Gutierrez 2021 J Olli Bee Foods Corporation

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3
Jollibee Foods Corporation*
Ben Paul B. Gutierrez
Prologue
Brothers Tony Tan Caktiong (Chairman) and Ernesto Tanmantiong
(Chief Executive Officer, CEO) are reviewing the materials to be
presented at the July 24, 2020 Annual Stockholders Meeting of
the Jollibee Foods Corporation (JFC). The corporation has seen
decreasing earnings and lower stock prices since its full acquisition
of two large US food companies, Smashburger and The Coffee
Bean and Tea Leaf (CBTL) in 2018 and 2019, respectively. More
seriously, severe losses have been experienced by the corporation
in the first half of 2020 following the closure of most of its stores
across the globe caused by the COVID-19 global pandemic.
These losses are unprecedented because they were the first
losses for Jollibee since it was established in 1978. Furthermore,
additional details of the ₱7 billion Business Transformation Plan
announced in May 2020 are needed to reassure the investors of
the recovery efforts of the corporation. The recovery program
must be accelerated to enable Jollibee to immediately return to
profitability.
JFC, a publicly listed Philippine foodservice company, and its
subsidiaries (the Jollibee Group) are engaged in the development,
operation, and franchise of quick service restaurants (QSRs) under
the trade names “Jollibee,” “Chowking,” “Greenwich,” “Red
Ribbon,” “Mang Inasal,” “Yong He King,” “Hong Zhuang Yuan,”
“Highlands Coffee,” “Pho24,” “Smashburger,” “The Coffee
*
This case was written by Ben Paul B. Gutierrez (Professor), Cesar E.A. Virata School of Business,
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. The case is not designed to illustrate effective or
ineffective handling of managerial decisions. It is intended for classroom discussion only.
Copyright © 2021. Not to be reproduced without permission.
147
Bean & Tea Leaf,” “Burger King,” “Hard Rock Cafe,” “Dunkin’
Donuts,” “Tim Ho Wan,” “Panda Express,” “Tortas Frontera,”
and “Yoshinoya” within and outside the Philippines (Jollibee
Foods Corporation, 2019, p. 1; Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021,
February 15). It has outlets in at least 34 countries, the largest of
which in terms of contribution to system-wide sales are in the
Philippines, the United States (US)/Canada, China, and Vietnam
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2020, April 14). Meanwhile, the
other businesses of the Jollibee Group include manufacturing
and property leasing in support of the QSR systems and other
business activities (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2019, p. 1).
JFC was incorporated on January 11, 1978 and was publicly listed
at the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) on July 14, 1993.
The Quick Service Restaurant Industry
Restaurant Classification
Restaurants may be classified according to “menu style,
preparation methods, pricing, and more importantly, how the
food is served to the customer” (“Foundations of restaurant…”,
2011, p. 8). Table 1 contains the five restaurant segments in the
food service industry according to the US National Restaurant
Association (NRA).
Table 1.
Distinctive Features of Five Restaurant Segments
Average cost
Restaurant Serving When order
per-person for Examples
Segment Staff? taken?
dinner
1. Fine dining Yes While patron is US$25 or more French, Italian, steak, seafood
full-service seated restaurants, etc.
restaurants
2. Family dining Yes While patron is 10 or less Denny’s, The Old Spaghetti
full-service seated Factory, etc.)
restaurants
3. Casual dining Yes While patron is 10 to 25 TGI Fridays, Applebee’s, Chili’s
full-service seated Grill & Bar, Outback Steakhouse,
restaurants etc.
148 Cases and Readings in International Business

4. Quick service No Order and pay 3 to 6 Subway, McDonald’s, Starbucks,
(fast- food) before eating KFC, Burger King, Domino’s
restaurants Pizza, Pizza Hut, Jollibee, etc.
5. Quick casual No Order and pay 7 to 9 Panera Bread, Five Guys Burger
restaurants before eating and Fries, Jimmy Johns Gourmet
Sandwich Shop, Chipotle Mexi-
can Grill, etc.).
Source: “Foundations of restaurant…”, 2011, Chapter 1, p. 8
There is some overlap between the family dining and casual dining
segments. Quick casual restaurants may be treated as a special
case of QSRs because they also follow the fast service format.
However, quick casual restaurants serve “freshly prepared,
wholesome quality, and authentic foods” (“Foundations of
restaurant…”, 2011, p. 8).
Industry Growth in the US

NRA projected the total US restaurant industry sales to reach
US$863 billion in 2019, about four percent of the US gross domestic
product (GDP) (Khandelwal 2019, para. 2). The restaurant
industry was projected to employ 15.3 million people in 2019,
roughly 10 percent of the US working population (Khandelwal,
2019, para. 2).
Restaurants have played an important role in people’s lifestyles.
The restaurant industry’s share of the food dollar has risen from
25 percent in 1955 to 51 percent in 2019 (Khandelwal, 2019,
para. 1). This means more than half of the food expenses are
now consumed outside the home in the US. This phenomenon of
greater spending on food away from home first occurred in 2010,
according to the US Department of Agriculture (Meyersohn,
2020).
Meanwhile, in the Philippines, according to the Family Income
and Expenditure Survey, the food consumed outside the home
is increasing from 5.4 percent in 2003 to 8.2 percent in 2015,
and the food budget still accounts for about 42 percent of the
household expenses (“Agricultural indicators system”, 2017). As
the household income increases, there is a larger opportunity for
QSR businesses in emerging countries like the Philippines.
Jolibee Foods Corporation 149

Restaurant demand is highly influenced by consumer tastes
and personal income (Lock, 2019b, para. 4). About 94 percent
of US consumers consider taste as the most important factor in
restaurant patronage (Lock, 2019b, para. 5).
QSRs have led restaurant sales as the average consumer fast-food
spending has increased because customers prefer them for offering
convenience and low-cost versus table-service restaurants (Lock,
2019b, para. 4). Many fast-food chains have introduced new deals
(e.g., value meals) in addition to their already low-priced menus.
It is expected that all age groups patronize fast-food, but middle-
income earners likely eat fast food more than those who are on
the higher or lower than average income earners.
The modern-day QSR originated and developed in the US. The
US QSR industry generated revenue of US$273 billion in 2019,
an increase of about US$90 billion over the past 10 years (Table
2). Furthermore, according to data from the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics, households with annual income of at least US$70,000
were responsible for 63 percent of total restaurant spending in
2018 (Khandelwal, 2019, para. 3). Table 3 describes the three
performance variables that drive the revenues of a QSR.
Table 2.
Revenue of the US QSR industry (in US$ Billion)
Year Revenue Year Revenue

2002 159.2 2010 190.5
2003 166.3 2011 193.1
2004 173.7 2012 194.8
2005 178.1 2013 196.1
2006 180.8 2014 198.9
2007 181.2 2018 256
2008 185.9 2019 273
2009 185.1 2020 239 (est)
Source: Lock (2019b, 2020)

Table 3.
Measuring a Restaurant’s Performance
Key Operating Metric Definition Unit of Measure
1. Comparable-store sales The sales of a restaurant chain’s In percentage terms
existing outlets (typically including
outlets in operation for more than
a year) in a period relative to the
sales in the same period in the
prior year.
2. Comparable guest counts The transactions of a restaurant In percentage terms
chain’s existing outlets in a period
relative to the transactions in the
same period in the prior year
3. Average check The average amount billed per Unit of currency
customer
Relationship: Changes in guest counts
(2) and check size (3)
drive the changes in
comparable-store sales
(1)
Source: Table prepared from information supplied by Khandelwal (2019), para. 6.
Technomic’s Top 500 Chain Restaurant Report showed that QSR

players still dominate the Top 15 restaurant chains by sales in
2018 (Table 4). Out of the leading QSR chains, the same report
claims that McDonald’s contributed the most to the overall
revenue of the U.S. fast-food industry in 2018, with Starbucks far
behind in second place. McDonald’s generated US$38.5 billion,
about US$19 billion more than its closest rival, Starbucks.
Table 4.
Top 15 US Restaurant Chain by Sales (in US$ millions)
Rank Restaurant Chain 2018 US 2018 US Units Segment Menu Category
Sales
1 McDonald’s 38,524 13,914 Quick Service Burger
2 Starbucks 19,660 14,606 Quick Service Coffee Cafe
3 Subway 10,410 24,798 Quick Service Sandwich
4 Taco Bell 10,360 6,588 Quick Service Mexican
5 Chick-fil-A *10,180 2,370 Quick Service Chicken
6 Burger King 9,939 7,330 Quick Service Burger

Table 4. (cont’d)
Top 15 US Restaurant Chain by Sales (in US$ millions)
Rank Restaurant Chain 2018 US 2018 US Units Segment Menu Category
Sales
7 Wendy’s 9,405 5,810 Quick Service Burger
8 Dunkin’ 8,786 9,419 Quick Service Coffee Cafe
9 Domino’s 6,591 5,876 Quick Service Pizza
10 Panera Bread *5,760 2,074 Fast Casual Bakery Café
11 Pizza Hut 5,526 7,482 Quick Service Pizza
12 Chipotle Mexican 4,805 2,452 Fast Casual Mexican
Grill
13 Sonic Drive-In 4,447 3,606 Quick Service Burger
14 KFC 4,433 4,074 Quick Service Chicken
15 Applebee’s 4,211 1,693 Casual Dining Varied Menu
250 Jollibee 126 40 Quick Service Chicken
Source: Technomic’s Top 500 Chain Restaurant Report; *Technomic estimate
The 10 largest fast-food chains in Technomic’s Top 500 Chain

Restaurant Report in 2019 together accounted for 90 percent of the
sector’s growth in 2018 (Maze, 2019, para. 1). The fast-food chains
grew, not by adding new outlets, but by focusing on generating
same-store sales and traffic. The fast-food chains in the Top 500
together accounted for 170,000 outlets in 2018, up by just 440
from the year before (Maze, 2019, para. 2). The growth in the
restaurant industry is explained by rising income levels, better
restaurant facilities, availability of better quality ingredients, and
a variety of cuisines, among other factors.
The large fast-food chains have leveraged their considerable
marketing and financial advantages over their rivals, especially
in meeting more consumers’ demands for convenience (Maze,
2019, para. 3). The top 10 chains grew sales by 4.7 percent on
average, while the other 140 chains increased sales by an average
of 0.8 percent (Maze, 2019, para. 3).
In terms of brand value, McDonald’s, Starbucks, KFC, and
Subway came out on top (Lock, 2019a, para. 2). McDonald’s
unsurprisingly accounted for the highest, with more than double
the value of closest competitor, Starbucks (Table 5).

The rapid growth of QSRs has also been achieved through
franchising. A franchise is a contract between the owner and the
franchisee for the right to operate and market the QSR brand
for a fixed initial fee and a percentage share of monthly sales
for the duration of the agreement. Franchisees also contribute
a percentage of their sales for their share in advertising of the
brand. The company usually owns the premises or secures a
long-term lease for the location, while the franchisee invests in
the equipment, furniture, and fixtures (Khandelwal, 2019, para.
8). About 93 percent of McDonald’s restaurants in the world are
operated by franchisees (Khandelwal, 2019, para. 8).
Table 5.
10 Most Valuable Fast-Food Brands Worldwide (in US$ Millions)
QSR Brand 2019 Brand Value
1. McDonald’s 130,368
2. Starbucks 45,884
3. KFC 17,205
4. Subway 17,124
5. Domino’s Pizza 9,570
6. Pizza Hut 7,580
7. Burger King 7,063
8. Tim Hortons 6,680
9. Chipotle 6,201
10. Taco Bell 6,182
Source: Lock (2019a)
Trends
Home deliveries and takeout services have grown since 2017
as more restaurant operators have offered delivery options
to capture this growth trend (Khandelwal, 2019, para. 8). QSR
leader McDonald’s has increased the number of outlets that offer
food delivery (Khandelwal, 2019, para. 8). In 2017, McDonald’s
underscored its clout and market presence when it negotiated a
favorable deal with Uber Eats, enabling it to expand delivery in
9,000 of its 14,000 US restaurants (Maze, 2019, para. 5).

“In the fight for market share, some will succeed and others
won’t,” McDonald’s CEO Steve Easterbrook said in January 2019.
“We intend to keep positioning McDonald’s on the winning side”
(Maze, 2019, para. 3).
The foodservice industry is also becoming more automated.
Technology has changed how customers order, pay, and
are served. The biggest change in QSR retail technology is
eliminating the need to line up with a cashier to give an order
(“The future…”, 2017, para. 2). Mobile apps and self-order
kiosks enable customers to order food easily, and the adoption
of these non-face-to-face platforms has increased QSR sales
growth (Khandelwal, 2019, para. 8). The degree of convenience
is heightened when customers’ orders are ready for pickup by
the time they arrive. “Customers can decide the level of human
interaction, whether to grab and go, or choose to stay, enjoy the
ambiance, and interact with staff” (“The future…”, 2017, para. 2).
Millennials appear to be driving the automation in QSRs. They are
addicted to technology and their smartphones (“The future…”,
2017, para. 3). They have no fear of making digital payments
during shopping and eating out. They are an important customer
group for QSRs. There are 80 million millennials in America,
about one-fourth of the entire population, with US$200 billion
in annual buying power (“The future…”, 2017, para. 4). A recent
study from the Food Institute of the US Department of Agriculture
shows that 44 percent of those dollars spend on dining out (“The
future…”, 2017, para.4).
Millennials also feel at ease with a mobile ordering platform
and they will prioritize ease and convenience over brand loyalty
(“The future…”, 2017, para. 4). Yum Brands, the owner of Taco
Bell, KFC, and Pizza Hut, made a US$200 million investment in
the online ordering provider Grubhub (Maze, 2019). It integrated
Grubhub service into the point-of-sale systems at Taco Bell
and KFC in the US, and effectively expanded delivery in their
restaurants (Maze, 2019). Yum Brands also acquired another
online ordering company, QuikOrder, to improve the capabilities
of its Pizza Hut brand (Maze, 2019, para. 6). Smaller and midsized

chains cannot match those kinds of investments that McDonald’s
and Yum Brands did (Maze, 2019, para. 7), but may compete
more effectively by offering superior food or service.
These online ordering and delivery systems enable a QSR
company to keep a profile of their customers, create relationships,
and offer VIP incentives to their most loyal customers. What
makes one restaurant stand above another is its use of digital
engagement with their customers (“The future…”, 2017, para. 2).
The increasing demand for convenience, especially among the
millennials, has posed a new kind of competition for the QSRs.
It is not coming from other restaurant segments, but it is coming
from the convenience stores (c-store, c-chains) and to a lesser
extent, the small grocers and supermarkets offering ready-to-eat
meal options. C-store and c-chains like 7-Eleven, Sheetz, Wawa,
and Kwik Trip in the US offer meal kits, salads, keto snacks,
Kombucha, and espressos (Meyersohn, 2020, para. 2); they offer
space for inside dining areas to their customers, with food quality
matching restaurants’ offerings. Here, the “average amount of
time customers spend inside the c-store is less than four minutes”
(Meyersohn, 2020, para. 6).
“Convenience retailers with compelling foodservice programs
are a growing threat to quick service restaurants,” Frank Beard,
c-store trends analyst at GasBuddy said (Kelso, 2019, para. 4).
“Data show that people choose convenience stores over fast-
food locations because of the convenience of an all-in-one stop
for fuel and food, followed by a preference for the taste of the
food at c-stores” (Kelso, 2019, para. 4). A study from the National
Association of Convenience Stores stated that foodservice sales
now make up 23 percent of sales at c-stores in the US—a three
percent increase throughout the past five years (Kelso, 2019).
The same trend is happening in the Philippines, where c-stores
(e.g., 7-Eleven, Ministop, FamilyMart, etc.) offer prepared meals
similar to the QSR format that not only encourages Filipinos
to dine out rather than eat at home (“Filipinos flock…”, 2014),
but also serve as a 24/7 convenient eating place among single-
person households working in the business process outsourcing

industry. Citing industry reports, Masigan (2019) claims that
fast-food sales inside c-stores will grow at a phenomenal rate of
32 percent, far exceeding the 12 percent year-on-year growth of
the Philippine QSR industry.
In response to a shift in consumer preferences, restaurants have
increased their focus on healthy food (Khandelwal, 2019, para. 8).
According to an NRA survey, 61 percent of consumers say they
order more healthful food at restaurants than before (Khandelwal,
2019, para. 8). This healthy trend, while popular, is not a major
choice consideration because 83 percent of US consumers still
dine at QSRs at least once a week (Lock, 2019b).
However, the clamor for healthy food has started premiumization
and the rise of the fast casual segment. There is a growing trend
among the millennials toward “upscale fast food” because
too many fast-food chains have effectively copied each other
(Celentano, 2019). This latest trend in restaurant concepts is
known as fast casual because it combines casual dining with
takeout. Thus, fast casual restaurants may also be considered
QSRs (“The different types…”, n.d.).
A fast casual restaurant has similar operations to a fast-food
restaurant. The food is prepared to order in disposable packaging
akin to QSR, but its ingredients are healthier, have higher quality,
and are produced following sustainable processes (“The different
types…”, n.d., para. 17). According to Morgan Stanley, millennials
comprise 51 percent of fast casual restaurants’ customers
(“The different types…”, n.d., para. 20). These customers are
environmentally and socially conscious professionals who are
very busy and value convenience (“The different types…”, n.d.,
para. 20). Typical fast casual menus include organic green salads
that are hand-tossed and not pre-packaged, “artisan bread not
the white loaf bread or soggy rolls found elsewhere,” and grass-
fed beef burgers (Celentano, 2019, para. 11).
Examples of the upscale fast casual segment are the Pret A Manger
chain and Panera Bread. Although the sandwich shops are also
QSRs, Pret A Manger goes more upscale as it “offers healthier-
for-you food in appropriate portions—and gets consumers out

of the store in about one minute” (Celentano, 2019, para. 7). At
Panera Bread, instead of basic sandwiches, it offers “Signature
Hot Paninis, such as the Cuban chicken and tomato, mozzarella
and fresh basil” (Celentano, 2019, para. 11). According to the
London-based market research firm Technavio, the fast casual
market is expected to hit US$66.87 billion by 2020 (Celentano,
2019, para. 13).
Risks
The QSR business deals with several risks. First, while the
franchise model offers several benefits, it may expose a
franchisor to certain risks, such as its “dependence on the ability
and willingness of franchisees to implement new initiatives,
their ability to maintain food safety, and their ability to grow
the business” (Khandelwal, 2019, para. 9). Franchisors rely on
field representatives (mystery shoppers) to ensure that their
franchisees adhere to food standards, customer service, and
cleanliness.
Second, food safety is an important issue, especially for QSR
chains that have grown in size. Any incidences relating to food
safety may destroy a brand’s image and could greatly affect its
business. For example, Chipotle Mexican Grill suffered multiple
E. coli outbreaks in 2015 that tarnished its image and took the
company more than two years to recover from (Khandelwal,
2019, para. 9).
Third, disruptions in the supply chain or increased cost of raw
materials used in making the food and drinks served in the
restaurants may constitute risks and increase the cost of doing
business. Disruption in the supply may happen due to weather,
natural disasters, transportation issues (Khandelwal, 2019, para.
9), or even a change in the information system that happened
to Jollibee’s Chickenjoy. Some raw materials may not be as
easy to obtain and difficult to replace. For example, Starbucks
uses specific arabica coffee beans. A disruption in the supply
of these coffee beans could impact the company’s performance
(Khandelwal, 2019, para. 9).

