Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Own Case Outline
Own Case Outline
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position?
FACTS: • Cruz, a 4th year law student, filed an administrative case against Atty.
Cabrera for misconduct in violating the Code of Professional
responsibility as he said “Appear a ng appear, pumasa ka muna” in
the court.
• The case was referred to IBP where he was suspended for 3 months
for violating the rule.
ISSUE: WON Cabrera’s statement is a violation under the rule
HELD: No, SC dismissed the case for lack of merit but admonished him to be more
circumspect in performing his duties
TITLE: BERNARDO VS MEJIA
HELD: The position was granted as the court stated that he learned his lesson from
the experience, and it knows how to show compassion when the penalty
served its purpose.
TITLE: ALAWI VS ALAUYA
FACTS: • Alawi filed a complaint against Alauya, a clerk of court of the 4th
judicial Sharia District for usurpation of the title “Attorney” by
writing several letters using the title
• Alauya justifies that the title “Atty is lexically synonymous with
“counsellors at law”- a title used by Sharia lawyers.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent has the right to use the title “Atty”
HELD: No. because persons who pass the Sharia’s bar are not full-pledged
members f the Philippines Bar and may only practice law before Sharia
courts.
FACTS: • Argosino passed the bar but the court deferred his oath taking due
to his previous conviction for reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide.
• He was discharged from probation and filed before the SC a
petition to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
ISSUE: • W/N the petitioner should be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath
HELD: Yes, the SC recognizes that Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber
(after the evaluation of this case)
ISSUE: W/N respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor
• The court allowed him to take his oath but not allowed to sign the roll
of attorneys
ISSUE: W/N the respondent engaged in unauthorized practice of law
HELD: Yes, because he appears as a counsel before his oath. Passing the bar and
lawyer’s oath will not make him a full pledge lawyer as he needed to sign the
ROA to be one.
FACTS: • Medado passed the bar, took an oath, and scheduled to sign in the Roll
of Attorneys
• He failed to attend as he had misplaced the Notice to sign the ROA
• After he found the notice, he realized that he didn’t sign it and what he
signed was an attendance record
• When he attended a seminar, he was required to provide his roll
number but unable to provide it
• He filed a petition to sign the ROA but the office of bar confidant
denied it for gross negligence, gross misconduct and lack of merit.
FACTS: • Atty. Buffe previously worked as a clerk of court VI of the RTC Branch
in Romblon
• Resigned and within one year prohibition, she engaged in the practice of
law by appearing as a private counsel.
ISSUE WON PUBLICO can be reinstated, for being in exemplary moral character
despite not completing pre-law requirement
RULING YES, Petitioner is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.
TITLE: FIGUEROA VS BARRANCO
FACTS: • Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco should be
denied admission to the legal profession. He passed 1970 bar exams but
failed 1966-1968 exams.
• Patricia Figueroa and Barranco had been lover for several years and they
had a child out of wedlock. Barranco promised several times that he
would marry Patricia however he failed to fulfill his promise to marry her.
• In 1971 she learned that he married another woman and therefore filed
this petition on the ground of gross immorality
ISSUE: W/N grounds invoked constitutes gross immorality
HELD: No. The Court find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. Barranco
engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry
suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute
grossly immoral conduct.
TITLE: PEOPLE VS MACEDA & JAVELLANA
FACTS: • Avelino Javellana is the counsel for the defendants in a criminal case,
who was subsequently implicated in the killing of an ex-governor in
Antique. Javellana was arrested and by such arrest, he is deemed to be
under the custody of the law. When Javellana was brought before the trial
court, he informed the court that there exists a real and grave danger to his
life if he were to be confined in the Antique Provincial Jail. Thus, RTC
Judge Maceda issued an order of giving to Atty. Deogracias Del Rosario
the custody of Javellana with the obligation “to hold and detain” him in
Atty. Del Rosario’s residence in his official capacity as the Clerk of Court
of RTC.
• However, the order was not strictly complied with as Javellana was not
detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario, instead, he went about his
normal activities as a free man, including engaging in the practice of law.
RTC recalled the order of Judge Maceda.
ISSUE: W/N Javellana is allowed to continue practice of law, despite his status as a
detention prisoner.
HELD: NO.As a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to
practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention
prisoner. The trial courts order was clear that private respondent "is not to be
allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner."
ISSUE: WON the petitioner may be granted the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.
HELD: YES. Subject to re-take of lawyer’s oath and payment of appropriate fees.
Appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they,
likewise, sought admission to the Bar under the provisions of Republic Act No.
972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, they were subsequently notified of
the resolution of this Court denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath as lawyer
is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only, before the Supreme
Court, by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution
denying the d petition of appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a denial of the
right to said oath, as well as a prohibition of or injunction against the taking
thereof. When, this notwithstanding, appellees took the oath before a notary
public, and formally advised this Court, not only of such fact, but also, that "they
will practice in all the court of the Philippines,"
ISSUE WON the acts of the defendants constitutes contempt of court
HELD: Yes. Appellees herein expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact,
challenged and defy the authority of this Court to pass upon and settle, in a final
and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the
bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and
impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general, and the Supreme Court,
in particular. Thus, they performed acts constituting an "improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice," in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of said Rule 64.
TITLE: IN RE PURISIMA
Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations but the Court disqualified him from
becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null and
void on two (2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of
completion of the pre-bar review course and (b) He committed a serious act of
dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a member of the Philippine Bar
when he made it appear that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine
Law School (PLS) when PLS had not offered such course since 1967.
ISSSUE; WON petitioner did enroll in and complete his pre-bar review course in UST as
he herein avows
HELD: ES. The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October 2002
hearing that the subject Certification of Dean Dimayuga was duly submitted to
the OBC a week after the filing of the Petition to take the bar appears to be
credible. It is supported by documentary evidence showing that petitioner
actually enrolled and completed the required course in UST.
FACTS • Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this
original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative
to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act
No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991.
Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his
nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post.
Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the
mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23
imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career;
thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against
the rest of the DFA officials and employees.
FACTS The petitioner, Atty. Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic. Petitioner
contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, to which as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the
advertisements presented. ( Secret marriage, guam divorce)
ISSUES 1. Whether or not, the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
constitutes practice of law and
2. Whether the same are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility
HELD: Both Yes. The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of
law as defined in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept
and limited acceptance of paralegal services in the Philippines. It is allowed that
some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been permitted with a
limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations
granting permission therefore.
FACTS: This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In 1961, he was admitted to the Philippine Bar, from 1962 to 1986 he became
part of the Philippine Civil Service and then he migrated to, and worked in the
USA in 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He alleged that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Service
since the Civil Service Law prohibits the practice of profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was
working in the USA.
The IBP commented that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual
practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as
long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a
member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of
Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9
and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on
the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated
Bar Program. Petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP
of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated, thus his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during
the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the
Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003
HELD: NO. He is not exempted from the payment of IBP Dues. Payment of dues is a
necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt.
This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as
ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the
type of practice, the member is engaged in.
2. Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues
owing to limited practice of law and for being a senior citizen.
HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the
Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility