incompressible”—if the density of the flow is held constant, then changes in
pressure and velocity become the significant factors in producing lift. In its most simplified
form, Bernoulli’s equation states that total pressure equals the sum of dynamic pressure
plus static pressure. According to the Bernoulli equation, or Bernoulli’s principle (and
Newtonian physics), because the mass flow remains unchanged, variations in velocity
result in corresponding, but inverse changes in pressure, and vice versa. Thus, as the vel-
ocity (dynamic pressure) of the airflow over the cambered surface of an airfoil increases,
static pressure above that surface decreases, while total pressure remains unchanged.
The force of lift develops as a result of the pressure differential acting across airfoil surfaces.
If we are describing a wing during flight with a more cambered upper surface, then lift is
the result of the decreased static pressure (attributable to increased air velocity) acting
above the wing’s surface, and greater pressure (due to lesser airflow acceleration) on the
lower surface (and possibly some amount of impact pressure resulting from wing angle
of incidence). In the same way, the rotating blades of a helicopter main rotor produce lift
that is controlled to produce thrust, the force opposing drag, for propulsion and, also, for
maneuvering. Similarly, a propeller converts the shaft horsepower (shp) output from the
UAS powerplant to a propulsive force by rotating in an air mass to produce a pressure dif-
ferential across the propeller back (cambered surface) and the flat face (surface having the
higher pressure). An alternative explanation is that the thrust resulting from the acceler-
ation of a mass of air through the propeller (or rotor) disk develops according to Newtonian
mechanics, that is, according to the laws of the conservation of momentum, energy, and
mass (Seddon 1990). Thrust produced by any propeller or propulsor is represented by the
letter “F,” for force, and equals the product of the mass of air and the amount of acceler-
ation imparted to that air mass (i.e., F = m × a).
Unfortunately, a propeller is not terribly efficient at converting shaft horsepower to
thrust. Propeller efficiencies may fall between 50% and 87%, though some newer NASA
airfoils and advanced planform designs, as incorporated in the unducted fan (or propfan)
powerplants developed for manned aircraft during the 1980s, were able to achieve around
90% conversion of input power to thrust. Geometric pitch is the theoretical distance a given
point on the propeller (usually measured at the 75% radius or spanwise blade station)
should advance in one revolution if no inefficiencies were present. Effective pitch is the
actual distance a propeller moves through the air under specified conditions. The difference
between geometric and effective pitch is referred to as slip. (More will be said about these
terms in the section on UAS powerplants.) Propeller slip results from inefficiencies and
represents losses in the conversion of input power to thrust. Factors that reduce the ability
of the propeller to effectively propel (i.e., “pull” or “push”) the aircraft through the air
include, for example, aerodynamic drag, suboptimal angles of attack that produce stalled
regions on the blade, and energy lost to vibration, noise, and tip flutter. These conditions
result in energy conversions (or, losses) that diminish performance and account for the
difference between the expected distance of travel (geometric pitch) and the actual dis-
tance covered (effective pitch) in a single revolution. Successively outboard blade stations
travel increasingly greater distances, and consequently, at correspondingly higher speeds.
The blade shank, the thick, noncambered section located just outboard of the hub, is trav-
eling at a much slower rate than the propeller tip. Because the amount of lift produced
by an airfoil section at a given blade station is a function of both airspeed (of the relative
wind) and angle of attack, the propeller manufacturer designs the propeller so that its
blade angle decreases from hub to tip. This is referred to as propeller twist. Twisting the
blades in this way produces more uniform pressure distributions (lift) across the propeller
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disk, maintaining a relatively acceptable angle of attack while preventing blade sections
from either stalling or “turbining” (being driven like a pinwheel). Twisting the blades
improves propeller efficiency. Because accelerating a larger mass of air to a lower velocity
for a given amount of thrust (recall that force, in this case, thrust, is the product of mass
times acceleration) requires exponentially less energy (energy consumption increases as
the square of the increase in acceleration), larger propeller diameters have the potential to
produce thrust more efficiently, but the design trade-off is that increased tip speeds intro-
duce higher energy (and power) losses. Similarly, adding blades using three or four instead
of two holds the potential to accelerate a greater amount of air through the propeller disk,
but the increased losses due to drag and the additional weight and complexity (especially
in a constant speed design) may offset any potential efficiency gains. Martin Hepperle has
a great section on his website explaining in more detail the factors influencing propeller
design. www.mh-aerotools.de/airfoils/propuls4.htm
The preceding highlights several of the ways sUAS designs are similar to those of
manned aircraft. However, due to scale effects among other factors, certain differences
also exist. On average, the size (mass) of both unmanned fixed-and rotary-wing air-
craft are orders of magnitude less than their manned counterparts (Austin 2010). As we
“scale down” aircraft to smaller sizes, all attributes are not affected in the same way. For
example, wing surface area, being two dimensional, will vary inversely as the square of
the scaling factor, whereas volume, a cubic, will vary inversely as the cube of the scaling
factor. Thus, all other factors held constant, wing loading—that is, weight (mass in the
gravitational field of the earth) divided by wing area—tends to increase with a decrease in
UA size. Higher wing loading affects aircraft performance, decreasing the rate of climb and
increasing stall speed. Decreasing the rate of climb may negatively affect endurance, and
consequently, range. Increased stall speed increases stress on all recovery structures (main
and nose landing gear system primarily). Higher wing loading may compel the designer
to use a catapult launch system in lieu of the less equipment intensive hand launch. Higher
wing loading also reduces maneuverability. Conversely, any reduction in mass affects the
ability of the UAS to resist the disturbing or upset force of wind gusts, an important con-
sideration in many data gathering missions. Neither are rotorcraft immune to the effects
of reduced scale. Narrower blade chords and smaller rotor disks produce low Reynolds
numbers, which reduce the efficiency and lift of the rotor system (Seddon 1990) that, in
turn, decreases range, endurance, and payload. Thus, in UAS design, size is important,
affecting several operational characteristics that may, in turn, affect the ability of the plat-
form to meet mission requirements.
So, to bring the conversation full circle, vehicle size will frequently be dictated by the
mission. A large platform may be necessary for stability, to carry enough fuel for the
desired range and endurance and to mount the necessary sensor package or payload.
Additionally, electrical power consumption of the various payloads can push engine sizes
larger to meet this demand. Or, the agility of a smaller UAS package may be desirable
for close-up work and for negotiating the tight spaces encountered during infrastructure
inspections. On the other hand, an inappropriately sized UA may reduce system perform-
ance. Selection of appropriate design attributes and platform size and configuration or
of an existing unmanned platform design that will optimize performance and effectively
and efficiently fulfill the mission is best accomplished through the judicious selection
of components and the careful consideration of the performance of the overall system.
During the selection or design process, keep in mind that the overall UA system should
be a synergistic assembly of individual components with sometimes competing system
demands and often opposed operational constraints. The selection or design process is one
224
of reconciling these inconsistencies to maximize performance. Often, optimization of the

entire system (to achieve the mission goal) may only be achieved by sacrificing perform-
ance of certain individual components and subsystems, which are integrated to form the
UA system.
10.3 Airframe Designs

UAS designs may be broadly categorized according to how these aircraft develop lift. That
is, whether the wings are fixed with relation to the airframe and carried forward with the
aircraft through the atmosphere or whether, alternately, the lifting airfoil rotates around a
fixed axis providing the capability of producing lift with zero airspeed and, theoretically,
in an infinite number of directions. Whether fixed-or rotary-wing, UA in each class are
designed in a myriad of configurations. This section of the chapter is devoted to an over-
view of UA airframe designs, corresponding attributes and considerations, as well as the
advantages and disadvantages of types discussed.
10.3.1 Fixed-Wing Designs

For a variety of reasons, some of which have been discussed, UA are produced with much
greater design diversity than those that are manned. For example, 70% of the latter are
configured with a low wing and a T-tail or inverted-T empennage (Louge et al. 2004),
whereas UASs are commonly designed with tail/empennage configurations that include
cruciform (the Navy’s Ion Tiger), T-tail (the Rustom-H and the Hi Aero Gabbiano), inverted-
T (Northrop Falconer), V-tail (Northrop Grumman Global Hawk), inverted-V (General
Atomics Predator), H-tail (AAI RQ-2 Pioneer), and Y-tail (General Atomics Reaper) sta-
bilizer/control surface groups. Each has characteristics that may recommend them to a
certain design solution. V-tails are an attempt to reduce the parts count and the wetted
area (surface areas in contact with air flows) of the tail surfaces over those of the T-tail/
inverted-T designs, whereas, since air flowing off the vertical stabilizer is constrained by
structure, induced drag may be diminished with the latter designs (though at the cost
of some increase in parasite drag). Some claim that the cruciform design combines the
advantages of the T-tail and inverted-T designs (Sadraey 2009). Because the tailplane of
an H-tail is bookended by the vertical stabilizers, wingtip vortices that trail off of the hori-
zontal stabilizer and form behind the aircraft are reduced decreasing induced drag. In
comparison to a V-tail, the Y-tail design increases yaw stability and provides protection
for the propeller during rotation and flare with a penalty in increased wetted area and,
correspondingly, in drag. UAS wing configurations include conventional high-, mid-, low-
wing aircraft, canards, and flying-wing designs. Certain of the flying-wing designs have a
distinctive fuselage (Insitu ScanEagle and Gatewing X100), while others are of all-wing or
blended wing-body construction (NASA’s Helios, Boeing’s X-48, and the Skywalker X8).
(Because no humans are aboard, the fuselage may be entirely omitted, and the blended
wing-body/flying-wing design is increasingly being used as an sUAS remote-sensing plat-
form.) In general, the process of designing a UAS affords greater freedom in the selection of
configuration (Gundlach 2012). Compared to manned aircraft, much greater design diver-
sity exists in the global fleet of aircraft, which are flown unmanned. According to Gundlach
(2012, 128), as a design consideration, UAS “[t]‌ails are the artistic pallet of the designer.”
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10.3.1.1 Factors in UAS Tail Designs

The purpose of the tail is to provide stability and the control moments needed to trim and
maneuver the aircraft. Control (or maneuverability) and stability are antithetical design
considerations, increasing one diminishes the other. To illustrate this point, it might be
mentioned, parenthetically, that with the introduction of computer-assisted fly-by-wire
systems, it became possible to destabilize fighter designs (i.e., to introduce negative static
stability into the aircraft) to make them more maneuverable and reduce supersonic trim
drag. The General Dynamics F-16 was the first aircraft intentionally designed to incorp-
orate a slight aerodynamic instability, which is known as relaxed static stability (rss)
(Figure 10.4).
An aircraft maneuvers through three dimensions of space, and its lifting, controlling, and
stabilizing surfaces must consequently provide control and stability about three axes: dir-
ectional stability/control (yaw) about the vertical, or “z” axis; lateral stability/control (roll)
about the longitudinal, or “x” axis; and longitudinal stability/control (pitch) about the
lateral, or “y” axis. The tail is primarily responsible for controlling motion about the y-
and z-axes. The stabilizing tail surfaces, the vertical and horizontal stabilizers in a con-
ventionally configured design, are airfoiled surfaces, and with the wing, these are termed
“lifting surfaces” to differentiate them from the aircraft control surfaces (i.e., ailerons,
rudder, and elevator). (On nonconventionally configured aircraft, the control surfaces
might be, on a flying-wing UAS, elevons, or on an aircraft with an inverted-V-or V-tail air-
craft, ruddervators.) In a conventionally designed aircraft, the empennage is the aft-most,
skinned structure to which vertical and horizontal tailplanes attach.
To provide pitch (longitudinal) stability, an aft-mounted tail assembly must provide
an increasing tail down force with increasing velocity to counter the increasing pitching
moment of the wing. When properly designed, this surface produces lift in the direction
opposite the wing. The aerodynamic center (AC) of the wing is the location on the chord of
the wing about which pitching moments occur. Incompressible airfoil theory predicts that
the AC will fall at 25% chord regardless of wing camber, thickness, and angle of attack. In
actuality, the unpredictable, chaotic nature of air flow causes the AC to fall between 23%
FIGURE 10.4
General Dynamics F-16 was the first aircraft designed with relaxed static stability (rss). (Image courtesy
of NASA.)
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and 27% (Hurt 1965). Think about the AC as the lateral axis (y-axis) about which pitch
changes occur and the fulcrum about which the aircraft is balanced. With the CG of the
aircraft located forward of the AC, the tail-down force acts as a counterbalance. If airspeed
decays, less down force is produced, the nose drops, airspeed increases, and the equilib-
rium is restored. In this way, the horizontal stabilizer contributes to longitudinal (static)
stability. This relationship between the AC and the tail-down force produced by the tail-
plane is also why adverse loading of the aircraft to move the CG aft of the AC is too often
disastrous: Both CG and tail-down force are acting in concert to cause the aircraft nose to
pitch up and reduce, possibly catastrophically, control while simultaneously increasing the
likelihood of a stall. Moreover, to provide pitch stability, especially at lower airspeeds, an
aft tail must not stall before the wing—doing so would cause a loss of tail-down force and
a severe pitch break while the aircraft wing continues to produce lift. This design require-
ment is generally accomplished using a tailplane with a lower aspect ratio than the wing,
which increases the range of angle of attack before a stall occurs (Gundlach 2012).
In a conventionally designed aircraft, the vertical stabilizer is the primary source of dir-
ectional control and stability. (Although a wing, especially one that is swept, will con-
tribute to static directional stability, any effect is relatively slight.) Should the aircraft yaw,
or sideslip, the change in angle of attack of the vertical stabilizer causes a side force (change
in pressure differential acting on the major surfaces of the vertical stabilizer) to yaw the
aircraft about the CG in a restoring moment that will turn the nose of the aircraft into the
relative wind. The size of the vertical stabilizer and the arm (distance between the stabil-
izer and the CG, or x-axis) will determine the effectiveness of the stabilizer in creating a
restoring force following any displacement of the nose in yaw.
The trade-off in any tail design is effectiveness in producing the desired stability and con-
trol moments versus weight and parasite drag. Consequently, as a general rule of thumb,
the tail should be no larger than that which produces the desired level of stability and con-
trol. A number of other factors affect the decision regarding the selection of configuration
(whether T-tail, Y-tail, V-tail, etc.), and these will be subsequently discussed.
In closing this section, it might be worth noting that the design of all aspects of manned
aircraft, from nose to tail and wingtip to wingtip, is guided and constrained by the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 14, entitled Aeronautics and Space (e.g., CFR 14, Parts 23,
25, 27, 33, and 35). In the emerging field of UA, group 3–5 design engineers use relevant
sections of accepted industry and regulatory design guidance to guide UA airframe design
as UA are increasingly integrated into the National Airspace.
10.3.1.2 Conventional Wing, Inverted-T-Tail Aircraft

Gundlach (2012) offers a generalized definition of conventional aircraft describing these as
constructions with tail surfaces located behind the wing. For the purpose of the ensuing
discussion, this definition will be narrowed by restricting the definition to those aircraft
having tail surfaces installed in an inverted-T configuration (i.e., vertical and horizontal
stabilizers attached to the empennage). During the time of UAS infancy, UA were manned
aircraft modified to fly without an onboard operator (i.e., as a true drone, remotely piloted
aircraft [RPA], or autonomous UAS). Consequently, manned and UA were nearly identical
and of conventional design. Examples include the Hewitt-Sperry Automatic Airplane (or
Curtiss-Sperry Flying Bomb), Lawrence “Burst” Sperry’s Verville-Sperry M-1 Messenger,
DeHaviland’s Tiger-Moth-based Queen Bee, the B-17s of Operation Aphrodite, and the
B-24/PB4Ys of Operation Anvil (see Figure 10.5). During WWII, the U.S. developed
purpose- built UA. These incorporated the common- for-the-
time forward wing and
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FIGURE 10.5
Upon completion of its 80th combat mission, the B-17 Flying Fortress, The Careful Virgin, was transferred to
Operation Aphrodite and deployed, as an RPA, against V-1 emplacements in France. (Army Air Corps image.)
inverted-T empennage, having a vertical stabilizer/rudder, forming the leg of the “T” and
a horizontal tailplane/elevator located at the bottom of the vertical member to create the
characteristic inverted-T shape. All surfaces attached to a tapered empennage. Examples
include the low-wing Interstate TDR-1, the high-wing Denny Radioplane OQ-1/2/TDD-1
(and its descendent, the Northrup MQM-57 Falconer), and the high-wing Naval Aircraft
Factory TDN-1. UAS designs that resemble conventionally designed manned aircraft
have become increasingly rare with the passage of time. Currently produced examples of
UASs constructed with forward wings and inverted T-tails are much less common than
similarly configured manned aircraft, and examples are generally confined to the least
sized sUAS (e.g., the AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven, the PrecisionHawk Lancaster, and the
Aeromapper EV2).
A primary advantage of the conventional design is that it is a proven configuration in
which lifting surfaces can be conveniently attached to the empennage by conventional
means. Sadraey (2009) claims that familiarity with this well-tested construction is the
reason that 60% of manned aircraft are manufactured with forward wings and a conven-
tional inverted-T tail. Another advantage inheres to the fact that this design is the simplest
and easiest upon which to perform predictive computations and performance analyses.
According to Sadraey (2009, 299), “The analysis and evaluation of the performance of a con-
ventional tail is straight forward … If the designer has low experience, it is recommended
to initially select the conventional tail configuration.” Finally, a conventional tail configur-
ation is lighter and less complex than some other designs (e.g., an H-tail design).
10.3.1.3 Conventional Fuselage, Aft Engine Designs

Many UASs exist to carry sensors: radar, optical, RF, etc. Frequently, these sensors require
an unobstructed field of view (FOV). Not infrequently, the FOV in the forward hemi-
sphere is most important. This is the primary reason for placing the engine at the aft of the
fuselage. Aircraft propulsion systems are notorious for creating heat, vibration, exhaust,
and oil. Any of which can disrupt the quality of data captured by these sensors. An obvious
solution is to put the propulsor at the extreme opposite end of the aircraft from the sensors.
This puts the sensors in clean air for capturing the best data and the propulsor’s effuse
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flow away harmlessly behind the aircraft. Also note that certain data links can be disrupted
by the intermittent blockage of a propeller. This configuration can be seen in the Northrup
Grumman Global Hawk and the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Predator, Reaper
and Gray Eagle series of UAs. It is also noteworthy that the added synergy of the inverted
V protects the propeller from ground strike in the event of a bounced landing. The obvious
challenge is achieving proper CG with a long, often destabilizing nose requiring large tails
(www.ga-asi.com/gray-eagle).
10.3.1.4 Twin-Boom, Pusher-Propeller Designs

In a twin-boom design, the booms, made up of composite (often carbon fiber) cylinders
or of monocoque construction, replace the empennage as primary structure and provide
the attachment points for the stabilizers. Under the broad definition earlier ascribed to
Grundlach, twin-boom designs are “conventional” configurations if defined in terms of
wing loading and control functionality (i.e., in comparison to canard and flying-wing
designs).
Twin-boom UASs have proliferated. These designs share a common heritage, the lineage
of which can be traced back to the Israeli efforts to develop UA for military applications.
Impressed by the performance and potential of the Firebee UA, the Israeli military placed
an initial order with the Ryan Aeronautical Company for 12 of the aircraft which the Israelis
used for engineering and test prototypes to develop modifications and improvements to
support their military’s specific operational requirements. The Israelis renamed the modi-
fied Firebees Mabat (Hebrew for “Glance”) and also purchased Northrop Chukar decoy
drones (renamed Telem, meaning “Furrow”). These aircraft were deployed during the
1973 Yom Kipur War, and, although losses were heavy, the aircraft successfully completed
their missions and proved their value. IAIs manufactured the twin-boom, PT-6A-powered
Arava STOL/utility/transport aircraft, and based on the engineering experience gained in
producing this aircraft, one year later, in 1974, the Israelis began development of the Scout
UA, a twin-boom, pusher propeller (as opposed to a conventional tractor propeller) design.
Thus, it began the proliferation of UAS twin-boom designs that have been produced
in a variety of tail configurations. The Tadiran Mastiff, a contemporary of the Scout, was
designed as a twin-boom T-tail. The upright T design removes the stabilizer and control
surfaces from the turbulence of the propeller discharge and from the engine exhaust. The
IAI Scout, the AAI/IAI Pioneer (RQ-2), and the IAI Hunter (RQ-5), Searcher and Heron,
are all twin-boom, H-tail designs.
The Aerosonde and RQ-7 Shadow, both produced by AAI, and the Penguin, manufactured
by the UAV Factory, all incorporate inverted V-tails supported by a twin-boom structure
(Figure 10.6). In comparison to a V-tail, an inverted-V design may produce slightly better
yaw characteristics (Pro-Verse Roll) in a coordinated turn.
The use of ruddervators on these designs complicates the control system software—
combining pitch and yaw inputs using differential control surface movements requires
suitable diligence verifying adequate control authority in both axes simultaneously
(Figure 10.6, UAV Factory Penguin BE). Note that this electrically powered pusher design
is constructed with an inverted-V tail supported by carbon fiber booms.
Aside from the advantages and disadvantages ascribed in the preceding paragraphs to
various characteristic tail configurations, certain positive and negative attributes inhere to
the twin-boom design, itself. Twin-boom construction offers the designer an opportunity
to create an aircraft having less “wetted” area and drag, although the drag produced by
using two stabilizers and additional control surfaces may negate this advantage. The use
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FIGURE 10.6
UAV Factory Penguin B. (Image courtesy of UAV Factory.)
of twin-boom construction also affords flexibility in meeting design goals. During design,
the arm of the tail may be increased or decreased with relative ease to counterbalance
anticipated payload weights and provide the necessary stabilizing and control moments.
For example, control surface arm and stabilizer moment may be increased by moving
the entire tail aft, to improve stability and controllability (at the expense of reduced
maneuverability).
Twin-boom construction is analogous to a box, which surrounds a pusher propeller
to enhance structural stiffness as well as often protecting a propeller. On V-tails, this
decreases surface side-loading to reduce torsion (twisting). On the negative side, the
tail surface located in the discharge of a pusher prop will tend to increase interference
drag and minimally reduce propulsive force, while exposing the tail assembly to greater
buffeting and vibration. Finally, with the engine mounted in the rear of a pusher design,
greater fuselage volume is available for the payload, while sensor packages will be
provided a clear view without the distorting influences of engine exhaust, heat, and oil.
An additional consideration with a twin boom configuration is overall aircraft stiffness
and flutter. The entire weight of the booms and tails are cantilevered off the aft portion
of the wing. The engineer must pay careful attention to structural stiffness and weight to
produce a flutter free design.
Another option available to design UASs with an FOV undistorted by exhaust gasses is
that of a twin-boom, twin-engine aircraft, such as the InView Unmanned Aircraft System,
having wing-mounted powerplants (Figure 10.7). Despite this advantage, multiengine,
fixed-wing UASs are not common. Centerline thrust (pusher/tractor design) twin-engine
configurations represent an attempt to overcome the undesirable yaw characteristics that
occur when operating on a single wing-mounted engine (e.g., during an engine-out inci-
dent), but this option suffers from the combined disadvantages of both pusher and tractor
designs plus the complexity of a twin-engine installation (Gundlach 2012). Nonetheless, one
prominent example of a twin-boom, centerline thrust UAS is the RQ-5 Hunter developed
jointly by IAI and TRW, Inc. (TRW was acquired by Northrop Grumman in 2002).
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FIGURE 10.7
Twin-boom, twin-engine InView UAS. (Image courtesy of Barnard Microsystems.)
10.3.1.5 Flying Wings

As the name implies, the distinguishing characteristic of a flying wing is that this design
features a single horizontal lifting surface, although vertical members in the form of
winglets, wingtip endplates, and vertical stabilizers may be present. UAS Winglets (e.g.,
Insitu ScanEagle) function as they do on manned aircraft to reduce tip vortices and
induced drag. Winglets reduce lift distribution drop-off at tips and use vorticity to create
a component of lift in the thrust direction. Vorticity instead occurs behind the wing or at
the end of the winglets. Extending below the wing, wingtip endplates are often provided
at the tips of sUAS flying wings (e.g., the Gatewing X100 and the IAI Malat Mosquito) to
decrease induced drag (parasite drag will be increased) and to protect the underside of
the aircraft during a landing. True vertical stabilizers installed on UASs are an attempt
to overcome, to some degree, the inherent directional instability of a flying wing design.
Although vertical stabilizing surfaces are relatively uncommon on a UAS, one example is
that of the WASP III Battlefield Air Targeting Micro Air Vehicle (BATMAV). (Due to dir-
ectional instability and a lack of computerized stability augmentation systems, vertical
stabilizers were also incorporated in the design of early manned flying wings, such as the
Northrop YB-49 Figure 10.8). Control and possibly stabilizing inputs are accomplished
through differential movement of elevons (a combining of aileron and elevator into a
single moveable surface) installed on the trailing edge of the wing. The fuselage may be
clearly discernable (e.g., Institu ScanEagle) or nonexistent (e.g., Skywalker X8). According
to Gundlach (2012, 120), when conventional aircraft are defined under the broadened
definition in which the categories of twin-boom and conventional forward-wing aircraft
having an empennage/tail assembly are conflated, “[f]‌lying wings are the second most
prevalent UAS configuration.”
The flying-wing design affords certain advantages over other designs. Its construction
is straightforward with fewer parts and qualities that simplify assembly and manufacture.
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FIGURE 10.8
Northrop YB-49 flying wing (circa 1947–1948). Note the vertical stabilizers necessitated by the lack of a flight
dynamics computer. (U.S. Air Force image.)
The flying wing is attractive to designers because it offers the theoretical potential for high
aerodynamic efficiency (low drag for the amount of lift produced), which leads to lower
energy consumption and increased range. These characteristics can result in improved L/
D ratios. Flying wings are robust, and sUASs are often constructed without landing gear,
saving weight and reducing parasite drag. This design affords considerable flexibility
in payload positioning, although aircraft CG is critical and the load must be judiciously
distributed. Also, because UAS flying wings are most frequently of pusher design, the
lack of a forward-mounted powerplant affords the same advantages as a twin boom—that
is, greater fuselage volume for sensor packages and a clear view without the distorting
influences of engine exhaust and heat. For military UASs, an added advantage of the
flying wing is a low radar cross section (RCS), which is a measure of the detectability
of the aircraft. The characteristic of minimal RCS is a significant reason why unmanned
combat aerial vehicles, such as the Northrop UCAV X-47B, among other entries in the
Navy’s Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) compe-
tition, and stealthy reconnaissance UASs, such as the Lockheed Martin RQ-3 DarkStar and
the RQ-170 Sentinel, are of flying-wing design. Again, in these instances of military UAS
applications, it can be seen that mission goals dictate design characteristics.
Of course, as with most things in life, there is no such thing as a “free lunch,” and
certain negative aspects inhere to the flying-wing design. Due to the lack of stabilizing
surfaces, flying wings exhibit the inherent characteristic of directional instability, although
the autopilot or stabilization augmentation systems are able to mitigate this instability to
varying degrees. Trade-offs exist between wing loading and speed, maneuverability, and
stability. A flying wing is sensitive to displacement by wind gusts and air turbulence.
Designing a flying wing requires the use of “nonstandard,” blended airfoils—the aero-
nautical engineer cannot just consult a catalog of wing designs (e.g., NACA Report No.
824) to select the airfoil for an appropriately shaped wing. Finally, flying wings have a
narrow CG range and balancing the payload, autopilot, receiver, avionics, antennae, etc.,
can be challenging.
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10.3.1.6 Canard UASs

Canard UASs incorporate a single, horizontal wing, smaller and located ahead of the main
lifting surface. Unlike an aft horizontal stabilizer, which produces a downward force to
raise the nose, the canard produces lift acting in the same direction as the main wing.
Typical canard surfaces share the lifting duty with the main wing and usually have control
surfaces for pitch control and airfoil camber for specific flight conditions. Distinguished
from a “Tandem” configuration by virtue of the canard being substantially smaller than
the main wing. The canard being upstream of the main wing can create undesirable flow
conditions for the main wing. Canard lift creates downwash effectively reducing the angle
of attackand coefficient of lift (Cl) of the main wing across the span shadow of the canard
and likely defeating any laminar flow that might otherwise exist. For reasons of airworthi-
ness and stability, the canard must stall before the main wing. Suitable airfoil selection and
a more heavily loaded canard surface (forward “CG”) are typical ploys to achieve an early
canard stall. This design feature prevents the main wing from approaching maximum Cl
thus increasing takeoff and landing distances and potentially affecting endurance, (Cl^3/
Cd^2). Of course, safe CG ranges must be respected.
UA incorporating a canard wing are much rarer than conventional, twin-boom or flying
wing designs. The reason so few canard UASs exist, according to Gundlach (2012, 113), is
“because there are no aerodynamic advantages over the conventional configuration,” and
unless autopilots with capable stability augmentation are implemented, the excessive trim
drag penalty of the canard configuration impacts performance too greatly. Although not
common, examples of canard UASs exist and include the highly maneuverable aircraft
technology (HiMAT) RPA developed by NASA in the mid-to late-1970s to demonstrate the
feasibility of an unmanned fighter for aerial combat; the ADCOM YABHON-R medium-
altitude long endurance (MALE) UAS was developed in the United Arab Emirates; and the
L-3 Mobius, an optionally piloted vehicle (OPV), capable of autonomous flight. Despite
relatively few examples of canard UASs, this design has been evident since the dawn of
powered, heavier-than-air flight—the Wright Flyer was a canard design. A special comment
on the Piaggio P.1HH HammerHead as a special type of canard, or more accurately a “3
Lifting Surface” aircraft. This configuration features the ability to have all three surfaces
sharing the load without the over loading of the front wing, as a canard requires; thus, the
main wing can reach maximum Cls for takeoff and landing.
10.3.2 Rotating-Wing or Rotary-Wing Designs

In comparison to the fixed-wing UAS, rotary-wing aircraft embody characteristics that
may be beneficial in certain applications and disadvantageous in all others. Rotary-wing
UASs are highly maneuverable and capable of vertical takeoffs and landings. The tradeoff
is a systemic reduction in speed, endurance, range, payload, and reliability. The reduced
performance being predominantly the result of inefficiencies associated with the rotor
system (attributable to the complexities of rotor aerodynamics and the low Reynolds
numbers [ratio of inertial forces to viscous forces within a fluid] associated with narrow
cord rotor blades particularly nearer the hub). The aerodynamics of rotary-wing flight is
well beyond the scope of this chapter. (For example, Boeing, supported by NASA, has
produced a two-volume tome, Rotary-wing Aerodynamics, NASA Contractor Report 3082,
on the topic.) Nonetheless, the reader will find a few of the more prominent aerodynamic
characteristics and their ramifications described in each of the sections that follow. This
brief overview will suffice for an introduction to the flight and design of rotary-wing UASs.
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Those readers interested in a more detailed description will have no difficulty locating
additional resources.
10.3.2.1 Helicopter UAS

The aerodynamics and flight physics associated with a helicopter are very complex.
A helicopter simultaneously produces both lift, to oppose the weight of the aircraft, and
thrust, represented by a vector acting in the direction of flight, by accelerating a mass of
air through the rotor disk. The energy imparted to the air mass is provided by the fuel
or battery, converted to mechanical power by the aircraft powerplant, and transmitted
through gear reduction (e.g., in a transmission) to the main shaft that supports the main
rotor blades. The helicopter gear reduction (transmission) is necessary to convert the high
rpm, low torque output of the motor to low rpm, for aerodynamic efficiency (generally, the
transonic regime should not be entered), and high torque to move the blades through the
viscous fluid of the atmosphere. In a hover, 60%–70% of this power is consumed in pro-
ducing lift (referred to as induced power), while the remainder (referred to as profile drag
power) is expended in overcoming parasite drag (Gessow and Myers 1985). Because low
Reynolds numbers are characteristic of narrow chord/short span blades (Schafroth 1980)
and the energy required to accelerate an air mass increases as the square of the acceler-
ation, increasingly larger diameter rotors become increasingly efficient due to the ability to
process greater amounts of air through the rotor disk (Gessow and Myers 1985). Another
contributing factor is that increasing the length, and therefore the aspect ratio, of the rotor
blades reduces the drag induced by producing lift. The trade-offs are increased parasitic
drag and the reduction in rotor rpm, which will reduce dynamic pressure and tend to
diminish lift, necessary to keep tip speeds subsonic.
In a no-wind hover, lift is produced symmetrically across the rotor disk. Things change
dramatically with any relative motion of the air mass with respect to the rotor disk (as
would occur as the result of a gust of wind or from directional flight). Assuming a two-
bladed rotor system, the blade moving into the relative wind, termed the advancing blade,
produces greater lift, while the blade traveling in the same direction as the relative motion
of the air mass, the retreating blade, produces less lift. This destabilizing condition, known
as dissymmetry of lift, is mitigated through effective rotor system design. Because the rela-
tive airspeed of the advancing blade produces more lift, this blade tends to rise while
the retreating blade produces less lift and will descend. This is a fortunate circumstance,
because in ascending, the angle of attack of the advancing blade decreases to reduce lift,
while, as the retreating blade descends, its angle of attack increases to increase lift. Thus,
rotor systems are designed to allow a predetermined amount of blade flapping, to miti-
gate the effects of dissymmetry of lift. Blade flapping may be designed in a helicopter
rotor by using a flapping hinge installed in the hub (fully articulated rotor), by using a
teetering (aka teeter-totter) hinge in a semirigid rotor head supporting two rotor blades
(common on Bell helicopters), or by allowing flexing in the blades and hub (modern rotor
hubs, or “flextures,” of manned helicopters may use composite materials and rubber-like
elastomeric bearings to permit adequate blade flexing). Enter the law of conservation
of angular momentum that states that angular momentum, calculated as the product of
mass times angular velocity times distance (of the CG from the spin axis), does not change
(under idealized conditions, i.e., no friction). When a helicopter blade flaps in response
to dissymmetry of lift, its CG shifts: the advancing blade flaps upward driving the CG
inward, while the retreating blade flaps downward to cause the CG to move outward.
If mass does not change but the distance of the CG to the spin axis does, then velocity
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must react inversely for angular momentum to be conserved. The commonly used analogy
is that of figure skaters withdrawing arms inward to increase their rate of spin—this is
another example of the effects of the law. Because flapping causes the blades to accelerate
(lead) or decelerate (lag), provision for this movement must also be accommodated and
is accomplished through hub flexing and blade bending or installation of a lead-lag (or
drag) hinge incorporated in the rotor hub. (Tail rotor blades also encounter dissymmetry
of lift and may also be provided with hinges to accommodate blade flapping.) Although
sUAS helicopters have been fitted with hinges to allow blade flapping (e.g., Zeal produced
aluminum teetering hinges for high-performance applications), the moments and forces
acting on smaller rotor systems are generally low enough that flexing and bending can
accommodate most blade movement.
Large unmanned helicopters (e.g., the Northrop Grumman Fire Scout and the Boeing
A160 Hummingbird) accomplish variations in lift and thrust in the same way that manned
helicopters do, that is, by maintaining a desired rpm while effecting blade pitch changes
about a feathering hinge installed in the hub. To increase lift (and altitude), a collective pitch
change causes all blades to simultaneously increase angle of attack by the same amount.
Thus, lift across the disk is increased. The rotor heads of smaller unmanned helicopters
(e.g., the AutoCopter and the Yamaha RMAX) often incorporate feathering hinges as well.
Moreover, rather than directing inputs straight from the servos through the swash plate
(a device that transforms the rotating motion of a shaft into reciprocal motion) to the pitch
change mechanism, still smaller helicopters (e.g., the ZALA 421-02 and the T-Rex) may
also use a flybar (aka paddles or stabilizer bar) system, similar to that found on two-bladed
Bell and Hiller manned rotary-wing aircraft. The flybar system consists of a bar, fitted with
paddles or weights at the end, installed at 90° to the main rotor blades and perpendicular
to the main rotor mast. The purpose of the flybar assembly is to provide additional cyclic
inputs in response to wind and turbulence, which, in turn, results in greater stability and
control. The smallest, electric unmanned helicopters (e.g., the Proxdynamics Black Hornet
Nano), which are sometimes classed as microaerial vehicles (MAVs), generally have fixed-
pitch main rotor blades and increase or decrease lift by varying rotor rpm.
All helicopters, manned and unmanned, large and small, develop directional flight in a
similar way. To produce directional thrust, the pitch of the blades must change differentially
to tilt the rotor disk in the direction of desired travel. Tilting the rotor disk is accomplished
through differentially changing the pitch of the blades, through cyclic inputs, as they orbit
around the main shaft axis. Due to gyroscopic precession, these inputs must occur 90°
ahead of maximum tilt. To illustrate the effects of gyroscopic precession, assume that the
direction of blade rotation is counterclockwise as viewed from above the disk (common
for manned helicopters produced in the United States). If the longitudinal axis of the heli-
copter is the 0°/360° reference line extended forward of the helicopter, then, to fly forward,
the input to increase pitch must occur at the point 90° in the direction of rotation, while
that to reduce pitch must occur at the point 270° in the direction of blade rotation. Due to
gyroscopic precession, maximum blade deflection will occur 90° later and the rotor disk
will tilt forward, directing thrust and moving the helicopter forward.
Another design feature of rotor blades is that, like propellers, they often incorporate
twist, increasing blade angle from tip to hub. (Because the velocity of the inboard blade
region is lower, without an increase in blade angle, less lift would be produced nearer
the hub.) As with propellers, this is done to reduce stress and increase efficiency by more
evenly distributing lift across the entire rotor disk. This twist is less apparent in helicopter
rotors, largely because it is distributed across a much greater span.
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Torque effect is present in both fixed-wing and rotary-wing designs, but much more
dominant in the latter. Torque effect develops as the result of Newton’s 3rd law, “for every
action there is an equal and opposite reaction.” Power delivered to the rotor causes the
fuselage to display the propensity to rotate in the direction opposite the rotor. This ten-
dency varies linearly,—increase power, increase torque effect. Torque effect is countered
on single-rotor helicopters, both manned and unmanned, by the tail rotor (aka, antitorque
rotor). If the thrust produced by the tail rotor is less than torque effect, the fuselage
will yaw in the direction opposite main rotor blade rotation; if thrust produced by the
antitorque rotor is greater than the torque effect force, the fuselage will yaw in the direc-
tion of main rotor rotation. Using two rotors affords the advantage of torque cancellation,
whereby the two rotor systems rotate in opposite directions and thus the torque of one
cancels that of the other and no other antitorque system (e.g., a tail rotor) is necessary.
Examples of UASs with two main rotor systems include both coaxial, contra-rotating,
and tandem, counterrotating designs. The difference is that in the former example, the
blades rotate around a common axis, while in the latter, rotation occurs about two inde-
pendent axes. The first rotary-wing UAS, the QH-50 DASH, developed by Gyrodyne for
the Navy in the late 1950s and early 1960s, was a coaxial, contrarotating design powered
by a Boeing turboshaft producing 300 shaft horsepower. During the late 1980s and early
1990s, Sikorsky experimented with a coaxial unmanned design known as the Cipher and
Cipher II, which subsequently evolved into the USMC’s Dragon Warrior UAS. Currently
produced examples of a tandem, counterrotating UAS rotor system may be found on the
unmanned version of the Kaman K-MAX, a helicopter capable of lifting an external load
equal to its own weight, and the IAI Ghost, which resembles a Chinook manned heli-
copter in configuration. The K-MAX rotor system, wherein the blades mesh, much like
those of an old-fashioned, mechanical egg beater, is also referred to as a synchropter or
intermeshing rotor design.
10.3.2.2 Multirotors
Multirotors exist mainly in quad-, hexa-, and octocopter configurations. Note that all have
an even number of rotors for torque cancelation. (Though much less common, three rotor,
“Y-frame” multirotor designs also exist, but these must use a tail rotor or rotor tilting,
which greatly complicates flight dynamics and aircraft control, to counteract the torque
effect induced by an odd number of rotors.) Manufacturers of sUAS multirotors include
DJI, Airobot, Aeryon, now owned by FLIR, and Skydio. Multirotors are almost exclusively
small UASs, powered by electric motors. They afford the advantages of VTOL flight, the
ability to hover and loiter on station, agility, and a relative freedom from vibration, but at
the expense of limited range, altitude, and endurance. Multirotors modulate the various
prop rpm’s for control and this is done in a prescribed manner to keep the net torque of
the system nulled.
Recall that the earlier discussion of drag principally focused on fixed-wing aircraft.
The reason that the points made in that section were more relevant to those aircraft is
attributable, in part, to the fact that drag increases with airspeed. The missions for which
VTOL aircraft (e.g., helicopters and multirotors) are designed generally do not dictate high
airspeeds. Moreover, where endurance and range may be sacrificed to obtain other desir-
able attributes, such as maneuverability, a rotary-wing platform may be selected over a
fixed-wing configuration. The ability to fly in any direction, rather than in only a straight
line, negates the advantages of streamlining, and multirotor designs consequently do not
236
incorporate fairings or fillets or any other strategy to reduce form or interference drag.
Aerodynamically, multirotors are very dirty—antennae, wires, controllers, and motors
protrude into the airstream. In comparison to the design of fixed-wing UASs, the low-
speed operational envelope and directional agility of rotary-wing aircraft render the con-
sideration of drag less important in the design process. However, as the pressure to achieve
faster and longer flight envelopes grows, so will the refinement of the multirotor shaping
to reduce drag and rotor blockage.
10.3.2.3 Other Rotating-Wing UASs

Examples of UAS rotary-wing designs that are neither helicopter nor multirotor exist. One
is the Eagle Eye tiltrotor, powered by a single Pratt & Whitney Canada (P&WC) turboshaft
producing more than 600 shp. Designed and constructed by Bell, the Eagle Eye closely
resembles the larger manned versions of the company’s tiltorotor designs. To transition
from helicopter mode to airplane mode, the tiltrotor is capable of rotating the nacelles,
located at the end of its wings, from the vertical position to a horizontal orientation and
then back to vertical for a landing. Although the Eagle Eye is capable of flying like an
aircraft, it is strictly a VTOL aircraft—the blades of the rotor-props are too long to accom-
modate a conventional, run-on landing. In 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard placed an order for
Bell Eagle Eyes to bolster the USCG’s deep water surveillance program, but the order was
subsequently frozen due to lack of funding.
A second example of a novel UAS rotary-wing design is that of the single-rotor, ducted-
fan Honeywell RQ-16 Tarantula Hawk (T-Hawk) powered by a four HP boxer twin
(Figure 10.9). The ducted fan is extremely efficient (negligible induced drag) allowing for
a rotor many times smaller than would otherwise be required. The T-Hawk overcomes
torque effect by deflecting the thrust of the fan with fixed turning vanes and maneuvers
by using louvers to vector thrust (direct or deflect fan discharge) in the desired direction
of travel.
FIGURE 10.9
Honeywell Tarantula Hawk landing. (Image courtesy of Honeywell Aerospace.)
237
10.4 Launch and Recovery Systems

All UA must be launched and, although some are intended to be expendable, most will
(hopefully) be recovered. Just as the nature of the mission touches upon nearly every
aspect of UAS design, so, too, does the choice of airframe and powerplant influence, even
dictate, the method of launching and recovering many UAS configurations. The author has
identified a few examples at points throughout this chapter. Recall that a design with less
wing area will exhibit less drag, but the associated increase in wing loading may compel
the designer to use a catapult launch system in lieu of the less equipment-intensive hand
launch. The relationship works in the other way, too. That is, the desire for a particular
means of launching and recovering an aircraft may predetermine airframe and propulsor
configuration, something that largely drove the design and development of the UTC Vireo.
The Vireo was developed to compete for a government contract emphasizing compact-
ness, portability, and the ability to be hand-launched and recovered without benefit of a
capture device (subsequently discussed). Consequently, the Vireo sUAS was developed
around a flying wing, mounted high on the fuselage, to facilitate hand launches and with
belly skid (integral to the battery pack) and folding propeller to increase survivability
during landings in rugged, remote areas. The launch and recovery elements (LREs) of any
UAS are components of a subsystem existing as integrated or discrete entities comprising
a portion of the entire UAS. In concluding this chapter, the author will discuss the relation-
ship of the launch and recovery subsystem to the entire UAS.
Perhaps, the oldest method of initially applying the dynamic energy necessary to
achieve lift for UA is the abrupt release of potential energy via catapult and the much
more gradual and gentler acceleration of the hand launch. Both means were used, from the
earliest days of flight, to launch models of gliders and powered aircraft before committing
to the more consequential attempts at manned flight. Early examples of unmanned,
hand-launched aircraft include the contra-rotating feathered rotor devices developed by
Lomonosov (1754) and Launoy and Bienvenu (1783), the scale models of the patented
powered monoplane designed and flown by the du Temple brothers (c. 1857–1870) and the
research models constructed by Otto Lilienthal, Samuel Pierpont Langley, and the “father
of aerodynamics,” Sir George Cayley, all flown around the turn of the nineteenth century;
John Stringfellow purportedly employed a catapult to launch models of the Ariel, the first
patented, powered aircraft design (1848), and Elmer and Lawrence “Burst” Sperry used a
catapult engineered by the future designer of the famed Norden bomb sight to launch the
Hewitt-Sperry Automatic Airplane (aka, the Sperry Flying Bomb) in 1918 (Jarnot 2012).
Probably, the earliest and certainly, the simplest method of launching UAs, still very
common today for lofting sUAS, is the hand launch. The primary advantage is obvious—
no additional launch equipment are needed in the field. The time and logistics associated
with transporting, setting- up, and tearing-down the extra equipment are completely
eliminated. Consequently, support costs are also reduced. This type of launch is very gentle
and (unless the attempted launch fails) the concern over additional forces placed on the
UA during acceleration is also eliminated. Problems may arise where insufficient energy
can be imparted to the aircraft to achieve liftoff, particularly in no-wind or light-wind
conditions. Maintaining altitude and imparting the proper trajectory during launch may
also be challenging. Aircraft that are most likely suitable for hand launching are those with
a low total weight, low wing loading, and high specific static thrust. “Most hand-launched
unmanned aircraft weigh less than 20 lb with wing spans under 10 feet” (Gundlach 2012,
238
441). Examples of hand-launched sUAS include the Aerovironment RQ-11 Raven, the
Wasp and the Puma, and the Lockheed Martin Stalker.
Catapult launchers (including what are sometimes referred to as rail launchers) and
“tensioned line” systems (aka High Start or Hi Start systems) use one of several methods
to store the initial energy subsequently imparted to the UA to provide the dynamic energy
necessary to produce lift. The application of this energy cannot be too abruptly applied.
(Langley’s Great Aerodrome experienced structural failures when the spring-powered
catapult accelerated the ungainly aircraft to 27 m/s (60 mph) in a mere 21 m (70 feet).
The Wright Brothers also employed rail launch systems, and catapult/rail launch systems
thus predate the use of landing gear.) Small, relatively light UASs may be launched by a
catapult that stores energy in a bungee. Bungee cord has improved over the years, and
currently produced bungee has much greater elasticity, and consequently greater capacity
to store energy than older materials could provide. The British company, Universal Target
Systems, currently produces a bungee catapult capable of launching a 105 kg (approxi-
mately 231 lb) UAV to a launching speed of 24 m/s (about 54 mph) (Novakovic and Medar
2013). Larger fixed-wing UA may be launched from a pneumatic catapult. For example,
both UAV Factory and Arcturus UAV manufacture catapult systems capable of storing
compressed air to launch their aircraft. In comparison to pneumatic launch systems,
advantages generally afforded by bungee launchers include compactness, lighter weight,
less complexity, and a smaller footprint once assembled in the field. Although bungee
launchers afford several advantages, pneumatic launchers are more common (Gundlach
2012). Carrier deployed UA, such as the Northrop Grumman X-47B UCAV, are launched
from the same steam-powered catapult as their manned counterparts.
Other commonly used launch techniques include rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO or,
sometimes, JATO for jet-assisted takeoff) as used to launch the German V1, the Ryan
FireFly and FireBee, and the Northrop BQM-74 Chukar, air-drop launches (Lockheed
Skunkworks D-21 and the Boeing X-51 Waverider) and even car-top launch systems
(UAV Factory Penguin and the Sperry Flying Bomb) where the UA is carried to take off
speeds by an automobile and then released to lift from the carrier cradle. Larger UASs,
generally weighing more than approximately 455 kg or 1,000 lb (e.g., the Global Hawk
and aircraft in the Predator/Reaper class), operate exclusively from paved (or, at least,
improved) runways and often rely on retractable landing gear for launches. Of course, a
variety of configurations exist, and, for example, the UAV Factory Penguin II incorporates
fixed tricycle landing gear to operate from grass fields and pavement, but, as previously
mentioned, may alternatively be launched from a car-top cradle or pneumatic catapult.
RATO/JATO launch systems are simple in construction and afford high specific thrust
(thrust to weight ratio) and modularity. RATOs are particularly beneficial when the lack
of a runway and the complexity, logistics, and footprint of a catapult launcher precludes
its use. An early example of an RPA incorporating two RATO bottles integrated into its
fuselage is the Northrop MQM-57 Falconer, a UA whose lineage is traceable through the
15,000 OQ-2/TDD-1 drones and their variants produced during WWII back to Reginald
Denny’s original Dennyplane, powered by the Dennymite engine. The MQM-57, which
carried a high-resolution camera, is an early example of a successful tactical reconnais-
sance UA. The RATO bottles could abruptly loft the Falconer, which was powered by 72
hp McCulloch O-100, from a zero-length launch ramp. (The aircraft relied on a parachute
recovery system.) Heavier UAs, requiring a relatively high rate of acceleration to lift off,
may also benefit from an RATO/JATO launch system. The German V-1, with its short,
stubby wings and relatively high wing loading, required an RATO, steam catapult, or air-
drop launch. More recently, RATO systems have been used to launch the AAI RQ-2 Pioneer
239
and the TRW/IAI-developed RQ/MQ 5A/B/C Hunter in areas where space available for
takeoff was limited. In designing RATO/JATO systems, alignment with the aircraft’s CG is
critical to maintaining control during launch.
An airdrop launch affords several advantages. When combined with a parachute
recovery system, which also eliminates the drag associated with a landing gear carriage,
an airdrop launch allows designers to optimize the wing for high-speed flight. (This is
also true for an RATO/JATO launch system where a parachute recovery is employed.)
Since the UA is usually at a relatively higher altitude than other launch systems provide,
aircraft takeoff weight is reduced while range and endurance are increased. Most UA are
airdropped from under the aircraft, an approach generally considered safer than carrying
the aircraft above the mothership. The Lockheed M-21/D-21 air launch, in which the D-21
UA was to lift from a modified SR-71 mothership, failed to provide sufficient separation
resulting in a fatal accident (described in the next paragraph), after which the D-21 was
dropped from beneath a B-52.
Regardless of the type of launch mechanism, certain desirable characteristics gener-
ally inhere to devices used to impart the dynamic energy necessary to loft the UAS. The
requisite length of the launch varies directly with the square of change in UAS velocity and
inversely with acceleration, whereas, “[t]‌he launch energy imparted to the UA is propor-
tional to the takeoff gross weight [and the imparted] … kinetic energy … is proportional
to the relative launch velocity squared. This implies that launch speed can be a more sig-
nificant launch energy driver than UA weight” (Gundlach 2012, 424). Although transfer-
ring a certain level of energy to the vehicle is necessary, it is, at the same time, desirable to
minimize forces during launch (and recovery) to prevent the overstressing of structures,
to reduce wear and tear on the launch mechanism, and to minimize the field footprint
of any associated apparatus and supporting devices (e.g., a compressor and accumulator
for pneumatic launchers). Thus, the rate of UA acceleration and the amount of generated
energy converted to force to be absorbed by the launching device is significant. Also,
launch mechanisms must provide sufficient clearances during the entire operation. This
seems obvious, but failure to provide adequate clearance between Lockheed’s D-21 super-
sonic UA and the M-21, a modified SR-71 Blackbird, during an air launch resulted in a fatal
accident in which the Launch Control Officer, Ray Torick, drowned after ditching over the
ocean. (The pilot, Bill Park, who had previously ejected from a Blackbird at 500 feet and 200
knots, survived, but both the D-21 UA and the M-21 mothership were destroyed.)
Gundlach (2012, 425) defines the recovery (or capture) operation as the successful
activity of “… transitioning the UA from a flying state to a nonflying state.” Recovery
systems include the use of capture nets, parachute deployment, arresting devices, pro-
prietary apparatus such as the Insitu SkyHook® (Figure 10.10), and conventional landing
gear systems. The recovery phase can provide greater challenges than the launch oper-
ation. The approach requires adherence to an airspeed controlled within narrow limits,
near stall, where the aircraft is susceptible to wind gusts, and a precise ground track to
intersect the location where the aircraft is to be captured or recovered. Moreover, upon
capture, the dynamic energy carried by the UA must be dissipated in a controlled way to
minimize stresses induced in the platform and recovery device. Even a belly landing can
produce very large forces on the fuselage as it compresses to absorb energy, particularly
where descent rates are high.
The necessity of using a launch and recovery system may be dictated by the design
and mission of the aircraft, but the choice of recovery may also afford certain inherent
advantages. A belly skid recovery, which relies on the friction between the ground and
the UA airframe to arrest forward motion, eliminates the drag associated with landing
240
FIGURE 10.10
A Boeing Insitu RQ-21A Blackjack captured by the company’s proprietary SkyHook® recovery system.
(U.S. Navy image.)
gear to enhance range and endurance and obviates the need for a runway. Larger, often
tactical, UASs that may not well withstand the forces and abrasion experienced during a
belly landing often rely on a net recovery. Nets can also be used as an arresting barrier in
conjunction with conventional landing to more rapidly slow an UA while reducing the
aircraft’s rollout. Similarly, arresting cables may be employed in much the same way. The
SkyHook® proprietary recovery system employs a unique configuration wherein a vertical
arresting cable is clutched by a grasping claw located at either wing-tip of certain Insitu
UASs (e.g., ScanEagle and Integrator). This configuration provides an extremely small
footprint and is consequently often found installed on a ship deck or trailer. Parachute
recovery systems, used on a wide range of aircraft (e.g., sUAS, tactical and air-launched
UA), provide low descent rates and relatively soft landings. However, a means of cutting
the parachute free after touchdown can prevent the extensive damage caused by a strong
surface wind dragging the aircraft through the desert before recovery personnel can get
to the aircraft. Parachutes can also be employed as emergency flight termination and drag
inducing (drogue chute) devices. UA suspended under a parachute canopy may also be
snagged for recovery during descent, a common means of retrieving the Ryan Firebee
during the Vietnam War.
The largest UASs (e.g., the Global Hawk) commonly employ the most complex command
and control system for launch and recovery. The Global Hawk’s LRE (aka, the satellite con-
trol station) is intended to be rapidly deployable and capable of controlling the aircraft in
the field to a distance of approximately 370 km (200 nautical miles) (Austin 2010). Once the
241
UAS is aloft, control of the aircraft is “handed off” to the mission control element (MCE) for
BLOS operation during the majority of the mission. Upon completion of the operation, the
Global Hawk is flown to within range of the LRE and control relinquished so that the air-
craft may be landed at its base of origin. The most advanced launch and recovery systems
are fully integrated with the navigation avionics, autopilot, and aircraft subsystems to pro-
vide the capability of fully automated takeoffs and landings. One example is the Advanced
Launch and Recovery System (ALRS) available on the IAI Heron II. The ALRS cannot only
perform preprogrammed autonomous takeoffs and landings, but also “handoff” aircraft
control to the ground station of a forward base of operations. According to Israel Aerospace
(2002 under Advanced Ground Control Stations), the ALRS “… minimizes human error
during [critical] … phases of flight and reduces the cost of operator training.”
General Atomics UAS’s implement a Launch and Recovery Team that uses a GCS at a
forward location to take off, land, and service the UA. Once in the air, control is handed
off to a mission team hundreds to thousands of miles away controlling the UA via a satel-
lite network. Additionally, automatic takeoff and landing systems are being implemented
extensively as this book is being written within the General Atomics Predator/Reaper/
Gray Eagle family of UASs (Figure 10.11).
For DOD or military UAs, it is typically desirable for group 3–5 UA to adopt a launch
and recovery scheme that blends in seamlessly with the existing infrastructure utilized for
manned aircraft.
10.5 Conclusion
As can be seen from the great diversity in airframe construction, design options for UASs
are numerous affording the designer and engineer tremendous flexibility and control over
FIGURE 10.11
Gray Eagle UA on gear. (GA-ASI Image.)
242
the final aircraft configuration. Many factors ultimately affect the decisions that culminate
in the final design, but the most significant among these is the mission goal. After all,
the UAS exists solely to efficiently and successfully achieve some objective, most often
in the civilian world, the acquisition of remotely sensed data, and in the DOD world,
deliver ordnance in addition to remotely sensed data often venturing into hostile airspace.
(Survivability can be another aspect of UA design the scope of which is beyond this text).
The selection of airframe configuration should be accomplished with full consideration of
how the UAS is to be used and of the ultimate goal of the mission for which the system is
to be flown.
10.1 Why does the author state that, in designing any UAS, form follows function?
10.2 List factors in the design of UASs. Why are these important? Of these, which two
are likely the most significant? Why?
10.2.1–10.2.3 Describe economic and exogenous design factors and tell how
these may influence UAS design.
10.2.4 What are the four main forces acting on any heavier-than-aircraft during
flight? Describe how lift and thrust develop. What are the sources that
sum to produce total airframe drag? Describe each. Explain why total
airframe drag is greater than the sum of the drag acting on each indi-
vidual component. Explain how an increase or reduction in drag affects
other UAS design parameters.
10.2.5 Define aspect ratio, fineness ratio, and wetted aspect ratio and tell how
these influence UAS performance and design.
10.2.6 Describe how a propeller develops thrust. Define propeller blade face,
blade back, geometric pitch, effective pitch, and slip. What are sources
of propeller inefficiencies? Describe these. Why are propeller and rotor
blades “twisted” so that the blade angle changes from blade station to
station?
10.2.7 What is meant by “scale effect?” How does scale effect affect UAS, par-
ticularly sUAS, design?
10.3 When classified according to the method of lift production, what are the two
broad categories of UAS?
10.3.1 Gundlach (2012) states that the great diversity in tail designs is analo-
gous to an artist’s pallet. List and describe the various tail configurations
available to the designer of UASs.
10.3.1.1 Describe the X, Y, and Z axes as these relate to aircraft stability
and control. What is meant by “tail-down” or “nose-up” force?
Why is this important? How is it designed into UA?
10.3.1.2 Compare and contrast the various configurations of control/
lifting surfaces employed in UAS design to impart stability
and control about the X, Y, and Z axes, providing advantages
and disadvantages of each. Identify aspects or characteristics
unique to each (e.g., the use of ruddervators or elevons).
243
10.3.1.3
Briefly discuss the origins and history of twin-boom, pusher
UA designs that are so common today.
10.3.1.4 Briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the single
fuselage, aft tail, aft engine, and nose payload configuration.
10.3.2 Discuss the benefits and drawbacks of selecting a rotary-wing design
over that of a fixed-wing.
10.3.2.1 Explain the flight dynamics and their control in a helicopter
UAS. How may torque cancelation be achieved? What is
the difference between counterrotating and contrarotating
propellers and helicopter rotor systems?
10.3.2.2 Why are the majority of multirotors configured with an even
number of rotors? What is a Y-frame multicopter? How is
torque cancelation achieved on Y-frame sUAS?
10.3.2.3 The Honeywell Aerospace Tarantula Hawk is a novel approach
to sUAS rotary-wing design. Describe the construction of the
T-Hawk and its rotor system. How does Honeywell achieve
torque cancelation on this sUAS?
10.4 Describe the various launch and recovery systems that are a part of any UAS,
providing characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of each. Provide
examples of UASs using each. Provide the phrases represented by the acronyms
LRE, MCE, and ALRS and tell how each are used in the command and control
of UASs.
References
Austin, R. 2010. Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS Design, Development and Deployment. Chichester,
UK: John Wiley and Sons.
Melbourne: Department of Defense, Aeronautical Research Laboratory.
Gessow, A. and G.C. Myers, Jr. 1985. Aerodynamics of the Helicopter. New York: Frederick Unger
Publishing.
Gundlach, J. 2012. Designing Unmanned Aircraft Systems: A Comprehensive Approach. Reston: American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
Hurt, H.H., Jr. 1965. Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators. Washington, DC: Naval Air Systems
Command.
Israel Aerospace Industries. 2002. Advanced Ground Control Stations. www.iai.co.il/2013/34404-
37386-en/IAI.aspx (accessed April 12, 2015).
Jarnot, C. 2012. History. In Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, eds. R. K. Barnhart, Hottman,
S.B., Marshall, D.M., and Shappee, E., pp. 1–16. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis
Group.
Louge, M., A. Halterman, A. Billington, E. Franjul, J. Gong, Y. Lee, J. Nersasian, C. Ozkaynak, J. Pei,
and M. Ujihara. 2004. Mars unmanned aircraft 2003–2004. Working paper, Odysseus Team,
Cornell University. www.southampton.ac.uk (accessed June 6, 2014).
Novakovic, Z. and N. Medar. 2013. Analysis of a UAV bungee cord launching device. Scientific
Technical Review 63(3):41–47.
Raymer, D. 1992. Aircraft Design: A Conceptual Approach, 5th ed. Washington, D.C. : American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics; pp. 37–40.
Sadraey, M. 2009. Aircraft Performance Analysis. Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller.
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Schafroth, D.M. 1980. Aerodynamics, Modeling and Control of an Autonomous Micro Helicopter. PhD dis-
sertation, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, Schweiz (Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology in Zurich).
Seddon, J. 1990. Basic Helicopter Aerodynamics: An Account of First Principles in Fluid Mechanics and
Flight Dynamics of the Single Rotor Helicopter. Oxford, UK: BSP Professional Books.
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11
UAS Propulsion System Design
Michael T. Most and Graham Feasey
11.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

11.2 Engine Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
11.2.1 Reciprocating Engines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
11.2.1.1 Four-Cycle Engines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
11.2.1.2 Two-Cycle Engines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
11.2.1.3 Diesel Engines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
11.2.2 Wankel or Rotary Powerplants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
11.2.3 Gas Turbine Engines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
11.2.3.1 Turboprop and Turboshaft Engines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
11.2.3.2 Turbofan Engines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
11.2.3.3 Turbojets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
11.2.4 Electric Motors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
11.3 Propellers and Rotors on UASs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
11.4 Propulsion System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
11.4.1 Engine Subsystems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
11.4.2 Propulsion System Installation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
11.4.3 Hybrid Electric Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
11.5 Safety Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
11.5.1 Reliability and Risk Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
11.5.2 Certification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
11.6 Maintainability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
11.7 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
11.1 Introduction
The propulsion system design must satisfy the requirements derived from the unmanned
aircraft system (UAS) requirements. UAS design requirements include aircraft speed, pay-
load weight, runway length, climb rate, endurance, maneuverability, maximum altitude,
environment, aircraft reliability, etc. These requirements are balanced against each other in
an iterative process to determine the propulsion system requirements. Propulsion system
requirements include thrust (and lift for rotorcraft), efficiency, propulsion system environ-
ment, propulsion system reliability, etc. These requirements are further specified in greater
detail for the engine, propeller, and ancillary systems.
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246
In this chapter, we examine engine designs, propellers, and the systems that bring these
components together resulting in the overall propulsion system design. Unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) propulsion systems are not unique—they are essentially the same as any
other application. The principles detailed here describe large UAS; however, they are
equally applicable to smaller UAS.
11.2 Engine Design

Engines convert the stored chemical potential energy of fuel into mechanical work that
is used to produce motive force for the UAV. The choice of engine depends upon a trade
space of interrelated and competing factors. Engine selection depends upon requirements
of: available fuel, thrust, efficiency, reliability, maximum altitude, maintainability, weight,
cost, noise, etc. In addition to providing motive force, the engine also powers an alter-
nator/generator that produces electrical energy for avionic, sensors, and payloads. Waste
heat from the engine may be used to keep systems warm at high altitudes.
The following sections provide an overview of the engine types used on UAVs.
11.2.1 Reciprocating Engines

Reciprocating internal combustion engines translate linear motion, from a piston, into
crankshaft rotary motion. Combustion energy is directed to the piston in the power stroke.
Most of the power produces useful work. Some power drives the other pistons through
the other cycles. The remaining power is lost to friction. The following sections describe
two-and four-cycle engines, as well as Wankel regardless of fuel type.
11.2.1.1 Four-Cycle Engines

Four-cycle or four-stroke engines operate according to the Otto cycle (after Nikolaus
August Otto), which is an idealized thermodynamic cycle describing the operation of a
spark ignition, reciprocating engine consisting of five events and requiring four strokes of
the piston to complete the cycle. The piston is linked to a throw on the crankshaft through
a connecting rod. As the throw rotates around the crank axis, it will pull the piston down-
ward in the cylinder drawing in air, which has been mixed with fuel in the proper pro-
portion, through the open intake valve. This is the intake stroke. During the next 180°
of rotation, the throw drives the connecting rod/piston assembly upward to compress
the fuel/air mixture in the cylinder. Compression is necessary in a heat engine to pro-
vide sufficient expansion of the air during combustion and the power stroke to extract a
useful amount of power from the fuel. During the compression stroke, both intake and
exhaust valves are closed. Due to the inertia stored in the rotating/reciprocating engine
components, the ignition event generally occurs before the piston has reached its max-
imum upward travel on the compression stroke allowing the stored energy to carry the
piston through top dead center (TDC) as the compression process is completed and the
burning fuel/air mixture is attempting to expand. The combined effect of compression
and combustion provides maximum downward push on the piston during the power
stroke. During this 180° of crank throw rotation, the force acting on the top of the piston
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UAS Propulsion System Design 247
FIGURE 11.1
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Predator XP & Rotax 914 Turbocharged Four-Stroke Engine. (Image
courtesy of General Atomics Aeronautical System, Inc.)
is transmitted to the crankshaft through the connecting rod. The engine generates power
for the production of thrust only during the power event. The next 180° of rotation of the
crankshaft pushes the piston upward in the cylinder to expel the exhaust gases through the
exhaust valve, and overboard through the exhaust system. Thus, four strokes and 720° of
crankshaft rotation are necessary to complete the five events of the Otto cycle.
Four-stroke engines afford certain design benefits: less vibration (in comparison to a
two-stroke engine), quieter operation, relatively high torque, and a broader power band.
When range and endurance are important factors in the anticipated mission of the UAS,
four-stroke engines offer the major advantage of providing the higher fuel efficiency than
two-stroke internal combustion engines. On the other hand, they are also generally heavier,
more complex, and expensive than two-cycle engines. Four-stroke aviation engines have
relatively high compression ratios that require higher octane fuel to prevent preignition of
the fuel. Aviation engines use aviation gasoline (AVGas) that uses tetraethyl lead (TEL) to
boost octane number.
One example of a UAS four-stroke powerplant would be the 120 horsepower (hp)
Teledyne Continental IO-240-B7B installed on the Eagle ARV UAS. Another is the Austrian-
produced (opposed) four-cylinder, 115 hp, turbocharged Rotax 914F engine that powers
the RQ/MQ-1 Predator A and Predator XP (see Figure 11.1). The IAI RQ-5 Hunter was
also powered by a Moto Guzzi two-cylinder, four-stroke powerplant. Small four-stroke
engines, available in sizes of 7.5 cc and above, may be installed on small UAS (sUAS)
platforms. An example would be the Barnard Microsystems InView UAS powered by a
pair of 29.1 cc (1.8 cubic inch) displacement powerplants that burn 100 low lead aviation
fuel to which is added synthetic oil in a 20:1 ratio to provide lubrication.
11.2.1.2 Two-Cycle Engines

Two- cycle engines complete the same five events (i.e., intake, compression, ignition,
power, and exhaust) required of any practical heat engine, but in just two piston strokes
and 360° of crankshaft rotation. Although slightly more complex two-cycle designs exist
(e.g., those using rotary and reed valves), the simplest construction requires no valves and
very few parts. As the piston begins upward on the compression stroke, a low pressure
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area is created below the piston. Occupied by the piston connecting rod and the crankshaft,
this area is enclosed and termed the crankcase. Air, mixed with fuel in the proper mixture
ratio and a small amount of oil for lubrication, is drawn into the crankcase and stored. At
the same time, above the piston is a charge of air and fuel, previously stored in the crank-
case during the preceding compression stroke, which is being compressed by the upward
motion of the piston. The ignition event is timed at the proper point around the maximum
upward travel of the piston (TDC) to provide maximum expansion of the gases and the
greatest downward force on the piston through the connecting rod to the crankshaft. This
is the power stroke. With the downward travel of the piston, an exhaust port is uncovered
to begin the scavenging of the cylinder. As the piston continues downward, an intake port
is uncovered and the decreasing crankcase volume forces the fuel/air mixture stored there
through the intake port and into the cylinder. The fresh charge pushes the remaining spent
gases out of the cylinder through the exhaust port. The intake port and then the exhaust
port are covered by the piston as the fresh charge is compressed and the process is repeated
so long as the engine continues to operate. Thus, the two-stroke engine is capable of com-
pleting all five events in one complete crankshaft rotation.
Some fairly obvious advantages of the two-stroke design are simplicity, with few
moving parts, compactness, and low weight. This last attribute contributes to a high
specific power (power-to-weight ratio), at least within a narrow power band. Compared
to other powerplants, two-stroke designs are relatively inexpensive. Two-stroke engines
are also able to operate on lower grade fuels owing to their lower compression ratios.
One disadvantage is a lack of smoothness in operation that creates airframe vibration.
While a vibration-free UAS platform is necessary for susceptible payload sensors, the
shaking induced by a two-stroke powerplant can prove difficult and costly to isolate
and dampen. Two strokes are also notoriously noisy with a relatively high rate of fuel
consumption. This inefficiency has a negative impact on range and endurance. Another
serious disadvantage associated with two strokes is the poor performance that occurs
during off-load power (Fahlstrom and Gleason 2012). At low revolutions per minute
(rpms), the exhaust gases do not scavenge well in a two-cycle engine, and consequently,
dilute the fuel/air charge drawn into the combustion chamber. The resulting lean mix-
ture produces intermittent firing, popping, and rough operation, and may even “kill”
the engine. This characteristic can be fatal to the UAS if it occurs during an attempted
recovery at low engine rpm.
In the earliest days of UAS design, most aircraft were manned aircraft modified to
respond to exogenously originated or preprogrammed commands, and purpose-built
UAS powerplants did not exist. As late as the 1960s, the selection of a UAS two-stroke
engine was limited to those that were commercially available and included generator,
lawn mower, and chain saw engines, but these quickly proved to be “… unsatisfactory in
terms of life at high output, level of vibration, fuel economy and reliability” (Catchpole
and Parmington 1990, 1). Research, driven largely by military requirements and funding,
developed new designs and evolved these to the point where, today, two-stroke engines
power a multitude of diverse unmanned platforms. Manufacturers, including Cosworth,
Sachs, Desert Air, Graupner, Husqvarna, Hirth, 3W Modellmotoren, and Ricardo, among
others, currently produce two-stroke engines, explicitly for UASs, capable of operating
on gasoline, kerosene fractions, and glow fuel (a mixture of methanol, nitromethane, and
synthetic or castor oil to provide lubrication). Examples of UASs on which these are (or
have been) installed include the RQ-2 Pioneer, UAV Factory Penguin, the IAI Searcher, the
General Atomics Gnat 750, and the SVU-200 unmanned helicopter designed by American,
Dennis Fetters, for export to China.
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11.2.1.3 Diesel Engines

In diesel cycle engines, the fuel is ignited by the heat generated by the compression stroke.
To produce enough heat and achieve the autoignition temperature of the fuel, diesel cycle
engines have higher compression ratios than four-cycle engines. This, in turn, generates
much greater power stroke pressures. To contain these higher pressures, diesel engines
are more substantially built and therefore heavier. Diesel cycle engines may be four-cycle,
two-cycle, or Wankel designs. Modern diesel cycle engines are turbocharged with direct
fuel injection. Turbocharging increases the air charge on the intake stroke, which increases
engine power. Fuel is directly injected into the combustion chamber when the piston is
near top-dead-center. The air pressure in the cylinder is very high at this point requiring a
very high fuel supply pressure. Engine power is controlled by the quantity of fuel injected.
Heavy fuel engines (HFEs) burn heavy fuels (HFs), that is, more dense than gasoline.
Mineral based (i.e., not biofuels) HFs are obtained from kerosene and diesel petroleum
fractions. Diesel cycle fuels are rated by cetane number that is akin to octane number for
gasoline. UAS HFs include Diesel, JP-5 (kerosene-based fuel with a relatively high flash
point developed for carrier use), JP-8 (similar to Jet A-1), and biodiesel hydrocarbons. Jet
B and JP-4 (aka, avtag or by the NATO code, “F-40”) are “wide-cut” (containing 50%–
70% gasoline fractions) and may not be recommended for use in certain UAS HFEs. Other
HFEs are capable of burning either gasoline or kerosene fractions. Although diesel engines
(which may be either two-or four-stroke configurations) burn the same fuels as other HFE
engines, the difference is that nondiesel HFE engines rely on spark ignition, rather than
the heat of compression, to ignite the fuel–air mixture. HF UAS engines may be of diesel,
Wankel, two-or four-stroke design. To ensure more efficient combustion, two-stroke HFEs
frequently have two spark plugs installed in each cylinder.
The push by the military and governmental agencies to encourage adoption of HF UAS
powerplants (aka, the single fuel initiative) can be explained by the many advantages
resulting from burning HFs. In comparison to gasoline, HF is energy dense, containing
more energy per volume (about 15% more)—consequently, the potential for improved
endurance drives the use of HFs. In comparison to gasoline, HFs generally store longer
without degradation. Some HFEs are capable of operating on a two-stroke oil/gasoline
mix (e.g., 3W-International HFEs). Because HF has a higher flashpoint, the operation of an
HFE UAS may be considered safer. HF may be more readily available in remote areas and
less developed countries. HFEs are generally very fuel-efficient (consuming ≈20% less by
volume than Otto cycle engines), which improves endurance.
Examples of UAS HFE installations include the General Atomics Gray Eagle (see
Figure 11.2) in which is installed a Thielert Centurion 1.7L turbo-diesel producing 101 kW
(135 hp); the USMC Dragon Warrior Vantage incorporating a heavy-fuel Wankel engine
powering the main rotor (the tail rotor is driven electrically) generating 31 kW of power
(42 hp); and the new IAI Super Heron powered by a Fiat DieselJet powerplant (of Italian
manufacture) developing 147 kW (200 hp).
11.2.2 Wankel or Rotary Powerplants

The Wankel engine is named after its inventor, the German engineer, Felix Wankel, who
received a patent for his design in 1929. The engine consists of triangular rotor, having
slightly curved, equilateral sides, rotating within an epitrochoidal chamber, sometimes
described as a two-lobe stator (Falstrom and Gleason 2012). The triangular shape of the rotor
creates three volumes in the chamber, each of which will produce, in a single revolution,
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FIGURE 11.2
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, MQ-1C, Gray Eagle & a Thielert Centurion. (Image courtesy of General
Atomics Aeronautical System, Inc.)
the five necessary internal combustion engine events—that is, the equivalent of three
complete Otto cycles. Thus, because three power pulses occur in one revolution of the
rotor, the specific power of the engine is high. This rotating assembly is the only moving
part in the engine. Because Wankels convert the force of the pressure created in the com-
bustion chamber into rotation without reciprocating motion, these are extremely smooth-
running engines—a significant consideration where a steady, stable, vibration-free UAS
sensor platform is desired. Falstrom and Gleason (2012, 81) emphasize the importance
of this characteristic saying, “Vibration is the deadly enemy of electronics and sensitive
electro-optic payload systems and is much of the reason for the lack of system reliability of
UAV systems.” Wankels are also very compact with a high specific power. Rotary engines
can be made to operate quietly when fitted with an effective muffler system. Although
Wankels are reasonably fuel-efficient and capable of high rpms, torque output is some-
what low, a problem that can be solved using a gear reduction system. Rotary engines are
installed on a number of UASs, including the RQ-7 Shadow and the RQ-2C Pioneer both
powered by UEL AR-741 rotary engines producing 28.3 kW (38 hp) and the Schiebel S-100
Camcopter, powered by an Austro AE50R Wankel producing 41 kW (55 hp).
11.2.3 Gas Turbine Engines

Gas turbines that power manned and unmanned aircraft are referred to as Brayton cycle
(or Joule cycle) powerplants. Named after the American engineer, George Brayton, other
descriptors alluding to Brayton cycle characteristics are constant pressure (referring to an
idealized condition where the combustion process is assumed to occur without changes in
combustor pressure) and open cycle, a reference to the fact that all processes are constantly
ongoing as air (aka, working fluid) is processed through the powerplant (as opposed to the
discrete cycles of two-and four-stroke engines). The main constituent components of an
aircraft gas turbine are the inlet, compressor, diffuser, combustor, and turbine section. These
are assembled to create what is known as the core engine (of a turbofan) or the gas gen-
erator (of a turboprop or turboshaft engine). The gas generator or core engine is the basic
assembly upon which aircraft gas turbines rely to produce the gases or working fluid neces-
sary for the engine to function as a propulsor. Although greater detail will subsequently
be introduced, for now, we can differentiate aircraft gas turbines as follows: turbojets were
251
installed on older fixed-wing designs that relied strictly on the reaction thrust generated
by the engine; turbofans are more efficient propulsors, consisting of a core engine and fan
module, found on newer fixed-wing airplanes and UASs; turboprops, consisting of a gas
generator, gearbox, and propeller, are installed on fixed-wing aircraft, both manned and
unmanned; and turboshaft powerplants are installed on helicopters and tiltrotors. An air-
craft gas turbine is mechanically simple, but the physics and thermodynamic principles
associated with its operation are complex. Gas turbines are considered to be the most reli-
able and smoothest operating of all powerplants available for installation on unmanned
aircraft (Fahlstrom and Gleason 2012). They generally burn HFs (e.g., kerosene hydro-
carbon fractions) and are, by far, the most expensive of UAS powerplants. Gas turbines are
generally installed on larger, high-performance UASs.
The turbojet, turboprop, turboshaft, and turbofan all consist of the same basic compo-
nent assemblies in which the five events characteristic of an internal combustion engine
occur. Air enters the inlet and is ducted or routed to the compressor where the air under-
goes an increase in static pressure and total pressure. Compressor design may be axial
flow, centrifugal, or a combination of the two. A stage of axial compression consists of
a set of rotating blades, or rotors, installed around the circumference of the compressor
drum, and a set of downstream stationary blades, or stators, installed in the compressor
housing. The compressor drum, and consequently, the rotors are driven by the turbine(s)
to accelerate air into the stators. The stators slow the airflow and increase working fluid
static pressure, before directing it into the next stage of compression. An axial-flow com-
pressor is extremely efficient, but exhibits a very low per-stage compression ratio, approxi-
mately 1.1:1 to 1.25:1. This high efficiency is the reason that the majority of large aircraft
gas turbines are constructed with axial-flow compressors, which may achieve an overall
compressor pressure ratio of 40:1, or more. Axial-flow compressors are found in the
gas turbines powering large UASs (e.g., the Global Hawk) and Unmanned Combat Air
Vehicle (UCAV) (e.g., the X-47B). Centrifugal compressors achieve a much greater per-
stage pressure increase, but at a much lower compression efficiency. The use of centrifugal
compressors can create a compact powerplant, and these are integral to the TPE331-10
installed on the General Atomics Reaper. Due to losses that increase substantially with each
boost in pressure, no more than two stages of centrifugal compression will be incorporated
into an aircraft gas turbine. The compound compressors, integral to some turboprop and
turboshaft gas turbines (e.g., the Pratt & Whitney Canada, or P&WC, PT6, and the Rolls
Royce 250, and M250), are configured with multiple stages of axial compression dischar-
ging into a single stage of centrifugal compression. Passing out of the final compressor
stage, the air enters a divergent duct, known as the diffuser, where the working fluid slows
and static pressure increases. Taken together, these components, the inlet, compressor, and
diffuser, are sometimes collectively referred to as the cold section of the engine.
The hot section consists of the combustor, turbine section, and exhaust duct. Often, the
diffuser duct will be constructed with vanes that reduce airflow turbulence and direct
the working fluid into the combustion section (aka, combustor) where fuel, continuously
sprayed from the fuel nozzles, mixes with the air just before being ignited to rapidly oxi-
dize in the combustion process. Working fluid temperature and energy reach maximum
values in the combustor. Upon exiting the combustion section, the working fluid enters the
turbine section to pass through multiple stages of turbine. Unlike a stage of compression,
a stage of turbine consists of a set of upstream stators (aka, the diaphragm or nozzle) and
a downstream set of the turbine blades installed in a rotating disk. This rotating assembly,
or rotor, is also known as the turbine wheel or T-wheel. The nozzle assembly directs the
working fluid, at the proper angle and velocity, into the cupped turbine blades causing the
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rotor to spin like a pinwheel. Because energy is incrementally extracted by each successive
T-wheel, less is available to each downstream stage, and the diameter of each rotor is suc-
cessively larger to uniformly capture the appropriate amount of power in each subse-
quent downstream stage. The rotor disks are fastened to the turbine shaft and the power
extracted by the rotors is used to drive the compressor and any propulsor airfoils (i.e., the
fan, propeller, or rotor blades of a helicopter). From the turbine section, the working fluid
enters the exhaust duct to be directed overboard.
Aircraft gas turbines often incorporate two (or, less commonly, three) sets of turbines,
the compressor, or gas generator turbines and the power, or free turbines. This distinc-
tion is a key feature differentiating various classes of gas turbine designs. Although other
configurations exist (e.g., the PT6), most often the power or free turbine shaft rotates within
the compressor turbine shaft. Because the two assemblies are independently supported
by separate bearing systems, they can rotate at different rpms, with the more upstream
turbine assembly, the compressor turbine, rotating faster. The gas generator turbine con-
stantly drives the compressor to process air in the continuously ongoing process of the
Brayton cycle. No turbine system driving the compressor will extract all of the energy
available in the working fluid. In a turboprop, turbofan, or turboshaft powerplant, some
power must remain in the working fluid to drive the propeller, fan, or rotor blades. Only a
turbojet does not have a power turbine assembly. Nonetheless, some energy must remain
in the working fluid to provide thrust during acceleration of the working fluid through the
propelling nozzle of the exhaust duct. The output shaft of a turboprop or turboshaft will
drive a gear reduction system. If the propeller or rotor blades reach transonic speeds, aero-
dynamic performance dramatically deteriorates and the output rpm of the power turbine
is too high to drive the propulsor airfoils at an rpm acceptably low to operate efficiently.
Consequently, the gear reduction system (the gearbox, gear reduction unit, or the transmis-
sion of a helicopter) converts high rpm, low torque to low rpm, high torque to drive the
prop or rotor blades. Due to the heavy loads encountered by gearboxes integral to turbofan
installations, an aircraft fan is rarely driven through gear reduction.
11.2.3.1 Turboprop and Turboshaft Engines

