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FORMATION OF A GOD REPRESENTATION

C. Ellis Nelson
Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explore recent theories in psycho-
analysis and data from the observation of infants from birth to the age
of three in order to help answer two questions. (1) What is the human
condition that causes people to form an image of god? (2) Are psycho-
logical characteristics of individuals formed before they adopt a reli-
gion strong enough to influence their interpretation of religion?
A description of Freud's drive/structure model of human nature is
contrasted with the object relations school of psychoanalyst's model.
The work of D. W. Winnicott on transitional objects and Stephen
Mitchell's effort to integrate the views of various theorists of object
relations is used to show how a god representation is formed in the
infant's mind.
Following the lead of Ana-Maria Rizzuto, this is a psychological
paper about god. How an image of god, constructed to fill a mental
need, is converted to a Christian image of God is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, some implications for congregational religious
education will be cited.

The reason for this paper arises out of two observations of


the role of religion in human life. (1) Religion has been a part of
the culture of all people of which we have a historical record.
Even today after a flood of rationalism from the Enlightenment,
religion continues to be a powerful force in the lives of individu-
als and a sustaining power of many warring nations. What is the
human condition which causes people to form an image of God?
(2) Religion as practiced in the lives of many westerners is not
consistent with the beliefs held. Forgiveness, for example, is at
the center of Christian theology; yet many Christians are vin-
dictive or harshly judgmental. Contrariwise, it is not uncommon
to see people who claim no religious beliefs who are kind, for-
giving people. Are psychological characteristics of individuals,

Religious Education Vol 91 Noi Winter 1996

22
C. ELLIS NELSON 23

formed before they adopt a religion, strong enough to influence


their understanding of god?
The purpose of this paper is to explore recent theories in
psychoanalysis and data from the observation of infants from
birth to the age of three in order to help answer the above ques-
tions. It is assumed that the experiences of early childhood form
the basis of a person's sentiments (emotionally charged attitudes
or dispositions) and continue, perhaps unconsciously, through-
out life. Many physical and mental developments take place af-
ter the age of three, and events occur which may alter one's
conception of god; but these later developments are beyond the
scope of this paper.
This paper is a study in the social psychology which underlies
religion. It is not about any particular religious tradition, about
god as defined by theologians, or about faith as a human charac-
teristic. In order to remind the reader that this is a psychological
study, the word "god" will not be capitalized. However, because
infancy is such a crucial period in the formation of an image of
god, some implications of this study for the religious education
work of a congregation will be noted.

ORIENTATION
There are two sources of data for understanding the devel-
opment of infants: One is the "observed" infant and the other is
the "clinical" infant. Data from the observed infant come from
researchers in human development who up until a few decades
ago were mainly interested in the delineation of physical achieve-
ments such as the infant's ability to sit up or the capacity "for
perceiving and thinking about objects" (Stern 1985, 14). Some
researchers are now concerned about how infants feel about
themselves and other persons. This more recent research on the
social nature of the baby has made it possible for Stern to inte-
grate observational data with psychoanalytic theory about the
infant's formation of a self (ibid., 3-12).
Data from an observational perspective about an infant's
image of god is almost nonexistent. Hyde's careful review of
research on early childhood religion reports few studies on chil-
dren below the age of three (1990,64-76). This is because empiri-
cal research on children's religion is dependent on their linguistic
ability, which is not well-developed until after the age of three.
The second source of data—the clinical infant—comes from
24 FORMATION OF A GOD REPRESENTATION

psychoanalysts who are in a therapeutic relationship with adults.