Fourth, consumer taste and lifestyle preferences could change.
The movement towards healthier eating has led to criticisms
about the nutritional quality of the meals offered by many
fast-food chains; others even attributing fast-food chains as the
culprit in increasing obesity among the children and youth (Cu,
2016; Kritz, 2017; Uy, 2016). With mounting US government
pressure, some fast-food chains began shifting to healthier menus
(e.g., McDonald’s); some of them even went as far as including
nutritional and calorie information on their packaging and
brochures (Sellers, 2005).
Finally, QSRs with international operations must comply with
political requirements of their host countries, such as corporation
laws, national minimum wage regulations (Lock, 2019, para. 3),
food safety, labeling, and packaging requirements, among others,
all of these affecting costs. Hygiene and quality regulations also
vary significantly between nations. Contractual labor became an
issue when President Rodrigo R. Duterte assumed office in June
2016. Many retail establishments, including fast-food chains,
had to adjust their personnel hiring policies to comply with new
government policies.
Jollibee’s Vision
Tan Caktiong’s dream is for Jollibee to dominate the fast-food
industry in the Philippines, next, Asia, and then, to be among
the leading QSR players of the world. “Since the start of Jollibee
Foods 40 years ago, I have always dreamed it to be the largest food
company in the world,” Tan Caktiong said in a press statement
on June 29, 2018, at the company’s annual shareholder meeting
(Venzon, 2018, para. 15).
“Tony is a visionary and he loves to dream big. That’s primarily
the reason why (Jollibee Foods Corporation) is where it is
today. Because of that bold vision, the entire organization has
been challenged, but it has been fulfilling trying to achieve the
vision,” Tanmantiong says (Gilchrist, 2019, para. 17).

“Our dream has been getting bigger––we wanted to become the
biggest in the Philippines (Exhibit 1) and once we achieved that,
we wanted to become the largest in Asia. When we became the
largest Asian restaurant company in the world, we sought to
dream bigger. Today, our dream is to become one of the top
five restaurant companies in the world,” Tanmantiong says
(“Jollibee Foods: Conquering…”, 2019, para. 3).
“That’s the vision of Jollibee—to make it a global brand,”

Tanmantiong says (Reed & Ramos, 2018, para. 5).
Exhibit 1.
Market Shares of Philippine QSR Players
Jollibee Foods
55%
Max's
1%
Seven & I
4%
Yum! Brands
5%
McDonald's
Others 21%
14%
Source: Adapted from Sayson & Wong (2017)
Venzon (2018) reported that Jollibee’s sales from its 13 restaurant

brands and over 3,000 outlets worldwide rose 15.2 percent to
US$3.4 billion in 2017, making it the 16th largest in the world by
sales according to Euromonitor (Exhibit 2). JFC needed to grow
its sales about four times to overtake the US$11.2 billion sales of
Dunkin’ Brands Group and meet its goal of entering the top five
QSRs in the world (Venzon, 2018).

Exhibit 2.
Global Sales of Selected Fast-Food Companies (in US$ billions)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
McDonald's 86.02%
Yum Brands (KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell) 35.33%
Restaurant Brands International (Burger King) 30.88%
Doctor's Associates (Subway) 18.82%
Dunkin' Brands Group 11.21%
Jollibee Foods 2.91%
Based on 2017 sales, excludes convenience stores that sell cooled meals; local currency data at
current prices converted using year-on-year rates
Source: Adapted from Venzon (2018)
The Beginnings of Jollibee (1978–1981)

Tan Caktiong was the founder of JFC (Exhibit 3). At age 22, shortly
after graduation, Tony and his wife, Grace, started with two
franchised Magnolia Dairy ice cream outlets in Cubao and Quiapo
in 1975, with an initial investment of ₱350,000.00 (Gonzales, 2019;
Lord, 2019) (Exhibit 4.) Tony revealed that the idea of his venture
started after visiting the Magnolia ice cream plant while he was
a chemical engineering student at the University of Santo Tomas
(De Leon, 2013).
Exhibit 3.
Tony Tan Caktiong
Photo: Courtesy of Jerome Favre/Bloomberg | Getty Images

Exhibit 4.
Cubao Ice Cream House in Quezon City
Photo: Courtesy of Jollibee
Tony and Grace came from entrepreneurial families. The couple

decided to become entrepreneurs rather than join the corporate
sector as employees. Grace’s father, who was a businessman,
helped them get started with the Magnolia franchise. On the
other hand, Tony’s father started a small Chinese restaurant in
Davao after leaving the Buddhist monastery where he served as
a cook. As a teenager, Tony worked at his father’s restaurant. “It
was nothing special for ambiance, but it became known for the
tastiness of its food,” he recalled (De Leon, 2013, para. 20).
Hamburgers and sandwiches adapted to the Filipino palate
were added to the menu when his customers asked for hot
meals (Santos, 2019). These new food items eventually became
more popular than ice cream (Lord, 2019). Tan saw the soaring
popularity of hamburgers at that time.
Thus, on January 11, 1978, JFC was incorporated as a Filipino-
owned company, with an initial network of seven Jollibee fast-
food restaurants in Metro Manila (Jollibee website, Milestones/
History) (Exhibit 5.) Jollibee called its flagship offering
“yumburgers.” In its first year, it reported total sales of ₱2 million.

Exhibit 5.
The First Jollibee Store
Photo: Courtesy of Jollibee
“Jollibee” came from “Jolibe,” the current spelling was so chosen

by the family because the “bee” was associated with hard
work and “jolly” prefix was added for happiness or enjoyment
at work (Viray, 2019). Its non-standard spelling allowed Tan
Caktiong to promptly obtain a trademark (Lord, 2019). “Jollibee”
is a registered trademark in the Philippines and other countries
(Exhibit 6).
Exhibit 6.
The Jollibee Trademark
Source: World Intellectual Property Organization
“It compares the employees of the company to busy workers in a

hive: hardworking, industrious, and providing the sweet things
in life,” said Dennis Flores, President and Head of International
Business, EMEAA, (Europe, Middle East, Asia, and Australia) for

parent company JFC. “And Sir Tony thought it was not enough
that the employees worked hard, but they should also be enjoying
their work” (Lord, 2019, para. 9).
“As early as [owning] five stores, Sir Tony was already dreaming
of being the best in the country and the world,” said Flores (Lord,
2019, para. 11). Tan Caktiong offered franchises starting in 1979,
opening Jollibee’s first franchised-store on Ronquillo Street, Sta.
Cruz, Manila. By 1981, Jollibee had 10 stores (Lord, 2019).
Tan Caktiong Prepares for McDonald’s Entry in the

Philippines (1980–1981)
Tan Caktiong faced early headwinds in his nascent business. In
1980, he received information that McDonald’s, the number one
fast-food chain in the world, was coming to the Philippines. At
that time, Jollibee only had nine stores compared to the thousands
of McDonald’s stores worldwide.
“When we learned that McDonald’s was coming into the country,
friends were telling us to shy away from the competition—do
(like) other businesses and to not try confronting the global
giant,” said Tanmantiong (Gilchrist, 2019, para. 6).
Tan Caktiong chose to directly compete with MacDonald’s. He
believed he had better knowledge of the local market and great-
tasting products that Filipinos like. (Conde, 2005). Following Sun
Tzu’s “know your enemy” dictum, he flew to the US to scout
McDonald’s (Conde 2005). Returning to Manila, he brought
with him several ideas to defend Jollibee against the expected
McDonald’s onslaught (Conde, 2005).
He adopted McDonald’s successful elements into his Jollibee
business: the mascot, colorful uniforms of the crew, and their
cheerful greetings (Conde, 2005, para. 8). Jollibee stuck to its own
menu of French fries, fried chicken, and a burger that catered to
the Filipino taste and priced much lower. Thus, Jollibee could
be simply described as a Filipino-style fast-food restaurant with
American-influenced dishes specializing in burgers, spaghetti,
chicken, and some local Filipino dishes. “He brought the standards

of Jollibee notches higher, at least on par with McDonald’s, by
basically copying what McDonald’s was doing,” said John Victor
Tence, Vice President for Corporate and Human Resources of
JFC (Conde, 2005, para. 9).
With only nine branches, Jollibee started an aggressive marketing
campaign by airing its first television (TV) commercial in 1980. It
introduced Chickenjoy and French fries as well as its well-loved
Jollibee mascot to support its brand awareness and identity efforts
(Jollibee website, Milestones/History, n.d.). When McDonald’s
opened its first store in 1981, its novelty had worn off because it
no longer offered anything new. In 1982, Jollibee supplemented
its TV advertising with in-store promotions, novelty premium
items, and Kiddie Birthday packages for kids. It also added
a local favorite Palabok Fiesta to its Western menu of burgers,
Chickenjoy, fries, and spaghetti (Jollibee website, Milestones/
History, n.d.).
The hamburger war also invaded the advertising arena. In 1982,
JFC obtained the services of a small start-up Filipino-owned
agency Basic Advertising of partners Herminio “Minyong”
Ordoñez and Tony Mercado along with Nonoy Gallardo and
Telly Bernardo. Ordoñez coined two Tagalog words to portray
Jollibee’s superior taste: “Langhap-sarap, Hindi bland,” (roughly
translated, “the smell of deliciousness, not bland”) in a highly
successful advertising campaign (Ordoñez, 2012). He claimed he
added the second phrase “not bland” as a dig at McDonald’s.
Tan Caktiong also placed smaller Jollibee outlets around each
big McDonald’s branch and “estimated the US firm’s sales by
counting trash outside its branches” (Morales & Petty, 2019, para.
22). Since 1984, Jollibee outsold McDonald’s domestically. In
2002, The Economist magazine wrote: “The Philippines is a huge
embarrassment to McDonald’s,” citing a Taylor Nelson Sofres
study showing that Jollibee was the “most often visited” fast-
food restaurant in the country (Conde, 2005, para. 11).

The Rapid Growth of Jollibee (1978–1998)
From ₱2 million total sales during its first year of operation in
1978, total sales increased to ₱24 million in 1980. In 1981, Jollibee
entered the list of the top 1,000 corporations in the Philippines
with sales of ₱36 million from its 10 stores. By 1984, it was in the
Top 500 list and dominated the local fast-food market (Conde,
2005). Jollibee doubled its sales between 1987 and 1989 exceeding
₱1 billion, and then again by 1991, and further tripling them
by 1996 (Lord, 2019). In 1998, total system-wide sales increased
29 percent over 1997 to ₱14.52 billion, while after-tax profit
increased 33 percent over 1997 to ₱863 million (Jollibee Foods
Corporation, Annual Report, 1998). In 2019, Jollibee controlled
about 56 percent of the US$5 billion Philippine fast-food market
(“The fried chicken king…”, 2020).
“It opened its 100th outlet in 1991, then reached 200 in 1996, 300 in
1998, 400 in 2001, 500 in 2004, 600 in 2007, 700 in 2010, 800 in 2013,
and 1,000 in 2015” (Lord, 2019). It was listed on the PSE in July
1993, raising ₱216 million (US$8 million), and its share price rose
135 percent in the first three months” (Lord, 2019, para. 16). As of
December 31, 2020, JFC had 1,185 Jollibee stores (Exhibit 7) in the
Philippines and 294 stores abroad (Jollibee Foods Corporation,
2021, February 15).
Exhibit 7.
A Typical Jollibee Store
Photo: Courtesy of Philippine Star

The Growth of the Philippine Business
Jollibee Acquires Local Food Brands (1994–2016)

Unlike other QSR companies that focused on their food concepts
and grew organically and expanded geographically (e.g.,
McDonald’s), JFC chose to acquire established food brands
to diversify its product offerings as it pursued growth and
domination of the Philippine fast-food industry. Lovell Sarreal,
Senior Assistant Vice President of Research at Maybank ATR Kim
Eng Securities in Manila, said, “Most competitors have single
brands. Having multi-food concepts enables Jollibee to capture
a bigger chunk of the dining-out market. For example, a typical
customer can eat at Jollibee on Monday, Chowking on Tuesday,
etc.” (De Leon, 2013, para. 7).
Greenwich (1994, 2006)

In 1994, JFC acquired 80 percent of Greenwich Pizza Corporation
(established in 1971 by Cresida Tueres) with 50 outlets for ₱100
million (“Jollibee seeks…”, 1999). Greenwich offered a variety of
Italian main and side dishes specializing in pizzas and pastas. By
end-1998, Greenwich had more than tripled its store network to
169 stores, 48 of them opened during that year and reached ₱2
billion in system-wide sales (Jollibee Foods Corporation, Annual
Report, 1998). After 11 years, JFC purchased the remaining 20
percent stake from its partner, Green Foods Franchising Inc. for
₱384 million in January 2006 (Dela Peña, 2006).
Ysmael V. Baysa, Jollibee’s Chief Finance Officer (CFO), reported
the company took the ₱384 million from the company’s cash
reserves allotted for its expansion (Dela Peña, 2006). In 2004,
Greenwich had system-wide sales of ₱3.5 billion, 10 percent of
the Jollibee Group’s total sales (Dela Peña, 2006). As of December
31, 2005, Greenwich had 239 stores, 128 of them were company-
owned and 111 were franchised outlets (Dela Peña, 2006). As of
December 31, 2020, Greenwich had 273 stores in the Philippines
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021, February 15).

Chowking (2000, 2011)
Following the Greenwich acquisition, Jollibee acquired in 2000
the Philippines’ largest Chinese fast-food chain, Chowking Food
Corporation (established in 1985) from Antares Holdings, a
group controlled by its President and founder Robert Fung Kuan
(“Jollibee seeks…”, 1999). Chowking served Chinese food menu
mainly noodle soups, dim sum, and rice bowls with toppings.
At the time of the purchase, the family of Jollibee Chair Tan
Caktiong already owned 50 percent of Chowking that had 162
stores, including four in the US and three in Dubai (“Jollibee
seeks…”, 1999). Jollibee proposed to issue new Jollibee shares in
exchange for Chowking’s (“Jollibee seeks…”, 1999). The buyout
excluded the four US Chowking stores operated by Fortune Food
Service Co. Inc. which holds the US master franchise.
“One of the key benefits of an alliance with Jollibee would be
substantial savings on purchasing, marketing, and administrative
costs for Chowking,” says Jollibee Vice President Rufino de
la Rosa (“Jollibee to acquire…”, 1999, para. 3). Jollibee’s two
commissaries can also supply more stores. The merger will
further allow Jollibee to maximize storage space, especially if
new Chowking branches are built side-by-side with Jollibee
stores. “Chowking will attract consumers in the graveyard shift,”
he adds (“Jollibee to acquire…”, 1999, para. 4).
On May 27, 2011, JFC took over the operations of a chain of 20
Chowking restaurants in the US (Loyola, 2011). JFC’s subsidiary
Tokyo Teriyaki Corporation acquired all US-based Chowking
stores (18 in California and one each in Nevada and Washington)
from Fortune Food Service Co. Inc. (Dumlao, 2011a, para. 2). JFC
paid a purchase price of US$16 million (₱693.3 million) for the
assets, US$12 million to be paid on May 27, 2011 and US$800,000
to be paid annually over the next five years (Dumlao, 2011a).
As of December 31, 2020, Chowking had 571 stores in the
Philippines and 48 stores abroad (Jollibee Foods Corporation,
2021, February 15).

Red Ribbon (2005)
Not content with the Greenwich and Chowking brands, JFC then
acquired 100 percent of the cake and pastry restaurant chain Red
Ribbon Bakeshop for ₱1.7 billion in October 2005 (Dela Peña,
2005). Red Ribbon started in 1979 in the home kitchen of Teresita
Moran, daughter of founders Amalia Hizon Mercado and her
husband Renato Mercado. Aside from its affordable, good
quality cakes and pastries, its product offerings include popular
Filipino dishes and confectionaries (Dela Peña, 2005, para. 6).
The company disclosed that Red Ribbon Bakeshop would be a
valuable synergistic member of the Jollibee family (Dela Peña,
2005, para. 10).
In fiscal year ending June 30, 2005, Red Ribbon had revenues
of ₱2.5 billion. At the time of the acquisition, Red Ribbon had
147 stores (Philippines 131 and California, USA 16) (Dela Peña,
2005). As of December 31, 2020, Red Ribbon had 495 stores in the
Philippines and 31 stores in the US (Jollibee Foods Corporation,
2021, February 15).
Mang Inasal (2011, 2016)

On November 22, 2010, JFC acquired a 70 percent stake in Mang
Inasal (chicken barbecue) for ₱2.98 billion (US$68.8 million) from
Inapt Investments Inc. of Edgar Injap Sia III (Dela Peña, 2010).
Jollibee valued the entire Mang Inasal business at ₱4.3 billion and
made Sia a billionaire (Rimando, 2010). Mang Inasal had annual
total revenues of ₱2.6 billion and system-wide sales of ₱3.8 billion
(Rimando, 2010).
The rapid growth of Mang Inasal had caught Tan Caktiong’s
attention. It started as a single proprietorship by Sia in December
2003 in Iloilo City. It became the first chicken barbecue, fast-
food chain that combined the dine-in concept and unlimited rice
(Austria, 2016). Sia achieved Mang Inasal’s growth by opening up
franchising opportunities in 2005 when it had about 30 stores. It
then opened about 55 stores every year. At the time of acquisition,
Mang Inasal had 303 branches and only 24 were company-owned.

Franchise holders of the 279 stores shelled ₱800,000, roughly the
same amount that Sia spent at the start of the business (Rimando,
2010, para. 6).
Sia had plans of an initial public offering by 2011 in its bid to
raise capital and ramp up its stores to 500 by 2012 (“Jollibee
acquires…”, 2010). JFC said it would continue the “expansion
of Mang Inasal’s store network, cost improvement on its raw
materials and supply, and greater operational efficiency by
applying [Jollibee’s] technology and scale” (“Jollibee acquires…”,
2010, para. 12).
On April 9, 2011, four months after the purchase of Mang Inasal,
Jollibee jettisoned its homegrown Manong Pepe business launched
in 2007 with 20 carinderia-type stores in Metro Manila (“Jollibee
closes…”, 2011). It closed its low-cost homestyle Filipino food
chain Manong Pepe with 12 stores left to focus on growing its
larger QSR such as the newly acquired Mang Inasal (“Jollibee
closes…”, 2011). “For now, Jollibee will concentrate on building
Mang Inasal. However, it will retain and maintain its ‘Manong
Pepe’ trademark and operating processes for potential use in the
long term” (“Jollibee closes…”, 2011, para. 7). “It also plans to
convert existing Manong Pepe stores to its other brands where
the sites are suitable,” Tan Caktiong (para. 8).
JFC purchased the remaining 30 percent of Mang Inasal with
458 stores for ₱2 billion on April 22, 2016 (Austria 2016). As of
December 31, 2020, Mang Inasal had 594 stores in the Philippines
Jollibee Acquires Philippine Franchises of International Brands

(1995–2021)
JFC has shown its success in developing market-leading brands
across several categories, i.e., locally acquired brands Greenwich,
Chowking, Red Ribbon, and Mang Inasal, and local franchises
Delifrance until its sale in 2011, Burger King, and Yoshinoya. It has
further demonstrated its management acumen and operational
excellence in its acquired brands and Philippine franchises.