Turboprops and turboshaft gas turbines are so similar as to be essentially the same. The
free or power turbines of both designs drive a gear reduction unit to reduce the output
rpm and increase the torque delivered to the propulsor airfoils. In fact, aircraft gas turbines
(e.g., P&WC PT6, Lycoming T-53, and the Rolls Royce 250) have often been installed on
both helicopters and fixed wings, and the primary factor determining whether these are
considered turboprops or turboshafts is the type of aircraft on which they are installed,
that is, a turboshaft if installed on a rotary-wing aircraft and a turboprop if installed on
a fixed-wing aircraft. Turboprops are more efficient at lower power output and airspeeds
than turbofans allowing them to loiter for longer endurance at a location of interest.
One example of a reconnaissance UAS powered by two turboprops is the centerline
thrust IAI Eitan (“Steadfast”) powered by two PT6-As developing 900 kW (1200 shp) each.
Figure 11.3 shows another turboprop-powered UAS is the General Atomics Reaper (previ-
ously known as the Predator B), powered by the Honeywell TPE331-10 producing 671 kW
(900 shp). Examples of turboshaft powerplants installed on UASs include the Honeywell
T53-17A-1 installed on the Kaman (K-1200) K-MAX. This powerplant is capable of pro-
ducing 1,341 kW (1,800 shp) of power, but is flat-rated to 1,118 kW (1,500 shp) for takeoff
and 1,006 kW (1,350 shp) in flight. A powerplant may be flat-rated for other reasons (e.g.,
to provide sea-level performance to a certain pressure altitude), but in this case, it is done
253
FIGURE 11.3
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, MQ-9 Predator B Reaper & Honeywell TPE331 Turboprop. (Image
to increase powerplant and transmission life. Another example of a UAS turboshaft instal-
lation is that of the Pratt & Whitney Canada PW207D turboshaft, which develops 478 kW
(641 shp) and powers the Bell Eagle Eye tiltrotor.
11.2.3.2 Turbofan Engines

As previously discussed, accelerating a larger mass of air to a lower velocity for a given
amount of thrust (thrust is the product of mass times acceleration) requires exponentially
more energy (energy consumption increases as the square of the increase in acceleration).
Because, in comparison to the older turbojet design, a turbofan imparts a relatively low
level of acceleration to a larger mass of air (for a given level of thrust), turbofans will
always be the more fuel-efficient design. Additionally, the air discharged from the fan
contains lower levels of energy per unit volume, which is one reason that fanjets are inher-
ently quieter than turbojets. (Another is the higher frequency of the noise energy in the fan
discharge.)
Turbofans are installed on some of the most sophisticated UASs yet produced. These
include the General Atomics Predator-C powered by a Pratt and Whitney PW545 pro-
ducing 18.3 kN (4,119 lb) of thrust (see Figure 11.4); Northrop Grumman Global Hawk,
powered by a Rolls Royce F137 turbofan, developing approximately 34 kN (7,600 lb) of
thrust; the Northrop Grumman X-47B UCAV, powered by the Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-
220U, producing 71 kN (16,000 lb) of thrust; and the Lockheed Martin Polecat (Figure 11.5),
powered by two Williams FJ44-3E turbofans (Figure 11. 6), each developing 13.3 kN (3,010
lb) of thrust. Because maintaining the lowest possible radar cross section is an important
design characteristic of many military UASs (e.g., the X- 47B and Lockheed Martin’s
DarkStar and Polecat), the fans installed on these aircraft are generally small, producing
a medium to low bypass ratio (a comparison of the amount of air discharged by the fan
relative to the amount entering the core engine). Not infrequently, the bypass ratio of UAS
turbofans is very low, possibly less than 1:1.
11.2.3.3 Turbojets
Turbojets, developed during World War II (WWII) are very noisy, and in terms of fuel
consumption, extremely inefficient, particularly at lower airspeeds. On the other hand,
254
FIGURE 11.4
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Predator C Avenger & a Pratt & Whitney PW545 turbofan. (Image
FIGURE 11.5
Polecat developed “in-house” at Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works®. (Image courtesy of Lockheed Martin Skunk
Works®.)
they are without the additional complexity and weight of an integral gearbox, prop or fan,
and therefore, exhibit a high specific thrust. Turbojets have not recently been installed on
UASs but have provided the propulsive force for the Ryan Firefly (General Electric YJ97-
GE-3 turbojet producing 17 kN, or 4,000 lb of thrust), the Ryan Firebee (Continental J69-T-
29A turbojet generating 7.6 kN, or 1,700 lb of thrust), and Firebee II (Teledyne CAE J69-T-6
turbojet producing 8.18 kN or 1,840 lb of thrust), a UAS frequently flown on reconnais-
sance missions in Vietnam and as recently as 2003 in Iraq.
11.2.4 Electric Motors

The operation of UAS electric motors will be more fully discussed in the chapter on
UAS electrical systems, so the treatment here will consequently be brief. UAS electric
powerplants are generally brushless DC motors (BLDC or BL motors). Advantages of
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FIGURE 11.6
Two Williams F44 turbofans (above) powered the Lockheed Martin Polecat. Williams International produces
a family of small, lightweight civil-certified FJ33/FJ44 turbofan engines (roughly in the 1,000–4,000 lbf range).
(Image courtesy of Williams International.)
brushless motors (compared to brushed electric motors) include greater torque and spe-
cific power, more torque per amp (higher electrical efficiency), lower maintenance, and
a longer life (no brushes, slip rings, or commutator to pit, burn, or wear) and less elec-
tromagnetic interference (EMI), which is often an extremely important consideration for
UA systems. (EMI can induce spurious signals in autopilot, avionics, and communications
systems to the extent that the vehicle may be uncontrollable and subsequently lost.) BLDC
motors may be of inrunner or outrunner design.
An inrunner BLDC motor is constructed by mounting permanent magnets on the rotor
(connected to the output shaft), which are simultaneously attracted and repelled by
the magnetic fields produced by the stationary windings (or stators) positioned around
the magnets. In an outrunner design, the outer shell, in which the permanent magnets are
installed, rotates around the central stator. Again, the permanent magnets are attracted/
repelled by the magnetic fields established in the stator windings. The output shaft, to
which the propeller or vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) rotor drive system connects,
is integral to this outer shell. Brushless motors often use neodymium permanent magnets
(also known as NdFeB, NIB, or Neo magnets), which are made up of the rare earth metal,
neodymium, alloyed with iron and boron. These are the strongest permanent magnets yet
developed. Neodymium magnets are available in several grades (strengths)—the stronger
the magnet, the more it costs. The use of strong magnets makes a BLDC motor very efficient.
Due to inherent advantages, sUAS electric powerplants are most commonly, though
not exclusively, of outrunner design. An outrunner will rotate much more slowly than
an inrunner and, yet, produce more torque. Because the outrunner stator is interior to the
motor, the windings and internals can be sealed to protect them from the environment.
Outrunner windings are not subjected to centrifugal loading that may extend motor life.
Air cooling of the windings is not necessary, since heat can be dissipated by conduction.
This is significant because one factor limiting the maximum sustained power output by a
brushless motor is the amount of heat produced by the BLDC—too much heat may per-
manently damage stator winding insulation and weaken rotor magnets.
Electric motors are installed on a large proportion of sUAS fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopters and nearly exclusively on multirotor VTOLs. Examples include the UAV
Factory Penguin BE, the UTC Aerospace Vireo, and the Aeryon Labs Scout and SkyRanger
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FIGURE 11.7
Aeryon Labs Scout quadcopter with outrunner BLDC motors. (Image courtesy of Aeryon Labs, Inc.)
(Figure 11.7). Although electric motors are very quiet and provide extremely smooth,
vibration-
free operation, the primary design trade- off is that of reduced endurance
and range. Endurance for the Scout quadcopter is approximately 25 minutes, while the
published flight time of the fixed-wing Vireo is one hour, though this depends much
on winds. Published endurance for the Penguin BE is 110 minutes. Compare this to the
published endurance of 20+ hours for the Penguin B powered by a two-stroke 3W 28i two-
stroke engine. Battery-powered sUAS, however, are continuing to make significant gains
in endurance with each design.
11.3 Propellers and Rotors on UASs

The propeller is generally considered to be an integral component of a powerplant instal-
lation. On a fixed-wing aircraft (rotary-wing aircraft and multirotors were covered in pre-
vious sections), the combination of powerplant and propeller creates the propulsor, the
unit responsible for generating a propulsive force. With the exception of those examples
powered by a turbojet, turboshaft, or fan, all fixed-wing UASs generate a propulsive force by
accelerating a mass of air through a propeller disk. All of the preceding UAS powerplants,
excluding jet, fan, and turboshaft gas turbines, drive propellers. Thus, a propeller is not an
insignificant component of the majority of fixed-wing unmanned aircraft. UA propellers
may be of fixed or variable pitch (e.g., ground-adjustable) or of constant speed design.
Propellers for UAs are made from a variety of materials: wood, carbon composite, fiber-
glass, aramid, aluminium, nylon, fiberglass-reinforced nylon, steel, etc. Propeller noise can
be reduced by increasing the number of blades for a given thrust rating. Manufacturers
include Sensenich, McCauley, Aerovate, and Northwest UAV (NWUAV), among a large
number of others. Sensenich has been producing propellers for target drones and recon-
naissance UASs since the 1950s (e.g., for Dennyplane aircraft and the Northrop Falconer).
sUASs most often use fixed-pitch propellers. These small propellers often have their
diameter and pitch information displayed on the propeller back (cambered surface). The
first number indicates the diameter of the prop disk (the distance, in inches, measured
from tip to tip on a two-bladed propeller) and the second represents the geometric pitch,
or the distance the prop should theoretically travel in one revolution (see the preceding
257
discussion under UAS Flight Dynamics and Physics). The pitch of a fixed-pitch propeller
should be chosen to align with the mission and flight characteristics of the UAS: Selecting
a propeller of lesser pitch will reduce drag, and all other factors constant result in higher
rpms, a characteristic favoring lower speed operation and the takeoff/landing segments of
the flight. Choosing a higher blade angle (or greater pitch) would be warranted for higher
airspeed applications such as efficient operation at cruising speeds.
Large UASs, such as the turboprop Reaper, will use constant speed propellers in an
attempt to maintain an efficient angle of attack (around two to four degrees) where the lift
to drag ratio is maximized. Such a system is much like those found on manned aircraft: a
single-acting propeller governor will port high-pressure oil, diverted from the powerplant
lubrication system, to a piston in the propeller hub to effect pitch change or release oil
to allow some combination of spring force, aerodynamic forces, and the force exerted by
counterweights (if installed) to effect a pitch change in the opposite direction. The term,
single-acting, refers to the fact that the governor will direct high-pressure oil to cause the
blade angle to change in only one direction. A single-acting governor will direct oil to
the propeller to either increase pitch or decrease pitch—depending upon manufacturer
design; it can do either—but not both. A double-acting governor will route high-pressure
oil to either side of the propeller piston (a component of the pitch change mechanism)
to both increase and decrease blade angle. The Reaper uses a four-bladed McCauley pro-
peller, which is very similar to those found on manned aircraft. Aerovate and NWUAV
both produce constant speed propellers for UASs smaller than the Reaper; propellers
manufactured by the former use aerodynamic forces counteracted by spring force to
accomplish changes in pitch, whereas the designs of the latter may be either electrically or
hydraulically actuated.
11.4 Propulsion System Design

The design of the UAS propulsion system is the integration of engine, propeller, controller,
fuel delivery system, oil system, coolant system, air delivery system, exhaust system, and
alternator. These systems must be packaged to be safe and effective within the operating
environment of the UAV. Fuel and air are combined in the engine to form an explosive
mixture, which is ignited to release the chemical potential of the fuel as the heat of combus-
tion. The heat of combustion is removed from the engine by one of five mechanisms: useful
work, exhaust gases, and radiated heat, into the oil system or into a coolant system. The oil
lubricates moving parts and may provide hydraulic pressure to control the propeller pitch.
The exhaust system removes the combustion gases. The alternator produces the electrical
power needed to run the aircraft. The engine controller makes automatic adjustments, so
the engine produces the requested power within the operating limits of the propulsion
system.
11.4.1 Engine Subsystems

The air induction system supplies sufficient oxygen for the engine to combust the fuel
necessary to make power. The quantity of air needed depends upon the type of engine.
With each cycle, the reciprocating or rotary engine ingests a volume of air approximately
equal to the volume of the cylinder minus volumetric efficiency losses due to fluid friction
258
in the intake valve. As the aircraft climbs in altitude, air density drops. Because there is less
airmass in the cylinder, the engine burns less fuel and produces less power.
The induction inlet draws air from outside the engine nacelle. Extending the engine air
inlet into the freestream produces increased static pressure. When a fluid slows down, the
dynamic pressure is converted to static pressure. Along the surface of the aircraft, friction
slows down the air, so the scoop is moved away from this boundary layer. Consideration
is given to protecting the induction system from icing. Reciprocating and rotary engines
require a particle filter to prevent contaminants from clogging tight clearances. These filters
are a periodic maintenance item requiring access.
Medium-altitude long endurance (MALE) UAVs with reciprocating engines are often
equipped with a turbocharger to maintain a constant intake manifold air pressure (MAP)
with increasing altitude. A turbocharger uses the engine exhaust gas energy captured
through a turbine to drive an inlet air compressor mounted on the same shaft. The
turbocharger speed and compressor pressure ratio are regulated by a waste gate valve
that throttles the flow of exhaust gas to the turbine. The maximum compressor pressure
ratio dictates the altitude at which MAP starts to decline and engine power is limited.
This pressure ratio is dictated by the aerodynamics of the compressor wheel and com-
pressor housing. In general, high compression ratio compressors have a narrower air
mass flowrate in which they operate. At low air mass flow, the compressor surges and the
pressure and mass flow fluctuate wildly. At high air mass flow, the compressor reaches
the Stonewall curve where it cannot pump any more air. The shaft of the turbocharger is
usually lubricated with oil. The oil feed must have a very fine filter due to the very close
tolerances. The high speed of the turbocharger shaft (in excess of 125,000 rpm) generates a
large amount of heat. If the oil flowrate is insufficient, the oil will coke, a process where oil
undergoes oxidation and thermal breakdown producing solid black residue.
As the air is compressed, thermodynamic inefficiencies heat the air to the point that the
air density may be lower than the ambient air. An intercooler uses ambient air to lower
the temperature of the compressed air, thereby increasing the density. Care is taken in the
design to minimize the pressure loss through the intercooler. Typically, aluminium brazed
fin intercoolers are used for their light weight and thermal efficiency.
The hot engine exhaust must be directed away from the engine nacelle, keeping it away
from combustible materials and preventing it from impinging on flammable drain or vent
lines. The exhaust itself must be constructed of fireproof materials and have the flexibility
to withstand vibration and the relative movement of connected parts. Minimizing the
pressure drop in the exhaust ducting reduces backpressure on the engine that will nega-
tively affect power and efficiency. Consideration is also given to ensure that the exhaust
will not harm personnel handling the aircraft.
Most engines require a separate oil system to lubricate moving parts. Two stroke engines
and small electric motors do not require oil systems. In its simplest form, the oil system
consists of a tank, filter, pump, heat exchanger, and deaerator. The engine and gearbox may
either use a single oil system or each have their own dedicated oil system. Oil is consumed
by the engine necessitating the use of an oil tank. The size of the tank must be sufficient
to account to the maximum rate of consumption of oil for the aircraft endurance and have
sufficient room to account for the expansion of hot oil. The oil pump forces the oil through
the engine passages and allows heat to be carried away. If the oil was allowed to remain
stagnant, engine heat would cause the oil to coke and stop lubricating the moving parts.
The oil pump may be electrically driven; however, it is commonly mechanically driven
off the gearbox. There may be several filters in the oil system. A larger mesh size may be
located between the tank and pump to protect the pump from larger debris. A finer oil
259
filter is placed after the pump to protect the engine. The filter unit may include a magnetic
chip detector that can collect ferrous particles. When sufficient material is collected, the
particles bridge two electrical contacts and trigger a warning, caution, or alarm (WCA)
that may indicate that the engine is wearing prematurely. This filter must be accessible for
easy maintenance. Finer filters may be required to protect components with even tighter
tolerances. A heat exchanger is incorporated into the oil system to remove heat gained
from the friction of moving parts and the heat of the engine. The choice of heat exchanger
depends upon the system architecture and how the heat can be used. Some choices include
an air-cooled radiator, an oil-to-coolant heat exchanger, or an oil-to-fuel heat exchanger.
The system architecture may use multiple heat exchangers. The moving parts in the engine
and gearbox entrain air and some combustion gases into the oil, resulting in foam that
makes the oil less effective in heat transfer and lubrication. This necessitates the use of
a deaerator to separate these gasses from the oil while minimizing the loss of oil from
the system. The gasses are vented overboard of the aircraft in a location that does not
constitute a hazard. While these components constitute the basic components of an oil
system, there may be other propulsion system components that require oil, adding com-
plexity to the system.
A coolant system removes heat from the engine to prevent damage to the engine due to
the immense heat generated; however, not all engines require a coolant system. Gas tur-
bine engines are cooled by the high volume of air they ingest. Small reciprocating engines
transfer sufficient heat directly to the air with the aid of cooling fins on the engine cylinder.
Larger reciprocating and rotary engines require a coolant system to help remove some
of the heat. Coolant is forced through channels in the combustion chamber and out to an
air-cooled radiator. The coolant is usually a mixture of water and either ethylene glycol or
propylene glycol and additives. This mixture depresses the freezing point (antifreeze) and
raises the boiling point when compared with pure water. Through the block, the coolant
must have sufficient flow and pressure to prevent nucleate boiling that causes erosion of
the engine block. The radiator cap maintains an elevated system pressure by incorporating
a spring-loaded seal. A coolant tank ensures that the system remains filled and provides
expansion space for the hot coolant. As with the oil system, the coolant pump is either
electrically driven or mechanically powered off the engine. A temperature control valve
proportions the flow of coolant to the radiator to maintain the required temperature into
the engine.
The fuel system controls the flow of conditioned fuel into the engine to support the
requested power level. Fuel is conditioned to meet the temperature, pressure, and contam-
inant requirements of the engine. Because cold fuel requires more heat (and therefore more
time) to ignite, higher altitude UAVs must warm the fuel prior to injection into the engine.
UAVs that operate at lower altitudes may not need this preconditioning step. While some
reciprocating engine might still use carburetor systems that mix the fuel and air prior to
engine combustion chamber, most modern engines inject the fuel directly into the combus-
tion chamber when the air is nearly fully compressed. To ensure a fine mist of fuel droplets,
the fuel must be injected at a pressure much greater (at least twice) that of the compressed
air. This is achieved with a high-pressure pump mechanically driven off the engine. Since
combustion only occurs in the vapor phase, the droplets must evaporate before they ignite.
Larger droplets evaporate more slowly than small droplets that can delay ignition and
result in a less even burn. Sufficient excess flow is provided to keep the fuel pressure con-
stant during injection that will affect the mass flow of the time-based fuel injection. The
aircraft fuel system will contain a particulate filter with provisions to separate out water
that can collect in the fuel tanks.
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There are certain minimum control system powerplant instruments required for large
UAVs. All aircraft require measurements of fuel quantity, oil pressure, oil temperature, oil
quantity, and fire warning. Reciprocating engines require an engine tachometer, cylinder
head temperature, fuel pressure or fuel flow, MAP, and coolant temperature. Gas turbine
engines require gas temperature, fuel flowmeter, fuel pressure, tachometer, an air induc-
tion system ice protection indicator, fuel filter capacity indicator, an oil strainer warning,
and a means to indicate that any fuel filter heater is functioning. Turbojets and turbofan
systems require thrust indication and reverse thrust position. Turbopropeller UAVs require
a torque indicator and propeller blade angle.
The control system makes adjustments to the propulsion system actuators to achieve the
requested power command at the highest system efficiency within the operating limits of
the propulsion system. The control system consists of a full authority digital engine con-
trol (FADEC), sensors, and actuators. The FADEC is the digital computer that operates
the control system. Since the FADEC has full authority, there is no manual backup. To
increase reliability, the FADEC contains two or more completely redundant computers.
If one computer fails, another computer takes control. In its simplest form, the engine
controller is trying to achieve the commanded power; however, more complex propul-
sion system controllers use set points of airspeed or altitude. They may have different
modes for ground operations (taxi) and flight operations. The FADEC uses propulsion
system sensors to determine the current operating condition of the engines, such as fuel
inlet temperature and pressure; engine speed; air temperature and pressure; and exhaust
gas temperature. The FADEC also uses aircraft sensors such as outside air temperature
(OAT), atmospheric pressure, and air speed. Servo actuators adjust the manual controls on
propulsion systems originally designed for human control. The control system automates
many complex interactions with the propulsion system that would otherwise overburden
the pilot.
11.4.2 Propulsion System Installation

Large UAVs follow the many of the same requirements for propulsion system installa-
tion as manned aircraft. The structural mounting of the propulsion system to the air-
frame must withstand all anticipated aircraft and propulsion loads while dampening
the induced vibration. Aircraft loads are a combination of flight and ground loads. Flight
loads include the flight envelope, maneuvering loads, gust loads, rolling conditions, and
yawing conditions. Ground loads include landing loads, taxi conditions, and taxi loads.
Propulsion loads include engine thrust, engine torque, and side loads. Vibration is induced
by the engine and propeller. The vibration frequency is equal to the rotation speed of the
engine and the propeller. There is an additional vibration induced by each propeller blade
passing by the fuselage. The intensity and frequency of these vibrations affect not only the
functionality of sensor suites but also the structural integrity of aircraft components.
While some portions of the UAS propulsion subsystems, described in the section above,
are incorporated into the engine design, the remaining components are integrated separ-
ately into the airframe. The UAS propulsion design must consider the interfaces between
each of these components and package them accordingly. The engine will move on its
vibration mounts in response to the thrust and torque it produces. Propulsion components
mounted on the airframe must account for that relative motion without failure. Propulsion
system weight is a significant portion of overall UAV weight. Efforts are made to minimize
the weight without compromising safety or functionality. The packaging of the propulsion
system must also provide access to maintenance items.
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The engine nacelle is designated a fire zone due to the presence of flammable fluids
and ignition sources. Hot surfaces on the engine and sparking from the alternator bushes
are sufficient to ignite any leaking fuel or oil. If left unchecked, an engine fire may result
in structural failure of the aircraft and complete loss of aircraft control. This is a safety
risk to people and property on the ground. Elements are incorporated into the design to
mitigate against engine fire. The fire zone is isolated from the rest of the aircraft by a fire-
wall that prevents the spread of fire. All penetrations through the firewall are sealed. Fuel
and other flammable fluid tanks are located a safe distance from the firewall to prevent
the heat of a fire from igniting them. A shutoff means on the cold side of the firewall is
incorporated into the line supplying fuel to the engine to cut off the supply when a fire is
detected. Flammable fluid components and lines are constructed of fire proof materials to
prevent them from contributing to a fire. Similarly, any component required to shut down
the engine in the event of a fire is constructed of fireproof materials or protected with
shields or fire blankets. Drain holes prevent any leaking flammable fluid from collecting.
The engine nacelle is ventilated with fresh air to keep the concentration of any flammable
vapor below the lower flammability limit.
11.4.3 Hybrid Electric Systems

A hybrid electric powerplant combines the advantages of a combustion system and an
electric propulsion system. A combustion system’s endurance is only limited by the quan-
tity of fuel the UAV carries, which has a greater energy to weight density than batteries.
A UAV powered by an electric motor is quieter and has less vibration. By combining these
two systems, the combustion engine can operate at peak efficiency to drive an electric
generator. Power is stored in batteries with a high energy to weight ratio. High-efficiency
electric motors power a fan or propeller that provides the motive force for the UAV. During
operations where quiet operation or low aircraft vibration are required, the combustion
engine is shut off. A hybrid electric system has increased weight and complexity that can
be overcome by the increased energy efficiency. Depending upon the application and
corresponding power budget, the combustion engine may be downsized to produce the
average power demand of the aircraft. This saves the engine from needing to be sized for
takeoff and top speed requirements –saving weight.
11.5 Safety Evaluation

Loss of propulsion system thrust will result in loss of aircraft control. The associated hazard
depends upon the size and weight of the UAV. Even for very small UAVs, propulsion
system failure is mission critical. For large UAVs, there is also a potential risk to life and
property for anything in the path of an uncontrolled UAV. The propulsion system safety
evaluation assesses the risk. Factors that go into a safety evaluation include a reliability
assessment, a risk assessment, a review of the propulsion system design, and testing.
11.5.1 Reliability and Risk Assessment

A failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) is a systematic postulation of
potential failure modes and a subjective evaluation of the effect on safety critical functions
262
of the propulsion system. The engineers developing the propulsion system walk through
the components within each subsystem and ask the question, “What happens to the system
when this component fails that way?” They use engineering judgment to assess that par-
ticular failure mode on the rest of the system. A fault tree analysis (FTA) is a quantitative
assessment of critical failure rate. Critical failure rate (λ) is the inverse of the reliability
number, mean time between critical failures (MTBCFs). The FTA is a Boolean logic tree
that rolls up all of the known failure modes and their rates into a single aircraft reliability
number. The known failure modes are derived from the FMECA. The lower the assessed
aircraft reliability, the higher the risk assessment.
The top-level propulsion system failure is loss of thrust. There may be secondary failures
to evaluate, such as loss of electrical power from the alternator. Loss of thrust might further
be broken down into loss of engine power or loss of propeller functionality. Engine power
is further broken down into loss of fuel, loss of air supply, loss of ignition, loss of oil, loss of
coolant, controller failure, mechanical failure, and others, depending on the system. Each
of these systems are broken down further to their constitute components.
The component- level failure rates may be either produced from actual field data,
vendor data, or commercially available failure rate tables. The best data come from simi-
larly designed parts operating in a similar environment. The further the usage envir-
onment deviates, the less useful the data become. For example, the reliability data for a
fielded component are more accurate than data obtained in a laboratory environment that
cannot easily simulate all of the overlapping factors. Similarly, the reliability data from a
component used on an aircraft are more accurate than a similar component used on a sta-
tionary powerplant.
Overall system reliability is improved by incorporating redundant backups for critical
components. For instance, a backup fuel pump ensures that if the primary pump fails,
fuel still flows to the engine. To be fully redundant, the backup unit must be completely
separated from the primary unit. In the example, the backup fuel pump must have its own
fuel supply, inlet screen, and power circuit. This minimizes the number for single-point
failure in the redundant system. Another example is a multiengine aircraft that may be
flown with one or more engines inoperable.
11.5.2 Certification
The airworthiness authority grants an airworthiness-type certificate for the aircraft system
if substantiated by the data provided by the manufacturer. For propulsion systems, there
are three-type certificates required: engine, propeller, and propulsion system integration.
For the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), engines are covered by 14 CFR 33; propellers are
covered by 14 CFR 35; and propulsion system integration is covered by either 14 CFR 23 for
smaller UAVs or 14 CFR 25 for larger UAVs. Normal category rotorcraft are addressed in 14
CFR 27. Transport category rotorcraft are addressed in 14 CFR 29. The aircraft requirements
are written for manned aircraft. With the advent of UAS/RPV, airworthiness authorities
are creating new standards that address the unique attributes of these aircraft.
The procedure for obtaining airworthiness approval is similar regardless of the air-
worthiness authority. First, the aircraft manufacturer and the airworthiness authority
agree on the airworthiness code that will be the basis of certification. Second, the manufac-
turer and airworthiness authority agree on the means of compliance. There are four basic
means of compliance in rank of increasing significance: inspection, analysis, demonstra-
tion, and test. Some airworthiness authorities break these categories down further. For
many airworthiness requirements, there are prescribed acceptable means of compliance.
263
The FAA provides these in the Aircraft Advisory Circulars (AC). While these are the gen-
erally accepted ways of showing compliance, the manufacture may show compliance with
an alternate means with the airworthiness authority approval.
Third, the aircraft manufacture develops the compliance artifacts in accordance with the
negotiated means of compliance. An internal airworthiness reviewer, familiar with gen-
erally accepted practices, reviews the artifacts prior to submittal to the authority to help
ensure approval. The airworthiness authority may accept or reject the compliance artifacts
provided. The aircraft manufacturer has the opportunity to readdress the rejected artifacts.
Finally, once the airworthiness authority is satisfied, airworthiness approval is granted and
the aircraft is certified.
Changes to the aircraft after certification require airworthiness reassessment. These
modifications may be design improvements, vendor changes, or even changes in the
manufacturing plant where a component was made. Even a simple change may introduce
unforeseen interactions that adversely affect the overall aircraft airworthiness. Only those
portions of airworthiness code affected by the change are readdressed.
14 CFR 33 are the airworthiness standards for aircraft engines. This code addresses both
reciprocating and turbine engines. For both types of engines, the code details both design
and construction requirements, and an engine block test. The engine block test involves
a 150-hour endurance test where the engine is subjected to a series of rigorous cycles of
various power levels. A teardown inspection is conducted at the end of the test to prove
that the engine is still functioning within its acceptable limits. In addition, Part 33 requires
that the engines have instructions for continued airworthiness, an installation manual,
engine ratings and limitations, and established power or thrust rating. Any UAV manufac-
ture must conform to that documentation.
14 CFR 35 are the airworthiness standards for propellers. As with the engine code, the
propeller code has both design and construction requirements and test and inspection
requirements. Example of propeller tests includes bird impact, fatigue, lightning strike,
and endurance. As with the engine requirements, the propeller manufacturer must pro-
vide propeller configuration; instructions for continued airworthiness; an installation
instructions, propeller ratings, and operating limits; and features and characteristics. The
aircraft manufacturer must conform to this documentation.
The airframe manufacture is responsible for showing compliance with the powerplant
requirements. These requirements include the following categories: General, Fuel System,
Oil System, Cooling, Air Induction System, Exhaust System, Powerplant controls, and
Powerplant Fire Protection. A few examples of these requirements were briefly presented
in the sections above. As with the engine and propeller, the airframe manufacturer must
provide documentation such as operating limits, flight manual, instructions for continued
airworthiness, and a maintenance manual. The operator is required to follow this
documentation.
11.6 Maintainability
Continuing airworthiness is a set of instructions to maintain an aircraft in safe working
condition throughout its life. Before an aircraft can obtain an airworthiness certification,
the aircraft must have certain Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI)
that includes maintenance manuals, replacement intervals for life limited parts, inspection
264
procedures, requirements for modification of the aircraft, and requirements for amending
the operating limitations and procedures. The aircraft operator is required to follow the
MCAI to maintain the aircraft airworthiness.
The propulsion design should give consideration to the maintenance requirements.
Frequently maintained components, such as filters and fluid tanks, should be easily access-
ible. Some of the more common items were identified in the sections above. Larger UAVs
will require Ground Support Equipment to provide support and access to the propul-
sion system. Procedures for the maintenance of peculiar support equipment, which are
often custom designed, may also need to be developed. Access should be provided for
inspections such as for corrosion wear and fatigue. Failure to take maintenance into con-
sideration early in the design will result in a propulsion system that take a long time to
service that increases costs and result in increased downtime.
11.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we learned about some of the factors that go into UAS propulsion design.
UAS performance requirements are iteratively decomposed to the propulsion system
components. Safety requirements are provided by the airworthiness authority. The pro-
pulsion system consists of an engine, thrust-generating device (propeller, fan, or rotor),
and ancillary systems. There are a wide variety of engines to select from each with their
own advantages and disadvantages relative to the application. The ultimate choice of
system components are the ones that best satisfy the functional, environmental, and safety
requirements. Packaging the propulsion system into the UAV poses its own challenges for
mounting, interfacing, and safety. The completed system is evaluated for safety to ensure
that it is airworthy and capable of completing its intending mission.
11.1 Which of the four main aircraft forces do propulsion system provide?
11.2 Give an example of the iterative decomposition of requirements from the UAS to
the propulsion system.
11.3 List and describe the various powerplant configurations available to the designer
of UAS, identifying aspects or characteristics unique to each and the advantages
and disadvantages of each design when installed on UASs. Explain the operating
cycle of each. Give examples of UASs on which each is installed.
11.3.1 Describe the construction of inrunner and outrunner BLDC motors, giving
the advantages and disadvantages of each. Why are neodymium magnets
commonly used in the rotors of these motors? What will be the effect of heat
on these magnets?
11.3.2 Explain the differences between turbojet, turboprop, turboshaft, and
turbofan gas turbines? Give examples of UASs on which each type of gas
turbine has been installed?
265
11.4 Identify those UASs most likely to use a fixed-pitch propeller and those where a
constant-speed propeller would be used. A constant-speed system is heavier and
much more complex. Explain why, in the face of the preceding statement, these
would be used. Identify those flight regimes where higher or lower blade angles
would be desirable and justify your answer. When compared to a “cruise” fixed-
pitch prop, would a “climb” prop have a greater or lesser blade angle?
11.4.1 Describe the function of the typical propulsion subsystems. For each engine
type, identify which subsystems are required to operate that system. Why
are the other subsystems not required?
11.4.2 Describe the challenges involved with integrating the propulsion system
into the UAV. Which subsystem components might be integrated into
the engine and which are airframe components? Describe why some
components might not be integrated into the engine?
11.4.3 Describe how a hybrid powerplant system works. What are the advantages
and disadvantages of a hybrid powerplant? Are hybrid powerplants good
for all applications?
11.5 Why is a safety evaluation necessary for an unmanned air-vehicle system? Who is
the object of the safety evaluation?
11.5.1 What is an FMECA used for? What is an FTA used for? How do the FMECA
and FTA help the UAS propulsion system design? When should the FMECA
and FTA be conducted?
11.5.2 What is the process to prove the airworthiness of a UAS propulsion system?
What does airworthiness mean? Who grants an airworthiness-type certifi-
cate and who is it granted to?
11.6 What is continuing airworthiness? Why is it important?
11.7 Describe some common propulsion system maintenance items? Identify some
other propulsion system maintenance items not listed in this chapter.
References
Catchpole, B.G. and B. Parmington. 1990. Design and Preliminary Development of an Engine for Small
Unmanned Air Vehicles. Propulsion report 184. Melbourne: Department of Defense, Aeronautical
Research Laboratory.
Fahlstrom, P.G. and T.J. Gleason. 2012. Introduction to UAV Systems. Chichester, UK: John Wiley
and Sons.
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12
UAS Subsystem Nexus: The Electrical System
Michael T. Most and Samuel Stewart
12.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

12.2 UAS Electrical Systems: General Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
12.3 sUAS Electrical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
12.3.1 All-Electric sUAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
12.3.1.1 Power Sources for All-Electric sUAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
12.3.1.2 Electric sUAS Propulsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
12.3.2 Nonelectrically Powered sUAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
12.4 Electrical Systems for Large UASs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
12.5 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
12.1 Introduction
The unmanned aircraft (UA) electrical system provides the nexus of the UA subsystems
to perform the intended mission. The electrical system powers the navigation and flight
sensors; powers the flight, engine, and mission control computers; powers communication
and detect-and-avoid systems; powers electromechanical servos and motors; commands
valves for hydraulics if applicable; and in the case of small unmanned aircraft systems
(sUASs) provides the source of propulsion. The lack of a pilot aboard UA precludes the
use of manual mechanical flight control, in which pilot applied force is transmitted via the
control stick, levers, and pedals to the flight control surfaces using a combination of rods,
cables, gears, pulleys, and/or hydraulics. As such, UA necessarily use fly-by-wire flight
control, in which electrically powered flight computers combine flight sensor data with
remote pilot input or preprogrammed mission input to generate the flight control surface
commands. With no people on board, the purpose of UA is not the transport of personnel
but the utilization or delivery of the carried payload. The size and design of the payloads
are as varied as the size and design of the UA themselves:
• Cameras for video recording of films, shows, and advertisements

• Cameras for the inspection of structures, rail lines, site surveys, and wildfire tracking
• Services such as aerial refueling, crop dusting, and the delivery of online purchases
• Scientific instruments for meteorological and oceanic research
• Surface and maritime radar for patrolling borders and exclusive economic zone waters
267
268
• Military payloads for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

• Military payloads for signal jamming, target acquisition, and target designation
• Military stores for direct delivery of kinetic munitions and other weapons
Even in the case of UA drone racing, cameras and sensors are required for remote pilot
situational awareness. In some perspectives, the UA can be viewed as a flying electrical
power bus, allowing the UA to perform all aspects of its flight and mission.
For example, among the most diminutive of the commercially available sUAS is the
electrically powered Proxdynamics PD-100 (aka, Black Hornet Nano) microaerial vehicle
(MAV) that measures approximately 10 × 2.5 cm (4 × 1 inch) and weighs just 16 g (2.1
ounces) including the battery that provides 20 min, or more, of flight time. The PD-100 is
capable of remote operation as a remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) or of autonomous flight
enabled by an onboard autopilot with integrated avionics (i.e., GPS receiver, inertial meas-
urement unit, and three-axis gyro system). Because the MAV’s payload consists of an elec-
trically positioned, electro-optical sensor capable of streaming (downlinking) either a live
video feed or still images, the PD-100 is well suited to various 3D (dirty, dull, and dan-
gerous) missions including close-quarters search and rescue following a natural disaster,
inspection of nuclear and chemical manufacturing facilities, and hostage rescue and mili-
tary applications.
By comparison, as UA increase in size, platforms generally become more capable of
carrying larger, heavier payloads, which, in turn, provide greater mission capabilities.
Larger payloads typically require greater amounts of electrical power, affecting power
generation and distribution. The physical increase in size of UA necessitates that power
be distributed over longer distances, increasing the effects of cable resistance and induct-
ance. Larger UA have requirements for greater system redundancy to ensure safety.
Consequently, as a generalized observation, it could be stated that the complexity of the
associated onboard systems becomes greater as UA platforms become larger. The intri-
cacy and sophistication of the onboard systems of large UA (e.g., the Northrop Grumman
Global Hawk, the Lockheed Martin Sentinel, and the NASA-modified General Atomics
Reapers of the Ikhana and Altair programs) become comparable to those of large, turbine-
powered manned aircraft.
12.2 UAS Electrical Systems: General Characteristics

On the macrolevel, the electrical systems of UA may be characterized in broad terms, gen-
erally descriptive of those found in the majority of UASs. What follows is intended to pro-
vide a basic introduction and overview of electrical systems and to lay the groundwork
for the more detailed descriptions that follow in the subsequent sections. Electrical power
systems are typically viewed as three functions: electrical power source (generation), elec-
trical power transmission from the source to the load (distribution), and use of the elec-
trical power by the load (utilization). The distribution of electrical power, in turn, has two
key aspects that must be effectively managed: (1) steady-state conditions, which result in
voltage drops and the generation of heat due to the electrical current through the resist-
ance of the wiring, and (2) transient conditions, which result in voltage drops, spikes, and
ringing due to changing load currents through the inductance of the wiring.
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UAS Subsystem Nexus: The Electrical System 269
On nearly all UA, the primary or backup source of electrical power is chemical energy
stored in batteries. For sUAS, the batteries provide one or more voltage levels to power
the electrical system, such as 6V direct current (DC) and 12V DC. In larger UA, which inte-
grate technical standard order (TSO –A Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] standard)
avionics, commercial off the shelf (COTS) units, and government furnished equipment
(GFE) payloads, voltage levels are driven to aircraft standards such as 28V DC, 270V DC,
and 115V alternating current (AC) detailed in MIL-STD-704. Also, as the size of the UA
increases, battery power alone is typically insufficient to cover all electrical system power
demands, except for emergency and engine-out conditions, so electrical power is converted
from higher energy density chemical energy stored in fuel that is converted to mechanical
energy via combustion engine turboprop, turbofan, or auxiliary generators. In other cases,
supplemental UA power is converted mechanically via ram air turbines, converted chem-
ically from fuel cells, or collected electromagnetically via solar panels.
With the exception of superconductors, all electrical conductors have resistance. That
includes generator and servomotor windings, power distribution network wiring and
bus bars, and circuit card traces. Even batteries have internal resistance, which becomes
of particular concern during discharge, as batteries age, and as batteries operate in low-
temperature environments, both on the ground and at altitude. (This characteristic and the
responsible chemical processes are subsequently discussed.) The resistance of a conductor
is a function of the material of which it is made, given by a constant of material resistivity
and represented by a lower-case Greek rho, ρ. Given a particular conductive metal (e.g.,
copper or aluminum), resistance then varies directly with length and inversely with cross-
sectional area—the longer the conductor and smaller the cross-sectional area, the greater
the resistance. Expressed mathematically, the resistance of a conductor can be calculated
using the formula, R = (ρL)/A. Resistance generates heat as it converts electrical energy
into thermal energy. If the circuit is a heater, then no problem: it is doing its job. If the cir-
cuit is not a heater, then unnecessary resistance generates unnecessary heat that wastes
energy and can stress components, leading to an increase in component failure rates. While
a concern even for the smallest circuit cards, conductor resistance is particularly an issue
for the wiring of electrical power distribution networks as the lengths of power distribu-
tion cables are typically orders of magnitude larger than the lengths of circuit card traces.
Aviation quality wire (i.e., manufactured according to FAA and military standards and
specifications) is sized according to the American Wire Gauge (AWG) system in which
larger numbers indicate a smaller diameter wire. For example, 0.1 in diameter AWG 10
wire is an order of magnitude larger than 0.01 in diameter AWG 30 wire. Although a manu-
facturer could order wire in odd AWG sizes, aircraft wire manufactured according to FAA
and military specifications is generally available only in even-numbered AWG diameters.
Aviation quality wire is stranded for flexibility and manufactured only in copper or alu-
minum (although aluminum is less commonly used due to lower conductivity, higher
resistance, and susceptibility to corrosion). To decide which size wire to use, the designer
is left with the typical engineering trade off. Smaller wire is less expensive, weighs less,
and takes up less space. However, smaller wire has higher resistance, which, depending
on the current through the wire, results in larger voltage drops (V = IR drop of Ohm’s law).
Wire that is too small for the current applied will overheat (P = I2R as discovered by James
Prescott Joule while running experiments for his brewery). Overheating wire degrades the
wire insulation, increasing the risk of short-circuit failures, causes the wiring to become
stiff and brittle, and can be an ignition source for fires. Large wires can handle higher
currents, but are expensive, heavy, and take-up space. Every ounce of unnecessary cable
270
weight corresponds to less flight time due to the increase weight of the UA, requiring more
propulsion to keep the UA aloft. In addition, every cubic inch of space taken by unneces-
sarily large wiring displaces space that could have otherwise been used for batteries, fuel,
or payloads. Use of large wiring does not only affect the size of the wiring itself, but also
increases the size of conduits to route the cabling, the space for cable turns due to min-
imum bend radius requirements, and the space at the avionics box interfaces due to the
size of the connectors. The size of the connectors, in turn, can drive the size and weight of
the avionics boxes, compounding the issues of space, weight, and power. Consequently,
when designing any UAS electrical system or installing a new component, selecting a
wire of suitable diameter is critical to satisfactory system operation and longevity. For a
given UAS circuit, anticipated peak current flow, the maximum voltage drop acceptable
in the circuit, and the conductor length, from power source to component ground, are the
most important factors in selecting the correct AWG wire size. This problem is common
to all aircraft design, manned and unmanned alike, so guidance on wire gauge sizing is
readily available from government and commercial standards, such as Advisory Circular
AC43.13-1B published by the FAA, which, in turn, references Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) AS50881 that superseded the military document MIL-W-5088L. The wire
gauge sizing is dependent on the maximum current load, as well as the thermal effects
of altitude and the thermal effects of bundling multiple wires together. The guidance on
acceptable voltage drop for 28V DC, 270V DC, and 115V AC electrical power systems can
be found in the military standard MIL-STD-704F, which is also referenced in AC43.13-1B.
Of interest to some: superconductors are not a viable option for current UA as even current
“high-temperature superconductor” materials require cooling near –200°C using liquid
nitrogen, and are not practical due to the expense as well as the harsh environments of air-
craft avionics per aircraft environmental standards such as Radio Technical Commission
for Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-160 and MIL-STD-810.
Maxwell’s equations, along with the Lorentz Force Law, form the foundation of the math-
ematical modeling of electromagnetism. In particular, the equations show that changing
electric fields induce magnetic fields, and that changing magnetic fields “induce” electric
fields. As such, the transmission of electrical power generates electric and magnetic fields
that can be beneficial, as in the case of stored energy and noise reduction provided by prop-
erly damped capacitor and inductor filters, or detrimental, as in the case of radiated elec-
tromagnetic interference (EMI), capacitive signal cross talk, and inductive voltage drops
and spikes due to step loads. Like resistance, inductance is present in all conductors, not
just in coils and loops. Similar to resistance, the inductance of a straight wire is proportional
to the length of the conductor and inversely proportional to the cross-sectional width of
the conductor—the longer the wire and smaller the cross-sectional width, the greater the
inductance. The inductance of a conductor causes a portion of the electrical current to be
converted to a magnetic field. That portion of the power is not dissipated as was the case
for resistance, but is absorbed and stored as a magnetic field. The absorption of the power
can result in significant voltage drops when a load turns on or draws additional current
while operating. Inversely, the inductance can result in significant voltage spikes when
load currents are switched off as the collapsing magnetic fields return the stored power
back into the conductor. If left unchecked, those voltage spikes can cause damage to the
circuitry of the avionics or payloads. As such, electrical system design is just that a system
design. Design of the cables includes using proper gauge wire in twisted pairs with inter-
leaving to reduced magnetic effects, and using shielding with circular (360°) terminations
to reduce EMI radiation and susceptibility. The impedance (a measure of the opposition
of electric current to the energy flow when a voltage is applied) of twisted pair wiring is
271
2.2–2.4 times less than a single wire 2–4 in above a ground plane. As cited in MIL-STD-461F
appendix A (page 205, preceding Figure A-6), “where power distribution wiring has short
lengths, or where dedicated returns run with the high sides (versus structure return),”
use of 5 µH line impedance stabilization network (LISN) may be appropriate as opposed to
the typical 50 µH LISN used for single wire systems. The reduction in impedance allows the
use of smaller sized components for EMI filtering, saving space and weight within avionics
utilization equipment. Design of power distribution boxes includes using fuses, traditional
circuit breakers, and/or solid-state circuit breakers and current limited switches to limit
fault currents for circuit protection. Design of the electrical power system also includes
safety grounding, especially for 115V AC, 270V DC, or other high-voltage systems, for
circuits near fuel or other combustible vapors, and for materials that are subject to static
electricity build-up (e.g., propeller blades, flight surfaces, and even hydraulic lines and
fuel lines). Government and commercial standards provide guidance for those aspects
of the electrical system design, such as Advisory Circular AC43.13-1B, MIL-HDBK-274,
MIL-HDBK-454, and MIL-STD-464.
Another important characteristic of wire is the quality of its insulation. The purpose of
the insulation surrounding the conductor is to keep circuit current within the conductor.
A measure of the ability of the insulation to perform this paramount function has been his-
torically referred to as its dielectric strength, although preferred terms, depending upon the
context, might be relative permittivity or dielectric permittivity. If the wire abrades or is cut
or damaged by solvents or fuel, its dielectric characteristics are diminished, weakening the
insulation at a point where, if voltage is sufficient to overcome the remaining resistance at
that location, current will escape from the circuit (short circuit). Short circuits can generate
heat and impair or interrupt system operation. Short circuits can also lead to safety issues
for maintainers on the ground if AC or high-voltage DC is allowed to conduct to exposed
conductive surfaces. If the system does not incorporate circuit protection, the short circuit
may produce enough heat to cause an in-flight fire and result in loss of the aircraft. When
installed, such circuit protection devices should be installed as near the electrical power
source as possible to protect the maximum length of circuit wiring.
All electrical systems require a closed-loop circuit through which to conduct the current,
i.e., a power source path and a return path. In the case of larger UA of traditional semi-
monocoque construction (aluminum fuselage skin supported by load bearing internal
frame), not only does the low-impedance aluminum fuselage provide a path to conduct
high currents resulting from lightning strikes, but the aluminum fuselage/empennage can
also be used as the electrical power return path. An example of such UA is the Northrop
Grumman Global Hawk/Euro Hawk, which is designed around a fuselage constructed
of aluminum. For a historical snapshot, the Lockheed/ Boeing RQ- 3A DarkStar UA
(Figure 12.1) also utilized an aluminum fuselage, but that program was terminated in 1999
due to budget cuts. In such a configuration, the positive leads of DC power sources, such
as batteries and generators, are connected to a distribution bus to which the positive sides
of the component circuits also connect. When the return leads of the power source(s) and
the return leads of the component(s) are connected (grounded) to the airframe, a complete
circuit is provided. Current flow to circuits is then controlled by solid-state semiconductor
switching devices and/or electromechanical relays and contactors. Because only one
conductor carries current from the bus to the component with the airframe acting as the
conductive return path to complete the circuit to the source, this arrangement of wiring
is referred to as a single-wire system—and, it is something that is not possible where the
UAS structure is constructed completely of composite materials, such as nonconductive or
partially conductive glass fiber, carbon fiber, and Kevlar. In general, composite structures
272
FIGURE 12.1
Lockheed Martin/Boeing Tier III-(minus) RQ-3 DarkStar on the ramp following delivery to Dryden Flight
Research Center, Edwards, CA. (Image courtesy of NASA.)
have a higher strength to weight ratio than aluminum, making for lighter airframes.
There are also physical limitations of aluminum structures, where the thickness of alu-
minum panels are constrained to a minimum thickness required to support aircraft struc-
tural rivets. The combination of weight savings and panel thickness forces most sUAS to
utilize composite structures. Add to that the benefits for reduced corrosion, the ability to
use fewer parts of custom shapes instead of multiple part assemblies, and the increased
performance in extreme temperature and weather conditions, and it is no surprise that
even large commercial manned aircraft are transitioning to use composite structures, such
as the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. The cost (aside from the literal increased cost of composite
materials and fabrication) is that composite UAS manufacturers do not have the luxury
of a nearly equipotential ground plane of the aluminum fuselage for power returns, so
must either embed conductive strips or bus bars within the composite structure to be
used as a common distribution bus or shared ground, or must double the amount of
wire used, including both the power and dedicated return within the cables. The weight
savings of the composite fuselage typically exceed the increase in weight from the second
wires, for a net weight reduction, and including both power and return wires within
shielded, twisted pair cabling keeps cable routing clean and limits EMI. However, com-
posite structures, even those that include one or more layers of wire mesh within the com-
posite, require internal avionics to have higher levels of transient protection as induced
voltages from lightning strike currents are higher. Like all engineering problems, to goal
is to navigate all of the often-conflicting constraints to design a workable system (not the
optimal system as that is too expensive, takes too long to design/manufacture, and is
always subject to interpretation).
Another aforementioned design consideration associated with circuit wiring is the cre-
ation of EMI (aka, radio-magnetic interference [RMI]). EMI results in a voltage being
impressed upon a conductor creating a spurious signal, which can corrupt or confuse
the information carrying signal in sensitive autopilot, communication, and navigation
circuits to produce a system malfunction. EMI can even cause a critical UAS system to
fail completely (FAA 2012). More than one UAS has been destroyed as the result of EMI
produced by an unshielded magneto ignition circuit interfering with the autopilot and
avionics systems. Potential sources of such spurious signals are many and include igni-
tion systems, switch-mode power supplies, electronic speed controllers (ESCs), electric
273
motors, servos, and even conductors themselves. Any change in the intensity of current
flowing in a conductor results in an expansion or contraction of the associated electro-
magnetic field that surrounds the wire. Should the resulting relative motion cause this
varying field to cut across an adjacent conductor, a secondary voltage will be impressed
in the wire that is otherwise electrically insulated from the one carrying the initially
varying current flow. If this secondary circuit is carrying data to a critical component,
the impressed (spurious) signal can corrupt the original data signal, with potentially
undesirable or catastrophic results (e.g., a crash and loss of the aircraft). Because the
strength of the EMI-producing magnetic field decreases as the inverse of the square of
its distance from the receiving conductor, maximizing separation between conductors is
sometimes an effective strategy for reducing or eliminating electronic noise or interfer-
ence. Twisting wires is also a simple way to cause the interacting fields to cancel, and
thus, reduce EMI. A more positive EMI-suppression strategy is the use of shielded wire
or cable (FAA 2012). (An electrical cable consists of multiple insulated conductors, some-
times twisted, and routed together in a common sheath.) Another commonly employed
method used to reduce or eliminate EMI in UAS electrical systems, particularly those
found in sUAS, is the use of chokes made up of sintered soft iron or ferrite (ceramic
materials compounded with iron (III) oxide), which are available in a variety of sizes,
dimensions, and shapes, such as beads or tubes. Where used in sUAS installations,
the wires associated with EMI-producing circuits are often passed through the centers
of toroid-or donut-shaped soft iron chokes and coiled in turns around their surfaces.
The chokes are passive and are not connected to the circuit. Absorbing and dissipating
energy while being frequency-sensitive and tunable (by varying characteristics such as
size, shape, and material of construction), these chokes are somewhat analogous to the
inductors used in electrical circuits as EMI filters.
EMI filters are created from reactors, that is, inductors and capacitors. Although they
produce an opposition to current flow in an AC circuit, reactors differ from resistors in
several important ways: (1) the amount of opposition, termed reactance where attribut-
able to reactors, varies with frequency, and where both inductance and capacitance are
present in a circuit, it completely disappears at the resonant frequency; (2) reactors create a
phase shift between voltage and current, whereas resistors do not; and (3) because reactors
alternately absorb and return energy to the circuit, they do not convert voltage to heat in
the same way as a resistor. A final EMI-suppression strategy relies on the use of a cap-
acitor (or capacitors) in parallel with the load and/or an inductor (or inductors) in series
to create a low-pass (LP) electronic filter. An LP filter permits the passage of low-frequency
voltages (and associated currents), while higher frequencies are filtered or blocked. DC has
zero frequency and is freely passed. A high-pass filter, which will block lower frequencies
(longer wavelengths) while passing those of higher frequencies (shorter wavelengths), can
be constructed from some combination of inductors in parallel and capacitors in series
with the load. Because both LP and high-pass filters are frequency-sensitive, both types can
be tuned to pass or block frequencies or bands by varying the value of the reactors used in
the construction of the filter. Properly designed electronic filters include dampers to pre-
vent a high signal gain (amplification) at the resonant frequency. Consider the following
as an example of the use of an electronic filter to suppress the noise. DC aircraft fuel pump
motors are constructed of an armature, made up of many turns of insulated wire windings,
repulsed by the magnetic field produced by the stators. The relative motion created by
the rotation of the armature windings in the magnetic field of the stators induces a high-
frequency AC that, were it not filtered out by the capacitive noise filter integrated into the
motor, would generate a high-frequency EMI. Consequently, one potential application of
274
an electronic LP filter would be incorporation into the design of fuel pumps installed in the
tanks of UASs powered by gasoline or heavy fuel engines.
A point to be made, in closing this section, is that UAS electrical systems share common-
alities though the components and overall system design will vary with platform size and
mission. Nearly all UASs, from the smallest RPA to the largest, most sophisticated UA,
carry a battery. All UA electrical systems are powered from a primary source, most often
a generator or battery, and provide the available power to the electrical loads through a
distribution system. Most have some form of voltage regulation to provide proper voltages
to the various components. These similarities, as well as the differences, will be discussed
in the remainder of this chapter.
12.3 sUAS Electrical Systems

Not very long ago—a matter of a few years—the small UA flying today would not have
been possible. Improvements in certain enabling technologies that include power storage
(batteries), artificial intelligence (powerplant controllers and onboard computing), elec-
tronics miniaturization, and electric motor design have enabled the rapid evolution of small,
electrically powered UA. For example, in 2001, a conventional-for-the-time “brushed”
motor, suitable for powering an sUAS, required a gearbox and weighed approximately 269
g (Logan et al. 2007). As small electric motors evolved, brushless inrunner motors, com-
parable in power to brushed motors, became available. (Inrunner and outrunner brushless
DC [BLDCs] motors will be subsequently described.) Although at about 209 g, a compar-
able brushless inrunner weighed about 22.3% less than the brushed motor it replaced, it
still required a gear reduction system (Logan et al. 2007). Today, a brushless DC outrunner
motor, not requiring a gearbox but of comparable power output, would weigh approxi-
mately 181 g, a savings of 32.7% over the brushed motor of 2001. Electrically powered
sUASs currently use either brushless inrunner or outrunner electric motors to drive the
propeller or rotor system.
The smallest among sUASs are generally powered by electric motors. The use of an elec-
tric motor affords certain advantages in the design and operation of sUAS, providing quiet,
smooth, and reliable, low-vibration propulsion. Exhaust gas and noise are eliminated.
Larger UAS may use an internal combustion (IC) engine for propulsion and to drive a
generator as the primary source of electrical power. The addition of an electrical generator
requires more sophistication in power distribution and control, and leads to inherently
more complex electrical systems. Thus, the choice of power plant affects the design of
the entire electrical system. Each UA is a holistic integration of components, the entirety
designed to successfully achieve intended mission goals. Factors such as payload, endur-
ance, range, vibration levels, operational altitude, maneuverability, operating environ-
ment, and redundancy, among others, may factor into the choice of a power plant, and
thus, influence the design of the electrical system.
12.3.1 All-Electric sUAS

Arguably, the first all-electric UA flew in 1957 (Noth 2008). An RPA, the Radio Queen, was
powered by a brushed motor having a permanent magnet stator. Electricity was supplied
by a silver-zinc battery. Contemporary examples of all-electric, fixed-wing sUAS powered
275
FIGURE 12.2
View of all-electric Penguin BE payload bay. Visible in the bay, just forward of the wing, is the lithium–polymer
(Li–Po) battery cartridge and just aft of the wing, atop the powerplant cowling, is the air scoop to direct cooling
air around the BLDC inrunner electric motor. (Image courtesy of UAV Factory.)
by electric propulsion include the AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven, the UTC Aerospace
Systems Vireo, the UAV Factory Penguin BE (Figure 12.2), and the PrecisionHawk
Lancaster. Almost all multirotor sUAS are all-electric, and even some large unmanned
rotorcraft, such as the IAI Panther tiltrotor, which, at 65 kg (~143.3 lbs), approaches three
times the FAA maximum weight for sUAS (<55 lbs), rely exclusively on electrical energy
to operate the propulsion and all onboard systems. The use of an electric powerplant
dictates much in the design and construction of the sUAS electrical system, including
the requirement to not only control motor rpm, regulate voltage, and provide usable
DC power for the propulsion, but also to power the receiver, servos, avionics, onboard
computers, and payload. What generally will not be found on an all-electric sUAS are air-
borne charging systems and backup power sources (i.e., a dedicated emergency battery)
to provide power for starting and to energize the electrical system in the event of a loss of
the electrical generator.
12.3.1.1 Power Sources for All-Electric sUAS

The most common source of power in all-electric sUAS is one or more batteries. Power
sources for larger, all-electric UA include solar panels (NASA Pathfinder and Centurion),
fuel cells (U.S. Naval Research Labs Ion Tiger), or a combination of both (NASA Helios
HP03) (Figure 12.3). (The NASA aircraft also carried batteries to supplement the primary
sources of electrical power.) Batteries afford several advantages as sUAS power sources.
They exhibit relatively high- energy density, and unlike liquid fueled aircraft, which
become increasingly lighter during flight, all-electric sUASs powered by batteries do not
experience a shift in their center of gravity as power is consumed. On the other hand,
batteries are typically the heaviest component onboard sUAS, and battery weight may
be a factor determining the method of launch and the most important factor limiting the
range and endurance of the aircraft. Moreover, batteries consume large volumes of space,
and “[f]‌or a given energy storage, even Li–S batteries occupy four times the volume of that
of fossil fuels, presenting a problem for all other than short-range [unmanned aircraft]”
(Austin 2010, 291).
276
FIGURE 12.3
NASA Helios flying at a speed of approximately 25 mph and 10,000 feet off the coast of Kauai, Hawaii. (Image
courtesy of NASA.)
The basic unit of a battery is an electrochemical cell in which energy conversions occur.
Without an external circuit connected to the cell terminals, chemical reactions cause ioniza-
tion within the cell electrolyte and the active material on the positive plates or electrodes
(the cathode) and the negative plates or electrodes (the anode) (Gundlach 2012). During
this process, the active plate material is converted to the inactive material as cations form
at the positive plates of the cell. Simultaneously, anions, with extra electrons available to
become electricity, migrate to those plates, which are negative. Once the active material
is inactivated through the ionizing reactions, it is unavailable to produce additional free
electrons. The ongoing conversion of active material (to that which is inactive) explains
why all cells and batteries eventually self-discharge over time. Aside from taking part in
the chemical reactions occurring within the cell, another function of the liquid or paste
electrolyte existing between the positive and negative plates is to allow migration of the
ions within the cell, and thereby, conduct current internally through the cell. During dis-
charge (aka, galvanic action), when an external load is connected across the terminals of
the cell (or battery), the rate of ionization increases as electrons are drawn from the nega-
tive electrode under the attraction of the cations on the positive terminal. In this way, the
rate of chemical reactions occurring within the cell increases in response to the demand for
the power necessary to operate circuit loads. If active material is converted and consumed
during the chemical reactions of the galvanic discharge, the cell cannot be restored to its
predischarge condition. Nonrechargeable cells and batteries are said to be the primary
sources of power in, for example, a conventional carbon-zinc Leclanché dry cell that is
often referred to as a primary cell. In a rechargeable cell or battery, the active material is
not consumed and lost, but is only converted, and the chemical reactions that produced
the electrical current to power the external circuitry can be reversed through the applica-
tion of electricity from an external source (e.g., a generator or solid-state battery charger)
to restore the electrolyte and active plate material to their original states. The process of
producing chemical reactions through the application of electrical energy (DC) is known
as electrolysis or electrolytic action. Rechargeable power sources in which the battery
constituents can be electrolytically restored are referred to as secondary cells or batteries.
Nominal cell voltages are a function of electrolyte and active material chemistries,
which determine the rate at which ionization can occur to drive free electrons through the
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external circuit. (A more technically stated description would be that the available output
voltage is a function of the net reduction potentials of the positive and negative plates
or electrodes.) The term “battery chemistry” refers to the materials from which the cell
components (positive and negative plates and the electrolyte) are produced. For example,
lithium polymer and lithium-ion polymer batteries are constructed of similar materials
and develop voltage using comparable chemistries: graphite for the anode, lithium cobalt
or, rarely, lithium magnesium for the cathode, and a lithium salt electrolyte. In nickel–
cadmium batteries, the electrolyte is potassium hydroxide (KOH), while the negative plate
is cadmium and the positive plate is nickelous material (e.g., nickel (III) oxide-hydroxide).
Examples of nominal voltages associated with cells used in UAS applications, as either
main or supplementary power sources, include hydride cells (nickel–cadmium [Ni–Cd]
and nickel metal-hydride [NiMH]) producing 1.2 V per cell, lithium cells (lithium-ion
[Li-ion] and lithium–polymer [Li–Po]) generating 4.2 V, and lithium–sulfide cells (Li–S)
producing 2.1 V per cell.
Unlike voltage, the capacity of a cell is not a function of chemistry, but rather of the
amount of active plate or electrode material exposed to the electrolyte. Capacity may be
defined as the ability of a cell (or battery) to deliver a specified constant current flow over a
given period of time, often standardized at an hour, to a given voltage level. The specified
or expected rate of discharge is often referred to as the C-rate, for capacity rate. The C-
rate is also sometimes said to be shorthand for charging/discharging rate (Fahlstrom and
Gleason 2012). For example, a fully charged lead-acid (LA) cell will have a nominal voltage
of approximately 2.0 V (or possibly a tenth or two higher). The same LA cell is considered
discharged at 1.75 V. If the cell has a published ampere-hour rating (AH rating) of 1 amp,
the C-rate discharge would be 1 amp for 1 hour. At the end of that 60 min, if the cell voltage
is 1.75 V or higher, the cell is capable of delivering 100% of its rated capacity. If a “topped-
off” or fully charged LA cell is discharged at the C-rate to reach 1.75 V in one-half hour,
then the cell is at 50% of its capacity. A battery can discharge at much higher rates than
the specified C-rate, but for correspondingly shorter periods. At some point, the rate of
discharge will become too great, and the battery will be irreversibly damaged by the heat.
Another commonly used term, related to capacity, is energy density, which refers to the cell
(or battery) capacity per weight. Similarly, power density refers to maximum deliverable
power, expressed in watts per unit weight (Fahlstrom and Gleason 2012).
Cells of similar chemistry can be connected either in series or parallel (or both) to create
a battery. Connecting cells in series additively increases the output voltage of the battery,
while placing cells in parallel similarly increases capacity. As an example, connecting two
Li–Po cells in series produces a battery, commonly referred to as a 2S, having a nominal
voltage of 8.4 V, whereas placing the cells in parallel would create a battery having double
the capacity but the same voltage (4.2 V) as the individual cells. Thus, battery voltage is a
function of both cell chemistry and the number of cells connected in series, and capacity
of the battery is, keeping all other factors constant, the result of battery size (determined
by plate size) and, possibly, the number of cells connected in parallel. Sufficient voltage is
necessary to overcome circuit resistance and provide adequate power to operate the power
plant, servos, and other circuit loads. Where necessary, the voltage will be regulated to a
lower level appropriate to components requiring less energy to operate. Capacity affects
endurance and range. However, because capacity is also directly related to battery size, the
ability of a battery to deliver current may be a limiting factor in sUAS attributes related
to weight, such as the ability to hand launch the aircraft or in the size of the payload that
may be carried. In a “from-scratch” build, battery packs can be created with cells in both
series and parallel configurations to meet the design needs and mission goals of the UAS
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FIGURE 12.4
Penguin BE 48-cell, 640-Whr lithium–polymer battery pack constructed as a quick-change cartridge capable of
delivering regulated onboard voltages of 6 and 12 V. (Image courtesy of UAV Factory.)
platform (Gundlach 2012). For example, the UAV Factory designed the Penguin BE with a
48-cell, 640-Whr Li–Po battery pack that is constructed as a quick-change cartridge capable
of delivering regulated onboard voltages of 6 and 12 V (Figure 12.4).
Note, however, that batteries are far from ideal components. The parasitic impedances
of the battery, particularly internal equivalent series resistance (ESR), have a large effect
on the available output voltage at a given current. Battery ESR can vary widely from
one battery to the next even of the same design, especially due to the effects of aging
(both the passage of time and number of charge and discharge cycles), the duration
of storage, the state of charge and temperature during storage, and the temperature
during operation. Batteries are negatively affected by both high and low temperatures,
limiting safe charge and discharge environments. In general, sealed lead acid batteries
are heavy and have steeply sloped voltage curves during discharge. In general, Ni-Cd
batteries are among the most chemically stable batteries with relatively flat discharge
curves, but suffer from “memory effect” where repeated partial charge and discharge
cycles reduce cell capacity, requiring the cells be reconditioned by complete charge
and discharge cycles on regular intervals, increasing required maintenance. In general,
NiMH batteries have relatively high energy density, but are sensitive to high and low
temperatures, and are particularly sensitive during charging (cells can vent and release
hydrogen gas if overcharged). Li-Ion batteries do not suffer the “memory-effect” and
have very high energy densities, but typically have a life of about 1,000 charge and
discharge cycles, and are sensitive to high temperatures, particularly as many Li-Ion
chemistries are have exothermic reactions that can easily lead to thermal runaway with
disastrous results. Thermal runaway is particularly a risk when large cells are packed
together, as was the case of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. Use of smaller cells, more stable
chemistries, internal and external safety mechanisms (cell pressure vents, fuses, and
external phase change material to absorb thermal energy), and destructive safety testing
prior to fielding ensures Li-Ion battery safety at the expense of cost, complexity, weight,
and energy density.
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12.3.1.2 Electric sUAS Propulsion

Electric motors are energy converters, using electricity to produce a mechanical output in
the form of torque force. All DC electric motors operate through the magnetic attraction/
repulsion of the interacting magnetic fields associated with a rotating component (rotor,
shaft, or armature) and the stationary magnetic field (often referred to as the stator). The
dissimilar polarity of the fields—north (armature) and south (stator), and vice versa—
creates an attractive force that pulls on the armature or shaft to produce rotation. Similarly,
the rotor fields are repelled by the stator fields having similar polarities. This interaction
causes the armature (or output shaft) to rotate producing a torque force that can be used
to drive the propulsion rotor or propeller (or other electrical components such as landing
gear, flaps, and control surfaces). The magnetic fields of the armature and stator can be
associated with an electric current flowing through the multiple turns of wire to create an
electromagnet or generated by permanent magnets. Although stator and armature fields
may be generated by permanent magnets or an electrical current, permanent magnets
cannot be used, in the same motor, for both. The reason is that the polarity of one field
must be oriented, timed, and synchronized to attract (opposite field polarities) and simul-
taneously repel (fields of the same polarity) the fields associated with the stationary and
rotating motor components. Using permanent magnets to generate both fields would cause
the rotor to “lock-in” at a neutral position and rotate no further. Controlling the orientation
and timing of the fields is critical in producing rotation and the resulting torque force. The
means by which field orientation and timing are achieved varies according to the design of
the motor, that is, whether the motor is of “brushed” or “brushless” construction.
In a brushed motor design, the (stationary) stator field may be produced using either
permanent magnets or multiple turns of current carrying wire to wind the field poles or
field pieces. The stator field remains stationary. The timing of the switching operation that
controls the orientation of the magnetic field associated with the rotor is accomplished by
a mechanical device known as the commutator. The commutator is divided into discrete
segments, electrically insulated by a dielectric material such as mica. Opposing segments
(i.e., located 180° apart on the commutator) are the terminating points of the ends of one
winding. Stationary carbon brushes convey current from the external power source to the
armature windings by contacting commutator segments. As current flows into one segment
and out of the opposing one, a magnetic field is created in the rotor (armature) winding
and oriented in such a way that the interacting attractive and repulsive magnetic forces
of the armature and stator fields cause the rotor to develop torque. As the armature rotates,
the brushes contact another pair of commutator segments to energize the windings. The
direction of the current flow and polarity and orientation of the associated magnetic fields
are controlled by the commutation process in such a way that a torque force develops to
rotate the armature on its bearings.
Brushed motors can operate directly on source DC, and motor speed can effectively be
controlled by increasing or decreasing the strength of the magnetic field by using a vari-
able resistance to vary the intensity of the current flowing in the windings. In comparison
to brushless designs, the control of brushed motor rpm is much more easily achieved.
However, brushes produce friction that increases heat and reduces output power, constantly
wear and will eventually require replacement. Significantly, the interface of the brushes
and commutator is a source of potential arcing that may cause EMI and corrosion. In add-
ition, the brushes are made up of carbon, a semiconductor material having a measure of
inherent resistance that reduces the overall efficiency of the motor. The surface area where
the brushes make contact with the commutator relies on special coatings to prevent wear.
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Contaminants, particularly silicon from sand or room temperature vulcanizing adhesive,

can wear away the coating, drastically increasing the wear of the brushless and leading to
premature failure. As will be subsequently described, brushless motors control the timing
and orientation of the associated magnetic fields by what might be referred to as electronic
commutation—no brushes, no segments, and no arcing. Brushless motors offer greater
reliability, operate more quietly, and afford greater specific torque and thrust. BLDC pro-
pulsion motors also provide more torque per ampere of consumed current. In the twen-
tieth century, remotely piloted UA (e.g., the Radio Queen and the Magicfly) were powered
by brushed motors. Not until improvements in the transistor design and microprocessor
technology permitted, around the onset of the millennium, the economic miniaturization
of the necessary controlling microcircuitry (in the form of an electronic speed controller
[ESC]) did the widespread use of brushless motors in sUAS propulsion became possible
(Büchi 2012). Although small, brushed motors (e.g., the RS 540 and Speed 600) continue to
be available for hobby RPA, the advantages of brushless motors dictate their pervasive use
in electrically powered UASs.
As was discussed in the previous chapter, brushless motors are constructed as either
“inrunners” or “outrunners” using permanent and electromagnets. Both designs are used
to develop sUAS thrust. One commonality among inrunner and outrunner BLDC motors
is that the permanent magnets are always installed on (or in) the rotor, while the stator
conducts the electric current that establishes the electromagnetic field. Another is the use of
neodymium magnets (also known as NdFeB, NIB, or Neo magnets), the strongest type of
permanent magnet yet developed to increase efficiency and power output. The previously
mentioned motor controller, also commonly known as an electronic speed control or ESC, is
a microprocessor that acts as an inverter/switching device to convert DC to a bidirectional
pulsing current (as opposed to a sinusoidal waveform) to provide the desired voltage fre-
quency and voltage amplitude to the motor. The purpose of the motor controller, or ESC,
is to time, sequence, and orient the polarity of the electrically induced magnetic field to
properly attract/repel the magnetic fields associated with the permanent magnets. The
interaction of flux fields creates an angular force causing rotation of the output shaft and
the development of torque to drive the rotor or propeller—all without brushes. A sensor
(e.g., a counter-EMF [CEMF] or backvoltage sensing circuit, optical, or Hall effect device)
detects rotor position and speed to send rpm information to the ESC through a feedback
loop to provide the means by which the controller can maintain the desired level of power
output (rpm is one component in formulae used to calculate engine horsepower). The
ESCs that control small RPA and sUAS most commonly rely on a feedback system that
senses CEMF in the de-energized (or “floating”) BLDC motor stator winding to control
rpm. This strategy is effective in governing both inrunner and outrunner motors. Due to
BLDC stator design (which are wound in either delta or wye configurations), an ESC does
not recognize the type of motor and any given controller is “blind” to whether it is control-
ling the speed of an inrunner or outrunner aircraft powerplant.
An electronic speed controller becomes warm during operation. The MOSFET transistor
(metal–oxide–semiconductor field-effect transistor) found in many ESCs dissipates the
greatest amount of power during the switching operation that controls the voltage pulses
used to maintain the desired engine rpm. Consequently, the greatest amount of heat is
generated in the ESC, while the motor is operated at less than full rpm—reduced motor
speed requires more frequent switching to control the stator field currents. In general, the
higher the current rating of the ESC, the less is its internal resistance, and a larger, heavier,
more expensive controller (i.e., having a higher current capacity rating) will afford the
advantages of generating less heat, providing a longer service life, and possibly, yielding
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FIGURE 12.5
Carbon fiber forward-facing air scoop and carbon fiber cooling shroud installed around Penguin BE inrunner
BLDC motor and gear reduction. (Image courtesy of UAV Factory.)
very slightly improved range and endurance. Because the ESC generates heat, potentially
considerable amounts of it, providing adequate cooling is important, especially where the
controller incorporates the additional functionality of an integral BEC (described in the
following section). Consequently, additional ducting may be necessary to provide cooling
air to the motor controller, and possibly the motor itself (Figure 12.5). The use of heat
sinks may also be effective in reducing ESC temperatures. Cooling the ESC translates into
more efficient operation, less resistance (which increases with temperature), and lower
voltage drop at the controller (the voltage drop increases with resistance), which, in turn,
provides greater power to the motor. Moreover, the ESC itself can be destroyed by exces-
sive amounts of heat.
Often, an all-electric sUAS will carry a BEC (battery eliminator circuit or battery elimin-
ation circuit), which, because a battery is still required, is a bit of a misnomer. The BEC may
be a discrete component or incorporated into the electronic speed controller, especially
likely in those ESCs having lower power ratings. Obviously, the BEC cannot eliminate the
need for a battery in an all-electric UAS. However, by providing generally lower voltage
(usually around 5 V) to the receiver, servos, avionics, and payload gimbal/sensor(s) inde-
pendent of the electric energy provided to power the motor, the use of a BEC eliminates
the need for an additional battery (or batteries) dedicated to nonpowerplant components.
Lower capacity BECs, for example, those rated at approximately 5 amp, or less, generally
use a less expensive, linear voltage regulator, whereas those having higher current ratings
use a more efficient switch-mode regulator. (Linear-and switch-mode regulators are sub-
sequently discussed in detail.) Regardless of whether the BEC is a discrete component or
integral to the ESC, the two components are electrically connected in parallel, drawing
power for the entire electrical system from a single-source battery.
Because the permanent magnets of an inrunner BLDC are located on the output shaft
of the motor, the rotating mass is located close to the axis of rotation and the rotor, in
comparison to that of an outrunner design, and tends to spin considerably faster. (For
an explanation, the reader can review the discussion in the section “The law of conser-
vation of angular momentum in the helicopter aerodynamics” provided in Chapter 10.)
Consequently, these may be suitable to directly drive a small rotor in a ducted fan propul-
sion motor, or will require gear reduction to reduce rpm and increase torque to rotate a
larger propeller. Inrunners may be slightly more efficient than outrunners, which can con-
tribute to improved endurance and range. Another advantage of the inrunner design is the
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FIGURE 12.6
Aveox 27/26/7-AV inrunner BLDC motor with integral gear reduction and ESC as installed on the RQ-11
Raven. (Image courtesy of Aveox, Inc.)
compactness associated with a housing of smaller diameter, which can result in reduced
fuselage diameter and less drag. On the other hand, outrunners also afford advantages
to the UAS designer. Because the permanent magnets of outrunner motors are located in
the housing, the propeller or rotor is mounted directly to the rotating motor case. In com-
parison to an inrunner, this characteristic creates a much greater rotating mass located
further from the center of rotation, which means that outrunners spin more slowly while
producing greater torque. No gear reduction is generally necessary. Because the outrunner
stator is interior to the motor, the windings and internals can be sealed to protect them from
the environment. Moreover, outrunner windings are not subjected to centrifugal loading
that may extend motor life, and air cooling of the windings is often not necessary, since
heat can be dissipated by conduction. Both inrunners and outrunners provide the pro-
pulsive force for sUAS. For example, both the AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven (Figure 12.6)
and UAV Factory Penguin BE use integral planetary gear reduction systems incorporated
into inrunner propulsion motors, whereas the Aeryon Labs Scout quadcopter uses four
outrunners to produce both lift and thrust.
12.3.2 Nonelectrically Powered sUAS