Psychoanalysts create a life story with their patients, including
events that took place during the first few years of life. Such a
story will reflect the theory of the psychoanalyst about how the
patient's mind was shaped during infancy. Using the same case
material, a Freudian analyst will develop the story differently
from an analyst who is in the Winnicott school of psychiatry
(Stern 1985, 15). This situation presents us with two problems:
(1) Can we know how an infant's mind develops when the data
are being recalled many years later? (2) How can truth be ex-
tracted from narratives which are interpreted differently? Stern
follows the philosophical analysis of Ricoeur in affirming that
one can judge the truth claims of psychoanalysis. Ricoeur, after
discussing four criteria for psychoanalytical facts, states his thesis:
"If the ultimate truth-claims reside in the case histories, the means
of proof reside in the articulation of the entire network theory,
hermeneutics, therapeutics, and narration" (1978, 205). This does
not mean that a truth claim is restricted to the theory by which
the case is interpreted. Rather, it means that there are assump-
tions (about how the mind is formed and functions) from other
sources which can be used to test psychoanalytical claims. In
Stern's judgment such independent sources are data from the
observed infant and theories formulated by researchers who pro-
duce such data (1985, 16).
The problem of sorting out truth from theory referred to
above is not limited to psychoanalysis. Researchers who observe
what infants do may agree on what they see or measure, but they
may also have different theories about what the data mean or
about what is going on in the baby's mind. This is evident in the
work of developmental psychologists who study the status of re-
ligion in young children. Hyde's review of children's idea of god
(1990, 64-82) and Spilka, Hood and Gorsuch's overview of chil-
dren's stages of religious development reveal that the researcher's
theory influences the method used to obtain and interpret data
(1985, 62-75). Batson also notes the limitations of the scientific
method in the study of religion. "Ethical and practical considera-
tions," he states, "place severe restrictions on their use" (1991,
381).
We are thus faced with the dilemma of how to gather data to
answer the two questions which prompted this paper. Fortu-
nately, some theorists in the past two decades have unified data
about self-formation during infancy. In addition to Stern, pre-
C. ELLIS NELSON 25

viously cited, Mitchell (1988) has integrated various object rela-


tions theories into one model. Also, Rizzuto (1979) has applied
object relations theory to the process of forming a god represen-
tation. We are now, therefore, better able to understand the psy-
chological situation that causes an image of god to emerge from
the self's interaction with others.

OBJECT RELATIONS THEORY


Object relations is a theory about human nature; it is a critical
concept for psychology and religion. The theory evolved from
second-generation psychoanalysts who in their therapeutic work
learned that Freud's instinct model of motivation was inadequate
or was only partly correct. Early writers in the object relations
school, however, identified with Freud, and many of them con-
sidered their work simply an interpretation or elaboration of
Freud's views. (See Klein, 1923, 1960; Sullivan, 1925; Hartman,
1939; and Winnicott, 1949).

Freud's Metapsychology
Freud developed what has been labeled a "drive/structure"
model of human nature. He was influenced in his early years as a
biological researcher by Helmholtz's idea of the conservation of
energy. Energy, it was believed, was like physical substance—it
could not be destroyed; it could only be transformed into some-
thing else. As a medical student Freud also was influenced by
Brücke, who proposed that living organisms are a dynamic sys-
tem to which the laws of chemistry and physics apply. From
these and other sources Freud constructed a model of human life
whereby energy from biologically formed instincts affected one's
mind and influenced one's character. Freud's goal was to estab-
lish psychology as a natural science based on biology. Freud
(1905) defined instinct as follows.
By an 'instinct* is provisionally to be understood the psychical repre-
sentative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimula-
tion, as contrasted with a 'stimulus', which is set up by single excitations
coming from without. The concept of instinct is thus one of those lying
on the frontier between the mental and the physical. The simplest and
likeliest assumption as to the nature of instincts would seem to be that
in itself an instinct is without quality, and, so far as mental life is con-
cerned, is only to be regarded as a measure of the demand made upon
the mind for work. What distinguishes the instincts from one another
and endows them with specific qualities is their relation to their so-
26 FORMATION OF A GOD REPRESENTATION

matic sources and to their aims. The source of an instinct is a process


of excitation occurring in an organ and the immediate aim of the in-
stinct lies in the removal of this organic stimulus. (1905: 168)