“The firm cites value creation amongst its acquired brands
as one of its most significant successes. For example, in the
Philippines, we’ve practically made all our acquired brands
strong leaders in the segment,” Tanmantiong says (“Jollibee
Foods: Conquering…”, 2019, para. 3).
By September 2012, Jollibee’s domestic and international outlets
accounted for 49 percent of the company’s sales, and that share
was expected to decrease as the other brands in its portfolio
become more successful (De Leon, 2013, para. 7). JFC would like
to be a leading market developer of foreign restaurant brands in
the Philippines and has long-term plans of operating about 400
stores of foreign franchised brands (Jollibee Foods Corporation,
2021, February 15).
Delifrance (1995, 2006)

In 1995, JFC entered into a 50 percent/50 percent joint venture with
Delifrance Asia Ltd. to establish Baker Fresh Food Philippines
Inc. and to operate Delifrance, a French café and bakery chain
that served sandwiches and croissants in the Philippines (Valisno,
2007). Baker Fresh became the sole franchisee of the Delifrance
brand. It bought the remaining 50 percent stake of Delifrance
Philippine franchise in September 2006 (“Jollibee completes…”,
2011). Delifrance was a significant player in the French bakery-
café segment, catering to the more affluent customers. Its target
market was more upscale to those of Jollibee, Chowking, Red
Ribbon, and Mang Inasal.
However, JFC through its wholly owned subsidiary Fresh N’
Famous Foods Inc., sold the Delifrance Philippine franchise to
CafeFrance Corporation (CFC) of listed Euro-Med group for
₱110.3 million on December 31, 2010 (Jollibee Foods Corporation,
2010, p. 29). It also terminated the franchise agreement with
Delifrance Asia (“Jollibee completes…”, 2011). When it sold the
business, there were 23 Delifrance outlets in the country, 20 of
which were company-owned, three franchises, and two satellite
booths (“Jollibee completes…”, 2011). The sale supported JFC’s
intention to concentrate its resources on its larger QSR businesses.

Caffe Ti-Amo (2010)
On May 4, 2010, JFC agreed to establish a joint venture with a local
entrepreneur Pamela Tan (not related to Tony Tan Caktiong) and
her siblings to bring the South Korean coffee and gelato brand
Caffe Ti-Amo to the Philippines. The 50 percent/50 percent joint
venture entity named Coffetap Corporation had an initial capital
of ₱10 million (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2010, May 4).
Three stores were opened, one in Greenbelt 5 in Makati and two
franchised stores in Manila and Quezon City by December 2010.
Aside from the premium Italian gelato, Caffe Ti-Amo offered
local flavors such as ube, dulce de leche, piña colada, and peanut
butter. On November 30, 2011, JFC sold its business to CFC for
₱20.8 million (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2011, pp. 11, 40).
Burger King (2011)

JFC took over the Philippine operations of the American chain
Burger King by acquiring a 54 percent stake of BK Titans Inc.,
owner of Burger King’s Philippine franchise for ₱65.5 million
(US$1.49 million) in October 2011. JFC’s other minority partners
were Albert Lina (33 percent) and Manuel V. Pangilinan (13
percent) (Dumlao, 2011b). At the time of the acquisition, Burger
King had 23 restaurants in the country, mostly located in Metro
Manila, generating annual revenues of ₱800 million. As of
December 31, 2020, Burger King had 98 stores in the Philippines
The deal allowed JFC to enter the premium segment of the
hamburger category in the fast-food business, a niche market
that was less sensitive to economic cycles. JFC was expecting the
growth of the higher-end segment of the market “in the years
ahead as the Filipino consumers’ standard of living rises from the
growing economy” (Dumlao, 2011b, para. 2). At the same time,
JFC’s entry was seen as the opportunity for Burger King to scale
up its operations in the country.
Burger King based in Miami, Florida is the second-biggest fast-
food hamburger chain in the world with more than 11 million

guests entering its 12,300 stores daily in 78 countries (Dumlao,
2011b, para. 8). Burger King has similar products to Jollibee such
as hamburgers, fried chicken, and fries, but its products are priced
about 30 percent higher than comparable Jollibee products in the
Philippines (Dumlao, 2011b, para. 5).
Panda Express (2018)

In September 2018, JFC entered into a 50 percent/50 percent
joint venture agreement to establish JBPX Foods, Inc. with Panda
Restaurant Group, Inc. to bring Panda Express restaurants to the
Philippines (Francia, 2019). JFC’s 50 percent share was valued at
US$2.5 million.
Rosemead, California-based Panda Express, describes itself
as the largest family-owned and -operated Chinese American
restaurant group in the US. It is famous for its original recipes of
orange chicken, sweet fire chicken breast, honey walnut shrimp,
and Shanghai Angus steak. It has presence in more than 2,100
locations since it was founded in Pasadena, California in 1973,
with branches in Puerto Rico, Guam, Guatemala, El Salvador,
Aruba, Mexico, Canada, Dubai, Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and
Russia (Francia, 2019).
JBPX Foods Inc. was incorporated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on July 3, 2019 to enable the operation of the first
Panda Express store. JFC planned to develop five Panda Express
stores in Metro Manila during the initial phase of their partnership
(Francia, 2019). JBPX Foods would have its own management
team supported by JFC. As of December 31, 2020, Panda Express
had one store in the Philippines (Jollibee Foods Corporation,
2021, February 15).
Yoshinoya (2021)
In February 2021, JFC entered into a 50 percent/50 percent
joint venture with Yoshinoya International Philippines, Inc.
(YIPI), to operate and expand “Yoshinoya” in the Philippines
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021, February 15, para. 1). YIPI is

the Philippine subsidiary of Asia Yoshinoya International SDN
BHD and Yoshinoya Holdings Co. Ltd., the trademark owner of
Yoshinoya and a Japanese multinational food restaurant company
established in 1899 (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021, February
15, para. 2). Yoshinoya has three stores in the Philippines and
the joint venture plans to open 50 stores in the long term (Jollibee
Foods Corporation, 2021, February 15, para. 2).
Yoshinoya’s food, especially its “Gyudon” beef bowl, would
be very appropriate for the delivery platform. Yoshinoya, a
well-known brand in Japan, would be JFC’s first Japanese food
chain in the Philippines.1 There are more than 2,000 Yoshinoya
outlets around the world—Japan (more than 1,100 outlets), the
United States, Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan,
Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
In a PSE disclosure, Tan Caktiong describes the new partnership:
We are truly thrilled to have the opportunity to partner with
YIPI and grow the Yoshinoya brand in the Philippines. JFC will
benefit from Yoshinoya’s experience and know-how in Japanese
cuisine. The Philippines remains JFC’s most important market,
and Yoshinoya will be a strong addition to our presence in the
country. I am confident that this is the beginning of a long-term
and much larger partnership (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021,
February 15, para. 4).
The Jollibee Brand’s International Expansion (1986–2020)

Before acquiring Greenwich and the Delifrance franchise in the
1990s, JFC attempted to grow its business through international
expansion in the middle of the 1980s. Its earliest international
operations were a Singapore store in 1985, two Taiwan stores in
1986, and a Brunei store in 1987 (Hamlin, 1990; Reyes, 1995). The
Brunei business flourished, but the Singapore and Taiwan stores
had to close because of uncooperative partners (Table 6).
1
But this is not the first Japanese fast-food experience for JFC. It operated three outlets of Tomi’s Teriyaki
in California, part of another JFC acquisition in 2001 (Dela Peña, 2004).

Table 6.
Jollibee Store Openings Abroad
Year of Closure / Number of Stores as
Country Year of Entry
Re-entry of Dec. 2020
Asia-Pacific
Singapore 1985 1986 / 2013 11
Taiwan 1986 1988 –
Brunei 1987 18
Indonesia 1992 1999 –
Guam 1995 2007 / 2019 1
Vietnam 1996 141
Hong Kong 1996 10
Malaysia, Kota Kinabalu 1996 1997 / 2018 1
Papua New Guinea 1997 1999 –
Xiamen, China 1998 2001 –
Marianas, Saipan 1999 2009 –
Macau 2018 1
Middle East
Kuwait 1995 1999 / 2012 6
United Arab Emirates
Dubai 1995 1999 / 2012 16
Abu Dhabi 2016
Saudi Arabia
Dammam 1995
Jeddah, Riyadh 1996 12
Jubail 2013
Qatar 2010 10
Bahrain 2015 1
Oman 2017 1
USA
Daly City, CA 1998
Las Vegas, NV 2007 46
Hawaii 2011
New York City 2019
Plano, TX 2020
Canada
Winnipeg, Manitoba 2016
Toronto 2018 14
Edmonton, Alberta 2019
Regina, Saskatchewan 2019

Year of Closure / Number of Stores as
Country Year of Entry
Re-entry of Dec. 2020
Europe
Milan, Italy 2018 2
Rome, Italy 2020
London, UK 2018
Liverpool, UK 2020 3
Leicester, UK 2020
Total Jollibee 294
International
Sources: Bartlett & O’Connell, 1998; Cabuenas, 2020; Conde, 2005; Hamlin, 1990; Jollibee website,
SEC17C, 2021, February 15; Viray, 2019
By the end of 1998, Jollibee had 29 international stores. Tan

Caktiong wanted to duplicate the success of local stores in its
offshore stores and to account for 20 percent of the company
turnover in the long term (Labita, 1999). “Eventually, we hope
Jollibee can be the Philippines’ most popular export to the world,
said Tan Caktiong (Labita, 1999, para. 6).
JFC’s first prong of its international expansion strategy was to
follow the Filipino diaspora numbering about 10 million overseas
Filipino workers who long for a taste of home (Venzon, 2018). It
was natural to target the Filipinos because its product offerings
were tailored to the Filipino taste and banked on the Filipino
nostalgia. The success of the international expansion of JFC’s
flagship brand, Jollibee, was underpinned by the loyalty of Filipino
customers residing overseas. (“Jollibee Foods: Conquering…”,
2019). It would take some time to build the Jollibee brand and
attract the mainstream market of its host countries.
In a Forbes Asia interview, Tan Caktiong explained the wisdom of
opening Jollibee stores abroad with large Filipino communities:
We don’t have to advertise when we open in these places. The
longing for home is there. It’s just packed. They come here
because it’s the taste of comfort food. When we opened a
store in the Middle East, a customer asked me, ‘Sir, can you
play your old jingle? I want my daughter to hear it’ (De Leon,
2013, para. 8).

“It is more than a home for them,” Tan Caktiong continued,
referring to the familiarity Filipino customers enjoy in the firm’s
international outlets. (“Jollibee Foods: Conquering…”, 2019, para.
4). JFC harnesses word-of-mouth communication in countries
with a Filipino presence. It also implements targeted marketing
campaigns and focus groups among local consumers in its host
countries (“Jollibee Foods: Conquering…”, 2019, para. 4).
Jollibee’s President and Head of International Business for
EMEAA Dennis Flores explained this internationalization
strategy of following the Filipinos abroad during his keynote
address at the QSR Media Sandhurst Fine Foods Conference and
Awards in Sydney, Australia, on June 20, 2019:
Our first strategy is to bring Jollibee to markets with a significant
number of Filipinos living there. Once established, [we then]
crossover to the local mainstream customers. Markets such as
Singapore and Hong Kong started out being patronized by
the Filipino community. But soon as a new store opens, the
customer base has become mixed with more than half of our
customers being local Singaporeans and Hong Kongers (Santos,
2019, para. 8).
Luis Limlingan, Head of Sales at Regina Capital in Manila, said
that by targeting Filipinos abroad, Jollibee was positioned in a
“safe environment,” and Jollibee’s challenge was how it would
attract foreign customers (Reed & Ramos, 2018). He said the
company might need to customize its menu to appeal to foreign
palates by offering organic food or healthier options. “How do
you put it in an area where people are not familiar with it? What
is the hook to get non-Filipino customers in?” Limlingan said.
(Reed & Ramos, 2018, para. 22).
Speaking to the Financial Times, Tanmantiong expressed
confidence Jollibee could win over non-Filipino diners, who now
comprised half or more than half of its customers at its existing
overseas stores in Hong Kong, Brunei, and other locations outside
the Philippines (Reed & Ramos, 2018).

JFC rapidly implemented the opening of international Jollibee
stores in the 1990s in its so-called “plant the flag” strategy in January
1994 when Tan Caktiong hired Australian Pizza Hut veteran
Tony Kitchner as Vice President for International Operations after
Tan Caktiong realized that the Jollibee’s international business
needed structure and more resources (Bartlett & O’Connell,
1998). In Asia, it opened stores in Indonesia (1992), Guam (1995),
Vietnam (1996), Hong Kong (1996), Malaysia (1996), Papua New
Guinea (1997), Xiamen, China (1998), and Saipan (1999). In the
Middle East, it opened stores in Kuwait (1995), Dubai (1995), and
Saudi Arabia (1995) (Jollibee website) (See Table 6).
To attract the mainstream market, Jollibee offered region-specific
additions to its menu to better cater to local tastes, while retaining
its core products across its operational markets. This flexible
approach to meet overseas customer requirements motivated Jollibee’s
R&D to offer Saigon Chili Chicken in Vietnam, and Chicken
Burgers in the US “made with a 100 percent hand-breaded
chicken breast fillet, a brioche bun, garlic aioli sauce, lettuce, and
tomatoes” (“Jollibee home…”, 2020, p. 5).
Product adaptation was also followed earlier in Taiwan and
Brunei, during the 1980s. Bobby Sumulong, former Jollibee Vice
President for Marketing explained:
In Taiwan, it has added a fish fillet sandwich... Jollibee found
the Taiwanese didn’t like its sweet spaghetti sauce, and so
made it “more bland.” In Muslim Brunei, it calls its hamburgers
beefburgers and is certified as a halal restaurant that prepares
food according to Muslim law. You have to adjust to their
customs and religion. They won’t eat ‘hamburgers’ because
pork is forbidden (Hamlin, 1990, p. C1).
Jay Visco, Jollibee’s Marketing Director for International Opera
tions, claimed that in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia, burgers
and fried chicken are cooked with curry and lots of exotic spices.
Further adding mushrooms and gravy made these food items
popular among its loyal customers (Labita, 1999).

Most of the early Jollibee international stores closed after a few
years. Its successful international entries were in Vietnam, Hong
Kong, and Saudi Arabia. The closure of stores might be attributed
to the following: wrong choice of partners in joint ventures (e.g.,
Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia), small Filipino communities (e.g.,
Xiamen, China), JFC “paying its tuition” as it encountered some
difficulty in operating internationally, and the onset of the Asian
financial crisis in 1997.
“The company is hesitant about opening outlets abroad through
joint ventures (JVs) because when it first started expanding
overseas several of its joint ventures ran into trouble,” said Raffy
dela Rosa, Vice President for Finance, referring to the company’s
two Jakarta outlets, which opened in 1992. “The problem was
more of entry positioning,” he said, adding that Jollibee solved
the problem by turning the Indonesian stores into franchises in
1994 (Reyes, 1995).
In addition, there seemed to be an internal problem between the
International Division headed by Tony Kitchner and the group
that controlled the Philippine business leading to his inability to
access product research and development and finance, among
others (Bartlett & O’Connell 1998). It appeared that Kitchner did
not seriously consider the high costs associated with establishing
markets in new countries, and did not engage in substantial
market research (e.g., the Middle East store openings in Kuwait,
Dubai, and Bahrain) in his desire to build the International
Operations through rapid international expansion (Bartlett &
O’Connell, 1998).
In November 1996, Tan Caktiong realized he could no longer
support the costly internationalization program of Kitchner. He
would have preferred to go slower with international expansion
to ensure that each store became profitable for both the franchisee
and Jollibee (Bartlett & O’Connell, 1998). This strained relationship
between the International Business Division and the Philippine
business led to Kitchner’s departure and the appointment of
Manolo Tingzon in 1997 (Bartlett & O’Connell, 1998).

In 1997, after Jollibee opened its store in Port Moresby, Papua
New Guinea, there was an advertisement in a local newspaper
that said: “Wanted urgently, dogs and cats, any breed. Will pay
40 toea (equivalent to 40 US cents) per kilo live weight. Apply at
Jollibee…” (Thompson et al., 2017, p. 612). The person or party
who placed the advertisement was never found, and Jollibee
described the incident as a criminal attempt to sabotage its
business.
Starting in 2010, there was a resurgence in the Jollibee brand expan
sion strategy, while still targeting countries with large Filipino
populations (Table 4). The fast-food company aggressively
expanded overseas in line with its goal to generate 50 percent of
its sales from abroad (“Jollibee to set foot…”, 2017).
Jollibee opened its first outlet in the Dubai Mall in 2015 to beef up
its three stores in Dubai as it served more than 500,000 Filipino
expatriates living and working in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), with further openings planned (Dutton, 2016).
Jollibee opened its first store in Daly City, California in 1998,
followed by its second store in Las Vegas, Nevada in 2007 (Labita,
1999). It had since accelerated store openings to capitalize on
over three million Filipino population in the US (Venzon, 2018).
In 2019, Jollibee grew its US business at five times the rate of
the QSR industry with consistent double-digit growth in terms
of same-store sales and profits (Lee, 2019, para. 3). In the same
year, the company also inaugurated its new North American
headquarters in Los Angeles, California to support its growing
workforce and its expansion in the US and Canada (“Jollibee,
Home…”, 2020, para. 2).
It also ramped up store openings in Canada since opening its
first Jollibee store on December 15, 2016 in Winnipeg, Manitoba;
this city had the largest number of Filipinos in Canada, with a
population of 60,000. On January 26, 2017, this first Jollibee store
was visited by the Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and
his party (Jazul & Tadalan, 2017). JFC rapidly added stores across
the country, opening multiple locations within the Ontario and

Alberta provinces in 2018, then in Edmonton and Calgary in
2019 with record-breaking line-ups on their opening days (Lee,
2019, para. 6). Filipinos in Canada number about one million,
representing 2.7 percent of the country’s 37.7 million population
(Simeon, 2020).
Jollibee has been planning to go to Europe given the growing
population of overseas Filipinos and Filipino migrants in that
region. JFC is targeting Filipino communities in the United
Kingdom (UK), Italy, and Spain. There are more than 200,000
Filipinos living in Italy (“Jollibee to set foot…”, 2017), about
300,000 Filipinos in the UK (Reed & Ramos, 2018), and about
150,000 Filipinos in Spain (Alzona, 2015). Jollibee opened its first
European stores in Milan and London in 2018. In spite of the
COVID-19 global pandemic, Jollibee opened its second UK store
in Beatles-territory Liverpool on September 2, 2020, and its third
store in Leicester in December 2020 (Cabuenas, 2020). “The UK
has a very large Filipino population, and we also think that
Jollibee products can cross over to the mainstream market—
local British people,” says Tanmantiong (Reed & Ramos, 2018,
para. 11).
Fried chicken is the UK’s fastest-growing fast food. EMEAA’s
President Dennis Flores claims the British market spends some
€1.2 billion on quick-service chicken annually (Cabuenas, 2020).
When KFC temporarily shut more than half its UK stores because
of a supply chain problem, the British police had to issue a
statement asking the public not to contact them about the
“KFC crisis” because “it is not a police matter if your favorite
eatery is not serving the menu that you desire” (Gonzales, S.,
2018, para. 32).
“Chickenjoy is definitely the most popular offering on Jollibee’s
menu; it now accounts for 60 percent of the company’s worldwide
sales,” said Jollibee UK’s General Manager Fred Ventura, and
the company wants to concentrate on fried chicken in the UK
(Gonzales, S., 2018, para. 33). “We usually benchmark KFC, and
we believe we have a better product than KFC. We see that KFC
has many stores in the UK selling the same fried chicken, and we

think we have a good opportunity to cater to the same market
who are already eating fried chicken,” Tanmantiong said (Reed
& Ramos, 2018, para. 14).
Jollibee Acquires Foreign Food Businesses (2004–2018)