Small UA are also powered by propulsion consuming hydrocarbon or alcohol-based liquid
fuels. Although the onboard electrical source for the autopilot, avionics, and payload may
be an Ni–Cd, Li–Po, or Li–ion battery and as sUAS become larger with more powerful
IC engines, the installation of a generator as a power source becomes more attractive. At
the same time, the complexity and sophistication of the electrical system will also likely
increase as the aircraft size becomes larger.
Powering UAS electrical systems from an electrical generator becomes attractive, where
an IC engine is powerful enough to provide maximum propulsive force while having the
additional capacity to drive a generator capable of delivering sufficient electrical power to
energize all electrical components under the most adverse circumstances (with a margin of
safety in the form of additional reserve capacity). A generator converts some of the horse-
power developed by the engine to power for the electrical system by providing relative
motion between a conductor (a winding consisting of multiple loops or turns of wire) and
a magnetic, usually electromagnetic, field. All generators produce an AC output that must
be either mechanically or electronically rectified to DC. A conventional DC generator is
much like the brushed motor previously described. The stationary field windings (collect-
ively known as the stator) are energized with a DC to produce the magnetic field in which
the armature rotates. Brushes riding on commutator segments convert the output to a DC.
(Most often, enough residual magnetism exists in the field poles, about which the stator is
wound, to excite the armature when the generator shaft is first rotated. If the magnetism is
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insufficient, the field must be “flashed” from a suitable DC source such as an automotive or
aircraft battery for output to be achieved.) In fact, the construction of a DC motor and gen-
erator is so similar that a motor can be used as a generator simply by energizing only the
field windings and taking electrical power from the brushes. The familiar AC generator,
commonly known as an alternator, creates a magnetic field in the windings of the rotor.
(Electrical energy is transferred to the rotating armature via brushes and slip rings, so the
direction of current flow through the windings is consistent in polarity and intensity.) This
field (typically) sweeps across three discrete stator windings that produce a three-phase
AC output that is rectified (electronically commutated) by a diode bridge circuit coupled
to an LP filter to produce a very clean DC output. Though more complex, alternators are
generally lighter and more efficient than the older DC generator design.
Regardless of the power source, whether battery or generator, voltage regulation is neces-
sary. As previously mentioned, where current demands are not great (~5 amp or less), the
smallest of the UASs may use linear voltage regulators. Although generally an integrated
circuit, linear voltage regulators function in a way analogous to a voltage divider net-
work wherein the desired voltage is taken from the appropriate divider reference point
and any excess is dissipated as heat. This is very inefficient, and the electrical efficiency of
linear regulators is typically only around 40% and may fall to as little as 14% (Dimension
Engineering 2014). Linear regulators generate a lot of heat, particularly where current
flows are elevated, and may require a large heat sink, which will increase the overall size
of the installation. On the other hand, linear regulators are simple, inexpensive, and, where
current flows are low, acceptably inefficient. For higher current flows, switch-mode regula-
tion is a better option. Switch-mode regulation maintains the desired voltage by switching
on and off, alternately storing and returning magnetic fields in one or more inductors
and electric fields in one or more capacitors via diodes and transistors. Power is mainly
consumed during the switching operation, but since the regulating section (e.g., pass tran-
sistor) is mostly energized or de-energized, very little power is wasted. In comparison to a
linear regulator, a switch mode regulator may be 85% efficient, delivering more than twice
as much useful power for given voltage (Dimension Engineering 2014). Depending on
the topology, switch-mode power regulators can divide down the output voltage (buck),
increase the output voltage (boost), or do both (buck-boost), allowing the switch-mode
regulator to operate over a wide range of input voltages. Switch-mode regulators are con-
stant power devices, so act in the system as if they have a negative input resistance (i.e.,
draws more current at low input voltages, and draws less current at higher input voltages),
requiring careful input filtering to prevent oscillation, and requiring undervoltage lockout
to prevent unacceptably high-input currents at turn on. Technology has advanced such
that many switch-mode regulator ICs include undervoltage lockout, overvoltage lockout,
current limiting, and thermal shutdown protections all within the integrated circuit or
power supply module, requiring few to no external components (often requiring an
inductor, a voltage divider to set the point of voltage regulation, and input and output
bypass capacitors for filtering). The generator output of larger sUAS is controlled by a
solid-state device known variously as a generator control unit (GCU) or generator power
unit (GPU), among other terms. Because the acronym GPU could be confused with that
representing ground power unit, I prefer GCU and will use GCU in the text of this chapter.
The GCU regulates voltage and generally performs other functions, which may include
reverse current protection and a means to prevent excessive current flows. While some of
the generator output is used to charge an onboard battery, the GCU output must either
be routed through a buck-boost converter, or must be set greater than battery voltage
to overcome the battery’s internal resistance and provide the energy for the electrolytic
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FIGURE 12.7
The Northrop Grumman RQ-4/MQ-4 fuselage is of semimonocoque aluminum construction. (U.S. Air Force
image.)
chemical reactions that will cause the battery’s active material (and possibly electrolyte) to
be restored (i.e., charge the battery). (This was discussed earlier in the chapter.) The GCU
also provides power to a distribution bus or individual components (e.g., avionics and
payload), depending on how the electrical system is designed, at the proper voltage. The
point of regulation can be remote sensed to the point of the most sensitive payloads to com-
pensate for V = IR voltage drop in the power distribution system, so long as the upstream
avionics can handle the additional voltage. The reverse current function of the GCU is to
protect the generator when battery voltage may be higher than generator output. This can
happen, for example, at low engine rpms. Because the battery is connected to the generator
through the control unit, a high battery voltage will pass through the generator rotor and
stator windings and tend to drive the armature like that of a motor. This condition, known
as “motoring” or “generator motoring,” may cause the generator that is, at the same time,
being driven by the power plant to become damaged.
As the sUAS electrical system becomes more complex, the use of an electrical bus, or
common connection point for wires and multiple circuits, becomes more desirable. All
circuits must convey electrical energy to power the component and provide a return path
to the source. As discussed previously, the smallest of sUAS use wire for the entire cir-
cuit, from the power source to component and back to the source, referred to as dual-wire
system. Very large UASs, such as the Global Hawk (Figure 12.7), with a semimonocoque
design being either partially or entirely made of metal can utilize the metal aircraft as the
electrical power system return, referred to as a single-wire system. As UASs grow in size,
the criticality of failure increases, necessitating additional safety features. Circuit protec-
tion devices (e.g., fuses, traditional or solid-state circuit breakers, fusible links, and current
limited solid-state switches) on the power distribution bus limit current flow in the event
of a short or ground fault—a condition that will generate heat and possibly melt wire insu-
lation to cause a fire. To protect the maximum length of the conductor, this circuit protec-
tion should be connected as nearly as possible to the connection to the bus. The purpose of
285
including circuit protective devices in the electrical system is to prevent damage to the elec-
trical devices that are installed in the UAS, and to prevent component failures from propa-
gating to other units. While circuit components must be protected from excessive current
flow, an internal fuse, traditional circuit breaker, or solid-state circuit breaker is used to
protect the component (e.g., the UAV factory installs an internally accessed slow-blow fuse
in series with the power lead to the heater controller of the Penguin’s heated pitot/static
probe). Fuses are small, light-weight, and inexpensive, and can be readily purchased in
a variety of current thresholds and response times, ranging from 1 hour to fractions of a
millisecond. However, once blown, the fuse’s output cannot be reconnected until the UA is
recovered and the part in question is removed for repair. Traditional circuit breakers (e.g.,
mechanical, thermal, or magnetic field activated, with or without a protective relay pilot)
are readily available, but have relatively slow response times, typically ranging from sev-
eral minutes to 20 milliseconds. Solid-state circuit breakers and solid-state switches with
active current limiting, which output a fixed maximum current with or without voltage
foldback, or shutdown current limiting, which shuts off the output when the threshold
is exceeded, have significantly faster response times (on the order of 100 µs), and can be
configured to reenergize the output in the event the fault had cleared. Solid-state circuit
breakers and switches, however, are significantly more complex than fuses and traditional
circuit breakers. A small distribution bus may be connected across one side of multiple cir-
cuit breakers to act as a common connection and reduce the amount of wire necessary in
the circuitry; however, flight critical loads must be physically separated from noncritical
circuits in such configurations. A well-designed electrical system, particularly appropriate
to the larger UAS, isolates flight-critical and noncritical circuits from each other. This is
accomplished by powering two or more subsystem buses, often termed essential and
nonessential buses, from the main distribution bus. A large, slow-blow fuse, known as a
current limiter, or solid-state circuit breakers may be used to connect nonessential buses
to the main bus. In this way, a fault in the noncritical-to-flight circuitry causing excessive
current flow will “blow” (i.e., melt) the fuse or trip the solid-state circuit breaker to open
the circuit. Current flow in the damaged circuit will cease, preventing an electrical fire,
while allowing the critical circuits required for flight to remain energized.
12.4 Electrical Systems for Large UASs

The payloads, avionics, and communication systems of large UASs can consume substan-
tial amounts of power, and the electrical systems of these aircraft share much in common
with their manned counterparts. For example, as do many manned aircraft, the General
Atomics Predator B (aka MQ/RQ-9 Reaper) is powered by a Honeywell TPE-331 that
drives a starter/generator to power the ship’s electrical systems. Operating as a DC motor
while starting, both armature and field windings of a conventional starter/generator are
energized to rotate the engine compressor through the accessory gearbox. As the hot gasses
of the working fluid are generated, the starter is increasingly unloaded as the turbines
provide greater torque to take the engine beyond its self-acceleration, or self-sustaining,
speed. At this point, the starter can be de-energized. As the fuel metering system provides
sufficient fuel to the hot section to complete acceleration of the engine to idle, the field
windings of the starter generator can be reenergized to create the electromagnetic field
in which the de-energized armature windings rotate. Armature output is mechanically
286
rectified through a commutator and brushes to provide a DC electrical output to the main
power bus. If the operation of payload, communications, or avionics devices requires AC,
solid-state inverters will convert the DC and deliver AC at the desired voltage and fre-
quency to one or more AC buses. The use of a starter/generator saves considerable weight
(and space on the accessory gearbox), while reducing the overall complexity of the acces-
sory drive system. Further, because only one component is constantly driven (instead of
both starter and generator) by the power plant, greater power is available to drive other
accessories or for propulsion. Recently, several companies have developed brushless per-
manent magnet generators and starter/generators specifically for UAS applications, for
example, Northwest UAV for sUAS applications and innovative solutions for large UA.
Under an Air Force SBIR/STTR (Small Business Innovation Research/Small Business
Technology Transfer) contract, Innovative Power Solutions developed a brushless starter/
generator (BS/G) for the Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk/EuroHawk, powered
by the Rolls-Royce AE3007 (aka F137). These newly developed BS/G designs require less
maintenance and are even lighter than the conventional starter/generators still found on
the majority of smaller gas turbine power plants. General Atomics MQ-9B SkyGuardian
instead interfaces the Honeywell TPE-331 turbo prop engine to an AC generator and direct
drive brushless alternator.
In comparison to sUAS, a greater number of factors influence the determination of wire
size for larger UA. As with sUAS, the selection of the proper wire diameter is guided by
the length of the wire run, anticipated peak current flow, and acceptable voltage drop
from bus to ground. However, other factors, including aircraft service ceiling, number
of wires installed in a bundle or conduit, and intermittent operation may also affect the
choice of wire selected for use in the electrical systems found on large UASs. The selec-
tion of wire with sufficient diameter is essential to ensuring proper circuit operation, pro-
viding adequate component service life and precluding the creation of excessive heat,
which can lead to in-flight fires. On the other hand, using the smallest possible wire with
these desirable attributes would save weight and space, while increasing range, endur-
ance, and payload carrying capacity. Thus, determination of the correct wire size is best
achieved through following the guidance of the aforementioned commercial and mili-
tary standards. Although many such publications are intended for use in designing and
maintaining manned aircraft, the contents are also appropriate for a UAS. The electrical
systems and components of a UAS may even be installed in a pressure vessel, similar to
that designed into commercial transport aircraft, pressurized by bleed air from the gas tur-
bine power plant. This design not only provides a more benign operational environment,
but also reduces the risk of arcing that can damage electrical components, and possibly
under certain conditions, create an electrical fire resulting in the loss of the ship.
As UASs become larger, more capable, and more powerful and the complexity of UA
increases, their onboard electrical systems will become increasingly similar to those of
manned aircraft. The integration of a variety of payloads requires the electrical power
system support of a variety of standard bus voltages, such as 28V DC, 270V DC, and
115V AC. FAA regulations for emergency power (e.g., engine out and generator failure
conditions) require a minimum of 30 minutes of operation on battery power for aircraft
with an altitude ceiling of ≤25 kft, and 60 minutes for aircraft with an operational altitude
ceiling >25 kft. The utilization of high-voltage systems saves cable weight by the reduc-
tion of currents, especially in the case of hybrid electric power systems, but increases the
complexity of voltage conversions and adds safety risks to maintenance personnel who
require addressing. As larger UA have max endurance of over 40 hours per flight and have
a service life of 40,000 flight hours, such as the General Atomics MQ-9B SkyGuardian,
287
component reliability becomes increasingly paramount to maintain system safety and

achieve operational availability for mission effectiveness. Just as the pneumatic and
hydraulic pressure/actuator systems of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner have been replaced by
electrical systems, the same revolution is also occurring in the design of UA. According
to Ralph Livingston, Chief Engineer of Abbott Technologies Inc., built-in test equipment
for use in troubleshooting, will soon be commonplace on UASs and “[p]‌neumatic and
hydraulic actuators and controls [will become] … the dinosaurs of the unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) world” (Livingston 2013, 1). The higher energy efficiencies afforded by
replacement with electrical components of pneumatic/hydraulic system pumps, lines,
and actuators result in reduced heat loads, cooling requirements, and increased UAS
range and endurance (Livingston 2013). On the other hand, greater demands are corres-
pondingly placed on the electrical system in terms of increased complexity and gener-
ating capacity that translates into larger, heavier generators and more circuitry—again,
no free lunch.
Aside from technological advances, two other drivers of this homogenization will be
the influences of regulation and industry standardization that are expected to increas-
ingly come to bear on the design process. (Exogenous design factors were discussed in
the previous chapter on UAS design.) FAA 14 CFR Part 107 regulations were released
in 2016 for the operation of sUAS (<55 lbs) for nonrecreational and nonhobby use, with
rules for visual observer with unaided line of sight for see-and-avoid, containment in
the area of operation, and remote pilot certification. Operators of UA weighing ≥55 lbs
can apply for an exemption under the Special Authority for Certain Unmanned Aircraft
Systems per 49 U.S.C. Section 44807. Type certification for large UA is assigned to the Los
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) under 14 CFR Part 21. Detailed requirements
for type certified UA are not yet publicly available, but are expected to add UA as a spe-
cial class under 14 CFR § 21.17(b). A draft advisory circular for the “Design Standards and
Assumptions for Type Design Approval under 14 CFR 21.17(b) of Fixed Wing Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS)” was available for review in 2015. Based on that draft and com-
parable UA standards, such as STANAG 4671, expectations are that FAA regulations for
manned aircraft, covering design, maintenance, operation, and manufacture, will largely
be applied to UASs. Moreover, trade groups and industry representatives are also encour-
aging the standardization of large (and small) UAS electrical systems to reflect those of
manned aircraft. For example, one requirement of CFR 14, Part 23, applicable to manned
aircraft, is that a load analysis be performed to ensure that the generating system is cap-
able of producing adequate power to supply the needs of the electrical system with an
extra design margin to provide for expansion and a level of additional safety. A similar
requirement has been recommended by members of a prominent standards organization
making recommendations to the FAA’s UAS Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
(aka ARAC). Groups advising the FAA have made similar recommendations that UAS
be held to the same standards as manned aircraft in multiple areas, including continued
airworthiness, flight manual contents, risk management, certification, communications,
weight and balance, markings, maintenance, and structural integrity, among others. That
manned aircraft requirements will similarly be mandated for those which are unmanned,
particularly those among the largest of UASs, is likely. In fact, groups proposing industry-
wide standards and those representing the UAS industry in advising the FAA frequently
make recommendations regarding regulations and standardization, using terms such as
“established,” “appropriate,” and “accepted” in reference to engineering and verification
techniques. The use of such terminology and phrasing undoubtedly encourages similar-
ities in UAS and manned aircraft systems designs.
288
12.5 Conclusion
The electrical system is the essential nexus of the UA, interconnecting avionics, payload,
command and control, onboard computers, and receivers, among other components, into
a synergistically holistic, integrated system. It forms the backbone of the UAS, providing
the means of autonomous and remotely piloted flight, data acquisition, telemetry, and, in
some cases, propulsion. The electrical systems of sUAS are sophisticated, but relatively
straightforward in design. As the UA platform becomes larger and more complex, so,
too, does the electrical system that becomes increasingly similar to those found on large,
turbine-powered manned aircraft.
12.1 Why can it be said that the electrical system is the ubiquitous nexus of unmanned
aircraft systems?
12.2 List and define/describe the basic units of electrical measurement. Use these
to write the formulae for Ohm’s law and electrical power. Why is aircraft wire,
used in both manned and unmanned aircraft, stranded? List other important
characteristics associated with aviation wire and tell why each is significant.
Describe the AWG system. Give the formula for determining wire resistance and
elaborate the definitions of the unit and explain their meaning and position (i.e.,
whether a direct or inverse relationship) in the formula. What is meant by the
term voltage drop? How does a voltage drop in the external circuit affect compo-
nent operation and service life? State the purpose of fly-back diodes on inductive
loads. State the purpose of a soft-start on switched outputs to capacitive loads.
Give examples of circuit protection devices. What is the purpose of these? With
respect to location, where are circuit protection devices best installed. What is
the difference between single-wire and dual-(or double-) wire circuits? Why are
composite airframes considered to be dielectric (i.e., define dielectric and relate
this to UAS airframe construction), and how does this type of construction affect
UAS electrical system design? Define EMI/RMI and tell why this is significant
to dependable and safe UAS operation. Give strategies for mitigating or elimin-
ating EMI, and tell why these are effective. How are high-pass and low-pass filters
constructed? Which would most likely find application in UAS airframe circuit
construction and tell why you believe your response is correct.
12.3 What has allowed sUAS to proliferate in the current technological environment?
Identify some of the enabling technologies. Discuss the interaction of design
decisions, based on mission goals, which affect UAS power plant and, correspond-
ingly, electrical systems.
12.3.1 Identify and describe the all-electric unmanned aircraft that flew in 1957.
What is the significance of this flight?
12.3.1.1 List the types of batteries commonly providing electrical energy
for UAS ground and flight operations and describe cell chem-
istry and construction. Give nominal cell voltages for each type
of battery. Define battery capacity and tell how this relates to the
289
“C-rate.” What factors determine total battery voltage and cap-

acity? What is a 2S battery? What is the nominal voltage of a 3S
Li–Po battery? What is meant by “energy density” or “power
density?”
12.3.1.2 Describe, in a general way, the operation of an electric motor and
the operation of brushed and brushless motors. What is com-
mutation? What is the difference between electronic and mech-
anical commutation and on what types of motors would these
be found? How is rpm differently controlled on brushed and
brushless DC motors? Describe inrunner and outrunner BLDC
motors. Compare and contrast these, giving advantages and
disadvantages of each. What is the purpose of a BLDC motor
controller, an ESC, and a BEC? Provide examples of sUAS using
inrunner and outrunner BLDC motors and give ways in which
these installations would differ.
12.4 List types of nonelectric powerplants available to the UAS designer, giving
advantages and disadvantages of each choice (a review of Chapter 10 may be
helpful). How will the choice affect the electrical system design? Describe, com-
pare, and contrast linear and switch-mode voltage regulators. What is a GCU and
what functions does it perform? Define the term “motoring.”
12.5 Describe the starter/generator as installed in the TPE-331 turboprop powering
the RQ/MQ-9 Reaper. What recent innovation developed for the Global Hawk/
EuroHawk is likely to supplant the more conventional brushed starter/generator?
References
Austin, R. 2010. Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS Design, Development and Deployment. Chichester,
UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Büchi, R. 2012. Brushless Motors and Controllers. Norderstedt, Germany: Herstellung und Verlag.
Dimension Engineering. 2014. A Beginner’s Guide to Switching Regulators. Under “What’s wrong
with a linear regulator?” Accessed July 27, 2014, www.dimensionengineering.com/info/
switching-regulators.
Fahlstrom, P.G. and T.J. Gleason. 2012. Introduction to UAV Systems. Chichester, UK: John Wiley
& Sons.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 2012. FAA Aviation Maintenance Technician Handbook—
Airframe. Newcastle, WA: Aviation Supplies and Academics.
Gundlach, J. 2012. Designing Unmanned Aircraft Systems: A Comprehensive Approach. Reston: American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
Livingston, R. 2013. Intelligent Aerospace. Important considerations in designing electrical power
systems for unmanned aircraft. Last modified January 13, 2014. www.intelligent-aerospace.
com/articles/2014/01/uav-electrical-power.html.
Logan, M.J., J. Chu, M.A. Motter, D.L. Carter, M. Ol, and C. Zeune. 2007. Small UAV research and evo-
lution in long endurance electric powered vehicles. In Proceedings of AIAA Infotech @ Aerospace
2007 Conference and Exhibit, Rohnert Park, California, AIAA Paper 2007–2730, 7–10 May, 2007.
Noth, A. 2008. History of Solar Flight. Autonomous Systems Lab. Zurich: Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology. Accessed July 15, 2014. www.asl.ethz.ch/research/asl/skysailor/History_of_
Solar_Flight.pdf.
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13
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Communications
Saeed M. Khan
13.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292

13.2 Electromagnetic Wave (EM) Propagation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
13.2.1 The Electromagnetic Spectrum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
13.2.2 Electromagnetic Wave Propagation in Free Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
13.3 Basic Communication System and Its Elements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
13.3.1 Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
13.3.2 Transmitter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
13.3.2.1 Frequency Hopping Technique for Transmission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
13.3.3 Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
13.3.3.1 Antenna Directivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
13.3.3.2 Antenna Gain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
13.3.3.3 Antenna Polarization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
13.3.4 Receiver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
13.3.4.1 Signal to Noise Ratio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
13.3.4.2 Receiver Sensitivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
13.3.4.3 Despreading the Signal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
13.3.5 Demodulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
13.4 System Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
13.4.1 Establishing Bandwidth Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
13.4.2 Link Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
13.4.2.1 Reflection at Antenna–Cable Junction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
13.4.2.2 Losses at the Transmitting Antenna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
13.4.2.3 Losses due to Free Space Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
13.4.2.4 Power Received at the Receiving Antenna. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
13.4.2.5 Power in Decibel Milliwatt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
13.4.2.6 Signal-to-Noise Ratio at the Receiver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
13.4.2.7 Calculation of Signal-to-Noise Margin from
Receiver Sensitivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
13.5 Summary of Design Principles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
13.6 Associated Problems from EMI Interference, Jamming, and Multipath . . . . . . . . . . 315
13.6.1 EMI Interference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
13.6.2 Jamming. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
13.6.3 Multipath. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
13.7 Review Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
291
292
13.1 Introduction
A commonly used classification for unmanned aircraft data links is line-of-sight (LOS)
and beyond-visual-line-of-sight (BVLOS). In either case, a simple and practical way to
introduce UAS communications to the newcomer is through the concept of data links.
A data link is formed when a source and receiver communicate electronically. It has a
transmitter, a receiver, and a medium through which it communicates. In many wireless
applications, the medium is free space or air. The quality of the link depends on fre-
quency used, the medium, and the length of the link among other things. While there
may be a single or multiple data links between the aircraft and controller, the quality of
the link is key to conveying vital information to and from the unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) and the ground control station (GCS) wirelessly in most cases. This informa-
tion or data can be used for controlling the UAV manually or through automation by
manipulating control surfaces and throttle. Figure 13.1 illustrates UAV-GCS commu-
nication links for a small commercial remotely piloted vehicle. The link is also used
for downloading captured images and telemetry data among other things. Enhanced
commercial systems may employ the use of satellite links such as the Inmarsat Network
that allow UAV and GCS to take advantage of a global IP network (Wagenen 2015, 1).
For military UAS systems, additional complexity and functionality is required in the
design of the data link systems stemming from the need to access the World Wide Web;
resist unintentional interference; lower the probability of interception; boost security;
resist deception; and employ antijam capabilities (Fahlstrom and Gleason 2012, 191–
204). In other words, the functionality of these links makes them the lifeblood of any
UAS system.
In LOS systems, the UAV is always in LOS with the GCS. BVLOS systems may involve
other links, such as a satellite that is in LOS to one of the parties (UAV/GCS) but not
both. Communication links can also be characterized as being point-to-point or point-
to-multipoint (Figure 13.2). Another interesting link is one that forms between a swarm
of unmanned vehicles where they can communicate with each other while maintaining
connection to a ground station. While the link architecture can take many more complex
forms, they are usually derivatives of the ones that have been discussed.
13.2 Electromagnetic Wave (EM) Propagation

The frequency of the EM wave, the material properties of medium (e.g., air, water, space,
vacuum, etc.) through which it travels the distance the signal has to travel, the informa-
tion that is being carried by the signal, the source from which the signal emanates, and
the sink (receiver) that picks up this signal are all critical to understanding and building
a communication system. Furthermore, the same are also critical to understanding the
sensing and the imaging activities that most UAS platforms are involved in such as
disaster zone recovery, search and rescue efforts, battle zone communication, remote
sensing; photogrammetry, or simply movie making. While the most common form of
communication for UAVs is accomplished via radio wave communication, they are cer-
tainly capable of carrying payloads that use nearly different parts of the of the spectrum,
293
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Communications 293
UAV
Two-way
Telemetry
Data Link
at 915 MHz
UHF Band Video Data
RC control (ISM) Link at 5.8 GHz
Data Link
C Band (ISM)
for Surfaces and
Throttle at
2.45 GHz S
Band (ISM)
RC Controller
Laptop complete with radio modems

for telemetry and video data
FIGURE 13.1
A UAS Data LInk System for commercial applications.
and as such we begin our treatment of EM wave propagation with a brief overview of
the EM spectrum.
13.2.1 The Electromagnetic Spectrum

Typically, the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum is considered to start in the order of 103 Hz
(radio waves) all the way up to 1020 Hz (Gamma Rays). Table 13.1 broadly summarizes
the entire of the EM spectrum and some of its related applications. Up to the microwave
range, IEEE designations have been used, after which other commonly used conventions
have been followed.
Information regarding frequency ranges, wavelengths, sources, detectors, and related
applications has also been provided. Figure 13.3 is also a good way to look at the entire
spectrum with frequency and wavelength information. The chart also informs us on how
hot a body must be in order to emit certain frequencies (https://mynasadata.larc.nasa.
gov/basic-page/electromagnetic-spectrum-diagram).
294
UAV
POINT TO POINT
LINK
GCS
POINT TO
MULTIPOINT
GCS
FIGURE 13.2
Point-to-point and point-to-multipoint links.
13.2.2 Electromagnetic Wave Propagation in Free Space

How is wireless communication even possible in free space, given that it excludes the pos-
sibility of a guiding system such as a two-wire line or a coaxial line? The answer, of course,
is through radiation of EM waves. Radiation can come from many sources caused by time
that causes EM field variation. Undesired radiation can come from electronic circuits and
appliances of all sorts, but properly designed antennas serve as highly efficient sources for
controlled radiation.
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295
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Communications
TABLE 13.1
Electromagnetic Spectrum and Some Applications
Wave Typical Typical Some Related
Classification Frequency lengths Sources Detectors Applications
Below High Frequency 3–30 MHz 10–100 m ANTENNAS AND ANTENNAS AND Short wave radio, amateur radio, etc.
Microwave (HF) TRANSMITTER RECEIVER
(IEEE Very High 30–300 MHz 1–10 m ELECTRONIS ELECTRONICS Digital audio broadcasting (DAB)
Designation) Frequency (VHF) FM radio broadcasting, television
broadcasting, two-way land mobile
radio systems, etc.
Ultrahigh 0.3–1 GHz 0.1–1 m Mobile communications, broadcasting
Frequency
(UHF)
L and partial S Band 1–3 GHz 30–100 cm Wi-Fi, GNSS, ISM, Bluetooth, weather/
ship Radar,
Mobile Communications, satellite
communications, etc.
Microwaves S, C, X, Ku, K, 3–30 GHz (Typical) 1–30 cm Wi-Fi, Radar, air traffic control,
and partial KA bands (IEEE weather radar, surface ship radar,
designation) communications satellites, defense
tracking, vehicle speed detection, etc.
Millimeter Waves 30–300 GHz 1–10 mm 5 G Wireless, Radar Systems
(Typical)
INFRARED Terahertz (THz) 300 z to 3+ THz 0.1–1 mm Photoconductive Photoconductive Sensing and Imaging: Cameras,
Antennas, Antennas, Ultrafast Scanners, Body scanners, Ultrafast
Ultrafast LASER detectors, Imagers, etc.
LASER
Other Infrared 3 THz–490 THz 700 nm -0.1 mm IR IR Photodiode Fiber Optics, Gas Sensing, Optical
LED. LASER amplifiers, LiDAR Technology
Diodes
Visible Light Waves 490 THz–790 THz 400–700 nm LASER Diodes Photodiode Free space communication, fiber-optical
communication, satellite–satellite
communication, etc.
Ultraviolet Waves 790 THz–30 PHz 10–700 nm UV LASERs Avalanche Photodiode Flame detection, Imaging,
(APD) communication
X-rays 30 PHz–30 EHz 10–0.01 nm X-ray tube Si-PIN diodes Imaging
Gamma Rays more than 30 EHz Less than Natural Sources, Gamma-Ray Nuclear Radiation detection; Material
295
0.01 nm e.g., the Sun Spectrometer (GRS) Content Detection.
296
FIGURE 13.3
The Electromagnetic Spectrum. (myNASAdata; https://mynasadata.larc.nasa.gov/basic-page/electromagnetic-
spectrum-diagram retrieved December 18, .)
An antenna radiates efficiently when EM energy is guided through a transmission line

under matched conditions (meaning most of the incoming energy is transmitted to the
antenna with little reflection taking place at the antenna–transmission line interface).
Time-varying voltages and currents in a transmission line carry electric fields and mag-
netic fields. The electrical fields start on positive charges and end in negative charges and
magnetic fields are formed around current carrying conductors. These fields do not end at
the antenna but have been observed to be radiating into free space. The question then arises as
to what holds these fields in place without the presence of charges or how these guided
waves are detached from the antenna. One can conclude that while the charges are required
to excite these fields, they are not required to sustain them. As an analogy to this phenomenon,
it has been observed that when a pebble tossed into a pool of water, it will create ripples
long after it has settled in the bottom (Balanis 2005, 7–16). Some commonly used types of
antennas include the horn, dipole, monopole, spiral, and patch antennas (Figure 13.4).
Another important point about the radiated wave is that it may arrive at the receiver via
a direct path but also other paths (multipaths) due to reflection, refraction, and diffraction.
Reflection waves are caused when a signal bounces off objects before reaching the receiver,
while refracted waves are caused when the waves pass through different media on their
way to the receiver. Refracted waves can cause loss in signal amplitude while travelling
through lossy media (media that dissipate EM energy). Diffraction is a phenomenon that
occurs when a wave bends around a corner. Figure 13.5 is an illustration of these different
wave propagation phenomena. Multipath signals can lead to both destructive and con-
structive interference with the direct signal. Multipath signals that arrive almost as the
297
Quarter Wavelength Wire Twin wire feed
Half Wavelength
Coaxial feed
Monopole antenna with coaxial

feed over ground plane Dipole antenna with twin wire feed
Conducting Wire
Probe Feed Location Probe Feed Location
Conducting Patch
Dielectric
Layer
Ground Plane
Spiral Antenna with feed Patch Antenna

at center
FIGURE 13.4
Common antenna structures.
same time as the direct signal are more harmful and can cause more errors in the informa-
tion received.
For appreciable radiation to take place, effective lengths of the devices/circuits/antennas
should be comparable to a wavelength. Remembering that relationship between wave-
length (λ) and the frequency (f) in free space is simply (λ = c/f, where c is the speed of light
in free space or 3 × 108 m/s) where lower frequencies for both the wavelength and the
radiator get to be very large making it unsuitable for wireless communication (e.g., at a fre-
quency of 1 KHz, the free space wavelength is 300,000 m and at that size, it is very difficult
to construct an efficient radiator of appropriate size [~λ /4 and greater]).
298
Diffracted
Ray
Refracted
Path Direct Path
GCS
FIGURE 13.5
Obstructed direct path, refracted path, and edge diffraction of electromagnetic wave.
13.3 Basic Communication System and Its Elements

While there are many different types of data links, there are certain elements that they all
need to possess. All of these elements play an important role, the design of the system
whether the system is civilian or military, LOS or beyond-LOS (BLOS), and point-to-point
or point-to-multipoint, all share these commonalities. We will begin by looking at the basic
elements of any electronic communication system and expand our discussions on each of
these elements in addition to the special case of UAV-GCS communication.
Figure 13.6 shows a typical wireless communication system where communication takes
place in only one direction from transmitter to receiver (aka simplex system). While the
transmitter and receiver are separate entities in Figure 13.6, it is quite common to have
systems where each unit is capable of both transmitting and receiving (aka full duplex
system) at the same time with a device known as a duplexer that isolates a receiver from
the transmitter and allows the use of a common antenna. Since transceiver architecture is
basically composed of a receiving path and a transmitting path that contain the same basic
elements except for the duplexer, a separate discussion is not required at this stage.
299
TRANSMITTER
TRANSMITTING
MIXER/
INFORMATION MODULATOR RF POWER ANTENNA
FREQUENCY
SOURCE AMPLIFIER
SYNTHESIZER
CHANNEL
INFORMATION MIXER/ LOW NOISE

DEMODULATOR FREQUENCY AMPLIFIER
RETRIEVED
SYNTHESIZER (LNA) RECEIVING
ANTENNA
RECEIVER
FIGURE 13.6
A simplified block diagram of a communication system.
13.3.1 Modulation
Modulation combines information with a carrier signal. The first section on the transmit-
ting side holds the information source that can be analog or digital. Analog is converted to
digital data if digital data are required by the modulator. Commonly, transceivers use the
term modem to identify a system block that can serve both a modulator and demodulator
in such systems.
For the special case of frequency shift keying (FSK) modulation that is widely used in
UAV-GCS communication, all data need to be in digital form. Figure 13.7 shows how this
modulation can be accomplished. First, the digital data are converted to two different
voltage levels. In this case, a low-voltage level indicates a digital “1” and a high-voltage
level indicates a digital “0” (although the opposite is also possible). The FSK modulation
uses two different frequencies to modulate the input digital data stream with the higher
frequency being used to modulate 1s and a lower frequency to modulate 0s.
13.3.2 Transmitter
The transmitter takes in the modulated signal and outputs an amplified radio frequency
(RF) signal transmission (e.g., transmitter takes the FSK-modulated signal and outputs an
RF waveform). An RF power amplifier in the transmitter section delivers the signal to the
antenna for transmission. In the special case of UAV-GCS using FSK modulation, an added
complexity is thrown in (i.e., the output center frequency is not kept constant but hops
around as discussed in the following section).
300
11 0 0 10
1
Digital Information
Voltage Levels
assigned for
1’s and 0’s
FSK Modulated
output using different
frequencis for 1’s and 0’s
FIGURE 13.7
Frequency shift keying (FSK) modulation of digital data.
13.3.2.1 Frequency Hopping Technique for Transmission

The frequency hopping technique is what is known as a spread spectrum technique
because it changes frequency of transmission in a pseudorandom fashion as if to spread
the energy over a larger bandwidth. The key idea behind any spread spectrum technique
comes about from trying to make it practically impossible for others to listen in. In the
frequency hopping technique, someone not authorized to hear a conversation would pick
up unintelligible blips since the frequency changes in a manner that only allows people
with knowledge of the order of the frequencies of transmission (Figure 13.8) to listen
in. Blackened squares in the figure indicate how the center frequency varies over time.
Someone with intent to figure out this pseudorandom pattern may have to wait a long
time. In fact, sometimes, these patterns can be designed go on for years without repeating.
Another important advantage is that the noise from the channel (air for wireless) is also
spread out over the entire band making a better distinction between signal and noise pos-
sible. Frequency hopping is accomplished in the transmitter by mixing the modulated FSK
signal with a frequency synthesizer that changes randomly.
13.3.3 Channel
The connection between the receiving and transmitting antennas is made through the
channel for the wireless link. Assuming good atmospheric conditions, the amount of power
transferred to the receiver using an LOS link in air depends on the gain of the two antennas,
the polarization of these antennas, and the distance between them. The important topics of
directivity, gain, and polarization of antennas are discussed next.
13.3.3.1 Antenna Directivity

Before we can discuss the directivity of an antenna, we need to define an isotropic antenna.
Basically, an isotropic radiator is one that radiates equally in all directions. It is a hypothet-
ical concept, one that does not exist in the real world, since it requires the existence of a
301
POINT SOURCE
SIDE LOBES
ISOTROPIC ANTENNA PATTERN

MAIN LOBE
DIRECIVITY AND
MAXIMUM GAIN
IS MEASURED IN
THIS DIRECTION
DIRECTIONAL ANTENNA PATTERN

FIGURE 13.8
Frequency hopping scheme using pseudorandom frequencies.
point source antenna that is impossible to build. Figure 13.8 is graphical representation of
the radiation properties (aka radiation pattern) for a directive antenna and the hypothetical
isotropic radiator.
One also needs to understand the concept of radiation intensity of antennas to define
directivity. From the IEEE standard definition of terms for Antennas (IEEE 1983), in a given
direction, the power radiated from an antenna in per unit solid angle is its radiation intensity or,
in simpler terms, how much power is radiated by the antenna in a certain direction far
enough away from the antenna so as not to impact the antennas EM characteristics (far
field). The radiation intensity remains independent of distance in the so-called far field of
the antenna (MTI, 1).
All antennas have some directional properties and they radiate better in some directions
than others. If it is assumed that both the antenna and the isotropic radiator radiate the same
amount of total power, then the directivity of the antenna is the ratio of the maximum radi-
ation intensity to the radiation intensity of a reference antenna such as an isotropic radiator.
Moving forward, D0 (dimensionless) will be used to refer to the directivity of an antenna.
13.3.3.2 Antenna Gain

The antenna gain is simply the product of the directivity with efficiency that accounts for cable,
connector losses, and dielectric losses (Sevgi 2007, 212). Gain and directivity refer to maximum
302
gain and maximum directivity unless stated otherwise. Moving forward, G0 (dimensionless) will
be used to refer to the maximum gain of an antenna. The terms conduction efficiency (ec) and
dielectric efficiency (ed) can be difficult to grasp but they can be experimentally determined.
Based on our definition, the following relationship exists between directivity and gain.
G 0 = e c ed D 0 [13.1]
It is very common to provide the gain in decibels:
G0 (dB) = 10 log10 (G0 ) [13.2]
When the reference antenna is an isotropic one, dBi is sometimes used in the place of dB.
Thus, equation 13.2 may be written as:
G0 (dBi) = 10 log10 (G0i ) [13.3]
13.3.3.3 Antenna Polarization

EM waves produced by antennas can have linear, elliptical, or circular polarization associated
with them (Figure 13.9). The amount of power transferred in the antenna link through the channel
depends on how strong the match is between the polarization of the receiving and transmitting
antenna. In the case when they are properly matched, optimal power transfer can occur.
All EM waves possess an electric field and a magnetic field direction. The electric
field direction that is considered linear polarization occurs when the electric field vector
(E-vector) associated with the EM wave maintains the same direction as it propagates
through space. Dipole antennas and monopole antennas commonly used in UAV-GCS
communication are examples of linearly polarized antennas. In the case of linear polariza-
tion, the transmitting and receiving antennas must be polarized in the same direction for
maximum power transfer.
In the case of elliptical polarization, the electric field vector traces out an ellipse
(Figure 13.10) in a plane perpendicular to the direction of propagation. The polarization
in this case may either be right-handed (clockwise) or left-handed (counterclockwise).
Circularly polarized antennas have E-vectors that trace out a circle in a right-handed or
left-handed sense. In the case of elliptical or circular polarization, it is not enough to have
the matching polarization between transmitting and receiving antennas; the sense must
match as well. As an example, circularly polarized patch antennas are commonly used in
UAVs for receiving GPS signals from satellites.
13.3.4 Receiver
After passing through the channel, the EM signal arrives at the receiver where it is converted
by the antenna to electrical energy. While passing through space between antennas, the
signal becomes very weak and needs to be amplified in a low noise amplifier (LNA) very
close to the antenna. For the signal to be picked up and demodulated by the receiver, a cer-
tain signal-to-noise ratio called the receiver sensitivity is required. Both of these items are
discussed below along with the despreading of the frequency-hopped signal.
303
E-vector
Y
Y
LINEAR POLARIZATION WITH E-VECTOR

POINTING IN THE SAME DIRECTION WHILE
PROPAGATING THROUGH SPACE
RIGHT HAND ELLIPTICAL POLARIZATION

WITH E-VECTOR ETCHING OUT AN ELLIPSE
WHILE PROPAGATING THROUGH SPACE
RIGHT HAND CIRCULAR POLARIZATION

WITH E-VECTOR ETCHING OUT A CIRCLE
WHILE PROPAGATING THROUGH SPACE
FIGURE 13.9.
Radiation pattern of isotropic and directional radiator.
13.3.4.1 Signal to Noise (S N ) Ratio

We begin our discussion about (S N ) ratios by looking at the sources of noise in the wireless
communication system. First, there are the electronic devices themselves, known as thermal
noise, and are caused by the thermal agitation of electrons. This noise, sometimes known as
white noise, is independent of frequency. So, for a system that permits B Hertz of electronic
signals to pass through it (aka bandwidth) at a temperature of T kelvin, the noise power
(N) generated in watts is given by the relation,
N=kTB [13.4]
where k is the Boltzmann constant having a value of 1.38 × 10–23 joules per kelvin. Note
that joules are a unit for energy and are equal to the product of power in watts and time
in seconds. Other items impacting noise are the mixing of two different signals causing
unwanted energy production at sum and difference frequencies (or their multiples) called
intermodulation noise.
304
INFORMATION BAND INFORMATION SPREAD

ACCROSS A WIDER BAND
FREQUENCY HOPPING
TRANSMISSION
AMPLITUDE
AMPLITUDE
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
NOISE INTRODUCED
IN CHANNEL
INFORMATION BAND
AFTER DESPREADING
WITH CHANNEL NOISE EXTERNAL
REDUCED NOISE
AT RECEIVER
FROM CHANNEL
AMPLITUDE
AMPLITUDE
FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
FIGURE 13.10
Linear, elliptical, and circular polarization.
Crosstalk, another form of noise, can impact a wireless communication system when
antennas pick up unwanted signals from space, although highly directional antennas can
avoid this for the most part. Impulse noise can occur from both natural and man-made
sources and is experienced as irregular pulses and spikes. Lightning and pulses from
EM pulse (EMP) weapons are examples of natural and artificial sources of impulse noise
(Stallings 2007, 89–91). An advantage of frequency hopping systems is that they can spread
impulse noise across a broader bandwidth upon reception. The (S N ) is simply the ratio
of the signal power to the noise power; more commonly this is given in a decibel form
as below:
 S  S
  =10 log10   [13.5]
N dB N
If only thermal noise was considered, then

305
 S
 
N dB
 S 
= 10 log10  [13.6]
 kTB 
= 10 log10 S − 10 log10 k − 10 log10 T − 10 log10 B
13.3.4.2 Receiver Sensitivity

The receiver sensitivity is the minimum power required by the receiver to detect an RF
signal and demodulate the data. Typically, dBm is used to designate signal power levels
as below in communication systems. The signal power (S) in dBm is calculated using the
following formula:
(S )dBm = 10 log10 

S in milliwatts   S mw 
 or 10 log10  
1 milliwatt 1 mw 
If the power associated with the noise is N, then
(N )dBm = 10 log10 

N mw 

1 mw  [13.8]
The receiver sensitivity also depends on its clearance from the noise level. As an example,
in Wi-Fi LAN networks, the noise level needs to be cleared by about 20 dB. So, if the noise
level in a room is –95 dBm, then the signal level should be higher than –75 dBm. If one
knows the signal and the noise levels in dBm, then they can also compute the signal to
noise ratio in dB by the following:
 S
  = (S )dBm − ( N )dBm
N dB [13.9]
13.3.4.3 Despreading the Signal

The frequency hopping FSK scheme requires the spread signal from the transmitter to be
dispread at the receiver. This is achieved using the mixer/frequency synthesizer combo
that switches frequencies in the same pattern as the transmitter prior to demodulation. An
added advantage of using this scheme in the mixer/frequency synthesizer combo is that
the noise picked up by the EM wave passing through the channel (air in this case) is spread
out across the entire system bandwidth by the depreading process (Figure 13.11), thereby
lowering the noise level of the receiving system.
13.3.5 Demodulation
After the frequency hopping FSK signal has been through the despreading process,
demodulation is done by mixing the signal in two different paths by the two different fre-
quencies and integrating the outputs over the bit interval times. Demodulation results in a
binary stream of data. If analog data had been transmitted, then the digital output would
need to go through another step where a digital to analog (DAC) conversion takes place.
306
13.4 System Design

In this section, the goal is to develop design principles that allow us to use off the shelf parts
to design a complete UAV-GCS communication system. This means we will be developing
specifications based on an application that will guide us in purchasing and assembling the
proper receiver and transmitter components. No attempt will be made to design the indi-
vidual parts since that is out of the scope of this treatment and the focus will be on system
integration. We will begin the treatment by first studying the bandwidth requirements of
the system.
13.4.1 Establishing Bandwidth Requirements

The bandwidth is a range of frequencies of interest. Bandwidth requirements vary within
the same receiver or transmitter, depending on which component the signal is passing
through. The input information constitutes what is known as the baseband. When we are
talking about analog signals, the baseband is established by figuring out the difference
between the highest and lowest frequency components. Digital sources usually provide
data rates as opposed to bandwidth. Data rates are usually provided in bits per second
(bps). The Hartley relation provides a method of calculating bandwidth (B) in Hz from data
rate (DR) in bps and vice versa using the following relationship:
DR = 2Blog 2 M [13.10]
where M is the number of levels transmitted.
EXAMPLE 13.1
An analog source of 4000 Hz bandwidth is sampled using 256 level sampling. What
is the equivalent data rate? If the transceiver data rate is given as 10,000 bps, will this
data rate be enough for the source bandwidth?
Using equation 13.10,
DR = 2 ⋅ ( 4000 ) ⋅ log 2 ( 256 ) = 64 , 000 bps or 64 kbps
The data rate far exceeds the limits of the transceiver and as such will not be able
to carry this source.
For our next example, we calculate the bandwidth given the data rate.
EXAMPLE 13.2
An input data rate for a transceiver system is capped at 10,000 bps for a two-level
digital signal. What is the equivalent bandwidth for this baseband signal in Hz?
10,000 = 2 ⋅ B ⋅ log 2 (2)

or 10,000 = 2. B. 1
∴ B = 5000 Hz
307
In a real-world system, achievable data rates through a channel need to be calculated only
after taking into consideration the signal to noise (S N ) ratio. This is found by calculating
the Shannon-Hartley limit using the relationship below:
 S
DR = Blog 2  1+ 
 N [13.11]
In the next example, we calculate the DR given a (S N ) ratio for a channel. This example
will also help us specify the bandwidth requirements for antennas on our link.
EXAMPLE 13.3
While selecting an antenna for system, you are required to specify a bandwidth
assuming that you are using a modulation scheme that requires the modulated signal
to only have the same bandwidth as the baseband signal if the data rate is 100,000
bps. The given (S N )dBis 20 dB.
At this bandwidth, how many levels are needed for the digital data?
 S
20 = 10 log10  
 N
 20 
 S  10 
∴   = 10 = 100
N
 S
Hence, the   ratio is 100.
 N
100,000 = B × log 2 (1+100)

100 , 000 100 , 000 100 , 000
or, B= = = = 15, 020 Hz
log 2 (101)  log10 101  6.658
 log 2 
10
The minimum bandwidth required is therefore 15.02 kHz. Using Hartley relationship,
100,000 = 2 × 15,020 × log 2 M

100,000
or, log 2 M =
2 × 15,020
 100,000 
 2 × 15,020 
or, M=2 = 10.048
308
In order to achieve the 100,000-bps data rate using a 15.02 kHz bandwidth, an eleven-
level digital signaling would be required.
For the case of FSK, the bandwidth of each channel is given by 2” f+2B and not simply
B as in Example 13.3, where ” f is the frequency difference between the high frequency
and the low frequency used in modulating 1s or 0s; B is the baseband bandwidth. For the
frequency hopping FSK modulation, this is the bandwidth of each channel, and the total
channel bandwidth depends on the number of channels available.
EXAMPLE 13.4
A frequency hopping FSK modulation is operating using a system bandwidth
demarked by 902–928 MHz. If the difference (” f) between the high and low frequen-
cies of modulation is 4 kHz, what is the maximum number of channels that can exist
when the baseband signal has a bandwidth of 15 kHz?
From Example 13.3, B = 15 kHz
Channel = 2∆f + 2B = 2 × 4000 + 2 × 15,000 = 38,000 Hz
928,000,000 − 902,000,000
# of channels = = 684 channels
38,000
13.4.2 Link Design

Simply put, the key question that one hopes to answer from the link design is whether enough
transmitted power is getting through to the receiver, given the distance the signal must travel
after accounting for all losses along the way. Figure 13.11 presents an illustration of a link
and some loss considerations.
13.4.2.1 Reflection at Antenna–Cable Junction

If the reader is unfamiliar with the concepts of electrical impedance and characteristic impedance
of a cable they may move on to the next section since the effect of reflection at the antenna-cable
junction is going to be ignored in our treatment (assuming a well-matched condition exists).
However, there can be a significant reflection at the antenna–cable junction if the cable
and the antenna are not well matched. Moving forward without much detail, let us treat
the concept of electrical impedance as a measure of opposition to circuit current when
a voltage is applied. Impedance can be a complex quantity. The reflection coefficient (Γ)
can be calculated by knowing the antenna impedance (ZANT) and the cable characteristic
impedance (Z0) illustrated by the following relationship:
ZANT − Z0
Γ= [13.12]
ZANT + Z0
Now if one carefully matches the antenna impedance to the cable, characteristic imped-
ance Γ tends to be very small. If reflection was considered, assuming that the transmitter
cable carries the transmitted power (PT) to the antenna, it would be partly reflected as
given by the relationship below:
309
For transmitting antenna

we will ignore dielectric and
and conductor losses; also
good matching is assumed.
TR We will assume good atmospheric conditions

AN
SM with no losses
ITT
ER
DIS
TA
N CE
OF
PR
OP
AG
AT
ION For the receiving antenna
(d) it is assumed that the antenna is
pointing towards the maximum gain of
the antenna. And that there are no
polarization losses.
RE
CE
IV
ER
FIGURE 13.11
Impact of despreading on channel noise.
Power coupled to the antenna via transmitter cable
(
= PT 1 − Γ
2
)
≈ PT when Γ ≈ 0
In our treatment of link design, we will move on assuming we have a good match and all
the transmitter power (PT) is coupled to the transmitting antenna. However, one should
remember that there can be a serious coupling problem if the matching is not optimal.
13.4.2.2 Losses at the Transmitting Antenna

Some small dielectric and conductor losses occur at the transmitting antenna due to a
dielectric covering designed to protect the antenna from exposure to the elements (radome)
and conductor losses. In many cases, antennas themselves are partly constructed with
dielectrics. These losses are difficult to calculate by analytical techniques but are measur-
able. In our treatment moving forward, these losses will be ignored. So, at this stage, we
can say the transmitter power PT is also the power being transmitted.
13.4.2.3 Losses due to Free Space Propagation

So far, we have managed to ignore matching losses and antenna losses by making requisite
assumptions. Propagation losses cannot be ignored and form the bulk of the losses of
the link.
310
Assuming that the receiving antenna is aligned in the transmitting antenna’s direction
of maximum gain (GT), then the power density (PD) at the receiving antenna located at a
distance d from the transmitting antenna can be calculated from the following relationship
(Blake 2002, 520–527):
PT GT
PD = watts/m 2 [13.13]
4πd 2
One way to look at Equation 13.13 is to note that product PTGT is the power that an isotropic
antenna would require to create the same power density PD at the receiver (as created by
the directive antenna). Otherwise stated, an isotropic source radiating PTGT power into free
space can have the power density calculated by simply dividing the radiated power by
the surface area of a sphere of radius d. The product PTGT is also sometimes known as the
effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP).
EXAMPLE 13.5
A directional antenna has a gain of 7 dBi (decibel isotropic) at 900 MHz. If the trans-
mitted power is 0.5 watts, what is the power density 6 miles from the antenna in its
direction of maximum gain?
First, we need to convert the gain from decibels to a dimensionless number (GT).
7 = 10 × log10 (GT )
 7
 
∴ GT = 10 10  = 5.012
Now using Equation 13.13, we can compute the power density 6 miles away (9656 m).
0.5 × 5.012
PD = = 2.139 × 10 −9 watts per meter2 or 2.139 nanowatts per meter2
4 × À × (9656)2
13.4.2.4 Power Received at the Receiving Antenna

As the EM wave travels through free space, it creates a power density PD given by Equation
13.13 at the receiver. The question is how much of this power is accepted by the receiving
antenna. When the EM wave arrives at the receiving antenna, it sees the antenna as an
effective receiving aperture (Aeff). This effective aperture receives power that is a ratio of
the power received by the antenna (PR) in watts and the power density (PD) in watts per
meter square. If the receiving antenna has its maximum gain (GR) pointing at the max-
imum gain of transmitters, then the effective area of the receiving antenna is given by
λ 2 GR
Ae = [13.14]
4À
PR = A e PD [13.15]
A e PT GT
PR = [13.16]
4πd 2
311
EXAMPLE 13.6
If a receiving antenna is receiving power from the transmitting antenna in
Example 13.5, what is the power received (PR) by the receiving antenna?
The wavelength (λ) at 900 MHz,
c 3 × 108
λ= = = 0.333 meters
f 900 × 106
λ 2 GR 0.333 2 × 5.012
Ae = = = 0.044 meter 2
4π 4 × π
PR = A e PD = 0.044 × 2.139 × 10 −9 = 9.412 × 10 −11 watts or 94 picowatts
Equation 13.16 can be further expanded to the following form:
λ 2 GR PT GT λ 2 PT GT GR
PR = =
16π 2 d 2 16π 2 d 2 [13.17]
Equation 13.17 can also be rearranged to a form that derives the ratio of the power
received by the power transmitted:
PR λ 2 GT GR
=
PT 16π 2 d 2 [13.18]
c
Equation 13.18 can be rewritten by substituting where λ = ,
f
PR c2 G G
= 2 T 2 R2
PT f 16π d [13.19]
Now if we are interested in using km and MHz for distance and frequency, we need to
make the following substitutions in Equation 13.19:
d = 10 3 × dkm
f = 106 × fMHz
c = 3 × 108
Hence, Equation 13.19 can be written as
( )
2
PR 3 × 108 GT GR
=
( ) ( )
2 2
PT 106 × fMHz 16π 2 10 3 ⋅ dkm
[13.20]
( )
2
PR 3 × 108 GT GR
or, =
( ) 16π (f
2
PT 109 2
MHz )2 (dkm )2
312
 PR 
10 × log10   = 10 × log10 
× (
 3 108 2 
)  +10 × log ( G ) +10 × log ( G )
( )
10 T 10 R
 PT   9 2 2
 10 16À 
− 20 × log10 ( fMHz ) − 20 × log10 (dkm )
= − 32.442+ ( GT )dBi + ( GR )dBi − 20 × log10 ( fMHz ) − 20 × log10 (dkm ) [13.21]

( )

2
 PR  3 × 108 GT GR
or, 10 × log10   = 10 × log10   [13.22]
 PT   9 2
( ) 2
 10 16π ( fMHz ) (dkm ) 
2 2
the path (Lpath) loss in decibels can be computed by using Equation [13.21] or [13.22],
P 
L path =10 × log10  T  = 32.442 − ( GT )dBi − ( GR )dBi
 PR  [13.23]
+ 20 × log10 ( fMHz ) + 20 × log10 (dkm )
Once path loss is computed from Equation 13.21 and the power output of the transmitter
is known, the received power can also be known. Note that in this treatment, dielectric and
material losses at the transmitting antenna, atmospheric losses, and polarization losses
have been neglected. However, polarization losses at the receiver can be minimized by
manipulating the antenna structure’s positioning and alignment. Generally, the losses may
add 5–10 dB extra to the path loss and can be accounted for by adding on that extra amount
to the minimum clearance from the receiver sensitivity.
EXAMPLE 13.7
The receiving and the transmitting antennas have the same gain at 3.5 dBi. The dis-
tance between them is 5 km. The power at the transmitter is 0.5 watt @ 500 MHz.
How much power is received at the receiver?
First, we find path loss,
L path = 32.442 − ( GT ) − ( GR )dBi + 20 × log10 ( fMHz ) + 20 × log10 (dkm )

dBi
L path = 32.442 − 3.5 − 3.5+20 × log10 ( 500 ) +20 × log10 ( 5) = 93.401 dB

But,
P 
L path = 10 × log10  T  = 93.401
 PR 
93.401
P 
or,,  T  = 10 10
 PR 
∴ PR = PT ⋅ 10 −9.3401 = 0.5 ⋅ 10 −9.3401 = 2.285 ⋅ 10 −10 watts or 22.85 nanowatts
313
13.4.2.5 Power in Decibel Milliwatt

It is very common to have power levels to be provided in decibel milliwatt or dBm form.
Simply put,
 ( Power in milliwatts) 
(Power )dBm = 10 ⋅ log10  
 1 milliwatt 
EXAMPLE 13.8
What is the input power from Example 13.7 in dBm?
 (0.5 ⋅ 1000 ) 
(Power )dBm = 10 ⋅ log10   = 26.99 dBm
 1 
13.4.2.6 Signal-to-Noise Ratio at the Receiver

The signal-to-noise ratio at the receiver can be calculated if one knows what the noise
figure (NF) of the receiver is. The NF is simply the ratio of the signal-to-noise ratio at the
input by the signal to noise ratio at the output.
 S
 
N i
NF = [13.24]
 S
 
N o
in decibel form,
NFdB = 10 × log10 (NF) [13.25]
If the input power at the receiver is known, and thermal noise (N = KTB) can be identified,
then one can calculate the signal-to-noise ratio at the receiver with the help of the noise.
This implies known bandwidth and the temperature.
 S Pr
 
N i
NF = = kTB [13.26]
 S  S
   
N o  NR
Pr
 S kTB
rearranging,   = [13.27]
N R NF
 S
  = 10 × log10 ( Pr ) − 10 × log10 (kTB ) − NFdB [13.28]
N RdB
314
If the received power is given in dBm then equation 12.28 is rewritten in the form below,
 S
  = ( Pr )dBm − 10 × log10 (1000 kTB ) − NFdB [13.29]
N RdB
EXAMPLE 13.9
If the power received at the input of the receiver is taken from Example 13.6, what
is the signal-to-noise ratio at the receiver at 300K for a bandwidth of 1 MHz (using
NFdB = 10)? (Boltzman const, k = 1.38 × 10–23 Joules/K]
Using Equation 13.8,
 S
  = 10 × log10 ( Pr ) − 10 × log10 (kTB ) − NFdB
N RdB
( )
= 10 × log10 (2.285 × 10 −10 ) − 10 × log10 300 × 1.38 × 10 −23 × 106 − 10
= 37.419 dB
13.4.2.7 Calculation of Signal-to-Noise Margin from Receiver Sensitivity

Receiver sensitivity (RSdBm) is the minimum power level required by the receiver to
demodulate signal information. This information is provided by the manufacturer. A decent
clearance from this value (>10 dBm) is desired since the noise level in different systems can
vary. With RSdBm known, we can calculate the margin using the equation below:
Margin in dBm = ( Pr )dBm − RS dBm [13.30]
EXAMPLE 13.10
If the receiver sensitivity is -85 dBm, what is the signal-to-noise margin from problem
in Example 13.8?
Margin in dBm = ( Pr )dBm − RSdBm

= 10 × log10 (2.285 × 10 −10 × 1000) − ( − 85)
= 18.589 dBm
which is quite a good margin.
13.5 Summary of Design Principles

The first step would be to decide the data rate required for the application we have in mind.
If we are using off the shelve components, manufacturers will have the specifications about
315
what data rates are manageable. Section 13.4.1 has general rules for establishing data rate
requirements for a given application when FSK modulation is used where there were only
two levels (M = 2). In other digital modulation schemes, different values of M may need to
be used such as M = 2 for binary phase shift keying (BPSK) and M = 4 for quadrature phase
shift keying (QPSK). Very briefly, BPSK uses the same frequency and opposite phases to
modulate, while QPSK uses the same frequency with four different phases.
Currently, frequency hopping FSK is most widely used in UAV commercial applications,
but many applications may employ BPSK and/or QPSK. Loss calculations are not affected
by modulation techniques (FSK, PSK, or QPSK).
The worst-case link lengths need to be estimated and link losses calculated for those
worst-case scenarios. Section 13.4.2 covers much of this discussion. A look at Equation
13.23 tells us how to compute the path loss, but it also gives us the variable with which
to manipulate in order to decrease path loss. Since we really do not have as much control
over the ISM band frequencies that we use or the worst-case distances between receiver
and transmitter, selecting higher gain antennas always reduces the path loss. It must be
remembered that the EIRP must not exceed FCC guidelines. The key thing to remember is
that the path loss should include all the power received and clear the receiver sensitivity
by a safe margin.
13.6 Associated Problems from EMI Interference, Jamming,

and Multipath
13.6.1 EMI Interference
EMI interference occurs when an unintended signal finds its way to the receiver at the fre-
quency of concern. This might come into the receiver through a variety of pathways such
as conduction, radiation, crosstalk, ground, and power lines (Gerke and Kimmel 2005,
3–8). The EMI (sometimes also called RF interference), in some instances, can carry more
power than the intended signal and overwhelm the intended signal while passing through
the receiver stages. While spread spectrum techniques like frequency hopping are secure
from having information read by unauthorized entities, it cannot protect from interference,
especially when the interfering sources have higher or comparable power levels.
With the future of the UAVs becoming more significant, EMI problems are going to be
increasingly more challenging. From the current regulatory trajectories, it seems that com-
mercial applications will always require close monitoring of the aircraft. In a crowded
airspace, this can easily lead to an antenna picking more than one LOS signal intended for
someone else (Figure 13.12). The growing problem of EMI interference is a problem that
will need increased attention.
13.6.2 Jamming
Jamming problems are similar in some respects to the EMI problem we just discussed.
A jamming signal is disruptive whether this is in contested airspace or not. The jamming
signal carries a power level that overwhelms the receiver, making it difficult or impos-
sible to navigate or complete an intended application. Whether it is the GNSS signal being
jammed or the UAV-GCS link, this poses a threat to UAV operation. In the future, as newer
316
UAV
Two RC controllers
interfereing with the
same UAV-GCS link
UAV
RC Controller 1
RC Controller 2
FIGURE 13.12
Considerations for calculating received power at receiving antenna.
applications demand more and more UAV platforms, the problem of illegal jamming for
commercial advantage is also going to create problems that are normally associated with
contested battlefield scenarios. Currently, there are some positive developments related
to the design of spatial processing antennas that would cut off jamming sources (Heng
et al. 2015).
13.6.3 Multipath
We have discussed the concept of multipath before and talked about different pathways
a signal can take to a receiver, and how some of these signals arrive at the receiver after
bouncing around (Figure 13.4). The problems from multipath stem from the fact that two
or more copies of the signal arrive at the receiver sometimes interfere destructively by
opposing the phase of the direct signal, and sometimes it can increase signal amplitude by
being in phase. GNSS receivers, that also have this problem, are able to address it through
signal processing techniques to where signal arriving later at some interval can be ignored
317
by the processor (Kaplan and Hegarty 2006, 703). However, when the multipath signals
arrive closer to the direct signal, it still creates errors. The answer to this UAV-GCS problem
may lie in a similar solution to the one being proposed by Heng et al. (2015) in which the
antenna is designed to cut off the multipath signal through special processing.
13.7 Review Questions

1. Give an example of a Data Link for UAV-GCS communication specifying fre-
quency and modulation techniques? Use the classification systems presented in
this chapter to describe the type of link.
2. Research the Inmarsat Network. What are the potential advantages to using this
system?
3. How does an antenna transmit energy into space without charges to carry them?
4. What is a simplex connection? What is a duplex connection?
5. Describe FSK modulation? Why are we studying this type of modulation?
6. What is the function of the power amplifier in the transmitter?
7. What is a spread spectrum technique? What are the advantages with using spread
spectrum technology?
8. What is a communication channel? Give examples of three different channels?
9. What is a radiation pattern of an antenna?
10. What is meant by radiation intensity?
11. What is the far field?
12. What is antenna directivity?
13. What is antenna gain?
14. What kind of losses exists in antenna and its radome? (Just discuss loss mechanisms
in the antenna material)
15. How many types of polarization did we discuss?
16. What is right-handed circular polarization?
17. What is linear polarization?
18. What is the importance of the signal to noise ratio? How is channel capacity
influenced by its signal-to-noise ratio?
19. What is thermal noise? How do you calculate it?
20. What is impulse noise? What are the sources of impulse noise?
21. When do we need an ADC?
22. When do we need a DAC?
23. How are bandwidth requirements established for a data link?
24. What is data rate?
25. In the Shannon–Hartley relation [Equation 13.10] what is the significance of M?
26. What does the Shannon limit?
27. What assumptions are being made that lead to neglecting reflection loss at the
transmitting antenna-cable junction?
28. What is meant by EIRP?
29. What is the noise figure (NF)? What does it tell us about an electronic system?
30. What assumptions are being made that lead to neglecting the polarization loss at
the receiving antenna?
31. What is EMI interference? How is this, a threat to UAV-GCS communication?
318
32. How is EMI a challenge to the future of UAV-GCS communication?

33. What is meant by jamming?
34. What problems are we running into while trying to solve the problem of multipath?
35. Very briefly, describe the steps to designing a data link.
13.1 An analog source is 4000 Hz bandwidth is sampled using 16-level sampling. What
is the equivalent data rate? If the transceiver data rate is given as 1000 bps, will this
data rate be enough for the source bandwidth?
13.2 While selecting an antenna for a system you are required to specify a bandwidth.
Assuming that you are using a modulation scheme that requires the modulated
signal to only have the same bandwidth as the baseband signal if the data rate is
10,000 bps. The given (S N )dB is 20 dB. At this bandwidth, how many levels are
needed for the digital data?
13.3 A frequency hopping FSK modulation is operating using a system bandwidth
demarked by 902–928 MHz. If the difference (” f) between the high and low fre-
quencies of modulation is 4 kHz, what is the maximum number of channels that
can exist when the baseband signal has a bandwidth of 60 kHz?
13.4 A directional antenna has a gain of 5 dBi (decibel isotropic) at 900 MHz. If the trans-
mitted power is 100 watts, what is the power density 6 miles from the antenna in
its direction of maximum gain?
13.5 If a receiving antenna is receiving power from the transmitting antenna in review
problem 4, what is the power received (PR) by the receiving antenna?
13.6 The receiving and the transmitting antennas have the same gain at 5 dBi (decibels-
isotropic). The distance between them is 15 km. The power at the transmitter is 100
watt @ 500 MHz. How much power is received at the receiver?
13.7 If the power received at the input of the receiver is from review problem 7, what
is the signal to noise ratio at the receiver at 300K for a bandwidth of 1 MHz (Using
NFdB = 10)? (Boltzman const, k = 1.38 × 10–23 Joules/K)
13.8 If the receiver sensitivity is –85 dBm, what is the signal-to-noise margin from
review problem 7?
References
Balanis, Constantine. 2005. Radiation mechanism. In Antenna theory analysis and design. 3rd ed., 7–16.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Blake, Roy. 2002. Free-space propagation. In Electronic communication systems. 2nd ed., 520–527.
Albany: DELMAR.
Fahlstrom, P., and J. Gleason. 2012. Data-link functions and attributes. In Introduction to UAV systems.
4th ed., 191–204. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
319
Gerke, D., and B. Kimmel. 2005. EMI, noise, and interference—a different game. In EDN designers
guide to electromagnetic compatibility. 1st ed., 3–8. Newton, MA : EDN Custom Publishing
Services.
Heng, L., T. Walter, and G. Gao. 2015. GNSS multipath and jamming mitigation using high-mask-
angle antennas. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems 16 (2): 741–750.
IEEE, Standards. 1983. IEEE standard definitions of terms for antennas. (accessed March 29, 2015).
Kaplan, Elliott, and Christopher Hegarty, eds. 2006. Understanding GPS principles and applications. 2nd
ed. Boston; London: Artech House.
MTI, Group. in MTI [database online]. [cited March 29, 2015 2015]. Available from www.mtiwe.com/
?CategoryID=353&ArticleID=163.
Sevgi, Levant. 2007. The antenna as a transducer: Simple circuit and electromagnetic models. IEEE
Antennas and Propagation Magazine 49 (6): 211--218.
Stallings, William. 2007. Transmission impairments. In Data and computer communications. 8th ed.,
89–91. New Jersey: Pearson.
Wagenen, Juliet. Inmarsat parrot bebop drone takes flight for journalists. in Sattelite TODAY News
feed, ST Briefs, Telecom [database online]. 2015 [cited March 19, 2015]. Available from www.
satellitetoday.com/ t elecom/ 2 015/ 0 3/ 11/ i nmarsat- p arrot- b ebop- d rone- t akes- f light- f or-
journalists/(accessed March 19, 2015).
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14
Command and Control
Nathan Maresch
14.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

14.2 Human Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
14.3 Datalinks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
14.3.1 RF Spectrum and FCC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
14.3.2 Line-of-Sight Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
14.3.3 Beyond Line-of-Sight Communication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
14.3.4 Communication Protocols. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
14.3.4.1 MAVLink Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
14.3.4.2 MAVLinkHeader Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
14.3.4.3 MAVLink Message (Payload) Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
14.3.5 Error Detection/Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
14.3.6 Encryption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
14.4 UAS Flight Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
14.4.1 Autopilot Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
14.4.2 Sensors and Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
14.4.3 Tuning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
14.5 Large UAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
14.5.1 IMU/INS Stabilization Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
14.5.2 Additional Navigation Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
14.5.3 Launch and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
14.6 Open Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
14.7 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
14.1 Introduction
The definition of command and control may differ depending on context. From a human
perspective, especially in the context of the military, command and control has a lot to do
with the structure of ranks and the hierarchy within which a mission is accomplished. In
the context of unmanned aircraft system (UAS), the primary concern is with technology
implementation. It may be abbreviated “C3” or “C4,” etc., to be concise, adding communi-
cation and computers, respectively. While very useful to know, in the context of UAS, the
differences in abbreviation and terminology are essentially meaningless since they are all
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322
referring to the same concept. It is impossible to have command and control without com-
munication or computing elements. In the simplest of terms for UAS, command and control
refers to the issuing of commands through a communication medium, to a resource such as
an air vehicle, and verifying positive control over the situation. It is what allows operators
to send initial instructions and updates to flight plans and other aircraft systems, as well as
receive information about what is happening on board the aircraft while flying (Gundlach
2012). Depending on the mission at hand, some unmanned aircraft are flown completely
autonomously without transmitting or receiving communications from the ground station
throughout the entire flight (no C2 implementation). For almost all applications, however,
two-way communication with the aircraft is desired. This chapter will focus on radio fre-
quency (RF) datalinks, because they are the most common form of communication for
unmanned systems. Other mediums such as tethered cables and beams of light are some-
times used for information transfer (Austin 2010). This is true for both the uplink –the
commands from the operator to the aircraft, and the downlink –the status information
sent from the aircraft.
14.2 Human Element

It is important that all components of the command and control system are working prop-
erly, including the pilot in command (PIC); command and control begins and ends with
the human being. The ground control stations (GCS) that are used to monitor and con-
trol flights vary in size and complexity, from large control centers and mobile units all
the way down to small tablets and mobile phones. Operator interfaces for unmanned air-
craft continue to evolve and advance. Although the basic flight data are essentially the
same between aircraft, the display of this information will vary from system to system.
The only standardized information found on some operator screens is the inclusion of
the “six-pack” instruments, commonly condensed to a primary flight display similar to
manned aircraft glass cockpits. Each interface style and design has its own unique set
of strengths and weaknesses. Regardless of the amount of information displayed to the
operator, it is important that critical information is prominently displayed, and easy to
understand and comprehend. On an operator interface, there is usually a delicate balance
between operator workload and ease of use, and functionality and access to information.
Some interfaces are very intuitive and easy to use but have relatively few features. Others
include a larger feature set but have a complex interface with a higher learning curve.
The perfect human interface is both easy to use, and full featured. A display with a lot
of “clutter” is not necessarily a bad thing if the information is consistently located on the
display and important flight information is easily located. Other features that improve the
human interface include the consistent use of color coding and graphical indicators. For
example, one interface may simply display the system voltage as a number on the screen
(Part “a” of Figure 14.1). An improved interface may color-code it for proper operating
range (Part “b” of Figure 14.1); an even further improvement may be a graphical indicator
with color-coded operating range along with the actual readout (Part “c” of Figure 14.1).
As space becomes a premium, it may only be practical to display a limited amount of infor-
mation in this way. Other features, such as a warning annunciator system (with indicators
fixed in location), tabs or drop-downs, and the selective use of “drag and drop” commands
may also improve functionality while maintaining ease of use. An intuitive display of map
323
Command and Control 323
FIGURE 14.1
Voltage Status Indicator Variations: (a) Black Text (b) Red Low Voltage Text (c) Color-coded Red, Yellow,
Green Indicator.
data and flight information is essential to any interface; three-dimensional indication of

topography and flight plan information is also very useful. Color coding of the flight plan
itself may also be helpful to indicate terrain warnings or to determine if the plan is “live”
and current on the aircraft. Future systems will likely have much more standardization
between interfaces. They will be easier to learn and operate, while offering improved flight
efficiency and safety.
The most important aspect of operating an unmanned aircraft is safety. External pilots
are commonly implemented as a backup to the automation in case command and control
breaks down. They may take control of the aircraft with split-second reaction time in the
event of an impending collision or emergency. Communication between this person and
the PIC is critical. While the external pilot has control, the PIC may need to modify the
flight plan or other settings to ensure safety. An external observer may also be required
to maintain the safety of the flight, scanning the sky for traffic and communicating with
the PIC and external pilot. In many cases, there is also a separate payload or sensor oper-
ator. Communication between the PIC and payload operator may or may not be critical
to safety, but it is important to the mission at hand. The payload operator may need the
aircraft maneuvered to a certain area to keep areas of interest in view of the camera or
sensor. It is useful for the payload operator to have the current flight plan in view to know
how to maneuver the camera, and when, for example, the camera may be obscured by
landing gear during a turn. Additionally, for longer missions, communication becomes key
between the PIC and other parties, such as during an aircraft handoff procedure to other
operators at different GCS. Generally, provisions are made for the new operator to estab-
lish connection before the original operator disconnects (Gundlach 2012).
In the future, collision avoidance systems or similar technology may reduce the require-
ment for additional crew members such as external pilots. Detection systems using high-
resolution cameras may pick out relative airborne movement, show it to the operator, and
prompt them for an action (if not executing an automated response); the goal is to operate
unmanned systems with at least the same level of safety as manned aircraft.
There are still automated features to increase safety today, however. For example, if
the aircraft does not receive a transmission from the GCS for a preset amount of time, an
automated lost-link procedure may be executed. The operator may customize the lost-link
timeout and behavior before the flight. Generally, multiple actions are taken based on the
length of blackout time –the first may be to help to reestablish communication, such as can-
celing the existing flight plan and loitering near the ground-control station. If a connection
is not reestablished for an additional length of time, the system may take further action,
such as an autolanding. In some cases, the lost-link action may also be triggered in reverse
direction. Some systems may be programmed so that if the ground station does not receive
status information from the aircraft, it may transmit a lost-link initiation command, just in
case the aircraft is still able to receive commands. An easy way to accomplish this manually
without the programmed feature is to intentionally stop transmitting and let the aircraft
324
trigger the procedure. If at any time the link is reestablished, the operator may cancel the
lost-link flight procedure and resume the mission.
14.3 Datalinks
Datalinks communicate information between the ground station and unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV), and occasionally may be used to communicate with other system elements
such as antenna trackers. Wireless modems on the UAV transmit telemetry and receive
commands from the operator who has similar wireless hardware connected to the ground
station. These modems are typically transceivers connected to one or more antennas.
These could be Wi-Fi based with fast throughput, or relatively slow-speed serial modems;
modems that have throughput from tens to a few hundred kilobits per second (Kbps) are
sufficient for command and control. Figure 14.2 shows three different command and con-
trol transceivers. In some cases, there may be separate receivers and transmitters operating
on different frequencies (Gundlach 2012).
14.3.1 RF Spectrum and FCC

Before continuing, let us review radio frequencies. Put simply, the RF spectrum comprises
the large range of frequencies found between those we can hear and those we can see; in
other words, wavelengths between 100 km and 1 mm or frequencies between 3 KHz and
300 GHz near the beginning of the infrared light frequencies. In the United States, the civil
FIGURE 14.2
Various sUAS Command and Control Transceivers.
325
regulatory authority for this spectrum is the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
Part of the job of the FCC is to manage the radio spectrum in an efficient way, assigning spe-
cific frequencies (channels) to users and regulating their power output. This management
is to prevent interference from other users transmitting on the same frequency in the same
locality; everyone gets their own radio channel –not a particularly easy job to manage. If
someone simply decides to transmit on a particular frequency without authorization, they
may face significant fines or penalties, especially if they interfere with someone who has
a license for that frequency. Typically, the FCC allocates parts of the spectrum for certain
uses, such as the bands used for AM/FM music radio. To date, there are no bands set aside
for use exclusively by unmanned aircraft. Licenses are issued on a case-by-case basis by
availability, though several bands are being considered for unmanned aircraft specific use
(Transportation 2013).
There are also certain bands that do not require a license to use as long as the equipment
is certified to comply with a number of rules set forth in Part 15 of the FCC rules (The
FCC rules may be found in Title 47 of the US Code of Federal Regulations [CFR]). These
unlicensed bands are very popular for use with unmanned aircraft. Using these bands, the
radio equipment must hop between one frequency to another very rapidly over a large
range of frequencies (spread spectrum). The transmitter and receiver must be synchronized;
the receiver must hop using the same pattern as the transmitter for proper reception. Many
times, a specific pattern in use may appear completely random to an outside observer, but
the communicating devices remain synchronized to each frequency change; the pattern
is pseudorandom. The benefit of using this method is that multiple users may operate in
the same band without causing crippling interference to others; different users employ
different hopping patterns. This communication method is relatively immune to other
sources of interference as well, because noise occurring at one frequency results the loss
of only a small portion of a spread spectrum transmission; however, a potential pitfall is
that there is no license of exclusivity, so interference must generally be accepted. In fact,
the unlicensed frequencies are within part of the spectrum that previously was specified
only for RF noisy industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) uses; microwave ovens operate
in one of these bands. Advanced spread-spectrum transceivers can detect existing sources
of interference (such as a microwave oven running nearby) and avoid those channels com-
pletely (Blake 2002). Wi-Fi is an example of spread-spectrum technology in action. A visual
representation of frequency hopping is shown in Figure 14.3. This shows a spectrum meas-
urement of an unlicensed command and control link over about 60 seconds time. A section
of the RF spectrum is plotted along the horizontal axis. Elapsed time is plotted along the
vertical axis. Each horizontal segment indicates an average amount of RF energy sampled
during an interval of a few seconds. Most of the RF energy is concentrated at differing
FIGURE 14.3
Spectrum waterfall view indicating frequency hopping over time.
326
frequencies during each measurement interval. In contrast, a solid-consistent vertical con-

centration would indicate a traditional fixed-frequency transmission.
14.3.2 Line-of-Sight Communication

Virtually all civil unmanned aircraft use line-of-sight (LOS) RF communications for their
command and control data link. LOS in the context of RF signals simply refers to a direct
path between one antenna and one or more others. The distance between LOS antennas
in some cases may be several miles, certainly much further than the human eye can see.
Commonly called space waves, these RF frequencies are generally all those above 30 MHz.
Those below 30 MHz usually either follow the terrain of the earth, or are reflected off the
earth’s atmosphere to be received at another geographic location; conversely, because LOS
frequencies are by definition direct, buildings, mountains, or even the curvature of the
earth itself may become an issue for signal reception. While the specifics are beyond the
scope of this chapter, the higher the antenna above the earth, the further the signal may
propagate, depending on many factors such as transmission power and receiver sensi-
tivity. A higher “gain” directional antenna at the ground station (or if practically feas-
ible on board the aircraft) may increase the usable operating distance as well. Though
there are power limitations for licensed transmissions (and usually greater limitations for
unlicensed ones), there is generally enough transmission power available to accommodate
most flights within visual LOS without the need for high-gain antennas. Also, note that
there may be regulatory limits for the amount of gain an antenna may have.
As briefly mentioned above, unlicensed frequencies are popular for small UAS (sUAS).
The most common unlicensed frequencies are 915 MHz, 2.45 GHz, and 5.8 GHz, all of
which are LOS frequencies. Sometimes, all three are used within one UAS. For example,
915 MHz may be used for operator command and control of the aircraft, 2.45 GHz for
external pilot control, and 5.8 GHz for a video or other payload downlink. Besides the
reasons mentioned earlier for the popularity of spread spectrum technology, these specific
frequencies (and similar traditional licensed frequencies) are also popular because of the
compact nature of the antennas required to transmit and receive them. These frequencies
are high enough that the required antennas may be easily accommodated by most sUAS.
Recall that as frequency increases, the wavelength decreases. As the wavelengths become
shorter, so also may the dimensions of the antennas.
Signal strength is presented to the user in different ways, depending on the system.
Sometimes, the strength is estimated and displayed on a simplified 0–100% scale. Other
systems provide a more precise raw measurement of received power to the user. This
power reading is displayed in decibels referenced to 1 milliwatt (dBm). The received
power is always less than 1 milliwatt, so the dBm reading will be negative (in contrast,
transmitters output more than 1 milliwatt, so the dBm is positive). Generally, –40 dBm is
considered a very strong signal and –100 dBm a very weak one (the more negative, the
weaker the signal). Most receivers will not be able to tell the difference between the signal
and ambient noise at about –100 dBm. Different models of receivers (and the associated
link data-rate settings) will vary in their signal sensitivity, so acceptable lower values
will also vary; moreover, the ambient noise changes depending on environment, so some
safety margin is required to maintain a positive signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regardless of
the sensitivity of the receiver. Some data-link modems will also give an indicator of the
quality of the data received, usually some ratio of erroneous data to error-free data. Note
the acceptable range of signal strength values associated with your specific equipment
before flying.
327
Users of wireless datalinks should also periodically check the radio hardware they are
operating. One procedure that is beneficial to perform before flight is a reduced power
check. Reducing the power helps one find out if there are problems with the modems and
associated connections, cabling, and antennas. Some radios can be configured to reduce
the transmitting power on both ends enough for the check, and other times an attenu-
ator may be added between one of the antennas and the transceiver. An attenuator is a
matched resistor that dissipates a portion of the RF of power. Some attenuators are fixed,
and some may be adjusted to dissipate more or less power; in the case of a transceiver,
the attenuator reduces the transmitting power before reaching the antenna, as well as the
received power before it reaches the receiver. This simulates adding distance between the
ground station and the air vehicle. Note that it is important that an attenuator should be
installed and removed with the equipment off, as unplugging the antenna of an operating
transceiver may burn it out due to the signal being reflected back inside. If the system is
still able to operate with reduced power when separated by several meters, then it follows
that it should function at greater distances with full power. If the Received Signal Strength
Indicator (RSSI) is abnormally weak on both ends during the check, then the problem is
likely within the antenna, cabling, or connections on one or both sides. If the power is weak
on only one side, then the transceiver hardware is usually faulty, either a weak transmitter
on one end or an insensitive receiver on the other end.
A unique ID (sometimes paired with an encryption key), serial number, or network
address is what is used to establish a connection between the ground station and the UAV.
Sometimes, an ID must match between the aircraft and ground station transceivers, and
other times, it is easily specified or selected from a list of aircraft on the operator screen in
order to control one or more vehicles simultaneously.
14.3.3 Beyond Line-of-Sight Communication

Beyond LOS (BLOS) communication generally refers to the types of radio signals that can
travel over the horizon. This includes ground waves below 2 MHz, which follow the earth’s
terrain, and sky waves between 2 and 30 MHz, which bounce off the ionosphere to be
received at another location. Command and control communication using these frequen-
cies is rare for several reasons. For one, the required bandwidth is generally unavailable
at such low frequencies. Also, the size, weight, and power requirements of the hardware
(especially the larger antennas) rule out most sUAS.
Aircraft command and control via satellite communication is commonly designated
BLOS because of the ability to operate beyond the capably of a single LOS station; it is not,
however, BLOS from a technical standpoint because LOS microwave frequencies are used.
LOS signals are transmitted from a station to a satellite relay in space, and back down to
a receiver on the aircraft. Satellite communication is rare in the civilian realm due to the
high costs involved, though UAS may use this for long endurance, or faraway missions;
operators can control an aircraft from halfway around the world. One potential draw-
back is that a significant delay or latency of up to several seconds may be encountered.
Sometimes, the relatively precarious launch and recovery of the aircraft is handled by a
local crew communicating directly with the aircraft with minimal delay, and control is
transferred back to the crew operating the sat-com link for the mission. In other cases, the
entire flight may be conducted via satellite. A small fixed antenna on the top of the aircraft
is all that is required for effective low data rate satellite command and control (Gundlach
2012). Two examples of lower data rate satellite links are the Iridium and Inmarsat satellite
networks.
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Large-scale regional or wide-area distributed radio networks, such as cellular services,

may also fulfill the communication role required by BLOS operations. 4G LTE and lower
band 5G technology has more than enough available throughput for both command and
control and payload links. A reliability survey of the coverage area should be completed
before attempting BLOS flights using cellular networks.
Another aircraft may also act as a relay for BLOS command and control communication.
This aircraft is equipped with extra radio equipment to relay information between the
remote aircraft and the ground station. It may simply follow a loiter waypoint or have a
more complex flight plan to maintain a proper distance and altitude between these two.
The main mission for this relay aircraft is to preserve signal strength between both the
remote aircraft and the ground station.
14.3.4 Communication Protocols

