SECTION 1

Marcos vs Manglapus
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to
travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that
effect.

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although
in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control
over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power,
the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or
guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit
the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides
that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other
powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within
the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated. Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance
of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words.
Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing
implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of
the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the
national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is
also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the
common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people
forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that
"[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are
the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom
billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional
guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred
freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be
adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
79690-707, October 7, 1981.]

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect
the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything
not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at
153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be
viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [see
Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary
power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace.
Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external
and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times
of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to
exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed
forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep
the peace, and maintain public order and security.

That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been
recognized by memembers of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House
of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return
to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof
of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's
power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of
compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
Estrada vs Arroyo
Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he
submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President. The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered
resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions
before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the
succession of events after the exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon
investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of
Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express
speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives.
Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of
Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in
tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and
Industry.

As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The
call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to
open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16
was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number
grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.

As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive
Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner
decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal
for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner
had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00
p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para
magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power." There was no
defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem
was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of
January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period
of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his
family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. Again,
we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance
of this fact.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized
he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that
he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a
future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now
in the part tense.

Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of
the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that
"Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII." This
contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo
is only an Acting President.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. The
question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court cannot exercise its
judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr, there is a "textually
demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the
Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency.
The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political
issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is
a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been
laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a
co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."
Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he
should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put
a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place
him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. This is in accord with our ruling In Re:
Saturnino Bermudez that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court
during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance
that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the
presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution
before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. We now come to the
scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of
this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity
from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

Soliven vs Makasiar
Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the
President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect
way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be
exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also
demands undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of
the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's
behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover,
there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

De Lima vs Duterte
Sen. De Lima concludes that taking all the public statements of the President into consideration the
issuance of the writ of habeas data is warranted because there was a violation of her rights to privacy, life,
liberty, and security, and there is a continuous threat to violate her said rights in view of President
Duterte's declaration that he had been "listening to them, with the help of another country."

Also, the petition argues that President Duterte is not entitled to immunity from suit, especially from the
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data because his actions and statements were unlawful or
made outside of his official conduct; that based on the pronouncements in Rodriguez v.
Macapagal-Arroyo and Clinton v. Jones, the immunity of the President from suit covers only the official
acts of the Chief Executive; that his statements constituted violations of various laws, particularly Republic
Act No. 6713, and Republic Act No. 9710, and, as such, were not to be considered the official acts of the
President worthy of protection by presidential immunity from suit; and that because the habeas data
proceeding does not involve the determination of civil or criminal liability, his acts and statements should
not be considered as warranting the protective shield of presidential immunity from suit.
An important constitutional hurdle must first be surmounted before the Court considers taking full
cognizance of the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data. Is the President entitled to immunity
from suit warranting the immediate dismissal of the petition considering that he is the sole respondent in
this action?

The concept of presidential immunity is not explicitly spelled out in the 1987 Constitution. However, the
Court has affirmed that there is no need to expressly provide for it either in the Constitution or in law.
Unlike its American counterpart, the concept of presidential immunity under our governmental and
constitutional system does not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official act of the
President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit. The lack of distinctions prevents us from
making any distinctions. We should still be guided by our precedents. Accordingly, the concept is clear
and allows no qualifications or restrictions that the President cannot be sued while holding such office.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also
demands undivided attention.

With regard to the submission that the President must first invoke the privilege of immunity before the
same may be applied by the courts, Sen. De Lima quotes from Soliven where the Court said that "this
privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf." But that passage in Soliven
was made only to point out that it was the President who had gone to court as the complainant, and the
Court still stressed that the accused therein could not raise the presidential privilege as a defense against
the President's complaint. At any rate, if this Court were to first require the President to respond to each
and every complaint brought against him, and then to avail himself of presidential immunity on a case to
case basis, then the rationale for the privilege – protecting the President from harassment, hindrance or
distraction in the discharge of his duties – would very well be defeated. It takes little imagination to
foresee the possibility of the President being deluged with lawsuits, baseless or otherwise, should the
President still need to invoke his immunity personally before a court may dismiss the case against him.

Sen. De Lima posits that her petition for habeas data will not distract the President inasmuch as the case
can be handled by the OSG. But this is inconsistent with her argument that the attacks of the President
are purely personal. It is further relevant to remind that the OSG is mandated to appear as counsel for the
Government as well as its various agencies and instrumentalities whenever the services of a lawyer is
necessary; thus, a public official may be represented by the OSG when the proceedings arise from acts
done in his or her official capacity. The OSG is not allowed to serve as the personal counsel for
government officials. If Sen. De Lima's position that the acts complained of are not related to the official
functions of the President, then it also necessarily follows that the OSG can no longer continue to
represent him.

Besides, any litigation, whether big or small, naturally serves as a distraction to a party-litigant. Even while
represented by counsel, a litigant is still responsible for certain facets of the case, like presenting
evidence and disputing claims, and cannot simply leave the course and conduct of the proceedings
entirely to the discretion of his or her chosen counsel.

Sen. De Lima hinges her allegations of violations of her rights on the Magna Carta of Women, as well as
on Republic Act No. 6713. Although she claims that her present recourse does not seek to hold the
President administratively, civilly, or criminally liable, it will be impossible for the Court to enable her cause
of action to be established without first determining whether or not said laws, which carry penal sanctions,
had been violated. Any ruling on her petition will necessarily entail a judgment on whether or not the
President violated said laws.

Finally, Sen. De Lima asserts that for every right violated, there must be a remedy. No one can dispute
the validity of her assertion. We agree with her, but at the same time we must remind her that this ruling
will not deny her any available remedy. Indeed, the Constitution provides remedies for violations
committed by the Chief Executive except an ordinary suit before the courts. The Chief Executive must first
be allowed to end his tenure (not his term) either through resignation or removal by impeachment. Being
a Member of Congress, the petitioner is well aware of this, and she cannot sincerely claim that she is
bereft of any remedy.

SECTION 4
Brillantes vs COMELEC
Senate President Franklin Drilon had misgivings and misapprehensions about the constitutionality of the
proposed electronic transmission of results for the positions of President and Vice-President, and
apprised COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos of his position during their meeting on January 28, 2004.
Under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, it is the Congress that has the sole and exclusive
authority to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. Thus, any quick count to be conducted
by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President
and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of the Congress, but also would
be lacking of any Constitutional authority. You conceded the validity of the position we have taken on this
point.

The COMELEC trivializes as "purely speculative" these constitutional concerns raised by the
petitioners-in-intervention and the Senate President. It maintains that what is contemplated in the assailed
resolution is not a canvass of the votes but merely consolidation and transmittal thereof. As such, it
cannot be made the basis for the proclamation of any winning candidate.

RULING:
The Respondent COMELEC Committed Grave Abuse Of Discretion Amounting To Lack Or Excess Of
Jurisdiction In Issuing Resolution No. 6712
First. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation of election results based
on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for
the election of President and Vice-President. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution. As early as January
28, 2004, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon already conveyed to Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. his
deep-seated concern that the respondent COMELEC could not and should not conduct any "quick count"
of the votes cast for the positions of President and Vice-President. In his Letter dated February 2, 200433
addressed to Chairman Abalos, Senate President Drilon reiterated his position emphasizing that "any
quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of
the votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of
Congress, but would also be lacking of any constitutional authority."

Nonetheless, in disregard of the valid objection of the Senate President, the COMELEC proceeded to
promulgate the assailed resolution. Such resolution directly infringes the authority of Congress,
considering that Section 4 thereof allows the use of the third copy of the Election Returns (ERs) for the
positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, intended
for the COMELEC, as basis for the encoding and transmission of advanced precinct results, and in the
process, canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President, ahead of the canvassing of the same
votes by Congress.

The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and Rep.
Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is "unofficial," is puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is
proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the
COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an "unofficial" canvass of said votes.

Lopez vs Senate
Ruy Elias Lopez, Representative of the 3rd Legislative District of Davao City, filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus to ask the Court to declare unconstitutional the Canvassing Rules, which was
approved by the Senate And the House of Representatives in a joint session.
Lopez argued that the power and authority to open all certificates of canvass of votes for Presidential and
Vice-Presidential Candidates are solely and exclusively vested by the Constitution upon the Senate
President. While,the power and authority to determine the authenticity and due execution of all certificates
of canvass and to canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates are solely and
exclusively vested by theConstitution upon the Congress as one whole body.

RULING:
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress "to promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates." In Arroyo v. De Venecia (277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997), the Court ruled
that it had no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the
Constitution. Likewise, Santiago v. Guingona, (298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998) held that the Court —
under the doctrine of separation of powers — has "no authority to interfere" in the "exclusive realm" of a
co-equal branch, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Court has no authority to restrict or
limit the exercise of congressional prerogatives granted by the Constitution. The creation of the Joint
Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the other
members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack,
the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of
both Houses of Congress, voting separately

Pormento vs Estrada
The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the
President from "any reelection." Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general
elections held on May 10, 2010.

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper
interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or
not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of
legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches
on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be
decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the
essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or
controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
SECTION 12
De Leon vs Duterte
In his petition, petitioner alleged that the President has been absent from several engagements due to
health reasons and also had prolonged absences from public view. He further averred that the President
appeared incoherent during the COVID-19 live press conference on March 12, 2020. Thus, on the same
date, petitioner filed a Freedom of Information (FOI) Request under Executive Order No. 2 (2016) with the
OP. Seeking to be clarified on the status of the President's health, petitioner specifically asked for copies
of the President's latest medical examination results, health bulletins, and other health records. In
response to his request, the Malacañang Records Office (MRO) sent to him an electronic mail dated
March 13, 2020 stating that it is unable to provide the information requested. Petitioner anchors his
alleged right to be informed on the basis of Section 12, Article VII and Section 7, Article III, in relation to
Section 28, Article II, of the 1987 Constitution (Constitution).

Petitioner argues that the illnesses acknowledged by the President, i.e., Buerger's Disease, Barrett's
Esophagus, Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease, and Myasthenia Gravis, together with migraine and spinal
issues, are serious illnesses within the ambit of Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution. He also asserts
that these illnesses should be considered in addition to the psychological report submitted in the course of
the trial court proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage involving the President. The report
stated that the President has "Antisocial and Narcissistic Personality Disorder." For petitioner, the alleged
illnesses and psychological disorders of the President provide sufficient basis to trigger the right of the
Filipino people to be informed under Section 12, Article VII and Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.
RULING:
The outright dismissal of the petition is proper since on its face, the petition failed to set forth his material
allegations to establish a prima facie case for mandamus. Petitioner seeks to avail himself of the writ of
mandamus, but he himself cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on Section 12, Article
VII wherein the proponent thereof, Commissioner Blas F. Ople, stated that: "We are called upon to be
more trusting with respect to the Office of the President that they will know what appropriate means to
take in order to release this information to the public in satisfaction of the public's right to know of the
presidency." It was also further expressed in the deliberations that "the state of health or analysis as to
the actual condition of the President should be left to the President and his doctor" and that "the burden
[is left] to the Office of the President to choose the appropriate means of releasing information to the
public."
The Court also deems it proper to emphasize that in the recent months, the President has been visibly
holding regular cabinet meetings, belying petitioner's insinuation that the President is suffering from
serious illnesses. Further, the President's regular televised addresses to the nation as regards the
government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic show that the President has been actively performing
his official duties. Apparently, petitioner's allegation that the President is seriously ill is unsubstantiated
and is based merely on petitioner's surmises and conjectures regarding his perception of the declining
health of the President.