The first strategy involved the opening of Jollibee stores in
countries where there were a large Filipino base for viability,
and also hoped to attract the mainstream of the host countries
in the next phase. This was brand expansion––the first prong of
Jollibee’s two-pronged international expansion strategy (“Jollibee
Foods: Conquering…”, 2019). In its early international foray, this
brand expansion was successful in Brunei, the UAE, and Hong
Kong.
Tan Caktiong followed another internationalization strategy
starting in 2004. Instead of planting a store and building the
Jollibee brand in an international location, JFC began acquiring
established foreign QSRs or brand acquisition––the second
prong in JFC’s international expansion strategy (“Jollibee Foods:
Conquering…”, 2019).
“We decided the harder thing to do was marketing the brand,
so we buy brands with a following and just have to improve the
back end of the operation,” said Tan Caktiong (De Leon, 2013,
para. 11). This required applying JFC competencies in store
management and operations systems to improve their strength in
the marketplace. This also involved scaling-up its management
lessons learned from its local brand acquisitions that started
with Greenwich in 1994, while changing the playing field—from
managing acquired local brands to managing acquired foreign
brands.
Yonghe King (Shanghai, China), 2004

In 2004, JFC acquired an 85 percent stake of Yonghe King
(China), a major player in the Chinese fast-food industry, offering
traditional Chinese cuisine with Western-style service, for
US$11.5 million (₱1.2 billion) (Valisno 2007, para. 3, 5). Yonghe

King was very popular for its soy milk, dough sticks “youtiao,”
and noodles (Valisno, 2007). It had 88 noodle stores in 2005.
Jollibee’s management positioned Yonghe King as the
“contemporary Chinese fast-food chain.” Supreme Beef Rice and
King’s Beef Noodle meals were added to its core menu to dispel
the customers’ notion that the fast-food chain is largely a snack
and breakfast restaurant (Valisno, 2007, para. 5).
JFC also brought its Western management style to Yonghe King,
adding departments to perform business analysis, decision
support, and performance management. JFC relied on local
recruits to head the operations, marketing, network development,
and R&D sections to obtain a better knowledge of the Chinese
consumer market.
In 2007, JFC bought the remaining 15 percent stake of Belmont
Enterprises Ventures Ltd. (Belmont) in Yonghe King from
Academy Resources Ltd. for US$6 million (₱413.7 million)
(Valisno, 2007, para. 2-3). Belmont was the founder of Yonghe
King in Shanghai in 1995 (Valisno, 2007, para. 3). Jollibee’s CFO
Ysmael V. Baysa reported that Jollibee used its cash reserves in
buying Belmont’s stake.
“The purchase of the remaining 15 percent share of Yonghe
King reflects management’s optimism and confidence in the
significant future growth and rise in the economic value of the
Yonghe King business,” Jollibee Chairman and Chief Executive
Tony Tan Caktiong said in a statement (Valisno, 2007, para. 4).
In May 2007, there were 98 company-owned, and four franchise-
owned Yonghe King outlets in China (Valisno, 2007, para. 6).
Jollibee opened more than 100 Yonghe King fast-food outlets in
China during the period 2011 to 2012, bringing the total stores to
288 by 2013 (De Leon, 2013).
On July 27, 2010, JFC signed an agreement with Hua Xia Harvest
Holdings Pte. Ltd. to establish and operate Happy Bee Foods
Processing, a food processing and manufacturing facility in
Shucheng county, Anhui province in China; it would serve the

requirements of Yonghe King and Hong Zhuang Yuan businesses
in the mainland, as well as business institutions other than JFC’s
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2010, July 27). Shucheng county is
about 517 kilometers west of Shanghai and about 1,136 kilometers
southeast of Beijing, but it is close to the supply of agricultural
products for the JFC’s restaurants in China (SEC 17C, 2010, July
27). The planned investment in the facility was RMB50 million
(US$10 million), including the acquisition of land, use rights for
50 years for a parcel of land with an area of about four hectares
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2010, July 27).
In 2016, JFC’s offshore unit, Jollibee Worldwide Pte. Ltd. (JWPL),
acquired the remaining 30 percent stake in Happy Bee from its
partner Hua Xia Harvest Holdings Pte. Ltd. for US$10.34 million
(₱514.9 million) in an asset-for-equity swap (Jollibee Foods
Corporation, 2016, February 23). “With the change in ownership,
Happy Bee will no longer produce and sell food products to
institutions other than JFC’s restaurant businesses,” Tan Caktiong
said (Lazo, 2016, para. 6). This commissary would support the
growth of its Chinese food businesses by further enhancing its
food quality and safety.
In 2018, Yonghe King cooperated with third-party delivery
platform after observing a change in the Chinese customers’
consumption habits, and its delivery business grew at a rate
of 38 percent (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2018, p. 12). Yonghe
King also took advantage of Alipay and WeChat mobile phone
payment functions to create convenience for customers and
boost the restaurant sales (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2018, p.
12). Social media platforms such as WeChat and Weibo were
utilized to communicate with Chinese consumers and get real-
time feedback on its products and services. By the end of 2018,
Yonge King had accumulated 1.7 million WeChat fans (Jollibee
Foods Corporation, 2018, p. 12). As of December 31, 2020, Yonghe
King had 354 stores in China (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021,
February 15).

Hong Zhuan Yuan (Beijing, China), 2008
On August 23, 2008, four years after acquiring Yonghe King, JFC
bought Beijing-based Hong Zhuang Yuan, the congee chain, for
₱2.5 billion through its subsidiary JWPL (Liu, 2008, para. 2). Tan
Caktiong said the congee restaurant would increase Jollibee’s
market segment and geographical coverage in China (Liu,
2008, para. 4).
“The Hong Zhuang Yuan business is quite profitable and has no
debt,” Tan Caktiong said (Liu, 2008, para. 3). The Beijing restaurant
chain was estimated to have annual sales of ₱1.3 billion in 2008,
and operated 37 restaurants, mostly located in the Chinese capital
(Liu, 2008, para. 3). By 2013, JFC had increased stores to 52 as
it implemented three changes in the business: improving food
taste, redesigning the restaurants, and introducing new products
(De Leon, 2013, para. 12). As of December 31, 2020, Hong Zhuan
Yuan had 31 stores in China (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021,
February 15).
SuperFoods (Vietnam), 2012, 2017

In January 2012, JFC entered into a 50 percent/50 percent joint
venture with SuperFoods (Philippines/Vietnam) for US$25
million. SuperFoods operated Highlands Coffee Shops and Pho24
noodle houses in Vietnam, and had franchises of Hard Rock Cafes
in Macau, Hong Kong, and Vietnam (Dela Peña, 2012; De Leon,
2013). The SuperFoods Group had annual sales of around US$30
million. In 2011, it had 56 Highlands Coffee stores in Vietnam,
while Pho24 had 48 restaurants in Vietnam, 11 in Indonesia, four
in Hong Kong, three in Japan, one in Cambodia, and two in the
Philippines (Dela Peña, 2012). The partnership with SuperFoods
expanded Jollibee’s business in Indonesia with 13 Pho24s, where
it had two Chowking outlets (De Leon, 2013, para. 15).
JFC raised its stake in SuperFoods from 50 percent to 60 percent
for ₱2.71 billion in May 2017 (“Jollibee Foods takes control…”,
2017; Miraflor, 2017). Tan Caktiong was optimistic that Vietnam
could replicate the Philippine market. It planned to put up 20

to 30 new Highlands Coffee and Pho24 stores a year (Cabuag,
2019). “The business by the way is doing very well. It’s one of
our fastest-growing businesses and one of the most profitable in
terms of margin and one of the highest returns on investments,”
Tan Caktiong said (Cabuag, 2019, para. 16).
“We look at the population of Vietnam which is close to 95 million,
about the same in the Philippines and still fast-growing market,
so there is a lot of opportunities,” Tanmantiong told reporters
after the company’s stockholders’ meeting in June 2019 (Cabuag,
2019, para. 11).
Meanwhile, Tan Caktiong said the company is studying a plan
of bringing its joint venture behind the Highlands Coffee brand
to Vietnam’s stock market (Cabuag, 2019). To date, this had not
been implemented. As of December 31, 2020, Jollibee had 483
Highlands Coffee stores (Vietnam 433 and Philippines 50), 52
Pho24 stores (Vietnam 36, Indonesia 16), and two Hard Rock
Café stores in Vietnam (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021,
February 15).
Dunkin’ Donuts (some China territories), 2014

In December 2014, JFC invested US$180 million in a 60 percent/40
percent joint venture Golden Cup Pte Ltd. with Jasmine Asset
Holding Ltd., to operate US doughnut and coffee chain Dunkin’
Donuts in some China territories (Cabuag, 2015). JFC planned
to open 1,500 Dunkin’ Donuts stores in 20 years in Hong Kong,
Macau, Fujian, Hunan, Jianxi, Guangdong, Hainan, Guanxi,
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shangxi, Chongqing, Guizhou, Sichuan,
Yunnan, Heilongjiang, and Jilin (Venzon, 2018).
Jollibee had previous experience in the doughnut business in the
Philippines during the 1990s, under Donut Magic Philippines.
Inc., but the brand did not take off. As of September 30, 2020, JFC
operated six Dunkin’ Donuts stores in Beijing, China with plans
for expansion to other Chinese cities (Jollibee Foods Corporation,
2020, October 20). However, it closed three stores by December

Tim Ho Wan (Asia Pacific except in Hong Kong), 2018, 2019,
2020, 2021
On May 8, 2018, JFC’s wholly-owned subsidiary JWPL invested
SG$45 million (₱1.74 billion) to acquire a 45 percent stake of the
Titan Dining LP. Titan was a private equity fund and the Asia
Pacific master franchise holder of the “Tim Ho Wan” brand
(except in Hong Kong) (Loyola, 2018). The binding agreement
allowed JFC to fully acquire in seven years Tim Ho Wan Pte. Ltd.
(THWPL) and its affiliate, Dim Sum Pte. Ltd. (DSPL), which runs
Tim Ho Wan outlets in Singapore (Loyola, 2018). Established in
2009, Tim Ho Wan is a Michelin-star dim sum restaurant chain,
known for its barbecued pork buns. THWPL and DSPL owned 40
restaurants across Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Macau, Taiwan,
Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, and the Philippines, with further
development planned in the Asia Pacific region (Loyola, 2018).
“Titan may eventually add other brands in the foodservice sector
to its portfolio, with the objective to grow strong Asia Pacific
foodservice brands across multiple geographies and markets
and to bring strong global foodservice brands in Asia Pacific,”
Tanmantiong reveals (Loyola, 2018, para. 12).
On October 2, 2019, JWPL bought an additional 15 percent stake of
Titan Dining LP for SG$75 million (₱2.78 billion). The total value
of a 60 percent stake in Titan was worth SG$120 million (₱4.44
billion) as the fund size of Titan grew twofold to SG$200 million
(₱7.4 billion) (Piad, 2019). Another JFC wholly-owned subsidiary
Golden Plate Pte. Ltd. (GPPL) entered into a 60 percent/40
percent joint venture agreement with DSPL in Hong Yun Hong
(Shanghai) Food and Beverages Management Co. Ltd. with an
investment of up to US$13 million to operate Tim Ho Wan stores
in Shanghai and other cities (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2019,
p. 3). GPPL contributed up to US$7.8 million in proportion to its
ownership in the business. The first-ever Tim Ho Wan store in
China was opened in Shanghai on September 23, 2020, it opened
another two stores in 2021, and increasing this store number to
100 by 2025 (Ang, 2020; Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021, August
10). On October 30, 2020, JWPL increased its stake in Titan from 60

percent to 85 percent with another investment of SG$36.3 million
(₱1.3 billion) (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2020, October 20). It
signed a deal to acquire the remaining 15 percent for SG$71.56
million on August 10, 2021 (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021,
August 10).
Tortas Frontera (US), 2018

JFC invested US$12.6 million (₱668.7 million) in 2018 for a 47
percent stake in Tortas Frontera (US), a Mexican restaurant
founded by chef Rick Bayless. Tortas Frontera specialized in hand-
shaken margaritas, molletes, handcrafted tortas, and guacamole. It
had four stores: three at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport
and one at the University of Pennsylvania (Klein, 2018; Jollibee
Foods Corporation, 2018, p. 5). The Mexican food segment was
very popular and a rapidly growing in the US restaurant industry,
with estimated sales of US$40 to 45 billion in 2017 (Jollibee Foods
Corporation, 2018, December 21). Tan Caktiong discovered
Tortas Frontera on one of his food-tasting trips. Tan Caktiong
had eaten one of its sandwiches at the airport, and he liked it. He
asked, “who runs the place?” (Morales & Petty, 2019, para. 11)
JFC teamed up with Rick Bayless, a seven-time James Beard2
awardee, to develop and launch a new Mexican concept (“Jollibee
Foods conquering…”, 2019). This project became the Tortazo
restaurant that was launched in Chicago in February 2020, with
plans to add another in New York in 2021 (Venzon, 2020).
Divested Acquisitions
JFC acquired several other foreign food businesses that they
have since divested from. These are Chun Shui Tang (Shanghai,
China) purchased in 2006, Lao Dong Restaurant (Taipei, Taiwan)
in 2008, San Pin Wang in (Guangzi province, China) in 2010, Jinja
Bar Bistro (New Mexico, USA) in 2011, and 12 Sabu (Shanghai,
China), 2013.
2
Since 1990, the James Beard Foundation recognizes culinary professionals in the United States. The awards
recognize chefs, restaurateurs, authors, and journalists each year, scheduled around James Beard’s May 5
birthday (Awards policies…, n.d.).

Chun Shui Tang tea house had two tea stores in Shanghai, China.
JFC bought a 70 percent stake in the Lao Dong Restaurant, which
had eight beef noodle stores in Taipei, Taiwan for ₱61.1 million
(US$1.4 million) in 2008 (Lema, 2008). The plan was to introduce
Lao Dong in Shanghai, China. However, in 2009, JFC sold Chun
Shui Tang and its 70 percent stake in Lao Dong Restaurant (Taipei,
Taiwan). JFC claimed it would focus on building its bigger brands
(Yonghe King and Hong Zhuan Yuan) in China (Arcibal, 2009).
On April 30, 2010, JFC agreed to acquire a 55 percent stake of a joint
venture with Guangxi Zong Kai Food and Beverage Company
Ltd. for joint ownership of San Pin Wang chain of restaurants
based in Nanning and Liuzhou in the Guan Xi Zhuang Minority
Autonomous Region in Southern China for RMB30 million (US$6
million) (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2010, p. 38). Both partners
would put in an additional RMB20 million (US$4 million) for
future business expansion (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2010, p.
38). It had 34 beef noodle stores mostly in Nanning city (Jollibee
Foods Corporation, 2010, October 26). On December 12, 2016, JFC
sold its 55 percent San Pin Wang stake back to its partner for
RMB90 million (₱649.87 million). At the time of the sale, JFC had
expanded San Ping Wang’s presence from 34 to 71 beef noodle
stores (Dumlao-Abadilla, 2016; Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2016,
December 30).
On August 22, 2012, JFC entered into a joint vernture with
Hoppime Ltd., a subsidiary of Taiwan’s largest restaurant-chain
group, Wowprime. The partners would own the hot pot dining
chain 12 Sabu, which has 18 restaurants in Taiwan; and they had
plans for more restaurants in China, Hong Kong, and Macau
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2013, p. 10). Jollibee contributed
US$8 million (₱98 million) investment for its 48 percent stake (De
Leon, 2013). By December 2013, there were 12 stores in China. Tan
Caktiong’s son, Carl Brian, became JFC’s Business Development
Director managing the 12 Hotpot venture with Wowprime
in Shanghai (De Leon, 2013). However, the joint venture was
dissolved, and JFC sold its 48 percent stake back to Wowprime.
JFC discontinued operations of 12 Hotpot dining chain with 16

restaurants in Shanghai, China effective October 31, 2017 (Jollibee
Foods Corporation, 2017, November 2). JFC recognized a loss of
₱116.2 million in the sale.
On July 25, 2008, JFC acquired a 12 percent stake in Jinja Bar
Bistro of the US-based Asian restaurant Chow Fun Holdings LLC
for US$950,000. Chow Fun was the developer and owner of Jinja
Bar Bistro, with three stores in New Mexico, USA (“Jollibee buys
out Beijing…”, 2008; Liu, 2008). JFC increased its stake to 80.55
percent on March 31, 2011 for US$3.24 million (₱139.6 million)
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2016, December 23). It sold its 80.55
percent stake back to Chow Fun, with six Jinja Bar Bistros, for
US$1.6 million in November 2016 (Jollibee Foods Corporation,
2016, December 23).
These divestments showed JFC’s desire to move away from
smaller businesses, and focus on its bigger businesses as is
the case for Chun Shui Tang and Lao Dong (Arcibal, 2009).
Underperformance or slow growth appeared to be the reason
why the company unloaded 12 Hotpot and San Pin Wang
(Venzon, 2018).
Jollibee Ups the Ante in its International Acquisitions

(2015–2019)
Jollibee’s appetite for international acquisitions has grown bigger.
Jollibee has pointed out its capacity to create value among its
acquired brands as one of its most significant successes (“Jollibee
Foods: Conquering…”, 2019). This value creation ability must
be brought to the fore as it acquires two large losing companies:
Smashburger and CBTL. The increase in the size and value of
these two acquisitions is unprecedented in Jollibee’s history.
Smashburger (Denver, US), 2015, 2018

On October 26, 2015, in tandem with plans to open more Jollibee
outlets in the US, JFC acquired a 40 percent stake of reportedly
underperforming Smashburger for US$100.25 million (₱4.8
billion) (Austria, 2015; Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2016, January

13). Smashburger, a “fast-casual diner,” competes in the so-called
better burger segment. It serves “fresh (never frozen) 100 percent
certified Angus beef burgers that are smashed on the grill to
sear in juices” (“Smashburger enters…”, 2015, para. 8). “Better
burgers” are increasingly sought by sophisticated consumers
who are attracted to better quality and tastier but pricier offerings
(Venzon, 2018, para. 25). With 339 stores (184 company-owned
and 155 franchised), 40 outside the US, Smashburger had system-
wide sales of about US$339 million in 2015, about 20 percent of
JFC’s worldwide system-wide sales for the same year (Jollibee
Foods Corporation, 2015, October 26).
Smashburger’s CEO Tom Ryan regarded Five Guys and New
York-listed Shake Shack as its main rivals. The appeal for “better
burgers” was spreading beyond the US. Shake Shack has opened
its first branch in the Philippines on May 10, 2019, adding to its
stores in Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong (Arnaldo, 2020;
Venzon, 2018).
JFC signed a deal with an option to buy up to an additional 35
percent of Smashburger between 2018 to 2021, and the balance
of 25 percent between 2019 and 2026 (Austria, 2013). JFC bought
an additional 45 percent stake for US$100 million in March 2018
(Lema, 2018, para. 1) and the remaining 15 percent stake for
US$10 million in December 2018 (Gonzales, I., 2018) for a total of
US$110 million (₱5.74 billion) for the remaining 60 percent stake
in Smashburger.
“This acquisition will make JFC’s presence in the US more
significant, going beyond the Filipino market and service
mainstream consumers in the US$100-billion US burger market,
a food segment which is estimated to be almost three times
larger than the pizza sandwich or coffee segment in terms of
sales,” Tan Caktiong said. (Austria, 2015, para. 6).
“JFC also plans to bring Smashburger to Asia, starting in the
Philippines,” Tanmantiong said (Gonzales, I., 2018, para. 10) …
to be followed by Singapore and then in other countries in the
region,” he added. (para. 12).