"Instinct" is today so associated with patterns of activities


(such as birds' instinct to build nests a certain way) that it does
not exactly fit Freud's definition. The term "instinctual drive" is
better because it shows the source of energy—instincts—which
produce a general urge, i.e., drive. In Freudian psychology per-
sonality is structured in three major systems: id, ego, and super-
ego. These systems interact with each other within a person's
mind. The id represents the instinctive drives and, as indicated in
the last sentence in the above quotation, has as its aim the dis-
charge of energy. When persons discharge energy from drives,
they feel pleasure or are relieved of pain. The purpose of the
pleasure principle is to maintain comfort. The id is subjective,
demanding, and irrational, and remains so throughout life.
The ego emerges from the id as infants deal with the de-
mands of their surroundings. Although the ego continues to be
under the influence of the id, the ego becomes a conscious aware-
ness of one's self. It functions to turn instinctual drives into so-
cially acceptable behavior, to transform unconscious wishes into
dream images, and to reason about the events in which one is
engaged. The superego is formed out of the ego and is an assimi-
lation of what parents, relatives, and friends consider to be good
and bad behavior. This internalized style of life is moralistic and
is often considered to have two sections: the ego ideal and the
conscience. The ego ideal is that which children have absorbed
as good or idealistic behavior and for which they have been re-
warded; the conscience is that which children have internalized
as bad or wrong behavior and for which they have been pun-
ished. Energy from the drives activates the ego and superego
systems. These two systems develop meaning for whatever the
person does or thinks as a result of such stimulation. (For an ac-
count of how Freud modified his drive/structure model, see
Greenberg and Mitchell [1983, 21-78]. For a presentation of
Freud's psychology of personality see Hall [1954].)

The Metapsychology of Object Relations Theorists


The psychoanalytical literature on object relations is ". . .
extensive, multifaceted, confusing . . ." (Rizzuto 1979, 66). Each
writer has a special vocabulary and a unique way of relating
C. ELLIS NELSON 27

motivation to personality structure. The literature is more com-


plex than the familiar illustration of blind men explaining what
an elephant is by feeling only one part of the animal. It seems to
be more like blind people feeling different parts of different
animals. For the purpose of this paper, however, only those ele-
ments of object relations theory which relate to the formation of
a god representation will be used. (For an overview of the major
theories and the way theorists relate to each other see Bowlby
[1969, 17, 361-378; 1973, 375-398], Guntrip [1971] or Greenberg
and Mitchell [1983].)
Freud's biological model of human nature originally proposed
two drives: sex and self-preservation. Second generation follow-
ers of Freud who worked with children, such as Klein (1923) and
Winnicott (1971), and others, such as Sullivan (1925) and Fair-
bairn (1952), evolved a different theory. They came to believe
that the human drive was to form a self out of relations with
caregivers, normally at first the mother. Winnicott described this
radical shift of motivation with the following words.
Psychoanalysts who have rightly emphasized the significance of
instinctual experience and of reactions to frustration have failed to
state with comparable clearness or conviction the tremendous inten-
sity of these non-climactic experiences that are called playing. Start-
ing as we do from psychoneurotic illness and with ego defenses related
to anxiety that arises out of the instinctual life, we tend to think of
health in terms of the state of ego defenses. We say it is healthy when
the defenses are not rigid, etc. But we seldom reach the point at which
we can start to describe what life is like apart from illness or absence
of illness.
That is to say, we have yet to tackle the question of what life itself
is about. Our psychotic patients force us to give attention to this sort
of basic problem. We now see that it is not instinctual satisfaction that
makes a baby begin to be, to feel that life is real, to find life worth
living. In fact, instinctual gratifications start off as part-functions and
they become seductions unless based on a well-established capacity in
the individual person for total experience, and for experience in the
area of transitional phenomena. It is the self that must precede the
self's use of instinct; the rider must ride the horse, not be run away
with. (1971, 98-99)

Object relations theory assumes that human motivation and


personality come from relations with "objects." The word "ob-
ject" is used by Freud to mean whatever was a target of a drive,
which could be a thing or a person. Most psychoanalysts con-
tinue to use the term because it is a shorthand way to identify a
28 FORMATION OF A GOD REPRESENTATION

person's relation to all kinds of things, conditions, and people.