SECTION 13
Doromal vs Sandiganbayan
In October 1987, Special Prosecution Officer II, Dionisio A. Caoili, conducted a preliminary investigation
of the charge against the petitioner, Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for- violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA
3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the
Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of
electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).

There is no merit in petitioner's insistence that the information should be quashed because the Special
Prosecutor admitted in the Sandiganbayan that he does not possess any document signed and/or
submitted to the DECS by the petitioner after he became a PCGG Commissioner (p. 49, Rollo). That
admission allegedly belies the averment in the information that the petitioner "participated' in the business
of the DITC in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by law from having any interest.

RULING:
The Sandiganbayan in its order of August 19, 1988 correctly observed that "the presence of a signed
document bearing the signature of accused Doromal as part of the application to bid ... is not a sine qua
non" (Annex O, p. 179. Rollo), for, the Ombudsman indicated in his Memorandum/Clearance to the
Special Prosecutor, that the petitioner "can rightfully be charged ...with having participated in a business
which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC
remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest." (pp. 107-108, Rollo).
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members
of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly...
participate in any business." The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law
(PD No. 807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that "Pursuit of private business ... without the permission required by
Civil Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary action against any officer or
employee in the civil service.

Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary

These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 1988 and are being resolved
jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in
effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein
imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in
general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."
RULING;
NO. But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a
blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming
both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure,
unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Evidently, from this move as well as in the different
phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of
the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices
or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI," (N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may hold any other office or employment in the Government. . .." Under Section 5(4), Article XVI," (N)o
member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a
civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their
subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides" (U)nless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office
or employment in the Government."

It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the
prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states
that" (T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the
Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing
and covers both public and private office or employment.

Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the
Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are
proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself
and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. This being
the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII
cannot possible refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory
and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with
respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents’
interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article
IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the
high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand,
and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on
the other, may hold any other office or position in the government during their tenure.
Moreover, respondents’ reading of the provisions in question would render certain parts of the
Constitution inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section 13
of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but
who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B is absolutely ineligible "for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to
say that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has
reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B would render meaningless the specific provisions of the
Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet, and to act as President
without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not have been chosen or fails to
qualify. Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under
consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B providing the general rule and the other, i.e.,
Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2)
of Article IX-B be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said officials’ office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise
"any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition
of additional duties and functions on said officials. To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to
absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National
Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the
Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and
Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason to exist for lack
of a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be
prohibited.

To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering
positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the concerned official’s office. The term ex-officio means "from
office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one who is
a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate,
by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio
Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority.

Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members, their
deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or
appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive offices
is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of efficiency,
policy direction, continuity and coordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the
discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest and
general welfare and delivering basic services to the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the
President and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Without these additional duties
and functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the governing bodies or
boards of governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by their primary functions, they would be deprived of the means for control and supervision,
thereby resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.

It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the
prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions
must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an
ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor.

The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.
The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the
Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the
primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come
under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any
extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some
other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by
the Constitution.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and
government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

Dela Cruz vs Commission on Audit

On September 19, 1997, the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-0382 directing all unit
heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations which have effected payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to
cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on
multiple positions, to (a) immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation or
remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials, and (b) effect the refund of the same from
the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties
Union vs. Executive Secretary and Anti- Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. et al, vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, et al., promulgated on February 22, 1991. The COA Memorandum further stated that
the said Supreme Court Decision, which became final and executory on August 19, 1991, declared
Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and
assistant to hold other offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor.

Petitioners, through then Chairman Dionisio C. Dela Serna of the NHA Board of Directors, appealed from
the Notice of Disallowance to the Commission on Audit based on the following grounds:
1. The Decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Union and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines,
Inc. was clarified in the Resolution of the Court En Banc on August 1, 1991, in that the constitutional ban
against dual or multiple positions applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants.
It does not cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the position of
Assistant Secretary; and
2. The NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy
positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary.

On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No.98-3818 denying petitioners' appeal, thus:
"After circumspect evaluation of the facts and issues raised herein, this Commission finds the instant
appeal devoid of merit. It must be stressed at the outset that the Directors concerned were not sitting in
the NHA Board in their own right but as representatives of cabinet members and who are constitutionally
prohibited from holding any other office or employment and receive compensation therefor, during their
tenure

RULING:
Presidential Decree No. 757 is the law "Creating the National Housing Authority and dissolving the
existing housing agencies, defining its powers and functions, providing funds therefor, and for other
purposes." It bears stressing that under the above provisions, the persons mandated by law to sit as
members of the NHA Board are the following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, (2) the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, (3) the
Secretary of Finance, (4) the Secretary of Labor, (5) the Secretary of Industry, (6) the Executive Secretary,
and (7) the General Manager of the NHA. While petitioners are not among those officers, however, they
are "alternates" of the said officers, "whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals". Since the
Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving
"extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot
likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right
than their principals.

We thus rule that in rendering its challenged Decision, the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion.

Funa vs Agra
Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies
RULING;
According to the Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions: (1) those provided for under
the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice Presided to become a member of the
Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as ewquires by the primary functions of the
officials’ offices. The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to
the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of the two
offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain
both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation
as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to be
void for being in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution.

SECTION 15
Aytona vs Castillo
On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona as ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the corresponding oath.
On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on December
31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointment made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, (date when he, Macapagal, had been
proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962, President Macapagal appointed Andres V.
Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately. There were other
appointments thus submitted by President Garcia on that date, December 29, 1961. All in all, about three
hundred fifty (350) "midnight" or "last minute" appointments.

Whether the new President had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments
made by the past President, even after the appointees had already qualified.
RULING:
We are informed, it is Malaca�an's practice - which we find to be logical - to submit ad interim
appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in session. One good reason for the
practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for
confirmation. Nevertheless, this time, Malaca�an submitted its appointments on the same day they were
issued; and the Commission was not then in session; obviously because it foresaw the possibility that the
incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor. As a result, as already
adverted to, some persons whose names were submitted for confirmation had not qualified nor accepted
their appointments.

Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at noon of December
30, 1961. But it is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of President
Macapagal, his was no more than a "care-taker" administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the
orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know,
would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for debate had passed; the electorate
had spoken. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that
had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up
vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly
be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of
them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by
the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to
fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he
has benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative
and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the
members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason such selection. Where,
however, as in this case, the Commission on Appointments that will consider the appointees is different
from that existing at the time of the appointment and where the names are to be submitted by successor,
who may not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in extending such
appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia
exercised such "double care" which was required and expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be
force to the contention that these appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional
provision granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.
Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this Court resolves that it
must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or
"last-minute" appointments.

Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been
issued, it cannot be reconsidered, specially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to
mass ad interim appointments (three-hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief
Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of
exceptional circumstances justifying revocation and if any circumstances justify revocation, those
described herein should fit the exception.

Incidentally, it should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after the
appointee has qualified is the latter's equitable rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be successfully
set up in the present situation, considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and
other happenings detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic
foundation of claims to equitable relief. The appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or unwittingly
cooperated with the stratagem to beat the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity
and efficiency of the public service. Needless to say, there are instances wherein not only strict legality,
but also fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken into account.

In re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta
The question presented for resolution in the administrative matter at bar is whether, during the period of
the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII. A
corollary question is whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in
the interest of public service. The President expressed the view that "the election-ban provision (Article
VII, Sec. 15) *** applies only to executive appointments or appointments in the executive branch of
government," the whole article being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.'" He also observed that
further proof of his theory "is the fact that appointments to the judiciary have special, specific provisions
applicable to them" (citing Article VIII, Sec. 4 [1] and Article VIII, Section 9. In view thereof, he "firmly and
respectfully reiterate(d) *** (his) request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit *** the final list of
nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy."
RULING:
As you can see, Your Excellency, Section 15 of Article VII imposes a direct prohibition on the President:
he "shall not make appointments" within the period mentioned, and since there is no specification of
which appointments are proscribed, the same may be considered as applying to all appointments of any
kind and nature. This is the general rule then, the only exception being only as regards "executive
positions" as to which "temporary appointments" may be made within the interdicted period "when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety." As the exception
makes reference only to "executive" positions, it would seem that "judicial" positions are covered by the
general rule.

On the other hand, Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, requires that any vacancy in the Supreme Court "shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof." Unlike Section 15, Article VII, the duty of filling the
vacancy is not specifically imposed on the President; hence, it may be inferred that it is a duty shared by
the Judicial and Bar council and the President.

Now, in view of the general prohibition in the first-quoted provision, how is the requirement of filling
vacancies in the Court within ninety days to be construed? One interpretation that immediately suggests
itself is that Section 4(1), Article VIII is a general provision while Section 15, Article VII is a particular one;
that is to say, normally, when there are no presidential elections - which after all occur only every six years
- Section 4(1), Article VIII shall apply: vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days; but
when (as now) there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play:
the President shall not make any appointments. The reason for said prohibition, according to Fr. J.
Bernas, S.J., an authority on Constitutional Law and himself a member of the Constitutional Commission,
is "(I)n order not to tie the hands of the incoming President through midnight appointments."

De Castro vs JBC March Decision

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the
coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to
many legal dilemmas. May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety? What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII
(Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be
filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his successor? May
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of screening the candidates nominated or being
considered to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President
even during the period of the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII? Does mandamus lie to compel the
submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?
RULING:
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive
Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.

Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of
the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically
providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list
of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the
vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not
done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or Acting
President's term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall - an imperative, operating to impose a
duty that may be enforced - should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President
the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the
Constitution.

The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the
appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that
Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was "couched in stronger negative language." Such
interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional Commission's
deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no
question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to
eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the
appointments dealt with in the leading case of Aytona v. Castillo.

Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department.
The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be
midnight appointments to the Judiciary.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power
of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment.

To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further
undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from
the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to
the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election.
Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President,
appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the
appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the
incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely
because her term will end by June 30, 2010.

MANDAMUS ISSUE:
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It
is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or
officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.

For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right
to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated
by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to
be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's mandatory 90-day
period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be
submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus
herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the
Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in
performing that duty. For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained
delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a writ of
mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC
still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill
the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.

PROHIBITION ISSUE:
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the conclusion is ineluctable that only the President can appoint the
Chief Justice. Hence, Soriano's petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032, which proposes to prevent the
JBC from intervening in the process of nominating the successor of Chief Justice Puno, lacks merit.

On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is similarly devoid of merit. The
challenge mounted against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation
of a vote each to the ex officio members from the Senate and the House of Representatives, thereby
prejudicing the chances of some candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number of votes
required in accordance with the rules of the JBC, is not based on the petitioners' actual interest, because
they have not alleged in their petition that they were nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the
Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lack locus standi on that issue.

SECTION 16
Binamira vs Garucho
In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager
of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in
violation of his security of tenure. It appearing from the records you have submitted to this Office that the
present General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority was designated not by the President, as
required by P.D. No. 564, as amended, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, such designation is invalid.
Accordingly, you are hereby designated concurrent y as General Manager, effective immediately, until I
can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.