Jollibee’s owners reappointed Tom Ryan, a co-founder of
Smashburger and a former CEO of McDonald’s and Pizza Hut, in
2016. They believed that a competent founder can run a company
better than a professional outsider (Venzon, 2018, para. 26). JFC
also pushed for the closure of over 40 underperforming locations
between 2016 and 2017 (Venzon, 2018, para. 26). In December
2018, after owning 100 percent of the company, JFC named
veteran Jose Miñana, president of Smashburger, to oversee
Smashburger’s day-to-day operations. Ryan, who would remain
CEO, took on the additional role of Chief Product Development
Advisor for JFC Global (Maze, 2018).
JFC restructured Smashburger’s finances to reduce the high-
interest payments and improve the company’s bottom line.
“After we acquire the business, we do not expand immediately.
We first fix the basics of the business, the fundamentals,” Jollibee
CFO Ysmael Baysa said (Venzon, 2018, para. 27).
In 2018, JFC introduced new technology platforms, continued a
successful and unique marketing program, and explored new
menu items and platforms. A new online ordering platform was
launched in 2018 and fully implemented in the middle of 2019 to
help simplify digital ordering, improve customer engagement,
and grow sales. Menu changes included the introduction of
Crispy Brussels Sprouts, a new and delicious BBQ Ranch Salad,
and the popular Cold Brew Shake during the first quarter and
the addition of Mocha Cold Brew and Salted Caramel Cold Brew
Shakes during the third quarter (Jollibee Foods Corporation,
2018, p. 15.)
Jollibee’s 2019 net income has declined almost 25 percent as losses
at Smashburger continued. JFC explains that Smashburger’s losses
stemmed from “poor store locations and inconsistent quality”
(“The fried chicken king…”, 2020, para. 15). To stave off further
losses at Smashburger, Jollibee closed its unprofitable stores while
it opened in locations with “stronger traffic and visibility” (“The
fried chicken king…”, 2020, para. 16). Smashburger is expected
to break even in 2021. As of December 31, 2020, Smashburger

has 237 stores in the US (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021,
February 15).
The Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf (Los Angeles, US), 2019
In July 2019, JFC announced its 100 percent purchase of CBTL
for US$350 million (~₱18.3 billion) on a debt-free basis (i.e.,
the acquired business would have no debt upon acquisition)
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2019, September 24). The terms of
the deal included an infusion of US$100 million, representing 80
percent of the equity of Java Ventures, LLC, a US-based wholly
owned subsidiary of Super Magnificent Coffee Company Pte.
Ltd. (SMCC Singapore), a subsidiary of JWPL (Jollibee Foods
Corporation, 2019, p. 3) and the holding company that will
acquire 100 percent of CBTL. The balance of US$250 million
would become advances to Java (Dumlao-Abadilla, 2019, para.
4). JFC’s Vietnamese partners in SuperFoods would invest 20
percent in SMCC Singapore. The acquisition was completed on
September 24, 2019.
Prior to the CBTL buyout, JFC was reported in local and
international media to be exploring a bid for Britain’s upscale
sandwich chain Pret A Manger to compete in the growing US
coffee sector (Venzon, 2020). Pret A Manger was widely known
for its “organic coffee and wholesome sandwiches” (e.g., gourmet
baguettes, wild crayfish-and-rocket sandwich) to office workers
in Britain and cities like Hong Kong and New York; and it had
big plans for a US expansion (Wu & Daga, 2017, para. 2). Jollibee’s
offer valued Pret A Manger at over US$1 billion, based on its
2016 core earnings of just over £93 million from reported 2016
revenues of £776 million (US$1.1 billion) (Wu & Daga, 2017, para.
4). However, Pret A Manger was eventually sold to the private
equity firm JAB Holdings for US$2 billion in 2018, twice the US$1
billion that Jollibee was prepared to pay for it (Venzon 2018, para.
36). “It’s a very good brand, but we felt we cannot afford it,” Tan
Caktiong said of Pret A Manger (Venzon, 2018, para. 36).
Founded in 1963, CBTL had 1,189 stores at the end of 2018—336
company-owned, 853 franchised. CBTL’s three biggest markets

in terms of number of stores are in South Korea (292), the US
(284), and the Philippines (139). The remaining locations are
in Southeast Asia (308), other Asian countries (44), and in the
Middle East, India, and other regions (122). JFC was particularly
interested in CBTL’s presence in Indonesia (101) and Malaysia
(99), owing to its weak business position in these countries.
Tan Caktiong talked about the CBTL acquisition:
JFC’s largest and most multinational so far with business presence
in 27 countries. Combined with Highlands Coffee, with business
mostly in Vietnam, this acquisition will enable JFC to become an
important player in the large, fast-growing, and profitable coffee
business. CBTL will be JFC’s second-largest business after the
Jollibee brand. This will add 14 percent to its global system-wide
sales, 26 percent of its total store network, will bring international
business’ contribution to 36 percent of worldwide sales and will
bring JFC closer to its vision to be one of the top five restaurant
companies in the world in terms of market capitalization. Our
priority is to accelerate the growth of CBTL brand, particularly
in Asia, by strengthening its brand development, marketing, and
franchise support system (Dumlao-Abadilla, 2019, para. 10-13).
JFC’s shares declined by 7.99 percent after the announcement of
the CBTL acquisition due to concerns that CBTL would constrain
JFC’s earnings moving forward. “Market noticed that CBTL
posted a US$21 million loss in 2018, so the initial euphoria of the
news died down. Wait-and-see attitude prevails, waiting for JFC
to prove they can turn the company around,” said Eagle Equities
President Joseph Roxas (Dumlao-Abadilla, 2019, para. 8). In 2018,
CBTL had a total revenue of US$313 million, total cash flow as
measured by earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization (EBITDA) of US$23.7 million, and debt of US$83.56
million (Dumlao-Abadilla, 2019).
“The legal structure of CBTL is being redesigned for fast growth
both in the US and in Asia, to be driven mainly by franchising.
This is in line with JFC’s plan to build a truly global business.
We expect CBTL to be accretive to JFC’s profit within a short

period of time,” Ysmael V. Baysa, the company’s CFO, said
(Cabuag, 2019, para. 9).
JFC also sought to address high administrative costs to reverse
losses at CBTL including the closure of unprofitable outlets (“The
fried chicken king…”, 2020). By June 2020, it had closed 83 stores
since its acquisition (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2020, August 4).
As of December 31, 2020, CBTL has 1,071 stores, mostly in the US
and 25 other countries, including Indonesia and the Philippines
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021, February 15). It had also
transferred the coffee chain’s back-end office to Jollibee’s shared
services in the Philippines (Cigaral, 2020). It’s targeted to break
even in 12 to 18 months in 2021.
“We expect Coffee Bean’s performance to improve by the fourth
quarter of this year and become profitable by next year 2021,”
said Tan Caktiong during Jollibee’s annual stockholders’ meeting
held via Zoom on July 24, 2020 (Cigaral, 2020, para. 2).
In January 2020, JFC disclosed to the PSE that it raised US$600
million from a landmark issuance of perpetual securities in the
offshore capital market, the first-ever bond or perpetual securities
issuance of JFC, and the first time it has tapped the capital market
since its initial public offering in 1993 (Dumlao-Abadilla, 2020a).
JFC’s wholly-owned subsidiary JWPL issued the US dollar-
denominated Regulation S senior perpetual capital securities at a
rate of 3.9 percent a year for the first five years.3 Proceeds from the
offering would be used to refinance its short-term debt incurred
after the CBTL acquisition and to fund general corporate purposes
(Dumlao-Abadilla, 2020a).
“The objective of management for this issuance is to further
strengthen the balance sheet of JFC and build a stronger
foundation for accelerating its growth in order to achieve its vision
to become one of the top five restaurant companies in the world,”
Tanmantiong said (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2020, January 23).
3
Regulation S securities refer to bonds or stocks that may not be offered, sold, or delivered within the
US. On June 24, 2020, JFC through its subsidiary, JWPL issued a US$300.0 million 5.5-year and a
US$300.0 million 10-year Reg S only dual-tranche US dollar-denominated guaranteed senior notes,
with a coupon rate of 4.125 percent and 4.750 percent, respectively, and payable semi-annually (SEC 17C,
2020, August 4).

The Jollibee Organization and Operations
In 2019, Jollibee has become one of the world’s largest restaurant
franchises, with a footprint of more than 4,000 stores in 23
countries, including 37 in the US compared to QSR leader
McDonald’s presence of 37,000 stores worldwide and 14,000
stores in the US (“Jollibee aims…”, 2020, para. 1).
JFC’s business covers domestic and international territories. To
manage its numerous subsidiaries and joint ventures, Jollibee uses
both geographic and product-based organizational structures
(Exhibit 8). Reporting to the Board of Directors are five corporate
officers led by brothers Tony Tan Caktiong (Chair) and Ernesto
Tanmantiong (President and CEO). The three other corporate
officers lead in Finance, Human Resources, and Marketing.
Assisting the corporate officers are heads of regional business
units of the four major geographic regions: the Philippines, China,
North America, and EMEAA. Within each geographic region,
there are presidents or general managers for each business unit
(brand).
The Philippines is considered a regional unit because of its
major contribution to the total business. Reporting to Joseph C.
Tanbuntiong, the Regional Business Head of the Philippines,
are presidents/general managers of Jollibee, Chowking, Mang
Inasal, Red Ribbon, Greenwich, and Burger King (Jollibee
Foods Corporation, 2019, pp. 111-112). In China, the heads of
Yongke King, Hong Zhuang Yuan, and Dunkin’ Donuts China
businesses report to Tan Caktiong’s son, Carl Brian, Chairman
of JFC China (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2019, p. 113). Rowel D.
Vijandre, the former President of L’Oreal Philippines and former
General Manager of Johnson and Johnson Consumer Vietnam,
is the President and Regional Business Head of North America.
He is assisted by the President of the Philippine Brands (Jollibee,
Chowking, and Red Ribbon) and the President of Smashburger
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2019, p. 113). Finally, the EMEAA
Regional Head is Dennis M. Flores (Jollibee Foods Corporation,
2019, p. 114).

The quality of food and services offered and the company values
must be the same, whether the store is company-owned or
franchise-operated. JFC conducts values integration programs
among its franchise holders. “We also ensure that there is always
a venue for open communication,” Tan Caktiong added (“Jollibee
Foods: Conquering…”, 2019, para. 4).
Exhibit 8.
JFC Organizational Chart
(As of December 31, 2019)
Board of Directors (9)
Tony Tan Caktiong, Chair
William Tan Untiong
Ernesto Tanmantiong
Joseph C. Tanbuntiong
AngCho Sit
Antionio Chua Poe Eng
Artemio V. Panganiban
Monico V. Jacob
Cezar P. Consing
Corporate Officers (5)

Tony Tan Caktiong
Ernesto Tanmantiong
Ysmael V. Baysa
Arsenio M. Sabado
Daniel Rafael Ramon Z. Gomez III
Philippines China North America EMEAA

Joseph C. Tanbuntiong Carl Brian Tan Caktiong Rowel D. Vijandre Dennis M. Flores
Jollibee Yonghe King Philippine Brands

Justo S. Alano Shirley Shu-Hwa Chang Maribeth dela Cruz
Chowking Hong Zhuan Yuan Smashburger

Andrew L. Santos Li Yi Carl Bachmann
Mang Inasal Dunkin’ Donuts

Jose Alexander P. Subido Yi Sandy Sun
Red Ribbon
Zinnia Carmencita S.
Rivera
Greenwich
Joseph Michael V. Castro
Burger King
Jose Amado M. Dominguez
Source: Created based on information from amended SEC 17A, 2019, pp. 111-112.

Also, Jollibee adheres and commits to its “high standards as
symbolized by “F.S.C.”: Food (F) served to the public must meet
the company’s excellence standards or it will not be served at all;
the Service (S) must be fast and courteous; and Cleanliness (C),
from kitchen to utensils, must always be maintained. Jollibee is
proud of its employees who carry out their jobs” (Jollibee website).
To achieve the F.S.C. standards, high-quality ingredients are
sourced from its supply chain and prepared at its commissaries
for final cooking in the stores. Jollibee invests in technology in
food processing and other food-service innovations, as well as
the latest in-store operations systems (e.g., digitized touchscreen
ordering system, digital menu board, cashless payment system,
etc.). Employees are regularly trained to familiarize themselves
with these in-store innovations.
Jollibee’s owners treat the employees as family. Employees are
their partners in delivering Jollibee’s mission of serving great-
tasting food, bringing the joy of eating to everyone (Jollibee
website). Jollibee recognizes and retains its employees by
offering them the highest compensation and benefits packages
in the fast-food industry, and equipping them with modern and
comprehensive training programs (Jollibee website).
Dennis Flores, President and Regional Head of EMEAA, who has
been with Jollibee for 19 years, describes the family feel inside the
Jollibee organization:
I feel very strongly that we have a unique culture: our values
are putting the customer first, speed with excellence, humility, a
spirit of generosity, and integrity. These are not just words in a
document framed and hung on a wall; they’re values lived from
the store teams to the senior management. There’s a synergy
and unity of purpose among a diverse set of employees (Lord,
2019, para. 29).
Supporting the Jollibee outlets is the Jollibee Commissary System
that manages Jollibee’s total supply chain process. Operating
24/7, the raw materials and ingredients are pre-prepared to
meet the highest food safety and Good Manufacturing Practice

standards prior to their delivery to the stores. There are three
Jollibee Commissary System locations in the Philippines: (1)
Santolan, Pasig City, the distribution center for North Manila and
North Luzon; (2) Mandaue City, Cebu to service the Visayas and
Mindanao areas; and (3) the central site in Canlubang, Laguna
(Jollibee website). JFC has a number of other commissaries
servicing the specialty products of Chowking, Greenwich, Red
Ribbon, and Mang Inasal. As of December 31, 2019, the Jollibee
Group has 15 commissaries in the Philippines (Jollibee Foods
Corporation, 2019, p. 1). For its international markets, the Com
pany’s subsidiaries own and operate two commissaries in the
People’s Republic of China, four in the US and two in Vietnam
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2019, p. 2).
The Laguna commissary is the newest, biggest, and most
advanced in the country. It is operated by a JFC subsidiary, Zenith
Foods Corporation (ZFC) (Jollibee website). The commissary is
sprawled on a six-hectare property in the Calmelray Industrial
Park in Canlubang, serving over 800 Jollibee and Greenwich
stores (Jollibee website). It has production lines for the “marinated
Chickenjoy, frozen patties and pies, breads, sauces, hot dogs and
other meat products, and dry blended goods” (Jollibee website).
The Laguna commissary produces about 150,000 marinated
chicken pieces a day, 480,000 hamburger patties a day, and a
bakery that matches the volume output of the patties. Its pie line
produces up to 157,000 pocket pies in a 20-hour operating day;
and its output is exported to Jollibee stores in Hong Kong, Guam,
Saipan, Brunei, and the US (Jollibee website). Various sauce
products are processed in the ZFC sauceline, including those for
the Jollibee bestsellers, spaghetti and palabok (Jollibee website).
To maintain a steady supply of chicken for its popular Chickenjoy,
JFC invested ₱233.4 million on May 24, 2016 for a 30 percent
stake in the joint venture, C-Joy Poultry Meats Production, Inc.
(C-Joy Poultry), with Cargill Philippines, Inc. (Cargill), a wholly
owned subsidiary of US-based Cargill, Inc. Managed by Cargill,
C-Joy Poultry’s processing plant in Sto. Tomas, Batangas started

commercial operations on December 5, 2017 with a processing
capacity of 45 million chickens per year (Jollibee Foods Cor
poration, 2017, December 5).
The Breadth and Scope of Jollibee Group’s Businesses (2020)

The series of brand acquisitions of Greenwich Pizza, Chowking,
Red Ribbon, and the Burger King franchise in the Philippines, as
well as foreign businesses Yonghe King and Hong Zhuang Yuan
in China, has made JFC the largest homegrown fast-food company
in Asia by sales and market capitalization in 2013 (Venzon, 2018,
para. 33). However, five years later, with a market capitalization
valued at US$4.8 billion and with 16 brands or franchises to its
name, JFC’s rank dropped to number four among Asia’s listed
QSR companies (Morales & Petty, 2019).
Table 7 summarizes the various local and international
acquisitions of JFC and their store locations in 2010 and 2020.
From a single brand in 1978, JFC’s brand portfolio has expanded
to 18 owned and franchised brands. It owns five local brands
(Jollibee, Chowking, Greenwich, Mang Inasal, Red Ribbon)
and six international brands (Yonghe King, Hong Zhuang
Yuan, Smashburger, CBTL, Highlands Coffee, Pho24). It holds
franchises of seven international brands (Burger King, Dunkin’
Donuts, Hard Rock Café, Panda Express, Tim Ho Wan, Tortas
Frontera, Yoshinoya). Three of the local brands have international
operations (Jollibee, Chowking, Red Ribbon). On the other hand,
two acquired international brands (CBTL, Highlands Coffee) and
four international franchised brands (Burger King, Panda Express,
Tim Ho Wan, Yoshinoya) have Philippine operations. Appendix
A contains the subsidiaries that JFC directly or indirectly owns as
of December 31, 2020.