Object relations theorists use the term to mean relations with
people which have become internalized in the form of an image
or representation. In that sense, the word "object" usually means
relation to people.
Winnicott assumed that babies began to develop a self at
birth as they struggled to understand the environment in which
they found themselves. Babies did so by assuming that they
created the objects they needed, such as food from a nipple
(Winnicott 1966,181). The baby starts to be a self (transcending
inner and outer reality) by "creating" the external world within
the self. What babies inherit is a tendency to achieve maturity.
If the environment—especially the human relations—is "good
enough," the baby will grow from dependency to a state of rela-
tive independence (Winnicott 1971, 138-139).
The basic unit of psychology is not the individual struggling
with instinctual drives but an individual who, while experiencing
instinctual drives, struggles to become a self in relation to other
people. Personal relations are, therefore, not only the goal of an
infant; they are the matrix out of which the baby's mind is formed.
The baby has biological needs, but the self that is forming is
conditioned by the relation of the baby to the caregiver. The
quality of the infant's interaction with the caregivers will be in-
ternalized and will form the beginning of the infant's self. The
characteristics of the self thus formed will order the way the self
deals with instinctual drives.
This metapsychology which assigns priority to self-formation
is not a stage through which one goes, although the first three
years are critical. Rather, it is an affirmation that the self is the
guiding force throughout the life cycle. Although biological
changes and development will bring the matter of self identity to
the fore, one will constantly be forming, breaking, or modifying
relations with others—all of which require the self to make judg-
ments about what is happening, to select values on which actions
are based, to exercise will, and to anticipate future life conditions.

Developmental Sequence of the Self


Since the self is subjective, all efforts to account for its origin,
development and function are tentative. There has been a ten-
dency for researchers to wait until children have good use of
language before they study children's sense of themselves. In re-
C. ELLIS NELSON 29

cent decades, however, researchers have studied infants with


their mothers or with other infants and have compiled an enor-
mous amount of data about the sequence in which a typical in-
fant acquires a sense of self. The following outline follows Stern's
(1985) presentation of these data.
Birth to age two months: a sense of an emerging self. Infants
during this time regularly have periods of "alert inactivity" when
they respond to people and events by head-turning, sucking, and
looking.
Two to six months: a sense of a core self. During this time
infants begin to feel that they are separate from their mothers.
Stern reviews observations and experiments which suggest that
infants are beginning (1) to show some control over their move-
ments, (2) to sense that they have a body, (3) to affirm inner
states of feeling, and (4) to note some regularities in daily ac-
tivities.
Seven to fifteen months: a sense of a subjective self. During
this time infants (1) discover they have a mind, (2) express pref-
erences, (3) are alert to communication by words and gestures,
and (4) begin to understand feelings, motives and intentions
which lie behind overt behavior. This gigantic step toward self
awareness opens up a new and vastly expanding way to relate to
caregivers, neighbors, and playmates.
Fifteen months to thirty-six months: a sense of a verbal self.
At about the middle of infants' second year they begin to talk.
This achievement speeds them into conscious selfhood. It rapidly
expands the power of the mind as they begin to imagine things
which do not exist and to communicate about things and people
who are not present. By three years of age children can imitate
what others do and are able to see themselves as persons inter-
acting with other people.
These phases of self development do not replace each other.
Rather, each phase leads to the next so that a fuller sense of self
emerges. By age three the child has a repertoire of behavioral
patterns, a set of attitudes and values, and an outlook on life that
can be described with considerable accuracy by the caregivers.