RULING:
It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only
designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation
that the petitioner has failed to consider. Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on
the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent
official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board
of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the
Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is
legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a
particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However,
where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office
only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the
designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer
security of tenure on the person named. Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the
designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is
that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves
the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not
possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President.
The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that
could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the
Cabinet.

The argument that the designation made by Minister Gonzales was approved by President Aquino
through her approval of the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA is not persuasive. It must be
remembered that Binamira was included therein as Vice-Chairman only because of his designation as
PTA General Manager by Minister Gonzales. Such designation being merely provisional, it could be
recalled at will, as in fact it was recalled by the President herself, through the memorandum she
addressed to Secretary Garrucho on January 4, 1990. With these rulings, the petitioner’s claim of security
of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a
presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be
assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting
appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason). In
either case, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must be rejected.

Sarmiento vs Mison
In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison
from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements
in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments.
RULING:
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter
refer from time to time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be
appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments?
Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973
Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and
the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President,
without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third
groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.

As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers
whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers
may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate,
the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a
consul in the Consular Service.

As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor Commission on
Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and argues
that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this
implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers,
it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by
law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the
word "alone" in said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful study of the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word "alone" after the word
"President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in
draftmanship.
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers
was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except
appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently,
there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word
"President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers
whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16,
Article VII.

Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of
lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or
in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10,
Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where
the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out,
while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately
excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments.

Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June
1967. Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority
and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without
submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments
pertaining thereto.
Bautista vs Salonga
Whether or not the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR), an "independent office" created by the 1987 Constitution, is to be made with or without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments (CA, for brevity).
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the positions
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which
are to be made with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the
appointment by the President of the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made without the review or
participation of the Commission on Appointments.

To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members
of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit,
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the
second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the
President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights.

EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

AN APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE
WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989
Under this heading, we will assume, ex gratia argumenti, that the Executive may voluntarily allow the
Commission on Appointments to exercise the power of review over an appointment otherwise solely
vested by the Constitution in the President. Yet, as already noted, when the President appointed
petitioner Bautista on 17 December 1988 to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights with the advice to her that by virtue of such appointment (not, until confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments), she could qualify and enter upon the performance of her duties after taking her oath of
office, the presidential act of appointment to the subject position which, under the Constitution, is to be
made, in the first place, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, was then and there
a complete and finished act, which, upon the acceptance by Bautista, as shown by her taking of the oath
of office and actual assumption of the duties of said office, installed her, indubitably and unequivocally, as
the lawful Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights for a term of seven (7) years. There was thus
no vacancy in the subject office on 14 January 1989 to which an appointment could be validly made. In
fact, there is no vacancy in said office to this day.

Nor can respondents impressively contend that the new appointment or re-appointment on 14 January
1989 was an ad interim appointment, because, under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments
do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make, i.e., without the participation of the
Commission on Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution,
extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is
why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that
is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, can not be ad interim appointments.

The threshold question that has really come to the fore is whether the President, subsequent to her act of
17 December 1988, and after petitioner Bautista had qualified for the office to which she had been
appointed, by taking the oath of office and actually assuming and discharging the functions and duties
thereof, could extend another appointment to the petitioner on 14 January 1989, an "ad interim
appointment" as termed by the respondent Commission on Appointments or any other kind of
appointment to the same office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights that called for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The Court, with all due respect to both the Executive and Legislative Departments of government, and
after careful deliberation, is constrained to hold and rule in the negative. When Her Excellency, the
President converted petitioner Bautista's designation as Acting Chairman to a permanent appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17 December 1988, significantly she advised Bautista
(in the same appointment letter) that, by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and enter upon the
performance of the duties of the office (of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights). All that
remained for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment. Obviously, she accepted the
appointment by taking her oath of office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B.
Fernan and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of the Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights. Bautista's appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights was a completed act on the part of the President.

Quintos-Deles vs Commission on Appointments

On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President
pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. However,
petitioner and the three other sectoral representatives-appointees were not able to take their oaths and
discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of
the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by
the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the
House of Representatives. This opposition compelled Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. to suspend the
oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives.

Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends that her appointment as Sectoral Representative for Women
by the President pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, does not require confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments to qualify her to take her seat in the House of Representatives.
RULING:
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be
filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are
among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,"
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in
the President in the Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation
such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and
the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had been
extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." The reference to paragraph
2, Section 16 of Article VII as additional authority for the appointment of petitioner is of vital significance to
the case at bar. The records show that petitioner’s appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while
Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2
of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.

Calderon vs Carale
This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments
extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.

RULING:
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose appointment
are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.

Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees
referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only
with the President.

Deciding on what law to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial
function. The Court respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully, however, the
constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and Members of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption if we are to render
fealty to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.

Tarrosa vs Singson
This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a "taxpayer," questioning the appointment of
respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of
R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the
Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides: (a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who
shall be the Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be head of a
department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
RULING:
We dismiss the petition. The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the
ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of
Governor of the Bangko Sentral (Cf. Castro v. Del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196 [1967]). Such a special civil
action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public
office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another". However for the information of all concerned,
we call attention to our decision in Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992), with Justice Isagani A. Cruz
dissenting, where we ruled that Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government
officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution.
Soriano vs Lista
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the constitutionality
and legality of the permanent appointments, made by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, of public
respondents to different positions in the Philippine Coast Guard and their subsequent assumption of office
without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the 1987 Constitution.

RULING;
However, on March 30, 1998, after the aforesaid changes in the charter of the PCG, then President Fidel
V. Ramos, in the exercise of his statutory authority to reorganize the Office of the President, issued EO
475 transferring the PCG from the DND to the Office of the President. He later on again transferred the
PCG from the Office of the President to the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer
from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.

It is clear from the foregoing provision of the Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank of
colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require confirmation by the CA. The rule is that the plain,
clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be
given a construction that changes its meaning. The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation
by the CA under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause "officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain" refers to military officers alone. This is clear from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the proposed text of said Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution. Since the promotions and appointments of respondent officers are not covered by the
above-cited provision of the Constitution, the same need not be confirmed by the CA.

Pimentel vs Ermita
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed
in an acting capacity.

Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries
because "in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be
designated as Acting Secretary." The petition questions the constitutionality of President Arroyo's
appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments while Congress is in session.
RULING:
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure
intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department
secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a
position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily
have the President's confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the
President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session.
That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient
that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I,
Book III of EO 292 states that "[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch." Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

Petitioners assert that Section 17 does not apply to appointments vested in the President by the
Constitution, because it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget
that Congress is not the only source of law. "Law" refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress,
municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions.

Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse.
Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in
Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent
abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer
on constitutional law has observed:
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of
them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President
Arroyo's issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year.

Flores vs Drilon
The principal question is whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided,
however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates
the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government
posts.
RULING:
It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City,
hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 13where we stated
that the prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment by the President,
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided
in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by
the primary functions of the officials concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as
provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor. This argument is apparently
based on a wrong premise. Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or
automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The
phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not
merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the
subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex
officio" would have been used.

Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a
discretion. According to Woodbury, J.,"the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the essence of his
appointment," and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds that an "[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive
act involving the exercise of discretion." The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself
who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a
prerogative of the appointing power. Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing
appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental
component of the appointing power.

Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress)
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of
appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of
whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress
may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his
discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress
can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the
appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.

In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential
appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso
nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of
Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded
from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment,
sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of
appointment.

While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly,
while the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the
proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.

Matibag vs Benipayo
Petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment to the COMELEC is a temporary appointment that is
prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim
appointment can be withdrawn or revoked by the President at her pleasure, and can even be disapproved
or simply by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. For this reason, petitioner claims that an ad
interim appointment is temporary in character and consequently prohibited by the last sentence of Section
1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. Based on petitioner’s theory, there can be no ad interim
appointment to the COMELEC or to the other two constitutional commissions, namely the Civil Service
Commission and the Commission on Audit. The last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution is also found in Article IX-B and Article IX-D providing for the creation of the Civil Service
Commission and the Commission on Audit, respectively. Petitioner interprets the last sentence of Section
1 (2) of Article IX-C to mean that the ad interim appointee cannot assume office until his appointment is
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments for only then does his appointment become permanent
and no longer temporary in character.
We find petitioner’s argument without merit. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress. Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such
disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad
interim appointment is utterly without basis. The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an
ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can
at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. "A
distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the
President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person
thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It takes effect at once.
The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His title to such
office is complete. In the language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective ‘until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Perhaps, it is the literal translation of the word ‘ad interim’ which creates such belief. The term is defined
by Black to mean "in the meantime" or "for the time being." Thus, an officer ad interim is one appointed to
fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its
regular incumbent (Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not the meaning
nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used
in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the
President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment
that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the
Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.

An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government
employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that" [n]o officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Thus, an
ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office.
The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the
appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to
removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is
protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice
and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause
is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause
is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment.
These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim
appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of
ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the
Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees.

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment
or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the
appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how
briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the
three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes v. Yorac
and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party v. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President,
during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent" , this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence
of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before
the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments.
This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the
law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.

Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the
President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that
otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three
constitutional commissions.

If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were not extended ad interim appointments to fill up the three vacancies in
the COMELEC, there would only have been one division functioning in the COMELEC instead of two
during the May 2001 elections. Considering that the Constitution requires that "all . . . election cases shall
be heard and decided in division", the remaining one division would have been swamped with election
cases. Moreover, since under the Constitution motions for reconsideration "shall be decided by the
Commission en banc", the mere absence of one of the four remaining members would have prevented a
quorum, a less than ideal situation considering that the Commissioners are expected to travel around the
country before, during and after the elections. There was a great probability that disruptions in the
conduct of the May 2001 elections could occur because of the three vacancies in the COMELEC. The
successful conduct of the May 2001 national elections, right after the tumultuous EDSA II and EDSA III
events, was certainly essential in safeguarding and strengthening our democracy.

Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend, an ad interim
appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because the Constitution grants her that
power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the President in the exercise of
her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
her part, which has not been shown in the instant case. In fine, we rule that the ad interim
appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman
and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited
by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Petitioner also argues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are constitutional, the renewal of the their ad interim appointments and their
subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim appointee is
by-passed by the Commission on Appointments, his ad interim appointment can no longer be renewed
because this will violate Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution which prohibits reappointments.
Petitioner asserts that this is particularly true to permanent appointees who have assumed office, which is
the situation of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason if their ad interim appointments are deemed permanent in
character.
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision
of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing
authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the
Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the
appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the
disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this
instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional
prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.

An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission
on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been
finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session
of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold
its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the
President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is
recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments. Hence, under the
Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if
the President renews the appointment.

The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to
disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be
revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment
because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that" [t]he Chairman and the Commissioners shall
be appointed . . . for a term of seven years without reappointment." (Emphasis supplied) There are four
situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the
COMELEC, after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such
person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will
then be actually serving more than seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after
confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such
person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement
because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The third
situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or
resigned, and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot, be reappointed, whether
as a member or chair, to a- vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the
appointee also serving more than seven years.

The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years, and a
vacancy arises from death or resignation. Even if it will, not result in his serving more than seven years, a
reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited because his situation will be
similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose terms of office are less than
seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under any situation. Not one of these four
situations applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.