Table 7.
JFC’s Brand Portfolio and its Global Footprint
# Stores
Year of initial #
as of # Stores as of
Brand Country investment, Stores
December December 31, 2020
Yo / % Share at Y0
31, 2010
1. Jollibee Philippines 1978 (100%) 7 Philippines Philippines 1,185;
717; Abroad 294 (Vietnam
Abroad 67 141, Brunei 18, Hong
(US 26, Kong 10, Singapore
Vietnam 11, Macau 1, Malaysia
22, Brunei 1, US 46, Canada 14,
11, others Saudi Arabia 12, UAE
8) 16, Qatar 10, Kuwait 6,
Bahrain 1, Oman 1, Italy
2, UK 3 & Guam 1)
2. Greenwich Philippines 1994 (80%), 50 Philippines Philippines 273
2006 (100%) 239 223
3. Chowking Philippines 2000 (100%) 162 Philippines Philippines 571; Abroad
2011 (100%- 400; 48 (US 15, UAE, 20,
US) Abroad 38 Qatar 4, Oman 2,
(US 19, Kuwait 4 & Saudi Arabia
UAE, 15, 3)
others 6)
4. Red Ribbon Philippines 2005 147 Philippines Philippines 495;
221; US 38 US 31
5. Mang Inasal Philippines 2010, 2016 303 Philippines Philippines 594
345
6. Burger King P h i l i p p i n e s 2011 (54%) 23 - Philippines 98
franchise
7. Yonghe King S h a n g h a i , 2004 (85%), 88 China 200 China 354
China 2007 (100%)
8. Hong Zhuang Beijing, China 2008 (100%) 37 China 52 China 31
Yuan
9. Smashburger US 2015 (40%), 339 – US 237
2018 (100%)
10. The Coffee US 2019 (100%) 1,189 – 1,071 in various
Bean & Tea countries
Leaf
11. Highlands Vietnam 2012 (50%), 56 – Philippines 50; Vietnam
Coffee 2017 (60%) 433
12. Pho24 Vietnam 2012 (50%), 69 – Vietnam 36; Indonesia
2017 (60%) 16

# Stores
Year of initial #
as of # Stores as of
Brand Country investment, Stores
December December 31, 2020
Yo / % Share at Y0
31, 2010
13. Hard Rock Vietnam 2012 (50%), 3 – Vietnam 2
Café 2017 (60%)
14. Dunkin’ China 2014 (60%) 0 – China 3
Donuts franchise
15. Tim Ho Wan Singapore 2018 (45%) 40 – Philippines 7; Abroad 34
(Asia Pacific 2019 (60%)
franchise) 2020 (85%) (Singapore 12, Taiwan
9, Thailand 4, Australia
2, Indonesia 2,
Cambodia 1, Japan 1,
Macau 1, Malaysia 1,
Vietnam 1 &
China 1)
16. Tortas US 2018 (47%) 4 – US 5
Frontera
17. Panda Philippines 2018 (50%) 0 – Philippines 1
Express franchise
18. Yoshinoya Philippines 2021 (50%) 3 Philippines, 3
franchise
Total Philippines Philippines 3,217+;
1,921*; Abroad 2,607;
Abroad Worldwide 5,824
395;
Worldwide
2,316
* includes 12 Manong Pepe and 3 Caffe Ti-Amo stores that were eventually closed in 2011;
Yoshinoya, not yet included store locations from Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2011, March 31;
2021, February 15.
In spite of all its international investments and a presence of

more than 2,600 outlets abroad, more than two-thirds of JFC’s
revenues are still driven by the Philippines. Although it has
been steadily increasing, the contribution of foreign sales
relative to the total system-wide sales is only about 30 percent
(Table 8). The value of international segment’s assets relative
to JFC’s consolidated assets has increased from 49 percent
in 2018 to 55 percent in 2019 following its CBTL acquisition
(Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2019, p. 45.).

Table 8.
Percentage of Foreign Sales of JFC (2007–2019)
Year Percent Year Percent
2007 8.84 2014 23.70
2008 13.70 2015 23.30
2009 18.30 2016 21.36
2010 19.51 2017 22.78
2011 20.80 2018 27.11
2012 23.01 2019 29.56
2013 23.90
Source: Jollibee Foods Corporation: 2010, p. 12; 2011, p. 13; 2015, p. 11; 2019, p.13
In a Forbes Asia magazine interview in 2013, Tan Caktiong

revealed his vision and ambitious international expansion:
To become a global player, with a 50-50 split between domestic
and international sales by 2020. After a false start or two, the
company’s 541 overseas outlets––up from 326 at the end of
2009––now contribute 20 percent to revenue. “It’s a challenge
to reach 50 percent because the Philippines is growing fast so
the outside has to grow much faster,” he says (De Leon, 2013,
para. 4)
Seven years later at the end of 2020, JFC still has a long way to go
to reach its goal of 50 percent contribution of foreign sales.
Jollibee’s Global Expansion Plans

The firm’s expansion model is focused on three key market
pillars: the Philippines, the US, and China (“Jollibee Foods:
Conquering…”, 2019, para. 3). Jollibee still sees huge growth
potential in its home country because it has penetrated only
10 percent of its municipalities. Besides the Philippines, JFC
considers the US and China as having the largest and most
lucrative markets in the world (“Jollibee Foods: Conquering…”,
2019, para. 3).

“After branching out to other countries, including China, Tan
Caktiong pursued acquisitions in the US. The ambition was to
become one of the world’s top five restaurant operators and cut
dependence on the Philippines,” Tanmantiong said in 2017 (“The
fried chicken king…”, 2020, para. 14).
With the acquisition of California-based CBTL in July 2019, and
full control of Denver-based Smashburger in 2018, JFC wants to
earn 30 percent of its revenue in the US in 10 years (Morales &
Petty, 2019). It also aims to lift revenues in China to 30 percent
of overall sales, while the Philippines would fall to 30 percent
(Morales & Petty, 2019). In the medium term, JFC plans to cut its
reliance on its domestic market to 50 percent of sales (Morales
& Petty, 2019). Before its CBTL acquisition, the Philippines
accounted for 73 percent of sales while the US represented 15
percent, and China 12 percent (Morales & Petty, 2019).
“We want to spread our portfolio and risk,” Tanmantiong says.
“There’s a huge opportunity out there” (Morales & Petty, 2019,
para. 6). JFC plans to have six brands each in the US and China,
compared to its seven brands in the Philippines (Morales & Petty,
2019; Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2021, February 15). In the US
market, it already has six brands––Jollibee, Smashburger, CBTL,
Chowking, Red Ribbon, and Tortas Frontera, but it only has four
brands in China––Dunkin’ Donuts, Yonghe King, Hong Zhuang
Yuan (Morales & Petty, 2019), and Tim Ho Wan (Ang, 2020).
“North America is a key growth market for us at Jollibee to
achieve our goal of becoming one of the top five restaurant
companies in the world,” Tanmantiong said in a statement in
February 2019 when the first Jollibee location in New York City
opened (“Jollibee (Philippines) continues…”, 2019, para. 6). With
an aggressive franchising strategy, JFC plans to grow the Jollibee
chain in North America from 37 to 150 US stores and from 4 to
100 in Canada over five years by 2023 (Morales & Petty, 2019,
para. 24).

In China, the goal is to increase its 394 stores to 1,000 stores in five
to seven years, which may include acquiring more Chinese brands
(Dumlao-Abadilla, 2019a, para. 3). In China, the company plans
to open around 1,500 Dunkin’ Donut outlets in 20 years (Cabuag
2015; Venzon 2018).
After opening Jollibee stores in Milan and London in 2018,
Rome and Madrid are in the pipeline. JFC plans to grow its store
network in Europe from two to 50 in the next five years, mostly
in the UK with a target of 25 stores by 2023 (Dumlao-Abadilla,
2019a, para. 2).
But while the Philippines, the US, and China are seen as its three
growth pillars, Jollibee also considers growing its business in
Southeast Asia with over 600 million people and a young, growing
middle class (Venzon, 2018, para. 28). Jollibee’s offerings, such
as its signature Chickenjoy, are suitable in new Southeast Asia
markets. “Indonesians love Chickenjoy, we just need to make it a
little spicy,” Tanmantiong says (Venzon, 2018, para. 30).
India, the world’s second-most populous country next to China,
had long been on Jollibee’s radar. However, Tan Caktiong
says, “We didn’t understand the culture, and Indian food is
very different. If we really want to do it, there will be a lot of
effort, and we would need a local partner (Cabuag, 2015, para.
3). Opportunities abound in India4, as surveys showed that
locals rated Chinese food their second-most favorite after the
local dishes. He said, “the taste of the food of Jollibee is closer to
Chinese food” (Cabuag, 2015, para. 4).
Finally, Jollibee’s plans to upgrade its processes in managing its
global organization require it to be at the forefront of customer
service in product innovations, Jollibee must keep abreast
with emergent technologies and trends in the industry. Digital
transformation is sweeping the QSR industry. It is imperative that
JFC leverages digital technologies in transforming its business.
4
Incidentally, the Donut Magic brand is quite popular in India. Donut Magic was JFC’s donut business that
was closed in the 1990s.

“In the future, we see half of our sales coming from online
orders,” Tanmantiong says (“Jollibee Foods: Conquering…”,
2019, para. 6). In 2018, all Hong Zhuang Yuan stores launched a
self-service digital ordering system to enable customers to place
their orders by simply scanning the QR code on the table (Jollibee
Foods Corporation, 2019, p. 9). By November 2019, Jollibee has
introduced at least 97 self-order kiosks in its 37 Philippine outlets
(“Jollibee continues...”, 2019, para. 2).
Epilogue: COVID-19 Challenges Jollibee’s Global Expansion

On January 23, 2020, Jollibee closed all of its 14 Yonghe King stores
in China’s Hubei province, where the city of Wuhan, the first
epicenter of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak,
was located. The closed outlets accounted for only about one
percent of its total JFC store network and 3.6 percent of the
total store network in China, but the remaining establishments
experienced fewer foot traffic and decreased sales (“The fried
chicken king…”, 2020).
In the US, a national emergency was declared on March 13, 2020
accompanied by the closure of schools, a ban on mass gatherings,
and a stay-at-home order. According to the US restaurant booking
service OpenTable, restaurant reservations and visits in many
states started decreasing in February and fell to zero in April
(Venzon, 2020). In March, the US restaurant industry lost over
three million jobs and US$25 billion in sales, according to the
NRA, which has called for a government rescue (Venzon, 2020).
Smashburger, Jollibee, Chowking, and Red Ribbon suspended
dine-in services in the US, but continued serving their customers
through online delivery to homes (starting April 2020), takeout,
and drive-thru businesses.
In the Philippines, a similar lockdown, referred to as enhanced
community quarantine (ECQ), was enforced for one month
starting on March 15 in Metro Manila and extended to the Luzon
island on March 17. Metro Manila and Luzon together accounted

for 70 percent of the GDP of the Philippines. The ECQ that lasted
until May 31 prevented food service in the stores except for
pickup and delivery operations. Dine-in operations resumed at
50 percent capacity when the ECQ was downgraded to a general
community quarantine (GCQ).
As of the end of March 2020, the percentage of stores temporarily
closed due to pandemic was as follows: the Philippines, 69
percent, China 6 percent, North America 16 percent, CBTL 32
percent, and EMEAA 23 percent (Jollibee Foods Corporation,
2020, May 27). In April, only 50 percent of the stores were open
and this improved to 88 percent in June, but the operating stores
heavily relied on deliveries and takeout services as dine-in
operations were closed or had low sales volume (Jollibee Foods
Corporation, 2020, August 4). In announcing its second-quarter
financial results, Jollibee claimed that the closure of stores affected
same-store sales and its financial results globally with varying
recovery rates across territories as shown in Tables 9 and 10.
JFC’s third and fourth quarter 2020 results showed some improve
ment as losses were

Table 9.
2020 Quarterly Decline in Jollibee Same-Store Sales Compared to 2019
Quarter 2020 All Stores Philippines China North America EMEAA Super Foods CBTL Global
Q1 -47.0% -57.0% -37.0% -25.0% -45.0%
Q2 -39.0% -50.4% -29.9% -15.0% -25.5%
Q3 -35.3% -45.6% -7.7% -6.6% -11.8% -14.0% -21.6%
Q4 -35.2% +0.2% -3.5% -8.6% -5.4% -21.8%
Source: Jollibee Foods Corporation: 2020, August 4, November 9; 2021, February 15
Jolibee Foods Corporation

207
Table 10.
Unaudited Consolidated 2Q–4Q 2020 Financial Results of JFC
Financial Summary Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 YTD December
(in ₱ millions, unless other- %

2020 2019 2020 2019 % Change 2020 2019* % Change 2020 2019* % Change
wise mentioned) Change
System-Wide Retail Sales 30,678 59,428 -48.4% 40,593 57,362 -29.2% 49,548 72,724 -31.9% 175,970 234,792 -27.8%
Revenues 23,331 43,680 -48.6% 29,965 43,179 -30.6% 36,746 54,420 -29.9% 129,476 179,626 -27.9%
Operating Income (Loss) (5,268) 1,525 -445.5% (3,348) 1,317 -354.1% (2,680) 1,539 -274.1% (12,626) 6,479 -294.9%
Operating Income (Loss)
ex-Business Transforma-
tion Cost (1,173) 1,317 -189.0% 1,090 1,539 -29.2% (5,918) 6,479 -191.3%
EBITDA ex-Business Trans- 1,385 6,520 -78.8% 7,069 9,752 -27.5% 11,035 26,848 -58.9%
formation Cost
Net income (loss) Attributable 2,049 3,128 -34.5% (11,495) 7,303 -257.4%
to Equity Holders of the Par-
ent Company, as restated*

Net income (loss) Attributable (10,171) 1,040 (1,580) (1,580) 1,673 -194.5% 2,036 2,258 -9.8% (11,508) 6,432 -278.9%
to Equity Holders of the
Parent Company, without
restatement
Earnings (Loss) Per Com- (9.525) 0.952 (1.430) (1.430) 1.531 -193.4% 1.858 2.860 -35.0% (10.430) 6.684 -256.0%
mon Share – Basic (%)
Earnings (Loss) Per Com- (9.214) 0.940 (1.429) (1.429) 1.513 -194.4% 1.856 2.829 -34.4% (10.419) 6.608 -257.7%
mon Share – Diluted (%)
* Restated to reflect adjustment on the purchase price allocation for CBTL
Source: Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2020, August 4, November 9; 2021, February 15
trimmed after lockdowns were lifted (Table 10). Businesses in
developed countries recovered faster than those in emerging
countries. Third quarter 2020 same-store sales growth contraction
in China and North America went below 10 percent compared
to the Philippines’ contraction of 45.6 percent (Table 9). By
December 31, 2020, JFC reported that 96 percent of its worldwide
outlets were operating: 100 percent in China and EMEAA,
98 percent in the Philippines, 94 percent in North America, 95
percent for SuperFoods, and 90 percent for CBTL (Jollibee Foods
Corporation, 2021, February 15).
“There is a strong correlation between Jollibee’s revenues and
profits and gross domestic product (GDP),” said Raymond
Franco, Vice-President and Head of Research at the Manila
brokerage Abacus Securities (Venzon, 2020, para. 16). During
the first quarter of 2020, the Philippines’ GDP shrank to -0.7
percent, the first contraction since the fourth quarter of 1998. The
second-quarter GDP contracted by 16.5 percent, the largest drop
on record, and plunging the Philippines into a recession (Rivas,
2020). The government has thrice downgraded its GDP forecast
for 2020 from flat growth to -1 percent in March (Laforga, 2020a),
to -2 to -3.4 percent in May (Laforga 2020b), and to -5.5 percent
in August (Rivas, 2020); all these forecasts missed the 9.5 percent
economic contraction announced by the Philippine Statistics
Authority on January 28, 2021 (Laforga, 2021).
Think tank Oxford Economics considered the Philippine lockdown
as the most stringent and one of the longest among Asia-Pacific
countries, but its government’s containment measures “appears
not to be decisive and workplace mobility remains much lower”
(Laforga, 2020b, para. 32). It expected the economic recovery of
the Philippines along with Malaysia to lag behind three countries
(Australia, Thailand, and Vietnam) that were ahead in easing
their lockdown restrictions (Laforga, 2020b).
“My biggest concern on the Jollibee Foods Corporation is that
the COVID-19 situation exacerbates things for Smashburger and

CBTL and pushes back their break-even periods versus what
management internally expects,” said Daiwa Securities analyst
Renzo Candano (Venzon, 2020, para. 6). The CBTL acquisition
and the continuing losses at Smashburger had a negative impact
on Jollibee’s stock as shown in Exhibit 9. The bearish rating and
continued selloff shrank Jollibee’s valuation to 28.2 times 12-month
estimated earnings (a two-year low) in July 2019, a discount to its
10-year average of 31.4 (“The fried chicken king…”, 2020).
Since January 2019, nearly US$4 billion from Jollibee’s market
capitalization—around 55 percent of the company’s value—
was wiped out after losing Smashburger and CBTL businesses
were added to its portfolio and squeezed profit margins to an
18-year low, according to FactSet data (Venzon, 2020, para. 7).
The same FactSet data also show Jollibee’s current market value
of US$3.2 billion as of end April 2020 that placed it in the 18th
spot among the world’s largest restaurant companies versus the
goal of top-five position of Tan Caktiong (Venzon, 2020, para. 8).
The investors’ negative sentiment stemmed from Jollibee’s two
biggest recent acquisitions of loss-making—CBTL for US$330
million in September 2019 and an increase in ownership from 40
percent to 100 percent of the struggling Smashburger in December
2018 (Venzon, 2020). Both deals increased Jollibee’s exposure in
the highly competitive US restaurant sector.

Exhibit 9.
Jolibee Foods and PSEi
19 Dec 1993 - 22 Oct 2020
100
50
annual percent change
0
-50
-100
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
- - - - - - - - - - PSEi: annual return ____________ Jolibee Foods: annual return
Acquisitions:
1994 80% of Greenwich Pizza (Philippines) 2015 40% of Smashburger (US)
2000 Chowking (Philippines) 2017 Another 10% of SuperFoods
2004 Yonghe King (China) 2018 Remaining 60% of Smashburger
2005 Red Ribbon Bakeshop (Philippines) 45% stake in Tim Ho Wan Asia-Pacific franchise
2006 Remaining 20% of Greenwich Pizza (Philippines) 47% stake in Mexican restaurant Tortas Frontera
2008 Hong Zhuang Yuan (China) 50% JV to operate Panda Express in the Philippines
2010 Mang Inasal (Philippines) 2019 CBTL
2011 Burger King’s Philippine franchise Additional 15% stake in Tim Ho Wan franchise
2012 50% of SuperFoods (Philippines/Vietnam) 2020 Additional 25% stake in Tim Ho Wan franchise
2014 60% JV to operate Dunkin’ Donuts in China
Source: Thomson Reuters’ Eikon
JFC aimed to break even in one or two years for both of its two
large purchases Smashburger and CBTL. However, the tough
competition in the US restaurant industry from powerhouses
McDonald’s, Starbucks, and Dunkin’ Donuts derailed Jollibee’s
plans. Not only are both US acquisitions still losing money, but

also the COVID-19 global pandemic deflated Jollibee’s 2020
revenue forecasts (Venzon, 2020).
“This will make it even tougher for management to get them
(Smashburger and Coffee Bean) to profitability,” Raymond
Franco tells Nikkei Asian Review. “So, I think expansion plans
will be on hold for at least the next year or two” (Venzon, 2020,
para. 14).
Until a vaccine or a drug is discovered for COVID-19, the “new
normal” will continue to require people to observe physical
distancing even after the lockdown, posing a challenge for
restaurants in increasing foot traffic to their stores (Venzon, 2020).
Pia Magalong, consumer analyst at local brokerage firm Regina
Capital Development, sees the lingering effects of the lockdown
would be manifested in the hesitation of people eating out. “I
think we are seeing a shift in consumer behavior—more home-
cooking and food delivery. I don’t think this trend will end after
the lockdown is lifted,” Magalong says (Venzon, 2020, para. 20).
The gloomy prospects in 2020 prompted Jollibee to reduce
its capital expenditures to ₱5 billion from a record spending
program of ₱14 billion in 2019 (SEC 17C, 2020, April 14). The
original plan called for opening 600 stores in 2020 (now down
to 338 store openings, 81 in the Philippines and 257 abroad),
the higher number of international store openings made 2020
the first year in the company’s history when its international
business exceeded the store expansion in the Philippines (Jollibee
Foods Corporation, 2020, April 14; 2021, February 15). Franco
claims Jollibee was left with no choice but to reduce its capital
expenditures (CAPEX) to preserve liquidity during the crisis
(Venzon, 2020, para. 25).
“While the COVID-19 pandemic has brought unprecedented
disruption to our operations in the Philippines and other parts
of the world, we are already planning for the full restoration of
our operations. We expect growth to resume even if gradually,
driven by our delivery, takeout, and drive through business
channels,” said Tanmantiong (Venzon, 2020, para. 35).

