Brian T.

Simonson
CCJ 6485 -Special Topics: Terrorism
Dr. Pamela Griset
University of Central Florida

ARMED REVOLUTIONARY FORCES OF COLUMBIA (FARC)

OVERVIEW ON TERRORISM

U.S. Policy

Terrorism, although occurring for many centuries, has received increased attention during the past few decades

of U.S. history. This increase of attention is the result of growing threats towards the U.S. and its allies from a variety

of groups and individuals. These threats include promotion their ideology and beliefs through inflicting large-scale

causalities or threatening the act thereof. The U.S. state Department releases their annual report titled “Patterns of

Global Terrorism” annually. These reports provide an overall analysis of terrorist groups, their method of attacks,

future predictions of terrorism acts and the U.S. perspective and policy when dealing with terrorists. A quote released

in the 2001 report following the attacks on the world trade center states, “Terrorism casts it lethal shadow across the

globe—yet the world’s resolve to defeat it has never been greater...this chilling report details the very clear and present

danger that terrorism poses to the world and the effects that the United States and our partners in he international

community are making to defeat it, (U.S. State Department, 2001, 1).

The U.S. has a very clear policy regarding terrorism. Four main guiding principles are the foundation of U.S.

policy. First, the U.S. will make no concessions and strike no deals with terrorist. Second, the U.S. will pursue all

terrorists, no matter how long it takes and bring them to justice for their crimes. Third, the U.S. will isolate and apply

pressure on states that sponsor terrorism and force them to change their behavior. Fourth, the U.S. will bolster the

counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the U.S. and require assistance. (U.S. State Department,

2001 ix). The policies that the United States has developed in relation to combating terrorism provides the critical

elements needed when dealing with international terrorist groups.

Foreign Terrorist Organization

The term international terrorism includes foreign terrorist groups (FTO) form each part of the globe. The legal

criteria of an FTO, according to the U.S. State Department, is that it must be a foreign organization, engaged in terrorist
activity, terrorism, or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism and must threaten the

security of the U.S. or the national security of the United States, (U.S. State Department, 2005, xii). According to the

U.S. State Department, there are 42 FTO’s, as of October 11, 2005. The main objective of this paper is to provided a

detailed analysis on a single FTO, the Armed Revolutionaries Forces of Columbia (FARC). Several aspects of the

FARC, including their history, ideology, operations, tactics, logistics, and organized structure will be examined, as well

as the political history and culture of Columbia that has permitted the FARC to come into existence.

COLUMBIAN HISTORY AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE FARC

Columbia Overview

Columbia is know as one of the most prominent countries in Latin America. It is the fourth largest in land size

and has the third largest population of 41 million people. Its exceeds the educational level of workers in its workforce

than most other Latin American countries, and has more women working outside the home than elsewhere in the

region. (Villamizar, 2003, 26). Despite political turmoil, civil war and violence, for the past 50 years, Columbia has

experienced economy stability and success. “Between 1948 and 1998 its economy grew at an average rate of 4.5%.

Perhaps more strikingly, in the year 2000 it had its first recession in over 60 years. It was one of the few countries in

the region to enjoy an investment grade credit rating until it lost it in 1999,” (Villamizar, 2003, 26).

Despite the positive success of the Columbian economy, the country overall has achieved a less than favorable

reputation. “Colombia, like most over Latin American countries, never suffered major international conflicts but has

lived in a situation of almost continuous civil turmoil since independence,” (Serres, 2000, p193). Columbia is the

world’s largest supplier of illegal drugs, particularly cocaine, and has been accustomed to high crime rates and the

rampant insurgency of extreme conservative and liberal groups. Violent conflicts, often from the result of political

groups clashing, have become common place in the Columbian society throughout the last half of the preceding

century.

The distribution of wealth in Columbia is very skewed. The richest 3 percent own over 70 percent of the arable

land, while 57 percent subsist on less than 3 percent of that land. The richest 1 percent of the population control 45

percent of the wealth, while half the farmland is held by thirty-seven large landholders, (Brittain, 2005, p20). Thus, it
can be inferred from these statistics that a small percentage of wealthy citizens within Columbia possessed the ability to

directly affect governmental policy and economic conditions.

Political History of Columbia

Columbia has been marked though periods of extreme violence, coups, scandals, corruption and the constant struggle to

stabilize the conservative versus liberal political aspects between the several groups, including extreme leftist and right-

wing groups, drug traffickers, paramilitaries and even the Columbian Army. Events leading to the violent political

turmoil started during the late 1940’s, when the followers of the Conservative party began seeking to reclaim land

taken from them decades before by the liberal party. The culmination of the land struggle resulted in the assassination

of Jorge Elicer Gaitan, a populist leader of the Liberal Party, and began a period of violence called “La Violencia.” La

Violencia persisted for over 10 years as Conservative and Liberal guerillas fought against other. In the end, over

300,000 people are killed, with many more forcibly displaced, (Burbano, 2001, p24). During the middle of the La

Violencia conflict, several liberal peasants organized themselves together in a group called the “Independent

Republics” to help defend against the advancing Conservative party. One leader of this group, named Pedro Antonio,

who later changes his name to Manuel Marulanda Velez and is nicknamed “Tirofijo” (Sure Shot), becomes a

prominent figure towards the liberals cause. It is Velez’s group that later becomes know as Columbia’s largest and

most powerful guerilla, the FARC.