The information passed between the ground station and the unmanned aircraft must be
managed to ensure that communication happens reliably and efficiently. The information
is organized into individual pieces with manageable sizes according to a standardized
communication protocol, and serialized so that it can be transferred, in most cases via a
single data stream at a set rate of speed. Especially with status information transmitted
from a UAV, multiple bits of information from different components are constantly sent to
the ground station. Because of this, there is always a holding area, called a buffer, within
the hardware where the information can be held while waiting to be transmitted via the
radio system.
There are many roles that the communication protocol plays. Not only does it specify
how the information must be serialized for streaming, but it also assigns the sequence for
transmission. The information is inserted into what is called a packet, similar to a letter
sent via the post office. When a letter is placed inside an envelope for mailing, the postal
service does not care what the content of the letter is; it only uses the information on the
outside of the envelope, the most important being the stamp, then the region, state, city,
and address. If, for example, there was a large manuscript that needed to be sent to a pub-
lisher in multiple parcels, they might be numbered and totaled (1 of 6, etc.) so that the
recipient could easily reassemble the document from the individual packets. The publisher
could then respond with a status letter, and if one of the packets was to get lost in the mail,
they could easily request a specific packet be resent. Digital communication happens in
much the same way, with important communications being acknowledged successfully.
There is overhead in acknowledgements though, so some systems employ a communica-
tion protocol without acknowledgment when reception is not critically important, such as
a video stream.
Many communication protocols exist for unmanned aircraft communication, and many
systems use computer networking and the internet protocols. While that may seem to be
a simple and effective solution at first, these protocols have a relatively high overhead for
the types of messages being transmitted, and the information still needs to be understood
by both the transmitting element and the receiving element. When presented in the format
that the protocol specifies, the transmitting element must either add some sort of defin-
ition to the beginning of each message to aid in decoding on the receiver side, or similarly
package the message first (resulting in packets within packets). Understandably, this is less
efficient than it could be, and is a major reason why the majority of UAS have dedicated
protocols for the purposes of command and control.
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14.3.4.1 MAVLink Protocol

One popular protocol is called Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink). Each message trans-
mitted under this protocol has a set number of identifiers (similar to the address and stamp
on an envelope) called the header, along with the message itself, or payload (like the letters
inside the envelope), which may vary in size. Because the communication is serial in nature
(one stream of information), and the header is a fixed size, the packets are easily processed
in an efficient manner. The use of nonrelevant identification (such as placing the country
name on an envelope mailed domestically) is minimized for maximum efficiency.
14.3.4.2 MAVLink Header Structure

The structure of a MAVLink header is as follows: a packet always begins with a unique
one-byte “start of text,” or “magic byte” identifier that lets the receiver know that it is
an MAVLink packet of a particular version. As of this writing, the current version is 2.3
(MAVLink n.d.). The receiver is always watching for one of these identifiers to begin reading
the packet. If data are received without this identifier, they are simply thrown away forever.
Once the packet has been identified as MAVLink, the second byte identifies the size of the
payload inside the header, variable from 0 to 255 bytes. The receiver will stop reading and
listen for a new packet after reading the amount of data specified in the length field. Next,
the third byte contains what are called “incompatibility flags.” If there is a value in this
section of the header, the packet has special formatting and the receiver must understand
how to handle it. If the receiver does not understand a value in this part of the header, it is
incompatible, and must drop the packet, as there is no point in trying to continue reading
it. In contrast, the fourth byte contains “compatibility flags,” which also include special
instructions, but do not affect the structure of the message itself. These extra features main-
tain compatibility, even if the receiver does not know what they mean. Message priority is
a good example of this type of flag –the receiver can process the message properly even if
it does not know that it is set at a higher or lower priority. The fifth byte is an incrementing
sequence number, which rolls over once it reaches the maximum value of 255. Each packet
that is generated by a specific component gets a new sequence number, which helps to
identify lost packets (like the manuscript example above). The sixth value is the sender’s
system ID; there can be a maximum of 255 system elements in an MAVLink network plus
the ground station, which uses value 255. The seventh byte value in the sequence is the
component ID, used to identify specific components or subsystems of the sending system,
such as the autopilot, camera/gimbal, avoidance device, etc. This component specification
allows the protocol to be used with both internal communication between subsystems, and
external communication between systems. The next identifier now takes up three bytes,
instead of just one like in previous MAVLink versions. This is the message ID, used to iden-
tify the type of message being sent in the payload that follows immediately afterward. The
message ID will help the receiver prepare for message decoding. There is a lot of room for
expansion when using three bytes for the message ID instead of one; instead of the (back-
wards compatible) 256 possible message types used with older protocol versions, there
are nearly 17 million possibilities! After the payload, two bytes represent a dual-integrity
checksum (explained later), a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) byte calculated from all the
previous packet information except the MAVLink identifier byte, and an “Extra” CRC byte
seeded from the data definition to ensure common message coding/decoding. For add-
itional security, after the checksum is an optional signature (identified earlier in the header
by an incompatibility flag; if the signature incompatibility flag exists, then the receiver
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must know how to decode signed packets, otherwise it is incompatible and cannot decode
the packet). The signature is 13 bytes in length and has a structure of its own. The first byte
of the signature is the link ID, unique for each connection. The next six bytes represent
a timestamp updated every 0.00001 seconds. Finally, the last six bytes represent the sig-
nature itself, 48 bits of an SHA-256 hash calculated from the message, timestamp, and a
secret key that the transmitter and receiver both know. This helps ensure that the message
is secure, including the originator and message content (MAVLink n.d.).
After going through the header structure, it is interesting to note that headers contain
only sender information, nothing about the destination. If there is information destined for
a single system or component, it is specified by specific payload structure. As a result, all
packet headers are processed in some way by all receivers in the MAVLink network.
14.3.4.3 MAVLink Message (Payload) Structure

Messages are in the form of active commands sent to the UAV from the ground station, such
as a takeoff command, or status messages sent back from the UAV to the ground station,
such as current Global Positioning System (GPS) position. On average, there is a signifi-
cantly higher amount of status information being transmitted from the UAS than there are
ground station commands. Even though message lengths can vary, each payload message
has a specific structure similar to the header. The receiver looks up the structure for each
message using the message ID from the header; the packets themselves do not reveal how
the message payload is structured. The transmitter and receiver must share a common
library of message structure definitions, including byte ordering and size. Overhead in the
link can be reduced by doing it this way with a message ID instead of a full definition in
each packet (MAVLink n.d.).
The system uses one of the most fundamental messages, having ID 0, to track the
connection state. This is the “heartbeat” message, which is sent by each transmitter at a rate
of 60 messages per minute. After learning about all the information sent in each header,
it may seem straightforward to simply send only headers for a heartbeat, but heartbeat
messages do contain quite a bit of information encoded into nine bytes. The first payload
byte for a heartbeat message is the “type,” which indicates the airframe in use, such as
a fixed-wing airplane or quadrotor. Currently, there are 33 different types defined. The
second byte indicates the autopilot, of which there are now 20 defined such as ArduPilot,
PX4, or Paparazzi. The third is called the “base mode” byte, indicating the basic mode of the
autopilot. Instead of binary, it is encoded in bitwise form, so there are only eight available
base modes. Modes such as manual, stabilize, guided, auto, and hardware-in-the-loop are
encoded here. The next four bytes indicate a custom mode for extra autopilot-specific fields.
In addition to the base modes, custom autopilot modes not included in the base mode may
be encoded here, such as altitude hold, loiter, and landing mode. The eighth bit reveals
the general system status, such as initializing, calibrating, standing by (ready to fly), active
(motors on, possibly flying), shutting down, critical (flying, but degraded/ abnormal),
emergency (loss of functionality or control and in “mayday” –going down), or terminating
(intentionally crashing). Lastly, the MAVLink version is encoded (MAVLink n.d.).
Other types of messages have different sized payloads allocated; some of the most basic
messages only encode two bytes, such as the parameter request command message (#21).
This message payload only contains the target system and component ID. If the receiver of
the message sees the message ID, and its attributes match the target specified in the pay-
load, then it begins transmitting its list of parameter data. Two more double-byte status
message examples simply broadcast the current mission status, and mission item reached
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(IDs 42 and 46, respectively). In both cases, the payload is simply the mission (waypoint)
item sequence number. Another routine message, the (INS filtered) GPS message, ID#33,
encodes 28 bytes in its payload (MAVLink n.d.).
Because the status messages being sent back from the UAV are transmitted regularly, and
at a relatively fast rate, they do not require ground station acknowledgment of reception.
In fact, most packets are not acknowledged, only commands from the ground station, such
as “command_long,” have corresponding acknowledgment responses. This is achieved
by including confirmation and target system/component sections in the payload. On the
first transmission, the confirmation byte starts at zero, and if the UAV has not responded
with an acknowledgment after a timeout period, the command is resent. On each retry,
the confirmation value increases. An acknowledgment message returns the command ID
that it is acknowledging, as well as a detailed result, such as “accepted,” “denied,” “not
supported,” “in progress,” etc. A separate progress field can even indicate the progress by
percent completed. Fields for the system/component that originated the command are also
included as specific targets for acknowledgment. For messages that a receiver finds with a
system or component target other than itself, it is expected to retransmit the message via
any channel that it has seen target traffic from. Broadcast messages are handled similarly,
being sent to any channel that has not seen them (MAVLink n.d.).
14.3.5 Error Detection/Correction

Several techniques exist for detecting errors, ranging from a simple checksum to a CRC.
A checksum is the sum of all the zeros and ones that go into a data packet. The sum is
divided by a fixed number, and the remainder is transmitted with the packet for the check.
If this addition and division process results in the same remainder when the packet is
received, then it is valid.
There are potential issues with using a checksum; if, for example, a zero gets changed
to a one somewhere, and somewhere else a one gets changed to a zero, the sequence will
still pass as valid. A CRC is a bit more advanced, dividing the packet data by a cyclic
polynomial at each end, and using the remainder once again. Recall that the MAVLink
protocol mentioned above uses two of these for each message: one for the message itself
and another for the data fields that define the message to ensure that the receiver is using
the correct translation library. CRCs can detect more types of errors than a checksum can,
but no error checking method is completely perfect. Some data link modems take advan-
tage of extra datalink capacity by adding extra information called error correcting code
(ECC), or forward error correction (FEC). Depending on the error correction implemen-
tation, a significant percentage of errors may be fixed at the receiver without having to
request the data be retransmitted. There are also provisions for avoiding collisions –the
transmission of data by different systems at the same time (Blake 2002).
14.3.6 Encryption
Encryption is very important to the security of digital connections, and without it,
unauthorized third parties could eavesdrop on the link communication, or even worse
detect the type of communication occurring and transmit their own commands to the UAS,
possibly taking it over or terminating it. Citing these security concerns, many RF datalinks
are beginning to implement encryption. It is important to note that encryption, especially
public key encryption, involves computational power to implement, and thus introduces
delays in message transmission (Blake 2002).
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Two types of encryption are popular, public key, and private key (or symmetric key).
Private key is much simpler, combining a long number with the message information using a
built-in algorithm before being transmitted. The long number is the secret key (usually input
by the user as a password during setup) that both ends of the link know. At the receiving
end, the same algorithm decodes the message with the secret key (Blake 2002). It is important
that the secret key be secured during initial setup, however; usually, for UAS modems, the
setup process involves physically plugging into the datalink modem that carries some level
of security. If it were wirelessly initialized, however, this could be problematic.
Keeping the secret key safe is not much of an issue with public key encryption. The
message receiver sends out a public key that the transmitter uses to encode the data. The
public key alone cannot be used to decrypt the data, only encrypt it; a private key (which
may be kept safe) is still used for message decryption (Blake 2002).
14.4 UAS Flight Control

Regardless of the underlying control technology used for an unmanned aircraft, the pri-
mary method for an operator to create navigation commands for the aircraft is to use a
graphical map with waypoints to mark the course of the aircraft. Each waypoint has an alti-
tude associated with it. The aircraft flies from waypoint to waypoint, or may perform other
maneuvers such as circle about a waypoint. Figure 14.4 shows an example of a ground-
control station interface in use; the aircraft has just started flying to the first waypoint
FIGURE 14.4
Ground Control System Interface with Waypoints.
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FIGURE 14.5
Main Autopilot Interfaces.
here. The autopilot methods behind waypoint navigation vary between different types of
autopilot. Once the operator commands reach the autopilot, they must be processed by a
microcontroller to change various internal set points (such as a new waypoint). They must
process the new commands along with large amounts of sensor and location data, all while
navigating and intercepting an intended flight track and sending back status information.
Many autopilots use Kalman filters (or extended Kalman filters) to process the naviga-
tion information, fusing all the various sensor information together and rejecting outlying
information.
14.4.1 Autopilot Systems

Autopilot systems for sUAS generally consist of several core components integrated into
the device itself, as well as some external sensors and devices. Based on the instructions
and information it has, the autopilot output commands flow directly to the aircraft flight
controls. Figure 14.5 shows the main elements that the autopilot communicates with.
At the heart of the autopilot is a processor or microcontroller. This reads inputs such as
sensor values and command inputs, and performs computations such as determining the
amount of deflection required for a heading correction. Once computed, it commands the
flight controls to deflect an appropriate amount. The controller usually operates two or
more control loops nested within each other. The inner loop(s) operate at a much faster
rate, compensating for wind and keeping the aircraft in the air. The outer loop focuses
on the navigation of the aircraft and may be updated much slower. It may be surprising
to learn that regardless of which loop the controller is focusing on, it cannot do more
than one basic task at a time. Everything that it performs is done in sequence, with a
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FIGURE 14.6
Autopilot Components.
clock pulse signaling to go on to the next item on the list. This clock is merely a very fast
timed pulse, signaling at rates from many millions of times per second, to over a billion
times per second for higher end systems. The purpose of the clock is to keep everything
synchronized. This clock signal is derived from the regular vibrations of a quartz crystal
in the presence of a voltage applied to it. To handle high-priority tasks (and tasks that
require attention at specific intervals), the processor uses interrupts. This is a mechanism
that “interrupts” the current list of things to process to perform others, before resuming
once again. An interrupt may be triggered by an internal timer, performing important
tasks at certain intervals, or by an external signal. For example, an interrupt may be used
to trigger the reading of the current location of the aircraft from a GPS receiver when new
data are available.
Depending on the design of the autopilot system, the various sensors that interface
with the main processor may be mounted on board the autopilot itself or exist as separate
systems that plug in. Figure 14.6 shows the layout of the major components found on the
circuit board of an open-source autopilot system.
Besides transmitting telemetry through the data link, some autopilots may have a
flight-data recorder built-in. This consists of an onboard memory –in some cases even
an SD card that may be removed for easy download. A copy of the flight data is saved
in this memory, as well as transmitted through the datalink. If there is a lost-link situ-
ation or the aircraft is lost, the flight data may be downloaded later to aid in analysis or
troubleshooting. In some cases, this memory is useful for diagnostic functions and precise
measurements because the user may select the type of data to be collected, as well as the
rate at which it is collected. More information may be saved in this memory than the data
link is able to transmit back. For example, much faster accelerometer data may be saved
for vibration analysis purposes. Depending on various factors, the recording of additional
335
data may affect autopilot flight performance due to the extra processing required to save
the data.
14.4.2 Sensors and Components

The autopilot receives magnetic compass information using sensors called magnetometers.
Because of magnetic field sensitivity, magnetometers are primarily mounted externally to
the autopilot and aircraft electronics, though they are occasionally found on board the
autopilot circuit board. In most cases, the magnetometer includes a sensor for each air-
craft axis. Not only can magnetometers be used to detect the compass heading of the air-
craft, but, because they sense in all three axes, they can sometimes assist with the general
attitude of the aircraft. Magnetometers must be calibrated to the earth’s magnetic field
in the region in which flights are to be flown, since there is significant magnetic variance
from one region to another. Some can also compensate for certain local magnetic fields
generated on board the aircraft. The easiest to apply is called “hard iron” compensation.
This compensates for nearby sources of fixed magnetic fields, such as a magnet or any
other consistent magnetic field. An offset is applied to correct for these fields. “Soft iron”
magnetic fields are harder to compensate for. In many cases, soft iron compensation is
included, but because of the high level of processing required, it is not always an avail-
able feature. Any ferrous metals contribute to soft iron distortion. These (not otherwise
magnetized) metals are influenced by the magnetic field of the earth itself, and the distor-
tion read by the magnetometer will change as the aircraft changes orientation relative to
the earth’s magnetic field (Cork 2014). It is important to note that compensation for both
hard and soft iron errors assumes that the sources of distortion are fixed in relation to the
magnetometer; these compensation techniques will not work if an interfering object is in
motion relative to the magnetometer.
Barometric altimeter and airspeed information are received by pressure transducers. The
sensors that measure static pressure may be discrete devices mounted to the autopilot
without any air plumbing, or for more precision, include a port to attach a tube to air-
craft static ports. Barometric pressure sensors are sensitive enough to measure very small
changes in pressure. In fact, some sensors can detect a change of pressure over only six
inches of height change. It is important to calibrate the pressure altimeter prior to flight.
Systems from different manufacturers vary on how the calibration is done. Some systems
have the same interface as a manned aircraft, with a manual altimeter setting input. While
the manual process requires knowledge of what to input, the benefit is that the altimeter
setting can usually be updated while flying, as with manned altimeters. Other systems
may automatically calibrate when power is applied, though manual recalibration may be
required if time passes before flying. Systems like this generally must be on the ground in
order to be calibrated, and usually indicate altitude in reference to ground level. If launched
on a hill in this configuration, then it is possible to read negative altitude, depending on the
altitude display mode selected.
A differential pressure transducer is commonly used for airspeed measurement. This
measures the difference in pressure between the static ports and the ram air from the pitot
tube to indicate airspeed. Temperature may also be measured for true airspeed indica-
tion. The pressure produced by a pitot tube flying through the air is extremely small –the
measurement range for airspeed sensors is usually only a fraction of one pound per square
inch (PSI). In most cases, these sensors may be “zeroed” during pre-flight checks. Note
when testing airspeed sensors do not make contact with a pitot tube to blow into it or use
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FIGURE 14.7
Pitot/Static Tube With Sensor.
compressed air. Simply pressing and holding one’s finger firmly to a pitot tube is sufficient
for a quick air leak check. The trapped air is compressed enough to be detected by your
finger. The airspeed indication should increase and hold constant for a number of seconds
while holding the tip of the tube. Figure 14.7 shows the end of a combined pitot/static tube
with the differential pressure sensor.
Autopilots rely on the GPS for primary navigation; GPS is essential to the navigation
of almost all unmanned aircraft systems. Most systems have one or more GPS receivers,
which update the aircraft position multiple times per second. Figure 14.8 shows various
GPS receivers. A front and backside view of one is shown at the top of the figure. Note
that some have the ceramic GPS antenna integrated into the receiver itself, while others
are designed to have a remote antenna attached via a cable. The receiver must have a
lock on at least four satellites to obtain a three-dimensional position. The signals from
the satellites are extremely weak. In fact, the signals are weaker than the ambient noise
(noise floor); they have a negative SNR. A GPS receiver uses algorithms that look for
patterns in the noise consistent with what it expects from the GPS signals, and then
isolates the signals from the noise. The GPS antenna should always have a clear view
of the sky. If the receiver is in motion, the velocity and direction of movement can be
determined based on previous GPS readings. This is why the GPS aircraft heading is
incorrect or not available when the aircraft is sitting on the ground. The GPS receiver
itself does this processing.
Because GPS signal distortions are caused by various effects such passing through
different layers of the earth’s atmosphere, correction signals are generated by stations at
a known location to augment the original information and increase positional accuracy;
the distortions may then be subtracted out. You may hear this augmentation called DGPS,
SBAS, WAAS, and others. Sometimes, the stations themselves transmit the correction
signal on a local level, and other times, satellites retransmit them, as in the case of WAAS
(Cork 2014). There are subscription-based services that provide proprietary corrections
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FIGURE 14.8
Various GPS Receivers.
to improve the positional accuracy of GPS as well. Systems like this may improve GPS
accuracy by many times. Some unmanned aircraft employ Real Time Kinematic (RTK)
GPS for precision maneuvers such as automated landings. This uses a station at a known
location similar to augmentation systems, establishing a lock on a specific portion of the
carrier wave of the GPS signal. Because the carrier is a much higher frequency, greater
precision positioning is possible with the faster timing. These systems again require
data to be transmitted from the base to the receiver aboard the aircraft. Without regular
transmissions from the base, the remote receiver will quickly lose its lock on the carrier
and revert to using standard GPS. With RTK corrections, the positional accuracy can be
about one inch.
To determine the basic movement and attitude of the aircraft, the autopilot makes
use of accelerometers and gyros. These are usually found on board the autopilot itself.
Accelerometers detect acceleration along an axis, where gyros detect angular velocity
about an axis (Woodman 2007). These sensors require calibration or initialization. It is
important to note that because accelerometers by definition measure acceleration, they
will indicate the acceleration due to gravity. Accelerometers and gyros found on most
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autopilots are not used alone for primary long-term navigation. The reason for this is that
the small accelerometers and gyros suitable for these systems do not have enough pre-
cision to be useful over time; errors are additive without some correction. These sensors
are relatively low-cost micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) devices fabricated using
the same methods and materials as the integrated circuit industry (Cork 2014). Many
times, an MEMS device looks exactly the same on the outside as any other solid-state chip
mounted on a circuit board, and is just as small, even with all the elements needed for
three accelerometers and three gyroscopes (sometimes even three magnetometers as well)
in the same four millimeter square package. It is important to remember that MEMS are
mechanical devices, and subject to damage and failure. Though damage is extremely rare,
care should be taken to avoid sharp drops and falls. They should be checked regularly for
proper operation.
Some autopilots offload certain processes to a second processor. In some cases, this
secondary controller can handle the reading of the external pilot inputs, and encoding
of the outputs to the control-surface servos, among other tasks. If the main processor
fails, the secondary processor can route the inputs from the external pilot directly to the
servos, acting as a multiplexer. A multiplexer is basically a switch that allows a choice
of selection between multiple sets of input; one set is routed to the output. In this way,
the external pilot may fly the aircraft manually and safely land. For autopilot systems
without this functionality built-in, an external multiplexer may be added so that the
external pilot can switch control from the autopilot to their controller in the rare event
that an autopilot system failure occurs. In conjunction with the RC receiver, it can be
configured so that control is automatically routed to the autopilot if external pilot signals
are not received.
The external pilot controllers for sUAS are generally the same as those used for hobbyist
radio-controlled aircraft. The flight control servos on board the aircraft (and throttle servo
or electronic speed controller [ESC] on an electric aircraft) expect a pulse of a certain
duration. A pulse of 1.0 ms corresponds to full deflection in one direction, 1.5 ms center
deflection, and 2.0 ms full deflection in the other direction (with any pulse/deflection in
between). The rate that these pulses are sent to the servos varies between 50 and 400 Hz
depending on the system and type of servos. The technology used for transmitting the
pulses between the external pilot transmitter and the receiver on the aircraft also varies;
pulse code modulation (PCM) and proportional pulse modulation (PPM) are common
methods, and modern transmitters also use spread spectrum technology. Autopilots com-
monly have a provision for an external pilot to control the aircraft through the command
and control data link itself. This usually consists of a controller or joystick plugged into
the GCS or operator station. There is usually more delay with this method, due to the add-
itional processing associated with encoding and decoding the data packets, and autopilot
translation of the data into servo pulses.
14.4.3 Tuning
Autopilots generally require tuning to properly control and stabilize a specific airframe
type. The flight control systems commonly consist of a proportional, integral, and differ-
ential (PID) closed feedback controller for each set of flight surfaces. Each of these three
components have numeric settings, called gains. The gains are established during ini-
tial test flights, and usually do not require further tuning once they are set. The propor-
tional gain applies a correction that is proportional to the magnitude of the error in the
system. As the amount of error decreases due to the correction, so does the correction
339
itself. Performance may become an issue with smaller errors; the decreasing corrections
take longer to complete. Part “a” of Figure 14.9 shows a simulation of proportional gain
response. The horizontal line is the set point that is the goal, and the curved line is the
location in time relative to the set point (the controller response starting at the lower left
corner). If not concerned with the performance, proportional control alone may be accept-
able, though small corrections also present another problem besides speed. Because of
factors like friction and others, proportional feedback may not be enough to make full
corrections. There may be a dead band near the desired set point called steady-state error.
Oscillations will result if proportional gain is excessive (Kilian 2006).
The integral component is added to decrease or eliminate steady-state error. This adds
correction based on accumulating previous error. This can, however, introduce instability
in the system. The system can now easily overcorrect and create oscillations because no
braking is applied until after overshooting. Part ‘b” of Figure 14.9 shows the dangerous,
unstable response of having too much integral gain. If this response were to happen while
tuning in flight, the aircraft would most likely shake apart.
To reduce overshoot, the derivative portion is added for some extra braking effect
just before reaching the intended target. It also gives extra force at the beginning of the
movement, trying to predict the future error based on the rate of change of the current
error. Part “c” of Figure 14.9 shows derivative gain added, but the integral portion is still
too high. There is still too much overshoot. Too much derivative gain can slow down per-
formance due to the damping effect.
FIGURE 14.9
(a) Slow Response plus Steady-State Error (b) Dangerous Unstable Oscillations (c) Excessive Overshoot
(d) Properly Tuned.
340
There are various techniques for tuning PID controllers; however, tuning in general can
be a challenge because changing one term also affects the other two. The desired response
is fast and precise, without too much overshoot, instability or oscillation. Part “d” of
Figure 14.9 illustrates a desired response. Some autopilot systems have built-in methods
to automatically tune the system with an ongoing process of gain tweaking. Because it
corrects for a changing dynamic, this is called adaptive control (Kilian 2006). Adaptive
methods vary from simple algorithms to highly complex forms of artificial intelligence.
In some cases, the automatic tuning (or even marginal manual tuning settings) may cause
system instability when a dynamic such as wind velocity changes. Because of this, it is
important not to save manual gain settings close to a point where the system becomes
unstable.
14.5 Large UAS

Larger UAS typically contain many more subsystems and redundancies than do smaller
UAS. They typically contain components that are standard on manned aircraft, but not
usually found on sUAS. For example, large unmanned aircraft usually have multiple
satellite transceiver systems. For high data-rate, wide-band communication, a movable
directional antenna is used aboard the aircraft to maintain a lock on a satellite in space.
This is characterized by a large hump on the front of many larger aircraft; the hump is
usually a radome that is used to protect and provide unobstructed room for this large
dish to move about and keep a satellite lock regardless of the movement of the aircraft.
Directional tracking antennas are sometimes used at both the ground station and on
board large unmanned aircraft to further increase the usable LOS range for systems
acting as a radio relay as long as there are no physical obstructions between the ground
station, relay aircraft, and target communication aircraft. Due to size, it is uncommon
to use tracking antennas on small unmanned aircraft for this purpose. Other additional
equipment on large UAS include emergency locater transmitters (ELTs) and UHF/VHF
(Ultra-High Frequency/Very High Frequency) audio communication relays so that
operators can talk to manned aircraft as if they were on board. Military systems also
carry identification friend or foe (IFF) systems, as well as signals intelligence packages.
They may contain different types of navigation systems, such as both an autopilot
system and an inertial navigation system (INS). Usually, one or more of these systems
is equipped with an identical or similar redundant unit in case one system fails. A high-
performance gimbaled sensor package with an electro-optic camera, infrared camera,
and laser rangefinder/designator is standard. Other types of sensors such as LiDAR
and synthetic aperture radar may be found.
14.5.1 IMU/INS Stabilization Systems

Large UAS sometimes have dedicated inertial management units, or INS, that are designed
to operate without the need for external sources of real-time information. These systems
estimate their current position from a known heading and starting point. From this starting
point, inertial systems rely on detecting the acceleration (and therefore speed) of the air-
craft in each axis, and the rotational rate about each axis (and therefore heading) to perform
dead reckoning. For some inertial systems, these three accelerometers and three gyros are
341
all that is required; however, many times a magnetometer is added to detect the magnetic
compass heading and help reduce the rotational error of the gyro system. In some cases,
GPS is also added to correct errors that accumulate (Cork 2014). The fusion of data from
these sensors is processed with a computing device to determine relevant navigation infor-
mation such as current position, velocity, and heading. Stereo-optical sensor data (optical
odometry) may be incorporated with the INS data as well by using an extended Kalman
filter. This provides accuracy close to that of GPS (Kelly et al.)
Dedicated inertial navigation devices contain more precise sensors for measurement than
GPS-navigated sUAS autopilots generally do. For example, the drift rating on a fiber-optic
gyro (FOG) in an INS system may be a fraction of a degree per hour or less. It is typical for
the MEMS accelerometers and gyros on board sUAS autopilot systems to have position
errors of many meters or to drift 30 degrees per hour or more if uncorrected. Generally,
the more precise accelerometers and gyros within dedicated inertial navigation systems
are much larger, consume more power, and are costlier than their sUAS counterparts. As
a result, dedicated IMU/INS systems are rarely found on sUAS; they are typically found
aboard manned aircraft and large unmanned aircraft.
14.5.2 Additional Navigation Options

Before GPS was available, and INS systems were larger and more expensive, other
methods for unmanned aircraft navigation were common. One method incorporated
stations with tracking antennas maintaining a lock on the aircraft. The bearing of the air-
craft could be determined by locking on to the telemetry signal coming from the aircraft.
Special timing information was also encoded into the signal to determine the distance.
Another method involved identifying geographical features by comparing previously
acquired terrain imagery with images taken in flight. Because a literal comparison was
made between the two, this was called direct reckoning (Austin 2010). While not specific
to large UAS, a lot of research effort has been put into a similar, more modern method
that does not require preacquired imagery, called simultaneous localization and mapping
(SLAM). This method determines relative position using cameras (or similar sensors) to
form an internal map of the visual surroundings. This technology is fairly challenging
to implement due to the large amount of real-time processing required. While already
useful in indoor environments, recent research shows its utility for outdoor settings as
well (Wang et al. 2013).
14.5.3 Launch and Recovery

While systems are fairly straightforward for small unmanned aircraft, launch and
recovery becomes quite complex for larger systems. Besides having the automatic takeoff
and landing systems integrated into the autopilot system itself, large unmanned aircraft
sometimes have separate dedicated systems to handle this. These usually interface with
the autopilot system, and are called automatic launch and recovery ALR systems. Some
employ RTK GPS for precision landing. These systems may land the aircraft autono-
mously in the event of a communications system failure. An equipped aircraft sometimes
includes a special transponder that a tracking system near the landing area locks onto.
This is especially useful for approaches in high-dynamic landing situations such as ship-
board operations and during hostile weather. Other ALS systems are primarily optic-
ally based, employing dual camera systems for landing terrain and precise target object
tracking.
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14.6 Open Source

Open-source software and hardware have become very popular in recent years in the realm
of small unmanned aircraft. Companies from small startups to large corporations are using
open source, mainly because of its easier maintenance implementation and the extremely
fast advancements that can be made with multiple contributors. Open-source communi-
cation standards, such as the MAVLink protocol covered above, have made it easier to
develop interoperable ground station software and autopilot systems. An operator with a
compatible autopilot can test and choose the best ground station software for their appli-
cation because the two communicate using the same standard. Since the protocols them-
selves are open source, users may wish to further customize one for their specific use. By
using custom message IDs for the protocol and creating their own message formats, they
may add functionality to monitor their custom aircraft subsystems.
To define what “open source” is, there are two important types of code in the software
world that we need to talk about first. One type is called source code. Humans can read and
understand this type of code, and this is what software developers use to write programs
using the programming language of their choice. Developers can usually add their own
comments or notes about the function of a certain section of code they have written; these
comments can help the developer remember and help others understand what that section
does. This source code is kept on hand and tweaked and improved for future versions.
Once satisfied with a version, the developer feeds their code into a compiler. This throws
away all the comments and translates all the human-readable code into object code.
Generally, the object code or machine code is made up of the raw zeros and ones that
a machine (microcontroller, computer processor, etc.) can understand. Everything from
firmware to operating systems to the apps that people download to their smartphones is
made up of bits of object code. If one were to open an object code file as a text document,
it would appear as gibberish. If change had to be made to it to add a feature, it would be
nearly impossible without the object code.
When the source code is made available, either in the public domain or via a license,
then the program is open source. If a user wants to learn about how the software works,
the source code may be viewed to find out. Users may have the ability to change or
modify the way the software works to make improvements or introduce new features
depending on the license. There are lots of different types of licenses, but two types are
common. The first is used primarily by academia and private individuals; one example
is the General Public License (GPL). These types of licenses specify that all of the source
code must be shared with the end users, including all the freedoms that go with it. Other
types, such as the BSD (Berkeley Software Distribution) license, are more permissive,
allowing proprietary modifications without the requirement to share the source code.
This type of license is common for corporate users to use, as it allows them to protect
their developments.
Contrary to popular belief, open source is not always available without cost; the soft-
ware license spells out any terms that go along with it. As long as one complies with the
license, it is usually fine to charge for open-source software –whether it is your own work
or not. The person who buys it may have the freedom to give it away at no charge, how-
ever. Sometimes, the original developer sells it, and people purchase it to support the
developer’s work. In many cases, a community of developers works together to create
more complex programs that would be difficult to create alone, sometimes giving priority
343
to those who pay for specific features. Most open-source autopilot ground control software
and the firmware code that runs on the aircraft, fall into this category.
Open-source hardware is similar to open-source software. Developers of open-source
autopilots and related hardware make the design files and schematics for this hardware
available to the public. Users may use the schematics for troubleshooting purposes or to
build their own if they wish. Companies can also use the design to begin building and
selling the hardware, even if the original developer is already doing so. Sometimes, one
group creates an improvement that is eventually incorporated into hardware assemblies
from others. While this means that there may be various versions of hardware available
from different manufacturers, the diversity of design expertise means that there is great
potential for improvements.
14.7 Conclusion
As we have seen, the command and control element is a very pivotal part of the operation
of an unmanned aircraft system. Without command and control, all there would be is a set
and forget system, without monitoring capability. It works as the human communicates
through a standardized protocol using the RF spectrum as a medium, as was explained
previously. There was also an introduction to the workings of the autopilot and other
components needed to accomplish the intended commands and transmit back status infor-
mation. Because of open-source software and hardware, there are opportunities not only
to explore and learn more about how command and control works, but to potentially con-
tribute new ideas and improve existing technologies.
14.1 In the context of UAS, “command and control” refers to what? Define what is
meant by the terms “uplink” and “downlink.”
14.2 What is a “lost link” and what can trigger that event? What are some actions
an sUAS might be programmed to execute in the event of a lost link? Discuss
operator interface systems. Discuss those qualities, attributes, and characteristics
considered to be desirable and undesirable in a ground station display/human
interface. What might be considered the most important aspect of operating an
unmanned aircraft?
14.3 What is the purpose of a transceiver? What are sufficient throughput speeds for
command and control?
14.3.1 What is a simple definition for RF spectrum? Give the extremes, in terms of
frequency and wavelength, of the RF portion of the electromagnetic spec-
trum. How are frequency and wavelength related? What is spread-spectrum
transmission and how does pseudorandom frequency generation enhance
this technique? Give examples of applications of spread-spectrum tech-
nology. What are ISM frequencies? What is the civil regulatory authority in
344
charge of managing the RF spectrum in the United States? Why might RF

spectrum management be advisable?
14.3.2 Describe “space wave” RF frequencies? What is meant by LOS transmis-
sion? How can the curvature of the earth interfere with LOS communica-
tion? What is the purpose of an attenuator? Why is it good practice not to
insert or remove an attenuator while the equipment is operating? What is
the purpose behind temporarily reducing the transmit power prior flight?
What could be done to overcome this limitation? Which is a weaker RSSI,
-75 dBm or -95 dBm? What are the most commonly used unlicensed fre-
quencies for sUAS? Which of these are LOS frequencies? What is the rela-
tionship between wavelength and antenna size? What could happen if two
different UAS systems operate on the same ID?
14.3.3 What RF frequency range reflects off of the ionosphere for reception?
Describe BLOS communication. Is the use of satellite communications tech-
nically BLOS? Explain your answer. What frequencies of RF signals follow
the curvature of the earth’s terrain? What is the disadvantage of using BLOS
satellite communications with sUAS and advantages for larger UASs? If
ground and sky waves are BLOS frequencies, why don’t sUAS typically use
them? Why is it common to land BLOS-capable UASs using pilots at the
aircraft’s home base rather than controllers located in ground stations half
a world away?
14.3.4 What does a “buffer” do? How are digital communication packets similar
to physical ones? When might packets not require acknowledgement? Why
do most UAS have dedicated protocols for C2 instead of relying on popular
networking and internet protocols that already exist?
14.3.4.1 What is MAVLink? Are all payload messages the same length?
What does a “magic byte” do, and what happens if a packet is
received without one? Compare and contrast what happens
if a receiver does not understand an “incompatibility flag” vs.
a “compatibility flag.” Why is a sequence number important?
What message ID does the “heartbeat” message use, and at what
rate are they transmitted? Why must each receiver process all the
received headers in some way, even if a particular message is not
for that receiver? What information is contained in the “heart-
beat” message? Why do newer versions of MAVLink use three
bytes for the message ID instead of one? Does the payload portion
have a specific message structure even though the length can vary
between types? What types of messages require acknowledge-
ment; are messages from the UAV to the GCS acknowledged?
14.3.5 Give the various ways that modem information packets are tested to ensure
they arrive uncorrupted. How could a checksum operation fail to detect
erroneous data bits? Besides simply detecting errors, how might a modem
implement the ability to recover erroneous packets that were received
without requesting retransmission?
14.3.6 What are two popular encryption types, and describe the differences
between them.
14.4 What are waypoints and what role do they play in UAS navigation? What is the
purpose and function of a Kalman filter?
345
14.4.1 Describe sUAS autopilot architecture and operation. What is an “interrupt”

and in what situations might using one be desired? Describe some of the
uses of flight-data recording functionality.
14.4.1.1 Why might a multiplexer be important? What is a magnetometer
and what information does it provide to the autopilot? Describe
“hard iron” and “soft iron” interference and tell why these may be
of concern. What is a differential pressure transducer commonly
used to measure? Describe the use and autopilot processing of
GPS signals. What is the minimum number of GPS satellites that
must be received for a 3D solution? Describe what is meant by
DGPS, SBAS, WAAS, and RTK GPS. Describe MEMS sensors
and tell what information these provide the autopilot. Since they
are basically computer chips, can MEMS sensors be physically
damaged without damage to the exterior? What servo timing cor-
responds to center/neutral deflection?
14.4.1.2 What is autopilot tuning? Describe operation of a PID controller.
What are gains, and describe proportional gain. What happens if
proportional gain is excessive? What is adaptive control?
14.4.2 Why are tracking antennas generally not used on sUAS?
14.4.2.1 How do IMU/INS Stabilization Systems determine the current
position? How many accelerometers and gyros are required?
Why are magnetometer and/or GPS inputs sometimes used in
inertial navigation systems? Compare and contrast the IMU/INS
system integrated into sUAS autopilots to the discrete INS found
on larger UASs.
14.4.2.2 Describe alternative navigation systems. What is SLAM?
14.4.2.3 What are automatic takeoff and landing and ALR systems?
Describe these.
14.5 What does “open source” refer to? Does it mean free of charge? Describe differences
between source code, object code, and machine code? What does a compiler do?
Describe open-
References
Austin, Reg. 2010. Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVs design, development and deployment. West
Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Blake, Roy. 2002. Electronic Communication Systems, 2E. Albany: Delmar.
Cork, Lennon. 2014. Aircraft Dynamic Navigation for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. PhD dissertation,
Queensland University of Technology. http://eprints.qut.edu.au/71396/1/Lennon_Cork_
Thesis.pdf
Gundlach, Jay. 2012. Designing Unmanned Aircraft Systems: A Comprehensive Approach. Reston: American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc.
Kelly, J., Saripalli, S., and G.S. Sukhatme. Combined Visual and Inertial Navigation for an Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle. www.robotics.usc.edu/publications/media/uploads/pubs/ 540.pdf.
Kilian, C. 2006. Modern Control Technology, 3E. Clifton Park: Delmar Learning.
MAVLink. n.d. “MAVLink Developer Guide.” Accessed July 30, 2019. https://mavlink.io/en/
guide/
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United States Department of Transportation. 2013. Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Service
Demand 2015–2035: Literature Review & Projections of Future Usage. Technical Report, Ver.
0.1. www.ntl.bts.gov/lib/48000/48200/48226/UAS_Service_Demand.pdf.
Wang, Chao-Lei, T.M. Wang, J.H. Liang, Y.C. Zhang, and Y. Zhou. 2013. Bearing-only visual SLAM
for small unmanned vehicles in GPS-denied environments. International Journal of Automation
and Computing 10(5) 387–396.
Woodman, Oliver. 2007. An Introduction to Inertial Navigation. Technical Report, No. 696. University
of Cambridge Computer Laboratory. www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-696.pdf
newgenprepdf
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15
Unmanned Aircraft Subsystem Integration
William H. Semke
15.1 The Design Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349

15.2 Mission Statement and Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
15.3 Concept Development and Trade Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
15.4 Preliminary Design Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
15.5 Critical Design Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
15.6 Fabrication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
15.7 System Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
15.8 Flight Testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
15.9 Concluding Remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
The integration of subsystems into unmanned aircraft is an essential piece of the utiliza-
tion of unmanned aircraft system (UAS), as this what allows the aircraft to carry out their
intended mission. In most cases, the aircraft is a platform from which to collect data, make
observations, or to make deliveries to a desired location or target. Unmanned aircraft pro-
vide an ideal platform in situations where rapid deployment may be useful, environments
that may be hazardous, or extended durations missions. Examples of missions include
search and rescue operations, long-duration surveillance, military operations, precision
agriculture, sense and avoid technologies, and many other applications that utilize the
unique abilities of UAS.
The discussion of subsystems, and in particular UAS payloads, integration comes from
experience and processes developed and utilized at the Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Engineering (UASE) Laboratory at the University of North Dakota (Lendway et al., 2007;
Semke et al., 2007). The intent is to provide the reader an overview of the process along with
practical information regarding UAS-specific integration challenges and requirements.
The steps described have been successfully implemented in numerous projects and have
served as an excellent guide for successfully integrating subsystems onto UAS.
Payload subsystems come in a variety of sizes and configurations, from extremely com-
plex with heavy computational capabilities to relatively simple designs. Each system
tries to meet the objectives of the operator. Figure 15.1 shows the MQ-1B Predator Multi-
Spectral Targeting System, or MTS-A sensor ball. This payload integrates an infrared
sensor, optical cameras, a laser designator, and a laser illuminator into a single package
that provides multiple assets for military operations. On the other end of the sophistica-
tion scale is an example of a UAS payload system, a flying insect capture system using
deployable nets attached to its wings, as shown in Figure 15.2. This system was developed
347
348
FIGURE 15.1
Multi-Spectral Targeting System, or MTS-A sensor ball, integrated onto a MQ-1B Predator UAS for military
surveillance operations. (Photo credit: http://duncandavidson.com.)
FIGURE 15.2
Flying insect capture payload installed on the wings of an airborne UAS.
to support a study on the distribution and spread of disease by mosquitos. These two
examples, of which there are many thousands of others, illustrate the wide range of poten-
tial applications of UAS payload systems (Wehner et al., 2013; Lemler and Semke, 2012;
Dvorak et al., 2012).
The myriad of applications of UAS with their respective payloads provides great oppor-
tunity for researchers in many fields to implement and exploit the capabilities of UAS. The
349
Unmanned Aircraft Subsystem Integration 349
capabilities are unique to the airframes and many technical issues arise in the integration
of the payloads into the aircraft. This chapter provides guidelines for payload developers
for safe and effective payload design and subsystem integration.
15.1 The Design Process

The integration of subsystems onto UAS ideally uses a systems engineering approach to
design. Payloads typically involve many components that must be integrated together to
carry out the desired mission. This approach necessitates multiple steps on the way to a
complete UAS subsystem. These seven main payload design steps include:
• Mission Statement and Objectives

• Concept Development and Trade Studies
• Preliminary Design Review
• Critical Design Review
• Fabrication
• System Testing
• Flight Testing
Each of these steps and UAS-specific highlights will be discussed. The design process is
a complex and iterative process and multiple texts address valuable design methodologies
that can be implemented (Larson and Wertz 1999; Ullman 2010; Dieter 2000). This chapter
provides an overview of processes that have been proven to be successful in UAS payload
development within the UASE Laboratory with emphasis on several issues that are unique
to UAS subsystem development.
15.2 Mission Statement and Objectives

The mission statement for the product serves as the guide for the subsequent efforts. It,
along with the mission objectives, drives the design and integration process. Many times
the mission statement and the client requesting the design provide objectives, but the
design team can also develop them in-house. In both cases, the mission statement must
clearly state the intent of the project and the mission objectives should provide measur-
able outcomes. Using these as the guiding fundamentals, the design team can focus on
developing a subsystem that meets the needs of the end user. Without a clear and mean-
ingful mission statement and objectives, many teams find themselves drifting away from
the intended mission of the project, resulting in ineffective use of time and resources. The
mission statement should be short and concise and capture the essence of the project. The
objectives should provide clear and measureable outcomes that serve as an indicator of
how well the design and/or integration process is meeting the needs of the project. Both
are effective as a guide for decision-making throughout the project, as they are crucial to
provide the scope and direction the design team will need to make decisions in the subse-
quent design process steps.
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15.3 Concept Development and Trade Studies

Concept development and trade studies are the steps in the design process and often are
the most critical to mission success. This is where the mission statement and objectives of
the system are realized in actual design concepts and prior work is researched. It is cru-
cial that the designers and engineers understand fully the technical data or capabilities
that are desired. At this phase, several conceptual designs are developed and assessed
with a preliminary engineering analysis. This step often entails “back of the envelope”
calculations to make sure that there are no significant challenges that are unreasonable
or “show-stoppers.” In parallel with these activities, trade studies are often initiated to
explore potential system components. While searching for solutions, innovative technolo-
gies are often discovered that can be incorporated into the system. During the concept
development and trade studies, the following areas are addressed:
• Several conceptual designs are developed

• Design sketches are produced
• Parts and vendors are identified
• New parts/ideas are incorporated into the proposed “Final Design”
• Engineering analysis is initiated
UAS-specific actions at this phase include determining the type of aircraft necessary. The
aircraft type is based primarily on range, maneuverability, lifting capacity, and costs. With
hundreds to thousands of airframes to choose from, many times there are several viable
options and the best fit typically comes down to a cost versus benefit comparison. General
guidelines are that fixed-wing aircraft give longer duration flights that travel greater
distances, but lack the maneuverability of rotorcraft. Rotorcraft allow for fixed location
hovering and station keeping, but lack the flight efficiency of fixed-wing aircraft. In the
past, most UAS were fixed-wing aircraft, but more recent advances in electronics miniatur-
ization and battery developments have made multirotor aircraft the most common UAS
in use today.
In all aviation, the Size, Weight, and Power (SWAP) requirements of the subsystem must
be reduced as much as possible. The SWAP requirements dictate the airframe and its sub-
sequent performance during missions. On the large end of the spectrum is the Northrop
Grumman Global Hawk with the ability to carry over 3000 pounds of payload, as shown
in Figure 15.3. On the other end is a micro-UAS that is only capable of carrying specialized
payloads only a few grams in mass, as shown in Figure 15.4.
Once several concepts are generated and the performance versus cost benefits explored,
this is the best time to have additional discussions with the end users. Often, the desires
of the end users may not coincide with the technical abilities and/or budget of the pro-
ject. Now is the time to discuss what modifications may be appropriate. An example is the
desire to have a long-range radar system, but the only systems currently available that
are capable of the range requested require immense size and weight using today’s tech-
nology. So, either a compromise must be made between requirements and capabilities or
the project is at stand still and cannot move forward until technological advances improve
the capabilities or an innovative solution is found. It is important that all parties involved
must remain amenable to change and adaptable to continued technological advancements
while striving to meet the requirements. Unfortunately, sometimes, the technical barriers
are insurmountable with airborne capable technologies, and alternate systems are deemed
351
FIGURE 15.3
The Northrup Grumman Global Hawk UAS. This large UAS aircraft is capable of heavy lifting and long, high-
altitude missions. (Photo Credit: Wiki “Global Hawk 1” by U.S. Air Force photo by Bobbi Zapka - www.af.mil/shared/

media/photodb/
photos/070301-F- 9126Z- 229.jpg.
Licensed
under Public domain via Wikimedia Commons -
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Global_Hawk_1.jpg#mediaviewer/File:Global_Hawk_1.jpg.)

more appropriate, so the process of an airborne system ends at this point. However, with
slight modifications and/or additional technical development, the capabilities of airborne
systems are immense and can most times meet the true needs of the end user.
15.4 Preliminary Design Review

The Preliminary Design Review (PDR) is the next milestone in the design phase. This is a
formal review of the design where all parties have another chance to review the progress
and offer recommendations. This includes engineers and other technical experts, along
with the scientists and other end users who are looking for data or a useful tool. The design
concepts should have had the appropriate engineering analysis completed with sound
engineering practices. Design drawings of the system should also be prepared to illustrate
the system layout. This phase must serve as the last chance to make significant design
changes to the system. A list of the deliverables of the PDR is provided:
• Engineering analysis to verify design concepts

• Preliminary design drawings
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FIGURE 15.4
A Black Hornet nanohelicopter illustrating a UAS that is capable of carrying a few grams in an extremely
small, lightweight system. (Photo credit: “Black Hornet Nano Helicopter UAV” by Richard Watt - Photo www.

defenceimagery.mod.uk/fotoweb/fwbin/download.dll/45153802.jpgMetadata source: www.defenceimagery.

mod.uk/fotoweb/fwbin/fotoweb_isapi.dll/ArchiveAgent/5042/Search?FileInfo=1&MetaData=1&Sea

rch=45155077.jpg. Via Wikimedia Commons - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Black_Hornet_Nano_

Helicopter_UAV.jpg#mediaviewer/File:Black_Hornet_Nano_Helicopter_UAV.jpg.)
• Preliminary parts and vendor list

• Cost budget estimate
• Design simplifications and cost savings
• Timeline for completion
Throughout this stage of the design, aircraft Interface Control Documents (ICDs) are
extremely useful. Some commercial grade UAS have excellent documentation that is
readily available, while other aircraft only provide very limited resources. The documenta-
tion level may significantly influence the decision on what airframe to implement and/or
type of integration chosen. Useful information may include wiring schematics along with
capacities, mounting locations and types, physical dimensions, weight and balance infor-
mation, and many other useful design parameters. In addition, the quality and respon-
siveness of the customer and technical support the vendor provides is a critical factor in
determining the most appropriate hardware and software to implement.
UAS-specific actions at this phase include power and weight budgets, data storage, and
airframe flight worthiness. Typically, both power and weight resources are scarce in UAS,
so accurate accounting of each is critical. Therefore, care should be taken to find the most
efficient and lightweight components available.
Power estimates of each component with the respective efficiencies are tabulated. This
budget will help define whether the system can be self-powered or needs to use aircraft
resources. In general, a self-powered system with its own battery simplifies integration
and aids in the test and evaluation phase. However, using aircraft resources may reduce
the weight of the payload and therefore add mission life. The drawback to using aircraft
353
resources is that it requires detailed airframe interface information. This information is

included in detailed ICDs of the aircraft. Many aircraft developers and operators are reluc-
tant to provide this information and would prefer stand-alone systems for safety and pro-
prietary concerns. Using aircraft resources reduces the availability of the resources to flight
operations and any unforeseen problems could result in potential aircraft malfunction.
When stand-alone systems are used, most malfunctions result in only loss of data, not loss
of aircraft.
A weight budget is also created accurately accounting for all components. The aircraft
payload lifting capacity must be sufficient to carry the load, but proper balance must be
maintained for safe flight operations. The total weight of the aircraft must be no greater
than the maximum weight allowed for the make and model of the aircraft, and the center
of gravity must be within the allowable operational range of the aircraft (U.S. Department
of Transportation 2007). The balance of the aircraft is often the limiting factor, depending
on aircraft type. Some significant weight components that are often overlooked are wiring
and mounting hardware, which can account for a relatively large fraction of the total.
Sensor packaging and payload layouts are also introduced during this phase. The methods
used and mounting locations chosen have significant impact on maintaining safe weight
and balance for the aircraft.
Another UAS-specific issue is the potentially huge amount of data that may be collected
during flights. Decisions regarding data storage onboard versus telemetry to the ground
are made at this phase. There is a limited data link between the aircraft and the ground that
restricts the amount of data that can be transferred. Many types of compression schemes
can be helpful to reduce the incredible volume that may be created. While these methods
help, they can only reduce the amount so much and also the techniques often reduce
the quality of the data obtained, especially in high-definition imagery. Without a data
link, the other alternative is to store the data onboard the aircraft and retrieve it when
it lands. This is often the easiest method to implement and reduces the amount of hard-
ware required to be flown. The drawback is that the data are not real time, and therefore
not appropriate for applications where instantaneous information is required. In many
cases, onboard data storage does meet the needs of the end user and becomes the preferred
method of data acquisition due to the simplicity and weight savings that go along with it.
One other consideration during this phase of the design process is the assessment of
the payload on the airworthiness of the aircraft. Besides meeting the weight and balance
requirements, any additions and/or modifications to the aircraft have to be assessed on the
impact to flight operations. Examples include wing pods or any other device that changes
airflow during flight or may cause a flutter condition to develop, as shown in Figures 15.5
and 15.6. Most often, it is recommended that no structural or aerodynamic alterations be
made to the host aircraft. However, if it is deemed necessary to do so, the impact must
be analyzed for safe flight. This analysis is often complex and requires thorough mod-
eling and testing (Semke et al., 2014). Therefore, if it is not absolutely necessary, it is not
recommended.
15.5 Critical Design Review

The Critical Design Review (CDR) is the next phase of the design process. This is the
final paper design and analysis that is done prior to ordering and acquisition of parts and
354
FIGURE 15.5
An externally mounted missile system attached to the wing of a UAS. (Photo credit: TSGT Scott Reed, U.S. Air
Force - www.dodmedia.osd.mil/;
VIRIN: DF-SD-06-14785.)

components for the fabrication phase. The design is finalized and all the stakeholders have
a final review prior to fabrication. A complete description of the design specifications and
capabilities is presented for final comment. A time line for completion is also provided
that will guide the schedule along with allowing end users proper time to prepare for the
product. Many times this is the phase that must be completed before the distribution of
funds to support the fabrication of the system. A detailed list of items included in the CDR
include:
• Completed engineering analysis to verify design concepts

• Final design drawings
• Final parts and vendor list
• Final cost budget
• Final timeline for completion
• Preliminary testing to support design assumptions
The UAS-specific actions at this phase include the finalized power requirements and
weight and balance calculations. It is also the time where the parts and vendors intended
for use are found that provide the quality and traceability needed for UAS applications.
While the FAA does not currently dictate the exact standards of parts and materials, many
355
FIGURE 15.6
An external wing pod designed to carry radar equipment providing a clear field of view without interference
from the airframe and engine.
of the best practices developed in manned aviation are good guideline for application on
UAS. Some of the more relevant requirements are locking connectors, aircraft or equiva-
lently rated hardware, traceable materials, fastener back-off protection, and proper circuit
protection.
Electrical connections are essential for operation and some sort of locking mechanism
is needed to ensure that the connectors stay connected during flight. There is substantial
vibration during flight operations and any connection that becomes loose can lead to cata-
strophic results. Therefore, several types of LEMO-style push–pull connectors, as well as
Powerpole-style connectors have been implemented in our designs over the years. These
styles of connectors have proven themselves reliable and effective in flight operations.
Other types of connectors will also work well, but the user should verify that they are not
susceptible to loosening or disconnection during flight.
The hardware and materials used in the payload fabrication should be of the highest
quality for defect-free construction and problem-free operations. All hardware should be
aircraft (AN) grade or equivalent. AN-grade hardware meets high levels of performance
and can be traced to place and date of origin. These fasteners are free from defects that
can occur in lesser grade fasteners and have extremely high reliability. This makes them
an ideal choice in fasteners, especially in flight critical components. They also often come
with a back-off prevention method. The use of traceable materials is also recommended to
356
ensure high-quality, defect-free stock from which to manufacture components. This results
in dependable parts that meet the design specifications and perform well over the entire
lifetime of the payload.
The electronic components used should all be evaluated for temperature ratings. It has
been observed that elevated temperatures are a common occurrence in small UAS pay-
load systems without any active or passive cooling designed into the system. The small
aircraft typically have an enclosed area that houses the payload and over time elevated
temperatures often are encountered. These result in electronic failures, unusual operations,
or shutdowns. Conversely, cold temperatures encountered in winter operations and poten-
tially high elevations also produce failures and shutdowns. In both cases, care needs to be
taken in the selection of components and proper testing procedures conducted prior to
operations. Proper testing protocols will be outlined in the Systems Testing section of this
chapter.
Electromagnetic interference (EMI) is another significant factor to be concerned with in
UAS payload development. Improper wiring or unanticipated EMI can lead to interfer-
ence with command and control telecommunication links and also interfere with global
positioning system (GPS) signals. Proper shielding of sensitive electronics in payload
systems can help reduce the risk of interference with aircraft systems, or the possibility
of aircraft EMI interfering with the payload operations. In practice, the use of conductive
enclosures, EMI gaskets, and copper tape can help control EMI effectively. Coax and other
types of shielded cables with grounding also reduce unwanted antennae broadcasting or
receiving of stray electromagnetic radiation.
Proper circuit protection is required to reduce the risk of electrical overheating and poten-
tial fire. By installing a fused connection to the battery, short circuits and other electrical
malfunctions are isolated from the rest of the UAS. In addition, external access allowing
the payload power to be turned on and off is very beneficial. Traditional aircraft “remove
before flight” switches work well for this feature. The ability to turn on the payload with
an external switch is important, since the preflight testing and other aircraft preparations
may take significant time during which the power available to the payload is decreasing.
Therefore, the ability to easily turn on the payload near the time of takeoff increases the
operation time of the payload system.
15.6 Fabrication
Throughout the fabrication of the payload system, high-quality fabrication and workman-
ship must be maintained. The fabrication should follow the design specifications stated
and parts manufactured to the part drawings created. All wiring should be secured appro-
priately; this can be done with tie-downs or tacking down the wires so that they are not
free to move. This prevents oscillations that may lead to loose or intermittent connections
resulting in failure of the payload to operate effectively. Back-off prevention should also
be used on all threaded fasteners to prevent loosening and possible separation. This can
be accomplished by several methods including, wire tie downs, locking washers, deform-
able threads, nylon thread inserts, or liquid thread locker. The environment in which
UAS operate is often very dynamic and these vibrations can cause components to loosen,
leading to payload failures and loss of data collection opportunities.
357
The final product is only as good as the fabrication process; therefore, attention to detail
and utilizing proper manufacturing procedures and equipment is required. After pro-
ducing a quality design using solid engineering principles, the fabrication should result
in a high-quality system that will operate as expected. Poor fabrication methods may
result in ill-performing systems with many integration issues. The workmanship is also
a reflection on the overall perception of the system, and a poor-quality appearance may
give the impression that it is not a high-quality system. Therefore, it is recommended that
experienced technicians perform or oversee the fabrication of the payload system.
15.7 System Testing

System testing is the next step in the preparation of UAS payloads for flight. Laboratory
testing greatly improves the performance of the payload systems and helps ensure their safe
and effective operation in the field. Potential problems are much more easily discovered,
and corrected, in a laboratory setting. In this environment, access to the payload and ana-
lysis equipment is more readily available and will not impact the limited flight opportun-
ities that exist in the field.
EMI testing is one of the most critical aspects to be aware of and understand. First and
foremost, the command and control link to the aircraft cannot be compromised. Many
commercial autopilot systems use 900 MHz or 2.4 GHz transmission frequencies for the
command and control link. The aircraft also must continually communicate with the GPS
to know its position; therefore, the payload cannot interfere with GPS frequencies. In the
original GPS design, two frequencies are utilized; the L1 channel at 1575.42 MHz and the L2
channel at 1227.60 MHz. Preliminary lab testing using a spectrum analyzer and receiving
antennae and “sniffer” probes evaluates the radiated emissions from the payload when
powered and operational, as shown in Figure 15.7. If relatively large amplitude signals
are emitting from the payload near any of the command and control or GPS frequencies,
additional shielding and/or suppression is in order. If there are not significant levels of
EM radiation near the frequencies of interest, the EMI testing can move on to the next
level. The next level involves installing the payload into the aircraft and supplying power
in full operational mode to assess any potential interference from the payload to the air-
frame, or from the airframe to the payload. Either interference situation can be a significant
problem that requires attention. The payload must not interfere with aircraft operations,
but if the aircraft interferes with the payload, the mission operations may be sacrificed and
not return any useful data.
Vibration testing should also be done on the completed payload system. Typically, vibra-
tion testing is done to evaluate the survivability of payload in a harsh vibration envir-
onment. The testing is intended to discover potential faults resulting from the dynamic
environment experienced in flight. The faults often discovered include connecter dislodge-
ment where electrical connections are not completed or unreliable, fastener loosening where
structural components do not stay rigidly attached, and failure or destruction of vibration
intolerant components in the system. Any one of these failure modes, or any other, can lead
to a catastrophic failure of the payload during operation. The vibration levels encountered
in different types of aircraft vary considerably, due to a variety of reasons, including fixed
wing or rotor-type aircraft, size and weight of the aircraft, electric motor or gas-powered
358
FIGURE 15.7
An electromagnetic field test being conducted to measure the radiated emissions from the payload to check for
potential interference with command and control links.
engines, conventional landing gear or belly-land configurations, and many other factors
(Semke et al., 2009; Semke and Dunlevy 2018). Therefore, information regarding the vibra-
tion environment in the ICD for the aircraft should always be used when available.
A baseline vibration excitation test that may be used is the Proto-Flight Minimum
Acceptance Vibration Test Levels (MAVTL) specified by the NASA Payload Flight
Equipment Requirements and Guidelines for Safety- Critical Structures (NASA 2005).
The MAVTL vibration test levels are shown in Figure 15.8. This testing level exercises the
equipment to a level of excitation that exposes dynamic faults in the system. The random
profile is preferred to a swept sine approach because it more evenly excites the structure
over a relatively broad frequency range and does not overly excite a single, potentially res-
onant, frequency of the structure. This broad excitation frequency encompasses most of the
excitation frequencies experienced in many types of UAS.
Frequency Level/Slope
20–80 Hz +3.0 dB/Oct
80–350 Hz 0.04 g2/Hz
350–2000 Hz –3.0 dB/Oct
The payload system is placed in the flight configuration on the mechanical shaker and
excited for 1 minute at the random excitation levels indicted in the MAVTL test procedure.
A vibration testing system is shown in Figure 15.9, illustrating the shaker, amplifier, and
controller necessary for environmental vibration testing.
359
0.1
g2/Hz
0.01
0.001
10 100 1000 10,000
Freq (Hz)
FIGURE 15.8
Minimum Acceptance Vibration Test Levels (MAVTL) specified by the NASA payload flight equipment
requirements and guidelines for safety-critical structures
FIGURE 15.9
Vibration testing equipment, including the electrodynamic shaker, amplifier, and computer controller.
360
After the system has undergone vibration excitation, it is powered up and thoroughly
tested for performance. Any issues that arise should be documented and investigated until
a reasonable fix is produced. In some cases, it may be appropriate to operate the system
during the test to evaluate the systems performance while the excitation is active. Other
payloads only require that the system be able to withstand the vibration and continue
operations when activated. The appropriate test depends on the needs of the payload and
the environment in which it is operating.
Thermal testing in the environmental conditions likely to be encountered during
flight operations is also recommended. Many electronic components have safe storage
temperatures that are greater than the reliable operational temperatures. For example, both
hot and warm environments may cause interrupted operation of payload systems when
in flight. In past experiences, problems most often have been due to elevated temperatures
inside the enclosed payload bay of an aircraft on warm sunny days. With the electronics
operating, internal temperatures over 40° C may be encountered, resulting in limited
mission performance. Cold temperatures can be encountered in wintertime operations or
in high-altitude missions experienced by some payloads. To assess the ability of the pay-
load to operate in the anticipated environment, a thermal chamber (Figure 15.10) is an
ideal way to subject the system to adverse conditions in a controlled manner. The payload
is placed into the chamber and commanded to the appropriate temperature while it is
running. Continued exercise of the payload should be done throughout the test to assess
the performance. Once the desired temperature is achieved and the equipment come to
a thermal equilibrium without issue, the test can be terminated. In addition to thermal
testing, many of the chambers also allow for altitude simulation. Most often, small UAS
payloads are operated at relatively low altitudes, but some may be utilized in high-altitude
missions. In these cases, the appropriate altitude testing should also be performed.
The final test procedure that is unique to UAS testing is the mobile truck test. This test
exercises the equipment by providing a moving platform with a true GPS data stream
along with a vibration environment in self-powered mode. This procedure is an excel-
lent tool to utilize before the expense of flight operations. Typically, flight testing is very
limited due to associated costs, logistics, and availability, so truck testing helps to identify
FIGURE 15.10
A thermal altitude testing chamber used to simulate operating conditions that may be encountered by UAS
payloads.
361
FIGURE 15.11
A payload system being installed for a mobile truck test. This testing platform closely simulates the flight
environment in a relatively easy and inexpensive manner.
any problems in the full operational mode prior to flight. Shown in Figure 15.11 is a test
rack built to hold payloads in the back of a pickup truck. The payload system should be
powered in the same fashion as in flight, with battery packs or simulated power from the
vehicle. In this case, the rack system allowed the payload to operate in a rotated position
so that image collection of scenes could be captured. This test often exposes payload issues
that would not have been discovered by other laboratory bench testing. The combination
of a moving vehicle to exercise the GPS equipment and operating the entire system in
a mobile, dynamic environment is as close to actual flight testing that can be achieved
relatively easily without restrictions that come with flight. It is highly encouraged that
the mobile truck test be performed on every payload system prior to flight testing. Flight
opportunities are not readily available, and therefore, the payload should be thoroughly
tested to take advantage of the flights that arise.
15.8 Flight Testing

The last and final phase of payload development is the flight testing, which is arguably the
most enjoyable as well. While enjoyable, there are several facets of preparation that have
to be completed for this phase. These will help ensure a successful and productive flight
testing experience. The three deliverables that should be addressed in this phase are:
362
FIGURE 15.12
The field integration of a UAS payload into the airframe for flight testing.
• Detailed test plan

• Flight plan
• Equipment list
A detailed test plan is required to properly assess the performance of the payload. With
the limited flight opportunities and limited flight time, an effective and efficient test plan
is critical. Things to include in the test plan are the settings to be made on the equipment
and proper battery and data storage capabilities. In addition, the required altitude and
flight lines should be calculated for proper data collection. Any specialized support
equipment should also be prepared for flight testing. If any interfaces with the aircraft
are required, it is important to describe the interface completely and confirm that it is
compatible with the airframe. With the detailed test plan and the proper prior testing, all
integration in the field should be easily accomplished. Field integration of a payload into
a UAS for flight testing is shown in Figure 15.12.
Proper flight planning with the aircraft operator will mean that the desired data will
be obtained. The operator will help establish safe flight operations within the regulations
that most closely match the desired values. At times the payload developer’s wants may
not be achievable under regulatory restrictions or aircraft performance. For example,
a maximum altitude restriction may be applicable in the flight area being used or the
desired airspeed is less than the stall speed of the aircraft. Therefore, it is important to
work with the aircraft operator to establish acceptable parameters that most closely meet
363
FIGURE 15.13
The start of safe flight of a UAS after utilizing “best practices” in the payload development outlined in this
chapter.
the wants of the payload developer with the rules and capabilities of the aircraft. This
planning allows for more effective flight testing as the appropriate flight planning can be
done prior to operations.
The final preparation for flight testing is to develop a complete equipment list of all
the necessary gear and supplies required for the flight operations. This should include all
flight hardware, spare parts, test and evaluation tools, and any other supplies necessary
for operations and repairs. It may also include personal items that can help make the flight
operations more enjoyable. This includes items such as sunglasses, proper clothing, sun-
screen, insect repellant, a camp chair, snacks, and water. A detailed list will help guarantee
you have all the necessary supplies in the field and flight operations will meet the mission
objectives in a safe manner, as shown in Figure 15.13.
15.9 Concluding Remarks

This chapter is meant to provide guidelines that have been proven to be successful for UAS
payload development. As regulations and airspace operations continue to develop in this
rapidly evolving industry, increasingly specialized regulations and requirements may be
imposed. These new rules may become standards in legal operation and development.
Therefore, it will be prudent to use the information provided herein in compliance with all
state local, state, and federal regulations that may apply.
1) Name the seven steps in the design process for successful UAS payload
development.
364
2) Use the web to find two different fixed wing UAS with the same wingspan, one
using an internal combustion engine and one using an electric motor, and compare
the flight times and payload capacity.
3) Use the web to find two multirotor aircraft with a different number of rotors and
comment on the capabilities of each system.
4) Name six types of missions that data collection using a UAS is preferred over a
manned platform.
5) Name a mission where a real-time data stream is required.
6) What type of hardware (screws, nuts, and bolts) should be used in UAS
payloads?
7) Name two types of fastener back-off prevention methods that may be used in UAS
payloads.
8) Name two frequency bands many UAS use for command and control.
9) What is the highest vibration excitation frequency used in NASA MAVTL
testing?
10) Name the three deliverable for UAS payload flight testing.
References
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Unmanned Systems North America 2012, Las Vegas, NV, August 5–9, 2012.
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CA, 1999.
Lemler, K. and Semke, W., “Delivery and Communication Payloads for UAS Search and Rescue
Operations,” AUVSI’s Unmanned Systems North America 2012, Las Vegas, NV, August
5–9, 2012.
Lendway, M., Berseth, B., Trandem, S., Schultz, R., and Semke, W., “Integration and Flight of a
University-Designed UAV Payload in an Industry-Designed Airframe,” Proceeding of the
Association Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), 2007.
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Conference and Exposition on Structural Dynamics, 2018.
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Conference and Exposition on Structural Dynamics, 2014.
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Payload Design by Undergraduate Researchers for Educational and Research Development,”
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Semke, W., Stuckel, K., Anderson, K., Spitsberg, R., Kubat, B., Mkrtchyan, A., and Schultz, R.,
“Dynamic Flight Characteristic Data Capture for Small Unmanned Aircraft,” Proceedings of
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Structural Dynamics, 2009.
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newgenprepdf
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16
Detect and Avoid
Dallas Brooks, Stephen P. Cook, and Brandon Suarez
The MITRE Corporation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368

16.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
16.1.1 UAS as a Transformational Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
16.1.2 Standards as a Driver for UAS Integration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
16.2 Regulatory Basis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
16.3 Functions of DAA System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
16.3.1 Remain Well Clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
16.3.2 Collision Avoidance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
16.3.3 Detect and Avoid: Subfunctions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
16.4 Process and Functions of a DAA System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
16.4.1 “Observe” Tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
16.4.1.1 Detect Target. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
16.4.1.2 Track Target. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
16.4.1.3 Combine Target Tracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
16.4.2 “Orient” Tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
16.4.2.1 Identify Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
16.4.2.2 Evaluate Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
16.4.2.3 Prioritize Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
16.4.3 “Decide” Tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
16.4.3.1 Declare/Alert. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
16.4.3.2 Determine Maneuver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
16.4.4 “Act” Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
16.4.4.1 Command Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
16.4.4.2 Execute Maneuver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
16.4.4.3 Return to Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
16.5 The Role of the Pilot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
16.5.1 Pilot in-the-Loop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
16.5.2 Pilot on-the-Loop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
16.5.3 Pilot Off-the-loop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
16.6 The Role of Air Traffic Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
16.7 DAA System Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380
16.7.1 Surveillance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380
16.7.2 Avoidance Algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380
16.7.3 Displays. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
16.8 Detect and Avoid in the Terminal Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
16.9 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
367
368
The MITRE Corporation1

When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted
under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each
person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.
–14 CFR § 91.113, Right of Way Rules (except water operations) Subsection (b).
16.1 Introduction
One of the foundational tenets of flight is the responsibility of the pilot to see and safely
avoid other aircraft. From the dawn of manned flight, pilots have been expected to main-
tain vigilance to remain “well clear” from other aircraft.
By the middle of the 1900s, advances in aircraft detection technology (such as air traffic
control (ATC) radar and aircraft transponders) had allowed the ATC system to provide
more efficient and safe separation between aircraft through ever improving technologies;
most of which provide more information and more accurate information than a human
pilot. Despite these technological advances, however, the ultimate responsibility for
avoiding collisions has remained with the pilot. He or she must maintain vigilance, pri-
marily by using his or her eyes to scan outside the aircraft for traffic. This concept of the
pilot’s ultimate responsibility for safety has been a core principle of the nation’s aviation
regulatory system for decades. Also enshrined in aviation regulations are the limitations of
natural human vision that will lead to a loss of the pilot’s ability to “see and avoid.” From
the early days of aviation, it has been understood that being limited to using human vision
alone to navigate and keep separate from other aircraft leads to significantly diminished
operational flexibility. This led to the creation of instrument flight rules (IFRs) and a greater
reliance on Air Traffic Services (ATS).
Beyond regulation, this responsibility has been installed and upheld in our judicial
system as well. Dozens of court cases have been adjudicated to assess whether pilots have
performed the essential function of “see and avoid” in order to remain “well clear” of, and
avoid collisions with other aircraft. But for all the emphasis placed upon the linked respon-
sibilities of “see and avoid” and “well clear,” neither concept has been defined precisely.
Instead, both concepts are left as subjective judgments and are not tied to a specific metric
or level of safety. They are left open for interpretation by pilots, regulators, and the courts.
This tenet has remained stable for over a century, despite continual advancements in avi-
ation safety technologies that provide order-of-magnitude increases in aircraft detection,
conflict identification, and collision avoidance (CA) capabilities.
16.1.1 UAS as a Transformational Technology

The advent of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) has changed how technology’s role in
supporting or replacing functions once solely performed by human pilots is approached.
Taking a pilot out of the cockpit during extremely dangerous operations (e.g., combat,
wildfire support, and radiological leak/spill assessment) has clear advantages. A properly
equipped and configured unmanned aircraft can perform the same functions for longer
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Detect and Avoid 369
durations, without putting an onboard pilot at risk. However, the impacts of the funda-
mental differences in UASs are not confined to local flight operations; they are felt across
the entire aviation system. Removing the pilot from the cockpit means that he or she is no
longer able to provide eyes-on, subjective judgment to “see and avoid” other aircraft, to
remain “well clear”, and to avoid collisions. This factor, more than any other, has delayed
the integration of UASs with manned aircraft in all classes of airspace.
This same factor has a significant benefit as a forcing function, for the tremendous cap-
abilities of UASs to save lives and otherwise benefit society cannot be fully exploited until
UASs are safely, efficiently, and securely integrated into our airspace system. Today, tech-
nologies exist that can detect other aircraft and determine potential flight path conflicts
long before a human pilot could do so using only the naked eye. These technologies have
the potential to markedly increase the safety of aircraft operations due to the greater range,
accuracy, and reliability of the information they can provide to pilots. An added benefit is
their immunity to the stress and fatigue that can negatively affect the pilot’s performance.
This is particularly true in dense, complex airspace environments such as around busy
airports.
16.1.2 Standards as a Driver for UAS Integration

The systems that provide a means of compliance with “see and avoid” and “well clear”
are called detect and avoid (DAA) systems. The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) defines DAA as “the capability to see, sense or detect conflicting traffic or other
hazards and take the appropriate action” [ref. ICAO Annex 2 —Rules of the Air]. The ICAO
defines DAA in the context of five classes of hazards: Airborne Traffic, Terrain, Obstacles,
Hazardous Weather, and Other Inflight Hazards. For the purposes of this chapter, the focus
will remain on Airborne Traffic.
For DAA systems to be employed safely and effectively, they must be associated with
a performance standard—a measure of how well, and how reliably, they must work in
order to augment or replace that set of human eyes. Standards have been developed that
address how these systems will work in concert with other appropriately equipped air-
craft. Ensuring that two such systems cannot, through uncoordinated action, place their
respective aircraft in an even greater collision risk situation is paramount. The remainder
of this chapter will be largely based on the Minimum Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS) contained in RTCA DO-365 and RTCA DO-366, published in 2018 and invoked in
FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO) c-211 and c-212, respectively.
Note: “DAA” and “sense and avoid” (SAA) are used interchangeably throughout this
text because they fundamentally refer to the same concepts and capabilities.
The excerpt from 14 CFR 91.113 at the top of this chapter provides the basis for the key
regulatory accommodations needed for safe, reliable, and affordable technologies that may
be substituted for the subjective judgment of a pilot. The most important of these is a defin-
ition of “well clear” that can be quantitatively used to measure compliance. This definition
forms the basis of a performance standard for DAA systems, which is known as “DAA Well
Clear” (DWC) to distinguish it from the term used to describe onboard pilot judgment. The
quantified specification of the time, distance, or both that must separate the aircraft acts as
a common “measuring stick” against which to judge the simulated and real-time perform-
ance of DAA systems. Just as importantly, this same definition supports the introduction
of similar systems into manned aircraft, allowing pilots to benefit from increased situation
awareness and reliable alerts for aircraft that may present a collision risk. Appendix C of
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RTCA DO-365 contains an excellent explanation of the derivation and use of the concept of
“DWC.” [Ref. Consigilio and Chamerblin NASA Paper on DAA].
The second change is semantic. A modification of the term “see and avoid” must be
made to change or remove the word “see,” which restricts the process to the human eye-
ball. Using the more accurate term “detect and avoid” for UASs, or adding a proviso to 14
CFR 91.113 that allows for electronic methods in lieu of seeing would satisfy the regulatory
need and open the door to an electronic means of compliance for UASs.
16.2 Regulatory Basis

At the beginning of this chapter, 14 CFR §91.113, subsection (b) stated: “When weather
conditions permit, […] vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft
so as to see and avoid other aircraft.” It is important to note that this section levies the
requirement to “see and avoid” upon all pilots, regardless of the flight rules under which
the aircraft is being operated. Subsection (b) further states “When a rule of this section
gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not
pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.” [emphasis added]
In addition, 14 CFR 91.111 states that “(a) No person may operate an aircraft so close to
another aircraft as to create a collision hazard.” This regulation is focused upon the willful,
unsafe behavior of a pilot purposely flying too close to other aircraft.
For UAS, the challenge is demonstrating compliance with the rules of the air and
ensuring that the aircraft, even when not under direct onboard pilot control, is capable of
maneuvering sufficiently well to avoid a potential collision hazard. This challenge may
be broken into two main tasks: (1) avoid a collision and (2) remain “well clear.” From a
systems engineering perspective, these tasks can be viewed as functional requirements
that can be decomposed into independent, sequential subfunctions.
16.3 Functions of DAA System

According to the task description for DAA, it consists of two major functions: remain well
clear (RWC), the ability of the system to maintain an acceptably separated from other air-
craft; and collision avoidance (CA), the ability of the system to prevent a collision with
another aircraft.
16.3.1 Remain Well Clear

Remain Well Clear is defined in RTCA DO-365 as
The ability to detect, analyze and maneuver to avoid potential conflicting traffic
by applying adjustments to the current flight path in order to prevent the con-
flict from developing into a collision hazard. […] Remain Well Clear consists of two
components: maintain DWC and regain DWC.
RWC maneuvers occur at longer times and greater distances from other aircraft than CA
maneuvers. They are intended to be normal, nonobtrusive maneuvers that will not conflict
371
with accepted air traffic separation standards. The time and distance minima used to
measure the success of the RWC function is known as “DAA well clear”. It is distinguished
from the “well clear” written in aviation regulations so that it does not suggest that it
would apply to manned aircraft.
If a loss of well clear (LoWC) occurs, then the RWC function may attempt to Regain Well
Clear using different logic and metrics. Since RWC is independent from ATC Separation
Services and Collision Avoidance, RWC may alert the pilot before or after ATC initiates a
maneuver for separation, which may or may not lead to a CA alert. These overlaps between
functions should be minimized but may not be avoidable.
16.3.2 Collision Avoidance

CA, as depicted in Figure 16.1, is a DAA system function where a maneuver is initiated to
prevent another aircraft from penetrating the collision volume. While a pilot or a CA algo-
rithm does not necessarily need to know how the collision volume is defined, a common
definition is needed in order to model, simulate, and evaluate systems. Therefore, the
Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) is defined as another aircraft being within 500 ft in the
horizontal dimension or within 100 ft in the vertical. Action is expected to be initiated
with a relatively short time when the distance between the two aircraft is within this
volume. The CA function is intended to engage when all other separation assurance
actions fail, but being independent of those layers, may overlap in real-world conditions.
CA maneuvers may be disruptive to other ATC services but metrics are used in algo-
rithm evaluation to minimize that disruption. The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
FIGURE 16.1
Relative airspace volumes for the “well clear” and collision avoidance subfunctions. Note: “Collision Avoidance
System” has a specific regulatory meaning under 14 CFR 125.224 and refers to TCAS. In this chapter, collision
avoidance refers broadly to any action that the DAA system takes to avoid a collision, which may occur before
or after a loss of well clear (LoWC).
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TABLE 16.1
Subfunctions of the Detect and Avoid Process
FAA SAA Workshops DoD SAA SARP
Detect Target detection

Track Target track
(Not addressed) Target fusion
(Not addressed) Object identification
Evaluate Threat assessment
Prioritize Threat assessment
Declare Alert
Determine (action) Maneuver selection
Command Maneuver notification
Execute Maneuver execution
(Not addressed) Return to course
Source: Adapted from Federal Aviation Administration, Sense and Avoid (SAA) for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS), October 9, 2009 and January 18, 2013; and Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Sense and Avoid Blueprint, October 26, 2010.
Note: I n both of the approaches listed in Table 16.1, all of the subfunctions apply to both
RWC and CA. In the specific case of the “Return-to-Course” subfunction, an air-
craft that executes a CA maneuver must wait until “well clear” is regained before
returning to course.
System (TCAS), in use since the 1990s, uses vertical maneuvers between appropriately
equipped aircraft to avoid collisions when other means of separation assurance have not
been successful.
16.3.3 Detect and Avoid: Subfunctions

To support the core functions of RWC and CA, it is necessary to identify and sequence
the component subfunctions that support a safe and reliable RWC or CA maneuver. In its
2009 report, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) SAA Workshop identified eight
subfunctions for SAA. In 2011, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) SAA Science and
Research Panel (SARP) provided its own analysis, which added three new subfunctions.
A breakout of these subfunctions is detailed in Table 16.1.
The primary reason for the difference between the two function decompositions was
to align the SARP subfunctions with the requirements for DoD-developed SAA systems
that were already under development. While the nomenclature differs between the two
approaches, the underlying processes are largely aligned.
16.4 Process and Functions of a DAA System

This section details the 11 subfunctions of the DAA process depicted in Figure 16.2.
Entrance and exit criteria are provided that describe when each subfunction begins and
ends along the DAA encounter timeline.
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DAA encounter timeline
Observe Orient Decide Act
Threat
aircraft
Observe Orient Decide Act

tasks tasks tasks tasks
Detect target Identify object Declare/alert Command maneuver

Track target Evaluate threat Determine maneuver Execute maneuver
Fuse target tracks Prioritize threat Return to course
FIGURE 16.2
DAA encounter timeline and task breakdown.
16.4.1 “Observe” Tasks

16.4.1.1 Detect Target
The first step in either remaining “well clear” or avoiding a collision in an encounter with
another airborne object is to detect the target that poses a conflict. For a UAS, the detect
function is accomplished through the use of sensors that detect the presence and location
of other airborne objects. These sensors may be on board the aircraft, off-board, or a com-
bination of both, but in any case, they form a surveillance volume around the UA at any
given time. Section 16.7.1 contains a description of the types of sensors that may be used
to perform the detect function.
Entrance criterion: An airborne object enters the surveillance volume of the sensors used
for DAA of a UAS.
Exit criterion: One or more sensors detect the airborne object.
16.4.1.2 Track Target

Once the object is detected, it is necessary for a DAA system sensor to continue detecting it,
so that more information about the object can be calculated. This is referred to as “building
a track” that provides information such as position, speed, heading, and/or altitude of
374
the airborne object based on multiple detections from that sensor. Different surveillance
sources will build tracks differently and may provide different information to the DAA
system. There are several algorithms that sensor systems use to attempt to distinguish
between targets of interest (such as other aircraft) and extraneous targets (such as birds).
Entrance criterion: Sensor detection of an airborne object.