JFC disclosed to the Philippine Stock Market on May 22, 2020,
that it is spending ₱7 billion (US$138 million) on a global business
restructuring plan to be fully implemented by end-2020. The plan
involved changing its supply chain and resources deployment,
imposing physical distancing in dining areas, increasing capacity
for delivery-to-home and -office, takeout and drive through,
pursuing mobile apps for ordering and payment, building
“cloud kitchen” or purely delivery outlets in low-rent sites and
streamlining support for its management groups in the field and
the offices (Dumlao-Abadilla, 2020b, para. 9). The first four cloud
kitchens were put up in the UAE in March, Chicago’s River North,
and Singapore’s east region of Tanah Merah in August (Cabuag,
2020), and the west region of Clementi in October (Jollibee Foods
Corporation, 2020, November 9).
In an August 4 press release, JFC disclosed further that the
business transformation would involve closing 255 company-
owned stores in the US and China, including paying the pre-
termination penalties of store leases and benefits of affected
employees, converting 95 company-owned stores into franchises,
and closing commissaries (Jollibee Foods Corporation, 2020,
August 4, para. 6). By the end of 2020, JFC had reduced its 2019
store count of 5,945 by 507 stores or 8.5 percent (Jollibee Foods
Corporation, 2020, November 9). While JFC had been closing
some stores across its managed brands, it had opened more
international Jollibee-branded stores in Italy, the UK, the US, and
Canada.
“It is again time to embark on another business and organization
transformation in response to changing consumer behavior caused
by the COVID-19 pandemic,” says Tanmantiong after commenting
that JFC’s growth from a single store business in the Philippines
into a multinational multi-brand company was achieved through
deliberate changes in its operations at critical junctures (Dumlao-
Abadilla, 2020b, para. 11).

“2020 is an extremely challenging year for JFC, as for most other
businesses, but out of this transformation, we aim to emerge in
2021 as an even stronger business and organization,” says Tan
Caktiong (Almazan, 2020, para. 9).
“Regardless, our mission has not changed—to serve great-tasting
food, bringing the joy of eating to everyone!’ [and] our vision
remains the same—to be one of the top five restaurant companies
in the world,” he adds (Almazan, 2020, para. 10).

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Appendix A.
JOLLIBEE FOODS CORPORATION SUBSIDIARIES
The Company’s subsidiaries as at December 31, 2019 include the
following:
Country of % Ownership
Subsidiary Principal Activities
Incorporation Direct Indirect
Fresh N’ Famous Foods Inc. (Fresh N’ Philippines Food service 100
Famous)
Chowking Food Corporation USA USA Holding company 100
Zenith Foods Corporation (Zenith) Philippines Food service 100
Freemont Foods Corporation (Freemont) Philippines Food service 100
RRB Holdings, Inc. (RRBH) Philippines Holding company 100
Red Ribbon Bakeshop, Inc. (RRBI) Philippines Food service 100
Red Ribbon Bakeshop, Inc. USA (RRBI USA Food service 100
USA)
Mang Inasal Philippines Inc. (Mang Inasal) Philippines Food service 100
Grandworth Resources Corporation Philippines Leasing 100
(Grandworth):
Adgraphix, Inc. (Adgraphix) Philippines Digital printing 100
IConnect Multi Media Network, Inc. Philippines Advertising 60
(IConnect)
JC Properties & Ventures Co. Philippines Dormant 50
Honeybee Foods Corporation (HFC): USA Food service 100
Tokyo Teriyaki Corporation (TTC) USA Food service 100
Honeybee Foods (Canada) Corporation Canada Food service 100
(HFCC)
Jollibee Worldwide Pte. Ltd. (JWPL): Singapore Holding company 100
Regional Operating Headquarters of Philippines Financial ac- 100
JWPL (JWS) counting, human
resource and
logistics services
Golden Plate Pte., Ltd. (GPPL): Singapore Holding company 100
- Golden Beeworks Pte. Ltd. Singapore Food service 60
- Golden Piatto Pte. Ltd. (m) Singapore Holding company 75
- Cibo Felice S.R.L. (k) Italy Food service 100
- Bee World Spain, Sociedad Limitada(h) Spain Food service 100

- Hong Yun Hong (Shanghai) Food and People’s Food service 60
Beverages Management Co., Ltd.(a) Republic of
China (PRC)
Golden Cup Pte. Ltd. Singapore Holding company 60
Beijing Golden Coffee Cup Food & Bever- PRC Food service 100
age Management Co., Ltd.
Beijing New Hongzhuangyuan Food and PRC Food service 100
Beverage Management Co., Ltd. (Hong
Zhuang Yuan)
Southsea Binaries Ltd. (Southsea) British Virgin Holding company 100
Island (BVI)
Beijing Yong He King Food and Beverage PRC Food service 100
Co., Ltd.
Shenzhen Yong He King Food and Bev. PRC Food service 100
Co., Ltd.
Hangzhou Yongtong Food and Beverage PRC Food service 100
Co., Ltd.
Hangzhou Yong He King Food and Bev. PRC Food service 100
Co., Ltd.
Wuhan Yong He King Food and Beverage PRC Food service 100
Co., Ltd.
Tianjin Yong He King Food and Beverage PRC Food service 100
Co., Ltd.
Happy Bee Foods Processing Pte. Ltd. Singapore Holding company 100
(HBFPPL)
- Happy Bee Foods Processing (Anhui) PRC Food service 100
Co. Ltd.
JSF Investments Pte. Ltd. (JSF): Singapore Holding company 99
- SF Vung Tau Joint Stock Company(l) Vietnam Holding company 60
- Highland Coffee Service Joint-stock Vietnam Food service 100
Co.
- Quantum Corporation Vietnam Food service 100
Pho Viet Joint Stock Company Vietnam Food service 100
Pho 24 Service Trade Manufac- Vietnam Food service 100
ture Corp.
- Blue Sky Holdings Limited(l) Hong Kong Holding company 60
- Sino Ocean Limited Hong Kong Food service 100
- Blue Sky Holdings (Macau) Limited Macau Food service 100
Jollibee (China) Food & Beverage Mgmt PRC Management 100
Co. Ltd. company

Jollibee International (BVI) Ltd. (JIBL): BVI Holding company 100
- Jollibee Vietnam Corporation Ltd. Vietnam Food service 100
- Goldstar Food Trade and Service Vietnam Food service 100
Company Ltd (GSC)
- PT Chowking Indonesia Indonesia Food service 100
- PT Jollibee Indonesia Indonesia Dormant 100
- Jollibee (Hong Kong) Limited and Hong Kong Dormant 85
Subsidiaries
- Belmont Enterprises Ventures Limited BVI Holding company 100
(Belmont):
- Shanghai Belmont Enterprises PRC Business manage- 100
Management and Adviser Co., Ltd. ment service
(SBEMAC)
- Yong He Holdings Co., Ltd. BVI Holding company 100
- Centenary Ventures Ltd. BVI Holding company 100
Bee Good! Inc. (BGI) USA Holding company 100
- SJBF LLC (SJBF) (a)
USA Food service 100
Bee World UK Limited (UK) (b) UK Holding company 100
Super Magnificent Coffee Company Pte. Singapore Holding company 80
Ltd. (SMCC-SG) (f)
- Super Magnificent Coffee Company Ireland Holding company 100
Ireland Ltd. (SMCC-IE) (e)
- Super Magnificent Coffee Company Hungary Holding company 100
Hungary Kft. (SMCC-HU) (d)
Java Ventures, LLC (JVL) (g) USA Holding company 100
International Coffee & Tea, LLC (ICTL) USA Food service 100
(c)
600 Jefferson BH, LLC USA Holding company 100

CBTL Ventures LLC USA Food service 100
CBTL Franchising USA Franchising com- 100
pany
- The Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf (Singa- Singapore Food service 100
pore) Pte., Ltd. (CBTL-SG) (c)
The Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf (Malaysia) Malaysia Food service 100
Sdn., Bhd.
The Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf (Hong- Hong Kong Dormant 100
kong) Ltd.

Chanceux, Inc. Philippines Holding company 100
BKTitans Inc. (BKTitans) Philippines Holding company 54
- PFN Holdings Corporation Philippines Holding company 99
- PERF Restaurants, Inc. Philippines Food service 100
- PERF Trinoma Philippines Food service 100
- PERF MOA Philippines Food service 100
Jollibee Foods Corporation (USA) USA Holding company 100
Donut Magic Phils., Inc. (Donut Magic) (n)
Philippines Dormant 100
Ice Cream Copenhagen Phils., Inc. (ICCP) (n) Philippines Dormant 100
Mary’s Foods Corporation (Mary’s) (n)
Philippines Dormant 100
QSR Builders, Inc. Philippines Dormant 100
(a) On November 18, 2019, the JFC Group, through GPPL incorporated Hong Yun Hong in PRC.
(b) On August 28, 2019, SBEMAC was deregistered with the Shanghai Administration for Industry and
Commerce and completely dissolved and liquidated on December 23, 2019.
(c) On September 24, 2019, the JFC Group, through Java Ventures, LLC completed the acquisition of
100% share of International Coffee & Teac, LLC.
(d) On September 11, 2019, Super Magnificent Coffee Company Hungary Kft was incorporated.
(e) On August 22, 2019, Super Magnificent Coffee Company Ireland Limited was incorporated.
(f) On June 28, 2019, the JFC Group, through JWPL incorporated Super Magnificent Coffee Company
Pte. Ltd. In Singapore.
(g) On June 24, 2019, Java Ventures LLC (USA) was incorporated.
(h) On May 23, 2019, Bee World Spain, Sociedad Limitada was incorporated and registered in the
Mercantile Registry of Madrid.
(i) On April 17, 2018, the Jollibee Group, through BGI completed the acquisition of additional 45%
share of SJBF, increasing its ownership from 40% to 85%. Subsequently, on December 14, 2018,
the Jollibee Group, through BGI acquired the remaining 15% share resulting to 100% share in SJBF.
(j) On April 16, 2018, Bee World UK Limited (UK) was incorporated.
(k) On July 31, 2017, the Jollibee Group, through Golden Piatto Pte. Ltd. incorporated Cibo Felice in
Italy.
(l) On May 10, 2017, the Jollibee Group, through JSF increased its shareholding in SF Vung Tau Joint
Stock Company (SFVT) and Blue Sky Holdings Limited (Blue Sky) to 60%.
(m) On April 12, 2017, the Jollibee Group, through GPPL, incorporated Golden Piatto Pte. Ltd. to own
and operate Jollibee restaurants in Italy.
(n) On June 18, 2004, the stockholders of the Jollibee Group approved the Plan of Merger of the three
(3) dormant companies. The application is pending approval from the SEC as at December 31, 2018.
Source: Jollibee Foods Corporation, SEC 17A, 2019 Notes to Parent Financial Statements, pp. 10-12.

Appendix B.
JOLLIBEE FOODS CORPORATION
AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
JOLLIBEE FOODS CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES

CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION
(Amounts in Thousand Pesos)
December 31
2018 2017 2012 2011
2019 As restated As restated 2016 2015 2014 2013 As restated As restated 2010
ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash and cash equivalents 20,892,021 23,285,915 21,107,474 16,733,346 11,497,560 7,618,473 9,903,877 8,848,592 6,655,313 8,170,489
Short-term investments 2,130,000 883,200 1,413,400 726,002 922,317 - - - - -
Receivables and contract assets 5,906,289 4,862,744 3,941,073 3,376,702 5,432,776 7,621,193 3,082,873 2,750,341 2,388,617 2,098,921
Inventories 9,966,084 8,812,174 6,835,514 5,987,346 5,478,416 5,971,814 3,560,432 2,639,743 2,860,103 2,134,467
Derivative asset - - - - 9,868 - - - - -
Other current assets 6,725,008 4,694,389 3,858,219 3,545,339 3,828,229 2,809,911 1,836,995 1,394,525 1,354,915 1,168,580
Total Current Assets 45,619,402 42,538,422 37,155,680 30,368,735 27,169,166 24,021,391 18,384,177 15,633,201 13,258,948 13,572,457
Noncurrent Assets

Financial assets at fair value
through profit or loss 38,202 39,842 - - - - - - - -
Available-for-sale financial assets - - 29,862 26,212 21,462 21,479 21,479 128,149 120,649 176,283
Interests in and advances to joint
233
ventures,
Appendix B. (cont’d)
coventurers and associates 6,832,102 3,512,230 7,492,771 9,873,297 8,449,310 3,388,903 3,322,394 3,011,502 3,188 21,622
Property, plant and equipment 32,592,122 26,672,549 20,869,738 16,655,567 14,547,152 13,363,567 11,772,441 11,059,464 10,580,367 8,770,519
Right-of-use properties 42,907,418 36,564,242 25,324,378 - - - - - - -
Investment properties 572,722 848,974 848,974 983,428 998,113 1,025,645 751,767 754,013 772,469 777,720
Trademarks, goodwill and other
Intangible assets 50,208,119 31,541,825 15,730,239 9,086,742 9,412,134 9,385,110 9,103,637 8,837,559 8,542,321 7,990,646
Operating lease receivables 98,749 64,304 157,775 25,995 12,517 21,090 21,267 22,560 26,839 33,086
Finance lease receivables 161,934 184,800 204,698 - - - - - - -
Derivative asset - 82,852 11,949 78,329 75,031 - - - - -
Deferred tax assets 4,449,262 4,711,794 4,282,822 2,585,495 1,408,489 751,965 756,197 685,823 636,390 920,139
Other noncurrent assets 3,795,974 3,751,044 3,510,518 3,044,552 2,669,674 2,139,529 1,893,275 1,645,859 4,609,352 1,483,534
Total Noncurrent Assets 141,656,604 107,974,456 78,463,724 42,359,617 37,593,882 30,097,288 27,642,457 26,144,929 25,291,575 20,173,549
187,276,006 150,512,878 115,619,404 72,728,352 64,763,048 54,118,679 46,026,634 41,778,130 38,550,523 33,746,006

LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
Current Liabilities
Trade payables and other current
liabilities 34,652,065 28,716,769 25,254,613 21,960,567 19,527,046 16,295,665 14,249,926 11,753,066 10,165,595 9,172,704
Income tax payable 391,914 263,473 223,773 309,331 235,980 181,829 154,745 78,958 154,717 167,752
Short-term debt 22,180,320 - - - 282,360 1,865,000 - - 900,000 1,842,031
Current portion of:

7,036,754 5,743,062 4,238,194 - - - - - - -
Lease liabilities
3,415,975 4,892,102 1,216,219 1,561,516 927,916 715,520 1,106,275 4,572,840 777,302 2,341,125
Long-term debt
Liability for acquisition of
businesses 2,800 11,238 - - 94,852 32,906 107,667 216,368 104,763 170,194
67,679,828 39,626,644 30,932,799 23,831,414 21,068,154 19,090,920 15,618,613 16,621,232 12,102,377 13,693,806
Total Current Liabilities
Noncurrent Liabilities
Noncurrent portion of:
40,270,650 34,887,727 24,444,724 - - - - - - -
Lease liabilities
19,179,748 21,372,251 14,901,052 10,593,850 8,790,712 4,428,013 4,062,970 854,616 3,942,742 51,588
Long-term debt
- 2,907 - - - 101,064 129,008 151,204 178,965 141,255
businesses
2,221,320 1,320,646 1,489,546 1,658,178 1,466,530 832,390 932,841 521,578 9,379 212,089
Pension liability
Operating lease payables - net of
- - - 1,792,897 1,615,640 1,544,846 1,569,071 1,460,168 1,343,262 1,166,944
current portion
58,241 - 51,042 33,531 34,921 1,546 4,533 22,783 - -
Derivative liability
825,109 825,109 825,109 30,501 30,501 30,501 30,501 30,501 30,501 30,501
Provisions
Deferred tax liabilities - net 4,759,233 3,481,497 1,184,852 506,577 - 11,378 318,157 374,745 528,426 768,381
67,314,301 61,890,137 42,896,325 14,615,534 11,938,304 6,949,738 7,047,081 3,415,595 6,033,275 2,370,758
Total Noncurrent Liabilities
134,994,129 101,516,781 73,829,124 38,446,948 33,006,458 26,040,658 22,665,694 20,036,827 18,135,652 16,064,564
Total Liabilities
Equity Attributable to Equity Holders of the Parent Company
Capital stock - net of subscription
1,092,971 1,088,036 1,084,478 1,074,123 1,086,149 1,063,862 1,051,430 1,046,681 1,037,775 1,053,439
receivable
- - - - -17,178 - - - - -17,178
Subscriptions receivable
8,797,360 8,638,438 7,520,383 5,660,085 5,055,293 4,452,162 3,640,716 3,284,139 2,914,464 2,773,682
Additional paid-in capital
1,877,400 - - - - - - - - -
Other reserve
Cumulative translation adjustments
of foreign
subsidiaries and interest in JVs and
an associate 832,080 587,399 338,725 -20,811 107,225 -25,789 38,307 -351,379 -187,187 -317,023
Remeasurement loss on net defined
benefit plan-net of tax -965,391 -307,995 -461,769 -608,801 -536,580 -219,900 -472,054 -224,658 128,728 -

Unrealized gain on change in fair
value of
available-for-sale financial assets - - 6,758 4,291 - - - 102,627 102,627 107,164
235
Comprehensive income (loss) on
derivative liability -58,241 82,852 11,949 -33,530 -35,449 -2,395 -3,411 -7,087 - -
Excess of cost over the carrying

value of
noncontrolling interests acquired -1,804,766 -1,804,766 -2,152,161 -2,152,161 -542,764 -542,764 -542,764 -542,764 -542,764 -542,764
Retained earnings:
Appropriated for future expan-

sion 20,000,000 20,000,000 18,200,000 18,200,000 10,200,000 10,200,000 10,200,000 5,000,000 1,200,000 1,200,000
Unappropriated 23,009,145 19,391,656 15,664,077 11,659,531 15,487,039 12,445,662 8,817,166 12,871,154 15,238,047 13,042,709
52,780,558 47,675,620 40,212,440 33,782,727 30,803,735 27,370,838 22,729,390 21,178,713 19,891,690 17,300,029