In 1958, the Conservative and Liberal parties attempted a negotiated peace treaty, called the National Front, by

which both parties agreed to share power for the next 16 years. The National Front led to the end of La Violencia, but

power struggles continued to operated between the Conservative and liberal groups, (Burbano, 2001, p24). “Although

allowing a certain degree of pacification and a return to electoral democracy, the National Front, perpetuated the

traditional exclusivity of the Colombian state. It put and end to violence directed against moderate Liberals but did not

eradicate political repression…The policy of the Columbian government was very clear: recognition of moderate

liberal groups and repression against those that asked for ‘excessive’ reform,” (Serres, 2000, p194). The renewed

political exertion led to several groups within the opposing parties to separate and form their own collation. Columbia

witnessed the rise of several extremist factions, including the Cuban-styled foco based group called the National

Liberation Army (ELN), and the Maoism inspired group Popular Liberation Army (EPL). This is also the time when
the FARC adopted it official name and began to transform from a small collection of peasants to a significant urban

guerilla with members that were trained and skilled in the art of warfare.

Throughout the following decades of Columbia’s political history, power struggles continued as new elements

became major factors. Illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, kidnappings, extortions and corruptions continued to

present challenges for political figures to overcome. Inequality among Columbia’s rural and urban areas, along with

social imbalances led to continued social upheaval. As the drug cartels grew, Columbia began to see an increase in

international involvement. Assistance form the U.S. was evident through the mutual effort of providing training to the

Columbian Army by U.S. Special Forces and a 1.3 billion dollar U.S. aid package called “Plan Columbia” enacted to

expand the counter-narcotics operations of Columbia. A more through analysis of recent political reforms and

counter-terrorism efforts, both internationally and domestically, is present later in this article. An in-depth analysis into

Columbia’s most powerful guerilla, the FARC, is presented next.

Creation of the FARC

During the late 1950’s, Mannuel Marulanda Velez, joined by Jacob Arenas, created the liberal group called the

“Independent Republics.” The Independent Republics was composed of a small number of common peasants and used

Marxist ideology on economic self-management and military-defense. The Independent Republics was organized to

defend themselves from the violence propagated by conservative landowners, (Serres, 2000, p193). Velez’s group

continued to gain notoriety and members, until in 1964, when the Columbian army launched a massive counter-

offensive against the Independent Republics. 43 guerillas, including Velez and Arenas, survived the attack and had

fled to take refuge in the mountains of the southwestern state of Cacua (Molano, 2000, p24). In April 1966, Velez

became aware of the impossibility of using legal means against the rigid political and agrarian structure of the

Conservative government. He declared his surviving followers a guerilla group in order to start a war for the seizure of

power, and adopted the named of the FARC, (Serres, 2000, p194).

Ideology, Objective, and Doctrines

The FARC was created as a leftist organization that actively promoted the infusion of communist beliefs into

Columbian society through armed conflicts. It was organized to combat the wealth-dominated, rural hindering

capitalist economy of Columbia. FARC Commander Simon Trinidad supports this principle in his statement, “The
FARC is the only political organization that is in opposition to the Columbian oligarchy that keeps Colombians in

poverty, misery, and a state of underdevelopment. The FARC will make better use of the natural resources and provide

jobs, health care, education and housing so 40 million Colombians can live well,” (Molano, 2000, p25). Inspiration

towards the development of the FARC was spawned by the revolutionary euphoria derived from the success of Fidel

Castro in Cuba, (Serres, 2000, p193). The agrarian issue of returning the land to the citizens of Colombia has remained

the main objective behind the FARC ideology since its creation. Upon recruitment into the FARC, each new members

swears in an oath to forever fight the “social injustice” and follow the teaching of Marxism and Leninism.

“While the FARC is undoubtedly the largest and oldest of the Communist insurgent groups of Colombia, it is not

necessarily the most dogmatic in its devotion to the Marxist ideology. In fact, the FARC's growing hand in cocaine

trafficking, and even production, coupled with its on-again, off-again peace talks with the Colombian government,

indicate that the ideological backbone of the FARC is at best, ill-defined. The FARC continues to wage a war of words

devoted to Marxist principles, despite the fact that many of its battles are fought with the less idealistic motive of

controlling the illicit drug inustry.” -TKB

Agrarian Guerilla to a National Insurgency (1966-1982)