Exit criterion: Sensor(s) detect the object enough times to build a track with speed,
heading, and/or altitude information.
16.4.1.3 Combine Target Tracks

Once a track has been established, it is vital that this information be fused or combined
with other available sensor information to produce a single track for each target. Failure to
properly combine these data results in multiple tracks for the same target, which can con-
fuse a pilot or CA algorithm. The term “fusion” typically refers to the creation of a single
track that is of higher quality then any one of its inputs. The minimum requirement for
DAA systems is that detections or tracks from multiple sensors be combined into a single
track, which can be accomplished by selecting the best source. Alternately, if a track is built
by one sensor but not correlated (or confirmed) by another, the fusion algorithm must
determine the likelihood that the target is actually there. It is the fused information that the
pilot or system will use to evaluate the DAA risk. Certain surveillance sources, primarily
those dependent on GPS, must be validated by another sensor before they will be used by
the CA function for maneuvering.
This “validation” requirement has been adopted by DAA system standards from prior
TCAS standards but can be expanded when considering all of the sensors available to
a DAA system. For example, RTCA DO-365 contains performance requirements to val-
idate an ADS-B OUT track using an air-to-air radar if the ADS-B OUT-equipped intruder
is not equipped with an altitude reporting transponder. Unvalidated tracks could still be
used for RWC alerts and guidance, but special consideration is required to ensure that the
remote pilot knows that the alert will not progress to CA.
Entrance criterion: One or more tracks established by processing sensor information.

Exit criterion: A single track provided to the pilot or DAA system.
16.4.2 “Orient” Tasks

16.4.2.1 Identify Object
Presentation of a fused track represents confidence that an airborne object is present and
moving in the direction of the track. To validate that the object presents a potential threat,
the characteristics of that object are evaluated to assist in classification. The object’s size,
speed, presence of a transponder, and other factors affect its classification as a threat air-
craft, and therefore, the strategy to ensure separation.
In the future, if UAS are to fully utilize visual flight rule (VFR), there may be a need for
DAA systems that identify aircraft to determine which aircraft has the right of way. At the
present time, this capability has not been demonstrated in a scalable commercial way, and
therefore remains an objective functionality.
Objects that present characteristics not associated with an aircraft (e.g., birds, weather)
will invoke other avoidance procedures that are outside the scope of 91.113.
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Entrance criterion: A fused track for a given airborne object.

Exit criterion: An identification of the aircraft’s characteristics.
16.4.2.2 Evaluate Threat

Once a target is identified as an aircraft, the pilot or DAA algorithm must evaluate the
risk that the aircraft will conflict or collide with the UAS. This risk is usually measured by
determining whether the aircraft will violate predetermined proximity thresholds. These
thresholds may be measured either in distance (e.g., a violation will be closer than a speci-
fied number of feet) or time (e.g., a violation will occur within a certain number of seconds)
or both.
This is the function where a threat would warrant either a (caution level) RWC alert or a
(warning level) CA alert.
Entrance criterion: An identified aircraft.

Exit criterion: Evaluation of the risk of violating “well clear” or collision volumes.
16.4.2.3 Prioritize Threat

In cases where multiple aircraft are being tracked, the UAS pilot or DAA algorithm must
prioritize which aircraft poses the greatest threat and choose the best course of action (man-
euver) to reduce that threat. This may be done, in a simple way, by prioritizing CA alerts
higher than RWC alerts. In the case of multiple simultaneous intruders, more sophisticated
algorithms may be involved.
Entrance criterion: Assessment of the potential risk for one or more threat aircraft.
Exit criterion: Prioritizing which aircraft poses the greatest risk for a “well clear” viola-
tion or a collision.
16.4.3 “Decide” Tasks

16.4.3.1 Declare/Alert
Once a predetermined proximity threshold (either time or distance) is reached, the UAS
algorithm must declare to the UAS pilot or flight control system that action is needed to
remain “well clear” or avoid a collision. Notifying a human pilot normally involves the
presentation of decision aids (such as flashing icons or suggested course tracks and/or
altitudes) on a display. This will involve both an alert and guidance. For pictorial examples
of decision aids on a notional UAS display, see Section 16.7.3.
Entrance criterion: Highest-priority aircraft threat determined.

Exit criterion: Assessment that an avoidance action is needed.
16.4.3.2 Determine Maneuver

Once the pilot or DAA system has been alerted that action is needed, the next step is to
determine what that action should be. Changes to aircraft heading, altitude, and speed are
options available to the pilot or the system to ensure that the aircraft remains “well clear”
or avoids a collision. For some DAA systems, the determination of the appropriate action
376
may be left to the pilot. For others, an algorithm may recommend, or in some cases exe-
cute a specific maneuver or range of maneuvers designed to minimize risk. In some cases,
coordination with ATC may be necessary prior to maneuvering the UAS. See Section 16.6
for further discussion on the role of ATC.
Entrance criterion: Declaration that avoidance action is needed.

Exit criterion: Determination of the specific avoidance action needed.
16.4.4 “Act” Tasks

16.4.4.1 Command Maneuver
Once the appropriate course of action has been determined, that action must be
communicated to the UAS for execution. This may occur when the remote pilot makes
a control input to the UAS, or it may be directly commanded by the UAS flight control
system. It is expected that this maneuver command made by the pilot will utilize the same
C2 pathways as other maneuver commands, but it may have a greater urgency or higher
performance requirement associated with it.
Entrance criterion: Avoidance maneuver selected.

Exit criterion: Command of avoidance action delivered to UAS.
16.4.4.2 Execute Maneuver

Once the maneuver action has been commanded, the UAS control system must execute
it. The timing of that execution is critical. An otherwise correct maneuver, executed too
early or too late, might not effectively resolve the conflict. The decision time of the pilot,
the communication latency (delay) of the UAS control link, and the aircraft’s flight per-
formance dynamics all play a role in determining the acceptable maneuver execution
window.
It is important to note that the maneuvering situation remains dynamic. In some cases,
the other aircraft may also change direction or maneuver in an unanticipated manner,
decreasing or negating the effectiveness of the separation maneuver. When this occurs, it
is possible that the selected maneuver must transition into a more abrupt CA maneuver.
Entrance criterion: Avoidance maneuver command sent.

Exit criterion: Avoidance maneuver executed.
16.4.4.3 Return to Course

Once the UAS has executed the RWC or CA maneuver to resolve the projected conflict, the
UAS must now return to its intended course. That course may be
• As filed in the aircraft’s flight plan

• As previously directed by ATC
• As required to comply with appropriate airspace restrictions
The Return to Course action may be accomplished by the pilot, the DAA system, or some
other flight management function on the UA. The criterion for determining completion of
377
this subfunction is similar to the “clear of conflict” guidance used in the FAA-developed
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). In some cases, the pilot may need to con-
tact ATC to obtain a new approved route or receive permission to return to the existing
clearance.
Entrance criterion: Avoidance maneuver completed.

Exit criterion: UAS is established on its original or amended course.
16.5 The Role of the Pilot

Today’s UASs are actually not “unmanned” at all. For the vast majority of UASs operating
today, human pilots manually control or actively monitor the flight of the aircraft, and
have the full capability to intervene when conditions require it. DAA systems for piloted
systems must therefore account for the role and responsibilities of the UAS pilot when
addressing potential traffic conflicts. The degree of direct control or intervention of the
pilot in the DAA process is determined by the architecture of the DAA system, which may
change through the phases of flight or during contingencies (e.g., Loss of C2 Link). The
three general types of DAA systems are
1. Pilot in-the-loop
2. Pilot on-the-loop
3. Pilot off-the-loop (automatic)
Each of these architectures allocates the DAA subfunctions to the pilot differently, and
while grouping levels of automation in this way is not useful for the development of
requirements, it does help create common understanding across the community of interest.
Table 16.2 provides a summary of how the various subfunctions are allocated under each
category.
16.5.1 Pilot in-the-Loop

The FAA SAA Workshop report states that, “a UA pilot, who (actively) controls the aircraft
flight path, is said to be ‘in-the-loop.’ A pilot in-the-loop has the ability to control the UA
directly, or can immediately affect the trajectory of a UA controlled by an onboard com-
puter.” This may be thought of as the classic “radio control” type control architecture. On
more sophisticated systems, this will look like a typical “autopilot panel” control.
During pilot- in-the-
loop operations, the primary responsibility for the Determine,
Command, Execute, and Return-to-Course subfunctions is allocated to the UAS pilot. This
approach has the advantage of leveraging a pilot’s ability to apply human judgment and
right-of-way rules to the maneuver. However, this system has the significant disadvantage
of being reliant upon an uninterrupted command and control link between the ground
station and the aircraft. When that link significantly degrades or is lost, the aircraft loses
its ability to self-separate or execute a CA maneuver. It is widely anticipated that FAA-
certified UAS will NOT have a traditional “stick and throttle” to control the aircraft; auto-
pilot interface will be the norm.
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TABLE 16.2
Allocation of DAA Subfunctions
Allocation of Detect and Avoid Subfunctions (P = Pilot, U = UAS or DAA)
Subfunction Pilot in-the-loop Pilot on-the-loop Automatic
Detect target Ua Ua U
Track target U U U
Fuse target tracks U U U
Identify object U U U
Evaluate threat U U U
Prioritize threat U/P U U
Declare alert U/P U U
Determine maneuver U/Pa U/Pa U
Command maneuver P U/P U
Execute maneuver P U/P U
Return to course Pa U/Pa U
a ATC may be involved, depending on class of airspace, applicable flight rules, decision time, and other factors.
16.5.2 Pilot on-the-Loop

A UA pilot who provides flight path guidance to an onboard computer that controls the
aircraft flight path is said to be “on-the-loop.” A pilot on-the-loop has the ability to imme-
diately affect the trajectory of a UA if necessary but only through higher level “flight man-
agement” or “acceptance/rejection” level control. In practice, this level of control looks like
a modern transport aircraft flight deck with only the flight management system keyboards,
or what is more often called “keyboard and mouse.”
During pilot-on-the-loop operations, the primary responsibility for the evaluate, priori-
tize, and declare functions is allocated to the electronic system. Depending upon the pilot’s
actions, the Determine, Command, Execute, and Return-to-Course subfunctions may be
handled in two ways:
1. If the pilot intervenes, the DAA system shifts to a secondary role; notifying the pilot
via alerts and recommending action. The DAA system will continue to monitor
the situation through the Track, Evaluate, Prioritize, Declare, and Evaluation
sub-functions.
2. If the pilot does not intervene (e.g., fails to maneuver), the system is capable of exe-
cuting a self-separation or collision avoidance maneuver. This system provides a
useful “last resort” after an attempt to notify the pilot that “action is needed” has
not received a response.
Pilot-on-the-loop DAA systems have the advantage of keeping human judgment in the
equation but taking some of the burden off of the pilot. Another advantage is that they are
capable of executing an avoidance maneuver even when the command and control link to
the UAS is degraded or lost.
16.5.3 Pilot Off-the-loop

Pilot off-the-loop DAA systems have the ability to manage the UAS flight path without any
pilot notification or intervention. The primary responsibility for the Evaluate, Prioritize,
Declare, Determine, Command, Execute, and Return- to-
Course subfunctions are all
379
allocated to the electronic DAA system. The systems perform the entire DAA cycle without
the need for pilot notification or intervention.
As with pilot-on-the-loop operations, the system is capable of executing an avoidance
maneuver even when the command and control link to the UAS is degraded or lost.
A drawback of this control architecture is that it may not be able to respond correctly to
rapidly changing and/or unanticipated scenarios where human judgment is invaluable.
Without the pilot’s ability to intervene, the level of criticality of the DAA system may rise
so much that certification is difficult or unachievable. These systems will also be subject to
greater levels of scrutiny in terms of cyber security and resilience due to the pilot’s lack of
ability to intervene.
16.6 The Role of Air Traffic Control

For aircraft operating under instrument flight rules (IFRs), the ATC system ensures the
appropriate level of separation between other aircraft operating under IFR. However, ATC
is not responsible for separating IFR aircraft from VFRs aircraft, although they may pro-
vide traffic advisories and suggest appropriate maneuvering on a time-available basis.
As discussed in Section 16.2, the pilot of an aircraft is ultimately responsible to “see and
avoid” other aircraft. However, per 14 CFR § 91.123:
When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no pilot in command may deviate from that clearance
unless an amended clearance is obtained, an emergency exists, or the deviation is in response to a
traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory.
The section further states:
Each pilot in command who, in an emergency, or in response to a traffic alert and collision
avoidance system resolution advisory, deviates from an ATC clearance or instruction shall notify
ATC of that deviation as soon as possible.
While no regulatory language yet exists that covers DAA maneuvers, the precedent cited
for TCAS is clear: deviation from an ATC clearance (or instruction) is authorized in order
to prevent a collision based on alerts and guidance from an onboard system. The pilot of
a UAS is similarly responsible to notify ATC as soon as possible if a DAA maneuver is
executed either by the pilot or by the system.
For RWC maneuvers (a collision is not imminent, but a maneuver is necessary in order
to maintain “well clear”), the most relevant language is contained in 14 CFR § 91.181.
This section requires all aircraft under IFR to maintain their assigned course, but provides
an exception (“does not prohibit”) maneuvering the aircraft to pass “well clear” of other
aircraft. There are not similar provisions in ICAO or European regulations, so there is an
ongoing debate among the international community as to whether or not RWC maneuvers
require explicit approval from ATC.
As DAA systems become adopted and certified, clarification in these and potentially other
aviation regulations will be needed to ensure a clear understanding of the expectations and
procedures for compliance. Appendix A of RTCA DO-365 contains a flow diagram for this
interaction between pilots and ATC.
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16.7 DAA System Components

16.7.1 Surveillance
For DAA systems, sensors replace the human eye as the primary method of detecting other
airborne objects. Effectively purposed sensors can detect the presence of an object and its
relative location to the UA, but the goal of sensor development is not to simply replace
the capabilities and performance of the human eye. When sensors are combined with the
appropriate computational systems, the information gathered can be used to calculate
the velocity (speed and direction) of the object (track). Together, this is known as surveil-
lance. The resulting track information provides the basis for the Evaluate Threat, Prioritize
Threat, Declare/Alert, and Determine Maneuver functions.
Understanding the capabilities and limits of various sensors is critical to safe and reliable
DAA. The DAA system must account for potential error(s) in the sensor system(s) in order
to compute an appropriate safety margin for DAA alerts and guidance. In some cases,
using multiple sensors or sensor types can provide additional accuracy and/or reliability.
In DAA systems, sensors are often characterized in terms of energy (active or passive)
and the level of intruder aircraft participation (cooperative or noncooperative).
Active sensors direct energy (such as radio, sound, or light waves) toward the target and
receive a reflection in order to determine its presence and location. Examples of active
sensors are radar and LiDAR. Since the directed energy can be carefully controlled in mag-
nitude and direction, active sensors can attain significant precision in determining the rela-
tive location of another airborne object. However, in order to generate this energy, active
sensors often require more power and may be larger and heavier than passive systems.
Passive sensors detect an attribute of the target, such as sound, heat, or generated or
reflected light. Examples of passive sensors include acoustic, thermal, and electro-optical.
Passive sensors do not need to generate energy to accomplish detection, and thus may be
more compact and require less power than active sensors. However, they tend to be more
dependent on the surrounding environment, which could obscure or drown out the signal
from the target of interest. Passive sensors may also be less accurate than active sensors,
due to variability in the source attributes of the target, such as available light or sound
propagation.
Cooperative surveillance relies on equipment onboard the participating aircraft to broadcast
information. This is normally accomplished through an interactive process of transmission
(interrogation) and response known as transponding. This can also be accomplished when
aircraft continually broadcast their location without the need for interrogation. Examples
of cooperative sensor systems include Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) Mode C and S
transponders, with interrogators onboard aircraft (in the case of TCAS) or on the ground
(in the case of ATC radars); and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B).
Non-cooperative surveillance can track aircraft that are not equipped with transponders
or similar systems. This may be accomplished through the use of active detection systems
(such as radar) or through passive systems (such as an optical camera). Table 16.3 provides
a summary of common sensor attributes.
16.7.2 Avoidance Algorithms

Algorithms to generate alerts and guidance for DAA systems can augment or replace
some of the cognitive processing of a human pilot to determine the best action to avoid a
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TABLE 16.3
Attributes of Selected Sensors
Sensor Modality
Mode C/S Transponder Cooperative

ADS-B Cooperative
Optical Noncooperative, passive
Thermal Noncooperative, passive
Laser/LIDAR Noncooperative, active
Radar Noncooperative, active
Acoustic Noncooperative, active or passive
Source: Adapted from Lacher, Andrew, Maroney, David and Zeitlin, Andrew (The
MITRE Corporation). Unmanned Aircraft Collision Avoidance—Technology
Assessment and Evaluation Methods, 2007.
Note: Sensor(s) may be located on board the aircraft, or as part of an external system
(such as air traffic control radar).
potential LoWC or collision. However, just as the goal of DAA surveillance is not to replace
the human eye, the goal of an alerting and guidance algorithm is not to replace the human
brain. The system calculates the relative position and velocity, along with the uncertainties,
for the potential threat aircraft, and mathematically determines a maneuver or maneuver
space to resolve the conflict safely. This information may be provided to a human pilot as
guidance, executed automatically by the DAA system, or both.
Ensuring the safety and reliability of alerting and guidance algorithms requires exten-
sive testing with potentially millions of simulated encounter scenarios before they can be
recommended as safe for use. Avoidance algorithms should, whenever possible, recom-
mend a maneuver that is compliant with the appropriate aviation regulations regarding
course changes and aircraft right-of-way rules. According to existing regulations, when a
collision is considered imminent, a pilot may maneuver as necessary, including with the
assistance of onboard systems.
16.7.3 Displays
In general, DAA displays fall into three categories: informative, suggestive, or directive.
Informative displays (see Figure 16.3 for a notional example) are the simplest type of DAA
display. Informative displays provide current information to the pilot about the position
(horizontal and vertical) and velocity of surrounding air traffic. They do not provide infor-
mation about potential avoidance maneuvers. Informative displays are used to aid an “in-
the-loop” human pilot and are not considered sufficient for CA systems.
Suggestive displays provide the same position information as informative displays, but
also provide maneuver options or recommendations to assist the pilot in maintaining “well
clear” or avoiding a collision. Suggestive displays may use a variety of graphical decision
aids to assist with the pilot’s comprehension and decision-making processes. Examples
of decision aids include the depiction of “safe zones” or “keep away zones” for the UAS
to maintain an acceptable distance away from an intruder. A notional suggestive display
is shown in Figure 16.4, with the green-shaded regions showing an appropriate range of
horizontal maneuvers for the pilot to RWC from the depicted aircraft. Suggestive displays
are considered sufficient for an RWC function because the pilot can still consider other
objectives (e.g., minimize course deviation) to determine an appropriate RWC maneuver.
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FIGURE 16.3
Typical TCAS display on flight deck of a modern aircraft (left) and Notional example of an informative display
for UAS (right).
FIGURE 16.4
Notional example of a suggestive display for UAS.
Directive displays provide clear and specific maneuver guidance to the pilot or UA con-
trol system. In the notional example in Figure 16.5, a specific horizontal flight path is
drawn on the display, with accompanying text instructions that indicate the recommended
maneuver(s) to the pilot (i.e., Turn Right). This display type requires the use of a tested
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FIGURE 16.5
Notional example of a directive display for UAS.
and validated avoidance algorithm to calculate the optimal path for the UAS to maintain a
safe distance from other aircraft. Figure 16.6 shows a representative directive display of a
current example of UAS command and control software.
16.8 Detect and Avoid in the Terminal Area

The terminal area is a particularly difficult environment for DAA systems due to the com-
plexity of operations and the need for ground-based sensors to provide surveillance while
the UA approaches the ground to land. The most recent revisions of RTCA DO-365 include
requirements to operate the DAA system in the vicinity of an airport with the use case of a
UA conducting an instrument approach procedure in the presence of a VFR traffic pattern.
The transition from the en route environment to the terminal area is particularly difficult
to define. In the en route environment, ATC separation distances are 3 or 5 nautical miles
and aircraft fly less dynamically, making encounters statistically more benign. In the ter-
minal area, separation is often “visual” (i.e., delegated to the pilot onboard the IFR aircraft)
between IFR and VFR aircraft, and aircraft often maneuver in dynamic ways, especially as
VFR aircraft enter the traffic pattern. The acceptable distance between aircraft in the ter-
minal environment tends to be smaller than the en route environment because airspeeds
are lower and, under normal circumstances, pilots are able to infer the intentions of other
pilots. Understanding the intentions of other aircraft is particularly difficult for a remote
pilot, who does not have the benefit of direct visual contact with the other aircraft.
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FIGURE 16.6
Representative Directive Display from UAS Flight Software. (From, Directive Display Concept with options for
MIDCAS [A. Lenz, “HMI Questions and Discussions.” p. 17, 2014].)
16.9 Conclusion
For decades, UASs have held the promise to improve, and in many cases save human lives
by providing air-based capability quickly and cheaply without putting an onboard pilot
at risk. But in order to fully realize this promise, a UAS must be able to operate safely and
seamlessly with other air traffic.
DAA technologies represent the next great leap forward for the integration of the UAS
into the global airspace system. The use of robust DAA systems enables operation of UASs
in virtually all classes of airspace with a comparable, or even enhanced, level of safety
when compared to many types of manned aircraft.
Defining the components of DAA has been proved to be the critical step in focusing the
research, development, and test activities that will lead to accepted standards for UAS
design, manufacture, and operation. The resulting new generations of UASs will continue
to realize the tremendous benefits of unmanned technology; and benefits that help ensure
a safer, more capable future for everyone.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank:
385
Stephen George of the FAA’s UAS Integration Office. George created and led the FAA’s
UAS SAA Workshops, and without his leadership, a great deal of the current progress in
“detect and avoid” would not have been made.
Stephan Cook and Dallas Brooks, the authors of this chapter in the second edition, from
whom most of the material in the current Chapter came.
The participant organizations and individuals of the FAA UAS SAA Workshops from the
FAA, DoD, academia, Federally Funded Research & Development Centers, and industry.
The past and present members of the UAS SARP, originated under the DoD and now
cosponsored by the DoD, the FAA, NASA, and DHS.
16.1 What are the two functions of a DAA system?
16.2 How can these functions be decomposed into subfunctions?
16.3 What are the advantages and disadvantages of pilot-in-the-loop DAA systems?
16.4 What are the three components of the DAA system?
16.5 Why do DAA systems need a quantitative means to comply with “well clear?”
Note
1 Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 15– 1403. The author’s
affiliation with The MITRE Corporation is provided for identification purposes only, and is not
intended to convey or imply MITRE’s concurrence with, or support for, the positions, opinions,
or viewpoints expressed by the author.
References
Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: Rules of the Air. International Civil
Aviation Organization, 10th Edition, July 2005 (Amendment 44: November 13, 2014), pp. 1–5.
DO-185A with Attachment A—Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Traffic Alert and
Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) Airborne Equipment. RTCA Special Committee 147,
December 1997.
Cook, S., Brooks, D., Cole, R., Hackenburg, D., and Raska, V. Defining well clear for unmanned
aircraft systems. Paper presented to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
November 14, 2014.
RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Document- 365, Minimum Operational
Performance Standards (MOPS) for Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems
RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Document- 366, Minimum Operational
Performance Standards (MOPS) for Air-to-Air Radar for Traffic Surveillance
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17
UAS in Public Safety
Benjamin Miller and Adam Trojanowski
17.1 UAS in Public Safety: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387

17.2 UAS in Public Safety: Laws and Regulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
17.3 UAS in Public Safety: Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
17.4 UAS in Public Safety: Enabling Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
17.5 UAS in Public Safety: Training the Operator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
17.6 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
17.1 UAS in Public Safety: Introduction

Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) technology exists at the confluence of complex public
safety policy issues. UASs are understandably a concern from the perspective of those
who regulate and coordinate national airspace to enable safe commercial transport. Just as
legitimately, UASs are important matters for national and local safety and security author-
ities, both as a tool for accomplishing the public safety mission, and as a threat to that
safety. UAS and access to airspace are increasingly important to news gatherers, privacy
advocates, land managers, civil engineers, and the list keeps growing. The resulting web
of policy interests, some conflicting, some mutually reinforcing, warrants its own space
in any comprehensive discussion of UAS. This chapter will discuss regulations to some
degree, but current UAS regulations are already analyzed at length elsewhere in this text.
The purpose of the discussion here is to think about how the regulations developed, why
they took the form we see today, what could be done differently, and how could we better
use UAS as a tool for public safety.
17.2 UAS in Public Safety: Laws and Regulations

A discussion of UAS policy requires some history for context. Much of the early develop-
ment and use of UAS technology occurred in the framework of their military applications.
This created a space for the technology to advance without a strong pressure to conform to
the policy pressures of the civilian public safety realm. The process of integrating UAS into
existing air traffic looks different when it is your UAS, your air traffic, you set the mission
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388
priorities, you make the rules, and you have the ultimate power to enforce them. That may
be the UAS policy picture in a theater of war, but when the same technology is brought
into spaces with a large, diverse set of users and other concerned parties, policy questions
become complex.
The earliest regulatory requirements for UAS came from the technical fact that most
UASs are remotely controlled via radio signals, and therefore subject to regulation by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). 47 CFR 97 § 215 sets the basic guidelines for
radio control signals for model aircraft.
More substantial efforts to absorb UAS into the existing regulatory scheme began with
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). FAA’s September 16, 2005 memorandum “AFS-
400 UAS POLICY 05-01” was the first agency-level effort to bring order to the growing
presence of UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS). The memorandum established
some early concepts and set the tone for further regulation. Importantly, the memorandum
defined all unmanned aircraft as “aircraft” within the meaning of 14 CFR 1.1, declared
UAS a matter of national security, and established some early airspace and aircraft safety
rules. It is important to point out that the memorandum is not a regulation. The memo-
randum was a form of internal guidance for FAA personnel for how to determine if an
unmanned aircraft operation could be allowed within the NAS.
A useful early review of the state of UAS policy at the national level can be found in
the FAA’s September 2009 report DOT/ FAA/ AR-09/
7 “Unmanned Aircraft System
Regulation Review.” In addition to summarizing the state of the UAS policy world at the
time, the report set out a number of issues for future UAS regulations to address. Among
the goals were defining whether there were categories of UAS that did not need regulation,
and defining a set of operational capabilities for UAS.
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 set a timeline for the FAA to put in
place regulations for the commercial use of UAS. In the meantime, public safety agencies
sought to use drones under a set of exceptions to the existing aviation regulations. Those
regulations evolved over time to govern manned aviation in the skies above the United
States, but many rules were a poor fit for the disruptive concept of operations that came
with modern UAS.
In a scramble to accommodate the demand from users, both commercial and public,
the FAA issued Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COAs), carving out custom sets
of exceptions, authorizing particular UAS operations on a case-by-case basis. The process
was cumbersome, slow, and not easily scalable to accommodate the demand. Initial COAs
were limited to public operators, although public operators could sponsor a commercial
operator for the purposes of a COA, allowing commercial operators to fulfill the public
needs that could not be met by most public agencies at the time.
The mandate from Congress to enact regulations for the commercial use of drones
resulted in the FAA ultimately codifying the rules for small (55 pounds or lighter) drones
in 14 CFR 107. The rule became effective in June 2016, and finally gave UAS users a clear
set of rules to work with. Part 107 was intended for commercial UAS operators, but many
public agency operators noticed that the rules also made their UAS efforts simpler. A public
agency did not have to create a UAS program from scratch anymore, provided that its
drone pilots complied with the set of rules in part 107. Over the few short years of its exist-
ence, part 107 has evolved to accommodate a growing set of missions, and adapting to
the needs of the public safety community. The FAA has sought to make it easier for civil
operators under part 107 to apply for, and obtain waivers of certain rules, including oper-
ating in controlled airspace, flying over people, and flying at night. These waivers enable
public safety drone pilots to accomplish many missions within the confines of part 107. The
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UAS in Public Safety 389
FAA also established a process for public safety agencies to contact the Systems Operations
Support Center in emergency situations, allowing for expedited approval of otherwise
nonconforming flights.
COAs remain an important option for organizations whose missions do not fit well into
the part 107 scheme. Part 107 is flexible, but not a solution for every mission. One hard rule
that is not waivable under 14 CFR 107 is that it only applies to aircraft weighing 55 pounds
or less. As a practical matter, operations beyond line of sight of the remote pilot will also
typically require a COA –such operations may be possible under part 107, but technology
dictates that aircraft that can carry the required fuel or battery, as well as over-the-horizon
communications equipment to support beyond line-of-sight operations is more likely to be
over 55 pounds at takeoff. Moreover, while airspace waivers are available under part 107,
and obtaining them has become easier, operators who frequently perform missions in con-
trolled airspace can benefit from the COA process.
The FAA Extension Safety and Security Act of 2016 is notable for requiring the FAA to
develop standards for remote identification of drones. At the time this chapter was written,
the rulemaking process was underway, with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking having
been published on December 31, 2019. The remote ID requirement for drones is seen by
many as the underlying framework to enable future concepts, including more effective
counter-UAS laws and regulations, UAS Traffic Management (UTM), and to improve the
capability of drones to operate more autonomously in increasingly complex airspace.
The Act also called on the Secretary of Transportation to enter into agreements with
the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture to facilitate the use of drones in wildland fire-
fighting. Unfortunately, the principal firefighting agencies within those departments, the
Bureau of Land Management and the US Forest Service, have created increasingly high
barriers to their own use of drones—barriers the Secretary of Transportation and the FAA
are powerless to do anything about. In spite of clear congressional intent, the USDOI
and USDA have moved to require extensive (and mostly unavailable) training for UAS
operators who would fly under the agencies’ auspices. They have also prohibited the use
of drones manufactured in China, and even attempted to curtail others’ use of drones in
the airspace above the land managed by these agencies, in spite of a clear statutory delega-
tion of airspace management to the Department of Transportation.
In other provisions, the Act created a framework for requesting from the FAA a prohib-
ition on drone flights over certain sensitive facilities, mandated priority handling of COAs
when drones are needed for disaster response, and set up more ambitious goals, like the
continued study of a UTM system.
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 required further studies, reports, and develop-
ment of regulations in the UAS realm. Of particular note is the requirement that the FAA
develops rules for the “carriage of property,” enabling commercial delivery of goods by
drone. An important caveat is that establishing drones that deliver cargo as “air carriers”
will entrench any regulations of such activity in the federal realm, limiting the states’
authority to affect any aspect of such deliveries, or enforce the federal regulations.
17.3 UAS in Public Safety: Policy

An important question about UAS in the public safety realm, given some of the policy
complexities involved, is whether it is worth an agency’s efforts to integrate drones into
390
their operations, and if so, how to do it in a way that supports the agency’s mission most
effectively. UAS capabilities have evolved in important ways that make them an excellent
tool for many public safety missions. Lofting a camera over a tactical law enforcement
operation or a large structure fire, creating maps of a crime scene, monitoring crowd safety
at large public events, getting a look inside a vehicle with a gunman inside, delivering
communication or first aid supplies to a victim not otherwise reachable by authorities,
detecting and mapping a wildfire –these are just a few examples of what drones can do
for public safety practitioners. UASs often perform aviation missions that would be impos-
sible, impractical, unsafe, or too expensive to accomplish with manned aviation resources.
Yet, drones are not the answer to every public safety aviation need. Many missions remain
best served by manned aviation assets. UAS and manned aviation will coexist in the public
safety space, and will evolve together to accomplish more missions, with a better margin
of safety, at less cost to the public.
The public safety aviation community in the United States encompasses a large, diverse
set of aviation programs, each adapted to unique specialties, mission profiles, and agency
responsibilities. Until just a decade ago or so, public safety aviation meant manned avi-
ation, whether in the form of fixed-wing aircraft for firefighting, surveillance, critical
personnel transport, etc., or helicopters for firefighting, disaster contingencies, technical
rescue, law enforcement support, etc. The very high costs of manned aviation programs
meant that only larger and better funded agencies across the country could even consider
such programs.
UAS democratized public safety aviation. Drones are not yet capable of large-scale water
or retardant delivery on wildfires, or transporting personnel, but they can accomplish some
of the previous missions of manned aviation, and take on entirely new tasks. Whether a
law enforcement agency can afford a helicopter or not, the need for large area searches
will sometimes occur. No matter the method used, the search will cost money from public
coffers (and anyone who thinks that running a large search with hundreds of volunteers is
free or cheap should ask an accountant for a Sheriff’s Office).
An effective response to a hypothetical mission like the one described above requires
some careful deliberation. Everyone who sees a cost sheet for a helicopter understandably
assumes that it is a very expensive option. This is not necessarily the case –a $6,000 bill
for an hour of flight time and crew is very reasonable if accomplishing the same mission
from the ground would require paying 30 sheriff’s deputies at their $50 overtime rate for
five hours, and possibly short the next shift a few patrol deputies as the impact of such an
operation compounds.
Drones can address a part of the need for aviation. They can be an eye in the sky for
pennies to the manned aviation dollar. But current technology and regulations conspire
to make drones more suitable to low-altitude, short-duration missions for several reasons.
Among the reasons for the popularity of small, rotary-wing platforms, and the relative
paucity of larger, long-endurance fixed-wing platforms are the limits on small UAS (sUAS)
to weigh less than 55 pounds, prohibition on flights beyond sight of the operator, high level
of difficulty in safely integrating medium-and high-altitude UAS into the busy NAS, and
the relative ease of launching and recovering rotary-wing UAS compared to fixed-wing
UAS, especially in urban environments.
Early drone programs within civilian public safety agencies faced considerable skepti-
cism as military technology was adapted for public safety use. Many stories, some surely
apocryphal, but some certainly true, circulated about public fears about military Predator
drones being used for local law enforcement. Elevating law enforcement’s watchful eyes
391
above the level on which most of us conduct daily activities led to reasonable public con-
cern about privacy.
Those early worries about drones recognized that UASs were categorically different from
tools that came before. Law enforcement has used manned aviation for decades, and rea-
sonable policies and court rulings guided such uses. The low barriers to entry into the UAS
world meant that the concept was widely adopted, challenging the ability of regulations
and policies to keep up. Simple safety rules that prevented certain uses of manned avi-
ation did not apply to UAS. No court case existed to directly answer the questions posed
by UAS about how low and close to a residence a law enforcement UAS was allowed to
fly. Activities that required physical entry onto premises, and therefore triggered warrant
requirements, could now be accomplished without ever physically touching a suspect’s
property. A concept every law enforcement officer in the United States is familiar with is
that homes as well as the area immediately outside of the homes where their residents con-
duct activities of daily life (known in legal parlance as “curtilage”) get special protections
from government intrusions under the law. How far does the curtilage extend vertically?
Is it OK to have a drone persistently surveil an area the size of a small city, capturing not
only a suspect’s movements, but also those of thousands of others? Once the data exist,
even if only as evidence of a particular crime committed by a particular suspect, can it be
exploited to find evidence of other crimes? This is just a sampling of the questions that
have floated to the surface of the public safety UAS policy world.
Concerns about privacy, and whether drones are appropriate for a particular public
safety mission, have not gone away, and should not go away. The public may realize now
that when a local agency talks about buying drones, they do not mean armed military
drones. This does not mean that public concern has been addressed, but rather that we
need to be prepared to answer harder questions. Some of those questions may be the same
as in the past, but others may be heavily biased toward UAS. If the neighboring agency
can cut overtime expenses by equipping their crime scene investigators with UAS, cutting
on-scene time for fatal accidents by 80%, why is your agency not doing it? If a neighboring
state chose to deploy effective counter-UAS technology to respond to drone threats in real
time, why is your state completely reliant on federal resources, which may take days to
mobilize?
The idea that a public agency has the right to operate UAS does not flow from the FAA’s
power to enable such operations, but rather from a recognition that the FAA’s power is
limited, and flows mainly out of the power of Congress to regulate commerce. The FAA
has asserted broad authority to determine what activities in the airspace above the United
States constitute commerce, and what activities are properly “government operations” if
those operations occur in the air. That claim of authority is largely untested by litigation,
but it potentially encroaches on the police power of the states –their inherent authority to
regulate activity within their territory for the safety, health, and welfare of their citizens.
As UASs become increasingly important to local public safety authorities, the tension
between the FAA’s authority to regulate commercial traffic and the need for the states to
assert the needs of their public safety communities will increase. This tension will manifest
itself in the counter-UAS space more sharply than in UAS operations. This makes sense
if you consider it from the perspective of a local law enforcement agency. Navigating the
cumbersome federal regulations may be inconvenient when launching your UAS program,
but it is understandable, and even if your constituents see the program as necessary, they
will probably forgive the delay and cost necessary to conform to the rules. Countering
rogue UAS presents a different problem. When a genuine threat presents itself in the form
392
of a capable UAS operated by a malicious actor, the public may be less understanding of
federal guidelines and limits of local authority.
States have the inherent power to regulate for the health, welfare, and safety of their citi-
zens, and citizens rightly expect that states will do so. The legal term of art for this power is
“state police power.” States may find that the exercise of this power to protect their citizens
from, say, a rogue drone equipped with a flamethrower flying over a county fair, comes
into direct conflict with claims of federal authority to regulate radio emissions from all
sources in the United States, or claims that all aircraft in the air over the United States are
operating within the National Airspace System, and therefore, subject to exclusive federal
regulation and enforcement.
Consider one possible scenario for dynamically managing the need to keep the NAS
safe and efficient, while still allowing local authorities to do what is necessary to effect-
ively respond to local incidents. A local police officer responds to a call where he quickly
determines that using a UAS has the potential to save lives, maybe because it will afford
the responding officers a look inside a building where a hostage is being held. This
location has the misfortune of being located near an airport, with an interesting mix of
airspace classifications all around it. The officer has no worries –he knows that everyone
from state authorities to the federal government arranged for a simple process. He keys up
the microphone on his radio, and advises his dispatcher of the situation. Within moments,
dispatch has contacted the FAA and communicated the officer’s needs –airspace up to
100 feet above the location of the incident, horizontal radius of 1,000 feet from the center
of the roof of the building. FAA has the capability to instantly transmit the parameters
of this now-restricted airspace to all air traffic via equipment that interface with the navi-
gation equipment required on all aircraft. The location of the drone is securely transmitted
to other public safety aircraft that come into the airspace with the incident commander’s
permission. What technology, regulations, and interagency arrangements are necessary
to enable this kind of process? What regulatory culture is required to create this level of
cooperation between agencies with different perspectives, responsible to entirely different
governments?
17.4 UAS in Public Safety: Enabling Technology

UASs exist in their current form because several technologies advanced to the point where
they could be combined in ways not previously possible. None of the enabling technolo-
gies that make modern UAS possible are truly novel on their own. Batteries, position and
movement measurement devices, radio communications, and digital photography all
existed before the advent of small UAS systems we are now familiar with.
The constant drive toward reducing the size, weight, power requirements (SWAP),
and the ability of manufacturers to take individual components and integrate them into
microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) have transformed what is possible, and brought
previously complex and prohibitively expensive tools within the reach of public safety
organizations.
The evolution of batteries has also played an important enabling role in allowing sUAS
to take to the air. The energy density of older battery technologies made it impractical
393
to use them for flying machines –the batteries that could store enough energy and dis-
charge it at a fast enough rate were simply too big and heavy to fly on small rotary-wing
platforms. As batteries became smaller and more powerful, it is now not uncommon to
see small rotary-wing commercial drones that can fly for approximately 30 minutes on
a charge. The low SWAP of sophisticated components means that flight controls can be
effectively augmented through the use of inertial measurement units (IMUs), sophisticated
obstacle-avoidance systems that use both ultrasound and video to help reduce pilot work-
load. The same trends have allowed even very small drones to carry relatively high-quality
sensors, whether electro-optical, thermal, or otherwise, making them more useful to public
safety organizations.
What do all of these technological advancements mean for public safety? The implications
are broad. The cost of a manned aircraft of any kind is often an insurmountable bar for
public safety agencies, but the price of the aircraft is just a small fraction of the cost of
an aviation program. Flying a Blackhawk helicopter safely requires constant and expen-
sive training, maintenance, fuel, insurance, hangar space, and extra staff dedicated to the
task. The miniaturization of aviation also democratizes it. Sophisticated, but very small
and inexpensive components enable UAS flight to be augmented in ways that shorten
operator training time by orders of magnitude. The small size of most UAS reduces risks
associated with their use. Missions that would previously risk a pilot’s life and therefore
were not even considered in the past might now, in a worst-case scenario, result in the loss
of a $1,000 drone –a price many incident commanders are willing to bear for important
information.
Information from airborne platforms that is likely to alter the incident commander’s
decisions (called “decision-quality data”) can now be obtained by more agencies on more
incidents. The quality of documentation of complex incidents has been transformed.
A three-dimensional model of a large crime scene was, until recently, an exotic technology
reserved for juries in only the most complex trials and requiring tremendous resources.
Accident investigators are now starting to routinely gather evidence for accident recon-
struction from the air, and are able to present evidence to juries in ways that transform
their understanding of events. As an additional benefit of the technology, the investigators
can now spend less time exposed to the dangers of working near traffic, and can often open
roads more quickly after accidents.
Constantly improving software interfaces between small drones and existing public
safety tools have been transforming how those tools are used. Relatively inexpensive
systems can now be used to perform tasks that, until recently, were only possible with
very costly military systems. Small UAS can now ingest data from the terrain and update
existing Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) in near real time, as events are occurring.
The improvement in situational awareness and the potential to speed up and improve
decision-making by incident commanders are significant, and the barriers to putting
this kind of technology in the field with a broad cross-section of agencies are dropping
quickly. It is difficult to explain to those outside of the public safety realm just how
valuable it is to know how large a landslide is soon after arriving on the scene, or how
important it is to be able to update safe evacuations routes, based on real-time data,
when managing a quickly emerging wildfire. The frustration of not having access to this
kind of critical, life-saving information even once should be enough to convince anyone
of the potential value of airborne platforms that are cheap enough to buy, easy enough
to use, and powerful enough to provide decision-quality data to just about any incident
commander anywhere.
394
17.5 UAS in Public Safety: Training the Operator

The general public expects a certain level of skill and professionalism from police officers
and firefighters. In many subject areas, those expectations are formalized in laws and pol-
icies, and mature systems exist to verify that public safety professionals can do their jobs
safely, and above all do no harm. Police officers are required to have a driver’s license, but
they also receive considerable practical driver training, and are tested on their abilities
regularly. The same goes for firearms training, or safely operating a ladder truck with all
of its systems.
The current system for ensuring that public safety UAS operators can use their tools
safely and effectively is still in its infancy. The FAA requirements for obtaining a 14 CFR
107 operator’s certificate may appear reasonable on paper, but unfortunately extend only
to paper –there is no practical test of the operator’s skill. One can currently apply for
and receive a certificate authorizing commercial use of drones in a wide range of situ-
ations without ever touching or flying a drone. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology has partnered with public safety drone users to develop practical testing, and
many organizations are stepping in to provide training that includes flying drones in situ-
ations that simulate public safety UAS use. At the same time, mature sUAS programs in
public safety organizations have recognized that sUAS training is not, and should not be
like traditional flight training. Agencies that made early attempts to require too much have
found that treating sUAS programs like manned aviation programs is often counterpro-
ductive, and reduces the usefulness of sUAS. It is also important to account for the fact
that public safety sUAS operators are not learning their first new skill that requires care to
be done safely. Where manned aviation training, or even sUAS training for civilians may
appropriately start from the assumption that a completely novice pilot needs to start from
scratch and go slowly, sUAS training for public safety operators should be adapted to a
different profile of student, and a different teaching style.
17.6 Conclusion
UAS Technology is advancing at an exponential rate, with laws and regulations trying
to keep up. The effects are felt in all walks of life and occupations. Public safety can and
should lean in to this reality and invest in the modernization of its forces and capabilities
to capitalize on a technology that can save lives and money. UASs are just one part of the
big picture of a new and modern police force and fire service. Strong, practical policy,
training, and public communication are imperative to successfully adopting UAS tech-
nology within an agency.
While UASs have come a long way since this technology was first deployed in public
safety more than a decade ago and there are still new and useful ways to be discovered,
it is clear that future public safety operations will be safer and more efficient because
of UAS.
395
1. One of the foundations of the current air traffic management system in the United
States is that all airspace above the United States that is “navigable” is regulated
and managed by the federal government. This facilitates commerce by creating
a uniform set of rules for all aviation above the United States. But the concept
of navigable airspace has evolved with the advent of UAS. Navigable airspace
now includes the airspace at your knee level in your own back yard, since aircraft
(UAS) can now safely travel, take off, and land there. In light of current capabilities
of UAS, would you draw the line between federal authority and the authority of
state, local, and tribal governments differently? How?
2. Assuming that the responsibility for the safety of the NAS remains in the hands
of the federal government, how would you propose resolving the current conflict
between strict limits on state, local, and tribal authority to address any threats
posed by rogue drones and the practical reality that the FAA has only a small
handful (fewer than 10 by last count) law enforcement officers, and is unable to
respond to threats posed by rogue drones in anything approaching real time?
3. While the benefits of an elevated view of a public safety event are obvious and
thus has driven adoption of UAS by public safety, what other applications could
be beneficial as the use of UAS matures? In what way do these new applications
change the incident and provide more information or improved mobility to UAS
users in public safety?
4. Positive perception of any new technology in public safety, both by the public
and the users, is critical to programmatic success. While opinions may differ, it
is imperative that factual information is exchanged from adopter to stakeholder.
In what ways can adopters of UAS in public safety succeed in this information
exchange?
396
397
18
Cybersecurity Counter Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (C-UAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Randall K. Nichols
18.0 Problem –The Risk of Terrorist Attack vs. U.S. Air Defense System. . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
18.0.1 Contributing Technologies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
18.0.2 Attack/Defense Scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
18.0.3 Chapter 18 Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
18.1 Description of the sUAS/UAS Landscape. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
18.1.1 Autonomy vs. Automation Levels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
18.1.2 UAS Collaboration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
18.2 Establishment of a Risk Metric and Attack/Defense Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
18.2.1 Risk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
18.2.2 Attack/Defense (A/D) Scenario Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
18.3 Discussion of Conventional Vulnerabilities of Air Defense Systems
(ADS), Attacks by sUASs, and Countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
18.3.1 What Is the Counter-UAS Problem? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
18.3.2 Operational Protection from Hostile UAS Attacks –
A Helicopter View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
18.3.3 Countering UAS Air Threats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
18.3.4 Vulnerabilities Perspective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
18.3.5 Conventional Vulnerabilities of Air Defense Systems (ADS),
Attacks by sUAS, and Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
18.3.6 Conventional Countermeasures against sUAS / UAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
18.3.6.1 Active Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
18.3.6.2 Passive Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
18.3.7 Aggressor Counter-Countermeasures Specific to UAS
Deployment – SWARM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
18.4 UAS Sense and Avoid Systems (SAA). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
18.4.1 Airborne Sensing Systems (AS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
18.4.2 Sensor Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
18.4.3 Autopilot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
18.4.4 SAA Services and Subfunctions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
18.5 SCADA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
18.5.1 “UAS Are Just Flying SCADA Machines!” (Nichols R.-0., 2016). . . . . . . . . . . 413
18.5.2 SCADA Cyber Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
18.5.3 SCADA Cyberattack Vectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
397
newgenprepdf
398
18.5.4 Cyberattack Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414

18.5.4.1 Espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
18.5.4.2 Software-Based Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
18.5.4.3 Insider Threat Vulnerabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
18.5.4.4 Hardware-Based Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
18.5.4.5 Wireless Attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
18.5.4.6 General Attack Possibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
18.6 Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
18.6.1 Active sUAS/UAS Countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
18.6.2 Passive sUAS/UAS Countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
18.6.3 Aggressor Counter-Countermeasures Specific to UAS Deployment. . . . . . 424
18.6.4 Designing for Stealth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
18.6.5 Design to Acceptable Risk Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
18.6.6 Detection Signatures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
18.6.7 Acoustical Signatures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
18.6.8 Acoustic Signature Reductions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
18.6.9 Acoustical Detection Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
18.6.10 MEMS Gyroscope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
18.6.11 Resonance Effects on MEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
18.6.12 Countermeasures to Acoustic Attack – Gyroscopes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
18.6.13 Resonance Tuning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
18.6.14 SWARM C-UAS Functionality and Threats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
18.6.15 SWARM C-UAS Functionality Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
18.6.16 Counter-UAS as Disruptive Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
18.6.17 Joint Forces C-UAS Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
18.7 Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
18.8 Discussion Topics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
18.0 Problem –The Risk of Terrorist Attack vs. U.S. Air Defense System
The risk of successful terrorist attacks on U.S. Air Defense Systems (ADS) by small
unmanned aircraft system (sUAS)/ UAS is growing because of increased commercial
capabilities and accessibility of advanced small drones. They are capable of carrying
sophisticated imaging equipment and significant and potentially lethal payloads; have the
ability to perform extensive Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions;
and are readily available to civilians. A significant threat to civilian and military UAS
operations and safety is posed by UAS controlled by hostile actors, including large poten-
tial threats to ADS from UAS SWARMS.
18.0.1 Contributing Technologies

Commercial and military UAS are integrally linked to payload, navigation, communications,
and control linkages from ground, air, or satellite. These advanced small drones are vulner-
able to cyberattack and hostile takeover, so UAS designers and operators must be aware
of cybersecurity countermeasures (CMs) and defenses to reduce the risk of penetration by
hostile or negligent forces.
399
C-UAS and Artificial Intelligence 399
UAS are being designed with increasingly advanced artificial intelligence (AI) and auto-
mation capabilities that can be both beneficial and harmful. The increased automation and
AI capabilities can be used to complete dull, dangerous, and dirty (DDD) missions in all
weather conditions and are capable of longer flying times and endurance at more effective
altitudes. Unfortunately, when human decisions are taken out of the loop, software and
firmware code can be intercepted, replaced, reengineered, spoofed, exploited, destroyed,
and used against the originator. Iran accomplished this in 2011 (Jaffe & Erdbrink, 2011).
The number and type of possible cyber exploits against UAS key control systems
(payloads, navigation, rotors, and battery) represent a large, diverse, and lethal attack
vector set. However, the UAS designer and operator is not without an effective arsenal of
counter unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) measures. (Nichols R. R., 2020)
18.0.2 Attack/Defense Scenarios

The cyber risk analyst’s mission when flying a UAS against hostile forces is to determine
the risk, threats, vulnerabilities, impact, and CMs that may apply in an attack/defense
(A/D) scenario. The attacker has the advantage of flexibility, source, type of cyber vector,
location, height, frequency, and lethality of his cyberattack. The more difficult job of the
defense includes identifying the intruder and intrusion measure and applying the correct
CM (cybersecurity [nonkinetic], physical [kinetic], or electronic) in real time.
AI1 plays a role on both sides of this A/D scenario. It speeds up the decision-making
capabilities for both attacker and defender and can be used to determine the risk mismatch
between opposing forces. Cybersecurity attacks on UAS should never be underestimated;
damage to ships, navigation systems, commercial airplanes, property, and privacy are all
possible (Nichols, Mumm, Lonstein, Ryan, & and Carter, 2018).
18.0.3 Chapter 18 Plan

This broad chapter covers cybersecurity, C-UAS, and automation. It will start with a descrip-
tion of the sUAS/UAS landscape that includes the automation, collaboration, and vulner-
abilities of the ADS and their CMs; the role of AI; the importance of SCADA (Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition); and SCADA systems and their vulnerabilities.
The next section of the chapter will focus on the Ryan– Nichols (RN) equations
(R. K. Nichols and J. Ryan, 2000) as a way to evaluate the threats posed to and by sUAS/
UAS cyberattacks and cybersecurity, and to measure and judge Information Security
(INFOSEC) risk relationships. The RN equations are a versatile qualitative method that
evaluates A/D scenarios to determine the normal, best, and worst risk cases based on
the threats, vulnerabilities, impact, and CMs of the scenario. Dr. Daniel J. Ryan and
Dr. J.J.C.H. Ryan developed the core concepts of this approach in a series of papers (Ryan
J. J., September/October 2008) 2 (Ryan D. J., May 1993) (Ryan J. J., 2005) (Julie J. C. H. Ryan,
2006). The author developed the consolidated form of the RN equations and the techniques
for their use in teaching risk scenario evaluation.
Automation of sUAS/UAS will be explored next, with emphasis on collaboration cap-
abilities of SWARMS, which deserve special emphasis because they pose the highest risk
to assets and personnel. A brief discussion of conventional CMs to prevent or address UAS
deployments will also be presented.
Sense and avoid (SAA) systems are critical to UAS because they affect both attack and
defense scenarios using sUAS/UAS, as are cyber SCADA threats and vulnerabilities in and
to SAA and UAS. Cyber terrorism using UAS (i.e., “just flying SCADA Machines”) include
400
spoofing GPS, CAS sensory deprivation, disabling of gyroscope and microelectromechanical

systems (MEMS), and resonance. A taxonomy of traditional cyberattacks will be presented
and a brief look at present C-UAS advances, including electronic warfare (EW) and elec-
tromagnetic (EM) jamming, acoustical signatures, CM and identify friend or foe (IFF)
libraries, and stealth design, will conclude the chapter.
18.1 Description of the sUAS/UAS Landscape

18.1.1 Autonomy vs. Automation Levels
sUAS/UAS automation is divided into five classes of technology. Table 18.1 shows a break-
down of the automation landscape.
Table 18.1 shows the normal five levels of automation that characterize UAS systems
with some examples of commercial vehicles at each level. NASA has a more detailed auto-
mation breakdown, which is based on the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) deci-
sion loops (Barnhart, 2012).
Level 1 Slave and Level 2 minimally automated UASs are commonly sold by Amazon,
Walmart, and similar outlets. The human pilot makes all the decisions and has complete
control of the flying orders. Level 3 steps up the navigation capabilities with the ability to
use a mission plan.
Levels 4 and 5 add higher- level decision-making capabilities; collision avoidance
without human intervention, complex mission planning in all weather conditions, and
expert systems intelligence without human intervention (i.e., AI and advanced SAA
systems). Level 5 is not commercially available, but many designers are well on their way
to a fully operational Level 5 UAS. Much of the information on Level 5 designs and cap-
abilities is classified. In the author’s opinion, removing humans from the decision loop in
weaponized Level 5 UASs is a very risky venture.
18.1.2 UAS Collaboration

Table 18.2 shows four types of possible UAS collaborations. At the lower end of a threat
scale is the isolated attack by one UAS or a small group of UAS. The Type 1 specific missions
may be piloted or autonomous. They carry light payloads, are affordable, and are easily
assembled in the field. An example is the Raven used by U.S. Special Forces. The CM for
this type of attack is to identify the pilot or leader vehicle and destroy or disable it.
A UAS attack team is particularly effective against divided attack targets since disabling
part of the UAS Team does not guarantee mission failure. The real vulnerability of the UAS
team is the Chief; all synchronization and updates go through the Chief. If the Chief is
disabled or destroyed, the team is rendered useless. Identifying the Chief is critical and is
normally accomplished through intercepting communications (Nichols, Mumm, Lonstein,
Ryan, & and Carter, 2018).
Far more dangerous is the SWARM configuration, especially at the higher levels of
autonomous engagement. SWARMS have several advantages. They are efficient through
sheer numbers, and even when not controlled or automated, they display a decentralized
intelligence, much like a shoal of fish that moves together synchronously. UAS SWARMS
are not dependent on the survival of all of the members. Destroy part of the SWARM and
401
TABLE 18.1
Automation Levels
Automation
Level Name Characteristics Examples
Level 1 Slave Assist with piloting, react to disturbance, Drone Parrot, Quad Flyer
Remote Control Tethers (RC) GAUI
Level 2 Automated Maintains its flying orders and receives higher Chinese Dove, DJI Phantom
level orders and commands. series, Raven, Scan Eagle,
Levels 1 and 2 are commonplace in the Harpy
market. They require pilot intervention
and continuous communication link(s).
Reasonable prices <$1500 US, small size,
weight < 10 lbs.:
Level 3 Automated - Automated Navigation (preprogrammed flight Dragonfly, Microdrone
Navigation plan, based on GPS coordinates). Some with
GMBH, Fly-n-Sense,
Follow Me autopilot settings enable the sUAS Mikrokopter,
to automatically follow the operator. Micro- ASN-205, GJ-1, aka Wing
UAS premium cost < $20,000 US. Loong I. Fire Scout, WASP
III, Shadow, Heron,
Hermes, Barracuda
Level 4 Contextual Response from contextual data (w/o human Predator, Reaper, Avenger,
Response intervention) for Collision Avoidance (CA). Global Hawk, BZK-005,
CA3 They use active SAA and require a mission Mantis, Soaring Dragon,
plan. Costs and missions are classified. Sentinel
Level 5 Decision Full AI does not require human intervention. Levels 4 and 5 are confined
Maker Includes AI Decision-making with heavily to laboratories
networked computer support, has perceptive X47C series
sensors for space and time. Can complete Classified Cost and Missions
complex missions in unknown environments,
capable of intelligent adjustments including
mission rescheduling and key word-adaptive
control. Decision-Maker (expert system)
works from contextual data with coordination
and collaboration of signals [Think
“Terminator”]
Sources: R. K. Nichols, Drone Wars: Threats, Vulnerabilites and Hostile Use of UAS, 2017 and
Nichols, Mumm, Lonstein, Ryan, & and Carter, 2018.
the rest will continue their mission without abatement (Nichols, Mumm, Lonstein, Ryan,
& and Carter, 2018).
Three known CMs for an SWARM are:
1. Disrupt or change the Strategic Global View of SWARM (its only real vulnerability)
2. Force defender collaboration
3. Long-range acoustical weapons aimed at MEMS to disrupt SCADA and rotor
subsystems
Research on acoustic CMs indicates that they are successful against SWARMS, and have
the secondary advantage of being able to IFF using searchable sound frequency libraries
(Nichols R. K., et al., 2019, 2020). China appears to be the leader in innovative UAS SWARM
intelligence, through the efforts of the Chinese Electronics Technology Group Corporation
(CETC) (Kania, 2017).
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TABLE 18.2
UAS Collaboration
Type Name Advantages Disadvantages Countermeasures
1 Isolated Individual Piloted or autonomous Stop, disable, or destroy

UAS w/a specific mission to pilot and threat is
perform. Small, easy to removed.
assemble, affordable, light
payloads.
2 Group of Each UAS has its own The sphere of action Stop, disable, discover,
Individual UASs mission but the group is may be different for and deter or destroy
not a coordinated team. each UAS’s mission. pilot(s), and threat(s)
Increased number of Mission will not may be removed.
attackers increases the be fully completed
potential of success by when individual
saturating the defenses. UASs are destroyed.
3 Team of UASs Particularly effective Level 4 (w/o humans) Stop, disable, or destroy
(All members against divided attack yields surrounding team members.
assigned targets. Level 3 allows reactions but may Determine behavior
specialized tasks automatic navigation and lose synchronization logic and intervene.
and coordinated synchronized actions, but between team Survival of team
by Chief) no update to mission plans members. members is critical
based on field activities. to defense actions.
Level 5 permits Mitigate the threat.
continuous updates
and communications,
commando style.
4 UAS SWARM Efficient based on numbers, None except maybe Disrupt/Change the
(Uniform emergent large group cost and launch Strategic Global View
mass of behaviors and reactions, coordination of SWARM (its only
undifferentiated not controlled or real vulnerability).
individual’s w/ automated, decentralized Defender collaboration.
o Chief at level intelligence –think shoal (Kania, 2017)
4 or 5) of fish w/evolving local Subject to Acoustic
rules. A highly defense- Countermeasures up
resistant form, not based to a mile. Research
on the survivability of at short distances
individual members, no and loud sound
hierarchy. at resonance are
Strategic Weapon particularly effective
against MEMS and
rotor systems (Nichols
R. K., et al., 2019)
Source: R. K. Nichols, Drone Wars: Threats, Vulnerabilites and Hostile Use of UAS, 2017.
18.2 Establishment of a Risk Metric and Attack/Defense Scenarios

18.2.1 Risk
There is no such thing as a risk-free action or event, no 0% risk or 100% risk scenarios. There
are levels of risk that can be calculated either qualitatively or quantitatively. Cyberattacks
and cyber defenses fit well into a definition of qualitative risk.
In the arena of cybersecurity and information, much depends on the correct evaluation
of risk potentials. sUAS/UAS can be fruitful targets of open source and proprietary cyber
403
weapons. The risks and consequences of successful terrorist attacks against U.S. ADS, and
the sUAS/UAS segment in particular, are higher because of the current UAS-expanded
capabilities to perform ISR and to carry lethal payloads. An effective risk metric is needed
to evaluate the various A/D scenarios, and the principle processes required to express
risk results in terms of hostile activity and available CMs. Cyberattacks on the aviation
industry are not novel. They are substantial and pose a threat to aviation safety in the NAS
(INFOSECInstitute, 2014).
The RN equations can provide a wide variety of INFOSEC techniques when used to
evaluate the risks of information loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability; the trad-
itional CIA approach to INFOSEC (R. K. Nichols J. Ryan, 2000)4.
The RN qualitative Risk equations are:
Risk = Threats X Vulnerabilities X Impact /Countermeasures (18.1)
Risk ~ Threats /Countermeasures (18.2)
In these equations, Risk is the qualitative metric of information loss or potentially dan-
gerous consequences of a cyberattack. Threats are real, natural, accidental, intentional, mali-
cious, terrorist initiated, or negligent. Threats applied in the absence of appropriate CMs
will increase the likelihood of a successful cyberattack but can be mitigated or countered
based on the attack circumstances.
Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in the system that a threat may or may not exploit. Impact
is an after-the-fact accounting of the cyberattack. No matter what the magnitude, it is a con-
stant. Impact is essentially an accounting figure, generally in dollars, of the cost of the loss.
CMs are defensive strategies, programs, protocols, technologies, and physical or cyber
barriers put in place to reduce risk. CMs are a host of technologies that can be applied to
mitigate threats and reduce risk. Increased threats mean increased risk. Increased CMs
result in decreased risk. Conversely, decreased threats mean decreased risk and decreased
CMs mean increased risk. In practice, these equations require a qualitative legend to make
comparable cases (Nichols R. K., 2016).
The RN information risk evaluation equations fit into a larger scope of information
security subjects described in detail in Defending (R. K. Nichols and J. Ryan, 2000). They
cover the world of digital5 espionage, information warfare, and INFOSEC in organizations.
They use the practical CMs of cryptography; access control; digital signatures; certifica-
tion authorities; classification schema; identification; Permissions Management and Policy,
Authorization and Authentication (PMIAA); biometric CMs; virtual private networks;
on-and off-site backups; intrusion systems; firewalls; network-based tests and programs;
and enterprise continuity policies of protect, detect, and correct followed by regular and
random auditing and monitoring of information transactions. Additional items that may
be included in CMs are organizational structure, procedures, rules, legal, and physical
barriers.
Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in the computer system that may or may not be exploited
by a threat, just like tornadoes and hurricanes are natural forces that act upon land. They
do not occur because there is a weakness in the land or the people, but because of an
interaction of forces in the weather pattern. People have no effect on naturally occurring
threats.6 In contract law, they call this principle Force Majeure.7
Looking at the variables in Equation 18.1, it is noted that risk, threats, and CMs are
all variables that change and can be evaluated with respect to time. Vulnerabilities and
impact are constants that do not change. Vulnerabilities exist independent of the threats,
404
and threats do not necessarily exploit them. Impact is a change-in-cost evaluation. For
example, the impact of 9/11 before the planes hit was zero, but after they hit, the impact
was enormous and far-reaching. However, the cost in lives, dollars, materials, policy
changes, and pain is still just a number, so in terms of risk, it is a constant.
Equation 18.2 uses a little calculus to reach the conclusion that the derivatives with
respect to time of the constants (vulnerabilities and impacts) equals 0. This drops vulner-
abilities and impact out of the equation. Therefore, Qualitative Risk is a direct function of
threats and an indirect function of CMs applied.
There are some interesting relationships that become evident with the RN equations.
These are true whether you address them as qualitative (i.e., High, Medium, Low, or Low-
Medium, Medium-High) or quantitative (i.e., 20%, etc.). They may be expressed as Worst-
Case, Normal-Case, or Best-Case analysis.8
• Risk = ƒ(threats). Risk is a direct function of the application of a threat. The greater
the threat, the greater the risk; but it is never higher than 100% or lower than 0%. In
practice, the range is from 3–5% to 90%.
• Vulnerabilities may or may not be acted upon. In Information Security, some con-
siderations are operating systems, hardware, smart cards, network devices, and
software errors (intentional or just poor programming). There can still be risk, even
without vulnerability.
• Threat is really a vector space where the derivative or change with respect to some
variable (like time) determines the maximum (for the attackers) or minimum (for the
defenders). These two calculations work out nicely to the worst-case and best-case
scenarios in terms of risk assessment.9
• Risk = ƒ(1/Countermeasures); an inverse function. Risk increases with threats, and
decreases with the application of appropriate CMs, but not at the same pace, cost, or
level of application. Technology boosts can be nonlinear, or at different levels, or may
only affect part of the A/D vector space.
A superior model for evaluation of INFOSEC was developed by Parker in 1998 (Parker,
2002). The Parkerian Hexad is a set of six elements of information security proposed by
Donn B. Parker. The Parkerian Hexad adds three additional attributes (Possession or
Control, Authenticity, and Utility) to the three classic security attributes (Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Availability) of the CIA triad. These attributes of information cannot be
broken down into further constituents; they are nonoverlapping unique aspects. Any infor-
mation security breach can be described as affecting one or more of these fundamental
attributes of information.
18.2.2 Attack/Defense (A/D) Scenario Analysis

The RN equations have been used effectively for nuclear war calculations, suicide bombing
(SB), piracy, kidnapping, attacks on Critical Infrastructure Sectors (CIS), malware analysis
and effects, offensive and defensive cyber weapon use, INFOSEC, network security, and
hostile use of sUAS/UASs. The A/D risk analysis is a first-order approximation and an
approach to the qualitative assessment of the risk of threat scenarios.
Analysts look at all types of threat vectors. For example, what is the risk that a small
group of UAS controlled by terrorists will fly over the Superbowl or Ohio State Buckeyes
“Horseshoe” football stadium and release a payload of nuclear waste and Semtex10 directly
405
on the crowd? Quantitatively, this would be a difficult problem. Qualitatively, it may be

possible to formulate an approximation of the risk levels.
The A/D process is like taking a risk “picture” before and after an attack on an asset class.
What makes it a simulation or “what if scenario” is the technical boost to the system that
gives the attacker and defender separate “pictures” of the scenario. The analyst examines
actual cases and permutations to see what CMs would be required to mitigate risk.
Sometimes, a change in defense position is the only requirement –like a suicide bomber
who gives up the primary people-rich target for a less risky target because the defense on
the first target has reacted correctly. Ultimately, a qualitative net risk factor in percentage
units can be calculated. Each percentage unit translates to an amount of cost that will be
needed to reduce the case risk.
Agencies like the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) run thousands of threat scenarios to quantify the net risks
between worse-case and best-case scenarios as compared to the normal or to a known his-
torical case. They develop a list of case net risks and order them from high to low. They can
then allocate their budget to the mitigation of the highest risk scenarios. This is a dynamic
and ongoing process.
Here are the basics of the RN Risk Assessment (RNRA):
1. Choice of a Risk Legend to compare results. Equation 18.2 is used to generate a simple
Legend of Risk, and values are assigned by team members based on their years
of combined experience in the field. Figure 18.1 shows a Delta team assessment of
risk probabilities for a hypothetical A/D terrorist scenario.
2. Evaluation of the initial risk before any action has been taken. This is the baseline or ini-
tial risk assessment (IRA).
3. Evaluation of the risk after the action has been taken.
4. Comparison of the amount of risk after the action is taken to the baseline risk value (IRA).
This will determine the Actionable Risk (NET Risk).
5. In the A/D scenarios, attacks INCREASE risk. Defense actions DECREASE risk. Both
are positive vectors achieved through a technical boost to the system. The NET
between them is a positive risk number or probability, generally in favor of the
attacker. Defenders can rarely stop risk but can mitigate it with appropriate CMs.
There is no such thing as negative risk: but there can be positive risk in a negative
vector direction.
6. Nothing is static. Attackers can lose part of their effectiveness (small risk value)
because of an unexpected reaction by the defense or vice versa. This reduces the
Case Net Risk. These adjustments may be negligible, but not always. However,
they rarely change the risk value more than 5% in any direction. They work in
a 75%/25% ratio, similar to when two players are both drawing to a flush at a
poker table. Both “made” the hand, but one holds the higher card. One-fourth
times is a rule of thumb for effectiveness of the threat reactors (either attacker or
defender).
7. The Case Net equates to the dollars necessary for the Defender to budget for mitigation of
a particular threat.
8. Technical boosts to either side generally change the level of risk on the legend in item 1 by
one, or rarely two levels.
9. Analysts look at the worst case (attacker boost), expected case (actual data), and best case
(defender boost). These define the parameters and threat vector space.
406
FIGURE 18.1
RN Equation RISK Legend –team defined.
10. In the RN approach, vulnerabilities and impact are constants. Using calculus, they drop
out as 0 at the best-case and worse-case extremes. What is left is the cool equation
18.3; Risk is ONLY a function of Threats and CMs.
11. There are two types of cases. The single vector case is like the example above of a
UAS with a payload that can harm a football crowd. A multivector example would
be an attack on the entire electrical power grid, with cascading effects in other
DHS sectors (IT, oil and gas, healthcare, etc.). When complex CIS and multivector
interactions are being investigated, risk must be evaluated as a partial component
where the sum of the components is not more than 100% risk. What is sought is
a view of cascading effects. As a matter of practice, normally only two of the CIS
groups are affected by an attack on one, with the primary attack having the larger
portion of risk apportioned to it.
18.3 Discussion of Conventional Vulnerabilities of Air Defense

Systems (ADS), Attacks by sUASs, and Countermeasures
18.3.1 What Is the Counter-UAS Problem?
Picture for a moment 100 plus hostile UASs headed toward a military target with lethal
payloads. How do military planners envision defenses to a hostile UAS SWARM attack?
The risk of successful terrorist attacks on U.S. ADS by UASs is increasing because of
improving commercial capabilities and accessibility. Advanced small drones, capable of
carrying sophisticated imaging equipment and significant payloads, are readily available
to the public. A range of terrorist, insurgent, criminal, corporate, and activist threat groups
have demonstrated their ability to use civilian drones and gather intelligence. How does
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the country defend against a growing UAS threat? This is known as the Counter-UAS
Problem. General James D. Mattis, SECDEF (U.S. Secretary of Defense) summed up the
Problem succinctly:
Unmanned Aircraft are being developed with more technological systems and cap-
abilities. They can duplicate some of the capabilities of manned aircraft for both sur-
veillance/reconnaissance and attack missions. They can be small enough and/or slow
enough to elude detection by standard early warning sensor systems and could pose a
formidable threat to friendly forces.
(Chairman, 2012)
18.3.2 Operational Protection from Hostile UAS Attacks –A Helicopter View
According to LCDR Boutros of the Navy War College, developing technologies do not
paint a pleasant picture of the Counter-UAS problem (Boutros, Operational Protection,
2015). UAS has seen a widespread proliferation among both state and nonstate actors.
This is cause for concern to U.S. Operational Commanders. (Boutros, 2015). General James
D. Mattis, SECDEF concluded:
The proliferation of low cost, tactical unmanned aerial systems demands we think
about this potential threat now … we must understand the threat these systems pre-
sent to our joint force and develop the tactics, techniques and procedures to counter
the problem.
(Chairman, 2012; Myer, 2013)
It can be argued from the quantity and diversity of production that China is the current
leader in this technology, and China is thoroughly exercising its UAS capabilities in the
Spratly Islands (Nichols, Mumm, Lonstein, Ryan, & and Carter, 2018). However, more than
90 countries and nonstate actors have UAS technology and many foster terrorism. “Most
of the UAS systems, except for China, Russia, USA, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran inven-
tories are low-technology, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms”
(Boutros, 2015). Experts believe that by 2025, China will produce over 50% of UAS systems
(Yan, 2017). Yan predicts that China’s commercial drone market will top $9B USD in 2020
(Yan, 2017). The market value will triple to 180 billion yuan by 2025, according to the
guidelines from the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. This esti-
mate is much higher than a forecast by an iResearch report last year (iResearch, 2016),
which said that the overall market of UAVs, commonly known as drones, could reach 75
billion yuan by 2025 in China (Yan, 2017).
Iran has supplied long range, low technology Ababil UAS weapons systems to Syria
and Sudan, and to extremist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and ISIS. Hezbollah’s
inventory is estimated at over 200 UAS, which concerns the Israeli military commanders
(Zwijnwenburg, 2014).
The DoD’s 2018 Joint Publication (JP) 3-01 “Countering Air and Missile Threats” identi-
fies friendly assets that an adversary may attack during a campaign using UAS. A theater
commander must plan for counter-UAS actions against air defense sites, logistics centers,
and national critical infrastructure (Boutros, 2015). “Due to their small size and unique
flying signatures, many UAS are difficult to detect, identify, track, and engage with current
joint air defense systemsADS. The increasing proliferation of global UAS has exposed a
critical vulnerability in the protection function of operational commanders, requiring joint
408
efforts to include intelligence, electronic warfare (EW), cyber warfare, (CW) and FIRES (the
use of weapons systems to create a specific lethal or non-lethal effect on a target)” (Boutros,
2015). But UASs are not invincible. Neutralizing threats or mitigating risk includes active
and passive defense methods with kinetic and nonkinetic FIRES11 (DoD, JP 3-0 Joint
Operations, 2018).
Later in this chapter, unique research into acoustic CMs with a dual purpose of defense
and IFF will be presented (Randall K. Nichols D., 2018).
18.3.3 Countering UAS Air Threats

Advanced UAS can carry large payloads for great distances. U.S. Predator and Global
Hawk UAS, “Chinese Pterodactyl and Soar Dragon counterparts, and Iranian Ababil can
carry at least 500 Kg payloads greater than 300 km” (Boutros, 2015). “They can be armed
or unarmed, with ISR payloads, communications relays, Over-The-Horizon (OTH) target
acquisition, and precision strike capabilities” (Boutros, 2015).
Shorter range, tactical, small/micro UAS may not have the distance or payload cap-
acity of more advanced systems, but they can impact a campaign (or U.S. Homeland
Defense) in equally serious ways. Because of their size, their heat signatures are almost
nonexistent and easily evade detection. They offer more freedom of action. They can be
launched from within US air defense zones and fly to their targets in less time than it
takes for a coordinated response.
(Boutros, 2015)
(Nightmare alert: Imagine a SWARM of UAS carrying small potent binary bomb
payloads attacking a U.S. carrier at port less than 1 mile away from the UAS launch point.)
The enemy can effectively balance space, time, and force, and arguably frequency, too.
(Beaudoin, 2011). “Small UAS (sUAS) can perform short-range ISR, be outfitted with explo-
sive charges or chemical and biological agents for aerial dispersion, or simply fly over
troops or civilians to demoralize” (Boutros, 2015). Given the effectiveness of enemy use
of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, a mobile, airborne version would take the problem to an
entirely new level! (Nichols R.-0., 2016).
18.3.4 Vulnerabilities Perspective

sUASs are vulnerable to kinetic and nonkinetic outside influence in four different
areas: their link to a ground station, the ground station itself, the aircraft’s various sensors,
and cyber weapons. The military recognizes the first three factors, and the authors will
concentrate on the fourth.
“In 2009 Iraqi insurgents successfully hacked into U.S. Reaper drones, crashing them.”
(Boutros, 2015) (Horowitz, 2014). “In September of 2011, ground control stations at Creech
AFB were infected by a virus, temporarily grounding the entire UAS fleet” (Boutros, 2015)
(Hartman, 2013). UAS onboard sensors can be manipulated in many ways. “High inten-
sity light directed at an optical sensor can blind it. GPS receivers can be cyber-spoofed,
which consists of transmitting a stronger, but false, GPS signal to a receiver, resulting in
inaccurate navigation. Influencing the local magnetic field can have adverse effects on both
onboard hard drives and sensors that require magnetic orientation to operate correctly”
(Boutros, 2015) (Hartman, 2013).
409
The attacker’s objective is to better understand UAS subsystems, which facilitates

exploiting their weaknesses. The author’s contention is that the hostile technology of
remote-controlled warfare is difficult to control or abort; the best defense (counter-
UAS) is to address the root drivers of these threats. The threat-roots are cyber-offensive
weapons against UAS SAA and SCADA targets (Nichols, Mumm, Lonstein, Ryan, & and
Carter, 2018).
18.3.5 Conventional Vulnerabilities of Air Defense Systems (ADS), Attacks

by sUAS, and Countermeasures
A simplified, nonclassified view of the U.S. ADS against a hostile UAS attack occurs in two
stages:
1. Early Detection and Identification of “Danger Close” (Myer, 2013).12

2. Applied appropriate CMs with the secondary goal of restricting collateral damage.
The traditional ADS family of tools for detection includes:
1. Active Radar Surveillance –generate waves and use rebound echoes from the
UAS to locate and estimate distance, approach speed, size, penetration vector, and
short-term trajectory.
2. Passive Monitoring –cover the EM spectrum of visible, thermal infrared, and
radio waves on common communications channels.
When considering hostile UAS defense, planners need to consider several issues. The U.S.
ADS is optimized for missiles and aircraft deployed at high altitudes and speeds. ADS
data fusion (detection, identification, weapon lock-on, execute CMs) works better with
larger targets, not very small ones like UAS/sUAS. The U.S. ADS is effectively reactive for
longer ranges; close reactive engagements, such as sUAS /UAS, are suboptimal (Nichols
R. K., 2016).
There are clear vulnerabilities of the U.S. ADS to UAS:
• sUAS can be launched into action close to the target(s) less than 1 mile.
• sUAS exhibit a small radar signature so that the detection phase is hindered.
• Reactive action dictates a quick response near the target. This is not always
possible.
• sUAS/ UAS are designed for slow, low flight. Low flying sUAS avoid radar
identification.
• sUAS/UAS electric motors are both quiet and have limited thermal signature. This
makes for difficult noise detection, which is especially true if stealth technologies
have been employed (Nichols, Mumm, Lonstein, Ryan, & and Carter, 2018).
• sUAS /UAS operate in urban areas. The urban sphere presents additional problems
and potential collateral damage (Nichols R.-0., 2016).
18.3.6 Conventional Countermeasures against sUAS / UAS

There are two families of conventional CMs used to disrupt and destroy hostile UAS/sUAS
systems (excluding FAA Regulations, locked in firmware GPS No-Fly Zones, Registration,
FAA rules, and the like).
410
18.3.6.1 Active Measures