Less common stock held in treasury 180,511 180,511 180,511 180,511 180,511 180,511 180,511 180,511 180,511 180,511
52,600,047 47,495,109 40,031,929 33,602,216 30,623,224 27,190,327 22,548,879 20,998,202 19,711,179 17,119,518
Non-controlling Interests -318,170 1,500,988 1,758,351 679,188 1,133,366 887,695 812,061 733,101 703,691 561,924
Total Equity 52,281,877 48,996,097 41,790,280 34,281,404 31,756,590 28,078,022 23,360,940 21,731,303 20,414,870 17,681,442
Total Liabilities and Equity 187,276,006 150,512,878 115,619,404 72,728,352 64,763,048 54,118,680 46,026,634 41,768,130 38,550,522 33,746,006
Source: Jollibee Foods Corporation, SEC 17A, various years

CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION
(Amounts in Thousand Pesos, Except Per Share Data)
Years ended December 31
2018 2017 2016
2019 As restated As restated As restated 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
REVENUES
Gross sales 170,291,063 153,068,666 126,229,530 108,992,341 96,471,243 86,729,230 - - - -
Sales discount -3,381,699 -2,867,840 -1,565,982 -1,067,887 -660,554 -519,452 - - - -
Net sales 166,909,364 150,200,826 124,663,548 107,924,454 95,810,689 86,209,778 76,313,489 67,493,953 59,266,444 50,506,967
Royalty and set-up fees and others 9,715,716 8,443,464 6,882,988 5,887,016 4,669,029 4,461,460 3,969,280 3,565,086 3,288,483 2,864,757
176,625,080 158,644,290 131,546,536 113,811,470 100,479,718 90,671,238 80,282,769 71,059,039 62,554,927 53,371,724
PFRS 15 impact on system-wide
advertising fees 3,001,108 2,523,492 2,036,535 1,802,072
179,626,188 161,167,782 133,583,071 115,613,542 100,479,718 90,671,238 80,282,769 71,059,039 62,554,927 53,371,724
COST OF SALES 150,257,881 132,420,585 108,563,894 94,617,560 82,891,701 73,727,792 65,284,763 58,435,499 51,403,359 43,254,730
GROSS PROFIT 29,368,307 28,747,197 25,019,177 20,995,982 17,588,017 16,943,446 14,998,006 12,623,540 11,151,568 10,116,994
EXPENSES
General and administrative
expenses 18,884,582 15,460,619 13,929,375 11,861,440 10,288,043 8,953,711 7,427,887 6,908,803 5,939,318 5,271,067

Advertising and promotions 3,982,583 4,027,609 3,342,911 2,669,495 2,244,943 1,852,968 1,639,023 1,369,720 1,310,114 1,246,592
22,867,165 19,488,228 17,272,286 14,530,935 12,532,986 10,806,679 9,066,910 8,278,523 7,249,432 6,517,659
237
INTEREST INCOME (EXPENSE)
Interest income 400,657 424,419 269,433 286,913 257,783 242,045 245,574 270,114 179,763 163,081
Interest expense -3,187,298 -2,617,463 -1,793,377 -267,618 -225,544 -152,471 -152,920 -206,013 -291,343 -193,201
-2,786,641 -2,193,044 -1,523,944 19,295 32,239 89,574 92,654 64,101 -111,580 -30,120
EQUITY IN NET LOSSES OF JOINT VENTURES
AND ASSOCIATES 23,384 -86,750 -282,645 -337,145 -189,086 -126,174 -115,561 -50,954 300 -2,181
OTHER INCOME - NET 5,745,671 3,342,528 2,135,647 1,582,923 1,536,757 659,304 337,325 503,535 566,814 618,898
INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAX 9,483,556 10,321,703 8,075,949 7,730,120 6,434,941 6,759,471 6,245,514 4,861,699 4,357,670 4,185,932
PROVISION FOR (BENEFIT FROM) INCOME
TAX
Current 3,255,664 2,822,092 2,310,630 2,334,855 1,926,078 1,694,769 1,521,967 1,277,161 1,187,564 1,040,928
Deferred -195,024 -141,975 -727,700 -658,244 -537,470 -424,239 741 -127,457 -83,696 -67,532

3,060,640 2,680,117 1,582,930 1,676,611 1,388,608 1,270,530 1,522,708 1,149,704 1,103,868 973,396
NET INCOME 6,422,916 7,641,586 6,493,019 6,053,509 5,046,333 5,488,941 4,722,806 3,711,995 3,253,802 3,212,536
OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME (LOSS)
Other comprehensive income (loss) to be reclassified
to profit or loss in subsequent
periods:
Translation adjustments of foreign
subsidiaries 428,818 666,867 96,185 -137,728 82,044 -155,869 414,852 -169,425 133,207 -215,378
Translation adjustments of foreign
joint ventures
and an associate -131,893 -382,259 269,119 12,316 62,829 79,807 - - - -
Comprehensive income (loss) on
derivative
liability -141,093 70,903 45,479 2,368 -31,464 1,882 6,807 -13,124 - -
Net unrealized gain on change in fair value of

available-for-sale financial assets
- net of tax - - 2,467 4,291 - - -102,627 - -4,538 17,260
155,832 355,511 413,250 -118,753 113,409 -74,180 319,032 -182,549 128,669 -198,118
Other comprehensive income (loss) not to be
reclassified
to profit or loss in subsequent
periods:
Remeasurement gain (loss) on
pension -657,396 153,774 147,032 -72,221 -316,679 358,528 -247,396 -353,386 - -
Income tax effect - - - - - -106,374 - - - -
-501,564 509,285 560,282 -190,974 -203,270 177,974 71,636 -535,935 128,669 -198,118
TOTAL COMPREHENSIVE
INCOME 5,921,352 8,150,871 7,053,301 5,862,535 4,843,063 5,666,915 4,794,442 3,176,060 3,382,471 3,014,418

239
Net income attributable to:
Equity holders of the Parent
Company 6,432,434 8,212,608 6,939,577 6,164,735 4,928,236 5,361,979 4,671,559 3,727,084 3,231,667 3,197,794
Non-controlling interests -9,518 -571,022 -446,558 -111,226 118,097 126,963 51,247 -15,089 22,136 14,742
6,422,916 7,641,586 6,493,019 6,053,509 5,046,333 5,488,942 4,722,806 3,711,995 3,253,803 3,212,536
Total Comprehensive Income
Attributable to:
Equity holders of the Parent
Company 5,878,626 8,685,959 7,494,091 5,970,688 4,738,416 5,551,053 4,714,898 3,202,419 3,356,965 2,999,265
Non-controlling interests 42,726 -535,088 -440,790 -108,153 104,647 115,862 79,544 -26,359 25,506 15,153
5,921,352 8,150,871 7,053,301 5,862,535 4,843,063 5,666,915 4,794,442 3,176,060 3,382,471 3,014,418
Earnings per share for net income

Basic 5.887 7.663 6.580 5.747 4.618 5.075 4.450 3.577 3.138 3.118
Diluted 5.820 7.550 6.494 5.643 4.528 4.955 4.360 3.513 3.096 3.077

CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
(Amounts in Thousand Pesos)
Years ended December 31
2018 2017 2012 2011
2019 As restated As restated 2016 2015 2014 2013 As restated As restated 2010
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES
Income before income tax 9,483,556 10,321,703 8,075,949 7,730,320 6,434,941 6,759,471 6,245,515 4,861,700 4,357,670 4,185,932
Adjustments for:
Depreciation and amortization 13,473,246 11,885,752 8,928,224 3,995,868 3,425,677 3,186,380 3,072,456 2,705,626 2,401,594 1,978,006
Interest expense 3,187,298 2,617,463 1,793,377 267,618 225,544 152,471 152,920 206,013 291,343 193,201
Gain from the re-measurement
of the previously held interest -3,150,776 -754,804 -1,328,733 - - - - - - -
Interest income -400,657 -424,419 -269,433 -286,913 -257,783 -242,045 -245,574 -270,114 -179,763 -163,081
Impairment losses on:
Property, plant and equipment 399,212 - 431,939 42,731 - 2,000 -13,300 53,677 - -
Receivables 25,342 10,188 143,772 91,415 325,908 36,301 11,206 97,559 - -
Inventories 16,670 8,278 7,443 78,621 11,049 11,066 9,367 - - -
Other assets - - 122,759 - - - - - - -
Pre-termination of leases -400,367 -193,230 -52,778 - - - - - - -

Net unrealized foreign exchange
loss (gain) 265,042 -5,007 -6,913 -79,314 -31,603 6,320 -34,236 -30,893 4,582 -48,945
Stock options expense 262,875 311,964 227,483 241,324 173,212 166,491 150,419 76,984 73,596 65,658
241
Loss (gain) on disposals and retirements of:
Property, plant and equipment -278,318 45,540 174,510 236,609 136,747 156,615 446,159 318,631 216,295 183,846
Investment properties - - -231,036 - - - - - - -
Available-for-sale financial
assets - - - - - - - - 229 145
Reversals of impairment losses
on:
Receivables -91,402 -23,675 -20,705 -3,188 -4,606 -868 - - - -
Inventories -26,465 -6,148 -53,819 -18,129 -12,047 -8,489 - - - -
Property, plant and equipment -29,179 -408,184 -2,111 -2,000 - -62,647 - - - -
Equity in net losses (earnings) of
joint ventures
and an associate -23,384 86,750 282,645 337,145 189,086 126,174 115,561 50,954 -299 2,182

Loss (gain) on movement of
derivative liability - 49,791 129,371 -3,298 - - - - - -
Accretion of debt issue costs 19,551 14,945 3,274 - - - - - - -
Movement in pension liability -9,595 39,705 37,840 89,781 212,636 187,284 86,991 56,017 - -
Provisions - - 794,609 - - - - - - -
Loss (gain) on divestment of
subsidiaries
and interest in joint venture - - 116,207 -66,695 - - - - - -
Deferred rent amortization – net - - - 193,237 79,366 -24,048 110,196 121,185 182,565 168,528
Pension expense - - - - - - - 157,321 156,118
Reversals of impairment on
investment properties - - - - - - - - - -18,234
Write off of AFS financial asset - - - - - - 4,343 - - -
Income before working capital
changes 22,722,649 23,576,612 19,303,874 12,845,132 10,908,127 10,452,476 10,112,023 8,247,339 7,505,133 6,703,356
Decreases (increases) in:
Receivables -639,261 -740,070 -532,690 2,299,070 2,269,040 -4,329,136 -324,828 -214,753 -314,201 82,254
Inventories 18,425 -1,919,312 -715,127 -593,238 494,396 -2,413,959 -940,056 243,401 -693,934 -314,494
Other current assets -1,886,442 -509,335 -199,821 327,544 -1,510,843 -1,288,317 -447,087 308,052 -227,404 -133,653
Increases in trade payables and
other current liabilities 2,437,491 2,485,785 2,060,592 1,865,217 2,976,473 1,794,597 2,041,413 858,005 783,521 201,815
Net cash generated from
operations 22,652,862 22,893,680 19,916,828 16,743,725 15,137,193 4,215,661 10,441,465 9,442,044 7,053,115 6,539,278
Income taxes paid -3,127,223 -2,782,392 -2,396,189 -2,261,503 -1,871,927 -1,667,684 -1,446,922 -1,363,045 -1,206,994 -1,068,556
Contributions to plan assets - - - - -70,978 -108,669

Interests received 369,400 361,394 225,314 278,099 219,846 212,873 224,957 158,964 105,418 142,163
Net cash provided by operating
activities 19,895,039 20,472,682 17,745,953 14,760,321 13,485,112 2,760,850 9,219,500 8,237,963 5,880,561 5,504,216
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Acquisitions of:
Property, plant and equipment -10,041,912 -9,520,681 -8,904,796 -6,694,133 -4,596,787 -5,045,474 -3,907,876 -3,755,907 -3,700,449 -2,553,449
Interests in joint ventures -2,174,784 -1,410,885 -531,147 -1,617,092 -5,057,543 -74,999 -103,608 -98,040 - -5,000
Subsidiaries - net of cash

acquired - - - - - - - -127,585 - -
Intangible assets - -111,216 -69,634 -23,706 -99,980 -318,737 -267,270 - - -
Investment properties - - - - - - - - -8,011 -30,662
243
Minority interests - -528,800 - -2,070,159 - - - - - -
Market entry fee - - - - -93,870 -277,485 - - - -
Available-for-sale financial
assets - - -450 - - - -300 -7,500 - -3,940
Cash (paid) received from acquisition of business

- net of cash received (paid) -16,941,556 -3,798,118 105,251 113,358 - - - - -815,788 -2,714,811
Proceeds from disposals of:

Property, plant and equipment 1,802,465 932,283 362,288 92,730 46,049 291,196 50,663 41,767 31,976 96,030
Investment properties - - 365,490 - - - - - - 277
Subsidiaries - - - 96,486 - - - - - -
Decreases (increases) in:

Short-term investments -1,246,800 530,200 -687,398 196,315 -922,317 - - - - -
Interests in and advances to
joint ventures
co-venturers and associates - - 337,960 - - - -170,126 -105,179 18,734 -18,804
Long-term loan receivable - - - - - - - - -1,753,600 -
Other noncurrent assets 858,390 -102,327 -482,215 -170,598 -89,369 -270,947 109,573 166,332 -11,750 106,128
Advances to a joint venture -1,236,720 - -1,059,786 - - - - - - -
Recovery from a joint venture - - - - - - - 2,404 - -
Deposit for future business
transaction - - - - - - - - -1,096,000 -
Dividends received from non-con-
trolling interests 95,661 34,637 20,037 - - - - - - -
Net cash used in investing
activities -28,885,256 -13,974,907 -10,544,400 -10,076,799 -10,813,817 -5,696,446 -4,288,944 -3,883,708 -7,334,888 -5,124,231
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Proceeds from:
Short-term debt 22,180,320 - - - 7,594,200 1,865,000 - - 900,000 1,842,031
Long-term debt 1,485,526 11,126,459 5,517,281 2,993,810 5,176,600 1,053,535 2,582,580 1,700,800 3,131,020 -
Issuances of and subscriptions
to capital stock 585,461 475,537 861,125 368,620 435,029 657,386 210,908 301,597 68,700 27,887
Payments of:
Cash dividends -2,807,766 -2,667,060 -2,347,164 -1,988,082 -1,899,666 -1,560,658 -3,232,637 -2,274,367 -1,196,621 -2,556,644
Short-term debt - - - -282,360 -9,191,000 - - -900,000 -342,031 -305,024
Long-term debt -4,900,541 -5,524,746 -1,607,623 -929,558 -734,360 -1,096,988 -3,149,352 -728,864 -2,379,826 -53,697
Lease liabilities -8,419,749 -6,979,019 -4,902,325 - - - - - - -
businesses - - - -94,852 -87,775 -109,920 -149,815 -108,696 - -
Interest paid -1,434,897 -731,670 -360,856 -232,646 -188,648 -123,473 -141,263 -194,336 -284,118 -189,703
Contributions from non-controlling
interests 30,428 11,417 14,578 715,608 177,628 - 29,416 79,873 42,421 54,997
Acquisition of non-controlling
interests - - - - - - - - - -2,000

245
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Dividends paid to non-controlling
interests - - - - -63,503 -40,228 -30,000 -45,000 - -
Net cash provided by financing
activities 6,718,782 -4,289,082 -2,824,984 550,540 1,218,505 644,654 -3,880,163 -2,168,993 -60,455 -1,182,153
NET INCREASE (DECREASE) IN CASH AND

CASH EQUIVALENTS -2,271,435 2,208,693 4,376,569 5,234,062 3,889,800 -2,290,942 1,050,393 2,185,262 -1,514,782 -802,168
EFFECT OF EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES

ON CASH AND CASH EQUIV-
ALENTS -122,459 -30,252 -2,441 1,724 -10,713 5,538 4,892 8,016 -394 -4,600
CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS
AT BEGINNING OF YEAR 23,285,915 21,107,474 16,733,346 11,497,560 7,618,473 9,903,877 8,848,592 6,655,313 8,170,489 8,977,258
CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS

AT END OF YEAR 20,892,021 23,285,915 21,107,474 16,733,346 11,497,560 7,618,473 9,903,877 8,848,591 6,655,313 8,170,490

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3 Jollibee Foods Corporation *

Chapter · April 2023

Ben Paul Baltazar Gutierrez

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Ben Paul B. Gutierrez

The Quick Service Restaurant Industry

148 Cases and Readings in International Business

Industry Growth in the US

Jolibee Foods Corporation 149

Year Revenue Year Revenue

150 Cases and Readings in International Business

Technomic’s Top 500 Chain Restaurant Report showed that QSR

Jolibee Foods Corporation 151

The 10 largest fast-food chains in Technomic’s Top 500 Chain

152 Cases and Readings in International Business

Jolibee Foods Corporation 153

154 Cases and Readings in International Business

Jolibee Foods Corporation 155

156 Cases and Readings in International Business

Jolibee Foods Corporation 157

158 Cases and Readings in International Business

“That’s the vision of Jollibee—to make it a global brand,”

Source: Adapted from Sayson & Wong (2017)

Venzon (2018) reported that Jollibee’s sales from its 13 restaurant

Jolibee Foods Corporation 159

Yum Brands (KFC, Pizza Hut, Taco Bell) 35.33%

Restaurant Brands International (Burger King) 30.88%

Doctor's Associates (Subway) 18.82%

Dunkin' Brands Group 11.21%

Jollibee Foods 2.91%

The Beginnings of Jollibee (1978–1981)

Photo: Courtesy of Jerome Favre/Bloomberg | Getty Images

160 Cases and Readings in International Business

Photo: Courtesy of Jollibee

Tony and Grace came from entrepreneurial families. The couple

Jolibee Foods Corporation 161

Photo: Courtesy of Jollibee

“Jollibee” came from “Jolibe,” the current spelling was so chosen

Source: World Intellectual Property Organization

“It compares the employees of the company to busy workers in a

162 Cases and Readings in International Business

Tan Caktiong Prepares for McDonald’s Entry in the

Jolibee Foods Corporation 163

164 Cases and Readings in International Business

Photo: Courtesy of Philippine Star

Jolibee Foods Corporation 165

Jollibee Acquires Local Food Brands (1994–2016)

Greenwich (1994, 2006)

166 Cases and Readings in International Business

Jolibee Foods Corporation 167

Mang Inasal (2011, 2016)

168 Cases and Readings in International Business

Jollibee Acquires Philippine Franchises of International Brands

Jolibee Foods Corporation 169

Delifrance (1995, 2006)

170 Cases and Readings in International Business

Burger King (2011)

Jolibee Foods Corporation 171

Panda Express (2018)

172 Cases and Readings in International Business

The Jollibee Brand’s International Expansion (1986–2020)

Jolibee Foods Corporation 173

- - - - - - - - - - PSEi: annual return ____________ Jolibee Foods: annual return