The evolution of the FARC includes 2 distinct phases, the first of which is the growth form an agrarian guerilla

to a national insurgency. During the formative stages of the FARC, statues governing the operations and ideology were

a combination of vague calls for revolution and armed struggle mixed with reformist agrarian demands, (Serres, 2000,

p194). The FARC faced many challenges during this time. Recruiting new members was sporadic and difficult to

achieve, public support was minimal, and alliances with other leftist organization were non-existent. The lack of public

support can be attribute to an overpowering anti-communist climate of the Columbian economy and the absence of

“revolutionary conditions” in Columbia. Without the necessary support the FARC needed from its community,

repressive government measures were met with approval from Columbian citizens. Continuous government

confrontations, combined with little or no popular support from the public, led to the close extinction of the FARC

during the 1970’s, (Serres, 2000, p196). The FARC, ironically as history may have it, was saved from extinction by the

Columbian government. As the government’s pressure and combative measures continued to increase against the

leftist organizations, so did it’s repression against the indigenous citizens within the rural areas of Columbia. The
repressive measures implemented by the government led to the perception by an increasing proportion of Columbia’s

oppressed society towards the legitimacy of FARC’s ideology and cause.

As a result of its growing public support and the strong state repression combined with the increasing lack of

legitimacy of the Columbian regime, the FARC decided to become an organized movement. In 1982, pursuant to

Protocols I and II of the Geneva Conventions, which stipulate that oppositional armed movements vying for state

power must formally arrange themselves into a visible ranked military construct, the FARC formally organized itself as

a “people’s army” with a distinct chain of command, (Sanin, 2001, p421). The FARC added “EP” (Ejercito del pueblo)

and declared that, “henceforth, the military strategy would dominate the political strategy of the party, and the efforts

would be done to build alliance with other guerrillas or leftist groups to achieve the seizure of power,” (Serres, 2000,

p196).

National Insurgency to Chronic Political Violence (1982 – Present)

The period following the creation of FARC-EP, was characterized by several undermined peace attempts, vast

increase in public support and recruitment for the FARC, increased dependence of the leftist guerillas on illegal

operation, and the introduction of a third player, the paramilitaries. The first peace treaty of a cease-fire agreement

between the FARC and the Columbian government was signed in 1984. This led to the creation of the Patriotic Union

(UP), which was a legal political party associated with the FARC and other communist organizations of the Columbian

left, (Molano, 2000, p25). Despite promising outlook of the UP, it was dramatically set-back by a series of attacks

perpetuated by another guerilla organization, called the April 19th Movement (M-19), against members of the

Colombian Supreme Court. Further political talks were permeated by a sense of mutual recrimination, with increasing

demands on both sides. The FARC began to violate the cease-fire by re-initiating armed confrontations against the

Colombian government. In 1987, the Columbian army increased its efforts against the FARC in a violent campaign.

Each side had tactical advantages over the other, with the Colombian army receiving foreign aid form the U.S., and the

FARC camouflaging the majority of their forces throughout the dense, rural areas of Columbia. Meanwhile, while the

cat and mouse game between the national and guerilla forces was occurring, a third entity came into existence, the

paramilitaries. The paramilitaries were largely financed by the head of the Medellin Cartel, Pablo Escobar, in efforts to

protect the dug cartel’s interest in the drug trade and eliminate their competitors, the leftist guerilla organizations,
(Molano, 2000, p26). The paramilitaries grew in force, partly due to the army’s tolerance of their existence because of

their mutual destruction towards the FARC. In their pursuit of the FARC, the paramilitaries ensued a path of violence,

destruction and relocation towards rural peasants though to be FARC supporters. The insurgency of the paramilitaries

and the lack of response by the Columbian army, led to a vast increase in support for the FARC’s cause. “It cannot be

denied that the insurgency has considerable support form the civilian population. Over the past several years, an

increasing number of rural inhabitants have begun to migrate to FARC-EP inhabited regions, be it for relocation or

solidarity…over 20,000 people migrated to the FARC-EP held in Villa Nueva Colombia in one year alone…No better

example of the growing support for the FARC-EP exist than the number of rural inhabitants entering the FARC-EP

maintained demilitarized zone (DMZ), acquired during the peace talks,” (Brittain, 2005, p22). Recruitment, strength

and political leverage grew for the FARC, ensuring the continuation of the conflict, and thus enhancing the FARC’s

positive perception within its community. “The introduction of new actors with a certain autonomy from the two initial

belligerents, such as the paramilitary, made the conflict intractable,” (Serres, 2000, p198).

Today, the FARC and the Columbian government are still attempting to resolve the conflict through a

combination of peace talks and counter-insurgency. International interventions have led to new possibility in ending

the conflict, although both sides still remain strong. “Throughout the four decades since its inception, the FARC-EP

had developed into a complex and organized movement. Its program addresses a range of critical political, social,

cultural, and economic issues…The current constituency of the organization has grown from its base in the subsistence

peasantry to incorporate indigenous populations, Afro-Columbians, the displaced, landless rural labors, intellectuals,

unionists, teachers, and sectors of the urban workforce. What began as a largely peasant-led rural based land struggle

in the 1960s has since been transformed into a national sociopolitical movement attempting alternative development

objectives through the realization of a socialist society,” (Brittain, 2005, p23).