Active measures are designed to incapacitate and/or destroy the sUAS/UAS threat in a
direct way. This method may employ Ground-to-Air Defense (GTA), missiles, acoustical
gun, or a simple cyber rifle.
However, there are some defensive issues to be considered:
• GTA efficiency against sUAS, reactive targets is reduced, and is even less efficient in
urban zones where civilians are at risk.
• Simultaneous attacks on multiple fronts (see Team or SWARM formats, Table 18.2)
make CMs very difficult to apply and defense measures are mitigated.
UAS CM research is improving. The goal is to increase the ability of Ground-to-Air
(GTA) to react and improve their capabilities to a defined saturation limit. Team for-
mation allows decoys and shields. SWARM formation is easier to detect; the arrival
of a cloud of robot drones is hard to mask, but tough to neutralize. Commercial
company Liteye has developed an Anti-UAV Defense System (AUDS) that is able
to detect, track, and disrupt sUAS operations using pulsed, brief focused broadcasts
of directional frequency jamming. Liteye has also developed a mobile version call
M-AUDS (Liteye, 2018). China has developed a “5-sec” laser weapon to shoot down
sUAS at low altitude (500 m) with a 10 KW high-energy laser beam. Its range is 1.2 mi
and handles sUAS at speeds up to 112 mph (Nichols R.-0., 2016).
18.3.6.2 Passive Measures

Passive measures are designed to use physical protections around the target to protect it
indirectly. Decoys, shields, organized roadblocks, nets, jamming the aggressor’s sensors,
or total or partial GPS signal cyber-spoofing are some methods used. Passive CMs have
some positive outcomes. Decoys can be effective if the ADS knows which sensors are
employed for an sUAS Kamikaze attack18 and how they are used in the SAA subsystem.
Communication jamming, which can disrupt the interdrone communications required for
team or swarm formations, is effective against level 1 and 2 drones (Table 18.1) that require
pilot interaction. Sensor Jamming is effective regardless of automation. It is especially
effective when false GPS signals are used to give false GPS information, cause camera/
gimbal dislocation, and demagnetize the heading sensor (Nichols, Mumm, Lonstein, Ryan,
& Carter, 2018).
The 2011 Iranian incident taught the U.S. ADS planners some lessons about passive
spoofing waypoints and loss of signal (LOS) via GPS. LOS is an emergency condition
that causes sUAS/UAS to execute programmed responses. One of those responses may
be “return to waypoint.” Two types of spoofs can be executed. A complete spoof uses
the friendly SAA to estimate course, groundspeed, and time to target, and then force an
LOS and change the final waypoint. A partial spoof reports false positions, and changes
waypoints for perceived emergency conditions during LOS. Both spoofs are difficult to
detect and very effective (Editor, 2012).
18.3.7 Aggressor Counter-Countermeasures Specific to UAS Deployment – SWARM

The authors contend that a UAS SWARM attack is practically unstoppable unless the
defender (U.S. ADS) shows a strong collaboration and the ability to identify and match
the SWARM locations in a timely matter. This requires combined active and passive
411
measures and means that the ADS computer networks must process, detect, identify, and
target information (and make critical decisions) significantly faster and more effectively
than their enemies. Cost is an additional vulnerability factor. SWARMS can be assembled,
delivered, and targeted in a relatively inexpensive weapons package and can use local
counter jamming on target nets (Nichols R. K., 2016). Encouraging research suggests that
SWARM UAS is vulnerable to loud acoustic sound, near resonance frequency, directed
at its MEMS components, which disables the rotor systems and forces the UASs to crash
(Randall K. Nichols D., 2018) (Yunmonk Son, 2015).
18.4 UAS Sense and Avoid Systems (SAA)

UAS SAA systems and subsystems are covered in detail by other authors in this book.
However, it is important to be aware that all SAA subsystems are controlled by or are
part of SCADA systems. The SCADA systems are low-hanging fruit targets for hackers
and malicious state actors. Three areas of interest for offensive cyber weapon targets
of cyber intrusion are Airborne Sensing Systems (AS), SAA sensor parameters, and
autopilot.
18.4.1 Airborne Sensing Systems (AS)

There are two technologies available for airborne sensing of other aircraft: cooperative
and noncooperative. Cooperative technologies receive radio signals from other aircraft’s
onboard equipment. Cooperative behavior has two elements. First, the ATC Transponder,
which responds to ground-based secondary radar interrogations for air traffic control
(ATC) usage. Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) uses the same technology
in FAA classes of airspace.
Second are the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast systems (ADS-B). This
technology uses the Global Positioning System (GPS) or alternative navigational source to
make broadcasts of its own aircraft position, velocity, and data required to avoid collisions
(Angelov, 2012). Table 18.3 shows typical sensor coordinate systems. The first three
cooperate with each other, the latter five are noncooperative technologies (Angelov, 2012).
18.4.2 Sensor Parameters

Sensor technologies use standard parameters to provide a basis for comparison and ISR
performance. SAA Critical Control Systems include circuitry to affect UAS movement,
landing, control of direction, detection, and correction of the aircraft. Many of these
functions are incorporated into a UAS Autopilot, if capable. Table 18.4 Standard Sensor
Parameters shows the base set of technologies.
18.4.3 Autopilot
Table 18.5 shows the common components found in UAS autopilots. These provide the
means for UAS to affect movement, control, communications, detection, emergency
operations, battery, waypoint delivery, and payloads. These are high-value cyber targets.
412
TABLE 18.3
Shows Typical Sensor Coordinate Systems. (Angelov, 2012)
Sensor Technology Coordinate System
TCAS Relative range, altitude

Active interrogation of Mode A/C transponder Relative range, altitude
ADS-B Latitude, longitude, altitude, velocity
Electro-Optical Bearing (azimuth and elevation)
Laser /LIDAR Relative Range
Onboard Radar Range, Bearing (azimuth and elevation)
Ground-Based Radar Range and bearing from ground-reference
Acoustic Bearing
TABLE 18.4
Standard Sensor Parameters (Angelov, 2012)
Sensor Function
Field of View Describes angular sector within sensor making measurements. Outside this
field of view, sensor is blind.
Range Distance measured by sensor, within which is some good probability of target
detection
Update Rate Interval at which sensor provides measurements
Accuracy Uncertainty of position measurement –usually a single dimension
Integrity Probability that measurement falls beyond some normal operation limit
Data Elements Cooperative sensors –specific data to enhance ISR platform, ex: trajectory, identity,
intent
TABLE 18.5
Common components found in UAS autopilots
• Main Program/Processor: processing sensor data and implementation of control of UAV
• Magnetometer: measuring direction
• GPS: determine global position
• Airspeed/Altimeter: measure air speed and altitude
• UAV Wireless Communication: communicating with ground station
• Power System: provides power to UAV
• Inertial Measurement Unit: measures movement of UAV
• Boot Loader Reset Switch loads programs into main program board
• Actuators: receives commands from main processing board and moves control surfaces
• Manual Flight Control: overrides autopilot and gives control of UAV control surfaces to ground station
(Boutros, 2015; Clothier, 2011)
18.4.4 SAA Services and Subfunctions

The SAA (Sense and Avoid) function supplies two services. These are:
1. A self-separation service to act before a collision avoidance maneuver is needed. It

could support earlier gentler maneuvers.
2. The collision avoidance service that attempts to protect a small collision zone.
Avoidance is usually achieved by means of a late, aggressive maneuver (Angelov,
2012).
413
To achieve these services, the following list of SAA design subfunctions is required:
• Detect –various hazards and objects such as other aircraft, weather, and terrain
• Track –detected motion of object, determination of position and trajectory
• Evaluate –tracked objects, against criteria that would need an SAA maneuver
• Prioritize –tracked objects based on evaluation and tests performed
• Declare –that paths of the object and its own aircraft reach a point of decision for
movement
• Determine –specific maneuver based on geometry of encounter
• Command –own aircraft to perform maneuver
• Execute –commanded maneuver (Angelov, 2012)
From a cyberattack standpoint, taking computer charge of any of these subfunctions and
reprogramming them for hostile purposes is desirable. This is true whether the reprogram-
ming is done on the hardware chips (or built in by manufacturer), or whether software
after a control signal is intercepted, spoofed, destroyed, or jammed. Think like the CIA-
availability is a key INFOSEC principal CM. Reprogramming a UAV to miss its waypoints
in an emergency or to corrupt its GPS navigation systems can be an effective cyberattack,
and it is not so difficult. Prof. Todd Humphries and his University of Texas student team
successfully spoofed the GPS systems on an $80MM Yacht, the “White Rose of Drachs” and
sent it off course (News, 2013). The year before, he hacked the GPS systems of a drone with
equipment costing less than $1000 (Goldman, 2012). Weaponizing a consumer drone is a
reality (Greenwood, 2016). Protecting against this possibility is behind the curve (Randall
K. Nichols J. J., 2018).
18.5 SCADA
SCADA stands for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. Globally, there are
hundreds of millions of SCADA systems used to control every practical machine imagin-
able. SCADA started in the 1940s to control manufacturing processes such as flow
rates, temperatures, valves, pressure, and density, and now manages processes of all
kinds: chemical, mechanical, electrical, optical, IoT,13 frequency, UAS SAA and payloads,
communications, battery, cars, trains, airplanes, and satellites. Everything! (Nichols R.,
Nov 28–30, 2006).
SCADA systems have improved significantly over the decades in all areas except one –
security. SCADA systems are a security sieve. Figures 18.2 and 18.3 show examples of
SCADA Architectures (Nichols R., Nov 28– 30, 2006). An interesting example is the
automated and computerized system in modern cars. Everything is controlled by
SCADA: tires, engine, seat belts, safety bags, oil pressure, even door locks. However,
cyber hackers can exploit SCADA to disable a car remotely, while the driver is still in it
(Greenburg, 2015).
18.5.1 “UAS Are Just Flying SCADA Machines!” (Nichols R.-0., 2016)
Table 18.6 shows the principal functions that apply to all SCADA systems, including
UAS.
414
TABLE 18.6
Principal SCADA Functions
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems facilitate management with remote access to real-
time data:
• Channel to issue automated or operator-driven supervisory commands to remote station control devices
• A human–machine interface (HMI) is responsible for data presentation to the human operator
• A console that makes it possible to monitor and control processes,
• Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) are microprocessor-controlled electronic devices that interface sensors to
SCADA by transmitting telemetry data
SCADA systems for computerized real-time monitoring and control typically consist of:
• Master Control Unit (MCU)
• Remote Terminal Unit (s) (RTU)
• Communication Links
The supervisory system responsible for data acquisition:

• Data Acquisition
• Control activities on process
• Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are final actuators used as field devices
• Communication infrastructure connecting supervisory system to RTUs
• Various process and analytical instrumentation:
• RTU’s Alarm Systems
• Doors
• Battery Backup
• Low Power/Loss of Power Alarm
• Power Protection
• Passwords for Keypads, PC ports
• Log Alarm (or Event) When Local User Plugs PC in or Signs On
• Log Event when Local User Changes Values
18.5.2 SCADA Cyber Vulnerabilities

SCADA systems have plenty of cyber-related vulnerabilities. Most are connected to, in-
transit, with, or stored by computers. Those vulnerabilities multiply when connected to
the Internet. Table 18.7 applies to all systems including UAS (Nichols R., Nov 28–30, 2006).
There are so many design flaws and vulnerabilities in SCADA systems that the US govern-
ment has a special SCADA testing lab in Utah and has published copious recommendations
to improve security (NTSB, 2009).
18.5.3 SCADA Cyberattack Vectors

A brief overview of UAS Cyber Attack Vectors (by no means an exhaustive list) is found in
Table 18.8 (Nichols R.-0., 2016).
18.5.4 Cyberattack Taxonomy

UAS SCADA systems are susceptible to a broad range of cyber and network-specific
attacks on the SAA modules in aircraft and communication structures from the ground or
from satellite links. These represent system threats and vulnerabilities of the UAS struc-
ture and increase the risk of hostile use or takeover (Nichols R., Nov 28–30, 2006). A UAS
Cyber Attack Taxonomy is an organized view of potential cyber threats to UAS assets. The
Taxonomy is a list of agents that increase the risk of a successful attack on U.S. UAS ADS
assets.
415
Enterprise Firewall
network
Application Internet/business partners
Workstations Printer server
Hub/switch
Outside world
(may include vendors, customer
and other business partners)
Control System
Human-machine
Engineering interface (HMI)
Supervisory workstation
control and Redundant
monitoring application
station servers
Communications network can be the internet, a public switched

telephone network, a wireless network, or a hardwired network.
Remote/local station 1 Remote/local station N

RTU, PLC, A control system may RTU, PLC,
or other have multiple or other
controller remote/local stations, controller
(See note.)
Sensor Sensor Sensor Sensor
Control Control Control Control
equipment equipment equipment equipment
Modern Modern
Handheld device Handheld device
FIGURE 18.2
For corporate SCADA system.
18.5.4.1 Espionage
First, some elements must be defined. There is espionage by foreign hackers; the main
culprits are the Chinese, who encourage stealing state secrets and have been quite
successful (Brenner, 2011). Hackers have successfully attacked U.S. Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM) networks and have stolen designs for advanced U.S. weapons
systems (Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014). Table 18.9 shows the effectiveness of espionage.
There are three vulnerability classes exploited in UAS cyberattacks: software-based,
insider threats, and hardware-based. Software and hardware vulnerabilities are the result
of poor coding practices and the developers’ lack of security knowledge. Hardcoded
passwords exist because programmers prefer an effortless method of recovery for purposes
such as debugging. “Vulnerabilities have drastic impact on the security of software” (Sood
A.K. & Enbody, 2014). “Developers or programmers with malicious intent may implant
416
SCADA Client
Graphics
Tren- Active X 3rd Party
Editor HMI Alarm Log
ding Controls Applic.
ASCII Display Display
File
Editor Active X Container
Library
Client / Server / Publish / Subscribe - TCP/IP
SCADA SCADA Server
Recipe
Developt.
ASCII DB RT and Event Manager
Environ
Files
Recipe Data Report
Export/ Managt Proces- Alarm Log Archive
Gener.
Import sing
Ref.
Alarm DB Log DB Archive DB
Commercial Ref. DB SQL
DB DB
Project ODBC
Editor
DDE
Data
Commercial R/W API/DLL
Developt. Driver
tools Toolkit Private
Driver OPC EXCEL
Application
VME PLC PLC
FIGURE 18.3
UAS SCADA system internals.
TABLE 18.7
Examples of SCADA Design Vulnerabilities
• Ease of operation outweighs security
• Commonly set up on operating systems with known vulnerabilities
• Poor authentication systems in place
• Remote access allowed for maintenance and/or IT support
• Interconnectivity to vulnerable corporate networks
• Weak access control lists on firewalls
• Proper Network Access Control (NAC) is most crucial to prevent unauthorized connection within network
• First target of compromise for an attacker
• No use of standard IT defense software
• Wireless technology is common
• System connected to unsecured remote processors
• SCADA software not designed with robust security features
• Public information often available on specific systems
• Poor physical security on remote access points (Kilman, 2003)
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TABLE 18.8
Common Attack Vectors against SCADA Systems
Common Vectors:
• Backdoors and holes in network perimeter
• Attacks on field devices through cyber means
• Database attacks
• Communications hijacking and man-in-the-middle attacks
• Cinderella attack on time provision and synchronization
• Vulnerabilities in common protocols
To a control engineer, the possible attacks can be grouped into the following categories:
• Bogus input data to controller introduced by compromised sensors and/or exploited network link between
controller and sensors
• Manipulated and misleading output data to actuators/reactors from controller due to tampered actors/
reactors or compromised network link between controller and actuators
• Controller historian –feed forward control
• Denial of Service –missing deadlines for needed task actions
Attacks on Software:
• No Privilege Separation in Embedded Operating System
• Buffer Overflow
• Structured Query Language Injection
Possible UAS Attack Hardware and Software:

• SkyJack© 14
• Aircrack-ng© 15
• Node-ar-drone©
• Raspberry Pi©
• Parrot AR. Drone -2©
• Alfa© AWUS036H wireless adapter
• Edimax© EW-7811Un wireless adapter
• Snoopy© 16
Attacks on Communication Stack

• Network Layer
• Transport Layer
• Application Layer
Auxiliary tools:
• Password Theft
• Wireshark
• Man-In-the-Middle Attacks
• Trojan Horse Virus
• Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (R. K. Nichols, 2016)
computer hardware with code as part of a targeted attack. Insider threat vulnerabilities
are difficult to assess due to human element involved. Multi-layer defenses are required to
combat vulnerabilities in software/hardware world” (Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014).
18.5.4.2 Software-Based Vulnerabilities

“Military UAS defense systems deploy widely used software in their network devices: oper-
ating systems, open source software, routers, radio frequency devices, Internet Connection
Sharing (ICS) and SAA SCADA” (Sood A.K. and Enbody, 2014). UAS ground system
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TABLE 18.9
Espionage Thefts in last 20 years
• F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
• F/A-18 Fighter Jet
• Patriot Missile System
• RQ-4 Global Hawk Drones
• P-8 Poseidon Reconnaissance Aircraft
• UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter
• Littoral Combat Ship
• Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Missile Defense System
• Navy’s Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Program
• Compromised White House computer systems for espionage against military offices; interoffice
communication was targeted
• Nuclear codes
• Took temporary control of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) weather satellites
• Civil Reserve Air Fleet systems by compromising defense contractor’s computers (Sood A.K. &
Enbody, 2014)
network software may have the standard vulnerabilities; “hardcoded passwords,

backdoors in firmware, insecure protocols, Remote Command Execution (RCE), default
passwords for Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs), insecure authentication and author-
ization, malicious hardware. Critical infrastructure systems have hardcoded passwords
embedded in firmware which may allow attackers to gain complete access to system”
(Sood A.K. and Enbody, 2014). It does not end there. Other software-based vulnerabilities
include: “Backdoors exist for support or remote access purposes, Hardcoded passwords are
easily obtained by reverse engineering firmware, and analyzing functional components”
(Sood A.K. and Enbody, 2014). Also included is Remote Code Execution (RCE), which is an
attacker’s ability to execute the attacker’s commands on a target machine or target process
remotely. Another RCE vulnerability is a software bug that gives an attacker a way to exe-
cute arbitrary code or the ability to trigger an arbitrary code execution from one machine
onto another (Nichols R. K., 2016).
Unfortunately, RCE can be triggered by exploiting security flaws in operating system
components, browsers, ICS, SCADA, routers, Microsoft Office, Adobe Reader, and
Java. RCE is a powerful threat to UAS and supporting computer systems. “Attackers
exploit security issues; buffer overflows (stack, heap, integer), use-after free errors, race
conditions, memory corruption, privilege escalations and dangling pointers.” RCE vulner-
abilities keep growing and RCE vulnerabilities allow “attackers to execute arbitrary code
on compromised systems, drive-by downloads, spear phishing attacks” (Sood A.K. and
Enbody, 2014).
ICS/SCADA is particularly vulnerable to RCE vulnerabilities. Another form is SQL
injections, “which exploit weaknesses in web applications to allow attackers’ queries to
be executed directly in backend database” and allow attackers to extract sensitive infor-
mation such as credentials, emails, critical documents, and intelligence. “Data stolen using
SQL injection can provide critical information for advanced UAS targeted attacks” (Sood
A.K. and Enbody, 2014).
The final group in the software-based vulnerabilities set is “insecure authentica-
tion and file uploading flaws. These allow remote attackers to access critical systems
by exploiting weak authentication design and upload malicious code or firmware.
419
This security issue persists due to inability of systems to implement granular control
through proper authentication and authorization checks. File uploading attacks exploit
a system’s inability to determine the type of files being uploaded on server” (Sood
18.5.4.3 Insider Threat Vulnerabilities

“Insider threats involve a malicious employee or contractor that steals sensitive organiza-
tional assets or otherwise diminishes integrity of organization” (Sood A.K. and Enbody,
2014). Insider threats may be intentional or unintentional, but the outcome is the same,
increased risk. Intentional Insider Threats (IIT) is “when contractors or employees turn mali-
cious.” Their motives? Revenge, personal grudge, and/or greed. Regarding Unintentional
Insider Threats (UIT), “the U.S. military defense outsources jobs to contractors, which pre-
sent a softer target than military facilities. The resulting compromised contractors’ assets
allow attackers to steal intelligence from military defense networks. The contractor acts as
a proxy to provide entry for attacker, even though contractor has no intention of spying/
stealing assets” (Sood A.K. and Enbody, 2014).
“Edward Snowden worked as a contractor for Central Intelligence Agency and NSA.
Snowden leaked copious amounts of information, including information from the
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and National Security Agency
(NSA) project, ‘Anarchist’; Hacking of Israeli drone feeds; ‘The Drone Papers’-The
Intercept and Leaks regarding drone usage in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia” (Sood
18.5.4.4 Hardware-Based Vulnerabilities

The United States sometimes picks the wrong vendors to supply its critical UAS hard-
ware; the hardware imported from China includes backdoor access to the hardware after
deployment. “Exported Chinese manufacturing units compromised military-grade field
programmable gate array (FPGA) computer chips, circuits, and counterfeit devices, such
as scanners.” “Zombie Zero malware has been implanted in the software of scanner hard-
ware manufactured in China as part of an attack targeting shipping and logistics industries,
especially printers. When scanners are connected to networks, they provide platforms for
compromising networks. Counterfeit devices and circuits developed in China for U.S. mili-
tary and defense contractors to be used in warships, missiles, airplanes and UAS” (Sood
A.K. and Enbody, 2014). This is a threat to all nations that received hardware preinstalled
with malware (Nichols R.-0., 2016).
Hardware-based vulnerabilities observed in actual attacks on military defense systems
(Army) and applications include the following: backdoors and hardcoded passwords,
compromised GPS Satellite Communication (SATCOM) systems (Sood A.K. and Enbody,
2014), SCADA systems vulnerable to buffer overflows, and compromised GPS SATCOM
systems. The Navy has had its share of hardware-based threats also; RCE “XMLDOM
Zero-day vulnerability was exploited to attack U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars’ website,
SQL injections, Royal Navy website hacked, U.S. Army website hacked, insecure protocols,
spoofing and hijacking and attacks to spoof GPS communication to control U.S. drones”
(Sood A.K. and Enbody, 2014).
420
18.5.4.5 Wireless Attacks

Wireless attacks are the most generic form of hacking (Randall K. Nichols and Lekkas,
2002). Strategies to compromise a system’s ability to be controlled by its rightful owner
include:
• Password Theft
• Wireshark
• Man-In-the-Middle Attacks
• Trojan Horse Virus
• Gain Scheduling
• Fuzzing (Rouse, 2019)
• Digital Update Rate,
• Distributed Denial of Service,
• Buffer Overflow.” (Rani, 2016)
Password cracking or theft. “Even complex passwords can be cracked using software tools
such as dictionary attacks and brute force attacks.” Cracking programs are easy to obtain.
“Statistical methods such as Aircrack-ng”, which is a “Wired Equivalent Privacy and Wi-Fi
Protected Access Pre-Shared Key cracking program”, is freeware (Rani, 2016).
Wireshark. A robust tool to analyze and capture packets on wireless networks provides
the valuable and sensitive information in transmitted packets. Wireshark allows effortless
access to the client system and the ability to gain control over it through the display of a list
of available interfaces. A victim’s username and password can be obtained on a graphical
user interface (GUI).
Man-in-the-Middle (MIM) attack is another cyber- goodie. “Attacker gains control of
sensitive data by furtively modifying the communication link between two parties. End
users are usually unaware of manipulation performed by the attacker” (Rani, 2016). “The
attacker forms fake connections between the server and client.”
Forms of MIM attacks are:
• URL manipulation
• Rogue Domain Name Server
• Address Resolution Protocol poisoning
• Duplication of Media Access Control
• False Emails (Rani, 2016) (Randall K. Nichols and Lekkas, 2002)
Trojan Horse Virus. It is a malicious program with detrimental effects. It can monitor traffic
over a network, damage hard drives, leverage a security glitch, multiply and replicate like
a rabbit, and give the attacker access to a system remotely. “Trojan can continuously delete
files and ultimately demolish the Operating System and cannot be easily identified by anti-
virus programs” (Rani, 2016).
Gain Scheduling. A special form of cyberattack. There are four classes: fuzzing, digital
update rate, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), and buffer overflow. “Gain scheduling
is used to control non-linear UAS systems and hybrid UAS systems” (Rani, 2016). UAS
need different gains for control, depending on the state of the UAS: Mass, Altitude, Speed,
Flaps down. In a hybrid system, the system is assumed to have multiple modes of oper-
ation corresponding to takeoff, landing, and cruising.
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UAS will have different gains for controlling the vehicle that are often precomputed and
trusted. Gain parameters are coded into onboard autopilots. Without strict monitoring of
the UAS software, an override of gains goes undetected. Changes to gains or gain sched-
uling logic can cause decreased performance in the autopilot or instability the in UAS
(Rani, 2016). The attacker can manually override the safety systems for an hour, shut down
the system, and take control. Not much is required; the IP address of SCADA Server, a path
to the server, and then a Trojan or back door can be installed (Nichols R.-0., 2016). Gain
scheduling attack methods vary depending on UAS SAA systems. There are generally five
methods of attacks:
• Sensor spoofing to cause mode confusion,

• Overriding gains through hacking,
• Infinite switching between gains, which will cause loss of control,
• Causing Denial of Service (DOS) between controller gain block, and
• UAS controller block by overloading the onboard processor (Kim, 2012).
Fuzzing. In an UAS autopilot system, random inputs with expected distributions are
not uncommon, and Gaussian noise inputs are routinely accounted for. However, unex-
pected, invalid, or completely random inputs can cause unknown behaviors. An attacker
can access any data flow between components and corrupt them with bogus values.
Attackers use malicious fuzzing to discover SAA vulnerabilities. Intentional white-box
and black-box fuzzing tests can determine the system robustness of Guidance, Navigation
and Control (GNC) algorithms. Avionic and UAS programmers develop GNC algorithms
for unmanned rotatory and fixed-wing aircraft that are key to counterterrorist activities
and targeting high-value targets (HVTs). “Consequences for a fuzzing attack: Aircraft
instability, Process lock-up and/or invalid outputs to next SAA/GNC process. Common
fuzzing attack methods include buffer overflow attacks, sending malicious packets with
invalid payload data to UAS, and adding malicious hardware between components”
(Kim, 2012).
Digital Update Rate. UAS autopilots are digital computers. Inputs and outputs to and
from the autopilot are discretized (Zaharia, 2012). “Any continuous inputs to autopilots
are converted to digital inputs through discrete sampling. If the autopilot was designed
with a continuous controller, it is also converted to a discretized form. For a discretized
system, as sample time increases, the system becomes unstable/uncontrollable. For data
collection, longer sampling periods will increase probability of data aliasing” (Kim, 2012).
Hackers, knowing the above, have created a few methods of cyberattacks; “changing sam-
pling time of analog-to-digital converters through buffer overflow, hardware manipulation
and Denial of Service (DOS) or Distributed [networked] Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks
that prevent the processor from running the controller or navigator at desired update rate”
(Kim, 2012).
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). “A large-scale intrusion method performed by a
host source which causes detrimental effects to legitimate users by withholding services.
This either causes the system to shut down completely or rapidly drains system resources,
such as computing power and bandwidth” (Rani, 2016). “Once the attacker gains access,
new tools can be installed to enable control of the host. Infected systems continue to look
for other vulnerable systems and attack them too. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks result in a master-slave process where the affected victim is controlled by the
attacker. The attacker comes into control of many systems.” Resources of the system are
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TABLE 18.10
Steps in initiating a complex DDoS attack
Compilation of vulnerable agents
• Network first scanned for vulnerable agents and attacker compiles a list of agents to attack
• Possible to attack systems by setting up automated software to scan the network and take over vulnerable
agents
Defuse
• Flaws in security and agent vulnerability are misused by attacker
• Software codes are used to automatically attack and prevent the owner from controlling the system
• Actions are taken by the attacker to safeguard the code planted from being identified as Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS)
Connection
• Protocols such as TCP or UDP are used to connect with numerous agents and plan attacks
• Attacks can be performed on either single or multiple agents
Intrusion
• Features of the victim, such as port numbers, are confirmed
• Attacker launches the attack and alters properties in favor of the attacker since alteration of packets would
lead to complications in the identification of the source of attack (Rani, 2015)
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Scanning attack techniques

• Random
• Local subnet
• Hit list
• Permutation
• Topological
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) System Shutdown for at least five minutes:
• UAS operations can no longer monitor or control process conditions
• SCADA locks up, must be rebooted
• When comes back online, it locks up again
Items Needed for DDoS:

• Ability to flood server with TCP/IP calls
• IP Address of SCADA Server
• Path to server (Rani, 2015)
exhausted rapidly, and flooding of packets occurs on the victim’s end. The attacker then
removes all traces that could lead to locating the source of the attack by using a spoofed
Internet Protocol addresses. This prevents the victim from penetrating the source of the
illegal traffic targeted toward them (Rani, 2016). How is a DDoS attack initiated and how
is it related to UAS? Think about team or SWARM configuration controlled at a ground-
station network. See Table 18.10.
Buffer Overflow SCADA Attack. A buffer overflow vulnerability is exploited when some
control information is overwritten to modify the flow of control in a program, exploiting
and compromising control information to give control to the attacker’s code. It involves
overwriting the return address stored on the stack to transfer control to a code placed in the
buffer or past the end of the buffer. On hardware implementations, the stack grows down-
ward toward the lower memory addresses. When a function is called, the address of the
instruction following the function call is pushed onto the stack, so that the function knows
where to return control when it is finished. While the called function is being executed,
423
it allocates local variables on the stack, variables, and buffers at a lower memory address
than the return address. The process permits writes to the base address of buffer plus an
offset to the return address, and it overwrites the value of the return address.
In a buffer overflow SCADA attack, if the return address is overwritten with some arbi-
trary value, control will be transferred either to an invalid location in the memory or to a
location that does not contain valid executable code. This results in a segmentation fault.
If the overflow SCADA attack return address is overwritten in a clever manner, it can
transfer control to code inserted by the attacker in a buffer overflow. The attacker can place
executable code into the buffer, and then overwrite the return address with the address of
buffer. Control will then be transferred to the executable attack code contained in the buffer
(Nichols R.-0., 2016).
Control Acquisition Attack (CAA). The objective of attacker in a CAA is to assume direct
control of the unmanned vehicle. A proven example is to use GPS spoofing to shift the
flight path of the UAS to suit the purposes of attacker with limited control. If the attacker
can gain complete control of an unmanned vehicle, a man-in-the-middle attack is possible.
The attacker could send falsified data to the original controller to make it appear that the
vehicle is behaving normally, when, in fact, it is being controlled by attacker. CAA is an
undetectable attack that is especially dangerous (Nichols R.-0., 2016).
18.5.4.6 General Attack Possibilities

Autopilot Hardware Attack. The attacker can link directly to UAS autopilot to give control
over UAS and/or its tactical data. “They can corrupt data stored on board the autopilot or
install extra components that corrupt data flow. Hardware attacks affect UAS survivability,
control and allow tactical data to be collected. Hardware attacks can be carried out during
maintenance, storage, manufacturing, and delivery phases” (Kim, 2012).
Wireless Attack. Attacks are carried out through wireless communication channels. They
can occur if an attacker uses wireless communication channels to alter data on board a
UAS autopilot. The worst-case scenario is if an attacker can break the encryption of the
communication channel. The attacker can gain full control of the UAS if the communica-
tion protocol is known, and then can use a buffer overflow or similar method to corrupt
data onboard or initiate some event (Kim, 2012). Another type of attack is sensor spoofing
when the attacker sends false data through the onboard sensors of the UAS autopilot. The
danger of wireless attacks is that they can be carried out from afar while the UAS is being
operated (Nichols R.-0., 2016).
Control System Security. Attacks that prevent hardware/CPU from performing normally
include buffer overflow exploits through some input device, forced system resets to load
malicious code, and hardware changes or additions to the system (Kim, 2012).
Application Logic Security. These attacks use malicious manipulation of sensors or envir-
onment to provide false data to the control system. The control system behaves as pro-
grammed without fault, but some or all inputs to the system are corrupted. Attacks of this
type include sensory data manipulation, vehicle or system component state data manipu-
lation, navigational data manipulation, or command and control data manipulation to gain
complete control over the connected drone and gain access to corrupt the preprogrammed
flight path. Since the communication channel between the ground station and flight con-
troller of the drone is based on an unsecured protocol, a hacker can easily attack and gain
real-time access to the drone (Nichols R.-0., 2016).
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18.6 Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS)

It is time to change the focus from hostile UAS attack, threats, and vulnerabilities to defense
and C-UAS CMs. Here is a potpourri of ADS C-UAS CM. There are two general types of
sUAS/UAS CMs: active and passive (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020)
18.6.1 Active sUAS/UAS Countermeasures

The goals of active CM are to incapacitate or destroy the UAS threat in a direct way. (ex.
Ground-to-Air Defense [GTA], missiles, simple cyber rifle, drone catcher net, and loud
acoustic resonance sound aimed at the MEMS component).
There are two issues to be concerned with when using active C-UAS. First, the GTA effi-
ciency against reactive sUAS targets is reduced or poor in urban zones with civilians at
risk. Second, several hostile UAS can be launched simultaneously, with attacks on multiple
fronts (Team or SWARM formats) and this complicates the defense. The team formation
allows decoys and shields. The SWARM formation is easier to detect –the arrival of a
cloud of robot drones is hard to mask –but it is tougher to neutralize. The solution requires
an increase in the ability of GTA to react and improve to its saturation limit.
18.6.2 Passive sUAS/UAS Countermeasures

The goals of passive CM are to protect indirectly with measures such as physical protections
around the target, decoys, shields, organized roadblocks, nets, jamming of the aggressor’s
sensors, or a GPS total or partial spoof17 (Chapman, 2019).
Decoys can be effective as CMs, if the sensors employed for sUAS /UAS Kamikaze attack18
(Dictionary.com, 2019), and how they will be used against the host SAA, are known.
Communication jamming is effective against Level 1 and 2 drones, which require pilot
interaction.18 Jamming can disturb the interdrone communications required for team and
SWARM formations. Sensor jamming with false GPS information, camera/gimbal disloca-
tion, and heading sensor demagnetization are effective regardless of UAS automation levels.
LOS with a GPS complete spoof can still use SAA to estimate the course, groundspeed, time
to target. LOS with partial GPS spoofing (false positions) can change waypoints. This is dif-
ficult to detect and unfortunately effective [Iranian RQ-170 Incident 2011] (Editor, 2012).
18.6.3 Aggressor Counter-Countermeasures Specific to UAS Deployment

A UAS SWARM attack is practically unstoppable unless the defender exhibits strong col-
laboration and an ability to match the SWARM locations with combined active and passive
measures.
Table 18.11 shows the Targeting Area Dimensions for an sUAS/UAS. Defense designers
must protect against all of these vectors (Adamy D., 2009) (Adamy D., 2015) (Nichols R. K.,
Drone Wars: Threats, Vulnerabilites and Hostile Use of UAS, 2017).
18.6.4 Designing for Stealth

Table 18.11 calls for some clever thinking. A good place to start for both the sUAS/UAS
attacker and defender is to design for stealth. Stealth means “to resist detection” and can
425
TABLE 18.11
Defensive Targeting Area Dimensions for a sUAS / UAS
Defensive Target Area Dimensions
Dimension Function Action
Latitude Friendly Force Location Direction of Weapons

Longitude Enemy Force Location Maneuver of Forces
Elevation Force location Direction/Maneuver of Forces
Time Speed of Maneuver Timeliness of Attack
Timing of Weapon Release Enemy Vulnerability
Frequency Bandwidth Required Rate of Information Flow
(after Radio introduced) Frequency of Transmissions Vulnerability to Jamming
Vulnerability to Intercept
apply to the air vehicle; the internal SAA systems that control and create noise, heat, and
EM emissions; and changes in surface reflection (Nichols R. K., et al., 2018). For U.S. ISR
platforms and missions, it is essential that their UAS systems be undetected during oper-
ation, especially since it is best to assume that the enemy is using counter-UAS operations
and weapons. From a personal privacy standpoint in civil airspace, it is desirable to have
the UAV stealth features turned off.
18.6.5 Design to Acceptable Risk Level

In the discussion in Section 18.2, it was pointed out that the defense designer must reduce
the vehicle detectability to an acceptable risk level (Adamy D., 2009). Therefore, it is necessary
to reduce the transmitted emissions or reflected EM wavelengths to below their threshold
signature value.
18.6.6 Detection Signatures

UAS/UAVs are detected by their signatures: noise (acoustic), optical (visible), infrared
(thermal), and RADAR (radio). Acoustic or EM emissions occur at the following
wavelengths (Austin, 2010):
• Noise (acoustic) [16 m-2 cm, or 20–16000 Hz]

• Optical (visible) [0.4m –0.7 um]
• Infrared (thermal) [0.75 um – 1 mm]
• RADAR (radio) [3 cm – 3 mm]
A good portion of UAS signatures are a function of the operating height of the vehicle,
bandwidth, and operating frequencies.
18.6.7 Acoustical Signatures

Why are acoustics important in terms of sUAS/UAS? Offensive systems use ultrasonic
frequency resonance (ultrasonic sounds cannot be heard by humans) to intercept a drone.
Passive systems are difficult, if not impossible, to detect in the ultrasonic range. However,
defenders are able to identify, and track drone movements based on acoustic and/or
426
visual signatures. Most acoustic detection systems are limited in range due to environ-
mental variables; only 350–500 ft [Experimental/educational research] (Yunmonk Son,
2015). LRAD, Inc. has designed a Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) –LRAD 450XL
whose published range is 5577 ft all directions (LRAD, 2019). An LRAD used as a sonic
weapon can be a cost-effective way to defend a small area, especially against SWARM
attacks (Nichols R. R., 2020).
18.6.8 Acoustic Signature Reductions

An aircraft’s noise may be the first indicator of its presence. UAS noise emanates pre-
dominantly from vortices shed from tips of wings, rotors, or propellers. There are several
measures that can be taken to decrease noise, starting with lowering the wingspan or blade
span to enhance acoustical stealth. Conventional propulsion systems are a concern because
of the noise of combustion but reducing the mass and aerodynamic drag of the UAS can
reduce noise generation. Another alternative is to turn to electric motors, which develop
virtually no noise. Rotor noise can be detected and has a unique signature regardless of the
motor behind it. However, aerodynamic considerations limit the ability to increase stealth
design of elements located on the outside of the UAS.
18.6.9 Acoustical Detection Issues

Acoustic methods can be used to detect drones by recognizing the unique sounds produced
by their motors or rotors. Detection by Acoustical Signature (DAS) is a noninvasive and
undetectable passive approach to protection against the hostile use of drones (Nichols
R. K., et al., 2019). Defenders rely on a searching an indexed library of sounds produced by
known drones, which are then matched to sounds detected in the operating environment.
This is, in essence, an IFF function. However, IFF units are too heavy, complex, and require
too many SAA and battery resources to outfit most smaller drones, so often the defender
has no access to IFF functions.
Offensively, the current acoustic systems are mounted but could eventually become
man portable. Offensive systems are not normally detected by National ELINT (electronic
signals intelligence) assets. ELINT systems are not specifically looking for acoustic energy
signatures; therefore, the enemy can remain hidden from detection when using acoustics.
Passive detection is much cheaper and more cost effective to operate than a complex radar
system for a single installation, but radar is a more mature technology and is generally
favored.
For acoustic ranges lower than ultrasonic, the human ear is a problem for the designer.
It is most sensitive to frequencies around 3500 Hz and can hear sound down to a prac-
tical threshold of 10 dB. For a given sound pressure level, the attenuation of sound due to
distance in air and insulating material varies as the square of the sound frequency. Low-
frequency sound presents a greater problem for UAS stealth design.
The greater noise problem is posed by smaller UAS using piston engines, where sound
comes from their internal combustion and exhaust systems. Sound emission can be
reduced with sound-absorptive materials, silencers, and mufflers, and by directing the
intake and exhaust manifolds upward. The level of sound detected also depends on the
level of background noise for sound contrast. Noisy backgrounds (i.e., airports, city down-
town) limit detection and interdiction. Drone tuning (changing the stock propellers) can
limit the detection and interdiction of UAVs (Austin, 2010).
427
FIGURE 18.4
MEMS gyroscope unit.
18.6.10 MEMS Gyroscope

The MEMS gyroscopes, located in the rotor systems of most drones, are the primary target
for an acoustical CM. Figure 18.4 shows an MEMS gyroscope unit. A MEMS gyroscope
may be visualized as a single proof mass suspended above a substrate where the proof
mass is free to oscillate in two perpendicular directions. These are the drive direction and
the sense direction.
18.6.11 Resonance Effects on MEMS

The MEMS gyroscope has a resonant frequency that is related to the physical characteristics
of its structure. MEMS gyroscopes resonant frequencies are much higher than can be
heard (audible and ultrasonic ranges) and can be degraded using harsh acoustic noise.
Unexpected resonance output caused by an attack will cause the rotor system to malfunc-
tion; the rotors will spin at differing speeds causing the drone to become unstable and
crash (Kim, 2012).
The key point? MEMS gyroscopes contained in rotor systems are very susceptible to
malfunction when struck with rough noise that resonates inside the MEMS gyroscope
(Nichols R. K., et al., 2019, 2020)
18.6.12 Countermeasures to Acoustic Attack – Gyroscopes

There are CMs to an acoustical attack. One possibility is to provide physical isolation from
the sound noise. Surrounding the gyroscope with foam would be a simple and inexpen-
sive CM. Another is to use an additional gyroscope with a special structure that responds
428
only to the resonant frequency, so that the application systems can cancel out the resonant
output from the main gyroscope.
18.6.13 Resonance Tuning

Resonance can be induced by a malicious attacker, as long as resonant frequencies exist
in gyroscopes. In the operation of MEMS gyroscopes, bending changes the capacitance
between the sensing mass and the sensing electrode, and this capacitance change is sensed
as the output of the gyroscope. By using an additional feedback capacitor connected to the
sensing electrode, the resonant frequency and the magnitude of the resonance effect can
be tuned.
18.6.14 SWARM C-UAS Functionality and Threats

Why SWARMS? They collect data and information to aid military tactics and can distract,
disorient, and disrupt military operations. They can carry payloads outfitted for offen-
sive kinetic and nonkinetic (cyber) weapons. A recent technical example was seen in
Guangzhou China when more than 1000 sUAS performed an aerial display in Guangzhou
China, February 2017 (Huang, 2017). The two major types of mitigation available are
destructive and nondestructive (R. K. Nichols, 2019).
Destructive countermeasures include

• Laser System (Electro-Optical)
• Missile Effector
• Electromagnetic Countermeasures
Nondestructive Countermeasures include

• Identification
• Tracking
• Spoofing
18.6.15 SWARM C-UAS Functionality Challenges

Most electro-optical (EO) systems have several drawbacks. EO systems can only operate
during daytime and may confuse a UAS (in any tactical formation) with a bird or an air-
plane. Additionally, EO systems may be less effective if UAS are not operating within
direct line of sight of the sensor.
An acoustic CM will not be effective if a new UAS is not included in the sound file
library, so IFF acoustic library files must be regularly updated. Most RF detection systems
only detect narrow frequency bands when looking for known UAS RF signatures. Again,
library files need to be regularly updated. However, the defender can never cover 100%
of the drones being manufactured. It is not only the sheer number of drones, but it is also
the hundreds of UAS variants being produced worldwide in various weights, shapes, and
sizes, plus operating characteristics such as speed, flight duration, maneuverability, and
payload capacity. These UAS variations make tracking difficult.
It is difficult for radar and other surveillance systems to identify exactly what is out
there. The U.S. Government, DoD, and the DHS are trying to keep up with a commercially
429
competitive-driven hobbyist area of the economy (Zeitlin, 2012). They want to understand
how UAS are used by people with bad intentions, but it is very hard for the U.S. govern-
ment to keep pace with that much variation (Wyvern, 2018).
18.6.16 Counter-UAS as Disruptive Technology

UAS that have their flight interrupted by a physical means may fall to the ground at consid-
erable speed. Net-based systems equipped with a parachute intended to bring an ensnared
UAS down to the ground in a controlled manner are risky and inappropriate for use over
crowds (i.e., stadiums). Therefore, this technology is basically limited to military and law
enforcement uses.
C-
UAS jamming systems can interfere with legitimate communication links in the
vicinity.
The goal is to jam or spoof GPS signals and force the UAS to a new waypoint, but some
UAS can operate in GPS-denied environments or are built with protected communication
links, so this approach can be ineffective. Advanced jamming systems that only block the
frequency on which the targeted drone is operating are in development.
The U.S. military and allies, who see the proliferation challenge as significant, must
attempt to control the explosion of advanced UAS technologies. Preventing adversarial
nations and nonstate actors from acquiring this tech is vital to U.S. interests.19 Furthermore,
simplicity and the low cost of UAS technologies make this difficult to control; some levels
of interference are possible.
Counter-UAS has become a top priority for U.S. defense agencies (Wilson J. R., 2018).
Increased challenges in identifying friend from foe, and employing the appropriate CMs
are being investigated. The U.S. military is accustomed to three decades of conducting
ground and air operations in uncontested airspace environment. Short Range Air Defense
(SHORAD) systems have declined and passive air defense skills have atrophied across
U.S. forces (Wyvern, 2018).
18.6.17 Joint Forces C-UAS Challenges

Here is a list of Challenges to U.S. Joint Forces for Counter-UAS:
• U.S. forces are essentially “numb” to UAS presence. Recent combat experience in Iraq
and Afghanistan indicates that troops are highly accustomed to having friendly UAS
always available.
• Enemy UAS on the battlefield have been nonactors to this point but that may
change. U.S. forces lack UAS recognition training, making it difficult to observe the
characteristics of enemy UAS visually.
• All military leaders must take C-UAS into planning considerations
• Small, slow, and low profiles have proved to be significant challenges to traditional
air defenses.
• Reduction of dedicated SHORAD units creates potential gaps in air defense coverage
• The C-UAS problem is compounded by the ever-increasing proliferation of new UAS
designs and off-the-shelf systems sold to multiple countries
• U.S. military doctrine has not kept pace with the threat
• C-UAS training has not been a priority for most units
• Many military units have not updated plans to address the hazards UAS present
(Wyvern, 2018).
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18.7 Conclusions
Unmanned Aircraft Systems represent some of the most advanced U.S. air assets. They are
critical to the USA ADS. However, because they were designed with open communications;
SCADA controls; Internet interactions for ground, air, sea, and satellite support; and use
COTS software/hardware, they are vulnerable to a host of cyberattacks. Based on the
sheer diversity and number of potential cyber weapons that can be used at every stage
of the UAS mission, and the significant growth of UAS for defense purposes, the risk of
their hostile use against U.S. ADS is steadily increasing. Couple this with a huge growth
and increased sophistication of the UAS commercial technologies, the threat of hostile use
cannot be minimized (R. K. Nichols et al., 2019, 2020).
18.8 Discussion Topics

1) You are a terrorist. Contemplate the Risk and Success of a hostile take-over or
destruction of a friendly UAS by the following four methods:
• 1A –Spoofing GPS satellite communications
• 1B –Corrupting authentication of ground station communication signals
• 1C –Hijacking a UAS by hacking the internal ASIC chip communications
• 1D – ADS-B Spoofing/Jamming
• What cyber tools/weapons would you use to accomplish the 1A-1D goals?
2) Discuss the cyber countermeasures that could be used to terminate/disrupt/des-
troy an SWARM attack of 150 or more hostile UAS targeting an ADS facility.
3) Consider the following real case scenario and theory about U.S Navy Vessel
Collisions in the Pacific.
In 2017, there were chain of incidents/collisions involving four U.S. warships

and one U.S submarine. On 20 August, the guided-missile destroyer USS John S
McCain collided with the 600-foot oil and chemical tanker Alnic MC at 0624 JST.
Ten sailors died. On 17 June, the destroyer USS Fitzgerald collided with the ACX
30,000-ton container ship at 1330 JST, leaving seven dead. Records show that the
ACX turned sharply right at the time of collision. The route of the destroyer is not
shown on maps because commercial tracking data do not include military ships.
Damage to the starboard side of the USS Fitzgerald indicates that it would have
been on a bearing of approximately 180 deg. (South). The captain of the Philippine-
flagged container ship accused the Navy destroyer of failing to heed warning signs before
the crash. On 9 May, the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain collided with
a South Korean fishing boat off the Korean Peninsula. There were no injuries. On
31 January, the guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam ran aground dumping more
than 1000 gallons of oil into Tokyo Bay. On 18 August, the ballistic-missile sub-
marine, USS Louisiana collided with the Navy Offshore Support Vessel in the Strait
of Juan de Fuca. No injuries. (Office of CNO, 2020) (Lagrone, Chain of Incidents
Involving U.S. Navy Warships in the Western Pacific Raise Readiness, Training
Questions, 2017)
431
US Navy Official Response:

In all five incidents, the US Navy blamed their field leadership for not responding
in an appropriate manner, and blamed funding, lack of readiness, and lack of
training. Investigations and maintenance “holds” were initiated and courts mar-
shal and relief from duty were the punishments of the day. Reading between the
lines, this response would imply that the Skipper/XO/COB and at least five watch
sailors on each Naval vessel (roughly forty to fifty personnel including bridge
staff) were judged incompetent. Many US Navy careers were finished. Further,
this would also imply that all five vessels’ radar, emergency positioning alert
systems, AIS, sonar, and long-range collision avoidance equipment must have
been functioning perfectly, without a catastrophic failure or interference of any
kind (Office of CNO, 2020).
OR…
The Case for a Cyber Weapon:
There appears to be valid evidence to support the theory that at least two of the
US Navy warships and the commercial vessels they struck were the on the wrong
end of a hostile cyber weapon (Lagrone, 2017). They were receiving wrong GPS-
generated positional information. One theory is that an adversary’s cyber weapon
may have been deployed by UAS from a small, nearby vessel. The subject cyber weapon
may be an advanced modular entity that can spoof the GPS signals received by all
vessels in its range. Vessels given misleading data will make incorrect decisions in
terms of navigation and emergency responses –potentially leading to collisions
and deaths.
3A) Comment on the viability of the cyber weapon theory.
4) Research and choose one specific cyber threat or cyber weapon deployed against
SCADA systems used by UAS. Discuss the chosen SCADA threat and how it
exploits the vulnerabilities of the target system; the implications (impact) of the
attack; and what defenses and countermeasures might be used to defend or miti-
gate the threat to the target.
Notes
1 Artificial intelligence (AI) is an area of computer science that emphasizes the creation of intelli-
gent machines that work and react like humans. Some of the activities computers with artificial
intelligence are designed for include:
Speech recognition, learning, planning, problem solving and decision- making.
Research associated with artificial intelligence is highly technical and specialized. The
core problems of artificial intelligence include programming computers for certain
traits such as: knowledge, reasoning, problem solving, perception, learning, planning
and ability to manipulate and move objects.
(Technopedia, 2019)
2 Dr. Julie J.C.H. Ryan is a superstar in the INFOSEC community. Her research is prolific. See:
www2.seas.gwu.edu/~jjchryan/research.html. So is Dr Dan J. Ryan. See: https://security.iri.isu.
edu/ViewPage.aspx?id=926and rebuild=true
432
3 Some Level 3 UASs have capabilities that fall into Level 4 category. Datasheets do not necessarily
follow neatly into the author’s taxonomy.
4 The author praises the Velez and Morana text (2015) for its excellent presentations on the subject
of threat modeling (Morana, 2015). However, the RN equation is improperly cited on page 62.
The RN equation was published in book form in 2000 as part of the RSA #1 book launch in
San Francisco at RSA 200 Cryptographer Convention. The reduced forms of the RN equation
and application to A/Ds for my students is the author’s work. The discussion of the economic
relevance and the impacts of the RN equation started on page 54 of (Randall K. Nichols J. R.,
2000) and was based on a paper by Dr. Dan J. Ryan published in 1993 in the Colloquy of Security
Affairs (Ryan D. J., May, 1993) 26 years earlier.
5 Computers are ubiquitous, and this is why cyber threats are so integrally related to ADS.
6 In the author’s opinion only, this is contrary to the side of the climate change debate that feels the
world will soon end because of people’s interactions on physical climate. For an alternate view,
consult Gregory Wrightstone’s FACTUAL book: Inconvenient Facts: The Science that Al Gore doesn’t
want you to know. See: www.inconvenientfacts.xyz (Wrightstone, 2017)
7 Force majeure –or vis major (Latin) –meaning “superior force”, also known as casus fortuitus
(Latin) “chance occurrence, unavoidable accident”,] is a common clause in contracts that essen-
tially frees both parties from liability or obligation when an extraordinary event or circumstance
beyond the control of the parties, such as a war, strike, riot, crime, or an event described by the
legal term act of God (hurricane, flood, earthquake, volcanic eruption, etc.), prevents one or both
parties from fulfilling their obligations under the contract. In practice, most force majeure clauses
do not excuse a party’s nonperformance entirely, but only suspend it for the duration of the force
majeure. (A/CN.4/315, 1977)
8 Any decision in life ultimately is a risk decision where we are interested in the worst and the best
actions or results that can happen as a change from the norm SQ. Decisions that appear to yield
less risk are usually chosen. [Extreme sports enthusiasts fail this commonly accepted criterion.]
In legal terms, this is called performing Due Diligence. The object is to reduce, prevent or mitigate
the risk of an event of action.
9 This is the nub of the Attack /Defense Scenario (A/D) analysis.
10 Semtex is a general-purpose plastic explosive containing RDX and PETN. It is used in com-
mercial blasting, demolition, and in certain military applications (Pike, 2017). It is the terrorist’s
favorite choice of explosive weapon.
11 FIRES definition (US DoD –JP 3-0) the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or
nonlethal effect on a target. (DoD, Dictionary of Military Terms, 2018)
12 Danger Close Definition www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2013/May-June/
Myer.html Nov 14, 2013 -1) danger close is included in the “method-of-engagement” line of a
call-for-fire request to indicate that friendly forces are close to the target. ... Danger close is a term
that is exclusive from risk estimate distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used
to define danger close for aircraft delivery. Pi = Probability of incapacitation. 2) Definition of
“danger close” (US DoD) In close air support, artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it
is the term included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fire which indicates that
friendly forces are within close proximity of the target.
13 IoT –Internet of Things, the newest way to electronically connect everything imaginable.
Combined with Blockchain security, we see a technology revolution. (Author) “IoT is short for
Internet of Things. The Internet of Things refers to the ever-growing network of physical objects
that feature an IP address for Internet connectivity, and the communication that occurs between
these objects and other Internet-enabled devices and systems.” (Stroud, 2019)
14 Skyjack Drone© hack. Drone that flies around seeking wireless signal of any other drone in area.
Forcefully disconnects wireless connection of true owner of target drone. Authenticates with
target drone pretending to be its owner. Feeds commands to it and all other zombie drones.
SkyJack© primarily a Perl application that runs off a Linux. Detect drones by seeking out wireless
connections from MAC addresses. (Kamar, 2016)
433
15 Aircrack-ng© To put wireless device into monitor mode to find drones and drone owners.
Deauthenticate true owner of drone. Once deauthenticated, connect as drone waiting for owner
to reconnect (Aircrack-ng.org, 2016).
16 Snoopy© is a software that can hack into Wi-Fi and steal data attached to drones. Composed of
various existing technologies. Uses distributed tracking and profiling framework. Runs client-
side code on any device that has support for wireless monitor mode. Collects probe request and
uploads to a central server. Exploits handsets looking for wireless signal. Most leave their device
Wi-Fi setting on spoof network available to Wi-Fi searchers to use. Once connected to rogue net-
work, data are stolen. Differs from other rogue access points in the way data are routed. Traffic
is routed via an OpenVPN connection to a central server. Able to observe traffic from all drones
in field at one point. Traffic manipulation only done on server. Allows basic data exploration and
mapping (Glenn, 2012).
17 Many navigation systems rely heavily on GPS signals to determine their location in time and
space. By transmitting false GPS signals to these systems, it is possible to remotely take them
over. This has potential applications to the problem of rogue drones. The GPS is composed of a
network of satellites that continually broadcast timestamped messages describing their locations
in space. GPS receivers use these timestamped messages to determine how long it took for the
signals from each satellite to reach the receiver. Multiplying this time by the speed of light gives
the distance between the receiver and each satellite. These “pseudo ranges” may be combined to
solve for the receiver’s position and the time of day. The structure of the GPS signal is known to
the public and the frequencies that it uses are low enough to be generated with commercial-off-
the-shelf equipment.
This means that it would not be difficult (or expensive) for an adversary to build a
system that creates signals that would appear to a receiver to be from GPS satellites.
Transmitting these false GPS signals to receivers may cause them to lock onto the false
signals instead of the authentic satellite signals. This is called GPS spoofing (Bhatti,
2015) (Humphreys, 2009) (Chapman, 2019) (Kerns, 2014). Systems that rely heavily on
GPS to determine their location, such as ships at sea, are highly vulnerable to being
spoofed (Bhatti, Humphreys, 2015).
18 For those not familiar with this WWII horrific tactic: A Kamikaze was a member of a special corps
in the Japanese air force charged with the suicidal mission of crashing an aircraft laden with
explosives into an enemy target, especially a warship. sUAS/UAS can do the same thing but with
a larger number of deployed AC.
19 The author thinks that this is a waste of time. China currently outstrips UAS production by a large
factor. No way they decide to stop their growth in view of their stated military New Silk Road
Land and Sea strategy (Nichols R. K., et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies
and Operations, 2020) (Nichols R. K., 2019).
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19
Unmanned Traffic Management (“UTM”)
Michael S. Baum
Unmanned Traffic Management by Michael Baum (CRC Press, 2020) introduces unmanned
traffic management (UTM) and how it integrates unmanned aircraft operations into
national airspace systems to forge an aviation future that is agile and resilient, with
innovative and viable new services. This introductory, extensively annotated book begins
with a history of UTM and explains how the UTM concept has progressed through exten-
sive collaborative research and testing with private and public entities such as NASA’s
UAS Traffic Management Project, the UTM Pilot Program (UPP), the UAS Test Site
Program, and private sector applications, including initial UAS package delivery services,
enterprise fleet services, and data services necessary to implement UTM. Other national
governments making significant contributions to UTM research and development are
also discussed.
Chapter 2, UTM Concept of Operations (ConOps) outlines UTM Concept of Operations and
identifies global variations of a notional architecture of UTM-based operations and how
they may eventually enhance or merge with legacy air traffic management systems. This
chapter identifies and describes many UTM participants, including UAS operators, UAS
Service Suppliers (USS), Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSPs), Air Navigation
Service Providers (ANSPs), Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs), and other participants and
stakeholders; it also describes data and data exchanges necessary for safe and secure UAS
operations. The scope and characterization of possible UTM services are described, to
include, in part, registration, discovery, strategic coordination, conformance monitoring,
constraint management, UAS remote identification, and associated security services.
Because UTM harbors a heightened attack surface from its developing federated infra-
structure (analogous to those of Internet and cloud services), due attention is given to
cybersecurity standards development, secure operations, and awareness. The chapter
also presents centralized versus federated architectural considerations. It gives focus to
Flight Information Management Systems (FIMS), and mentions System-Wide Information
Management Systems (SWIM) and other supporting elements of notional UTM architec-
ture. Discovery (the essential process by which a USS finds relevant peer USS to help UAS
avoid one another in the same airspace) is described and various approaches to implemen-
tation are explained. The chapter introduces discovery methods and lexicon, the discovery
and synchronization service (DSS), data rights and privacy management, and detect and
avoid (DAA) technology.
Since UTM is infeasible without standards, Chapter 3, Standards-Making for UTM, surveys
leading and relevant standards development organizations (SDOs) and their work product.
There are a growing number of SDOs contributing to UTM development, with particular
leadership by ASTM International, and certain regional and domain-specific SDOs.
439
440
Evolving UTM Governance is explored in Chapter 4— including approaches to the

assessment, approval, management, and oversight of UTM components and ecosystem.
These approaches include performance- based regulation, self-declaration, third- party
audits, service level agreements, and traditional or updated airworthiness certification.
The “rules of the air” must respond to the boundaries of UTM and ATM and advancing
surveillance technologies, resolve when manned aircraft will be required to participate
in UTM, and contemplate incremental autonomous operations. Traditional airspace rules
(such as for instrument and visual flight for manned aircraft) may present unworkable
gaps to UTM, prompting proposals for new airspace volumes and constructs. Moreover,
fairness in airspace access presents novel challenges requiring industry consensus and
technical solutions.
Other governance challenges, recognizing the nondelegable government role in airspace
regulations, include the broadening influence of state, regional, and local governments as
UTM stakeholders, and community issues such as noise, privacy, and safety policed at the
local level. Industry consortia and nongovernmental organizations factor into the broader
governance ecosystem, including how federated UTM might best be governed. Business
models and competition law affect governance, particularly since some of the world’s lar-
gest companies are at the helm. Apportionment of liability and development of effective
insurance regimes must also be addressed. Risk assessment methodologies are essential, so
the Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) developed by the JARUS working group
responsible for SORA Annex H is examined for its possible contributions.
The governance chapter also includes a brief discussion of spectrum, noting initiatives to
exploit both licensed and unlicensed spectrum, including via standards-and rule-making.
A discussion of UTM administration considers how a notional UTM consortium may
benefit by adopting certain attributes fashioned by the highly regulated banking industry
and its automated clearinghouse network fostering trust, high-volume operations, and the
gravitas to help forge effective regulation.
Chapter 5, Selected Initiatives and Implementations, examines early significant, influential,
and innovative efforts to advance the state of UTM. These include the FAA’s Low Altitude
Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) and “U- space” (the European
version of UTM). Safety mitigations and lessons learned from LAANC operations in the
United States are featured, and an outline of U-space initiatives follows, with an overview
of proposed implementing regulation. Selected UTM initiatives and implementations
from around the world that influence, serve as pathfinders, and advance UTM are also
presented.
Finally, the Future of UTM is considered in Chapter 6, including potential barriers to its
success, international coordination, and regulatory reform. A few specific areas highlight
where technology innovation is imperative, such as for communications infrastructure
and autonomy. Other promising technologies such as blockchain are considered.
UTM will support more than very low level (VLL) operations: air taxis, high-altitude
(high “E”), and perhaps even space traffic management (STM) operations. Urban air
mobility (UAM), increasingly known as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), the infrastruc-
ture and aircraft for short-haul urban air transportation, is introduced. UAM components
include multimodal aerial ride sharing, electric aircraft, an automation platform, and
connected skyports. What is being learned in UTM will inform and enable UAM.
Nearly every dimension of the aviation infrastructure is in the crosshairs of UTM and fair
game for scrutiny, imagination, innovation, disruption, and reformulation. These changes
can truly be viewed as disruptive and even “revolutionary.”1 Remarkably, UTM has bled
441
Unmanned Traffic Management (“UTM”) 441
into, if not permeated a broad swath of aviation’s fabric. It is synthesizing new capabilities
from disparate disciplines and modes of transportation—whether terrestrial, airborne, or
beyond—reshaping the future of both manned and unmanned aviation. While its effect
may still be largely unfelt, since its most significant impact is to future infrastructure and
operations, we can be assured that UTM will be central to the future of aviation.
Note
1. Kopardekar, Parimal, Ph.D., et al., NASA Ames, Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of
Operations, 16th AIAA Avi. Tech., Integration, and Ops. Conf. (June 2016), p. 16, https://utm.arc.
nasa.gov/docs/Kopardekar_2016-3292_ATIO.pdf
442
newgenprepdf
443
20
The Future of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Tom Haritos and R. Kurt Barnhart
20.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443

20.2 Anticipated Market Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
20.3 The Future of UAS Market Segments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
20.3.1 Private/Commercial UAS Market Segment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
20.3.2 Public UAS Market Segment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
20.3.3 Predicates to Future Market Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
20.3.3.1 Routine Airspace Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
20.3.3.2 Training and Certification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
20.4 The Potential for Career Opportunities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
20.5 Emerging Trends in Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
20.5.1 Miniaturization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
20.5.2 Power Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
20.5.2.1 Alternative Energy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
20.5.2.2 Electric Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452
20.5.3 Materials Improvements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452
20.5.4 Revolutionary Manufacturing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454
20.5.5 Computing and Artificial Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454
20.6 Future Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454
20.6.1 Atmospheric Satellites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
20.6.2 Air Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
20.6.3 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456
20.6.4 Commonality/Scalability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456
20.6.5 Swarming UAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
20.7 Five Years and Beyond. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
20.1 Introduction
Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535–475 bc), an ancient Greek philosopher, was noted for his
observance of the constancy of change in the universe. Nowhere is that constancy more
evident than in the high-tech world of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). The very term
itself has been the subject of debate in some sectors, including many in the media, who
have adopted the term “drone” instead of UAS. Other sectors have migrated to the term
443
444
“remotely piloted aircraft.” To proponents of this last term, the usage of “unmanned” is a
liability when attempting to explain publically just what these aircraft do. As such, writing
about the future of the UAS is a bit slippery. Therefore, the majority of this chapter will
focus on broader and more enduring industry trends as opposed to attempting to make
specific predictions in this highly dynamic area.
20.2 Anticipated Market Growth

No discussion of an industry is complete without an examination of historical precedents,
for context, and future trends. It has only been within the last 15–20 years that UAS has
become a significant industry segment. That makes it young by any measure. Driven by
robust technological advancement, the market for UAS manufacturing and support ser-
vices that began as a miniscule, barely noticeable segment of the industry, has become,
in a relatively short span of time, a major component of the aerospace enterprise. Recent
growth has been steady, and predictions point to continued expansion. As is often the case,
new segments of industry experience rapid growth that is almost immune from the eco-
nomic cycles that affect more mature industries. This has certainly been, and continues to
be, the characteristic of the UAS market.
20.3 The Future of UAS Market Segments

According to http://marketresearchmedia.com, UAS market expenditures can be broken
down into nine basic segments:
• Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E)

• Platforms or air vehicles
• Ground control systems
• Payloads and sensors
• Service and support
• Sensor data processing and dissemination
• Training and education
• Data management
• Revenues by UAV groups
By all accounts, the worldwide UAS market forecast continues to indicate strong growth for
the foreseeable future. Major UAS market research firms agree that the industry will con-
tinue to experience strong growth over the next 5–10 years. The Teal Group Corporation,
a team of integrated market research analysts, estimates in their 2019 World Civil UAS
Market Profile and Forecast that the total revenue market will be $90 billion over the next
10 years worldwide for nonmilitary UAS production. The fastest anticipated growth is in
the commercial sector. The inclusion of military UAS research expenditures would increase
the forecast by an additional 70–80 billion dollars spent over the next decade. Worldwide
UAS expenditures in the commercial sector will continue to experience a compound
445
The Future of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 445
9 $16,000
8 $14,000
7
$12,000
6
$10,000
5
Value
Units
$8,000
4
$6,000
3
$4,000
2
1 $2,000
0 0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028
Units (Air vehicles, Millions) Value ($ Millions)
FIGURE 20.1
Teal Group’s World Civil Unmanned Aerial Systems –2019 Market Profile & Forecast.
annual growth rate of approximately 8.5% as the industry begins to explore technology
innovations for expanded and nonsegregated UAS operations such as beyond-visual-line-
of-sight. The inherent need for enhanced data communication and data transfer technolo-
gies, advanced remote sensing payload, detect and avoid, and counter UAS applications
will lead toward this exponential increase in the coming years. Figure 20.1 depicts the Teal
Group’s civil UAS production forecast, which anticipates that the UAS market will triple
in size by 2028.
The FAA has long divided flight operations into two broad categories depending upon
whether the responsible entity is public or private. As defined under 14 CFR 1.1, public (or
public use), aircraft are those “aircraft owned [or leased for at least 90 days] and operated
by the government of a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the
United States or a political subdivision of one of these governments,” or by a branch of the
U.S. military. Under 14 CFR 1.1, private aircraft are those that are “not public aircraft,” that
is, those that are privately owned and commercially operated. These definitions have been
extended by the FAA to include UASs.
20.3.1 Private/Commercial UAS Market Segment

In the first edition of this book, published in 2010, the Private/Commercial UAS market
was described as “the dam which is ready to break,” and at no time has that statement been
more accurate than it is now –albeit somewhat later than many expected at that time. In
2012, the FAA recognized the inherent need to focus on the bourgeoning UAS industry and
established the UAS Integration Office, a division within the FAA Flight Standards Office,
often referred to as AFS-80. During the same year, Congress enacted Public Law 112–95 –
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. This law established the required statu-
tory definitions for UAS, a comprehensive 5-year roadmap, criteria for the selection of
UAS test sites, and an achievable path forward for private companies to access the nation’s
airspace; a case-by-case exemption process for commercial UAS operations (i.e., Section
446
333 Exemption). Before that point, the primary regulatory mechanisms for most UASs to
operate in the National Airspace System (NAS) were to apply to the FAA for either an alter-
nate type of airworthiness certificate (i.e., special airworthiness certificate) in the experi-
mental category or a Certificate of Authorization (COA) that established a wide spectrum
of controls and limitations for specified UAS operations. COAs have typically only been
available to public agencies, thereby excluding commercial operations. Until this need was
addressed by the interim regulation, the COA process played a vital role in airspace access
for those operating UASs defined under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as public
aircraft. To date, if a proposed public use operation falls outside the allowances of any
regulation, then the implementation of the COA process may still be necessary. Thus, the
COA process is expected to continue to play a role in UAS operations in the foreseeable
future for public operations that fall outside the constructs of 14 CFR Part 107.
In June of 2016, the FAA amended regulations to Title 14: Aeronautics and Space to add
sUAS to the proposed rule. As defined in Title 14 CFR Part 107, an small UAS (sUAS)
is a remotely operated aircraft that weighs less than 55 pounds. Applied exclusively to
sUAS, this rule currently limits operations to daylight hours when the vehicle operator is
within visual line of sight of the vehicle (among other restrictions). Title 14 CFR Part 107
has provided a small segment of the UAS industry with initial operating procedures to
introduce low-risk, visual-line-of-sight UAS operations into the NAS. Although this is a
noteworthy effort on the part of the FAA to implement sUAS regulations, further research
is necessary to address issues that remain unresolved. For instance, access to airspace
for large-scale UAS and UAS operations is still prohibited due to the potential safety
challenges and the associated risks that larger systems pose when sharing airspace with
conventional aircraft in expanded and nonsegregated operations. Similarly, expanded and
nonsegregated operations for sUAS are prohibited under this rule. Entities who wish to
operate their UAS outside the auspices of 107 must petition the FAA for an exemption
to waive aspects of the final rule or apply to operate under Title 49 USC 44807, formerly
referred to as the “Section 333 Exemption”.
The potential for commercial UAS applications seems to have no limit and is growing
daily. As more people and industries become aware of the game-changing potential of this
technology, new applications will emerge, driven by technological enablement and the
light at the end of the regulatory tunnel. As Kyle Snyder of North Carolina State University
has said, “Show me an industry and I’ll show you [one or more applications] for UAS.”
Universities across the nation are seeing rather dramatic rises in external relationships
developing around the commercial potential of this technology. These industries include
energy, real estate, public safety, transportation, public resource management, animal
health, journalism, TV/Film, and the list goes on.
As of this writing, the regulatory landscape of UAS is ever-changing and is evolving
rapidly. In 2017, a Presidential mandate initiated the selection of the UAS Integration Pilot
Program (IPP). This initiative has provided state, local, and tribal governments with an
opportunity to experiment and evaluate the integration of civil and public UAS operations
into the NAS. They are pushing the regulatory envelope to identify the advantages and
shortcomings of its regulatory and technological underpinnings. The IPP initiative has
generated meaningful dialogue among the FAA and lead IPP participants as they evaluate
specific use cases, concept of operations (CONOPS), and effective approaches to future
rulemaking and the full-scale integration of UAS into the NAS.
That same year, however, the Department of Interior restricted UAS operations over crit-
ical infrastructure because enforcement of the sUAS rule has proven to be challenging.
447
Recent studies conducted by leading universities have established a baseline to better

understand the interference caused by unauthorized use of UAS in the NAS. The issue
is a significant compromise to the safety of the national airspace and its consumers and
has encouraged a proliferation of counter-UAS and UAS detection technologies in recent
years. Growth in the counter-UAS arena is expected to expand exponentially to combat the
nefarious use of these sophisticated technologies near and around critical infrastructure in
the United States and around the world.
As of December 2019, the FAA proposed the Reauthorization Act of 2018 to amend
segments of the current sUAS rule. It includes statutory language to permit routine night
operations, an Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to establish remote identifi-
cation for UAS as a mechanism to control access to airspace, and an NPRM to examine
current regulations about the type certification of unmanned aircraft. The UAS industry is
expanding at an exponential rate; a rate at which technological innovation has outpaced
the regulatory landscape for quite some time. We will continue to observe this trend for
many years to come –with a hope that the delay in establishing policy and regulation will
not stifle innovation and advances in technology.
20.3.2 Public UAS Market Segment

This segment of the market will continue to be dominated by the military, first responders,
and higher education-related research and training activities. Universities, both individu-
ally and in partnership with industry, will continue to lead with technological advances
and innovations that drive and create economic opportunities. The military will continue
to lead by pushing the limits of technology to meet the needs of situational awareness and
response, and will be responsible for the vast majority of UAS sector spending for quite
some time. First responders will continue to help lead the public sector by driving the need
for, and the capability to use, UASs to save lives and enhance their public acceptance. This
is in addition to all of the potential UAS applications that state and federal agencies and
offices may use to improve efficiencies and increase the quality of services.
20.3.3 Predicates to Future Market Access

The aforementioned expansion of UAS market segments is dependent upon their ability to
gain access to the NAS for expanded and nonsegregated flight, as well as the establishment
of training and certification standards similar to those that have evolved for the regulation
of manned flight. In a similar manner, expanded and nonsegregated operations will most
likely involve interaction between UAS pilots, manned pilots, and air traffic controllers;
much like aircraft operations are conducted today under instrument flight rules (IFRs).
To achieve full-scale integration and interoperability of manned and unmanned aircraft
in domestic and international airspace, future work will require efforts to ensure: (1) UAS
and associated systems (e.g., detect and avoid and collision avoidance sensors) will be
certified as airworthy to achieve type certification, (2) UAS will be operated by a qualified
pilot or operator in the appropriate class(es) of airspace, and (3) UAS will operate in com-
pliance with applicable regulatory guidance and avionics equipage standards. Current
research efforts at K-State in partnership with other core universities under the FAA’s
Center of Excellence, ASSURE, are examining the theoretical and practical underpinnings
of expanded and nonsegregated operations as a mechanism to inform the FAA as they
develop policies and rules.
448
20.3.3.1 Routine Airspace Access

The term “airspace” applied herein refers to the usable space from ground level to the alti-
tude where the atmosphere thins and space begins. The United States operates the busiest,
most complex NAS in the world, yet it is among the world’s safest systems. Most people
take this system for granted and never think twice about it, since it largely consists of an
invisible network of aerial highways, preferred routes, urban transition zones, and no-fly
zones, all dictated by stringent regulation and policy. The reason this busy, highly com-
plex system is so safe is because access to the NAS is tightly controlled and reinforced
through the FAA’s certification process that consists of policies and procedures that apply
to operators at all levels (pilots, air traffic controllers), aircraft, landing/navigation facil-
ities, and more. Without this system of certification, the skies above our heads would be a
chaotic and very dangerous place. As can be seen, the integration of an entirely new tech-
nology into this system can be a complex and often slow task, but one that is necessary
to minimize disruption and ensure that the historic levels of safety to which we all have
become accustomed will continue after UASs are fully integrated.
As was pointed out previously, the pathway for routine airspace access for low-risk sUAS
operations has been opened, and a mechanism to allow commercial sUAS activity is cur-
rently available, albeit with expanded and nonsegregated operational approvals granted
on a case-by-case basis for now. In the future, we can look forward to the next iterations
of sUAS regulations, hopefully within 2 years. The proposed modifications to the existing
rules may become more flexible to allow routine expanded operations (i.e., Operations
Over People) with sUAS in the NAS. The large UAS regulations will be somewhat more
complex and are several years from fruition. There is a substantial increase in complexity
inherent with operating large UASs in the NAS. However, since large UAS are more closely
align with traditional airframes, access to the NAS for government entities operating
larger platforms has been possible. For instance, The United States Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) agency has been operating large Predator UAS in the NAS for years
because of their ability to accommodate traditional manned certification requirements for
airworthiness and pilot/operator training.
In the future, it is anticipated that restrictions on night operations will be removed, yet
permission for routine nonsegregated BVLOS flights that would allow these vehicles to
reach their full potential may not be added for another decade. As has been the pattern of
the FAA, restrictions will probably be gradually loosened over time as operational track
records are established and the existing prohibitions prove to be too limiting or are dem-
onstrably unnecessary.
20.3.3.2 Training and Certification

For many years, federal standards have governed all facets of aviation from operator
training and certification requirements, to aircraft materials certification, to aviation-related
manufacturing, and aircraft maintenance standards. As UAS standards are developed,
established, and proven, manned aircraft standards are often incorporated or modified as
applicable and practical. The size and performance of the vehicle and the complexity of the
intended mission will drive UAS-related certification. For instance, the smallest vehicles
are intended to be operated within visual line of sight, so current expectations are that no
airworthiness certification processes will be required and only minimal operator training
will be mandated. For larger, more complex vehicles, the implementation of airworthi-
ness standards, and more stringent operator requirements, which may include practical
449
test standards for complex operations, are likely to be prescribed. It is also probable that
the airworthiness standards, at least for some vehicles, will consist of industry consensus
standards following a model similar to the light-sport aircraft certification process that
the FAA implemented approximately 10 years ago. Another possibility is the traditional
model of certification (i.e., 14 CFR Part 21.17(a) will be used, especially with systems like
the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper that are classified in the Group 4 category.
Current work at Kansas State University is exploring low-risk UAS-type certification with
a new framework, the durability and reliability (D&R)-based-type certification process.
The D&R has been authored by the Small Airplanes Standards Branch, Policy & Innovation
Division. The goal is to establish and provide Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)
with an unambiguous and prescriptive method to produce a consistent, repeatable, and
scalable framework for functional flight testing as a mechanism to demonstrate safety
assurance and document the reliability of their systems. The successful integration of a
mechanism to demonstrate safety assurance may relieve the tension on regulations for
airworthiness compliance. This work serves as an extension of previous efforts in conjunc-
tion with the FAA to validate consensus standards by applying airworthiness standards
developed for sUAS by a group of industry representatives as a part of the American
Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) F-38 committee structure. In the aforementioned
analysis, an sUAS that was representative of aircraft available for commercial operations
was selected for evaluation. To assess the relevancy of F-38 standards, K-State researchers
conducted a series of tests that replicated a wide variety of potential operational conditions
and determined at each stage of the evaluation whether ASTM guidelines were appro-
priate to ensure the safe operation and integrity of the aircraft and associated systems.
Other groups are currently working through similar validation processes to develop
and evaluate airworthiness standards in areas that include UAS electronics and operator
certification.
20.4 The Potential for Career Opportunities

UAS career opportunities in the future will abound as the vehicles and applications become
more numerous and the airspace opens to routine operations. There will be opportun-
ities for UAS operators, sensor operators, and technicians (aircraft maintenance, electronic,
and information technology). Larger vehicles with a larger logistical footprint will require
more job specialization, whereas smaller vehicle operation is more apt to require the oper-
ator to perform multiple functions including launch/recovery, flying, maintenance, and
data collection and dissemination. Many anticipate that the main occupational skill for
operations that can be accomplished by sUAS will be in a primary technical area other than
those that are aircraft-related (i.e., civil engineering, infrastructure maintenance, etc.), and
the UAS operational skill will be an add-on. Others believe that the sUAS operator will
need to be able to operate across a spectrum of industries, and will send mission data and
imagery to those with the appropriate skill set for analysis. The future reality will likely
be a hybrid of these two extremes. Those who desire a career in UAS would do well to
select training which exposes them to a wide range of platforms and automation control
software, as well as education that exposes them to the larger challenges faced by industry,
including political and economic challenges.
450
Many universities are now creating UAS- focused degree programs that center on
vehicle operations, system integration, and data collection. Examples include Kansas
State University, the University of North Dakota, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University,
Middle Tennessee State University, Purdue University, and multiple 2-year colleges such
as Sinclair Community College in Ohio, and Cochise College in Arizona.
20.5 Emerging Trends in Technology

There are numerous technological trends related to UAS to look for in the coming years.
A brief discussion of a few of the most notable of those trends is found in the subsections
that follow.
20.5.1 Miniaturization
Driven by advances in materials and processing technology, the size of many platforms
will continue to become smaller. Each evolution of electronics technology allows designers
to incorporate greater capabilities into increasingly smaller platforms. The limiting factor
in miniaturization is often the dissipation of heat energy; more energy is released as more
is being accomplished in these small spaces. In the future, as this problem is solved, it
is likely that all the components necessary for vehicle operation in the NAS (navigation,
communication, position reporting, etc.) will be located on one small printed circuit board
that could be easily removed and placed in another vehicle. As miniaturization technology
evolves, micro air vehicles (MAVs –wingspan smaller than 6 inches) and nano air vehicles
(NAVs –wingspan smaller than 3 inches) will become more prevalent in the future (see
Figures 20.2 and 20.3).
20.5.2 Power Solutions

In the future, the energy to power UASs will continue to be the subject of much research.
The requirements to become more ecologically friendly, less expensive, and more capable
that stretch the limits of current sources of power will be answered by future solutions.
20.5.2.1 Alternative Energy