The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has served any term of office as
COMELEC member — whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three years, or
even for an unexpired term of any length of time — can no longer be reappointed to the COMELEC.
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim
appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold
otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the
running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on
Appointments. The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his
term of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous
appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities
and negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments.

Luego vs Civil Service Commission

The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor
Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983. The appointment was described as permanent" but the Civil
Service Commission approved it as "temporary,". On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the
legality of which does not have to be decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private
respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly, directed "that
Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the Administrative Division,
Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego.

Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement by the latter?
RULING:
The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by
Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it
was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary. The stamping
of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the appointment, which was
clearly described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33, dated February
18, 1983. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment it sell And what
made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein
and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position.

The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Indeed, the approval is
more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position
to which he has been named. As we have repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the
Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws. However,
a full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored parts, will make it clear that all the
Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate
civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is
disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on--or
as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the proper authorities.

Pobre vs Mendieta
On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed the petitioner, then an Associate
Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/ Chairman. He took his oath of office on February 17, 1992.

Even before Commissioner Pobre's appointment, the private respondent, Mariano A. Mendieta, as the
Senior Associate Commissioner, filed a petition for declaratory relief against Commissioner Pobre,
Executive Secretary Drilon, and Acting Secretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they be
enjoined from appointing, or recommending the appointment of Associate Commissioner Pobre as
Chairman of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, he (Mendieta), as the senior Associate
Commissioner, was legally entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC.
The petition raises an issue regarding the proper construction of the provision in Section 2 of P.D. No. 223
that: ". . . any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most Senior
of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term, resignation
or removal," whereby the legality of Pobre's appointment as PRC Chairman may be determined.
RULING:
We do not agree with Judge Somera's opinion that the filling up of the vacancy "for the unexpired portion
of the term only" refers to the unexpired portion of the term of the successor (the "most senior Associate
Commissioner") rather than the unexpired portion of the Chairman's term. The Court holds that the
succession clause operates only when there is an "unexpired term" of the Chairman/Commissioner to be
served. Otherwise, if the Chairman's term had expired or been fully served, the vacancy must be filled by
appointment of a new chairman by the President.

The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission (except the position of
"junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or by "operation of law" for that would
deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners —
"all to be appointed by the President" under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only
occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power would be when the position of junior (or
second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not presume that when the President issued
P.D. No. 223, he deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and
limited himself to the selection and appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest
rung of the ladder in that agency. Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court should so
construe the law as to avoid it.

Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/Commissioner to succeed Julio B. Francia, Jr.
at the expiration of his term did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 223 and in fact conforms with the
Chief Executive's interpretation and implementation of the law, the legality of said appointment should be
upheld.

SECTION 17
Drilon vs Lim
Pursuant to Sec. 187 of LGC, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing
certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code
unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and,
inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first
being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is
"the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with
law." His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of
supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a
violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local
governments,8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.

RULING:
We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision. Section 187
authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and,
if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he
did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance
unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law.
What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the
petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify
or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform
to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court,
Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control
but of mere supervision.
Villena vs Secretary of Interior
That the acts of the respondent in suspending the petitioner from office and in preferring by himself
charges against him and in designating a special investigator to hear the charges specified in Exhibit A
are null and void for the following reasons:
(a) Because the Secretary of the Interior, by suspending the petitioner, has exercised control over local
governments when that power has been taken away from the President of the Philippines by the
Constitution for the to abrogate and the power to abrogate means the power to power to control has been
interpreted to include the power usurp and the power to usurp necessarily includes the power to destroy;
We hold, therefore, that the Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the investigation of
the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose. In the deliberation
of this case it has also been suggested that, admitting that the President of the Philippines is invested
with the authority to suspend the petitioner, and it appearing that he had verbally approved or at least
acquiesced in the action taken by the Secretary of the Interior, the suspension of the petitioner should be
sustained on the principle of approval or ratification of the act of the Secretary of the Interior by the
President of the Philippines. There is, to be sure, more weight in this argument than in the suggested
generalization of section 37 of Act No. 4007. Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem
plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain prerogative acts which, by
their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are
certain constitutional power and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be
exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of
those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of
mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem). Upon the other hand, doubt is entertained by some members of the court
whether the statement made by the Secretary to the President in the latter's behalf and by his authority
that the President had no objection to the suspension of the petitioner could be accepted as an affirmative
exercise of the power of suspension in this case, or that the verbal approval by the President of the
suspension alleged in a pleading presented in this case by the Solicitor-General could be considered as a
sufficient ratification in law.

After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on the
board proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we have
adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph
1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.

The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the
enunciation of the principles that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines."
This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines,
and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an
advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom
confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op.,
Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance
of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of
the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of
that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers vs. United States, 47
Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U. S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of departments, of course,
exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional
power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted
departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the
absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the authority in the Executive
Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his
confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the
executive, not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable
for the acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before his own conscience no less than
before that undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of Daniel Webster, is the last
repository of popular government. These are the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type
of government, and if there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the
system unless we modify the Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution by any subtle process
of judicial interpretation or constitution.

Lacson-Magallanes Co vs Paño
May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of
Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — yielded
an affirmative answer from the lower court.

Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141. The precept there is that decisions of the
Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Plaintiff's trenchment claim is that this statute is controlling not only
upon courts but also upon the President.
Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.
So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure.
Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or
reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the
President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.

Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, the standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to the
Office of the President. This Court has recognized this practice in several cases. In one, the decision of
the Lands Director as approved by the Secretary was considered superseded by that of the President's
appeal. In other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal was considered a fatal
defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for non-exhaustion of all administrative remedies.

Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's
power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power.
The Constitution, petitioner asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of
control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the
President to act personally upon the matter.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not
as correct, however, is it so say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts
which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view.
The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative
functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule
which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who
acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or
even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of
Lands, may issue.

The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully
say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is
"disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and
cannot be successfully assailed. No such disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this
case.

City of Iligan vs Director of Lands

Whether the President of the Philippines can make such grant, donation or transfer to a province,
municipality or subdivision of the government for the purpose as provided and in accordance with Section
60 aforesaid of the Public Land Act instead of the Director of lands and/or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
The answer should be in the affirmative. As herein before stated the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources is the executive officer-in-charged with the duty of carrying out the provision of the Public Land
Act thru the Director of Lands who acts under his immediate control. Since it is the Director of Lands
who has direct executive control among others in the lease, sale or any form of concession or
disposition of the land of the public domain subject to the immediate control of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and considering that under the Constitution the President of
the Philippines has control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, etc., the
President of the Philippines has therefore the same authority to dispose of portions of the public
domain as his subordinates, the Director of Lands, and his alter ego the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources.
Such power of the President is recognized under Section 69 aforecited of the Public Land Act. From the
foregoing provision it is clear that the President of the Philippines may execute contracts in favor of any
province, municipality or other branch or subdivision of the government who shall need any portion of the
land of the public domain open to concession for educational, charitable or other similar purposes, in the
form of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any other form.

Having found that the President of the Philippines has the authority to donate or grant lands of the public
domain for residential, commercial or industrial purposes or other similar purposes, Proclamation No. 469,
donating the parcels of lands in question to the plaintiff is thus valid and binding and consequently the
second assigned error is when taken. The ownership of the parcels of land in question had thereby been
vested in the plaintiff City of Iligan by the issuance of said Proclamation No. 469 on October 4,1965.
Indeed what the records show is that the Mayor of the City of Iligan upon said proclamation immediately
had the lots surveyed and entered into negotiation with the National Investment & Development
Corporation and those interested in promoting a coco-chemical plant in Iligan City with the end in view of
accelerating the economic expansion of the City.

Gacson vs Arroyo
Lopez family requested for the return of TV Station Channel 4. Acting upon the request, respondent
Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, entered into with the ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to Arbitrate", pursuant to
which an Arbitration Committee was created, composed of Atty. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., for the Republic of
the Philippines, Atty. Pastor del Rosario, for ABS-CBN, and retired Justice Vicente Abad Santos, as
Chairman.

RULING:
Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also known as the Freedom
Constitution), which was in force and effect when the "Agreement to Arbitrate" was signed by the parties
thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised both the legislative and executive powers of the
Government. As Chief Executive, the President was (and even now) "assisted by a Cabinet" composed of
Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and accountable to the President. 5 In other words,
the Members of the cabinet, as heads of the various departments, are the assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law
to act in person, or where the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the heads of such departments performed in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.

Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter into the "Agreement to
Arbitrate" with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in behalf of the President
when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the
Philippines, as a party thereto.

Moreover, the settlement of controversies is not vested in the courts of justice alone to the exclusion of
other agencies or bodies. Whenever a controversy arises, either or both parties to the controversy may
file the proper action in court. However, the parties may also resort to arbitration under RA 876 which is a
much faster way of settling their controversy, compared to how long it would take if they were to go to
court. In entering into the "Agreement to Arbitrate", the Executive branch of the government merely opted
to avail itself of an alternative mode of settling the claim of the private respondent ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation for the return of TV Station Channel 4. Court held that where the government takes property
from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. That is, as it should be, for
the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice to a citizen.

Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez

As adverted to in the introductory portion of this Decision, the principal issue in G.R. No. 85439 is the
validity of the 28 October 1988 Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture. The exordium of said Order
unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM
requesting the Department for assistance "in the removal of the members of the Board of Directors who
were not elected by the general membership" of the cooperative and that the "ongoing financial and
management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors show (sic) that the management of the
KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175, LOI 23, the Circulars issued by
DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM." It is also professed therein that the Order was
issued by the Department "in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of
P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113."
As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement does
not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the
President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This
doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed.
There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the
courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the
instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the
claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.

Ang-Angco vs Castillo
The main theme of petitioner is that respondent Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo in acting on his
case by authority of the President in the sense of considering him as resigned from notice thereof,
violated the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers and employees in the classified service in
that he acted in violation of Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which vests in the Commissioner
of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against officers and
employees in the classified service, deprived him of his right of appeal under Section 18 (b) of the same
Act to the Civil Service Board of Appeals whose decision on the matter is final, and removed him from the
service without due process in violation of Section 32 of the same Act which expressly provides that the
removal or suspension of any officer or employee from the civil service shall be accomplished only after
due process, and of Section 4, Article XII of our Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee
in the civil service shall be removed except for cause as provided for by law." Since petitioner is an officer
who belongs to the classified civil service and is not a presidential appointee, but one appointed by the
Secretary of Finance under the Revised Administrative Code, he cannot be removed from the service by
the President in utter disregard of the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959.

Respondents, on their part, do not agree with this theory entertained by petitioner. They admit that if the
theory is to be considered in the light of the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the same may be
correct, for indeed the Civil Service Law as it now stands provides that all officers and employees who
belong to the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service
and as such all administrative cases against them shall be indorsed to said official whose decision may
be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from whose decision no further appeal can be taken.
They also admit that petitioner belongs to the classified civil service. But it is their theory that the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law applicable to employees in the classified service do not apply to the
particular case of petitioner since to hold otherwise would be to deprive the President of his power of
control over the officers and employees of the executive branch of the government. In other words,
respondents contend that, whether the officers or employees concerned are presidential appointees or
belong to the classified service, if they are all officers and employees in the executive department, they all
come under the control of the President and, therefore, his power of removal may be exercised over them
directly without distinction.