Transitional Objects
Objects relations theorists think in terms of three areas of self
reality. One is the inner self as it evolves according to the above
outline. Another is the external world which impinges on the in-
30 FORMATION OF A GOD REPRESENTATION

fant through the relationship to caregivers and circumstances


(food, shelter, medical treatment, and cultural environment) in
which the infant/mother live. The third area of reality is termed
"transitional phenomena."
The transitional phenomena begin to appear during the core
self phase. Infants previously accepted food and handling by
mothers as experiences they create to satisfy their needs. Now
they begin to realize mothers and things are separate and there
are limits to what they can do or expect. Winnicott, being a prac-
ticing pediatrician as well as a psychoanalyst, noted that babies,
in addition to thumb-sucking, would with the other hand take
part of the sheet into the mouth, hold an object close at hand,
pluck threads from clothing or blankets, or start to use babbling
sounds or special noises. Winnicott describes how we may ob-
serve the way infants are starting to create a reality between
inner and outer demands.
Also, out of all this (if we study any one infant) there may emerge
some thing or some phenomenon—perhaps a bundle of wool or the
corner of a blanket or eiderdown, or a word or tune, or a mannerism
—that becomes vitally important to the infant for use at the time of
going to sleep, and is a defence against anxiety, especially anxiety of
depressive type. Perhaps some soft object or other type of object has
been found and used by the infant, and this then becomes what I am
calling a transitional object. This object goes on being important. The
parents get to know its value and carry it round when travelling. The
mother lets it get dirty and even smelly, knowing that by washing it
she introduces a break in continuity in the infant's experience, a break
that may destroy the meaning and value of the object to the infant.
(1971, 4)

The term "transitional objects" is widely used in psychoana-


lytical literature, but it may convey a false impression. The word
"transitional" does not mean a temporary way station between
two developments of the self. The term is used to describe the
way an infant creates a reality between inner and outer reality.
Although this created reality relates to inner and outer experience,
it is a separate reality. It is the earliest experience of an infant
having control over an object and of the caregiver's respect for
what the infant is creating. Normally, however, children lose in-
terest in the objects of infancy as they acquire new and different
objects. Moreover, the "transitional" reality continues through-
out life as individuals must continue to relate inner needs and in-
C. ELLIS NELSON 31

terests to the requirements of living with other people and the


demands of society.
The word "object" calls attention to the thing which the in-
fant has used to create a reality different from inner or outer ex-
perience. To Winnicott, however, what is important is the natural
way this phenomenon occurred between infant and caregivers.
Parents accept a blanket or teddy bear as something the infant
cares about and allow the infant control over the object. Winni-
cott terms this an "intermediate area . . . that is allowed to the
infant between primary creativity and objective perception based
on reality-testing" (1971, 11). Once this process begins, it
. . . widens out into that of play, and of artistic creativity and appre-
ciation, and of religious feeling, and of dreaming, and also of fetish-
ism, lying and stealing, the origin and loss of affectionate feeling, drug
addiction, the talisman of obsessional rituals, etc. (1971, 5)

Play is the activity that initiates that transitional reality be-


tween self and others. Play can be observed as early as the pe-
riod between two and six months. Caregivers play "peek-a-boo,"
"I'm gonna get you," or similar games which cause the infant ex-
citement and delight. This play activity requires a caregiver, so a
self/other dialectic creates the transitional reality. When babies
are old enough to build a tower with blocks, they very often
knock it down. Building the tower was play, it was a creation of
the self. After the tower stood for a few minutes, the child began
to see it as a physical object outside the child's control. By knock-
ing it down children enhance the self's authority to do what it
wants to do.
Transitional objects which infants create out of a blanket or a
toy are an indication of what they are using to form a self. The
physical objects thus used will be abandoned as others take their
place. But the most important objects being formed within in-
fants are of persons, especially the caregivers, and these objects
will endure and be effective throughout the infant's life.