UASs will be no exception in the move away from fossil-based fuels, and much work has
already been accomplished in this area. Hydrogen fuel continues to be one of the most
desired sources of fuel for UASs due to the minimal impact of its emissions on the environ-
ment. Historically, the challenge of using this fuel source on an aircraft has been the heavy
weight of the equipment necessary to carry hydrogen in compressed liquid form; however,
one company is working to solve this by using pellets of hydrogen combined with other
chemicals that turn into hydrogen gas when heated slightly. This eliminates the necessity
for a heavy and bulky tank.
Biofuel technology typically involves the conversion of biomass into useable liquid
fuel. Several biofuels have been tested on UASs, but how this technology will meet future
energy needs, and which fuels will be used is still uncertain. Debate continues about the
exact carbon footprint of biofuel technology. However, future advancements will continue
451
FIGURE 20.2
Microchip. Permission is granted to copy, distribute, and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU
Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with
no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the
section entitled GNU Free Documentation License. (From Wikimedia search for Microchip.)
FIGURE 20.3
MAV. This image or file is a work of a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), an agency of
the United States Department of Defense, employee, taken or made as part of that person’s official duties.
As a work of the U.S. federal government, the image is in the public domain. (DARPA website: Information
presented on www.darpa.mil/is considered public information and may be distributed or copied unless
otherwise specified. Use of appropriate byline/photo/image credits is requested. Additional information may
be found in: Wikimedia Commons Search for Micro Air Vehicle.)
452
to reduce their environmental impact, making this type of energy more popular in the
future.
Developments in reciprocating engine technology include the latest in digital engine
control. These controls permit the engines to vary the ignition timing and compression
ratios to allow these engines to burn a variety of bio-and fossil-based fuels, making them
highly flexible and adaptable to a range of operating environments and conditions.
Solar technology continues to hold great promise as a renewable fuel source for UASs.
Current limitations include limited payload sizes, the number of solar arrays required to
develop sufficient power, and battery and other weight penalties. Efficiencies here will
allow researchers to translate more solar energy into electricity using less surface area,
and to store that energy in lighter and more efficient ways. The hope for solar power con-
tinues to lie in advances in material technology that will allow more energy to be extracted
and stored using less weight, and advances in electronics that will allow solar-powered
vehicles to use less power to operate. Google’s Titan project is one such example. The Titan
aircraft has a 15.5 m wingspan and can carry a 32 kg (70 lb.) payload. It is powered by 3000
solar cells and can provide up to 7 kW of power that is stored in lithium-ion and lithium-
sulfur batteries.
20.5.2.2 Electric Options

Currently, electric motor-powered UASs are vehicles capable of carrying small payloads.
They have an endurance of 1–2 hours, at most, with the weight of the battery being the
largest limiting factor. Advances in lithium-polymer battery technology currently hold
much promise for an extended battery life, a very light weight, and an ability to shape the
battery to conform to the aircraft’s design. Future advances in electric UAS will include
the ability for vehicles to replenish their power from electric transmission lines, an electric
fuel “tanker” concept that can refuel vehicles in flight. As antennae and laser technology
develops, it may also be possible to transmit electricity through the air to recharge onboard
batteries (see Figure 20.4).
20.5.3 Materials Improvements

It is inherent in the field of aircraft design that the less weight required for the structure of
the aircraft, the more payload it can carry. Advances in structural materials will focus, in
FIGURE 20.4
LiPo battery. Source: I, the copyright holder of this work, release this work into the public domain. This applies
worldwide. (Wikimedia Search LiPo Battery.) (From Wikimedia search for LiPo Battery or Lithium Polymer
Battery.)
453
FIGURE 20.5
Composite material –carbon fiber. Source: I, the copyright holder of this work, hereby publish it under the
following licenses: This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported
license. (From Wikimedia search for Carbon Fiber.)
large part, on composite technology and will no doubt become lighter, more durable, and
easier to manufacture, maintain, and repair. Costs for these advanced materials are sure to
escalate accordingly; however, the prices for current composite materials may correspond-
ingly go down. Some current limitations of composite aircraft structures include a lack of
long-term structural integrity, especially when exposed to abnormal conditions such as
in a contaminated or caustic environment. However, advances in nondestructive testing
(NDT) technology are working to reduce this limitation. One recent advance in composites
technology, which will continue to enhance fabricators’ ability to use composite material
in more intricate and cost-effective ways, is resin infusion molding (RIM) technology, a
technology that allows parts to be fabricated without the use of an autoclave –something
that is often prohibitively expensive for smaller fabrication shops. Also, thin-ply tape tech-
nology now makes it easier to fabricate complex parts with intricate shapes and curves (see
Figure 20.5).
Other material advances now and in the future will allow the shape of the air vehicle
structure to become dynamic depending on the needs and conditions of the flight. Principles
of aerodynamics dictate that the structural configuration of an aircraft is different when
optimized for high-speed flight than for low-speed flight. Typically, altering the shape of a
wing (the structural member most typically modified) has required the use of complex and
heavy variable-sweep mechanisms. For example, a wing configured for high-speed flight
will be very smooth (laminar) with low camber and will often sweep aft. Wings for low-speed
flight are typically the opposite, with high camber, low sweep, and may have technology that
disrupts laminar flow in favor of lift-enhancing technology such as vortex generators, flaps,
and leading-edge slats. Military aircraft of the past have used complex variable wing sweep
technology to assist in the transition from high-speed to low-speed flight. Materials in the
future will allow the shape of the structure to be modified as the mission requires without the
use of heavy, complex infrastructure. They may also be able to flex so that the requirement to
have traditional control surfaces (flaps and ailerons) is eliminated.
The concept of recyclable thermoset plastics is now becoming a reality. This will allow
certain structural plastics, traditionally discarded once the shape was “set” by heating past
454
a certain point, to be recycled. This will make these materials more desirable for use in cer-
tain aircraft applications and will help reduce permanent waste.
Other advances in the materials sciences will allow UAS structures and components to
become self-repairing when damaged, or will make the aircraft suddenly “invisible” to
observers by using a material that assumes the color and texture of the background behind
it. Although not a material per se, advanced adaptive flight control technology will interact
with these new materials to allow an aircraft to instantly reconfigure to an optimum “fly-
away” state should it become damaged in flight.
20.5.4 Revolutionary Manufacturing

The revolution in 3-D printing technology is allowing for more complex components to
be produced “on-demand” using a variety of materials including polymers and metals.
This is enabling the concept of “distributed manufacturing” where products and parts
can be produced and assembled at multiple simultaneous locations (including by the cus-
tomer), rather than being produced and assembled centrally then distributed through a
traditional supply chain. The impact on traditional manufacturing is expected to be sig-
nificant and revolutionary across multiple industries. As the cost of these 3-D printers con-
tinues to decline, it will likely become standard practice to produce and assemble the major
components of a UAS at any location (i.e., home). This is closely related to another trend in
manufacturing called “additive manufacturing.” Rather than beginning with a larger piece
of material and removing what is not needed for a part, raw materials are added incremen-
tally to build the part or component. There is very little, if any, waste.
20.5.5 Computing and Artificial Intelligence

Continual advances in the capabilities associated with powerful microprocessing are enab-
ling a future airspace system where advanced vehicles are capable not only of autonomous
flight, but also of operation in an environment where vehicles communicate and coordinate
with each other for collision avoidance and sequencing into and out of busy environments.
There will be little direct human involvement other than monitoring. Both wide-area com-
munication systems and real-time operating systems are now being developed to enable
this future system. Multi-input sense and avoid-enabled aircraft, through the use of artifi-
cial intelligence and neuromorphic technology, will learn from their environment and from
other “machines” via interconnectivity and will become capable of intelligent and autono-
mous decisions. The ethics of such technology are, and will continue to be, hotly debated
as the future reality of machines that can out-think human beings in certain ways and can
even self-replicate comes into clearer focus.
20.6 Future Applications

The technological advances discussed in the preceding sections will enable and drive the
evolution of unmanned aircraft and the mission capabilities of the UAS; what they can
accomplish and how they will be utilized. Several future applications, novel and evolved,
will be briefly discussed in the subsections that follow.
455
20.6.1 Atmospheric Satellites

One potential application of UAS includes supplementing the array of space- based
satellites by using ultra-long endurance, high-altitude, solar-powered UASs that carry an
array of sensors including cameras and communication relays. They can provide similar
capabilities as space-based satellites at a reduced cost, albeit serving a more limited geo-
graphic area due to their lower altitude. One example of this technology, currently under
development, is the Google Titan project to provide wireless Internet connectivity to
under-served areas of the planet. The Titan has a 15.5 m wingspan and can carry a pay-
load of up to 32 kg. It is powered by 32 solar cells delivering up to 7 kW of power for
payload and propulsion, storing the excess in lithium-polymer and lithium-ion batteries.
The aircraft cruises at an altitude of over 20 km; higher during daylight hours and drifting
slightly lower during darkness until the sun’s energy allows the aircraft to return to its
optimum altitude.
20.6.2 Air Transportation

The UAS paradigm is certainly advancing. Organizations such as Amazon are planning
for future same-day small package deliveries in certain markets as regulatory and techno-
logical frameworks allow. A novel partnership between Wing and FedEx has been formed,
with current use case operations established in the United States, Australia, and Finland.
Currently, organizations participating with the IPP have exercised regulatory aspects to
achieve 14 CFR Part 135 certification for these types of activities. While it may take some time
for these types of operations to become routine, some air carriers have openly investigated
the potential for air freight to be delivered on long over-water routes by UASs. When the
air traffic control structure is in place to accommodate this technology, these routes would
be perfectly suited to prove the viability of large-scale commercial UAS applications, given
that they would occur primarily over open water with no one on board.
Although many people currently would never board an aircraft for a flight without a
human pilot, it is definitely possible, if not likely, that some future generation will not be
at all apprehensive in that situation. For that to occur, the safety of these flights will need
to be demonstrated beyond question for many years, starting with similar aircraft and
freight operations. While this concept is many years in the future yet, a series of smaller
steps will begin the process. This may include going from two pilots to one, operating in
a much more modernized air traffic control system. For one pilot to be sufficient, tech-
nology will need to be capable enough that the single pilot serves as an automation man-
ager and monitor, who only intervenes physically in cases of emergency. In the 1940s,
the largest passenger aircraft operated with a flight crew of five (not counting the cabin
crew): captain, first officer, flight engineer, radio operator, and the navigator. Advances
in technology have allowed this number to slowly be reduced to two through the years.
The captain and the first officer are now the only two pilots, and safety is better than
ever. Twin turbojet aircraft routinely carry passengers for hire on corporate aircraft that
are approved for single-pilot operations, and they have done so for many years. In this
case, certain automation technology must be present and available to the pilot to reduce
the workload if needed. For larger scale operations carrying more people, it would be
important to be able to monitor the health status of that single pilot so that a backup
pilot on the ground could be available in the unlikely event of the failure of onboard
automation.
456
20.6.3 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle

The concept behind the unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) was to design an offen-
sive unmanned aerial weapons delivery platform, instead of mounting weapons on a
platform that was designed for another purpose. Currently, carrier operational trials
underway between Northrop and the Navy are on track and successful. Many under-
stand that this aircraft will be the standard for the future, and the human will most
likely be relegated to observing the UCAV’s performance and monitoring its systems
from the ground. Removing the operator from on board is somewhat controversial,
but proponents contend that human limits on acceleration combined with the weight
penalty for onboard life-support systems produce a vehicle with less than optimum
performance. Detractors continue to argue that computer logic will never adequately
replace the human decision-making process, especially the ability to make split-second,
high-consequence decisions. However, this debate appears to be moot; the investment
in this direction is already occurring. There will probably be automation failures in the
future; however, the rate of those failures or errors will be much less than the rate would
have been with a human operator. This is something that will need to be proven by quan-
tifiable data (see Figure 20.6).
20.6.4 Commonality/Scalability
Given the proliferation of UAS technology produced by multiple manufacturers, it is
the publically expressed desire of the military to move toward technical commonality to
increase efficiencies in acquisition, support equipment, training, servicing, and support.
As an analogy, some manned aircraft operators choose to operate only one common model
of aircraft with different variants to increase the familiarity of their aircraft operators,
servicers, and maintainers with the equipment. Much of the training and many of the
features are similar, which allows those who work with the aircraft to become much more
efficient at performing their jobs. Likewise, the military is seeking similar system com-
monality for many of the same reasons. It is inefficient to attempt to field a multitude of
unrelated vehicles. The concept of scalability, closely related to the concept of common-
ality, allows the features of one vehicle to be “up-” or “down-sized” based on the mission
requirements. The technological advances discussed in the preceding sections will enable
greater commonality among UASs and allow unmanned aircraft to be more facilely and
efficiently scaled, in less time, at a lower cost.
FIGURE 20.6
UCAV X-45A. This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States
Federal Government under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, and Section 105 of the U.S. Code. See Copyright.
(From Wikimedia search for UCAV or Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle.)
457
20.6.5 Swarming UAS

The concept of “swarming” is largely a military-oriented concept (borrowed from nature)
that is making inroads into the potential civil market. In military parlance, the concept of
swarming is when an objective is accomplished (i.e., a target is attacked or observed) using
multiple simultaneous aircraft, through varied means. It is a technique used to overwhelm
a target and subdue it quickly to gain a tactical or strategic advantage. This concept, which
is already being tested in military research, involves the close coordination of multiple
independent systems in a relatively small amount of airspace. In other words, these future
systems need to display a high degree of interoperability, coupled with a high degree of
autonomy. The command and control infrastructure has yet to progress to a point where
swarming can be supported, but a move toward this concept will no doubt drive those
necessary technical improvements (Flaherty 2014).
20.7 Five Years and Beyond

Since many future concepts are based on technology yet-to-be-invented, this is where the
discussion gets a bit more difficult and nonspecific. What is known is that scientific and
technological advancements are truly mind-boggling, and intelligent minds continue to
constantly push to almost any limit when challenges arise and the need and/or oppor-
tunity is great. As has been mentioned, machines that can learn to accomplish complex
tasks on their own, and can also learn from each other are being designed and fielded.
Complex tasks in the future will involve interacting with humans, learning to speak, and
generating ideas. Combined with advances in mechanics, structures and materials, and
power delivery, the future is anyone’s guess. We may indeed see a future where artificially
intelligent machines can repair or replicate themselves, seek their own fuel source, and
make decisions that could run counter to their originally intended design.
Another concept sure to continue into the future is the field of unmanned spaceflight.
Certainly, many unmanned space missions over the last 40 plus years have demonstrated
the advantages of being able to explore space and other planets without having to con-
sider the limitations of human physiology. The successes of the Mars rover projects have
demonstrated on a grand scale that unmanned operations are often the best way to accom-
plish a dangerous mission.
There is much more that could be discussed on this topic and certainly much more depth
that could be explored on each topic, but due to the scope of this text, we shall leave that
for further exploration by the reader. One thing is for sure, as has been said, the future is
unlimited and unmanned!
20.1 List the advantages and disadvantages of the term “Unmanned Aerial System.”
What are some alternate terms?
20.2 Refer to the eight basic segments of the UAS market in Section II of this chapter. Use
the internet to list one current development (within the last 90 days) in each area.
458
20.3 List three challenges of converting ground-based infrastructure (i.e., airports) to

joint manned/unmanned use.
20.4 Many UAS systems are designed to be used for surveillance; what challenges may
arise with widespread UAS use for surveillance?
20.5 What should be the limits of artificial intelligence as it relates to autonomous
decision-making by UASs?
References
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the
National Airspace System (NAS). November 2013. Washington, DC: FAA Communications.
www.faa.gov.
Flaherty, N. Aiming for the high life. Unmanned Systems Technology. November 2014. High
Power Media.
Frost and Sullivan. Global military unmanned aerial vehicles market assessment market research
media. Market Research Media Premium Market Analysis. Web. 9 January 2014. <www.
marketresearchmedia.com/?p=509>.
The Teal Group 2014. UAV Integrated Market Analysis. Web. 17 July 2014. <www.tealgroup.com/
index/php/about-teal-group-corporation/press-releases/118-2014-uav-press-release>.
The Teal Group 2020. 2019 World Civil Unmanned Systems Market Profile & Forecast. Web.
26 February 2020. www.tealgroup.com/index.php/pages/press-releases/60-teal-group-
predicts-worldwide-civil-drone-production-will-almost-triple-over-the-next-
For Further Reading

Singer, P. W. Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. New York: Penguin
Press HC, The, 2009. Print.
459
Epilogue
Douglas M. Marshall
This third edition has provided the reader with an in-depth look at the major challenges and
issues flowing from the rapidly evolving technology of unmanned aircraft systems. There
have been many advances in systems, capabilities, policies, and regulations since publica-
tion of the Second Edition of Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The chapters in
this edition that appeared in the second edition of this series have been updated to cover
recent developments in the technologies discussed, and new content has also been added.
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) technologies and the uses to which they have been
applied have evolved dramatically since the publication of the first edition of this book.
Arguably, the most disruptive element of this evolution has been the introduction into
the world market of relatively affordable multirotor vertical takeoff and landing aircraft
equipped with gimbaled high-definition or multispectral cameras capable of delivering
quality images and video from a stable platform. The ensuing “Cambrian explosion”
of manufacturers offering a wide variety of systems and components has generated an
untold number of entrepreneurs and new categories of UAS operators. Much of this expo-
nential growth has continued even while this third edition was being written, and while
the preceding 20 chapters have been intended to provide the reader with descriptions and
summaries of the state of the art of the technology, by necessity informed by past history,
it is likely that some of the information the authors have shared will be overtaken by new
advances and developments even as this edition goes to press.
It is useful, however, to summarize the high points of each chapter in an effort to bring
some order to the chaos of this dynamic and exhilarating industry. What follows reflects
the editors’ takeaways from each chapter.
Chapter 1
This chapter traces the history of unmanned aviation from ancient Chinese kites, through
early unmanned aircraft, to the Wright brothers and beyond, accelerated by military usages
in WWI and WWII.
It was in the crucible of “the war to end all wars” that aviation came of age, and along
with this wave of technological advancement came the critical but little recognized neces-
sity of achieving effective flight control.
Unmanned aircraft paved the way for the development of manned aircraft (Chinese
kites and hot air balloons), and the process has reversed as systems advances in manned
aviation led to the integration of manned technologies into unmanned systems.
459
460
The developmental process is the same for manned and unmanned aircraft and is par-
allel in all respects. Structures, propulsion, flight control systems, stabilization systems,
navigation systems, and the integration of all these components into flight automation
systems made the nearly parallel development of manned and unmanned aircraft systems
possible.
The reader is introduced to the three Ds: dangerous, dirty, and dull. Dangerous means that
either someone is trying to bring down the aircraft or the life of the pilot may be at undue
risk operationally. Dirty is where the environment may be contaminated by chemical, bio-
logical, or radiological hazards precluding human exposure. Finally, dull is where the task
requires long hours in the air, making manned flight fatiguing, stressful, and not desirable.
Nicola Tesla invented radio control and perhaps the radio itself (before Marconi), to
guide torpedoes. Lawrence Sperry developed the first practical gyro-control system for the
same reason. These inventions led to the first useful mechanical autopilot. In 1918, Sperry
teamed with Glenn Curtiss to create the first operational unmanned aircraft, the Curtiss
N-9 Aerial Torpedo (the first “drone” was never put into production). The Army answered
with the Kettering aerial bomb, or “Bug,” the first mass-produced unmanned aircraft.
The interwar period (1919–1939) produced a demand for target drones, which proved
effective against antiaircraft guns during tests by U.S. and British navies, and which led to
air power doctrine that favored aircraft carriers to defend the fleet.
The famous British actor Reginald Denny, model aircraft enthusiast, created an unmanned
target drone for the U.S. Army, and eventually produced over 15,000 OQ-1 Radioplanes
(TDD-1-Target Drone Denny-for the Navy), the most popular drone of WWII. U.S. and
Royal navies continued to develop newer versions of bigger and heavier target drones to
train antiaircraft crews during gunnery trials, with great success.
The first detection device on a drone was a primitive 75-pound RCA TV camera in the
nose of a TDN-1 Assault Drone (flown from another manned guiding aircraft). Later
versions were deployed successfully in the Pacific Theater during WWII. Eventually, the
Navy and Army air forces outfitted four-engine bombers with Sperry three-axis autopilots,
radio control links, and RCA TV cameras in the cockpit. They were loaded with explosives,
the idea being that crews would control it during takeoff, set up the automatic functions,
and aim to the target, and then bail out. The tests and early missions were largely unsuc-
cessful, resulting in abandonment of the program, but not before one such aircraft’s pay-
load detonated prematurely and killed the two pilots, one of them being President John
F. Kennedy’s older brother Joseph P. Kennedy.
The Germans produced the most advanced unmanned aircraft of the era with the V-1 Buzz
Bomb, which terrorized England for much of the war. The device was the first successful,
mass-produced, cruise-missile-type unmanned aircraft, and its design influenced many
postwar unmanned aircraft designs. Over 25,000 were built, which made it the highest
production unmanned combat aircraft in history, excluding modern hand-launched small
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Most were ground-launched, but some were deployed
from aircraft, making them the first air-launched unmanned system as well. While rela-
tively primitive with regard to accuracy and navigability, the V-1 was mass produced,
and, employing many firsts for autonomously flown aircraft, it influenced future designs
and provided the historical context to fund many more sophisticated unmanned programs
during the following Cold War. The U.S. Navy reverse-engineered a captured V-1 for use
in the invasion of Japan and made later improvements on it to evolve into the first naval-
launched, jet-powered, unmanned cruise missile.
The Germans developed other weapons systems throughout WWII. The lines between
guided missile and unmanned aircraft are not always clear, and the V-1 assault drones,
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Epilogue 461
explosive-packed, radio-controlled bombers, and the piggyback Mistletoe (Mistel) config-

uration all involved forms of an airplane, which places them in the category of unmanned
aircraft.
Unmanned systems development shifted from target drones and weapons delivery
platforms to reconnaissance aircraft during the Cold War years, a trend that continues today,
with 90% of all unmanned aircraft now being used for data gathering, remote sensing,
video imaging, aerial inspection, law enforcement, and environmental monitoring.
The Vietnam War witnessed the development of radar decoy drones designed to deceive
surface-to-air (SAM) missile radar into locking onto a drone instead of a manned aircraft,
using a combination of radar reflectors and radios that mimicked electronic signatures of
large aircraft such as B-52s.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the high-performance Ryan AQM-34 “Lightning Bug” reconnais-
sance aircraft enjoyed a long career in intelligence gathering and radar decoy roles, pri-
marily in high-priority missions of great national importance and later on as target drones
for fighter air-to-air missiles. The first helicopter UAS was also developed during the same
time frame, most notably the pioneering Navy QH-50 DASH (Drone Anti-Submarine
Helicopter), an aircraft developed to deploy homing torpedoes over submarines. Over 700
were built, and were also operated by other countries such as France and Japan.
All along this development history, the goal was to achieve as much autonomy from
manned ground control as possible. It was not until the advent of small, lightweight digital
computers, inertial navigation technology, and finally, the Global Positioning System (GPS)
satellite network, that autonomous unmanned aircraft operations gained flight autonomy
on a par with a human-piloted vehicle. The worldwide explosion in personal computers
and the digitalization of everyday items, from wrist watches to kitchen appliances, played
the most significant role in unmanned aircraft autonomy.
Moving forward into the most recent era, Middle East conflicts brought the emer-
gence of the twin-boom pusher UAV, such as the RQ-7 Shadow, and the Israel Aerospace
Industries’ “Scout,” both used for tactical battlefield surveillance and equipped with
advanced imagery capability. The Scout was accompanied by two other systems: the IAI
Decoy UAV-A and the Ryan-built Mabat. They were primarily used to detect and destroy
SAM batteries and provide quality eyes-on battlefield imagery for ground commanders.
The lessons learned from the 1982 Bekaa Valley conflict between Israel and Syria, where
the Scout UAS proved to be very effective, initiated a worldwide race to develop close-
battle unmanned aircraft.
Unmanned systems continued to evolve through the Desert Storm conflict in 1991 and
accelerated after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, as the military’s demands
for both reconnaissance and weapons delivery platforms have overcome inherent biases
from the manned aviation community. Military leadership has openly embraced the tech-
nology and has committed significant resources to the acquisition and deployment of
unmanned systems, increasing the number of aircraft from 30 in 2001 to over 8000 as of
2020. Amateurs and commercial UAS operators in the United States have leveraged the
military experience and advantages in capability through microelectromechanical systems
(MEMS), miniature power plants, and advanced radio systems to promote the transform-
ation of a toy into a viable tool. This revolution has happened so quickly that the FAA has
had great difficulty controlling the proliferation of commercial UAS manufacturers and
operators.
The question of whether unmanned aircraft will ever replace manned aircraft is yet
unanswered, and the challenge to that concept is the vulnerability of a fully autonomous
system to interference or jamming by a hostile force or element. Another challenge is the
462
chain of responsibility in the military weapons delivery arena, which suggests that a fully
autonomous system would not be allowed to employ lethal force.
Chapter 2
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce readers to the numerous applications of unmanned
aircraft systems. Much of this chapter has been updated from the previous versions to
showcase new commercial applications and software available for commercial UAS uses
today. New UAS applications are occurring at a rapid pace now that commercial UAS
applications can occur in the National Airspace System (NAS). Commercial applications
for UASs have increased tenfold since the FAA issued the certification requirements for
remote pilots under 14 CFR Part 107, 14 CFR Part 135 air carrier cargo operations such
as Wing and UPS, and 14 CFR Part 137 agricultural drone applications. This chapter
introduces methods for controlling UASs with a focus on the automated control methods.
This includes using software to manage a fleet of drones for a large commercial operations
and employing autopilot software to operate complex missions. Due to the amount of data
commercial UAS users can generate, sensor data management is key to working in situ-
ations where people and missions are spread out around the world. This chapter defines
the uses of analytical photogrammetry software and showcases change detection machine
learning with computer vision and autonomous flight path algorithms. Some of the new
commercial UAS applications added to the chapter include building/roof inspections, air-
craft inspections, power line inspection, and small and large unmanned cargo delivery. The
reader is encouraged to do more research in the UAS application that is of most interest. The
references in this chapter are a good place to begin performing more research.
Chapter 3
This chapter introduces the reader to the components that make up an “unmanned aircraft
system.” Whether military or civilian, the system typically consists of the human compo-
nent, the command and control system, the aircraft itself, the communication data link, the
payload, and the launch and recovery element.
The systems described may have different names, such as remotely piloted aircraft, or
remotely piloted vehicle, in addition to “unmanned aircraft system.” Whatever the name,
they are commonly categorized by weight, and in the future perhaps by risk-based criteria.
The physical and operational characteristics of both fixed-wing and vertical takeoff and
landing UAS platforms are described.
The elements of the command and control component consist of an autopilot, a pro-
grammable lost-link procedure, and some degree of autonomy in navigation. The ground
control station (CS) can be land-or sea-based, and can range in size from a handheld trans-
mitter to a workstation that can accommodate multiple personnel, such as a pilot and
sensor operator.
The communication data link connects the ground CS to the autopilot on the aircraft
and can be line-of-sight or beyond-visual-line-of-sight (BVLOS), with varying choices for
463
Epilogue 463
operating frequencies, subject to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations.

The BVLOS option requires a satellite link, which invokes the drawback of latency or delay
of transmission of the signal.
Payloads usually refer to an instrument on board the aircraft that provides imaging,
video, communications, sensing devices, radar, or other instruments that provide the
operator with information about a particular area of interest or phenomenon that requires
observation. Electro-optical, thermal infrared, multi-and hyperspectral cameras, and laser
range finders offer capabilities to record and retain images and data that are useful in a
wide and ever-growing variety of applications in the civilian and scientific communities,
in addition to multiple military uses.
The launch and recovery element ranges from hand-launched small UAS to catapult-
launched larger aircraft, with many others in between that take off and land very much
like a conventional aircraft.
The human element is the most important, consisting of pilot, sensor operator (usually
only for very large and complex unmanned aircraft), and supporting ground crew. The
pilot in command is still in charge of the safe operation of the aircraft. The human inter-
action (human factors) component of this element is covered in detail in Chapter 6.
Chapter 4
This chapter takes the reader through a comprehensive review of the key characteristics
of the payloads commonly found on UAS of varying sizes and lift capacities. The primary
reason that UASs are flown at all is to collect some form of data. Data can be generated in
situ (in place) or remotely with sensors, and the types of sensors that can accomplish this
task are the focus of this chapter.
There are two types of remote sensing sensors: spot sensors and imaging sensors. The
former measures a single location, such as identifying surface melt water on sea ice,
whereas the latter records multiple data points utilizing a number of different methods.
The most common remote sensors are cameras, which can be visible-spectrum cameras,
near-infrared cameras, long-wave infrared cameras, and hyperspectral imagers. Each has
its own unique capability of collecting and storing data, and the choice for the user is
to match the type of camera or imager with the mission and the type of platform to be
employed to carry it.
Other devices for data collection include light detection and ranging (LIDAR) and syn-
thetic aperture radar (SAR). LIDAR is useful for measuring distance to the ground from the
aircraft, and SAR radars are often used for mapping and have the advantage of being able
to “see” through clouds, smoke, and dust. SARs are also able to pick up surface features,
and they have high spatial resolution.
Remote sensing technologies support many applications in academic research and
science. They also offer much potential in emergency response and search and rescue
operations.
Other uses of the technology include creation of background imagery for mapping, 3D
point cloud/modeling, and measuring vegetation health, which has proved to be a signifi-
cant tool in precision agriculture and thermal mapping, as well as forestry and vegetation
management. Since the turn of the century, the industries that use remote sensing tools
have witnessed an explosion of digital technology that has been the foundation for the
464
growth of the UAS market as a whole, and of the remote sensing component in particular.
However, the field of UAS remote sensing is in its adolescence and developers are still
exploring its possibilities.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 provides a broad overview of the complexities of the aviation regulatory system
within which manufacturers, developers, users, and operators of unmanned systems must
navigate to stay on the compliance side of the law. The reader is introduced to a brief
history of the U.S. regulatory system in general, the FAA’s “tool box” in particular, and
the methods by which the FAA enforces those regulations, policies, orders, and guidance
documents.
Regulations applying to unmanned systems cannot be read in isolation from inter-
national regulations and standards, so additional attention is given to the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other European government aviation organizations
and commissions that have also developed or are in the process of developing compre-
hensive regulations for unmanned aircraft in sovereign as well as international airspace.
A brief exposition of the differences and similarities between regulations and consensus-
based industry standards is offered, with further exploration of how the standards process
has and will impact UAS/RPA operations and airworthiness requirements in the United
States and globally.
How the regulatory process works in the United States, from proposal and crafting of
regulations, to implementation, and then compliance and enforcement policies, is outlined
to inform the reader and the “prudent entrepreneur” on how to access, understand, and
comply with the relevant regulations and policies, with the ultimate goal being to avoid
the enforcement phase of the process. Brief summaries of similar processes in Europe and
elsewhere around the world are offered for comparison and analysis of attempts at global
harmonization of UAS regulations, rules, and standards.
Finally, a way forward is proposed, with suggestions to the user community as well
as the regulators on possible methods to reduce the pain of the “sausage making” pro-
cess in the development of reasonable, logical, and enforceable rules and regulations for
unmanned aircraft. The rule-making process is ongoing and evolving as this book goes
to press, and there may be some basis for predicting how future UAS rules may read, but
it is recommended that industry and user groups be involved from beginning to end so
that all voices are heard and the best outcome that maintains the high level of safety in the
U.S. and international aviation system can be achieved.
Chapter 6
While remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) are often referred to as unmanned, it is clear that the
humans involved and their actions are critical elements to safe operations. The goal of human
factors research is to provide operators and support personnel with the necessary knowledge,
skills, and abilities and to achieve the overall goal of safe, effective, and efficient operations.
465
Epilogue 465
The aim of this chapter is to provide a broad discussion of human factors concepts and
their application to the field of RPA operations. The chapter provides the reader with
an overview and in-depth analysis of the core challenges to all who are interested in or
committed to the development and evolution of unmanned systems, which is how to inte-
grate a wide range of operators and their experiences with equipment of varying capabil-
ities flying very different missions in often unpredictable conditions.
Many of the human factors concepts discussed are common to manned as well as
unmanned systems, and appear across other professions operating in complex, dynamic
settings. The scope of the problem is enormous.
The pitfalls of hindsight bias (the “belief that an event is more predictable after it
becomes known than before it became known”) are explained with reference to addressing
the concerns arising from the transition from manned aircraft to RPA systems. Examples
such as imaging technologies being used for sensing and avoiding hazards, the capabilities
of human vision versus the limitations of RPA visual displays as they influence in-flight
maneuvers, and differences in perception, peripheral vision, and relative motion demon-
strate that the transition faces many challenges.
Charles Wickens’ multiple resource theory was developed to explain human-cognitive
challenges of performing simultaneous and/ or difficult tasks. “Attention” is defined
as the management of brain resources, which can be managed in several ways, and are
referred to as attention types. Those types are categorized as “selective attention” (utilizing
a systematic visual scan of information sources that involves the operator’s skill to select
and process these information sources); “focused attention” (directing brain resources to
a single task, potentially resulting in poor distraction management and loss of situation
awareness); “divided attention” (performing two tasks simultaneously such as an RPA
pilot observing visual displays for optical images while controlling the aircraft, made more
difficult when tasks share resources); and “sustained attention” (the process of monitoring
the environment for changes, which may or may not be foreseen, such as an RPA operator
monitoring an automated system for failures, flight performance, and navigation, subject
to degradation over time).
Human errors occur when an action results in an outcome that was not intended, even
if the actions performed are intended. It is evident that well-trained and current operators
still commit errors. The nature of human error involves a wide range of activities, from
overall strategy and planning errors, to inadequate monitoring of information systems, to
poor technical execution of a skill. Some errors are inconsequential, which means that there
is no negative outcome if they are not identified and corrected. Many errors are identified
and corrected, through monitoring actions of operators or other individuals. Anticipating,
monitoring, identifying, and correcting errors are common tasks in the aviation industry.
When trained and qualified individuals commit errors, it is seen as an unexpected event.
In reality, errors are common and should be expected. Training professionals in RPA
operations should include active monitoring and expectation of errors.
Negative transfer is a common error when transitioning to new systems with similar
layouts. Negative transfer is using a previous, well-established skill in a new setting in
which the action is incorrect.
Threat and error management strategies began evolving in the 1970s with the beginning
of “cockpit resource management” (CRM) to assist crew interactions with regard to com-
munication, crew coordination, team building, and decision-making. The work of James
Reason, Douglas Wiegmann, Thomas Shappell, and others further identified ways to clas-
sify errors and contributing causes, with the intent to identify trends and develop effective
countermeasures. Shappell and Wiegmann’s publication of the human factors analysis and
466
classification system (HFACS) provided a framework to identify and classify errors and
contributing factors.
Crew resource management may be defined as “using all available resources—
information, equipment, and people—to achieve safe and effective flight operations,”
a concept arising out of a series of crew coordination incidents in the 1970s. Team con-
cept principles stem from manned aviation operations, where the goal is to train pilots
and other crewmembers to work together in a coordinated fashion, sharing information,
decision-making, and actions. In RPA operations, there are likely to be others outside the
operations team that would provide input or direct operations. The initial goals of CRM
training involved increasing participative management and assertiveness in the crews.
While a clear chain of command is important in RPA operations, participative manage-
ment refers to leaders who involve other crewmembers in the decision-making and actions
of the team. This discussion involves the use of power distance, effective communication,
ambiguity resolution, distraction management, and avoidance of negative transfer. These
are a few of the topics in advanced crew coordination coursework, but are considered cen-
tral issues in safe operations of unmanned systems.
Situation awareness is critical in unmanned aircraft operations. In spite of the diversity
of professions involved in situation awareness training, common cognitive processes are
used. Mica Endsley defined situation awareness as “an internalized mental model of the
current state of the flight environment.” Delta Air Lines’ training programs state that it is
“the ability to recognize events occurring to you and around you then reacting correctly
to those events.”
The task of vigilance requires individuals to direct their attention to information (e.g.,
aircraft position, instrument readings, airspace conflicts, and structures), which has the
most immediate impact on safety. Vigilance not only is managing the appropriate type of
attention but also requires knowledge of the operations to identify and correctly assess
the risks involved. Vigilance is commonly degraded by distractions. When using focused
attention to provide inputs to the control systems, even momentary distractions can lead
to significant problems. Distraction management strategies are designed to improve vigi-
lance of tasks.
When working in complex systems, correctly identifying and understanding a
developing situation (“diagnosis”) can be challenging. Achieving the correct diagnosis
involves many skills. Gary Klein describes the process as creating a story to explain
the findings, and using experience to shape the explanation. One challenge to make a
correct diagnosis can arise from the clarity of the information presented to the operator.
Incomplete, inaccurate, misleading, or conflicting information can impair this process. As
aviation professionals, training emphasizes the need to consider abnormal readings that
cannot be explained.
Risk analysis asks, “What is the likelihood and consequence of failure of each option I am
considering?” “Vicarious learning” is defined as an individual whose prior poor choices
and safety risks have not resulted in negative outcomes and, as a result, the individual
does not have a realistic assessment of the risks they are taking.
Individuals who exhibit appropriate vigilance correctly identify the problems occurring,
and have selected an appropriate course with regard to risk assessment may still fail in
that they do not act to correct the problem appropriately. Individuals who commit errors
may not be willing to identify and correct the error, as this will bring attention and possibly
blame and liability.
The goal when designing workstations (control modules, information displays, etc.)
is to create a system the operators can use efficiently and effectively (human–machine
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Epilogue 467
interface). Often, the control systems are analogs of previously designed control systems,
such as video gaming, aircraft controls, or computer keyboards.
In man–machine interfacing, compatibility refers to the consistency of the information
and control systems to the operator’s expectations. When transitioning to a new worksta-
tion, attention to compatibility can identify aspects that need modification or additional
training to achieve compatibility. Conceptual compatibility is the effective use of symbols,
colors, sounds, or other indicators to convey information. Spatial compatibility refers to
the organization of the information and control systems. Are the information systems
located where the operator would expect them? Movement compatibility refers to the dir-
ection and sensitivity of the movement. The direction and sensitivity of controls can lead to
operator error. Controlling a small, radio-controlled RPA through direct visual observation
is a good example of movement compatibility challenges. Systems that are poorly compat-
ible will increase demands on the users. Human–machine interactions can be challenging.
Proficiency, currency, and developing correct mental models of the systems you are using
cannot be overemphasized.
Chapter 7
In this chapter, the reader is introduced to system safety tools aimed at promoting the
safe integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). As organizational safety
measures and procedures are increasingly being prioritized at the “system” or manage-
ment level to ensure appropriate implementation, this chapter applies some of the time-
tested principles of safety management system (SMS) theory to a UAS setting and provides
the reader with practical tools that can be applied to any UAS operation as a system safety
enhancement.
Although not a step-by-step how-to guide for SMS implementation, this chapter examines
the hazard analysis process, which is a key foundational step in any SMS program, whereby
potential operational hazards are identified and quantified. Closely associated with that is
the “change analysis” process, which investigates organizational changes in light of their
impact on safety and informs the hazard analysis process. The reader can then use the risk
assessment tool to begin to assess risks in their own organization. The chapter continues
with a look at flight test cards and their role in the safety process, as well as a look at how
these tools can enhance the airworthiness process. Finally, the chapter concludes with acci-
dent investigation considerations specific to UAS.
Chapter 8
This chapter is a comprehensive treatment of the export control regulations related to
unmanned aircraft systems in the United States. The chapter starts with a glossary of
important terms related to export control. The discussion continues with an outline of
the sources of export controls in the United States and describes in detail the U.S. policies
that underlie the export control regulations. Also covered in this chapter is the multitude
of statutes, executive orders, and regulations that make up the U.S. export control system.
468
Many examples are given of products that are covered by the export control system and
would potentially require an export license to transfer, ship, or move outside of the United
States, and a full list of “exports” as defined by International Trade in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) is provided.
The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and ITAR regulations are very
complicated, and the unwary faces significant sanctions for noncompliance. The chapter
explores the purpose of export control, the underlying purpose or justification for enacting
export control regulations, the purpose of the export control license, who must obtain
an export control license, which federal agency issues such licenses, and describes the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and ITAR regulations. The authors describe how these
regulations apply to UAS and associated technologies, and also explain the differences
between ITAR and EAR regulations, which agency controls exports under the latter regu-
lation, and what is meant by the term “export” under ITAR regulations.
The reader is provided with information to be able to describe in detail EAR regulations,
to list and describe those UAS technologies that have been removed by the Departments
of State and Commerce from EAR and ITAR control, why export controls are described as
“strict liability” laws, and to describe the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and
corresponding annex in detail.
The chapter also explains the ITAR categories, including those categories and sections
that refer to UAS, describes what is meant by a compliance program, and explains why it
is important to have one if there is potential EAR and ITAR application.
Chapter 9
This chapter introduces the reader to the assumptions and processes that go into the
selection and execution of the design of an unmanned aircraft system. The design pro-
cess is outlined, emphasizing the philosophy that the design should be driven by the
mission to be accomplished by the aircraft and the system. A brief history of UAS devel-
opment, from military to public to commercial operations in the United States, beginning
in the early twentieth century and continuing through the present, provides context for
the evolution of mission-driven UAS designs. Raymer’s “design wheel” illustrates the
iterative nature of the process where preceding trade studies sets requirements, concepts
are derived from requirements, the design analysis may generate new concepts, and the
cycle may repeat.
The chapter covers design tools, airframe materials and components, propulsion systems
(battery-powered electric motors, gas turbine, and internal combustion engines), flight
control systems (autopilots, wireless remote, stability augmentation, auto takeoff, and
landing), control stations (GCS, handheld controllers, CS interface), payloads (cameras,
meteorological sensors EO/IR sensors, LIDAR, SAR), and communications, command,
and control (C3, wireless data links).
The ASTM International F38 Committee on Unmanned Systems is developing engin-
eering standards supporting UAS-type certification. RTCA Special Committee 203 was
established to develop standards for sense- and-avoid and C3 criteria and SC 228 is
developing minimum operational performance standards for detect-and-avoid equipment
and C2 command and control data links.
469
Epilogue 469
Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing is widely used for the UAS design verification of the
aircraft control system, sensor/payload integration, and the CS interface. After systems
verification, a simulated environment might be used to prepare for mission validation, or
for pilot/operator training, where the tasks of an actual mission might be simulated.
Chapter 10
UAS Airframe Design outlines the airframe design considerations as influenced by mission
goals and performance and payload constraints, while providing a general overview of
common designs and the reasoning behind the selection of a particular design over others
in a diverse field of alternative platforms. Probing even deeper into the design process
as described by the previous chapters, UAS Propulsion System Design examines engine
designs, propellers, and how those components are integrated to provide the most efficient
powers source for an unmanned aircraft, principles that are equally applicable to large or
small UAS. In comparison to the design choices available to those who engineer and create
manned aircraft, a much larger number of configuration options inhere to the creation
of unmanned aircraft, particularly small UAS or sUAS. Should the vehicle be a single-or
multirotor or fixed-wing aircraft? If a fixed-wing design, should it be a flying wing, con-
ventional configuration, or canard? Should the tail be a cruciform, T-tail, inverted-T, a Y-
tail, V-tail, or inverted V? Should the structure be traditional monocoque or composite?
These are but a few of the many alternatives that UAS operators and developers must con-
sider when addressing the requirements of the contemplated mission or use of the system.
Chapter 11
This chapter provides and in-depth treatment on the subject of UAS power plants, which
are very similar to (and in many cases the same as) traditional aircraft powerplants with
a few emerging nuances. This chapter covers detailed technical descriptions from a
nonengineering perspective. Covered in this chapter is a complete and detailed discus-
sion of all types of reciprocating and gas-turbine internal combustion powerplants. On the
reciprocating side, powerplant designs discussed include 4-stroke, 2-stroke, diesel, and
rotary engines. Gas turbine designs are broken down into turboprop, turboshaft, turbojet,
and turbofan engines with the advantages and disadvantages of each.
Emerging electric propulsion systems are discussed, along with propeller/rotor choices
and integration. Overall, as in the airframe (Chapter 10), propulsion system design consid-
erations are detailed for designers who are looking to integrate airframes with appropriate
power plants in light of the intended mission profile. The concept of maintainability is also
discussed as it relates to designing for ease of continued airworthiness.
Other topics discussed in this chapter include emerging certification efforts related to
aircraft as well as training and certification aimed at technicians and operators. Finally, a
discussion of design-safety considerations is also included, covering both reliability and
risk assessment considerations.
470
Chapter 12
An electrical system is essential to the operation of all controllable unmanned aircraft (UA).
Even the least complex RPA relies upon electrical power to receive, process, and distribute
input signals to achieve command and control, and often for propulsion. The intricacy and
sophistication of the onboard systems of large unmanned aircraft are comparable to those
of large, turbine-powered manned aircraft—and some make the case that, due to payload
and command and control requirements, large UASs are more complex than comparably
sized manned aircraft. The electrical system interconnects all subsystems, and therefore, is
the systemic nexus common to all UASs.
The evolution of UAS capabilities and the expansion of mission profiles will result in
larger, more sophisticated UAS coming into service. This circumstance will impact compo-
nent and subsystem design, which, in turn, will drive the evolution of larger, more complex
electrical systems and associated components. Brushless generators and starter/generators
have already been developed for UAS applications. A continuation of this trend will see
the replacement of hydraulic system components and fluid lines with electrical actuators
and wires. This will require more efficient and possibly higher capacity generators, larger
electrical distribution system components (to handle heavier current flows), and greater
complexity throughout the entire interconnecting subsystem nexus.
Chapter 13
Chapter 13 takes a look at UAS communication systems. This chapter starts with a prac-
tical way to explain UAS communication to the novice and moves into a more detailed
discussion. Items discussed in this chapter include electromagnetic wave propagation in
free space, and basic communication systems and its elements, which includes modulation
and frequency hopping.
A comprehensive outline of a basic communication system and its elements follows.
The elements should consist of modulation devices, transmitters, the channel for the
wireless link (antenna directivity, antenna gain, and polarization issues), the receiver
(signal-to-noise ratio, receiver sensitivity, dispreading the signal), and demodulation
design strategies. System design requires the establishment of bandwidth requirements
and effective link design. A summary of design principles is provided, along with a
discussion of bandwidth requirement and the associated problems for EMI (electromag-
netic interference) internal interference, jamming, and multipath (the different pathways
a signal can take to a receiver and how some of these signals arrive at the receiver after
bouncing around).
Chapter 14
The command and control (C2) components comprise the UAS subsystem that enables
controllable and autonomous flight. An essential C2 element is human, and the term
471
Epilogue 471
operator “in the loop” implies direct control of the vehicle through pilot intervention,
and operator “on the loop” indicates that the operator is monitoring autonomous flight.
Other components most generally comprising the C2 subsystem are the ground control
station (GCS) and associated software and electronics, antennae, ground-based and air-
borne transceivers, the autopilot to enable autonomous flight, air data and GPS systems,
MEMS gyros, accelerometers and magnetometers for navigation and vehicle control, the
interconnecting circuits and data buses, and onboard intelligences for computing and
data processing. Larger UASs may also include auto-takeoff and autolanding systems.
Although UAS command and control may occur via other methods (e.g., light transmission
or through the umbilical cable of a tethered vehicle), C2 is most commonly accomplished
via two-way transmissions that communicate commands to the UAS through an uplink
and telemetry from the aircraft to the GS through the downlink. The medium through
which this communication is accomplished is the radio frequency (RF) portion of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum.
The proliferation of UASs has paralleled improvements in binary computing devices
and associated electronics. The miniaturization of these devices and their incorporation
into microcircuits was enabled by developments in materials sciences, quantum physics/
solid-state theory, and semiconductor manufacturing techniques. As C2 systems continue
to evolve and mature to become more compact, less expensive, and more capable, it is
likely that the requisite level of human intervention will correspondingly decrease, just
as occurred in manned flight where transport crews have shrunk from five (pilot, copilot,
navigator, radio operator, and flight engineer) to two as the result of improved tech-
nologies. If predictions that unmanned transports will one day carry passengers to their
destinations prove true, the ability to do so will be dependent not only upon the evolution
of C2 systems to become nearly 100% reliable, but also the integration of detect-and-avoid
components into the command and control subsystem.
Chapter 15
The integration of subsystems into unmanned aircraft is what allows the aircraft to carry
out its intended mission. Payload subsystems come in a variety of sizes and configurations,
from extremely complex, with heavy computational capabilities, to relatively simple
designs. Each system tries to meet the objectives of the operator. The myriad applications
of UAS with their respective payloads provide great opportunity for researchers in many
fields to implement and exploit the capabilities of UAS.
The integration of subsystems onto UAS ideally uses a systems engineering approach to
design. Payloads typically involve many components that must be integrated together to
carry out the desired mission. This approach necessitates multiple steps on the way
to designing a complete UAS subsystem. Those steps typically consist of concept devel-
opment and trade studies, preliminary design review, critical design review, fabrication,
system testing, and flight testing.
This chapter provides guidelines that have been proven to be successful for UAS pay-
load development in a number of settings. As regulations and airspace operations con-
tinue to develop in this rapidly evolving industry, increasingly specialized regulations and
requirements will be imposed, and these new rules will in all likelihood become standards
for legal operation and development.
472
Chapter 16
One of the foundational tenets of flight is the responsibility of the pilot to see and safely
avoid other aircraft. From the dawn of manned flight, pilots have been expected to main-
tain vigilance so as to remain “well clear” from other aircraft. The advent of UAS has
changed how we approach technology’s role in supporting or replacing functions once
solely performed by human pilots.
The systems that allow a means of compliance with “see and avoid” requirements and
remaining “well clear” are called detect and avoid (DAA) systems. The legal definition of
“well clear”—a quantified specification of the time, distance, or both that must separate
aircraft—provides UAS a means to not only meet, but likely exceed the ability of aircraft
with onboard pilots to avoid a potential collision. This same definition supports the intro-
duction of similar systems into manned aircraft, allowing pilots the benefit of increased
situation awareness as well as reliable alerting for aircraft that may present a collision risk.
For UAS, the challenge is demonstrating compliance with the rules of the air—ensuring
that the aircraft, even when not under direct pilot control, is capable of maneuvering suffi-
ciently so as to avoid a potential collision hazard. This challenge requires execution of two
main tasks: (1) avoid a collision and (2) remain “well clear.”
The task description for DAA consists of two major functions: self-separation (SS), the
ability of the system to remain “well clear” of other aircraft; and collision avoidance (CA),
the ability of the system to prevent a collision with another aircraft.
To support the core functions of SS and CA, it is necessary to identify and sequence the
component subfunctions that support a safe and reliable SS or CA maneuver. The FAA SAA
Workshop identified eight subfunctions for SAA. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
SAA Science and Research Panel (SARP) provided its own decomposition, which included
the addition of three new subfunctions. These 11 subfunctions, in time- linear order,
are: detect target, track target, fuse target tracks, “orient” tasks, identify object, evaluate
threat, prioritize threat, decide tasks, declare/alert, determine maneuver, command man-
euver, execute maneuver, and return to course.
The role of the pilot (pilot in-the-loop, pilot on-the-loop, pilot-independent), and the role
of air traffic control are also examined as a foundation for a description of the DAA system
components (sensors, avoidance algorithms, and displays).
In 2013, the DoD SARP was tasked with defining a means of compliance with “well clear”
for UAS. As a foundation for their approach, the SARP arrived at five guiding principles
for UAS to comply with “well clear”:
1. “Well clear” is a separation standard for UAS.

2. DAA systems need a quantitative standard, while humans may judge “well clear”
subjectively.
3. “Well clear” is defined based on minimizing collision risk, but informed by
operational considerations and compatibility with existing manned aircraft CA
systems.
4. “Well clear” is defined in the horizontal dimension based upon time and distance.
5. “Well clear” is defined in the vertical dimension based on distance.
The result of this effort was the creation of a model that accounted for both time and dis-
tance from other aircraft, and provided a sufficient vertical (altitude) separation to support
appropriate avoidance maneuvering (including a minimum time to closest point of
473
Epilogue 473
approach of 35 s, a minimum horizontal distance of 4000 ft, and a minimum vertical dis-
tance of 700 ft from other aircraft).
Chapter 17
This chapter examines the history, practice, and implications of UAS in the service of public
safety in the United States. Starting with the earliest mentions of UAS in official documents
from the FCC and the FAA, the chapter surveys the development and current state of
laws affecting UAS operations by public entities such as law enforcement and firefighting
agencies. The authors discuss public aircraft operations, and the tension on the boundary
of federal aviation laws and regulations, and local public safety realities.
The chapter also surveys the technology, which continues to democratize the ability to
see and do things from the air for agencies that could never contemplate access to such
tools before UAS. The differences and strengths of manned and unmanned aircraft as
applied to public safety missions are discussed, as well as the interaction of regulations
and technology to define what is possible today. The authors also include a brief discussion
of the novel legal questions in the area of search and seizure presented by UAS. Discussion
questions at the end of the chapter are designed to get students’ thinking and discussing
the state of public safety UAS operations, and question their current form to ponder what
could be improved.
Chapter 18
Chapter 18 covers cybersecurity, counter unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) and auto-
mation. It describes the sUAS/UAS landscape that includes the automation, collaboration,
and vulnerabilities of the Air Defense Systems (ADS) and their countermeasures; the role
of AI; the importance of SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition); and SCADA
systems and their vulnerabilities. Consider that UASs are just Flying SCADA systems.
What follows is a discussion focusing on a qualitative tool, the Ryan-Nichols equations as
a way to evaluate the threats posed to and by sUAS/UAS cyberattacks and cybersecurity,
and to measure and judge qualitative Information Security (INFOSEC) risk relationships.
The RN equations are a versatile qualitative method that evaluates attack/defense scenarios
to determine the normal, best, and worst risk cases based on the Threats, Vulnerabilities,
Impact and Countermeasures of the scenario. Dr. Daniel J Ryan and Dr. J.J.C.H. Ryan
developed the core/fundamental concepts of this approach in a series of papers. The
author uses the consolidated form of the RN equations and lethality matrix in teaching
qualitative risk scenario evaluations.
Automation of sUAS/UAS is explored with emphasis on collaboration capabilities of
SWARMS, which deserve special emphasis because they pose the highest risk to assets
and personnel.
Sense and avoid systems (SAA) are critical to UAS because they affect both attack and
defense scenarios using sUAS/UAS, as are cyber SCADA threats and vulnerabilities in
and to SAA and UAS. Cyber Terrorism using UAS (i.e., “just flying SCADA Machines”)
474
include spoofing GPS, CAS sensory deprivation, disabling of gyroscope and MEMS, and
resonance. A taxonomy of traditional cyberattacks is presented and a brief look at present
C-UAS advances, including Electronic Warfare (EW) and Electromagnetic (EM) Jamming,
Acoustical Signatures, Countermeasure (CM) and Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) Libraries,
and Stealth Design conclude the chapter.
Chapter 19
The current UAS industry, social and cultural contexts, and operational environments are
dynamic, and specific predictions are sometimes difficult to formulate with any degree
of confidence. However, the continuation of certain established trends is probable, and
consequently, is a more reliable predictor of the future of the UAS enterprise than more
inconstant, speculative, uncertain aspects of the industry. Driven by robust technological
advancement, the market for UAS manufacturing and support services that began as a
minor segment of the industry has become a major component of global commerce in the
relatively short span of 15–20 years. All projections give credence to the expectation that
this strong growth will continue. And just as technology drives the market, economics, in
turn, will encourage the continued improvement of technology in terms of better manu-
facturing techniques, stronger, lighter, more suitable, and facilely applied materials and
smaller, faster, more capable, and less expensive microprocessors, avionics, autopilots,
and related UAS electronics. As regulations continue to evolve in concert with technology,
larger unmanned aircraft with more complex and rigorous mission profiles will emerge.
At the confluence of these trends will be an expanding job market for those involved in the
UAS segment of the aerospace industry.
With a longer time horizon, the development of alternative energy sources that
include fuel cells and hydrogen fuel pellets would afford another means of improving
UAS performance. Several companies, including Airbus, Boeing (Phantom Works), and
AeroVironment (in conjunction with NASA), are developing solar-powered UASs with
expected mission durations of 5 years or more. Sometimes termed atmospheric satellites,
these UAS platforms are being developed to act as weather and earth observatories and
telecommunications relay stations. Improvements in battery chemistries and construction
techniques will improve both range and endurance of electrically powered UASs, as well
as the useful load of such platforms. In-flight refueling to recharge the batteries of electric
UASs is also being explored as a means of extending flight parameters.
Updates to this chapter include a discussion of the role of artificial intelligence in UAS
automation as well as a discussion of emerging career opportunities. Also included are
discussions regarding emerging certification and training standards for vehicles and
operators in addition to the emerging market found in point-to-point delivery services.
As one peers further into the future, accurate predictions become more difficult.
A continued acceleration of the pace of technological advancement in this area will
not be surprising. Neither will be an increasing diversity of UAS mission profiles and
proliferation of the technology. As has often been stated, the future is unlimited and
unmanned.
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Epilogue 475
Chapter 20
This chapter is a condensed outline of a companion book by the same author, Michael Baum,
that covers in great detail the history, a concept of operations, standards making efforts,
governance, selected initiatives, and implementations, offering a look into the future of
unmanned traffic management (UTM) systems. UTM is a highly automated, distributed
system of systems for facilitating the safe and efficient integration of unmanned aircraft
operations into a nation’s airspace system. UTM and related concepts such as Europe’s
U-space are intended to manage unmanned aircraft system traffic without overloading
current air traffic control systems. UTM shares certain attributes with legacy air traffic
management (ATM) systems to provide separation, flow control, and navigation services.
As with ATM, airspace management, traffic flow management, and control systems are
considered the core element of UTM. Yet, UTM is different from ATM in important aspects.
While humans such as pilots and air traffic controllers play a central role in legacy ATM
systems, UTM relies on computing infrastructure to manage several key roles and provides
an all-encompassing framework for managing multiple UAS operations simultaneously.
UTM is based upon predefined protocols for cooperative data exchanges, is managed by
exception, and relies upon third-party services and service oriented architectures.
Despite their differences, UTM and ATM should not be viewed as competing systems.
Rather, they are complementary means to provide essential traffic management services.
Industry experts envision that UTM services will increasingly coordinate and eventually
merge into a universal ATM, creating a unified, seamless, and transparent infrastructure
regardless of operations. However, it is integrated, UTM will introduce new third-party
service providers, change communications paradigms and protocols, define new per-
formance requirements, and spur reexamination of the relationships, responsibilities, and
capabilities of aviation actors including civil aviation authorities (CAAs), air navigation
service providers (ANSPs), UAS, and other airspace users, both manned and unmanned.
Depending on the jurisdiction and implementation, CAAs and ANSPs may delegate
certain operational functions, while CAAs continue to focus on their regulatory, safety
oversight, and security roles. Moreover, given the fast pace of innovation, UTM must pro-
vide an extensible architecture to accommodate future applications, including urban air
mobility (UAM), and beyond. UTM will transform the architecture of ATM.
476
477
Index
AAI Aerosonde vehicle-top launch cradle, 70 AECA see Arms Export Control Act of
AAI RQ-2 Pioneer, 14–15 1976 (AECA)
AAI RQ-7A/B Shadow, 13, 201–2, 215, 221, aerial: mapping, 13, 20–2, 23, 25, 27–8, 32–4,
228, 250, 401, 461; see also unmanned aerial 38–40, 43; surveying, 20, 25, 34, 39, 41, 45, 54;
vehicles (UAVs) torpedo 1, 3–8, 12–13, 184, 200, 460; see also
AAM see advanced air mobility (AAM) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
Abbott technologies, 287 aerodynamic center (AC), 225; efficiency, 223,
above ground level (AGL), 59, 80, 110 231, 233, 234
AC see advisory circulars (AC); aerodynamic aeromapper EV2, 221, 227
center (AC); alternating current (AC) aeronautical information publication (AIP), 121
AC 43.13–1B, 270 Aerosonde Mark 4.7, 68
AC 91–57, 131 aerovel flexrotor, 59
AC-91–57B, 120, 135 aerovironment, 43, 63, 67–8, 229, 240, 277, 476;
AC 107–2, 114 Puma, 238; Raven, 13, 43, 59, 67–8, 99, 217, 229,
AC 150/5200–37, 120 240, 277, 284, 402–3; Wasp, 215, 230, 238, 401
academy of model aeronautics (AMA), xxi, Aeryon Labs Scout quadcopter, 255, 256, 282
120, 134 Aeryon Skyranger, 59
accelerometer, 337–8, 340–1, 345, 471 AESA see active electronically scanned
accident investigation considerations, 153–4, array (AESA)
163, 469; human factors, 137–52, 153–65, 207, air carriers, 104, 122, 389, 455
465–7; investigation roster, 165–6; software airframe design see unmanned aircraft
and hardware, 23, 29, 153, 163, 165, 344–5, system design
417; suggestions, 153, 165, 466; see also safety AFS see FAA Flight Standards Service (AFS)
assessments AFSIM see advanced framework for simulation,
ACO see Los Angeles Aircraft Certification integration and modeling (AFSIM)
Office (ACO) AFS-400 UAS Policy Statement, 105, 108, 111,
acoustical gun, 410 134–5, 388
acoustical signatures, 398, 400, 425, 474 AGL see above ground level (AGL)
acoustic countermeasures, 402 AIAA see American Institute of Aeronautics and
active electronically scanned array (AESA), 205 Astronautics (AIAA)
active radar surveillance, 409 Aibotix X6, 59
active sensors, 19, 27, 74–5, 77, 95, 382, 411; AIP see aeronautical information
see also remote sensing publication (AIP)
AD see airworthiness directives (AD) AIR see FAA Aircraft Certification Service
adaptive flight control, 454 AIR-130 see FAA Avionics Systems Branch
ADCOM YABHON-R, 232 airborne sensing system (AS), 397, 411
additive manufacturing, 454; see also unmanned aircraft detection technology, 368
aircraft technological trends aircraft gas turbine, 250–2; axial-flow compressor,
ADM-20 Quail see McDonnell ADM-20 Quail 251; centrifugal compressors, 251; cold section,
Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, 102 251; components, 251, 259–65; five events in
ADS-B see automatic dependent internal combustion engine, 250–2; hot section,
surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) 251, 269; Lockheed Martin Polecat engines, 253,
advanced air mobility (AAM), 440 255; thrust, 251–4, 256, 260–4; turbofans, 252–3,
advanced framework for simulation, integration 255; turbojets, 245, 250, 253–4; turboprop-
and modeling, 208, 211 powered UAS, 252; turboprops, 251, 252;
advanced launch and recovery system (ALRS), turboshaft, 235–6, 245, 250–3, 256, 264, 469; two
241; see also launch and recovery (L&R) Williams F44 turbofans, 255; UAS turboshaft
advisory circulars (AC), 102, 134–5, 263, 287 installation, 252–3; see also powerplant designs
477
478
478 Index
aircraft subsystems, 21, 193, 198, 241, 342 ANSI see American National Standards Institute
airdrop launch, 238–9; see also launch and ANSPs see air navigation service providers
recovery (L&R) (ANSPs)
air navigation service providers (ANSPs), 123, antenna, 28, 37, 62, 163, 291, 296–319, 324–7, 336,
125, 439, 475 340–5; directional tracking, 340; gain, 273,
airplane 3–5, 10, 27, 43, 104, 120, 218, 228, 239, 291, 300–2, 309–12, 315, 326, 338–9, 470; horn,
332, 463 296–303; isotropic, 300–3, 310, 328; isotropic
Airport and Airway Development Act of radiator, 300–1; jamming, 291, 315, 472;
1970, 105 monopole, 89, 296–7, 302; patch, 296–7, 302;
Airport and Airway Improvement Act of polarization, 291, 300–4, 309, 312, 317, 472;
1982, 105 point source, 79, 301–2; spatial processing,
Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity 316; spiral, 296, 297; see also channel dipole
Expansion Act of 1987, 105 AOA see angle of attack (AOA)
airspace integration, 49, 125, 157 AOI see area of interest (AOI)
air taxis, 440 APA see Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
air traffic, 104, 120–1, 124–5, 131–2, 160, 370, 373, application logic security, 423
389, 394, 397, 441, 449, 457, 477 AQM-34 Lightning Bug and Firebee series
air traffic control (ATC), 47, 122, 125, 142, 160, 11–12, 228, 238, 240, 254 see also unmanned
295, 367–8, 379, 381, 411, 455, 472, 475 aerial vehicles (UAVs)
air traffic organization (ATO), 111, 120 AR see aspect ratio (AR)
air transport association (ATA), 121, 218 ARAC see Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
air vehicle operator (AVO), 162 Committee (ARAC)
airworthiness, 105, 108, 110–14, 119, 121–3, 125, Arava STOL, 228
128–30, 132, 153, 160–3, 208–9, 234, 242, 264–7, ARC see Aviation Rulemaking
289, 255, 448–51, 466, 469, 471; continuing, Committee (ARC)
163, 263, 265 ARC International, 188–9
airworthiness certification, 105, 129, 132, 153, Arcturus UAV, 238
161–3, 265, 440, 448 ArduPilot, 29, 330
airworthiness directives (AD), 104 area of interest (AOI), 39, 41
all-electric Penguin BE payload bay, 275; see also ARINC, 218
sUAS electrical systems Armada see Drone Data Book
All The World’s Aircraft: unmanned see Jane’s Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA), 170,
Jane’s, All the World’s Aircraft 183, 468; see also export control
ALR see automatic launch and recovery Arnold, Colonel Henry “Hap” 5
(ALR), advanced launch and recovery Article 8 of the Chicago Convention, 122
system (ALRS) Artificial intelligence 2, 17, 31, 274, 340, 397, 431,
alternating current (AC), 269 443, 454, 458, 474
alternator, 246, 257, 261–2, 283, 286 aspect ratio (AR), 214, 220, 226, 233, 242
alternative energy, 443, 450, 474 Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems
altitude reporting transponder, 374 International (AUVSI), 41, 49, 55, 90, 92, 97,
AMA see academy of model aeronautics (AMA) 135, 218
Amazon, 49, 84, 195, 200, 400, 455 ASSURE, 14, 49, 447
American National Standards Institute ASTM see American Society of Testing and
(ANSI), 118 Materials (ASTM)
ambiguity, 146–7, 466; see also human factors in ATA see Air Transport Association (ATA)
unmanned aerial systems ATA-100 coding system, 218
American Institute of Aeronautics and ATC see Air Traffic Control (ATC)
Astronautics (AIAA), 207, 243, 289, 345, 385 ATF see Department of Justice, Bureau of
American Society of Testing and Materials Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ASTM), 118, 449 atmospheric satellites, 443, 455, 474
American Wire Gauge (AWG), 269 AutoCopter Corp., 234
AN-grade hardware, 355 Aviation Services International, 188
angle of attack, 222–6, 233–4, 257 atmospheric sampling, 47–8
479
Index 479
ATO see Air Traffic Organization (ATO) baseline vibration excitation test, 358; see also
ATO-R see FAA Office of Systems Operations payload
and Safety BATMAV see WASP III Battlefield Air Targeting
attack vector, 399, 414, 417 Micro Air Vehicle (BATMAV)
attention cue, 139; see also human factors in battery capacity, 129, 200, 277, 288
unmanned aerial systems battery chemistry, 277–8; see also sUAS electrical
attention types, 140, 142, 465; channeled, 137, systems
141; divided, 137, 141; focused, 137, 141, battery elimination circuit see battery eliminator
147–8, 150; selective, 137, 140, 467; sustained, circuit (BEC)
137, 142 battery eliminator circuit (BEC), 281, 289
attenuator, 327, 344 Battlefield Air Targeting Micro Air Vehicle
Aurora Flight Sciences, 196 (BATMAV), 230
Australia, 125, 136, 183, 455 battle zone communications, 292; see also
Autoland (systems), 323, 471 communication systems
autonomous aerial cargo utility system see Bekaa Valley conflict (Operation Peace for
Boeing/Aurora Flight Sciences Galilee), 14–15, 461
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast BEC see battery eliminator circuit (BEC)
(ADS-B), 374, 380–1, 411–12, 430 Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD), 342
automatic launch and recovery (ALR), 341, 345; Bernoulli’s equation, 222
see also large UAS navigation systems beyond line-of-sight (BLOS), 62, 203, 321, 327,
automated flight profiles, 21; control, 19, 21–2; 389; communication, 62–4, 69, 241, 298, 321,
autonomous flight path algorithms, 19, 32, 462 327–8, 344
automation levels, 397, 400–1, 424 beyond radio line-of-sight (BRLOS), 57, 64
autopilot 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 13, 19, 21–2, 29, 57, 59–62, Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight (BVLOS), 36, 62,
65, 69, 79, 194, 200, 203, 207–9, 231, 241, 255, 69, 118, 126–9, 151, 292, 448, 462–3
268, 272, 282, 321, 329–45, 357, 377, 397, 401, binary phase shift keying (BPSK), 315
411–12, 421–3, 460, 462, 471; components, Bing Maps, 88
333–5; hardware attack, 423; software, 19, 29, biofuel technology, 450; see also unmanned
464; unit, 61; see also small unmanned aircraft aircraft technological trends
autopilot systems biplane 4–6
AUVSI see Association for Unmanned Vehicle BIS see Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
Systems International (AUVSI) Black Hornet Nano helicopter, 214, 234, 268,
Aveox 27/26/7-AV inrunner BLDC motor, 282; 333, 336, 352
see also sUAS electrical systems Black Hornet Nano micro-aerial vehicle,
aviation quality wire, 269 214, 268
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee BLDC see brushless DC motors (BLDC motors)
(ARAC), 218, 287 BLM see Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC), 102, BL motors see brushless DC motors (BLDC
116, 119, 132, 167, 218 motors)
AVO see air vehicle operator (AVO) blockchain, 432, 440
AWG see American Wire Gage (AWG) BLOS see beyond line-of-sight (BLOS)
Boeing: Hummingbird, 234; SolarEagle, 214;
backscatter, 27 X-48, 224; X-51 Waverider, 219, 220, 238
B4UFLY, 115 Boeing/Aurora (autonomous aerial cargo utility
BNSF rail system, 114 system), 196
B-17 Flying Fortress 8, 226–7; see also fixed-wing Boeing Insitu RQ-21A Blackjack, 240; integrator,
designs 240; ScanEagle, 67, 69, 80, 202, 224, 230, 240;
B-52 (bomber), 11, 239, 461 SkyHook™ 67, 69, 239–40
bandwidth, 13, 64, 291, 300, 303–8, 313–14, Boeing 787 Dreamliner, 272, 278, 287
317–18, 327, 421, 425, 470 Boltzman constant, 314, 318
Bard College, 210 Boolean logic tree, 161, 262
barometric pressure sensors, 335; see also small boresight visual displays, 139
unmanned aircraft autopilot systems Boutros, LCDR, 407–8, 412, 434
480
480 Index
BPSK see Binary phase shift keying (BPSK) CETC see Chinese Electronics Technology
Brayton cycle powerplants, 250, 252 Group Corporation (CETC)
Brazil, 122, 125–6, 136, 183 CFD see computational fluid dynamics (CFD)
Bright Lights USA, 189 CFR see U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
BRLOS see beyond radio line-of-sight (BRLOS) change analysis, 153, 156, 159, 467
brushless DC motors (BLDC motors), 254–6, change detection and machine learning, 19, 30;
274, 275, 280–2, 289 algorithms, 19, 25, 32, 34, 93, 203, 208, 340,
brushless starter/generator (BS/G), 286 367, 380–1
BSD see Berkeley software distribution (BSD) channel, 291, 299–300, 302, 304–5, 307–9, 317–18,
BS/G see Brushless starter/generator (BS/G) 325, 331, 357, 409, 414, 423, 470; antenna
BuckEye Project (U.S. Army), 93, 97 directivity, 291, 300, 317; antenna gain, 291,
buffer (holding area), 107, 328 301, 317, 470; antenna polarization, 291,
buffer overflow, 417, 420–3 302; isotropic antenna, 300–1, 310; isotropic
bug, the see AQM-34 Lightning Bug and radiator, 300–1; radiation pattern of radiator,
Firebee series 303; see also communication systems
built-in flight data recorder 165, 334; see also channel dipole, 296
small unmanned aircraft autopilot systems checksum, 329, 331, 344
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), 170, Chicago Conference see International Civil
174–7, 185, 188, 192 Aviation Conference
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 43, 389 China, 126, 136, 182, 188, 189, 248, 389, 401, 407,
Buzz Bomb see Fieseler Fi, 103 410, 419, 428, 433
BVLOS see beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS) Chinese Electronics Technology Group
Corporation (CETC), 401
C2 see command-and-control (C2) Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information
C3 see communications, command, and Technology, 407
control (C3) CIR see color infrared (CIR)
CA see collision avoidance (CA) circuit protection devices, 271, 284, 288
CAA see civil aviation authority (CAA) CIS see critical infrastructure sectors (CIS)
camera 7, 12–13, 26, 30–3, 37, 39–40, 43, civil aviation authority (CAA), 127, 129; see also
64–5, 74–9, 82, 87, 94–6, 205, 238, 268, 323, UAS Regulations, Standards and Guidance
340–1, 347 (see also remote sensing); UAS civil infrastructure, 19, 35
sensing-theory and practice; export control; CJ see commodity jurisdiction (CJ)
international traffic in arms regulation (ITAR) CloudCap Technology Piccolo™ 60, 61, 63, 198
Canada, 126, 136, 182–3, 185 cloud storage, 83–5; see also UAS Sensing-
Canards, 224 Theory and Practice
capacity of cell, 278; see also sUAS electrical closed-loop circuit, 271
systems COA see certificate of waiver or
capacity rate (C-rate), 277, 289 authorization (COA)
carbon fiber, 221, 228, 271, 281, 453 coaxial line (or cable), 294
cooling shroud, 281 Cochise College, 450
carbon footprint, 450 Cockpit Resource Management (CRM), 144,
cargo aircraft delivery see unmanned aircraft 152, 465
system applications collision avoidance (CA), 111, 117, 323, 367–8,
career opportunities, 443, 449, 474 370–1, 378–81, 385, 400–1, 411–12, 431, 436,
catapult launchers, 238; see also launch and 447, 454, 472; rule, 111; see also detect and
recovery (L&R) avoid systems (DAA systems)
CCL see commerce control list (CCL) color coding, 322–3
CDR see critical design review (CDR) color infrared (CIR), 78; see also remote sensing
CEMF see counter-EMF (CEMF) command-and-control (C2), 57–8, 60, 62, 119,
Centaur (Aurora Flight Sciences), 196 203, 205, 206, 207, 240, 243, 288, 321–8, 337–8,
certificate of waiver or authorization (COA), 343, 356–8, 364, 377–9, 383, 423, 457, 462, 468,
108, 110–13, 160–1, 165, 388–9, 446; see also 470–1; discussion questions, 343–5; frequency
UAS in public policy hopping, 64, 291, 300–1, 304–5, 308, 315, 470;
481
Index 481
human element in, 322–4, 463; open-source conduction efficiency, 302

systems, 342–3; RF spectrum, 324–5; voltage CONEMP see concept of employment
status indicator variations, 323; see also large (CONEMP)
UAS navigation systems; small unmanned conflict identification, 368
aircraft systems (sUAS) consensus standards, 114, 135, 449
complementary conservation of angular momentum, law of,
metal-oxide-semi-conductor(CMOS), 95 233, 281
commerce control list (CCL), 169, 176–82, consumer technology association (CTA), 118
185, 192; see also export control Commerce control acquisition attack, 423
Country Chart, 180 control methods, 19, 21, 462; automated
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS), 29, 60, control, 19, 22–3, 464; exponential control, 21;
205, 208, 269, 430; payloads, 205; see also manual control, 19, 21; operator training and
unmanned aircraft subsystem experience, 21; over other aircraft subsystems,
commodity jurisdiction (CJ), 174, 186 21; stabilized control, 21–3, 43, 51
commonality, 443, 456 control station (CS), 37, 57, 60–1, 162, 193, 203–4,
communications, command, and control (C3), 217, 240–1, 292, 323–4, 333, 408, 462, 468, 471;
123, 195, 205–6, 321, 468; see also unmanned control station, 204; see also unmanned aircraft
aircraft subsystem subsystem pilots at controls in Ikhana ground
communication failures, 137; see also human control system security, 423
factors in unmanned aerial systems corona discharge, 37
communication latency, 376 counter-EMF (CEMF), 280
communication systems, 285, 291–2, 298–9, countermeasures (CM), 11, 144, 397–8, 402–6,
303–6, 318, 345, 437, 454, 470; antenna 409–10, 424, 427–8, 430–1, 434, 436, 465, 473
structures, 297; bandwidth requirements, counter UAS applications, 445
291, 306–7, 317, 470; data links, 293–4; crankcase, 248
demodulation, 291, 305, 470; design C-rate see capacity rate (C-rate)
principle, 291, 306, 314, 470; diffraction, 296, CRC see cyclic redundancy check (CRC)
298; duplexer, 298; electromagnetic wave crew coordination, 140–1, 144–6, 165, 465–6;
propagation, 291, 294, 470; elements, 291, see also human factors in unmanned aerial
304–5, 309, 322, 324, 329, 332, 338, 404, 470; systems
EMI interference, 291, 315, 317; examples crew resource management (CRM), 137, 145,
306–8; frequency hopping technique, 151, 156, 466; see also human factors in
300–1; FSK modulation of digital data, 300; unmanned aerial systems
jamming, 315; modulation, 299; multipath, critical design review (CDR), 347, 349, 353, 466
316; protocols, 29, 207, 321, 328, 342, 344; critical infrastructure sectors (CIS), 404, 406
review questions, 317–18; system design, CRM see cockpit resource management (CRM),
306; transmitter, 299; wave-propagation crew resource management (CRM)
phenomena, 292; see also channel; link design; crop dusting, 48, 267
receiver crosstalk, 304, 315; see also receiver
commutator, 255, 279, 282, 286 cryo-cooler, 65
compatibility, 149–50, 467; see also human CS see control station (CS)
factors in unmanned aerial systems CTA see consumer technology association
compliance program, 186–8; see also export (CTA)
control C-UAS, 397–400, 424, 428–9, 438, 473–4
composite technology, 453 current limiter, 285
compressibility drag, 219 curtilage, 391
computational fluid dynamics (CFD), 198 curtiss prototype 4
CONOP see concept of operations (CONOP) Curtiss, Glenn 4, 7, 17, 200, 226, 460
concept development, 347, 349–50, 471 Curtiss N2C-2 target drone see Navy Research
concept of employment (CONEMP), 193 Lab N2C-2 Target Drone
concept of operations (CONOP), 193, 388, 439, customs and border protection, 108, 448
446, 475 cyber attack, 414, 435
conductor, 269–73, 282, 284, 309 cyber rifle, 410, 424
482
482 Index
cyber security, 379 detect and avoid systems (DAA systems),

cybersecurity countermeasures, 397, 398, 267, 367, 369–70, 372, 374–5, 378, 383–5, 439,
432, 473 445, 447, 471; act tasks, 376; allocation of
cyber terrorism, 399, 436, 473 sub-functions, 372; avoidance algorithms,
cyber warfare, 408, 434 380–1; collision avoidance, 371–2; collision
cyclic redundancy check (CRC), 329 volume, 371; communication latency, 376;
components, 380; conflict identification,
DAA systems see detect and avoid systems 368; decide tasks, 375; directive display for
(DAA systems) UAS, 382; discussion questions, 385; display
DAA Well Clear, 367, 368–73, 375, 379, 381, for UAS, 382; displays, 381–3; encounter
385, 472 timeline and task breakdown, 372–3; forcing
DAG see Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) function, 369; functions of, 370–2; informative
D&R see durability and reliability (D&R) display for UAS, 381; LoWC (loss of well
DASH see drone anti-submarine clear), 371, 381; near mid-air collision, 371;
helicopter (DASH) observe tasks, 373; orient tasks, 374–7;
data abstraction storage structure, 83; see also pilot in-the-loop, 377–8; pilot on-the-loop,
UAS sensing-theory and practice 378; pilot role, 377; proximity thresholds,
data link, 15, 23, 57–8, 62, 64, 119, 123, 207–8, 375; regulatory basis, 370; relative airspace
228, 292–3, 298, 317–18, 326, 331–5, 338, 353, volumes, 371; remain well clear, 367, 370;
462; classification for, 292; point-to-point and resilience of DAA systems, 379; right-of-way,
point-to-multipoint links, 292, 294, 298, 474; 37, 107, 111, 114, 370, 377, 381; role of ATC,
UAV, 292–4; see also communication systems 376; see and avoid, 111, 132, 287, 368–70, 379,
data management, 71, 83–4, 444, 462 472; self-separation, 378, 412, 472; sensors,
data rate (DR), 306–8, 314–18, 326–7, 340 380–1; SSR (secondary surveillance radar),
data rights, 71 380; standards for UAS integration, 369–70;
data securities, 71, 84–5; see also UAS sensing- surveillance (cooperative), 373; surveillance
theory and practice volume, 373; track target, 367, 372–3, 378, 472;
data transfer technologies, 445 UAS as transformational technology, 368–9;
Da Vinci, Leonardo 1 validation requirement, 374; Well Clear, 375,
DC see direct current (DC) 379, 381, 385, 472
DDOS see distributed denial of service (DDOS) DHS see Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
DDTC see directorate of defense trade detection systems, 323, 380, 426, 428
controls (DDTC) detect, sense and avoid requirement see detect
dead reckoning, 340 and avoid systems (DAA)
decision quality data, 393 DGPS see differential GPS (DGPS)
Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG1), dielectric strength, efficiency, 271, 279, 297, 302,
196, 210 309, 312
defense articles, 170, 173, 183–4, 189 differential GPS (DGPS), 336
defense threat reduction agency (DTRA), differential pressure transducer, 335, 345; see also
405, 436 small unmanned aircraft autopilot systems
degraded monitoring skills, 142 diffraction, 296, 298
DeHavilland Gypsy Moth 6 digital engine control, 260, 452
Delta Airlines, 147, 466 digital update rate, 420–1
demodulation, 291, 305, 470 direct current (DC), 269
Dennyplane 6, 238, 256 direction (direct) reckoning, 341
Denny, Reginald 6, 16, 460 Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC),
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 170, 172, 174, 175, 185, 186, 190, 192
385, 405 Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Department of Justice (DOJ), 171 Agency, 183
Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Director of the United States International
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), 171 Development Cooperation Agency, 183
derivative portion see proportional, integral, direct reckoning, 341; see also large UAS
differential (PID) navigation systems
483
Index 483
discovery and synchronization service effective receiving aperture, 310