Whether the President has the power to take direct action on the case of petitioner even if he belongs to
the classified service in spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959. Petitioner
sustains the negative contending that the contrary view would deprive him of his office without due
process of law while respondents sustain the affirmative invoking the power of control given to the
President by the Constitution over all officers and employees, belonging to the executive department.
RULING:
To begin with, we may state that under Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 it is the
Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases
of all officers and employees in the classified service for in said section the following is provided: "Except
as otherwise provided by law, (the Commissioner shall) have final authority to pass upon the removal,
separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified
service and upon all matters relating to the employees." The only limitation to this power is that the
decision of the Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, in which case said
Board shall decide the appeal within a period of 90 days after the same has been submitted for decision,
whose decision in such case shall be final (Section 18, Republic Act 2260). It should be noted that the law
as it now stands does not provide for any appeal to the President, nor is he given the power to review the
decision motu proprio, unlike the provision of the previous law, Commonwealth Act No. 598, which was
expressly repealed by the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), which provides that the decision of
the Civil Service Board of Appeals may be reversed or modified motu proprio by the President. It is,
therefore, clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner
comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of
the procedure laid down therein in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be
said that he has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.

It must, however, be noted that the removal, separation and suspension of the officers and employees of
the classified service are subject to the saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by law" (Section 16
[i], Republic Act No. 2260). The question then may be asked: Is the President empowered by any other
law to remove officers and employees in the classified civil service?

The only law that we can recall on the point is Section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the
pertinent portion of which we quote:
(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such
removed officials. For disloyalty to the (United States) Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under
the Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines.

The phrase "conformably to law" is significant. It shows that the President does not have blanket authority
move any officer or employee of the government but his power must still be subject to the law that passed
by the legislative body particularly with regard the procedure, cause and finality of the removal of persons
who may be the subject of disciplinary action. Here, as above stated we have such law which governs
action to be taken against officers and employees in classified civil service. This law is binding upon
President.

Another provision that may be mentioned is Section (D) of the Revised Administrative Code, which
provides:
Power to appoint and remove. — The Department Head, the recommendation of the chief of the Bureau
or office concerned, shall appoint all subordinate officers and employees appointment is not expressly
vested by law in the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, and may remove or punish them,
except as especially provided otherwise, in accordance the Civil Service Law.

The phrase "in accordance with the Civil Service is also significant. So we may say that even granting for
administrative purposes, the President of the Philippines is considered as the Department Head of the
Civil Service Commission, his power to remove is still subject to the Civil Service Act of 1959, and we
already know with regard to officers and employees who belong to classified service the finality of the
action is given to the Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Board of Appeals.

Let us now take up the power of control given to President by the Constitution over all officers and
employees in the executive department which is now in by respondents as justification to override the
specific visions of the Civil Service Act. This power of control couched in general terms for it does not set
in specific manner its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron v. Reyes, supra, had
already occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter," to distinguish it from the power of general
supervision over municipal government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the power
to remove an officer or employee in the executive department. Apparently, the power merely applies to
the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act.
It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the
performance of his duties.

That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as used in administrative law. Thus, the
Department Head pursuant to Section 79(C) is given direct control of all bureaus and offices under his
department by virtue of which he may "repeal or modify decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices",
and under Section 74 of the same Code, the President's control over the executive department only refers
to matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a settled or definite course or method adopted and
followed by a government, body, or individual,2 and it cannot be said that the removal of an inferior officer
comes within the meaning of control over a specific policy of government.

There is some point in the argument that the Power of control of the President may extend to the Power
to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they
are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the
principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson V. Romero, supra), but not
with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent
power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the
Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or
in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose
appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for
their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of
1959.

In resume, we may conclude that the action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the
authority of the President, in taking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without
submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and should be set aside.
National Marketing Corp vs Arca
The pivotal point at issue is whether the President of the Philippines had authority to reverse the decision
of the Board of Directors of the NAMARCO and to order the reinstatement of Juan T. Arive. Respondents
maintain that he had, and they anchor their stand on Section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution, which
reads:
The President shall have control of all executive departments bureau or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
 Petitioners, however, disagree, and contend that the word "offices," interpreted in the light of the
preceding words "executive departments," and "bureaus," refers to offices performing governmental
functions which have no juridical personality, and, therefore, does not include government-owned and
controlled corporations. They claim that the above-quoted constitutional provision is not applicable and
that what should apply is Section 13(d) of Republic Act No. 1345, (NAMARCO Charter) which vests in the
General Manager the power and/or duty, with the approval of the Board of Directors, to remove, suspend
or otherwise discipline for cause any subordinate employee of the NAMARCO. They contend that in
reversing the order of the NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive from the service, and in
ordering his reinstatement, the President of the Philippines arrogated unto himself a power not authorized
either by the Constitution or by the law, hence his actuations were legally ineffective and certainly could
not be a basis for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
RULING:
We hold that the President of the Philippines' authority to review and reverse the decision of the
NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position in the NAMARCO and to order
his re-instatement falls within the constitutional power of the President over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. Under our governmental set-up, corporations owned or controlled by the
government, such as the NAMARCO, partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices, which are
administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office of Economic Coordination, "whose
compensation and rank shall be that of a head of an Executive Department" and who "shall be
responsible to the President of the Philippines under whose control his functions ... shall be exercised."
The fact that section 13(d) of Republic Act No. 1345 (the NAMARCO Charter and likewise section 11(d) of
the Uniform Charter for Government Owned or Controlled Corporations (Ex. Order No. 399 of January 5,
1951) which authorize the general manager of such corporations, with the approval of the Board of
Directors, to remove for cause any subordinate employee of the Corporation do not provide for an appeal
from the general manager's decision of removal to any superior officer, body or agency, does not mean
that no appeal lies from such decision to the President. In Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Patio, (21
SCRA 895, 899), where the Court upheld the President's action through his Executive Secretary of
reversing a decision of the Director of Lands which had been affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, notwithstanding the provision of Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 that such
decisions "as to questions of fact shall be conclusive," we stated that "the right to appeal to the President
reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments." And control simply
means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter." As
enunciated through Justice Laurel in Planas vs. Gil (69 Phil. 52, 76), "under the presidential type of
government which we have adopted ... all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive."

Biraogo vs The Philippine Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere
ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
"independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and
subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.

In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and
not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the President may create a
public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by
law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed since there is no provision in the
Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission. According to
the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority
to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions
and in the exercise of its administrative functions. This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of
the plenary powers wielded by the President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17,
both of Article VII of the Constitution.
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. As
correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President’s power to conduct investigations to
aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability
and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the
President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. It would not be
accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is
head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the
office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers
that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on
the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the
law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by
the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used
the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. It should be stressed that the purpose of
allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is
entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the
objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano
Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the
government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just
because the direction of the political winds have changed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for
the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or
allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General,
"whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission."

The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well
recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17
thereof. As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly
assume the functions of the executive department.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have
been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been
said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law." In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise
of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly
authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts
of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and
arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. Even
respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.

Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode
their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the
two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a
consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation." The actual
prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is
certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its investigation,"
under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before
the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.

At any rate, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared
with other similarly authorized government agencies. The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as
enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the
existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTC’s sphere of functions. Its power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC
commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman’s primordial duties.

SECTION 18
Guazon vs De Villa
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed
by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. The arrests range from seven (7)
persons during the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500)
allegedly apprehended on November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners
claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is
alleged that the following were committed:
1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours, police and
military units without any search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one residence
and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are in civilian clothes
and without nameplates or identification cards.
Public respondents cite Sec. 18 Article VII as a defense.

RULING:
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the nature described by
the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If
the military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements,
such drives must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by
such actions.

There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked
by the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and
alarming communist activities. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements which would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where
individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of security of the State. However, all
police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the
same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of
whose spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but
they are not in the least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections which are their
distinguishing features.

The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements
particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements
supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were conducted.

It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or
criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been no impediment
to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused
from sleep were arrested. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the
"areal zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of squatter and low income families are fully
protected.

Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of
the court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state may not
encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases
such as the present petition where the petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the police
actions, where no names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a
general one to stop all police "saturation drives," as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually
happened.

The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of
the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to submit themselves voluntarily for
character and personal verification." We cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the
petitions and admitted by the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers and
policemen committing certain abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the
essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in
troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient
numbers. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not
violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one
on one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals are
easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices
because all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.

The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit. Where not one
victim complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for the Supreme
Court. It is basically one for the executive departments and for trial courts. Well meaning citizens with only
second hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive,
the military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils.
The rules of constitutional litigation have been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of rights.
They should be followed. If our policy makers sustain the contention of the military and the police that
occasional saturation drives are essential to maintain the stability of government and to insure peace and
order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be evolved, they
should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and identifying violators is
necessary.

Ruffy vs Chief of Staff

It is contended, in behalf of Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus, that "by the enemy occupation of
the Philippines, the National Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating and governing the
existence of the Philippine Army including the Articles of War, were suspended and in abeyance during
such belligerent occupation." The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to
military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed. In their
memorandum they have raised an additional question of law — that the 93d Article of War is
unconstitutional.

The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed. This article ordains "that any person subject to
military law who commits murder in time of was shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court
martial may direct." It is argued that since "no review is provided by that law to be made by the Supreme
Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life imprisonment or death", it violates Article VIII,
section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines which provides that "the National Assembly
may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment."

RULING:
We think the petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure to perceive the nature of courts martial
and the sources of the authority for their creation.

Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the ordering of courts
martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in
Chief, independently of legislation." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike
courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. "The Supreme Court of the United States referring to
the provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide for the government of the army,
excepting military offenses from the civil jurisdiction, and making the President Commander in Chief,
observes as follows: "These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and
punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations, and
that the power to do so is given without any connection between it and the 3d Article of the United States;
indeed that the two powers are entirely independent of each other."

"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the
executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and
navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Of equal interest Clode, 2
M. F., 361, says of these courts in the British law: "It must never be lost sight of that the only legitimate
object of military tribunals is to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army."

Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34

The petitioners who are all civilians were arrested by the military authorities. They were all initially
detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. In the course of the proceedings, particularly on August 19,
1980, the petitioners went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus."
They sought to enjoin the respondent Military Commission No. 34 from proceeding with the trial of their
case. They likewise sought their release from detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of
their arguments is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to
have been committed during the period of martial law. They also maintain that the proceedings before the
respondent Military Commission No. 34 are in gross violation of their constitutional right to due process of
law.

RULING:
We agree with the dissenting views of then Justice, now Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee and Madame
Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma in Aquino, Jr. in so far as they hold that military commissions or tribunals
have no jurisdiction to try civilians for alleged offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning.

Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose
either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial
contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole,
is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Military commissions or
tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial system.

Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military government and even on the
premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over
civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have
remained open and have been regularly functioning.

Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as
Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline
therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives. Following the
principle of separation of powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of
the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws as when an individual should be
considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the
function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in
the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period
of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise
would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian concerned.

Moreover, We find that Proclamation No. 2045 (dated January 17, 1981) officially lifting martial law in the
Philippines and abolishing all military tribunals created pursuant to the national emergency effectively
divests the respondent Military Commission No. 34 (and all military tribunals for that matter) of its
supposed authority to try civilians, including the herein petitioners.