Images of Others Within the Self


Perhaps it would be helpful if we shift the language from the
general term "object relations" to "mental images" since our in-
terest is in the image formed in the mind as a result of a relation-
ship to others. Describing mental images one has of other people
32 FORMATION OF A GOD REPRESENTATION

is complicated by the lack of common terms with shared mean-


ings. In addition to "internal objects" writers use "illusory others,"
"introjects," "personifications," or the "representation" of a per-
son. Greenberg and Mitchell point out that there is little agree-
ment on how images work within a self.
They may be understood as serving as a kind of loose anticipatory
image of what is to be expected from people in the real world; as be-
coming closely entwined with the individual's experience of who he
is; as persecutors, fulfilling the function of a kind of critical internal
fifth column; or as a source of internal security and resource, invoked
in times of stress and isolation. (1983, 11)

In spite of this ambivalence we know that we internalize an


image of a person in terms of our relation to that person. More-
over, we are able to describe the image we have of the person
with considerable clarity. This does not mean that our image of a
person corresponds to what the person actually is. This situation
is caused in part because we know a person only in the relation-
ship we have had with the person and what that person has se-
lected to reveal; it is caused in part because we form our image
of a person out of our special psychological needs which may
not be based on what the person really is. Thus, the image we
have of other people is real in our minds and may endure despite
evidence to the contrary.

GOD REPRESENTATION
"Object relations" as a psychoanalytical term means all of the
people, things, and conditions to which a person relates. It is not
a lifeless term. It refers to the dynamic effect these objects have
on one's self. Even if the term refers to a teddy bear, it means the
affection one has for the animal. What is important is the mental
representation, what one creates or imagines as a result of rela-
tionship to the object. Mental representation is dynamic; that is,
it influences a person's perceptions, beliefs and behavior.
"Mental images" may be a better term for our explanation of
how god is represented in one's mind. "Image" does not mean a
photograph, although children can translate their image of god
into a drawing if requested. A mental image includes a set of
feelings, the source of which may be partly unconscious, that
one uses to describe a person or an entity one has created in the
mind. It is for this reason that an image of god is more significant
for religion than a vague statement of one's outlook such as
C. ELLIS NELSON 33

"faith." For example, Erikson's psychosocial developmental goal


for the first year of life is the acquisition of "basic trust" (1964,
69). By using a functional interpretation of religion, Erikson is
able to point out that basic trust has "the capacity for faith—a
vital need for which man must find some institutional confirma-
tion" (1968,106). Erikson notes that individuals may find institu-
tions other than religious ones in which their need for faith might
be fulfilled. "Basic trust" may lead to faith in god, but it does not
provide us with an image of god.
An image of god is a precise and dynamic element within the
self. It is the reality within one's being with which one carries on
a conversation. Moreover, one can have an image of god of
which one is afraid or which one does not like. Atheists have an
image of god in which they do not believe (Rizzuto 1979,47). So,
for our purpose, we will separate the mental image of god from
the general feeling of "basic trust."

Primary God Representation


A primary image of god is created by infants by the end of
their third year. This primitive image of god is formed to satisfy
psychological needs of their self formation, and it reflects their
experience with caregivers. According to Rizzuto, the process
starts at birth because the parents' interpretation of the birth in-
fluences their response to the infant. The parents' desire for the
baby, their understanding of their role in caring for the baby,
their financial, social, educational status and other such factors
are influential in their relationship to the child. Religious parents
will probably have a baptism or dedication service symbolizing
their understanding of god. The particular way the mother starts
the self development of the infant is through eye contact and re-
flecting back to the child a sense of the child's status. In a healthy
relationship the infant absorbs a feeling of being loved and
wanted (1979,182-188).
During the first seven or eight months the infant has expe-
riences related to caregivers of a physical nature such as being
fed, bathed, held, looking at the mother's face, hearing sounds
and music. Experiences of this type continue throughout infancy
and are preserved as memories. They may be later linked to a
particular god image and may result in a good feeling when sing-
ing "Safe in the Arms of Jesus," "O Love That Will Not Let Me
Go," "God Will Take Care of You," "Jesus, Lover of My Soul, Let
34 FORMATION OF A GOD REPRESENTATION