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE / COMPOSITION OF THE FARC

Military Structure and Ranks

The early stages of the FARC structure provided an almost non-existent structure. It was characterize by a

combination of rural peasants that bonded together for strength in combating the growing capitalist leaders of the time.
Manuel Marulanda Velez and Jacob Arenas were the only recognizable leaders during this time. Due to slow recruiting

efforts and continual debilitating blows delivered by the Colombian Army during the 1960’s and 70’s, the FARC was

unable to organize a well-defined structure. At the end of the 1970’s however, the FARC began to see a dramatic

increase in the size of it force, as a result of rising governmental oppression and the increasing corruption and violence

that characterized the Colombian Army. After the establishment of FARC-EP in 1982, the guerilla transformed from a

political group into an armed resistance. The new doctrines, along with a larger force, enabled the FARC to develop a

rigid military structure, composed of well-defined divisions and ranks.

The military structure that FARC currently uses focuses heavily on the chain of command. It is the chain of

command that keeps the more than 50,000 FARC combatants organized and accounted for. The basic unit is called a

Squad and consists of 12 combatants. Furthermore, a Guerilla is composed of two Squads, a Company is composed of

two Guerillas, a Column consists of two or more Companies and a Front contains more than one Column. Five or

more Fronts combined are called a Block. The highest leadership position in the FARC is referred to as the Central

High Command. The Central High Command overseas all directions, commands and operations of the FARC’s

activities.

Women and Children

Women represent a large portion of FARC’s armed combatants. “In 1974, the FARC had fewer than 900

members, of whom only a handful were women. Now the group fields some 15,000 fighters, including more than

5,000 women,” (Hodgson, 2000, p6). The women of Colombia perceive becoming a guerilla in the FARC as a way to

escape harsh conditions at home and obtain opportunities, such as education and equality. In the FARC, women are

afforded the chance to achieve a higher quality of life and the means to escape the “machoism” of Colombian society.

“In Colombia, money and weapons are they only things that confer power. In a country where women are usually

ignored, [women in the FARC] are surrounded by symbols that give them an identity,” (Hodgson, 2000, p6). A young

drill commander named Sandra was interviewed at a FARC rebel camp, just east of San Vicente. “We have all the

same duties and responsibilities , man or woman…Lot’s of women are here because their parents beat them, or just to

get away from the poverty. I got on well with my parents, but I had to work harder at home than I do here,” (Hodgson,

2000, p6). Another young FARC member named Ana Maria quoted, “It’s tough, but at least you don’t have to worry
about where you’ll get food and clothes from,” (Hodgson, 2000, p6). FARC commander Simon Trinidad further

acknowledge that fact that women guerillas are treated the same as the men, with some women serving in powerful

position in the high command, (Molano, 2000, p28).

Despite the benefits, there are sacrifices that must be made when women join the FARC; family becomes

secondary and the movement is primary. “Here you have to carry out your tasks, first you have to fulfill the missions

and they assign to you, then come your family commitments,” (Alape, 2001). Family relationships suffers due to the

traveling and covert nature of the FARC, but unlike the Italian Red Brigades, occasional “leave passes” are granted,

based on performance and discipline, to women to return home and visit their families. Furthermore, while women are

afforded the protection from sexual assault by other FARC members, their personal life, including the decision to have

children, is highly regulated. Most women, even as young as twelve, are placed on contraception through the use of

intrauterine devices inserted by FARC nurses. Those that become pregnant are forced to have abortions. Furthermore,

women may have relationships, but only with fellow FARC fighters and only with permission from their commanding

officer. (Jordan, 2002).

Similar to women, children are also a major percentage of FARC’s combatants. “The report on child soldiers

point out that the FARC has by far the most children in its ranks: it estimates that 7,400, or 25%, of the force is under

18. Typically, recruits are between the ages of 11 and 13,” (Economist, 2003, p35). Children, like women, join the

FARC to escape violence and poverty, that are common in the Colombian society. Children are recruited as young as

15, although there has been some report of even younger children serving in FARC’s ranks. The majority of children

are recruited willingly. “By and large, investigators found that Colombia’s children are not forcibly recruited. Instead

they join up because of “lack of opportunities”, including poverty, poor schooling, and violence at home. The guerilla

forces treat them, thrilling, as adults, immediately giving them revolvers and training them to handle AK-47s and 9mm

pistols,” (Economist, 2003, p35). FARC commander Simon Trinidad was intervened regarding the controversy of

recruiting young combatants.