The main opinion in Aquino, Jr. is premised on the theory that military tribunals have the jurisdiction to try
civilians as long as the period of national emergency (brought about by public disorder and similar
causes) lasts. Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 2045 is an acknowledgment on the part of the Executive
Department of the Government that the national emergency no longer exists. Thereafter, following the
theory relied upon in the main opinion, all military tribunals should henceforth be considered functus
officio in their relationship with civilians.

By virtue of the proclamation itself, all cases against civilians pending therein should eventually be
transferred to the civil courts for proper disposition. The principle of double jeopardy would not be an
obstacle to such transfer because an indispensable element of double jeopardy is that the first tribunal
which tried the case must be of competent jurisdiction. As discussed earlier, the military tribunals are
devoid of the required jurisdiction.

We take this opportunity to reiterate that as long as the civil courts in the land are open and
functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses
committed by them. Whether or not martial law has been proclaimed throughout the country or
over a part thereof is of no moment. The imprimatur for this observation is found in Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Quilona vs General Court Martial

On 14 December 1990, Petitioner, through counsel, wrote a letter to President Corazon C. Aquino,
expressing his desire to be tried by a civilian court and sought a waiver of military jurisdiction, for the
reason, among others, that the "enactment of the Philippine National Police Law creates his honest belief
that he should now be under the actual and real jurisdiction of a civilian court."

RULING:
Republic Act No. 6975, 10 creating the Philippine National Police (PNP), 11 which took effect on 1
January 1991, 12 provides:
"SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal
cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided,
That the courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP
members who have already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing
authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as, the Articles of War, as amended
by Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, that
criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this
it shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge."
Clearly, under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, respondent court martial acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the arraignment of the
petitioner on 28 December 1990. "By closing its eyes to the provisions of Sections 2 and 46, indelicately
asserting its military jurisdiction rather than letting go of the case to civilian jurisdiction to effectuate and
give flesh to the avowed policy and intent of the law, respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion."

Gudani vs Senga
On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP
to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security (Senate
Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the
conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and
the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) widely reputed as then
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been
designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of "Joint Task Force Ranao" by the AFP
Southern Command. "Joint Task Force Ranao" was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order
during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. The following day, Gen.
Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the senator that "no approval has been
granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear" before the hearing scheduled on that day.
Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both
testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections.

Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enjoining them and
other military officers from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent. Petitioners also
pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for
possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with
petitioners’ violation of the aforementioned directive.
RULING;
The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which
begins with the simple declaration that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines x x x" Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5,
Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute
authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the
ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may
otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.

It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of
speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights
may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to
a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed
without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on
the matter.

Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by
virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress
which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons
to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final
judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress
does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to
control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress
is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere
with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition,
since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the
military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a
modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy
lies with the courts.

SANLAKAS vs Reyes
They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some three
hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption
in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of
Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). In the wake of the Oakwood occupation,
the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring “a
state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. In view of the foregoing, I
am issuing General Order No. 4 in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, calling out
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the
necessary actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional
rights.

By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the
soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a
state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435

In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.), party-list organizations Sanlakas
and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not
require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. They further submit that,
because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the
proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.
RULING:
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the
President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion.
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated
power[s].” From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the
exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions,
namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power.
However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, “[t]hese conditions are
not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that ‘whenever it
becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.'”

Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from
declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with
Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of
rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that
the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional
effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Court’s mandate is to
probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is
devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.

Should there be any “confusion” generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of
rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does
not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about
these conditions. At any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the
rebellion “with due regard to constitutional rights.”

For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless
arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that “[i]n quelling or
suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant.
The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a ‘state of
rebellion.'”64 In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion
whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid
warrantless arrest are present.

It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power
was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of
the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without
factual basis.

The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law
and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no
indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the “theater of war” or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment
of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and
legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or
has exercised martial law powers.

The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised
powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President
by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section
23 (2), Article VI.

David vs Arroyo
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. In their presentation of the
factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the
executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns
of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not “necessary” for President
Arroyo to issue such Proclamation.
While the Court considered the President’s “calling-out” power as a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom, it stressed that “this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion.”This ruling is mainly a result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987
Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of
the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized
not only “to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,”
but also “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” The latter part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was
before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.81 It
speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.

As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that
“judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct,” but
that “the President did not act arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but
arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that “it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis” and that if he fails, by way
of proof, to support his assertion, then “this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond
the pleadings.”

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the
NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military
aid.

Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her
arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its “overbreadth.” They claim that its
enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces”
statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases. A plain
reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawlessviolence.

It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face
and when ‘such summary action’ is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least,
that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function,
a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to
sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the
scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive
controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.

Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek
to regulate only “spoken words” and again, that “overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.”
Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech,
which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as “manifestly strong medicine,” to be used “sparingly
and only as a last resort,” and is “generally disfavored;”

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional
aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers
to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties;
and the court invalidates the entire statute “on its face,” not merely “as applied for” so that the overbroad
law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that
motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the “chilling;” deterrent
effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes
that an overbroad law’s “very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression.” An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP
1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression.

Constitutional Basis of PP 1017

Calling Out Power
“by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”

Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.” Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the
circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her
Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the
country.

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing
lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes
beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President
must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act
under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the
limitations.

President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the
words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP
1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest.
Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be
deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.

Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no
so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President
invoked was her calling-out power.

The declaration of Martial Law is a “warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by
the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they
must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult
the restoration of order and the enforcement of law.”

Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban
on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance
of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief
only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an
exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence.

“Take Care” Power

“and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;”

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is
required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among
others, “execute its laws.” In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the
powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including
the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government.

Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano,
Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon
President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the clause “to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction.”

We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause
states: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.” Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by
President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees“?

President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue
decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees
are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued
by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the
1973 Constitution. This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Power to Take Over

as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.”

The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP
1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience “to all the laws and to all decrees x x x” but also
to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant
the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of
any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the “martial law” thinking of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention.122 In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos’ Letter
of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over
“the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National Railways,
the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the
Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national emergency.“

Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s
inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers.

A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency”
and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants
the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second,
manifold constitutional issues arise.

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution points out that the second paragraph of the above provision
refers not only to war but also to “other national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a “state of national emergency”
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that
Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a “state of national emergency.” The
logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national
emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers,
such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together.
Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same
subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other.123 Considering
thatSection 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national
emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency
powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a
power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise
to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over
of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President.
Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of
the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the
President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers
under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that “The
executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . .;” that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed;” and that he “shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of
cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war.
Such cases need not concern us here. Even though “theater of war” be an expanding concept, we cannot
with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has
the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from
stopping production. This is a job for the nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.

Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant
executive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.The Constitution limits his
functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws
he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the
President is to execute.

Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of
existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are
the elements of intensity, variety, and perception. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive
in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under
three (3) principal heads: a)economic,b)natural disaster, and c)national security.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP
1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional
circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.
Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute
authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by Congress.

IBP vs Zamora
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine
National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis. In view of the alarming increase in
violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal
directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime
prevention and suppression. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the
necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this
regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief
powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to
call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP
questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision. According
to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police
force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines.
Thus, the IBP prays that this Court "review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine]
deployment."
RULING:
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief.
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling
out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII. Under the foregoing
provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing
with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction
places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have
simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its
letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant in the deliberation of
the Constitutional Commission.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must
be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required
in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes
necessary," the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of
the power to call as compared to the two other powers. If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support
the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is
not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the
same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the
absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at
such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the
President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not
constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In
the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call
out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to
have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in
Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The
determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be
a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a
temporary restraining order every time it is exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution
to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the
military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely
abused, the President’s exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.

The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups,
kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila. . ." We do not doubt the veracity of the
President’s assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes
judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public
utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000.
Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in
law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the
civilian character of the police force.
Fortun vs Macapagal-Arroyo
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down
and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this
carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of
emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless
violence in Central Mindanao. Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao
and secure it from large groups of persons that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in
the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified
areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo
submitted her report to Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or in writing of her action.

Issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959

One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and
validate or invalidate the same.

Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress. Thus:
1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing to
Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or
suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or suspension, allow
their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems warranted.

It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in
exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has
initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on
its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should
the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in
fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and
the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30 days from the filing
of an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. More than two years have passed
since petitioners filed the present actions to annul Proclamation 1959. When the Court did not decide it
then, it actually opted for a default as was its duty, the question having become moot and academic.
Justice Carpio of course points out that should the Court regard the powers of the President and
Congress respecting the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus as sequential or joint, it would be impossible for the Court to exercise its power of review
within the 30 days given it. But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the Court to
fulfill its duty without pre-empting congressional action. Section 18, Article VII, requires the President to
report his actions to Congress, in person or in writing, within 48 hours of such proclamation or
suspension. In turn, the Congress is required to convene without need of a call within 24 hours following
the Presidents proclamation or suspension. Clearly, the Constitution calls for quick action on the part of
the Congress. Whatever form that action takes, therefore, should give the Court sufficient time to fulfill its
own mandate to review the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its issuance.

If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or
suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions
challenging the Presidents action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. If the Court finds none,
then it can annul the proclamation or the suspension. But what if the 30 days given it by the
Constitution proves inadequate? Justice Carpio himself offers the answer in his dissent: that
30-day period does not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The settled
rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has been terminated.

Lagman vs Medialdea
Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because there is
no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in
Mindanao do not constitute rebellion since there is no proof that its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any
part thereof from allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory.

Whether or not the petitions are the "appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph 3, Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court.
All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution. During the oral argument, the petitioners
theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui
generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in
Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. The Court agrees. A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18,
Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.

It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase "in an
appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5
of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18,
Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's
exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in
a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18,
Article VII.

The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to
constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Lansang, to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the ambit of judicial
review. Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the
President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the Constitution deemed it
wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII.

To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the
President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within
the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to question before
this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension. Moreover, the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a demandable right to challenge
the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or suspension. It further designated this Court as
the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to
render its decision thereon within a limited period of 30 days from date of filing.

The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in Article
VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department. To conclude
that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the expanded jurisdiction of
this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to place
additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII would be subsumed under Section I of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of the
Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII on top of the
expanded jurisdiction of this Court.

The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should
be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different
rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue
to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency
powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not applicable
under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within which this
Court has to promulgate its decision.

In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases.
It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege, of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen on the ground of lack o sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may
revoke th proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation o suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but
likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not look into the
absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe
deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the
sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was
made.

Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different
but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is,
the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can be
exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the judicial power to review to be exercised
independently from the congressional power to revoke.

Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it imperative to re-examine, reconsider, and set aside
its pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo. By the above pronouncement, the Court
willingly but unwittingly clipped its own power and surrendered the same to Congress as well as,
abdicated from its bounden duty to review. Worse, the Court considered itself just on stand-by, waiting
and willing to act as a substitute in case Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray declaration, which
must be rectified and set aside in this proceeding. We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously
exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary,
any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power
to review.

The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the
President's decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation.
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial
law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The
1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty
days; (2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the
Supreme Court."