Me to Thy Bosom Fly," or the refrain "And I Shall See Him Face
to Face." These early experiences form a feeling base on which a
particular god image may be built. These experiences of infancy
continue into childhood and are preserved, often unconsciously,
in the self regardless of the stage of cognitive development.
Later, when individuals develop the ability to reason abstractly,
there may be an effort to bring these early feeling states into
harmony with reason; but this is difficult to accomplish.
Infants' use of transitional objects during the time from about
seven to fifteen months indicates that they are becoming more
self conscious. Moreover, their relationship with caregivers be-
comes more intense as they assert the self which is forming. Self
formation results from the self consciousness that is being evoked
by the caregivers and the memories of experiences the infant has
had with the caregivers. These two activities, going on simul-
taneously, are defining the personality of the infant. Incidentally,
this process of forming a self continues throughout one's life as
one must relate one's self to the inner representation of persons
with whom one relates in social or business affairs.
During this period when the infant is developing a sense of
self as distinct from other people, there is no conscious god rep-
resentation. The interaction of the infant with parents, however,
is creating the sentiments (emotionally charged attitudes or dis-
positions) from which a god representation will emerge.
During or toward the last half of the third year infants de-
velop an image of god which they can describe. This image will
become more clearly focused as they grow toward age six. But
even by age four children can indicate the characteristics of their
god by drawing or dictating a letter to god (Heller 1986; Lang
1983).
The god image infants create between their second and third
birthdays differs from other objects they internalize. The god
image is not static. It is an inner feeling which influences their
ideas of the world and their behavior. This does not mean that
the god image is something they like. Some infants dislike or are
indifferent to their god image. A child as young as five may—
because of the death of the father—blame god and decide not to
respect that god (Baker 1982, 61). Like conscience, with which
the god image may become fused in a year or two, the god image
is an inner reality the child cannot ignore. It is the only reality
C. ELLIS NELSON 35

within the self that knows all about the self and is related to all
the problems and feelings of the self.
The god image is also unique among the objects represented
in the infant's self because it endures throughout the life span.
This comes about because most parents—and society generally
—reinforce the god image and negate other images. Although
the god image is created at a time when the infant may internalize
a mental image of ghosts, monsters, witches, or Santa Claus,
these images are slowly suppressed by caregivers and society.
The god image is encouraged or is allowed to be whatever the
infant says it is on the theory the infant will "out-grow" the prim-
itive image of god. One does not, however, outgrow the primi-
tive image of god. The reality of that image within the self has to
be reconciled with ongoing experiences. Some people are able
to give up childish ways in religion as the Apostle Paul admon-
ished them to do so that they would be able to reason like an
adult (1 Cor. 13:11). But many people are not able to overcome
fear, loneliness, or lack of self-confidence characterizing their
private god image without the help of psychotherapy (Rizzuto
1979,87-173).
The primitive image of god which is in place at about the age
of three is unique for each person. It is a personal god con-
structed out of material from two sources. The first is the inter-
nalized image and feeling states from relations with parents,
siblings, and playmates, plus the social, economic, and religious
situation in which the family lives (Hyde 1990, 83-97). The sec-
ond is the instructions caregivers have given the child. The child
at about age three becomes conscious of cause and effect rela-
tionships and wants to know what caused the wind to blow, the
pet dog to die, or the sun to rise each morning. If caregivers ex-
plain that god is connected to these events, then that cause will
probably be accepted as part of the child's god image. The child
could also be told that "these things just happen" or that "later
you will understand." In any case, children will collect bits and
pieces of what they are told in order to construct a god image.
Once the child has formed an image of god within the pri-
vacy of the mind, that image has the role of a person who has
been internalized (Rizzuto 1990,87). The god image has a some-
what independent status. The dialogue and the emotional rela-
tionship between the god image and the self is like that which
36 FORMATION OF A GOD REPRESENTATION

exists between two persons. The relation can be friendly, sup­


portive, judgmental, forgiving, suggestive as to how to act or
some combination of the above depending on the circumstances
the self is facing. The self can also resist, reject, or deny any rela­
tion to the god image.
An illustration of how children toward the end of their third
year form a god image came in a letter from a friend. Our friend,
Ruth, is the mother of Kristin, age two years and eleven months.
The letter reads: "Kristin and I had our first heavy philosophical
discussion Sunday night as we were leaving the grocery store.
She said, Ί like your green car, Mom.' I said, 'Thanks. It be­
longed to Grandpa Brice.' She said, 'He's dead, isn't he?' I said,
That's right.' She said, 'He's in heaven with God.' I said, 'Good
for you, sweetheart!' Then she said, 'He's in God's tummy.'"
Kristin has already formed and answered with the help of her
god image the most profound questions of our existence: Where
do people come from and where do they go?