“We recruit 15 year olds and up. In some fronts, there may have been some younger, but
[recently] we decided to send them back home. But what is the cost? During the last year a girl
arrived…14 years old and wanting to join the guerilla…In March she was sent back home because
the FARC’s Central Command said they would return to their parents all those younger than 15…
 Two weeks ago, I met this girl…She said she was working in a bar from six p.m. until sunrise. I
asked what she was doing and she said, ‘I tend to the customers.’ When I asked [how], she
lowered her head and started to cry. She is a whore. She is 14 years old. A child prostitute. She
was better in the guerilla. In the guerilla we have dignity, respect, and we provide them with
clothes, food and education. There are millions of others like this girl in Colombia who are
exploited in the coal mines, the gold mines, the emerald mines, in the coca and poppy fields. They
prefer that children working the coca and poppy fields because they pay them less and they work
more. It sounds beautiful when you say that children shouldn’t be guerillas, but children are in the
streets of the cities doing drugs, inhaling gasoline and glue. According to the United Nations:
41% of Colombians are children, 6.5 millions children live in conditions of poverty, another 1.2
millions living in absolute poverty, 30,000 live in the streets, 47% are abused by their parents, and
2.5 million work in high risk jobs. These children meet the guerillas and they don’t have parents
because the military or the paramilitaries have killed them, and they ask they guerillas to let them
join. We are carrying out our rule that no children younger than 15 years of age join,” (Leech,
2000, p24).

In contrast to the seemingly positive atmosphere that, reports have shown a darker side of FARC’s methods in

developing its younger guerillas. Children, as part of their training regime, are forced to torture and execute prisoners.

Rules and regulations placed on the young guerillas are strict and unyielding. “When they break the rules, child

soldiers are punished…[the children] are hauled before “war councils”…After the council, a show of hands determines

whether or not the child will be killed. Most are, with the executions often carried out by other children. Those who

are sparred may be chained to a tree for a month or ordered to dig trenches,” (Economist, 2003, p36).

Recruitment / Training / Development

Traditionally, the FARC’s guerilla forces have been composed of a few thousand peasants. Land exploitation,

political factors, and cultural factors gave the FARC a large base of peasants that were willing to fight for the cause.

However, this form of peasant adhesion into the FARC is double-sided. “On one hand, it ensures for the guerilla

movement a continuity of support in all agrarian frontier areas. On the other, this mode of support is one of the factors

for the further marginalization of the movement. As can be deduced, peasants do not support the FARC for ideological

reasons. Their adhesion is based on opportunistic considerations, and as such it is unstable,” (Serres, 2000, p201). As

the leftist movement progressed into the new millennium, it is suspected that the FARC is planning to move its
operations from the rural countryside to urban populated zones of Colombia. Realizing that the current peasant-based

guerilla force may not fully embrace the urban movement, FARC leaders are looking to recruit new members that will

support their ideology. The majority of FARC’s urban recruiting efforts are targeted at college students at Colombian

colleges. A member of the Colombian secret-police agency commented, “With the urbanization of the conflict, there

has been an intensification of recruitment activity at the universities on the part of the subversives. They’re trying to

amplify their zone of influence in the cities and one of the ways they’re doing that is by infiltrating the universities,”

(Easterbrook, 2003, pA52). Police Sergeant Alberto Cantillo further states, “The FARC are using students to spread

their ideology and incite rebellion,” (Easterbrook, 2003, pA53). FARC targets public-college students because most of

them have experienced the poverty in Colombia and are more likely to sympathize with the rebels’ cause. There are

secretive leftist student groups that offer recruiting strategies that include paying student’s tuition and inciting protest

that often lead to clashes with the police. It is thought that if they can involve the students in protests and provoke

violent police action, the students will become radicalized and persuaded to join the rebels. (Easterbrook, 2003, pA53).

In addition to actively promoting on college campuses, the FARC also maintains the website, farcep.org, which

provides propaganda aimed at recruiting new members and promotes the rebels’ cause, domestically and

internationally. Obviously, the creation of the website is targeted to a more urbanized public with access to the

internet and provides another example of the FARC changing its operational tempo into the urban scene.

A successful part of any armed combative group is the training of its new members. The FARC has developed

a paramilitary training program that includes a two month regime, during which new member are taught principles,

such as the operation of the Russian made AK-47 and the U.S. M-16, basic communication systems and the chain of

command. “For most trainees the day begins at dawn with physical exercises and calisthenics. In the FARC-EP,

training courses include what the group calls "closed order" and "open order" skills. The first include in-camp duties,

such as defense, weapons training, arms assembly and cleaning, look-out duties, parade ground routines, formation,

presenting arms, etc. The second involve in-combat training, including survival techniques and tactics for mounting

ambushes and surprise attacks,” (Brett, 2003, 61). The FARC also provides instruction that teaches the fundamental

principles and ideology to new members. A seventeen year old young recruit named Marta stated, “They teach us

history: the history of Che Guevara or Jacobo Arenas or Marxism-Leninism every day from 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. We read.
There isn't any math or science taught, only politics, weaponry, and the FARC's rules. Before we go out to fight, there

is a talk: We are going out to defend Colombia, so that equality can come--to help the poor--so that the rich don't take

from the poor,” (Brett, 2003, p61). Another young recruit added, “They taught me how the government was oppressing

and exploiting the peasants and confusing them with lies. They want to do like they did in Cuba, like in Cuba there is

equality, there are no rich and poor, and everyone is equal. And they talked about politics, about Plan Colombia, which

was a trap to provide weapons to finish off the guerrillas,” (Brett, 2003, p61).