The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase "imminent danger thereof"
as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law.
They perceived the phrase "imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of abuse;" besides, the
calling out power of the President "is sufficient for handling imminent danger."
A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power,
which is normally a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police power,
with the military's assistance, to ensure public safety and in place of government agencies which
for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a locality, which remains under the
control of the State. In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006,
stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the
"(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news
media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in-Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated
power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law." It must be stressed, however,
that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer to
a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so­called "graduation
of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides which power to choose.

These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief;
it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants
a mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially,
with the President. The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a
given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his
powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the
government, and the very integrity of the State. It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review
does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail
given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain
of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the Congress not to interfere a priori in the
decision-making process of the President. The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution
of the requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the conclusion that
judicial review does not include the calibration of the President's decision of which of his
graduated powers will be availed of in a given situation.

The Court must similarly and necessarily refrain from calibrating the President's decision of which among
his extraordinary powers to avail given a certain situation or condition. It cannot be overemphasized that
time is paramount in situations necessitating the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. It was precisely this time element that prompted the Constitutional
Commission to eliminate the requirement of concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition by the
President of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Considering that the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is now anchored on
actual invasion or rebellion and when public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or in
imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and urgency for the President to act quickly to protect the
country. The Court, as Congress does, must thus accord the President the same leeway by not wading
into the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution to the Executive Department.
The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to
Proclamation No. 216 or the declaration of martial law on May 23, 2017, the President had already issued
Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a state of national emergency on account of
lawless violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216.
Based on the foregoing presidential actions, it can be gleaned that although there is no obligation or
requirement on his part to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or sequential basis, still the
President made the conscious and deliberate effort to first employ the most benign from among his
extraordinary powers. As the initial and preliminary step towards suppressing and preventing the armed
hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation
did not improve; on the contrary, it only worsened. Thus, exercising his sole and exclusive prerogative,
the President decided to impose martial law an suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the
belief that the armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to actual rebellion and publip safety requires
it.

Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 will (a) have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55; or
(b) also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi
and other parts of the Mindanao region.
The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state of
national emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated
September 4, 2016, where he called upon the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to
undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless violence in the Mindanao region, and
to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere in the Philippines. In Kulayan
v. Tan, the Court ruled that the President's calling out power is in a different category from the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law.
In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently
of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law,
although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as
in this case.

The scope of the power of review under the 1987 Constitution refers only to the determination of
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus. Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the framers
of the 1987 Constitution are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time they were drafting
the Constitution. Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of th Constitution
should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law
and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to
determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases. We conclude, therefore, that
Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review by the introduction of the "sufficiency of the
factual basis" test.

As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this
Court. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this
Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts
or information known by or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension,
which facts or information are found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to
Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past
events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President. Past events
may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as these are connected
or related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.

After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during
the declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review
is concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are in place to
cover such a situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60 days; Congress may choose to
revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made; and, this Court may investigate the factual
background of the declaration. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the
proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration
and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that support
the conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration
and/or suspension.

The parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis
for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of
such power." Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial
law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.

In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convince himself that there is
probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being
committed. To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows:
1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3)
there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

Whether Proclamation No. 216, Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual basis.
There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The
President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the
removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of
the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of
the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.

Public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. In his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence
perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or
establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation to the armed
hostilities, bomb threats were issued; road blockades and checkpoints were set up; schools and churches
were burned; civilian hostages were taken and killed; non-Muslims or Christians were targeted; young
male Muslims were forced to join their group; medical services and delivery of basic services were
hampered; reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were hindered; and the security
of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised. These particular scenarios convinced the President that
the atrocititts had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelldd him to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to
the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only
a part thereof under martial law.

Lagman vs Pimentel
On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216.
In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2
extending Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017. In a letter to the President, through Defense
Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana (Secretary Lorenzana), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of
Staff, General Rey Leonardo Guerrero (General Guerrero), recommended the further extension of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year
beginning January 1, 2018 "for compelling reasons based on current security assessment." On
December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session, adopted Resolution
of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.

RULING:
With regard to the extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ, the same special and specific jurisdiction is vested in the Court to review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
Necessarily, and by parity of reasoning, a certiorari petition invoking the Court's expanded
jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Congress'
extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.

Furthermore, as in the case of the Court's review of the President's proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ, the Court's judicial review of the Congress' extension of such
proclamation or suspension is limited only to a determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
By its plain language, the Constitution provides such scope of review in the exercise of the Court's sui
generis authority under Section 18, Article VII, which is principally aimed at balancing (or curtailing) the
power vested by the Constitution in the Congress to determine whether to extend such proclamation or
suspension.

Congressional check on the exercise of martial law and suspension powers

The 1987 Constitution grants the Congress the power to shorten or extend the President's
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Congressional check on the President's martial law and suspension powers thus consists of:
First. The power to review the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or suspension. The review is "automatic in the
sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension is
made." The Congress' decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the
President.
Second. The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the President's
initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety
requires it.

Joint executive and legislative act

When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension, as described during
the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, becomes a "joint executive and legislative act" or a "collective
judgment" between the President and the Congress.

The manner in which Congress deliberated on the President's request for extension is not subject to
judicial review
In Pimentel, Jr., et. al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole, this constitutionally-vested authority is
recognized as a grant of full discretionary authority to each House of Congress in the formulation,
adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from
judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of
the power as will constitute a denial of due process.

Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the
President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus. Such silence, however, should not be construed as a vacuum, flaw or deficiency in the provision.
While it does not specify the number of times that the Congress is allowed to approve an extension of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear
that the only limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or
suspension are that the extension should be upon the President's initiative; that it should be grounded on
the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that it is subject to the
Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.

Thus, whenever there is a determination that the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires
the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ, the Congress may exercise its
authority to grant such extension as may be requested by the President, even if it be subsequent to the
initial extension.

Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and
suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on its duration; thus,
the provision states that that the extension shall be "for a period to be determined by the
Congress." If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit the extension to sixty
(60) days, as petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 theorize, they would not have expressly vested in the
Congress the power to fix its duration.

The Court cannot accept said petitioners' argument that the 60-day limit can be deduced from the
following clause in Section 18, Article VII: "the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension." The word "manner" means a way a thing is done or a mode of procedure; it
does not refer to a period or length of time. Thus, the clause should be understood to mean that the
Congress must observe the same manner of voting required for the revocation of the initial proclamation
or suspension, as mentioned in the sentence preceding it, i.e. "voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session."
The President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216
The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate that the rebellion, which
caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its "remnants" have been resolute in
establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and training of new
members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and continued attacks. More
specifically, the remnants of DAESH-inspired DIWM members and their allies, together with their
protectors, supporters and sympathizers, have been monitored in their continued efforts towards
radicalization/recruitment, financial and logistical build-up, as well as in their consolidation/reorganization
in Central Mindanao, particularly in the provinces of Maguindanao and North Cotabato and also in Sulu
and Basilan. These activities are geared towards the conduct of intensified atrocities and armed public
uprisings in support of their objective of establishing the foundation of a global Islamic caliphate and of a
Wilayat not only in the Philippines but also in the whole of Southeast Asia.

The question, therefore, is whether the acts, circumstances and events upon which the extension was
based posed a significant danger, injury or harm to the general public. The Court answers in the
affirmative. As his December 8, 2017 letter to the Congress would show, the President's request for
further extension had been based on the security assessment of the AFP and the PNP. Notably, the
President also acknowledged that the grounds or "essential facts" cited in his letter were of his "personal
knowledge" as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The President's request to Congress also
referred to the monitoring activities that led to the Executive's findings, which the AFP confirmed during
the January 17, 2018 oral argument.

SECTION 19
Torres vs Gonzales
On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the Philippines
on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this
condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." On 10 October
1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against petitioner. Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and
Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted
by final judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and
Q-20756 nor of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926 Petitioner also contends that he was
not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly
claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution.

Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to
serve the balance of his original sentence.
RULING:
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The determination of the occurrence
of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a
purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon
under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary,
much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended
for the violation of his conditional pardon. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process,
and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his
trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the
parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What
is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that
he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition
upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The consequences that we here deal with
are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict granted
conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final
judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal
penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he
can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.

Monsanto vs Factoran
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is
entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment
RULING:
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.

The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as
relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or
disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the
offender is a "new man", and "as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;" is to ignore the
difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted
criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may
regard him as more dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it places no
restraints upon him following his conviction." Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all
the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded
on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.

Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full
agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted
felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although
such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. The rationale is
plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the
common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic
reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of
estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing
power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were
expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply
for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her
qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be
evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with
public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.

People vs Salle, Jr.

For resolution is the enforceability of the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellant Ricky Mengote
during the pendency in this Court of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. In its Memorandum
filed for the Appellee on 15 December 1994, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the
conditional pardon granted to appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment of conviction is
not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court of his appeal. On the other hand, the FLAG, through
Atty. La'o, submits that the conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw the appeal,
he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon which
resulted in the finality of his conviction.

RULING:
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after
conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is "
final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973
Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes
final. Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his
appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality.

We now declare that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of
the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if
one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the
appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must
require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his
appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as
the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the
appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before
the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly,
those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the
accused from confinement.
Garcia vs Commission on Audit
On 23 January 1980, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense charged.
Consequently, petitioner sought reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal in the criminal
case. In an indorsement dated 7 April 1980, petitioner's request to be reinstated was denied by the
Bureau of Telecommunications. Hence, petitioner pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive
clemency. On 26 August 1981, acting on the favorable indorsements of the then Ministry of Transportation
and Communications and the Civil Service Commission, Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin
T. Venus, Jr., by authority of the President, per Resolution No. O.P. 1800, granted executive clemency to
petitioner. Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries effective 1
April 1975, the date of his dismissal from the service. This was denied by the COA in its 5th Indorsement
dated 12 October 1982 on the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the
payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the service.

Whether he is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of
executive clemency.
RULING:
Time and again this Court has unfolded the effects of a pardon upon the individual to whom it is granted.
In Monsanto v. Factoran,6 we have firmly established the general rule that while a pardon has generally
been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as
innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness . It does not erase the fact
of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Unless expressly grounded on the
person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The
pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of
the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement
because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence
and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged.
When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party
from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently dismissed
from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based
on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was
founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the
offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary
reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for
his reinstatement by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service
Commission.

The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of
the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the
service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the
administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of
the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment;
he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages.8 This is meant
to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered
as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the
executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to
those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted
of the charges against them.9 There is no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations
aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.

Sabello vs DECS
Finally, the herein petitioner was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, restoring him to 'full civil and political rights.' With this instrument on hand, the herein
petitioner applied for reinstatement to the government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position
of a mere classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I. Petitioner
claims he must be restored to the same position he was in before he was convicted on a mere technical
error and for which he was given an absolute pardon.

RULING:
As a general rule, the question of whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his former position is
a matter of discretion of the appointing authority, but under the circumstances of this case, if the petitioner
had been unfairly deprived of' what is rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving
justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the appointing power, but
discretion tempered with fairness and justice.

As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictate that
he be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom
teacher. However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from September 1, 1971 to November
23, 1982 since in Monsanto this Court said he is not entitled to automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was
lawfully separated from the government service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his
reinstatement had been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is afforded
only to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
acquitted of the charge against them.