(DSS), 439 EIRP see effective isotropic radiated
distributed denial of service (DDoS), 420 power (EIRP)
distributed manufacturing, 454; see also electric aircraft, 29, 211, 216, 338, 440
unmanned aircraft technological trends electrical conductors, 269
distraction management strategies, 466 electrical impedance, 270–1, 308
DJI Phantom 2 Vision Quadcopter, 195 electrical power, 80, 223, 257, 262, 268–71, 274–5,
DJI Inspire, 34, 59 282–4, 289, 470; industry, 36–7
DoD see U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) electrical systems, 254, 267, 268–71, 273–5, 282,
DoD JP3-0 Joint Operations (FIRES), 408, 432 285–8, 470
DOJ see Department of Justice (DOJ) electric generators, 261, 273, 274–6, 282–6, 470
DOT/FAA/AR-09/7 Unmanned Aircraft electric options, 443, 452
Systems Regulation Review, 388 electric field vector (E-vector), 302–3
DR see data rate (DR) electric motors, 74, 80, 202–4, 235, 245, 254–6,
drag, 216, 218–22; see also unmanned aircraft 258, 261, 274, 279, 409, 426, 468; see also sUAS
system design electrical systems
Dragon Warrior UAS, 235, 249 electrochemical cell, 276
drone, 194; silhouette chart for scale electrolysis, 276
comparison, 73 electromagnetic field test, 337, 358; see also
Drone Advisory Committee, 115 payload
Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH), electromagnetic interference (EMI), 255, 270–5,
12–13, 235, 461; see also unmanned aerial 279, 288, 291, 315–17, 319, 356–7, 470; testing,
vehicles (UAVs) 357; see also communication systems; payload
Drone Compendium see Armada electromagnetic pulse (EMP), 135, 304
Drone Data Book see Bard electromagnetic radiation (EM radiation), 27,
Drone Enable/4, 122 75–6, 356, 357
Drone Racing League, 203 electromagnetic spectrum (EM spectrum), 24–6,
DSS see discovery and synchronization 53, 73, 75–6, 78, 80, 89, 95, 293, 409
service (DSS) electromotive force (EMF), 261, 280
D-trade, 186 electromagnetic wave propagation, 291, 294
DTRA see defense threat reduction electronic code of federal regulations (e-CFR),
agency (DTRA) 118; see also UAS Regulations, Standards, and
due process, 106, 108, 116 Guidance
dual use items; see export control, International electronic commutation, 280; see also sUAS
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) electrical systems
dual-wire system, 284 electronic filters, 273; see also unmanned aircraft
duplexer, 298; see also communication systems electrical system
durability and reliability (D&R), 449 electronic gyrostabilization, 65
electronic signals intelligence (ELINT), 426
Eagle Eye (Bell), 59, 236, 255 electronic speed controllers (ESCs), 272, 280–1
EAR see export administration electronic warfare, 400, 408, 433–4, 474
regulations (EAR) electro-optical cameras (EO cameras), 65
ECC see error correcting code (ECC) ELINT see electronic signals intelligence
ECCN see export control classification (ELINT)
numbers (ECCN) ELTs see emergency locater transmitters (ELTs)
e-CFR see electronic code of federal regulations Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 340, 450
(e-CFR) emergency locater transmitters (ELTs), 340
ECRA see Export Control Reform Act of emergency response, 20, 35, 45, 71, 87, 463
2018 (ECRA) emerging trends in technology, 452
EEA see Export Administration Act (EEA) EMF see electromotive force (EMF)
effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP), 310, EMI see electromagnetic interference (EMI)
315, 317 EM jamming, 400, 474
effective pitch, 222, 242 EMP see electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
484
484 Index
EM radiation see electromagnetic radiation (EM traffic in arms regulation (ITAR), 183–5;
radiation) issues in real life, 185–6; license, 170–9, 181–3,
EM spectrum see electromagnetic spectrum (EM 186–90; military items, 171, 175–6; military
spectrum) know how, 171, 172, 174, 176–7, 181, 186,
encryption functionality, 172 330; Missile Technology Controls Policy, 176;
Endsley, Mica, 147, 466 nonmilitary, 170, 178, 444; protecting products
energy density, 269, 275, 277–8, 289, 392 of, 186–8; re-export, 172, 182, 186; sources of,
energy systems, potential 2 173; terms for, 171–3; Trading with the Enemy
enterprise fleet services, 439 Act, 170; transfer (of controlled articles), 170,
entry-level quadcopter with gimbal, 79, 87, 88 172–3; violations, 170, 186, 187–90; work
environmental impact, 452 outside of United States, 189–90; see also
EO see executive order (EO) export administration regulations (EAR);
EO cameras see electro-optical cameras (EO International Traffic in Arms Regulations
cameras) (ITAR)
EP see external pilot (EP) export control classification numbers (ECCN),
equivalent series resistance (ESR), 278 177–9, 181–2, 192; on CCL, 169, 177–81, 186,
error, human, 142–4; see also human factors in 192; see also export control for unmanned
unmanned aerial systems aircraft
error correcting code (ECC), 333 externally mounted missile system, 354
error correction strategies, 143 external pilot (EP), 22, 60, 162, 165, 323, 326, 338;
ESCs see electronic speed controllers (ESCs) console, 22
ESR see equivalent series resistance (ESR) external wing pod, 355
European Organization for Civil Aviation
Equipment (EUROCAE), 118, 122–4; see also FAA see Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
UAS Regulations, Standards and Guidelines FAA Aircraft Certification Service, 111
European Organization for the Safety of Air FAA Avionics Systems Branch, 111
Navigation (EUROCONTROL), 122, 124–5, FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of
127, 136; see also UAS Regulations, Standards 2016, 114
and Guidelines FAA Flight Standards Service, 111
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 110, FAA Flight Standards Service (AFS), 111; see also
118, 122–7, 130, 133; see also UAS Regulations, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Standards, and Guidance FAA Flight Technologies and Procedures
E-vector see electric field vector (E-vector) Division (AFS-400), 111
executive order (EO), 116, 170, 176, 183, FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
191–2, 467 (FMRA), 102, 104, 108, 110, 113–14, 120, 131–3,
Executive Order 11958, 170, 183, 191–2 135; see also UAS Regulations, Standards, and
exogenous design factors, 218, 242, 287; see also Guidance
unmanned aircraft systems design FAA Order 1000.37B, 120
experimental airworthiness certificate, 112 FAA Order 1100.161 CHG 1, 120
Export Administration Act (EEA), 177 FAA Order 2150.3C, 105
Export Administration Regulations (EAR), FAA Order 8000.365, 120
169–74, 176–9, 181–2, 185–92, 466; commerce FAA Order 8000.369B, 120
control list (CCL), 177–82, controlled items, FAA Order 8040.4B, 120
177; Export Administration Act of 1979, 177; FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, 106, 115,
Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 170; 135, 389
import, 170–1, 416; MTCR Annex, 180; UAS FAA SAA Workshop, 372, 377, 472
items, 181–2; see also export control FAA TSO c-211 and c-212, 369
export control, 173; AECA, 170, 176, 183, 190, Factory TDN-1, 7–8, 227, 458
468; agency responsibility, 175; compliance failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis
program, 186–7, 190–1, 468; Department of (FMECA), 160–1, 261–2, 265
Commerce License Review Process, 187; Fairey Scout, 6
discussion questions, 191; export controlled far infrared (FIR), 67
data, 174, 187; flowchart, 179; international FARs see Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)
485
Index 485
FCC see Federal Communications Flybar system, 234

Commission (FCC) fly-by-wire flight control, 181, 225, 267
fault tree analysis (FTA), 160, 208, 262, 265; flying insect capture system, 347–8
see also safety assessments flight control systems, 2, 29, 181, 184, 338,
FEC see Forward error correction (FEC) 460, 468; see also small unmanned aircraft
federal aviation administration (FAA), 16, 28, autopilot systems
33, 45, 49–50, 58–9, 64, 101–20, 126, 130–5, flight data recorder, 165
160–2, 194, 196, 206, 218, 262, 269, 289, 372, flight dynamics see unmanned aircraft
458, 473; AC, 102, 104–14, 120, 263; AD, 104; system design
domestic committees, 119, 133; enforcement flight information management system
authority over UAS, 107–10; informal (FIMS), 439
rulemaking, 116–17; policy statement, 102, flight test cards, 153, 161, 467
105, 108, 110, 112, 116–17, 120; rulemaking flight testing 4, 347, 349, 360–4, 449; see also
authority, 104, 116; toolbox, 104, 108, 133; payload
types of regulations, 107; see also UAS FLIR see forward-looking infrared (FLIR)
Regulations, Standards and Guidance flying-wing designs, 213, 230–1
federal aviation regulations (FARs), 102–7, 110, FMECA see failure modes, effects, and criticality
114, 117–22, 133 analysis (FMECA)
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), FMRA see FAA Modernization and Reform Act
62, 64, 315, 321, 324–5, 388, 463, 473 of 2012 (FMRA)
Federal Information Security FMV see full motion video (FMV)
Management Act, 85 FOG see fiber optic gyro (FOG)
Federal Register Act of 1935, 116 foreign military sales, 186; see also export
federated UTM, 440 control, International Traffic in Arms
FedEx, 34, 455 Regulations (ITAR)
fiber optic gyro (FOG), 341 forward error correction (FEC), 331
Fieseler Aircraft Company, 9 forward-facing air scoop, 281
Fieseler Fi 103 (V-1) German Buzz Bomb, 9, 18; forward-looking infrared (FLIR), 26, 30–1, 65
see also unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) four layers of defenses, 144; see also human
15 C.F.R 730 et seq., 176 factors in unmanned aerial systems
15 C.F.R. Part 772, 191 four-stroke motors, 214, 246–50
Filmmaking, 20, 43 14 CFR Parts 1.1, 21–49, 61–7, 71–7, 91–105,
FIMS see flight information management 119–35, 141–7, 150–61, 170–1
system (FIMS) 14 CFR 1.1, 104, 110–11, 120, 133, 388, 445
fineness ratio, 214, 220–1, 242 14 CFR 21, 287
Finland, 136, 183, 455 14 CFR 21.17(a), 447
FIR see far infrared (FIR) 14 CFR 21.17(b), 114, 287
Firebee UA see Mabat 14 CFR 21.25(a)(2), 114
Firebird see Northrop Grumman 14 CFR 21.185, 114
FIRES see DoD JP3-0 Joint Operations 14 CFR 23, 262
firmware, 342–3, 399, 409, 418 14 CFR 25, 262
first person view (FPV), 203 14 CFR 27, 262
first responders, 47, 54, 447 14 CFR 29, 262
fixed-wing designs, 213, 224, 251; B-17 Flying 14 CFR 33, 262–3
Fortress, 226–7; canard UAS, 213, 232; factors 14 CFR 35, 262–3
in UAS tail designs, 213, 225–6; flying wings, 14 CFR 49, 132
213, 230–1; General Dynamics F-16, 213, 225; 14 CFR 61, 133
inverted-T configuration, 213, 226–7; InView 14 CFR 71, 132
Unmanned Aircraft System, 229; Northrop 14 CFR 91, 105, 111, 132
YB-49 flying wing, 230; twin-boom design, 14 CFR 91.13(a), 109
213, 228–9; UAV Factory Penguin BE, 228; 14 CFR 91, 111, 107, 109, 370
vertical stabilizer, 226; see also unmanned 14 CFR 91, 113, 107, 111, 368–70
aircraft system design 14 CFR 91, 119, 134
486
486 Index
14 CFR 91, 123, 379 Germany, 18, 126–7, 136, 172, 182–3, 243, 289
14 CFR 91, 181, 379 Getting Started with Defense Trade (DDTC
14 CFR 101.11, 134 publication), 186
14 CFR 101.21, 134 GFE see government furnished
14 CFR 101.31, 134 equipment (GFE)
14 CFR 107, 33, 132, 287, 388–9, 394, 446, 462 gimbal mounting system, 65
14 CFR 125, 224, 371 GIS see geographic information systems (GIS)
14 CFR 135, 455, 462 Global Hawk, 47, 54, 59, 73, 195, 201–3, 209,
14 CFR 137, 462 214–17, 224, 228, 238, 240–1, 251, 253, 268, 271,
47 CFR §215 (FCC), 388 284, 286, 289, 333, 350–1, 401, 408, 418
49 USC, 44807, 446 global positioning system (GPS), 13, 15, 16, 32,
FPV see first person view (FPV) 40, 46, 53, 83, 143, 268, 302, 319, 330–1, 334,
France, 13, 126, 136, 182–3, 227 336–7, 341, 346, 356–7, 360–1, 374, 400–1,
frequency hopping, 64, 291, 300–1, 304–5, 308, 408–13, 419, 424, 429, 433, 461, 471, 474;
315, 318, 325; see also communication systems receivers, 336, 408; spoofing, 400, 408, 410,
frequency shift modulation (FSK), 299–300, 413, 423–4, 429–1, 433, 434, 435, 438; see also
305, 308, 315, 317–28; see also communication small unmanned aircraft autopilot systems
systems Global UTM Association (GUTMA), 118
frequency synthesizer, 299–300, 305, 316 GNDVI see green normalized vegetation index
FSK see frequency shift modulation (FSK) (GNDVI)
FTA see fault tree analysis (FTA) Goodwin, Paul, 139, 152
full motion video (FMV), 26, 35–8, 43, 45, 51, 65 Google Earth, 88
full spectrum spark-gap transmitter 3 Google’s Titan project, 452, 455; see also
fuzzing, 420–1 unmanned aircraft technological trends
GoPro gimbal, 87
gains, 198, 338, 345, 420–1; see also proportional, government furnished equipment (GFE), 269
integral, differential (PID), small unmanned GPS see global positioning system (GPS)
aircraft autopilot systems GPS No-Fly Zones, 409
gain scheduling, 420–1 GPU see generator power unit (GPU)
GAM-67 (Crossbow), 11 graphical software interface, 22
Gatewing X100, 226, 232 green normalized vegetation index (GNDVI),
GCS see ground control station (GCS) 89–90, 92
GCU see generator control unit (GCU) ground control station (GCS), 61–3, 203, 205,
Geiger Mode LiDAR, 80 209, 217, 241, 292, 294, 298–9, 302, 306, 315,
General Atomics Altair, 268 317, 322–3, 338, 344, 471; AeroVironment
General Atomics Avenger, 214, 254, 401 handheld, 63; General Atomics MQ-1
General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper (Predator B), 66, Predator, 62; for larger military UAS, 61;
201–2, 215, 221, 253, 289, 449 Piccolo™ Command Center, 63
General Atomics MQ-9B SkyGuardian, Groupe Speciale Mobile Association
203–4, 286 (GSMA), 118
General Dynamics F-16, 219, 225; see also ground support equipment (GSE), 216–17
fixed-wing designs ground-to-air defense (GTA), 410, 424
general public license, 342 ground waves, 327
generator control unit (GCU), 283–4, 289 GSE see ground support equipment (GSE)
generator motoring see motoring GSMA see Groupe Speciale Mobile
generator power unit (GPU), 283 Association (GSMA)
geographic (or geospatial) information systems GTA see ground-to-air defense (GTA)
(GIS), 30, 35, 41, 54, 82, 85, 88, 98, 100, 393 guidelines for safety-critical structures: payload
geometric pitch, 222, 242, 256 flight equipment requirements (NASA), 339,
geospatial data types, 71, 81; raster, 81; 358–9, 364
vector, 82 GUTMA see Global UTM Association
geospatial imagery, 81; georeferenced, 81–2, 84; Gypsy Moth (De Havilland) see Queen Bee
geotagged, 81–2; orthographic, 81–2 gyro-control system 3, 460
487
Index 487
gyros 3, 13, 203, 337–8, 340–1, 345, 471 human factors in unmanned aerial systems, 137;
gyrodyne, 235 action, 149; ambiguity, 146; attention, 140, 147;
cognitive, 138, 140–2, 147, 152; compatibility,
HALE see high-altitude, 149–50; crew resource management, 145–6;
long-endurance (HALE) diagnosis, 148; distraction management,
hall effect device, 280 141, 146–8, 150, 465–6; divided attention,
hard-iron compensation, 335, 345; see small 141–2; effective team management, 146;
unmanned aircraft autopilot systems enormity of scope, 138; fatigue, 137, 144–5;
hardware, 19, 23, 29, 35–8, 79, 153, 158, 160, focused attention, 141; hindsight bias, 137–9,
163–6, 207–9, 324, 327–8, 330, 342–3, 352–3, 150–2, 465; human element, 57, 58, 68, 321–2,
355, 363–4, 398, 404, 413, 415, 417–19, 421–3, 417, 463; human error, 142–4, 465
430, 469 human–machine interfacing, 149; layered
hardware-based vulnerabilities, 398, 419 error defenses, 145; load stress, 140; multiple
hardware-in-the-loop (HIL), 207–9, 469 resource theory, 140; negative transfer, 143,
hazard analysis, 153–6, 467; change analysis, 146, 149, 151, 465, 466; peripheral vision, 139,
156–9, 467; hazard list, 153–5; initial hazard 465; power distance, 146; relative motion,
identification tool, 156; preliminary hazard 139–40, 465; risk analysis, 148–50; saturation,
analysis, 153, 155–6; purpose, 156–9; review 137; selective attention, 137, 140–1; situation
and analysis, 153, 156–7; see also safety awareness, 147; spatial disorientation, 137,
assessments 148; supervisory influence, 144; sustained
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act attention, 137, 142, 465; team concept
106 principles, 145; threat and error management,
heavier-than-air craft 3, 221 144–5; vigilance, 147–8; see also remotely
heavy fuel engines (HFEs), 214, 249; see also piloted aircraft (RPA)
powerplant designs human machine interface, 148, 414, 418
heavy fuels (HFs), 214, 249 human perception, 137, 139
Hellfire missile, 59 Humphries, Todd, 413
Hepperle, Martin, 223 hydrogen fuel, 450, 474
Heraclitus of Ephesus, 443 hyperspectral imagers, 65, 67, 71, 77–9, 93, 96–9,
Heinkel, 111 bomber 9 463; see also remote sensing
Hewitt-Sperry Automatic Airplane, 226, 237
HFACS see human factors analysis and IAI see Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI)
classification system (HFACS) IC see internal-combustion (IC)
HFEs see heavy fuel engines (HFEs) ICAO see International Civil Aviation
HFs see heavy fuels (HFs) Organization (ICAO)
Hi Aero (Gabbiano), 221, 224 ICAO UAS Advisory Group (UASAG), 122;
high-gain directional antennas, 306, 328 see also RPAS Panel
Highly Maneuverable Aircraft Technology Icarus 1
(HiMAT), 232 ICDs see interface control documents (ICDs)
high fidelity graphical interfaces, 208 Idaho National Lab, 93, 98
HIL see hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) identification friend or foe (IFF), 340, 400–1, 408,
HiMAT see Highly Maneuverable Aircraft 426, 428, 437, 474
Technology (HiMAT) IDETEC Stardust, 221
hindsight bias, 137–9, 150–2, 465; see also human IEEE see Institute of Electrical and Electronic
factors in unmanned aerial systems Engineers (IEEE)
holding area, 328 IEEPA see International Emergency Economic
Honeywell RQ-16 T-Hawk, 214, 236, 243 Powers Act (IEEPA)
Honeywell Tarantula Hawk landing, 238; IETF see internet engineering task force (IETF)
see also rotary-wing designs IFF see identification friend or foe (IFF)
horsepower (hp), 222, 235, 247, 280, 282 IFF acoustic library files, 428
Huerta, Michael, 114, 135 IFR see instrument flight rules (IFR)
human factors analysis and classification image stabilization, 65; see also UAS
system (HFACS), 144–5, 152, 466 sensing-theory and practice
488
488 Index
imaging sensor, 71, 75–7, 463; see also UAS International Council on Systems Engineering
sensing-theory and practice (INCOSE), 196, 210
impulse noise, 304, 317; see also receiver International Emergency Economic Powers Act
IMU see inertial measurement unit (IMU) or (IEEPA), 189
inertial management unit (IMU) International Organization for Standardization
INCOSE see International Council on Systems (ISO), 74, 118, 178
Engineering (INCOSE) International Traffic in Arms Regulations
induced drag, 219–20, 224, 230, 236 (ITAR), 169, 170–9, 181–91; categories dealing
induced power, 233 with UAS, 177, 181–5, 191; -specific export
inductance (of wiring), 268, 270, 273 compliance program, 186; violations, 169–70,
industrial inspection, 19, 35 186, 187, 188–91; see also export control
industrial, scientific and medical (ISM), 62, 64, International Telecommunications Union
293, 295, 315, 325, 343 (ITU), 118
inertial measurement unit (IMU), 321, internet engineering task force (IETF), 118
340–1, 345 internet of things (IoT), 413, 432, 437
inertial navigation system (INS), 11, 321, 331, interrupts mechanism, 334–5
340, 341, 345 Interstate TDR-1, 7, 227
Information Security (INFOSEC), 399, 403–4, Inverted-T, 213, 224, 226–7
413, 431, 435, 473 investigation roster (sUAS) see safety
INFOSEC see Information Security (INFOSEC) assessments
infrared cameras (IR cameras), 71, 78, 463 InView Unmanned Aircraft System, 229–30, 247;
infrastructure inspection, 25, 35, 71, 84, 88, 113 see also fixed-wing designs
Inmarsat Network, 292, 317, 319, 327 Ion Tiger, 224, 275
inner control loop see flight control systems IoT see internet of things (IoT)
Innovative Power Solutions LLC, 286 Ireland, 127, 136, 183
INS see inertial navigation system (INS) Iridium satellite system, 64, 327
insider threat vulnerabilities, 398, 417, 419 IR cameras see infrared cameras (IR cameras)
in situ see remote sensing ISM see industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM)
integral planetary gear reduction systems, 282 isotropic antenna, 300–3, 310, 318
integral component see proportional, integral, isotropic radiator, 300–1
differential (PID) ISR see intelligence, surveillance, and
intermodulation noise, 303 reconnaissance (ISR)
internet connection sharing (ICS), 283, 417–18 Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), 14, 214, 221,
Instituto de Agricultura, 93 228, 243, 247, 248, 249, 252, 275, 461; Arava
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers STOL, 228; Decoy, 461; Eitan, 252; Ghost,
(IEEE), 98, 99, 118, 293, 295, 301, 319, 434, 437 235; Heron, 249, 221, 228, 249, 401; Heron
instrument flight rules (IFR), 111, 123, 368, 379, II, 241; Hunter, 203–4, 223, 228–30, 239, 247;
383, 447 Mabat, 13, 228, 461; Malat Mosquito, 214, 230;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Mastiff, 221; Panther tiltrotor, 275; Pioneer,
(ISR), 45, 58–9, 87, 88, 184, 268, 398, 403, 228; Scout, 14, 228; Searcher, 228, 248
407–8, 411–12, 425 ISO see International Organization for
interdependent synergism, 215 Standardization (ISO)
interface control documents (ICDs), 352–3 Italy, 54, 127, 136, 182–3
Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08-01 ITAR see International Traffic in Arms
(FAA), 105, 108, 134 Regulations (ITAR)
intermodulation noise, 303; see also receiver ITAR-specific export compliance program, 186
internal-combustion (IC), 200, 246, 247, 249, 251, ITU see International Telecommunications
274, 364, 426, 468, 469; see also UAS Propulsion Union (ITU)
System Design
international aviation regulations, 101, 103, 120 JAA see joint aviation authorities (JAA)
International Civil Aviation Conference, 121 jamming, 11, 13, 17, 64, 268, 292, 315–16, 318–19,
International Civil Aviation Organization 400, 410–11, 424–5, 429–30, 434, 461, 470, 474;
(ICAO), 18, 101, 135, 369, 385, 464 see also communication systems
489
Index 489
Jane’s, All the World’s Aircraft: unmanned, 210 239; Boeing Insitu RQ-21A Blackjack, 240;
Japan, 6, 8, 10, 13, 48–9, 55, 127, 136, 182, 183, catapult launchers 4, 9, 59, 67–9, 223, 237–9,
433, 460–1 463; Global Hawk’s, 240; hand-launched UAS,
JARUS see joint authorities for rulemaking on 67–8, 68, 237; launch techniques, 238; MQM-
unmanned systems (JARUS) 57, 238; RATO/JATO launch systems, 238–9;
JARUS JAR doc 06 SORA package, 123–4, 130, recovery phase of operation, 239; recovery
136, 440 systems 239–40; Vireo, 237, 255–6, 275; see also
JATO see jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) unmanned aircraft system design
jet-assisted takeoff (JATO), 238–9 launch and recovery element (LRE), 67–8, 240,
joint authorities for rulemaking on unmanned 243; see also launch and recovery (L&R)
systems (JARUS), 118, 124, 130, 133, 440; law of conservation of angular momentum,
see also UAS Regulations, Standards, and 233, 281
Guidance lead-acid (LA), 277
joint aviation authorities (JAA), 123; see also leakage drag, 219, 221, 277
UAS Regulations, Standards and Guidance LiDAR see light detection and ranging (LiDAR)
Joint Publication (JP) 3-01 “Countering Air and life-cycle costs, 196, 217
Missile threats”, 407, 434 lift, 18, 199, 218–26, 230–4, 237–9, 242, 245,
Joule cycle powerplants see Brayton cycle 257, 282, 453; see also unmanned aircraft
powerplants system design
Joule, James Prescott, 269 light detection and ranging (LiDAR), 19, 23, 27,
31, 35–6, 55, 65, 71, 77, 79–80, 82, 93, 95, 97–9,
Kalman filters, 333, 341, 344 205, 295, 340, 380–1, 412, 463, 468; see also
Kaman K-MAX K-1200, 235, 252 remote sensing
Kansas State University, 22–3, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, lightweight biplane 4, 5
49, 449–50 light sport aircraft certification process, 449
Kettering, Charles 4, 5, 17, 460 Lilienthal, Otto 2, 17–18, 237
Kennedy, Lt. Joseph P. 8, 460 linear regulators, 283
Klein, Gary, 148, 152, 466 line impedance stabilization network (LISN), 271
K-MAX rotor system, 235; see also rotary-wing line-of-sight (LOS), 15, 36, 57, 62, 64, 114, 203,
designs 292, 321, 326, 327, 389, 446, 462
know-how see export controls link design, 291, 308–9, 470; examples, 308–9;
losses at transmitting antenna, 309; losses
LAANC see low altitude authorization and due to free space propagation, 309–10; power
notification capability (LAANC) in decibel milliwatts, 313; power received at
L&R see launch and recovery (L&R) receiving antenna, 311–12; receiver sensitivity,
LA see lead-acid (LA) 314; reflection antenna–cable junction,
Landstar/Yi-Lan Chen, 189 308–9; S/N ratio at receiver, 313–14; see also
Lauber, John K. 145, 152 communication systems
lead-acid (LA), 277 LiPo battery, 452; see also unmanned aircraft
Laliberte, Andrea, 93, 98 technological trends
Langley, Dr. Samuel P. 3, 17, 237 LISN see line impedance stabilization
large UAS navigation systems, 340; alternative network (LISN)
navigation, 345; autolanding systems, 323, Liteye Anti-UAV Defense System (AUDS),
471; automatic launch and recovery, 341; auto- 410, 436–7
takeoff, 204, 205, 241, 341, 345, 468, 471; BLOS Livingston, Ralph, 287, 289
communication, 327–8; direct reckoning, 341; LNA see low-noise amplifier (LNA)
see also command-and-control (C2) load stress, 140
large unmanned helicopters, 234 Lockheed Martin/Boeing Tier III-(minus) RQ-3
larynx 6 DarkStar, 221, 272
launch and recovery (L&R), 57–9, 67, 155, 213, Lockheed Martin: Indago, 34; M-21/D-21,
216, 237, 239–41, 243, 321, 327, 341, 362–3, 239; MQM-105 Aquila, 14; Polecat, 253–5;
462, 463; airdrop launch, 238–9; automatic QF-16, 219; RQ-3, 231, 272; RQ-170, 231, 424;
(ALR), 341, 345; belly skid recovery, 237, Sentinel, 268; Skunkworks, 238; Stalker, 238
490
490 Index
long-range acoustic device (LRAD), 426, 436; MAVLink see Micro Air Vehicle Communication
see also communication systems Protocol (MAVLink)
long wave infrared (LWIR), 19, 24–6, 65, 67, 75, MAVTL see minimum acceptance vibration test
78, 86, 92, 95; cameras, 26, 65–6, 71, 75–9, 86, levels (MAVTL)
92, 95; see also remote sensing Maxwell’s equations, 270
LORAN networks, 11 Mayrow General Trading, 188–9
Lorentz Force Law, 270 MCAI see mandatory continuing airworthiness
LOS see line-of-sight (LOS) information (MCAI)
Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office McDonnell ADM-20 Quail, 11; see also
(ACO), 287 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
loss of signal (LOS), 410 MCE see mission control element (MCE)
lost link procedures, 60, 323–4, 334, 462 MCSO see Mesa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO)
low altitude authorization and notification means of compliance, 162–3, 262–3, 269–70, 472
capability (LAANC), 33, 194, 440 mean time between critical failures (MTBCFs),
low noise amplifier (LNA), 299, 302 160, 262
low-pass (LP), 273, 288 mechanical power, 233
LRAD see long-range acoustical device (LRAD) medium altitude long endurance (MALE),
LRE see launch and recovery element (LRE) 232, 258
L-3 Mobius, 232 memory effect, 278; see also sUAS electrical
LWIR see long wave infrared (LWIR) systems
MEMS see micro-electrical mechanical
Mabat UAS, 14, 228, 461 systems (MEMS)
M&S see modeling and simulation (M&S) MEMS gyroscope, 398, 427, 437
machine code, 342, 345 messenger aerial torpedo (MAT), 6, 226
Magicfly UAS, 280 metadata, 26, 30, 334, 352
magnetometers, 335, 338, 471 metal-oxide-semiconductor field-effect
maintenance man-hours per flight hours transistor (MOSFET), 280
(MMHFH), 208 Mexico, 127
MALE see medium altitude long micro-aerial vehicle (MAV), 230, 234, 268, 321,
endurance (MALE) 329–31, 450–1; see also unmanned aircraft
malware analysis, 404 technological trends
mandatory continuing airworthiness Micro Air Vehicle Communication Protocol
information, 163, 263 (MAVLink), 29, 32, 34, 321, 329–32, 344–5
man-in-the-middle attack (MIM), 420 microbolometer, 78, 94
manned-unmanned teaming, 205 microchip, 451; see also emerging trends in
manual on remotely piloted aircraft systems, technology
122, 135; see also ICAO RPAS Panel microcontroller, 332, 342
manufacturing codes, standards and micro-electric mechanical systems (MEMS),
regulations, 119 16, 94, 338, 341, 345, 392, 398, 401–2, 411, 424,
market growth, 443–4 427–8, 437, 461, 471, 474
market segments, 443–4, 447 Micro Spectrometer Instrument Suite
mars rover, 457 (NASA), 77
MASPS see minimum aviation system Micro Unmanned Aircraft Systems Aviation
performance standards (MASPS) Rulemaking Committee, 116
Mastiff (Tadiran Electronics Industries), 221, microwave range, 293
228 Middle Tennessee State University, 450
MAT see messenger aerial torpedo (MAT) mid-wave infrared (MWIR), 19, 24–6, 65,
MAV see micro-aerial vehicle (MAV) 67, 75, 86
MAVTL see minimum acceptance vibration test MIL-HDBK-516, 161, 162
levels (MAVTL) MIL-HDBK-274, 271
materials science, 454, 471 MIL-SPEC-881D, 210
Mattis, James D. SECDEF (Secretary of MIL-STD-461F Appendix A, 271
Defense), 407 MIL-STD-464, 271
491
Index 491
MIL-STD-704/704F, 269–70 MQ-9 Predator B, 66, 201–2, 252–3, 285; see also
MIL-STD-810, 270 unmanned aircraft system design
MIL-STD-882D/E, 154–7, 159, 164 MQ-9B SkyGuardian, 203–4, 286
MIL-W-5088L, 270 MQM-105 Aquila see Lockheed Martin
MIM see man-in-the-middle attack (MIM) MRAM see mishap risk assessment
miniaturization, 15, 94, 205, 274, 280, 350, 393, matrix (MRAM)
443, 450, 471 MTBCFs see mean time between critical failures
minimum acceptance vibration test levels (MTBCFs)
(MAVTL), 339, 358–9, 364; see also payload MTCR see Missile Technology Control
minimum aviation system performance Regime (MTCR)
standards (MASPS), 119 MT1 controls see Missile Technology 1 (MT1)
minimum operational performance standards controls
(MOPS), 119, 207, 369, 385 MTS-A sensor ball see MQ-1B Predator Multi-
minimum safe altitude, 107 Spectral Targeting System
mishap probability levels, 164; see also safety MTS-B sensor pod see multi-spectral targeting
assessments system-B sensor pod (MTS-B sensor pod)
mishap risk assessment matrix (MRAM), 164; multimodal aerial ride sharing, 440
see also safety assessments multiple resource theory, 140, 465
mishap severity categories, 164 multiplexer, 340, 345
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), multi-rotor systems, 235–6; see also rotary-wing
171–5, 178, 181–2, 191–2, 468; annex, 169, 171, designs
182, 191; countries in, 182–3; see also export multi-spectral targeting system-B sensor pod
control (MTS-B sensor pod), 66
Missile Technology 1 Controls, 181 MUM-T see manned-unmanned teaming
Missile Technology Controls Policy, 176 MWIR see mid-wave infrared (MWIR)
mission control element (MCE), 241, 273
mission-derived design, 205; see also unmanned N2C-2 Target Drone, 6; see also unmanned aerial
aircraft system design vehicles (UAVs)
Mission Planner software, 23 N-9 Aerial Torpedo, 4, 460
mission planning, 20, 33, 51, 163, 400 NAA see National Aviation Authorities (NAA)
Mistletoe Bombers 1, 10, 461; see also unmanned NACA Report No. 824, 231
aerial vehicles (UAVs) nano air vehicles (NAVs), 450; see also emerging
Mitchell General Billy 5 trends in technology
MMHFH see maintenance man hours per flight NANO SAR Circa 2008, 81
hours (MMHFH) NAS see National Airspace System (NAS)
mobile truck test, 360–1; see also payload NASA Centurion, 275
model aircraft, 16, 103, 107, 109–13, 120, 125, NASA Global Hawk, 47, 54, 195; see also Global
127–8, 130–1, 388, 450 Hawk; Northrop Grumman Global Hawk
modeling and simulation (M&S), 207, 437 NASA Helios, 224, 275–6; see also sUAS electrical
Montgolfier Brothers 2 systems
MOPS see minimum operational performance NASA Ikhana, 195, 268
standards (MOPS) NASA Sierra, 77, 98
MOSFET transistor see metal-oxide- National Airspace System (NAS), 28, 54, 58, 103,
semiconductor field-effect (MOSFET) 105, 112, 133, 135, 153, 214, 278, 392, 439, 446,
transistor 458, 462, 467
MotoCalc, 200, 209 National Aviation Authorities (NAA), 124; see
motoring, 284, 289; see also sUAS electrical also UAS Regulations, Standards and Guidance
systems National Institute of Standards and Technology
MQ-1B Predator Multi-Spectral Targeting (NIST), 434, 436
System, 347, 348 National security, 85, 121, 128, 169, 178–9, 187,
MQ-1C Gray Eagle, 203–5 190–1, 388, 419, 434
MQ-8 Northrop Grumman Fire Scout, 59, 215, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
234, 401 109, 116, 134, 141, 145, 151, 414, 436
492
492 Index
NATO UAV Interoperability, 207, 210 non-segregated UAS operations, 445

natural resource management, 20, 39, 43 normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI),
Navaids (navigational aids), 121 42, 67, 89–90, 99
Naval aircraft factory TDN-1 Assault Drone, North Carolina State University, 446
7, 8, 227, 460; see also unmanned aerial Northrop Grumman RQ-4/MQ-4 fuselage, 284;
vehicles (UAVs) see also Global Hawk
NAVs see nano air vehicles (NAVs) Northrop Grumman Firebird, 196
navigable airspace, 104, 107, 395 Northrop MQM-57 Falconer, 227, 238
navy aerial torpedo 4 Northrop YB-49 flying wing, 231; see also fixed-
Navy PB4Y-2 Privateers 8; see also unmanned wing designs
aerial vehicles (UAVs) Northrup Grumman Global Hawk/EuroHawk
Navy Research Lab N2C-2 Target Drone, 7; UAV, 286, 289; see also Global Hawk
see also unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) Northwest UAV (NWUAV), 256, 257
NdFeB see neodymium permanent magnets Norway, 128, 136, 182, 183
(neo magnets) notice of availability (NOA), 118, 132
NDT see nondestructive testing (NDT) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), 114,
NDVI see normalized difference vegetation 116, 117, 120, 389, 447
index (NDVI) NTSB see National Transportation Safety
near infrared (NIR), 19, 24–6, 31, 40, 42, 67, Board (NTSB)
75, 77–8, 89–92, 97, 98, 465; see also remote NWUAV see Northwest UAV (NWUAV)
sensing cameras
near mid-air collision (NMAC), 371 object code see machine code
negative transfer, 143, 146, 149, 465, 466 Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA), 400
neodymium permanent magnets (neo magnets), OEM see original equipment
255, 280 manufacturer (OEM)
neo magnets see neodymium permanent Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), 175
magnets (neo magnets) Ohm’s law, 269, 288
Netherlands, The, 50, 128, 136, 183, 188 OHR&A see operational hazard review &
NetUASC3 see Networked UAS analysis (OHR&A)
Communications, Command, and Control OIC see operator in charge (OIC)
(NetUASC3) oil and gas industry, 34, 38–9
Networked UAS Communications, Command, OODA see Observe, Orient, Decide and
and Control (NetUASC3), 205, 206 Act (OODA)
neuromorphic technology, 454 open-source communication standards, 342–3;
Newtonian mechanics, 222 see also command-and-control (C2)
New Zealand, 34, 128, 136, 183 open-source software, 342–3
NF see noise figure (NF) operational hazard review & analysis
NGO see non-governmental organization (NGO) (OHR&A), 156–7, 159, 166
NIB see neodymium permanent magnets operation Aphrodite 8, 226, 227
(neo magnets) operator interfaces, 322
night operations, 128, 447–8 optical odometry, 341
NIR see near infrared (NIR) optionally piloted aircraft, 196
NIST see National Institute of Standards and optionally piloted vehicles (OPV), 182
Technology (NIST) OQ-1 Radioplane 6, 227, 460; see also unmanned
NMAC see near mid-air collision (NMAC) aerial vehicles (UAVs)
NOA see notice of availability (NOA) original equipment manufacturer (OEM),
noise figure (NF), 313, 317 102, 449
No Live Operator Onboard (NOLO), 6 orthographic mosaic images, 82; see also remote
nominal cell voltages, 276, 288; see also sUAS sensing
electrical systems orthomosaic maps, 34, 82; see also unmanned
noncooled cameras, 65 aircraft systems applications
nondestructive testing (NDT), 453 orthorectification, 39
non-governmental organization (NGO), 121 orthorectified imagery, 82
493
Index 493
Otto cycle, 246–7, 249–50 PMIAA see Permissions Management and

outer control loop see flight control systems Policy, Authorization and Authentication
Outrunner BLDC motor, 254–6, 264, 274–5, (PMIAA)
280–2, 289 PO see payload operator (PO)
over-the-horizon (OTH) target acquisition, policy statements, 102, 104, 105, 116, 117
389, 408 POS see position and orientation system (POS)
position and orientation system (POS), 79
P&WC see Pratt & Whitney Canada power budget, 261
(P&WC) power density, 277, 289, 310, 318
PANS see Procedures for Air Navigation power distance, 146, 466; see also human factors
Services (PANS) in unmanned aerial systems
Paparazzi, 330 powerplant designs, 216, 247–8, 250, 252, 253,
parasite drag, 219, 224, 226, 230, 231, 233 256–7, 263–4; Aeryon Labs Scout quadcopter,
Parker, Don B., 404, 436 255, 256, 282; alternator, 246, 257, 261–2, 283,
Parkerian Hexad, The, 404 286; compression stroke, 246–9; crankcase,
passive monitoring, 409 248; electric motors, 74, 80, 200, 202, 235, 245,
password cracking, 420 254–6, 258, 261, 274, 279, 409, 426, 468;
pathfinder initiative, 114 four-cycle engines, 245–6, 249; heavy fuel
payload: baseline vibration excitation test, 358; engines, 214, 249, 274; Otto cycle, 246–7,
concept development and trade studies, 337, 249–50; Outrunner BLDC motor, 255–6, 264,
349–50, 471; design process, 193–7, 207, 209, 274, 280–2, 289; power stroke, 246, 248, 249;
213, 215–18, 223, 236, 287, 347–50, 353, 363, propellers on UAS, 162, 234, 243, 235, 256–7,
365, 468, 469; design review, 347, 349, 351, 353, 263, 426; single-acting (propeller, governor),
471; electromagnetic field test, 337, 358; EMI 257; sUAS electric powerplants, 255; two-
testing, 357; fabrication, 347, 349, 354–7, 453; cycle powerplants, 247–9; Wankel engine,
field integration of UAS, 362; flight testing, 214, 246, 249–50; see also aircraft gas turbine;
323, 347, 349, 360–3; flying insect capture unmanned aircraft system design
347–8; MAVTL, 358–9, 364; mobile truck test, powerpole connectors, 355
360, 361; subsystems, 193, 194, 205, 216, 347, power stroke, 246, 248, 249
349; system testing, 357–63; thermal testing, PPM see proportional pulse modulation (PPM)
360–1; vibration testing, 357–9 practical testing, 394
payload operator (PO), 165, 323 practical test standards, 394
PCM see pulse code modulation (PCM) Pratt & Whitney Canada (P&WC), 236, 251, 253
PDR see preliminary design review (PDR) precision agriculture (PA), 20, 39, 40, 41, 53–4,
Penguin B, 229, 256 90, 96, 98–100, 113, 347, 463; crop damage
Penguin BE 48-cell, 228, 255, 256, 275, 278, assessments, 42; crop health assessment, 41–2;
281, 282 stand counts, 42
Penguin II, 238 PrecisionHawk, 30–1, 54–5, 114, 227, 275
Permissions Management and Policy, preliminary design review (PDR), 351–3
Authorization and Authentication preliminary hazard list (PHL), 154–6, 159, 166
(PMIAA), 403 preliminary hazard list/analysis (PHL/
Phantom Works, 214, 474 A), 155–6
PHL see preliminary hazard list (PHL) pressure altimeter see small unmanned
PHL/A see preliminary hazard list/analysis autopilot systems
(PHL/A) presumption of denial, 172, 174, 182
photogrammetry, 19, 26, 30, 39, 54, 79, 96–100, primary flight display see unmanned aircraft
292, 462 system design
Piaggio P.1HH HammerHead, 232 privacy concerns, 157
PID see proportional, integral, differential privacy management, 439
(PID) private key see symmetric key
Pilot’s license, 126, 128 procedures for air navigation services
Pitot/static tube with sensor, 336; see also small (PANS), 121
unmanned aircraft autopilot systems product life cycle, 154
494
494 Index
profile drag power, 233 RCMP see Royal Canadian Mounted

propeller: pitch, 222, 234, 242, 256–7, 265; slip, Police (RCMP)
222, 242; twist, 234 RCS see radar cross-section (RCS)
proportional, integral, differential (PID), RDT&E see research, development, testing and
338–9, 345 evaluation (RDT&E)
proportional pulse modulation (PPM), 338 real estate industry, 20, 33, 44, 131, 446
propulsor, 222, 227, 237, 250, 252 real-time kinematic (RTK), 337, 341, 345
Prox Dynamics PD-100 micro-aerial vehicle Reason, James, 144, 151, 152, 465
(Black Hornet Nano), 214, 234, 268, 334, 352 receiver, 291, 302; crosstalk, 304, 315;
public aircraft, 108, 111–12, 445–6, 473; see also despreading signal, 291, 302, 304, 305, 309;
UAS in Public Safety impulse noise, 304; intermodulation noise,
public key, 332 303; receiver sensitivity, 291, 302, 305, 312,
Public Law, 112–95; see FAA Modernization and 314, 315, 326, 470; signal-to-noise ratio, 302,
Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA) 313–14, 326; thermal noise, 303–4, 315; see also
public safety agencies, 388–90, 393 communication systems
pulse code modulation (PCM), 338 reciprocating engine technology, 452; see also
Purdue University, 450 unmanned aircraft technological trends
pushbroom sensors, 77; see also remote sensing recovery systems see launch and recovery (L&R)
PX4, 29, 330 RECUV see Research and Engineering Center
for Unmanned Vehicles (RECUV)
QH-50 Drone Anti-submarine Helicopter RECUV Tempest UAS, 47, 195
(DASH) see Drone Anti-Submarine recyclable thermoset plastics, 453
Helicopter (DASH) Regal VUX-1UAV, 80
quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK), 315 relaxed static stability (rss), 225
Quail, (McDonnell ADM-20) 11 Remote Command (or Code) Execution
queen 6–7, 274, 280 (RCE), 418
Queen Bee 7, 16, 226 remote control (RC), 8, 13, 15, 21, 55, 60, 203,
210, 401, 407
radar cross-section (RCS), 231 remote identification of unmanned aircraft
radiation intensity, 301, 317 systems, 114–15, 118, 389, 439, 447
radiation pattern, 301, 303, 317 remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), 2, 3, 57, 102,
radio-control (RC), 6, 8, 10, 16, 60, 108, 110, 150, 107, 122, 126, 128, 135, 137, 151, 226, 268, 444;
189, 338, 377, 388, 460, 467 human perception and RPA operations, 136,
radio frequency (RF), 62, 299, 322, 417, 471 139–40; imaging technologies in, 139; training
radio signal interference (RFI), 64, 296, 315, 325 professionals in, 143, 465; see also human
radio-magnetic interference (RMI), 272, 288 factors in unmanned aerial systems
radiometric calibration, 75 remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), 2, 58, 178, 292
Radio Plane YQ-1B, 11 Remote Pilot’s Certificates (Part 107), 49,
Radio Queen, 274, 280 106, 462
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics remote sensing, 24, 33, 43, 49, 54–5, 65, 72–81,
(RTCA), 118, 124, 207, 210, 218, 270, 369–370, 84, 86, 88–9, 93–9, 224, 292, 364, 445, 461,
374, 379, 383, 385, 468 463–4; active sensors, 19, 27, 75, 77, 95, 380;
RAE see Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) applications, 19, 20, 22–30, 33, 35–41, 43,
RATO see rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO) 46–8, 52–7, 67, 72, 78–95, 362; array sensors,
rail launchers see launch and recovery (L&R) 77; background imagery, 71, 81, 88, 463;
Ram air turbines (RAT), 269 categories of, 73; common sensors, 71, 77;
Random Antiterrorism Measures Program, 85 data asset management, 19, 29–30; data
Raster data see geospatial data types processing and analysis, 20, 51, 52; digital
RAT see Ram air turbines (RAT) surface models (DSM), 29; digital terrain
Raven see AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven models (DTM), 29; electro-optical cameras,
RC see radio-control (RC) 19, 25, 57, 65, 73, 205, 268, 463; emergency
RCE see Remote Command Execution response, 19, 20, 35, 45, 71, 87, 463; full
(RCE) motion video (FMV), 19, 26, 35–7, 43, 45,
495
Index 495
51; hyperspectral imagers, 71, 78–9, 93, 463; risk-based classification, 58

imaging sensor, 71, 76, 77, 463; laser range RMAX see Yamaha RMAX
finder (see unmanned aircraft subsystem RMI see radio-magnetic interference (RMI)
integration); LiDAR, 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 36, 55, rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO), 238
71, 77, 79–80, 82, 93, 95, 97–9, 205, 295, 340, Rolls-Royce AE3007 (F137) engine, 286
380–1, 412, 461, 466; light amplification, 26; Roskam, J., 196, 210
line scanners, 77; live video, 28, 43, 44, 86, Rotary-wing Aerodynamics (NASA Contractor
268; long-wave infrared cameras (LWIR), Report 3082), 232
71, 78, 463; middle-wavelength IR (MWIR), rotary-wing designs, 232, 235–6; helicopter
19, 24, 25, 26, 65, 67, 75, 86; multi-spectral gear reduction, 233; helicopter UAS, 233–4,
imaging, 40, 66, 78–9, 96, 347, 348, 459; near- 461; Honeywell Tarantula Hawk landing,
infrared cameras (NIR), 19, 24, 25, 26, 31, 40, 236; large unmanned helicopters, 234; lift,
42, 67, 75, 77–8, 89–92, 97, 461; non-cooled 233–4; multi-rotors, 235–6; rotorcraft, 203,
cameras, 65; optical cameras, 347; passive 223, 245, 262, 275, 350; torque effect, 235, 236;
electro-optical, 19, 24, 25; pushbrooms, 77; UAS rotary-wing designs, 232–3, 236; see also
quadcopter with gimbal, 88; radiometric unmanned aircraft system design
calibration, 75; sensor types, 24, 25, 26, 71, ROW see right-of-way (ROW)
76–7, 380; short-wave IR (SWIR), 19, 24–6, 67, Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE), 6
75; small UAS Gimbal, 87; spatial continuity, Royal Air Force, 5–7
76–7; spot sensors, 71, 76–7, 463; synthetic Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 46, 55
aperture radar (SAR), 19, 27, 28, 31, 35, 71, 77, RPAS Panel, 122
80–1, 87, 98, 205, 340, 463, 468; TASE Gimbal, RPV see remotely piloted vehicle (RPV)
86; thermal imaging (FLIR), 26, 30, 31, 65; 3- RQ-2 Pioneer, 15, 201–2, 221, 224, 228, 238,
D point cloud/modeling, 29–30; vegetation 248, 250
health measurements, 71, 89; visible spectrum RQ-3 DarkStar, 231, 253, 271, 272
cameras, 71, 77–8, 463; see also unmanned RQ-7 Shadow, 13, 14, 201, 202, 215, 221, 228,
aircraft sensing 232, 250, 401, 461; see also unmanned aerial
remote sensing spectrum cameras, 78 vehicles (UAVs)
repetitive flight paths, 23 RQ-11 Raven, 13, 43, 59, 67, 68, 99, 215, 227, 238,
Research and Engineering Center for Unmanned 275, 282, 400, 401
Vehicles (RECUV), 47, 195, 205, 206 RQ-16 T-Hawk (Honeywell), 214, 236, 243
research, development, testing, and evaluation RQ-170 Sentinel, 231, 268, 401
(RDT&E), 444 RRL see residual risk level (RRL)
residual risk level (RRL), 155, 157 rss see relaxed static stability (rss)
resin infusion molding (RIM), 453 RTCA see Radio Technical Commission for
resistance of conductor, 269–70 Aeronautics (RTCA)
Resolution 1540 (United Nations Security RTCA DO-160, 270
Council), 173 RTCA DO-365/366, 369, 370, 374, 379, 383
Reynolds numbers, 197, 223, 232, 233 RTK see real-time kinematic (RTK)
resonance tuning, 398, 428 rulemaking, 101–5, 108, 110, 113, 116–18, 120,
RF see radio frequency (RF) 131–3, 136, 190, 218, 287, 389, 446, 447
Righter, Walter, 6 rules of the road, 104
right-of-way (ROW), 37, 107, 111, 114, 370, Rustom-H, 224
377, 381 Ryan Aeronautical Company, 228
RIM see resin infusion molding (RIM) Ryan model, 147, 11; see also unmanned aerial
risk analysis, 137, 148, 403, 466; see also human vehicles (UAVs)
factors in unmanned aerial systems Ryan-Nichols equations, 473
risk assessment, 130, 153–4, 157–61, 164, 196,
245, 261–2, 404–5, 440, 466, 467; development, SAA see sense and avoid (SAA)
153, 159; purpose, 154; residual risk level SAA Science and Research Panel (SARP), 372,
(RRL), 155, 157; risk level (RL), 154, 155–7, 385, 472
159–60; small UAS, 158, 159; use, 159–60; see SAE see Society of Automotive Engineers
also safety assessments (SAE)
496
496 Index
SAE AS50881 (on wire gauge sizing), 270 sensitive facilities, 389
safety assessments, 153; mishap probability SESAR see Single European Sky ATM Research
levels, 164 ; mishap risk assessment matrix, (SESAR)
164; mishap severity categories, 164; see also SFARs see Special Federal Aviation Regulations
accident investigation considerations; hazard (SFARs)
analysis; risk assessment; safety evaluation SFM see structure from motion (SFM)
safety evaluation, 160; airworthiness Shadow see RQ-7
certification, 161–2; airworthiness test card, Shannon-Hartley limit, 307; see also bandwidth
162; flight test cards, 161; risk assessment, Shappell, Thomas, 144–5, 152, 465
160; see also safety assessments shaft horsepower (shp), 222, 235
safety management system (SMS), 50, 120, 128, Shannon–Hartley relation, 317
130, 165, 467 SHORAD see Short Range Air Defense
SAMs see surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) (SHORAD)
SAR see search and rescue (SAR) short-circuits see sUAS electrical systems
SARP see SAA Science and Research short-haul urban air transportation, 440
Panel (SARP) Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD), 429
SARPS see standards and recommended short-wave infrared (SWIR), 19, 24–6, 67, 75
practices (SARPS) shp see shaft horsepower (shp)
SATFOR see Special Air Task Force (SATFOR) signals intelligence (SIGINT), 46
satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS), 336 signal interference, 64
sausage making process, 131 signal-to-noise ratio (S/N ratio), 291, 302, 303,
SBAS see satellite-based augmentation 305, 307, 313–14, 326; see also receiver
system (SBAS) signal strength, 61–2, 326–8
SBIR see Small Business Innovation simple storage system (S3), 84
Research (SBIR) simultaneous localization and mapping
SC-203 see Special Committee, 203; Unmanned (SLAM), 341, 346
Aircraft Systems (SC-203) Sinclair Community College, 450
SCADA see Supervisory Control and Data single-acting propeller governor, 257
Acquisition (SCADA) Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR),
scalability, 443, 456 118, 122; see also UAS Regulations, Standards
ScanEagle™, 67, 69, 80, 202, 224, 230, 240 and Guidance
Scout see Israel Aerospace Industries single-pilot operations, 455
Schmidt, Paul, 9, 18 single-wire system, 271, 284; see also sUAS
SDO see standards development electrical systems
organization (SDO) situation awareness, 137, 141, 146–50, 369, 465,
SDSPs see supplemental data service providers 466, 472; see also human factors in unmanned
(SDSPs) aerial systems
SEAD see suppression of enemy antiaircraft size, weight, and power (SWaP), 350, 392–3
destruction (SEAD) SkyGuardian, 203, 204, 286
search and rescue (SAR), 20, 25, 33, 45–6, 59, 87, SkyHook™, 67, 69, 239, 240
97, 112, 121, 128, 146, 268, 292, 347, 364, 463 Skyports, 440
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), 183, 210, 372, 407 Skywalker X8, 224, 230
Secretary of State, 183–4 sky waves, 327
Secretary of the Treasury, 183 SLAM see simultaneous localization and
Section, 333; Exemption, 43, 113–15, 135, 446 mapping (SLAM)
see and avoid requirement, 111, 472 Small Airplanes Standards Branch, Policy &
self-separation (SS), 378, 412; see also detect and Innovation Division, 449
avoid systems (DAA systems) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), 286
Senders and Moray, 142 Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR), 286
sense and avoid (SAA), 111, 131, 207, 347, 364, small unmanned aircraft autopilot systems,
369, 372, 397, 399, 411, 412, 434, 438, 454, 468; 332; attenuator, 327; barometric pressure
sub-functions, 378; see also detect and avoid sensors, 335; built-in flight data recorder
systems (DAA systems) 333; checksum, 329, 331; command and
497
Index 497
control transceivers, 324; data link modems, spectrum, 24–6, 37, 64–5, 67, 71, 73, 75–8, 80, 89,
326–7; differential pressure transducer, 123, 291, 292–6, 300, 315, 321, 324–6, 338, 357,
335–6; external pilot controllers, 338; flight 409, 440, 471; see also UAS Sensing-Theory
control systems 2, 29, 181, 184, 338, 460, 468; and Practice; electromagnetic spectrum
gains, 198, 338, 421; GPS receivers, 336, 408; (EM spectrum); Federal Communications
hard iron compensation, 335; inner control Commission (FCC)
loop, 203; interfaces, 22, 119, 207–8, 210, Sperry Aircraft Corporation see messenger
270, 322, 323, 333, 384, 393; interrupts, 333; aerial torpedo (MAT)
magnetometers, 335, 338, 471; pitot/static Sperry, Elmer, 3, 4, 6, 8, 200, 237
tube with sensor, 336; pressure transducer, Sperry, Lawrence, 4, 6, 237, 460
335; soft iron compensation, 335; stabilized Sperry Messenger lightweight biplane 6
control, 19, 21–2, 43, 51; steady-state error, spoofing GPS, 400, 408, 410, 474; see also global
339; see also small unmanned aircraft systems positioning systems
(sUAS), command and control spot sensors, 71, 76–7, 463; see also remote
small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS), sensing
113, 115, 120, 167, 267, 364; command Spratly Islands, 407
and control transceivers, 324; electric spread spectrum technique see frequency
powerplants, 354–5; ground control system hopping
interface with waypoints time, 332; IMU/ SQL injections, 418, 419
INS stabilization systems, 321, 340–1; SR-71 Blackbird, 239
line of sight communication, 321, 325–6; SS see self-separation (SS)
multirotors, 60, 213, 214, 235–6, 256; rotor SSA see system safety assessment (SSA)
blade dynamics, 232–4, 252; space waves, STA see Strategic Trade Authorization (STA)
325; see also command- and-control (C2); UAS STANAG, 4586, 119, 210
Regulations, Standards and Guidance; UAS STANAG, 4671, 203, 287
in Public Safety; small unmanned aircraft Standards and Recommended Practices
autopilot systems (SARPS), 101, 121, 122; see also UAS
SMS see safety management system (SMS) Regulations, Standards and Guidelines
S/N ratio see signal-to-noise ratio Standards Development Organization (SDO),
(S/N ratio) 116, 118, 439
Snowden, Edward, 419 standard sensor parameters, 411, 412
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), 118, state police power, 392
207, 218, 270 stator, 249, 255, 274, 279–80, 282–4
soft-iron magnetic field see small unmanned steady-state error, 339; see also small unmanned
aircraft autopilot systems aircraft autopilot systems
solar technology, 452; see also emerging trends in stealth design, 400, 426, 474
technology steering commands, 203
solid-state circuit breakers see sUAS electrical STM see space traffic management (STM)
systems S3 see simple storage system (S3)
SORA, 123–4, 130, 440; see also JARUS JAR doc Strategic Trade Authorization (STA), 181
06 SORA package strict liability regime, 189; see also export control
source code, 342 structure from motion (SFM), 39–40, 71, 82
South Africa, 129, 136, 172, 183 STTR see small business technology
space traffic management (STM), 440 transfer (STTR)
space waves, 325 sUAS electrical systems, 274; all-electric
Special Air Task Force (SATFOR), 8 Penguin BE payload bay, 277; all-electric
Special Airworthiness Certificate, 108, 111, 113, sUAS, 267, 274–5, 281; Aveox, 27/26/7-AV
114, 446 inrunner BLDC motor, 282; battery chemistry,
Special Committee, 203; Unmanned Aircraft 277–8; BEC, 281; brushed motor, 274, 279–80,
Systems (SC-203), 119, 207, 210 282; brushless motors, 255, 280, 289; capacity
Special Federal Aviation Regulations of cell, 277; carbon fiber cooling shroud,
(SFARs), 103 281; carbon fiber forward-facing air scoop,
spectral reflectance see remote sensing 281; commutator, 255, 279, 282, 286; current
498
498 Index
limiter, 285; electric sUAS propulsion, 279–82; Target Drone Denny 1 (TDD-1), 6, 460; see also
electrolysis, 276; electronic commutation, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
280; electronic speed control, 280–1; energy target drones 5–6; Larynx 6; Navy Research Lab
conversions in electrochemical cell, 222, N2C-2 Target Drone 6; OQ-1 Radioplane 6,
276–8; energy density, 269, 275, 277, 278, 392; 227; Queen 6, 7; Queen Bee 7, 15, 226; Sperry
GCU, 283–4; memory effect, 278; motoring, Messenger biplane 6, 226; in formulating
284; NASA Helios, 275, 276; nominal cell power doctrine 6
voltages, 276; nonelectrically powered sUAS, targeting area dimensions, 426–7
282–3; Northrop Grumman RQ-4/MQ-4 TASE 400 Gimbal, 86
fuselage, 284; Penguin BE, 48-cell, 278; power TCAS see traffic alert and collision avoidance
density, 277, 310; power source, 268, 270–1, system (TCAS)
279, 283–4; short-circuit failures, 269; single- TDC see top dead center (TDC)
wire system, 271, 284; solid-state circuit TDD-1 see Target Drone Denny 1 (TDD-1)
breaker, 271, 284–5; stator field, 279–80; TDN-1, 8
superconductors, 269, 270; switch-mode TDR-1 Assault drone 7
regulators, 281, 283; system redundancies, Teal Group Corporation, 444, 458
194; 2S, 277; voltage regulation, 274, 283; technical assistance agreements (TAA), 171; see
see also unmanned aircraft electrical system also export control
subsonic flow, 221 technical standards order (TSO), 104–5, 269
superconductors see sUAS electrical systems teleautomation 3
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Tempest UAS see VORTEX-2
(SCADA), 399–401, 409, 411, 413–24, 430 temporary flight restrictions (TFR), 105, 160
supervisory influence, 144–5; see also human Tesla, Nikola 3
factors in unmanned aerial systems test ranges, 113
suppression of enemy antiaircraft destruction tethered aircraft, 322, 471
(SEAD), 11 TFR see temporary flight restrictions (TFR)
supplemental data service providers thermal Infrared cameras, 57, 64–5, 75, 78,
(SDSPs), 439 409, 463
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), 11 thermal noise, 303, 304, 313; see also receiver
surveying, 20, 25, 34, 39–41, 45, 54 thermal testing, 360; see also payload
swarming UAS, 184, 443, 457 thermographic cameras see long wave infrared
Sweden, 129, 136, 183 (LWIR) cameras
SWIM see system-wide information thin-ply tape technology, 453
management system (SWIM) 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), 118
SWIR see short-wave infrared (SWIR) three D’s 2, 461
switch-mode regulators, 282, 283; see also sUAS 3-D printing, 454
electrical systems 3GPP see 3rd Generation Partnership
symmetric key, 332 Project (3GPP)
synthetic aperture radar (SAR), 19, 27, 28, 31, 65, thrust, 200, 214, 218–23, 229, 230, 233–8, 245–7,
71, 77, 80–1, 97–8, 205, 340, 463, 468; NANO 251–4, 256, 260–4, 280, 282; see also aircraft gas
SAR Circa, 2008, 81; see also remote sensing turbines; unmanned aircraft system design
system complexity, 165 tilt-rotor designs, 60
Systems Operations Support Center, 389 Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 104
system safety assessment (SSA), 123, 160 Title 49 U.S.C. § 44809, 110
System Safety for the 21st Century (Stephens), 167 top dead center (TDC), 246, 249
system testing, 347, 349, 357–8; see also payload topographical maps, 41
system-wide information management system Torque effect, 235, 236; see also small unmanned
(SWIM), 439 aircraft systems; rotor blade dynamics
tower/antenna inspection, 19, 37
TAA see technical assistance agreements (TAA) Trading with the Enemy Act, 170
tail rotor, 234–5, 249 traffic alert and collision avoidance system
tail designs see unmanned aircraft (TCAS), 117, 371–2, 374, 377, 379, 380, 382,
systems design 385, 411, 412
499
Index 499
training and certification, 443, 447–9 sausage making process, 131, 466; standards
training and education, 444 and guidance vs. regulations, 118–20
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), 469 UAS Service Suppliers (USS), 437
transceivers, 299, 324, 325, 327, 471 UAS SWARMS, 398, 432
TRANSCOM see transportation command UAS Test Site Partnership, 115
(TRANSCOM) UAS Traffic Management Project (NASA), 437
transmitter, full-spectrum spark-gap 3 UAVs see unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
T-Rex small helicopter, 234 UAV Factory, 226–7, 236, 246, 253, 273, 276, 279,
tribal governments, 446 280, 283
Trojan Horse virus, 417, 420 UCAV see unmanned combat air
TRW, 229, 239; see also IAI RQ-5 Hunter vehicle (UCAV)
TSO see technical standards order (TSO) UCAV X-45A, 454
turbine wheel (T-wheel), 251 UCAV X-47B, 229, 236, 249, 251
turbofans, 252, 253, 255 UCLASS see unmanned carrier-launched
turbojets, 253–4; see also aircraft gas turbine airborne surveillance and strike (UCLASS)
turboprops, 252–3 UHF see ultra high frequency (UHF)
turboshaft, 252–3 UIUC see University of Illinois
turret mounting system see gimbal Urbana-Champaign (UIUC)
mounting system ultra high frequency (UHF), 338
22 C.F.R. § 120–130, 170 ultrasonic frequency resonance, 423
22 U.S.C. 2778 see Arms Export Control Act of ultraviolet (UV), 24, 67, 293
1976 (AECA) United Kingdom, 129, 136, 182, 183
T-wheel see turbine wheel (T-wheel) University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
twin boom pushers 1, 13–14; see also unmanned (UIUC), 197
aerial vehicles (UAVs) University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL), 49, 55
two-cycle engines, 247, 249 UNL see University of Nebraska-Lincoln
2S battery, 277; see also sUAS electrical systems (UNL)
2019 World Civil UAS Market Profile and University of North Dakota, 134, 345, 348
Forecast (Teal), 444 unlicensed frequencies, 323, 324, 342
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Advisory
UA see unmanned aircraft (UA) Group-ICAO, 122
UAM see urban air mobility (UAM) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Registration
UAS see unmanned aircraft systems Task Force (RTF), 116
(UAS), unmanned aircraft systems unmanned aerial vehicle control system (UCS),
engineering (UASE) 119, 205, 208
UASAG see Unmanned Aircraft Systems unmanned aerial vehicle factory Penguin BE,
Advisory Panel-ICAO 226, 253, 254, 273, 276, 279, 280; see also
UAS Cyber Attack Taxonomy, 414 fixed-wing designs
UAS Data Exchange and Manufacturer’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 2; AAI
Toolkit, 115 RQ2 Pioneer, 14, 15, 201–2, 221, 224, 228,
UAS grouping, 158, 160 238, 248, 250; aerial torpedo 1, 3, 4–7, 198;
UAS Integration Office, 385, 445 amateur-built unmanned aircraft 1, 15–16;
UAS Integration Pilot Program (IPP), 115, AQM Lightning Bug, 12, 461; autonomous
448 operation, 13; Curtiss prototype 4; Desert
UAS Regulations, Standards and Guidance Storm, 14–15; early aviation development
101–3; collision avoidance rule, 111; 1–2; early reconnaissance aircraft, 10–11; first
enforcement and sanctions, 105–10; FMRA helicopter, 12–13; long-range reconnaissance,
of 2012, 102, 104, 108, 110, 113, 114, 120, 131, 11–12; and manned aircraft, 15–16; need
132; future of UAS regulations, 130–2; history for effective control 2–3; overcoming
of, 103; ICAO, 120; informal rulemaking, 116, manned pilot bias, 15; radar decoys, 11;
117; international aviation regulations, 120–4; radio and autopilot 3–4; target drone 5–7;
process, 116–18; public aircraft, 108, 111–12; teleautomation 3; three D’s 2; twin boom
regulation of unmanned aircraft, 110–16; pushers 1, 13–14; U.S. Army Liberty Eagle 5;
500
500 Index
WWII German Mistletoe, 10; WWII German system, 347, 348; Northrup Grumman Global
V-1 Buzz Bomb 9–10; WWII U.S. Navy Hawk UAS, 351; payload subsystems, 347;
Assault Drone 7–8; see also Federal Aviation systems engineering, 196–8, 210, 347, 349, 370,
Administration (FAA) 471; system testing, 356, 357–61; temperature
unmanned aircraft electrical systems, 265; ratings, 356; test plan, 362; thermal chamber,
aviation quality wire, 267; AWG system, 360; thermal testing, 360; trade studies, 347,
267–8; electrical power, 266; electronic filters, 349–50; vibration excitation test, 358, 360,
271; EMI-suppression strategy, 271; EMI 364; weight budget, 353; see also payload;
gaskets, 354; excitation frequencies, 356; for unmanned aircraft system design
large UASs, 283–4; general characteristics, unmanned aircraft system applications, 19,
266–72; impedance, 268–9; LEMO connectors, 33; aerial chemical application, 20, 48–9;
353; Lockheed Martin/Boeing Tier III-(minus) aerial filming, 43; aerial mapping, 39–40;
RQ-3 DarkStar, 270; miniaturization, 14, 94, aerial photography, 43; aerial surveying,
203, 272, 278, 348, 441, 448; nonconductive 40; atmospheric information collection, 47;
composites, 267; Ohm’s law, 267; power cargo/package delivery, 49, 50; chemical
source, 266–7, 273; resistance of conductor, applications, 48; civil infrastructure, 35–6;
267; wire selection, 268–69, 284; see also sUAS communications relay, 47; computer vision,
electrical systems 28, 31–2, 88; electric power industry,
unmanned aircraft market segments, 441, 445; 36–7; filmmaking, 43–4; hazardous
airspace access, 446; career opportunities, 447; material detection, 48; hydrocarbon/
emerging trends, 448; future applications, methane emission, 48; image recognition,
453; private/commercial, 443–4; public, 445; 31; industrial/infrastructure inspection, 35;
routine airspace access, 446; training and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
certification, 446; see also unmanned aircraft 45; law enforcement, 45; marketing,
systems (UAS) 44; meteorology, 47; natural resource
unmanned aircraft sensing, 24, 72–6; aircraft as management, 43; news reporting, 44; oil and
sensor platform, 74; drone silhouette chart gas inspection, 34–5; orthomosaic maps, 34;
for scale comparison, 73; infrared sensors, photogrammetric applications, 39; precision
78; in situ sensing, 72–3; jamming, 315; laser agriculture, 41–3; radioactive material
designator, 67; laser illuminator, 347; platform detection, 48; real estate, 44; remote sensing,
considerations, 74; point cloud, 27, 29, 40, 82; 43, 49, 73, 74 (see also remote sensing);
RGB (red, green, blue) cameras and sensors, search and rescue, 45–6; signals intelligence
23–6, 31, 33, 77, 99; sensor packaging, 351; (SIGINT), 46–7; 3-D model of cornfield, 26;
size categories, 73; spectrum analyzer, 355; tower/antenna inspection, 37–8; video
tethered aircraft, 322, 471; see also remote capture, 20; volumetrics, 41; water sampling,
sensing 49; wind turbine inspection, 37; see also
unmanned aircraft subsystems, 198; airframe, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)
198–200; airframe cost relative to payload unmanned aircraft system design, 193;
capacity, 201; communications, command, airframes, 198; battery, 200; converting shaft
and control, 205–6; control station, 203–5; horsepower to thrust, 222; CS interface,
design tools, 196–7; flight control system 203, 205, 207; drag, 216, 218–23; economic
200–3; fraction of system cost vs. airframe influences on design process, 217; exogenous
empty weight, 201; NetUASC3, 205–6; factors affecting, 218; form follows function,
payloads, 205; performance of representative 216–17; heavier-than-air craft, 221; high
UAS over a range of sizes, 196, 202; aspect ratio wings, 214, 220–1; incompressible
propulsion system, 200; servos, 194, 208, 267, airfoil theory, 222; lift, 218–23; mission-
273, 275, 277, 338; see also unmanned aircraft derived design, 205; primary flight display,
system design 322; process, 193–7, 207, 213, 215–18, 223,
unmanned aircraft subsystem integration, 347; 236–7, 347, 349, 350, 353, 365; safety, 207,
Black Hornet nano helicopter, 352; externally 261, 264, 323, 339, 358, 359 (see also safety
mounted missile system, 354; external wing assessments); Skunk Works® 3 + Mach
pod, 355; flight testing, 361–3; laser range D-21, 219; standards, 206–7; subsonic flow,
finder, 65, 67, 86; multi-spectral targeting 221; tail designs, 213, 225, 228; verification
501
Index 501
and mission validation, 207–8; wheel, unmanned aircraft technology, 21; automated
251–2, 258; X-51 Waverider, 219–20, 238; control, 22–3; control methods, 21; external
see also unmanned aircraft subsystem; pilot console, 22; full motion video, 26;
fixed-wing designs; launch and recovery manual control, 21; metadata, 26; Mission
(L&R); powerplant designs; rotary-wing Planner software, 23; payloads, 23; stabilized
designs control, 21; still imagers, 26
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), 57–8; AAI unmanned carrier-launched airborne
Aerosonde vehicle-top launch cradle, 70; surveillance and strike (UCLASS), 231
airframes, 198; air transportation, 455–6; unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV), 231, 238,
anticipated market growth, 444; arresting 251, 253, 456
cable, 67, 69; atmospheric satellites, 453; unmanned gliders, 2; see also unmanned aerial
automation, 60; autopilot, 60–1; autopilot vehicles (UAVs)
systems for, 60–1; autopilot unit, 60; beyond unmanned spaceflight, 457
line-of-sight operations, 203, 389; career unmanned technology, 20, 21
opportunities, 449–50; catapult launcher, unmanned traffic management (UTM), 439–41
67; classification system, 58–9; command UPP see UTM Pilot Program (UPP)
and control element, 58, 60; commonality/ urban air mobility (UAM), 440, 475
scalability, 456–7; communication data link, U.S. Air Defense System (ADS), 397, 398, 406
62; data processing and analysis, 51, 52, U.S. Army Liberty Eagle, 5
82, 85; electro-optical cameras, 57, 65, 73, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 104,
205, 268, 280, 393, 412; elements of, 58; 109, 135, 226, 325, 446, 472; see also U.S.
fixed-wing UAS, 58–9; Frost & Sullivan Aviation Regulatory System
forecast, 458; future of, 329, 444–5; gimbal, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 389
65, 86, 87; ground control station, 37, 60–1, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 166, 170,
162, 203, 204, 217, 292, 322, 323, 343, 444; 186, 241, 372, 385, 428, 432, 434
human element, 68; laser, 67; launch and U.S. Department of Commerce, 97, 170, 176,
recovery, 67–8; line-of-sight operations, 188–9, 192–3
114, 203; lost-link procedures, 61; market U.S. Department of Interior (USDOI),
expenditures, 444; military, 61, 64, 65; 43, 446
mission planning, 20, 33, 51, 165, 400; USDOI see U.S. Department of Interior (USDOI)
payload, 64; spectral imaging payloads, use cases, 446
67; swarming UAS, 184, 424, 426, 445, 459; U.S. export control regulations see export
Teal Group’s forecast, 447; thermal infrared control
cameras, 65–7; UCAV X-45A, 231, 238, 251, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), 43
253, 456; unmanned combat air vehicle U.S. Forest Service, 389
(see UCAV X-45A); vertical takeoff and USFWS see U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
landing, 59–60; see also unmanned aircraft (USFWS)
system applications; unmanned aircraft U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 43, 55
market segments; unmanned aircraft USGS see U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
technological trends U.S. Munitions List (USML), 173, 174, 176,
unmanned aircraft systems engineering 181, 184–6
(UASE), 347 U.S. Navy’s QH-50 DASH, 11–12; see also
unmanned aircraft technological trends, 450; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
alternative energy, 450; biofuel technology, U-space, 124, 125, 130, 136, 440, 475
450; carbon fiber, 453; computing and artificial USS see UAS Service Suppliers (USS)
intelligence, 454; electric options, 452; LiPo U.S. State Department, 170, 174, 191, 192
battery, 452; materials improvements, 452–4; UTC Vireo, 237, 255, 256, 275
MAV, 451; microchip, 451; miniaturization, UTM architecture, 439
450; power solutions, 450; reciprocating UTM governance, 440
engine technology, 452; revolutionary UTM standards-making, 439
manufacturing, 454; solar technology, 452; UTM see unmanned traffic management (UTM)
3-D printers, 454; see also unmanned aircraft UTM Pilot Program (UPP), 115, 439
systems (UAS) UV see ultraviolet (UV)
502
502 Index
variable wing-sweep technology, 453 WAAS see wide area augmentation

vector data see geospatial data types system (WAAS)
vegetation health measurements, 89; airframes Wankel engine, 214, 245, 246, 200, 249–50;
for vegetation applications, 93; broader see also powerplant designs
vegetation management, 92–3; CIR image WASP III Battlefield Air Targeting Micro Air
made from bands NIR, 91; decreasing point Vehicles (BATMAV), 230
density affects tree height measurements, 94; Wassenaar arrangement, 173, 176, 192
GNDVI created from NIR, 92; multispectral wave-propagation see also electromagnetic wave
images of Monteboro vineyard, 91; UAS in (EM) propagation
agriculture-thermal mapping, 92; UAS in WBS see work breakdown structure (WBS)
agriculture-vegetation indices, 90–2 wetted aspect ratio, 220
vegetation index (VI), 89–90 WG-73 see Working Group 73 (WG-73)
Vengeance Weapon-1 see World War II white noise see thermal noise
(WWII)—German V-1 Buzz Bomb Wickens, Charles, Wiley, Lt. Wilford J., 140,
Velodyne HDL-32E, 27, 55 152, 465
Versailles Treaty, 121 wide area augmentation system (WAAS), 336, 345
vertical stabilizer, 34, 224, 226, 227 Wiegman, Douglas, 144, 145, 152, 460
vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL), 22, 35, 36, Williams F44 turbofans, 255; see also aircraft gas
37, 52, 58–60, 67, 214, 235, 236, 255 turbine
Verville-Sperry M-1 Messenger, 226 wind turbine inspection, 37, 51
very high frequency (VHF), 295, 340 wing, 49
very low level (VLL), 440 wireless attacks, 420, 423
VFR see visual flight rules (VFR) wireless data links, 468
VHF see very high frequency (VHF) wireshark, 417, 420
vibration testing, 357–9; see also payload work breakdown structure (WBS), 196
vicarious learning, 149, 466; see also human Working Group, 73 (WG-73) 123
factors in unmanned aerial systems workstation design, 138
vigilance, 147–8, 150, 368, 466, 472; World War II (WWII), 4, 39, 77, 170, 253;
see also human factors in unmanned German Mistletoe Bombers, 9–10; German
aerial systems V-1 Buzz Bomb, 8–10; N2C-2 Target Drone
Vietnam War, 10, 240, 461 6; Navy/Interstate TDR-1 Assault Drone
Vireo, 237, 255, 256, 275; see also launch and 7, 8; Operation Aphrodite, 8; U.S. Navy
recovery (L&R) Assault Drone 7; see also unmanned aerial
visible (VIS), 19, 24–6, 31, 42, 59, 65, 67, 74, 75, vehicles (UAVs)
77, 78, 409, 425, 463; see also remote sensing Wright Brothers, 2, 3, 17, 200, 238, 259
spectrum cameras
visual flight rules (VFR), 111, 368 X-51 Waverider (Boeing), 219–20, 238
visual observer (VO), 64, 114, 151, 152, 287 XPATCH, 208
VLL see very low level (VLL)
VO see visual observer (VO) Yamaha RMAX (RMAX), 48, 234
VORTEX-2, 205 Yom Kippur War, 228
VTOL see vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL)
vulnerability classes, 415 ZALA, 421–2; helicopter, 234

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i

Third edition published 2021

3 The “System” in UAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

4 UAS Sensing – Theory and Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

5 UAS Regulations, Standards, and Guidance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

6 Human Factors in Unmanned Aerial Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

7 Safety Assessments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

8 Export Control and ITAR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

9 Unmanned Aircraft System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

10 UAS Airframe Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

11 UAS Propulsion System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

12 UAS Subsystem Nexus: The Electrical System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

13 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

14 Command and Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

15 Unmanned Aircraft Subsystem Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

16 Detect and Avoid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367

17 UAS in Public Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387

18 Cybersecurity Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-​UAS)

19 Unmanned Traffic Management (“UTM”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439

20 The Future of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443

About the Editors

xii About the Editors

Brian Argrow is a professor of aerospace engineering sciences and founding director

Feasey earned an Associate of Science in Chemistry from Saddleback Community College;

• Author/​Developer: Certificate in Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) –​Cybersecurity

Nichols served as COO of INFOSEC Technologies, LLC, a consulting firm specializing

Academy and a Master of Aeronautical Sciences degree from Embry-​Riddle Aeronautical

Douglas M. Marshall and Benjamin Trapnell

1.1 The Beginning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 The Beginning

2 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

1.2 The Need for Effective Control

1.3 The Radio and the Autopilot

4 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

1.4 The Aerial Torpedo: The First Modern Unmanned

1.5 The Target Drone

6 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

1.6 WWII U.S. Navy Assault Drone

8 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

1.7 WWII German V-​1 Buzz Bomb

10 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

1.8 WWII German Mistletoe

1.9 Early Unmanned Reconnaissance Aircraft

1.10 Radar Decoys: 1950s–​1970s

1.11 Long-​Range Reconnaissance Unmanned Aircraft

12 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

1.12 First Helicopter Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 1960s–​1970s

1.13 The Hunt for Autonomous Operation

1.14 The Birth of the Twin Boom Pushers

14 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

1.15 Desert Storm: 1991

1.16 Overcoming the Manned Pilot Bias

16 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

1.17 Amateur-​Built Unmanned Aircraft

1.18 Will Unmanned Aircraft Systems Replace Manned Aircraft?

18 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Mark Patrick Collins

20 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

2.2 Basic Technology

2.2.1 Control Methods

2.2.1.1 Manual Control

2.2.1.2 Stabilized Control

22 Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems

18 Cybersecurity Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS)

• Author/Developer: Certificate in Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) –Cybersecurity

Academy and a Master of Aeronautical Sciences degree from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical

1.7 WWII German V-1 Buzz Bomb

1.10 Radar Decoys: 1950s–1970s

1.11 Long-Range Reconnaissance Unmanned Aircraft

1.12 First Helicopter Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 1960s–1970s

1.17 Amateur-Built Unmanned Aircraft

2.3.2 Passive Electro-Optical Sensors

2.3.2.1 Electro-Optical Imaging System

2.3.2.3 Full-Motion Video Sensors

2.3.2.4 IR/NIR/SWIR Sensors

2.3.2.5 MWIR/LWIR Sensors

It is a stand-alone simultaneous localization and mapping device for robots, drones,

2.5.8 Tower/Antenna Inspection