After initial training, recruits are refrained from front line duty and evaluated regularly by their superiors based

on their performance. Those with the right aptitude may be provided additional training in explosives, advanced

marksmanship, use of heavy machine guns or special missions, including covert ops and assassinations. A former

FARC combatant that escaped form the rebels claimed, “They could see that I was able, that I was active and alert in

doing things. I started to like guns and I was good at taking them apart and putting them together and even repairing

them. In car mechanics, you learn to do that sort of thing. So I spent six months training and then went to work

undercover. What they trained me to do was to shoot at 500, 600, or 700 meters with a rifle with a telescopic sight. Not

everyone had access to a weapon like that. It impressed me and I began to like it. But it stopped being fun when I had

to kill people,” (Brett, 2003, p61).

Training can also be tailored to accommodate the needs of the group. With the new focus of entering urban

warfare, some new guerillas receive training an accelerated urban militia training program. These militias receive a

shorter period of initial training that is composed of intelligence gathering, infiltration, kidnappings, and the capture of

suspected collaborators, and the use of home-made bombs. (Brett, 2003, p61). Recently, the FARC as also been

seeking international training to develop its urban warfare skills. Intelligence from the British security agency have

suspected a collaboration between the IRA and the FARC. “[It is theorized] that the IRA might be advising the FARC

on how to move operations away from its rural base into urban areas. The IRA are probably—with the possible

exception of some groups in Israel—the world’s most sophisticated urban guerillas,” (Gibson, 2001, p29). Given the

FARC’s traditional policy of not seeking international assistance, this could signify the magnitude of the rebels’ urban

operations that are being developed.

OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS OF THE FARC

Targets and Tactics

Targets of the FARC have changed over time to combat the evolving Colombian political scene. During FARC’s

origination, the targets were the wealthy landowners of the ruling class, called “pajaros,” that were capitalizing on the

rural land of the peasants, (Burbano, 2001, p24). The statues of the FARC in 1966 were a combination of vague calls

for revolution and armed struggle mixed with reformist agrarian demands against the capitalist leaders, (Serres, 2000,

p195). As times progressed, the FARC encountered new oppressions. During the 1980’s, the FARC declared itself an

armed resistance group, and shifted their objective to include all those in the Colombian population that supported the

capitalist ideology. Law enforcement officials, wealthy executives and powerful leaders were not exempt. “In the past

decade, over 5,000 Colombian police have been killed, thousands of civilians slaughtered, the government’s authority

obliterated in much of the country,” (Social Policy, 2003, p42). To combat the rising threat, the Colombian

government increased its use of the Colombian Army to combat the rebels. In addition to the Colombian Army, right-

wing paramilitaries arose to combat the leftist groups. Although not an official government entity, the Colombian

Army allowed their proliferation to grow. The FARC’s spread of targets had increased tremendously. “In the last

week of June 2005, FARC-EP forces carried out a major ambush of a [paramilitary] unit in the far southwestern

providence of Putamayo and they successfully engaged with military troops in North Santander near the Venezuelan

border at the other end of the country,” (Brittain, 2005, p27). Today, the FARC targets a vast number of groups,

including capitalist leaders an supporters, government forces and the right-wing paramilitaries.

The tactics used by the FARC are consider conventional warfare tactics. Besides the common small arms

(Russian AK-47 and the U.S. M16), prominent tactics include kidnappings and extortions. Other tactics that the FARC

is know to use is car bombings, and sporadic raids on military camps and government installations. Kidnapping and

extortion, although primarily used to finance their objective, can be used to provide political “bargaining chips” when

negotiating peace settlements.

As with their targets, the tactics used by the FARC have changed over time. “The revolutionary ideology of the

insurgency was heavily entrenched in maintaining guerilla characteristics in defensive structure and militaristic

operations. However, the insurgency recognized the need to begin its historic development by expanding its operations
into ‘an authentically offensive guerilla micro-level attacks against the state/paramilitary forces without engaging the

enemy in a continuous full-scale war of assault. The actions that began in the early weeks of 2005 mark an important

change. While maintaining its guerilla structure, the FARC-EP have been moving away form small-scale operations

and into large-scale, continuous, direct confrontations implemented through well-orchestrated, simultaneous attacks on

state forces in many parts of the country,” (Brittain, 2005, p28).

Funding / Procurement

FARC struggled during the initial stages of its development. Foreign support was almost non-existent, due to

a lack of Latin American interest by the Soviet Union and the policy of socialist countries, such as Cuba and Nicaragua,

in maintaining state-to-state relationships, (Serres, 2000, p 204). The FARC depended on contributions from the local

community and the Kidnappings, given the relatively low risk of prosecution from Colombian law

enforcement officials and high ransom payment commonly paid, are one of the FARC’s

primarily methods of income. wealthy government banking institutions. The policy of supporter reliance and theft kept

the FARC operation, until 1982, when the FARC changed its political direction and required a larger funding source.