Llamas vs Orbos
Petitioner posits that the issuance by public respondent of the May 15, 1991 Resolution was "whimsical,
capricious and despotic, and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting lack of jurisdiction," (p. 6,
petition) basically on the ground th executive clemency could be granted by the President only in criminal
cases as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in
administrative cases. Petitioner also contends that since respondent governor refused to recognize his
suspension (having reassumed the governorship in gross defiance of the suspension order), executive
clemency cannot apply to him; that his rights to due process were violated because the grant of executive
clemency was so sudden that he was not even notified thereof; and that despite a finding by public
respondent of impropriety in the loan transaction entered into by respondent governor, the former failed to
justify the reduction of the penalty of suspension on the latter. Petitioner further alleges that the exftutive
clemency granted by public respondent was "the product of a hocus-pocus strategy" (p. 1, Manifestation
with Motion, etc.) because there was allegedly no real petition for the grant of executive clemency filed by
respondent govemor.

Respondent govemor avers that since under the Constitution fiffl discretionary authority is granted to the
President on the exercise of executive clemency, the same constitutes a political question which is
beyond judicial review.
Such a rule does not hold true in the case at bar. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner
in which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a
settled rule that when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether
said powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power
of judicial review. And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the
President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the President. In the case at bar, the
nature of the question for determination is not purely political. Here, we are called upon to decide whether
under the Constitution the President may grant executive clemency in administrative cases. We must not
overlook the fact that the exercise by the President of her power of executive clemency is subject to
constitutional l'um'tations. We will merely check whether the particular measure in question has been in
accordance with law. In so doing, We will not concern ourselves with the reasons or motives which
actuate the President as such is clearly beyond our power of judicial review.

Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases,
based on Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. According to the petitioner, the qualifying phrase
"after conviction by final judgment" applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of
executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been "convicted in an administrative case," allegedly
because the word "conviction" refers only to criminal cases
Petitioner, however, describes in his very own words, respondent governor as one who has been
"convicted in an administrative case" (par. 22-a, petition). Thus, petitioner concedes that the word
"conviction" may be used either in a criminal case or in an administrative case. Moreover, applying the
doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," We cannot sustain petitioner's view. In
other words, if the law does not distinguish, so We must no distinguish. The Constitution does not
distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in
criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from
the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation,
cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve
criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more
reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.

It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the President's executive
clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the Constitution,
that is, "no pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC"
(Article IX, C, Section 5, Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be
pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit.

We wish to stress however that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, We refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the
Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
SECTION 21
Commissioner of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading
The Court of Tax Appeals entertained doubts on the legality of the executive agreement sought to be
implemented by Executive Order No. 328, owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the
making of said executive agreement. The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our
fundamental law in the making of "treaties" (Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]),
which are, however, distinct and different from "executive agreements," which may be validly entered into
without such concurrence.

RULING:
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the
Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a
vote by the Senate or by Congress. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.
From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such
subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights,
trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of
claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts. International
agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements
embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those
involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive
agreements.

Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive
agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments
— treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that
of more formal documents denominated "agreements" time or "protocols". The point where ordinary
correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated
executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready
ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements
as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into
under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in
character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to
certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the
Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping
profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international
claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights, etcetera. Some of them were
concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of
Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly
those with respect of the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded
independently of any legislation."

The validity of the executive agreement in question is thus patent. In fact, the so-called Parity Rights
provided for in the Ordinance Appended to our Constitution were, prior thereto, the subject of an
executive agreement, made without the concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of the Senate of the United
States.
Pimentel vs Executive Secretary
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and
the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both
domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive
department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its
discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a
ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners
invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they
have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.

Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit
to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations even without the signature of the President.
RULING:
We rule in the negative.
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As
the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect
to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states
and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making,
the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the
concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive.

The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a
check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in
the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and
balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth.

Petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify
treaties belongs to the Senate.
We disagree.
Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the
instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the
U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his
authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers,
which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for
one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals,
becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted,
depending on the issues involved, and may even "collapse" in case the parties are unable to come to an
agreement on the points under consideration.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature.
This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of
symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the
state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance
with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will
bring home to his own state.

Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions
of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states
to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they
find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and
consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them.

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which
usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the
parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the
instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.

Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It
should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct
steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by
the state’s authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the
formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government. Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25, 1997
provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its ratification. It mandates that
after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative, the same shall be transmitted to the
Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification
papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for ratification. After the President has
ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence.
Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the
provisions of the treaty to render it effective.
Section 7 of Executive Order No. 459 reads:
Sec. 7. Domestic Requirements for the Entry into Force of a Treaty or an Executive Agreement. — The
domestic requirements for the entry into force of a treaty or an executive agreement, or any amendment
thereto, shall be as follows:

A. Executive Agreements.
i. All executive agreements shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs after their signing for
the preparation of the ratification papers. The transmittal shall include the highlights of the agreements
and the benefits which will accrue to the Philippines arising from them.
ii. The Department of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to the endorsement by the concerned agency, shall
transmit the agreements to the President of the Philippines for his ratification. The original signed
instrument of ratification shall then be returned to the Department of Foreign Affairs for appropriate action.

B. Treaties.
i. All treaties, regardless of their designation, shall comply with the requirements provided in
sub-paragraph[s] 1 and 2, item A (Executive Agreements) of this Section. In addition, the Department of
Foreign Affairs shall submit the treaties to the Senate of the Philippines for concurrence in the ratification
by the President. A certified true copy of the treaties, in such numbers as may be required by the Senate,
together with a certified true copy of the ratification instrument, shall accompany the submission of the
treaties to the Senate.
ii. Upon receipt of the concurrence by the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the
provision of the treaties in effecting their entry into force.

Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the
treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to
the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself
requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally
confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its
willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state’s
representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the
duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the
state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the
Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the
requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no
legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal
obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial
grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in
taking offense.

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject
to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although
the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not
be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be
encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of
mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of
the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

Bayan Muna vs Romulo

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement
(Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP. In response to a query of then Solicitor General
Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his
letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement
under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and
consent of the US Senate. In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents
in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least
declared as without force and effect. For their part, respondents question petitioner’s standing to maintain
a suit and counter that the Agreement, being in the nature of an executive agreement, does not require
Senate concurrence for its efficacy.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines,
practices, and jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls "into the category of
inter-governmental agreements," which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. In
another perspective, the terms "exchange of notes" and "executive agreements" have been used
interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes
binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President
"sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’"

Senate Concurrence Not Required

Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as "an international agreement
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation."
International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after
executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not
require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject
matters than treaties.

Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of
their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have
remained within their powers. Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the
Constitution. Authorities are, however, agreed that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart
from the concurrence-requirement aspect. As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty
has greater "dignity" than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a
treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike
an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.

Petitioner parlays the notion that the Agreement is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of
a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner takes a cue from Commissioner of
Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court reproduced the following observations made by US
legal scholars: "[I]nternational agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and
those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties
[while] those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions
and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive
agreements.
We are not persuaded.
The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in
Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on
a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The
primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft an
international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. Verily, the matter of
form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or
an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt
servanda principle.

Petitioner’s final point revolves around the necessity of the Senate’s concurrence in the Agreement. And
without specifically saying so, petitioner would argue that the non-surrender agreement was executed by
the President, thru the DFA Secretary, in grave abuse of discretion.
By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head of state and
government, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. The Constitution vests in
the President the power to enter into international agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the
required concurrence votes of the Senate. But as earlier indicated, executive agreements may be validly
entered into without such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in
the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, "executive altogether." The right of the
President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.

In thus agreeing to conclude the Agreement thru E/N BFO-028-03, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, represented by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acted within the scope of the
authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution. At the end of the day, the President––by
ratifying, thru her deputies, the non-surrender agreement––did nothing more than discharge a
constitutional duty and exercise a prerogative that pertains to her office.

While the issue of ratification of the Rome Statute is not determinative of the other issues raised herein, it
may perhaps be pertinent to remind all and sundry that about the time this petition was interposed, such
issue of ratification was laid to rest in Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary. As the Court
emphasized in said case, the power to ratify a treaty, the Statute in that instance, rests with the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate, whose role relative to the ratification of a treaty is limited merely
to concurring in or withholding the ratification. And concomitant with this treaty-making power of the
President is his or her prerogative to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate; or having secured the latter’s
consent to the ratification of the treaty, refuse to ratify it. This prerogative, the Court hastened to add, is
the President’s alone and cannot be encroached upon via a writ of mandamus. Barring intervening
events, then, the Philippines remains to be just a signatory to the Rome Statute. Under Art. 125 thereof,
the final acts required to complete the treaty process and, thus, bring it into force, insofar as the
Philippines is concerned, have yet to be done.

Agreement Need Not Be in the Form of a Treaty

For one, we find that the Agreement does not amend or is repugnant to RA 9851. For another, the view
does not clearly state what precise principles of law, if any, the Agreement alters. And for a third, it does
not demonstrate in the concrete how the Agreement seeks to frustrate the objectives of the principles of
law subsumed in the Rome Statute.

Far from it, as earlier explained, the Agreement does not undermine the Rome Statute as the former
merely reinforces the primacy of the national jurisdiction of the US and the Philippines in prosecuting
criminal offenses committed by their respective citizens and military personnel, among others. The
jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to the Rome Statute over high crimes indicated thereat is clearly and
unmistakably complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction of the signatory states.
Moreover, RA 9851 clearly: (1) defines and establishes the crimes against international humanitarian law,
genocide and other crimes against humanity; (2) provides penal sanctions and criminal liability for their
commission; and (3) establishes special courts for the prosecution of these crimes and for the State to
exercise primary criminal jurisdiction. Nowhere in RA 9851 is there a proviso that goes against the tenor
of the Agreement.

The view makes much of the above quoted second par. of Sec. 17, RA 9851 as requiring the Philippine
State to surrender to the proper international tribunal those persons accused of crimes sanctioned under
said law if it does not exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute such persons. This view is not entirely
correct, for the above quoted proviso clearly provides discretion to the Philippine State on whether to
surrender or not a person accused of the crimes under RA 9851. The statutory proviso uses the word
"may." It is settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes discretion, and cannot be
construed as having mandatory effect. Thus, the pertinent second pararagraph of Sec. 17, RA 9851 is
simply permissive on the part of the Philippine State.

Besides, even granting that the surrender of a person is mandatorily required when the Philippines does
not exercise its primary jurisdiction in cases where "another court or international tribunal is already
conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime," still, the tenor of the
Agreement is not repugnant to Sec. 17 of RA 9851. Said legal proviso aptly provides that the surrender
may be made "to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties." The Agreement
can already be considered a treaty following this Court’s decision in Nicolas v. Romulo which cited
Weinberger v. Rossi. In Nicolas, We held that "an executive agreement is a ‘treaty’ within the meaning of
that word in international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the United States."

Likewise, the Philippines and the US already have an existing extradition treaty, i.e., RP-US Extradition
Treaty, which was executed on November 13, 1994. The pertinent Philippine law, on the other hand, is
Presidential Decree No. 1069, issued on January 13, 1977. Thus, the Agreement, in conjunction with the
RP-US Extradition Treaty, would neither violate nor run counter to Sec. 17 of RA 9851.