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper was to explore objective relations


theory from birth to age three in order to answer two questions.
(1) What is the human condition which causes people to form an
image of god? The answer according to this theory is that the
self, beginning to be formed at birth, creates a representation of
god out of its relation with caregivers in order to account for the
world in which it finds itself. (2) Are psychological characteris­
tics of individuals formed before they adopt a religion and are
they then strong enough to influence one's understanding of god?
The answer is yes; the infant's memory of relations to people and
circumstances has a decisive effect on the child's image of god.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Some implications for religious education sponsored by con­


gregations from the perspective of object relations theory are as
follows.
1. Object relations theorists agree that the quality of an in­
fant's relationship to caregivers produces a memory that endures
throughout life. This means that the primary god image, which is
deeply influenced by parents, must undergo a secondary process
C. ELLIS NELSON 37

in order to become a theologically informed image. Some sec-


ondary influences will be effective during childhood and early
adolescence such as the substance and nature of instruction in re-
ligion, the religious beliefs and practices of the family, and the
religious ethos of the community. But a secondary reimaging of
god will not have the full resources of the self until about age
sixteen, when a person ordinarily develops the ability to reason
abstractly. From that point on, individuals will be mentally
equipped to reconcile their personal god image with a theologi-
cally informed image.
The self/god image process which started in infancy goes on
throughout life. Some people will not be able to progress beyond
their infantile needs for comfort or for a god like the preferred
parent. Other people will be able to mature in relation to their
god image just as they mature in relation to their parents. Mature
people will also rework their self-image in relation to life expe-
riences as part of the maturation of their god-image.
2. A person's image of god is more significant than faith in
god. "Faith in god" is an attitude psychologically founded on a
feeling of trust which a person may connect with the god of a
certain religion. An image of god has particular characteristics
which exist in dynamic relation to one's self. Thus, religious edu-
cators should always try to be precise about the nature of god—
what god is like, what god approves or disapproves. Even after
abstract reason has emerged in middle adolescence, people usu-
ally reflect on their image of god in terms of specific situations
and what one should be or do in such situations. To a remarkable
degree the Bible is of this nature; for there is little abstract mate-
rial in the Bible about religion but a great deal about how god
acted in relationship to particular life situations of the people be-
ing discussed in the story.
3. The period from about three to six years of age is of critical
importance, as the child's god image is still in an embryonic
stage. During this time the god image becomes more sharply fo-
cused. Children's ability to use language and their alertness to an
ever-widening set of life experiences (especially through their
viewing of television) requires that caregivers and kindergarten
leaders talk to children about how they are relating their god im-
age to life situations and to the behavior of other people.
4. To be effective, religious education must be personal even
if it is conducted in a classroom. This is because the primary god
38 FORMATION OF A GOD REPRESENTATION

image is constructed by the self for self needs. Changes in the


self will cause changes in the god image and vice versa.
5. Christian education for children and early adolescents—in
addition to worship and an environment of friendly acceptance
—should contain basic beliefs in order to help children internal-
ize the image of god the church has experienced through the
centuries.
6. Christian education for adults—in addition to a discussion
of theology and ethics in relation to life situations—should pro-
vide groups in which they can explore their feelings such as love,
fear, grief at the loss of a friend, loneliness, guilt, or forgiveness
in order to help reconstruct their self/god image.
C. Ellis Nelson is Research Professor in Christian Education at Austin Presby-
terian Theological Seminary in Austin, Texas.

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^ s
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