Kidnapping, extortion and involvement in the international drug trade became the key sources of funding for the

FARC’s activities.

Colombia is the considered the kidnap capital of the world, with the FARC responsible for the majority of all

kidnappings, (Briggs, 2002, p.29). Kidnappings, given the relatively low risk of prosecution from Colombian law

enforcement officials and high ransom payment commonly paid, are a lucrative option to guerilla forces operating in

Colombia. “Kidnappers [make] structured decisions based on risk of apprehension or detection, their own self

interests, and instrumental motives such as the amount of money they could obtain by kidnapping certain individuals,”

(Johnson, 2003, p19). Traditionally, the FARC committed acts of kidnapping for political purposes, but now it appears

that profits have become the primary motivating factor. Estimates about how much the group earns from kidnapping

vary from $140 million to $500 million per year with the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee guesses that 40

percent of the FARC’s budget originating from kidnapping, (Briggs, 2002, p.29). The most common type of

individuals kidnapped, according to the Terrorist Knowledge Base (www.tkb.org), are high ranking government
figures or powerful CEO of large multinational corporation. These individuals are mostly likely to have large

insurance plans to pay high ransoms.

Currently, Colombia supplies eighty percent of the world’s cocaine and about sixty percent of the high-grade

heroin sold in the U.S., (Lawrence, 1998, p.6). With such an abundant opportunity, drug trafficking has become a

major source of income for the FARC. It is estimated that between $400 and $600 million a year is raised through

FARC’s drug trafficking activities, (Jurith, 2003, p. 158). The drug opportunities are easy to acquire, with the majority

of FARC’s agrarian supporters involved in the production of coca. The decision of the FARC to enter the drug trade

has been met with resistance from the drug cartels, otherwise known as the ‘narco-oligarchy,’ based in Colombia. The

FARC collects a ‘revolutionary tax’ from the peasants and basic producers of cocaine to provide protection against the

drug cartels, (Serres, 2000, p.205). The drug cartels want to seize the land form the peasants to manufacture their own

crops and maximize profits. In its efforts to combat the guerilla organization and seize the drug producing land, he

drug cartels created narco-paramilitaries groups. “The narco-paramilitaries are now a second enemy of the movement

and, as such, a supplementary violent actor in the confrontation. From this perspective, one can believe that the drug

business has dramatically contributed to the intractability of the Colombian conflict,” (Serres, 2000, p.206).

COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS

Domestic Efforts

Initially, the Colombian government did little to impede the progress of the FARC. The FARC was viewed as

another insurgent movement that was common to the political scene in Colombia. Because of the FARC’s lack of

significant power, the government created “security forces” composed of peasants to deal with the problem, rather than

dedicate a full scale military assault, (Marks, 2003, p.80). These security forces were trained, equipped, and

logistically supported by the armed forces, (Santina, 1998, p.40). Eventually, these security forces were to become the

right-wing paramilitaries that were supported, and often collaborated with, the Colombian army. Due to the violent

method often used by the paramilitaries, the Colombian government banned them in 1989. In 1994, the paramilitaries

were reinstated when the Colombian government established “special private security and vigilante services” whose

members were allowed to arm themselves in self-defense, (Santina, 1998, p.41). Today, the success of the
paramilitaries have been minimal against the FARC, although the situation and violence has increased significantly in

Colombia since their inception.

The Colombian army, also know as COLAR, also engaged in short battles with the FARC during the 1970’s

and 1980’s. During this period, the Colombian government endeavored and failed in several peace talks with the

FARC in attempts to bring the civil dissidence and violence to an end. It was not until the later 1990’s when the

COLAR began a dedicated campaign to combat the guerilla organization. Army Lieutenant General Fernando Tapias

Stahelin, head of the Colombian armed forces, and General Jorge E. Mora Rangel, head of the COLAR, used their

leadership styles to revitalize the forces under their command and employ tactics more appropriate to conduct warfare

against the FARC, (Marks, 2003, p.83). The leaders concentrated their plan around two major areas of emphasis. First,

they allocated forces to secure resources strategic to national survival and operations. Second, they strategically placed

additional forces in a position to stop the insurgency from gaining power by cutting off the FARC’s “mobility

corridors” by attacking intermediate base areas and primary base areas. Presently, the COLAR continues to use these

principles of warfare in their attempt in defeating the FARC.

In addition to the use of paramilitaries and the COLAR, the Columbian government has employed a variety of

other counter-terrorism methods against the FARC. During the turn of the new century, prior-Colombian president

Andrea Pastrana attempted to re-open the possibilities of peace negotiations. When questioned how Colombia was

going to defeat the FARC, president Andrea replied, “For 40 years we’ve been fighting a devastating war. That’s why

we propose to achieve peace by getting to the negotiating table,” (Weymouth, 2000, p.50). The FARC was willing to

engage in peace negotiations, however, the demands requested by both sides were too great for a consensus to occur.

Following the failed peace negotiation attempts, current Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe, has a much different

perspective to combating the FARC. President Uribe’s tactics are a more aggressive and direct approach to deal with

the situation. President Uribe increased the power and authority of the Colombian Security Forces and added 55,000

extra soldiers to the COLAR, specifically to combat the FARC, (Economist, 2002, p.37). Other tactics, such as coca

crop destruction, include manual eradication and aerial spraying. Manual eradication of coca fields are more effective

and resulted in more support from the peasant farmers, since aerial spraying often killed the illegal and legal crops,
(Economist, 2005, p.36). Overall, the majority of Colombia’s citizens support President Uribe’s aggressive approach to

combating the leftist movement.

International Efforts

As Colombia’s drug problem emerged and began to increase, so did U.S. involvement. It has been the common

tradition of the U.S. to provide Colombia with counter-narcotics aid. Initially, most of the U.S. aid was provided to

train and outfit the Colombian forces to combat the drug cartels and leftist groups. As the drug war intensified, the

U.S. resorted to other military options. The U.S. provided training to Colombian military officers at both the U.S Army

School of the Americas (SOA) located at Fort Benning and the Special Warfare Center located at Fort Bragg, (Santina,

1998, p.41). In addition, “U.S. Special Forces have trained hundreds of Colombian soldiers in military strategies,

counter-guerilla tactics, and intelligence gathering,” (Santina, 1998, p.42). Military equipment, including three Black

Hawk helicopters valued at $35 million each and another $14 million to upgrade existing Colombian airpower, have

been provided to by the U.S., (Santina, 1998, p.42). The U.S. also paid an annual amount of $200 million to operations

in Colombia that involved the aerial spraying of coca fields, (Economist, 2006, p.37). However, due to the

controversial nature of the destruction of aerial spraying, the program was quickly disbanded.

The most prominent, and widely-debated U.S. involvement in Colombia, involved the collaboration between

Colombian President Pastrana and the Clinton Administration in the creation of “Plan Colombian”. Plan Colombia

was presented as a strategy to combat the growing conflict within Colombia and signified official U.S. direct

intervention. It was perceived at the time Plan Colombia was created that a negotiated peace could not be achieved

under the existing conditions in Colombia, (Sanin, 2002, p. 419). Plan Colombia was expensive and required the help

of foreign aid, thus paving the avenue for U.S. involvement. “The Government of Colombia estimates that

implementing Plan Colombia will cost about $7.5 billion over the next three years, and Colombia has committed to

spending $4 billion of its own resources and international financial institution loans to execute the plan. The Pastrana

Government is asking the [U.S.] to provide the remaining $3.5 billion in bilateral foreign assistance,” (Sanin, 2002,

p.424). The Clinton Administration approved the funding package and provided $2.04 billion dollars between 1999

and 2002. In addition, military supplies, equipment and training were allocated at the expense of the U.S., (Brittain,

2003, p. 22). Although promising, Plan Colombia did not eliminate, or even reduce, the drug trade. In fact the flow of
level of cocaine being cultivated in Colombia had increased, (Brittain, 2003, p.22). “What has occurred in Colombia’s

narco-industry is a partial monopolization of coca processing, production, internal domestic distribution, and

international trafficking by the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)—the principal paramilitary

organization…The reality of Clinton’s Plan Colombia is that the paramilitary forces—indirectly trained by the United

States and supported by the Colombian army—now control the drug industry,” (Brittain, 2003, p.22).

Despite the disarray from Plan Colombia, President Bush, along with the current Colombian President Uribe,

enacted a new plan involving an armed campaign against the support bases of the Colombian insurgencies. The new

plan was called “Plan Patriota.” Plan Patriota was a continuation of the war on drugs in Colombia, however, unlike

Plan Colombia, U.S. troops actively engaged in battles alongside the COLAR. Under a reformulated policy that was

enacted following the events of September 11, the new official U.S. doctrine permits an assault by U.S. military forces

against all groups labeled as a terrorist organization, (Brittain, 2005, p.24). Reports during October 2002 stated that,

“United States Marines were on “orders to eliminate all high officers of the FARC...[and] scattering those who escaped

to the remote corners of the Amazon,” (Brittain, 2005, p.24). The FARC, aware of the aggressive nature of Plan

Patriota, relocated their troops to the mountainous regions of Colombia in an effort to wage the attacks. The method of

retreat into the rural countryside was effective and reports in late 2004 indicated that the FARC actually increased the

size of its forces, (Brittain, 2005, p.24). FARC Commander Raul Reyes quoted, “Look around, here we are. Do you

see any [government] troops? Plan Patriota has not disseminated the FARC-EP. We move freely throughout the

region as we have for the past several years,” (Brittain, 2005 p.24). Currently, the U.S. continues to send aid and

supplies to Colombia in its efforts to combat the deepening problem, however, intelligence reports indicate that the

FARC remains strong in their quest to instilling a socialist rule in Colombia.

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

Success of the FARC

Projection of FARC’s Future

WORKS CITED