CIVILPROCEDURE

THE BAR LECTURES SERIES

Volume I

WILLARD B. RIANOt
Bar Reviewer in Remedial Law, Commercial Law and Civil Law
Author: Fundamentals of Civil Procedure;
Evidence (A Restatement for the Bar);
Civil Procedure (A Restatement for the Bar);
Evidence (The Bar Lectures Series);
Criminal Procedure (The Bar Lectures Series);
Dean, College of Law, University of the East
Former Dean & Executive Dean, College of Law,
San Sebastian College Recoletos-Manila
Member, Remedial Law and Commercial Law Committees,
U.P. Law Center
Former Professorial Lecturer, Philippine Judicial Academy,
Supreme Court of the Philippines

2022
Bantam Edition

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 Philippine Copyright 2019, 2022

by

'
"-c..A./'J
A...
WILLARD B. RIANO
~-- '
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..... DEDICATION

ISBN 978-621-04-3886-4 ''To Nina ... my baby ...

No portion of this book may be copied or and

reproduced in books, pamphlets, outlines or notes, her babies ... "
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articles, reviews, legal papers, and judicial or other
official proceedings with proper citation.

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My Father worked tirelessly on his books, doggedly
revisiting and updating them. After his passing, I wanted
to ensure I found the right people to continue his work,
who would update his books as if they were their own. My
father poured his heart and soul into his books - they are his
legacy. I'm eternally grateful to have found the right people
to continue that legacy. I would like to thank all who, in one
way or another, contributed to the completion of these latest
editions.
Preface
This humble work is the second volume of a two-volume
material in Civil Procedure. This latest edition incorporates
the relevant laws newly passed as well as most recent
pronouncements of the Supreme Court. Like its previous
editions, its aim is to present the legalese found in the Rules
of Court in a simplified manner to enable the student of law to
grasp the essential concepts in Remedial Law. However, this
is more than that ... much more.

"Basta para kay Dean ... ". This was the answer I received This is a nod to my father's wishes to craft his work in a
when I asked a close colleague in the legal industry of my way that would tremendously benefit the law students and bar
Father's to update Civil Procedure I and Civil Procedure II. reviewees. As my father would have wanted, this is made to
I am very fortunate that there are those, like you, who still equip his intended readers with important tools which would
think very fondly of him. Thank you for all your hard work greatly help them in passing the annual bar examinations.
and dedication to this project. But, most importantly, I thank That has always been his first and foremost goal.
you for remembering my father with kindness and warmth. I
think, aside from his books, he should also be remembered for
the person he was.
My sincere thanks also go out to Lee Anne Joy Torno
and her team at REX. You were an irreplaceable partner in
this first endeavor of mine to update my father's books. Your
guidance and assistance throughout this whole process went
above and beyond and for that, I want to thank you from the
bottom of my heart.
To the readers, as always, these books are for you. My
Father wrote these books for his students as a guide to help
them achieve their dreams of becoming lawyers. I hope you
find in these pages the spark that ignites your instinct to
succeed in your endeavor. Best wishes and good luck!

iv
V
 A DAUGHTER'S MESSAGE TO THE READERS
I humbly present to you my father's last and greatest works.
These editions are very special to me, since contained in these pages
are my father's last words and part of the legacy that he left to the
world. Much of the writing was done in my home, surrounded by
family. My father would hunker down in front of his laptop and
write tirelessly from morning to night, taking breaks throughout
the day to play with his grandson, Christopher, or chat with me. It
was during these times that I saw my Dad's passion for his books, as
well as his deep compassion for his students. It showed in the effort
that he took to craft each sentence, each paragraph, and each page,
so that nothing would be lost in the translation of the law. He would
read me excerpts and ask if, as a layman, I understood what he was
trying to get across. I think that was always his measure of success
for his writing: if a person, like me, with no education in the law,
could understand the concept he was trying to explain, then he was
on the right path.
This is the common thread in the books my father authored: to
simplify law concepts in a manner that is easy to grasp. He took the
most daunting law subjects, and presented them in such a way that
they became less the behemoth than they were previously thought.
He transferred, through the pages, his innate understanding of
Remedial Law subjects in a way that made it easier for his readers
to understand.
To his readers, I hope you find inspiration in these pages to
persevere and be one step closer to your dreams. I hope you find
within yourself the "homicidal instinct" to succeed, and the strength
and faith to stay in your chosen path. In the words of my dad,
"Believe in what you are now. Have faith in what you shall become.
Dreams come true with faith."
Nina Riano-Louridas
Los Angeles, California
November 22, 2019
vi
CONTENTS
Chapter I
General Principles
I. Remedial Law and the Rules of Court
Concept of remedial law; sources ............................................. . 1
Substantive law distinguished from remedial law
(Bar 2006) ......................................................................... . 1
Major aspects of remedial law .................................................. . 2
Scope of civil procedure in the Rules of Court ......................... . 3
Prospective effect of the Rules of Court (Bar 2011) ................ . 3
When procedural rules do not apply to pending actions ......... . 4
Actions or proceedings governed by the Rules of Court .......... . 5
Actions or proceedings not governed by the
Rules of Court ................................................................... . 5
The need to follow fundamental evidentiary rules ................. . 7
II. Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court
Constitutional authority to promulgate rules ......................... . 8
Limitations on the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court .......................................................... ••······ 10
Power to amend and suspend the rules ................................... . 10
Pro hac vice rule ............................................................ ••••••••••••• 14
The rule on liberal construction; purpose (Bar 1998) ............. . 14
General rule on compliance with procedural rules;
exceptions ....................................................... •••••••••••••••••••• 15
III. Nature of the PhiliJ:lpine Courts
Courts of law and equity; application of equity
jurisdiction ........................................................... •••••••••••••• 17
When equity does not apply ............................................ •··•······ 17
Judicial power ................................................... ••••••····•·············· 19
Doctrine of hierarchy of courts (principle of judicial
hierarchy) (Bar 2011; 2017) ............................................. . 20
vii
When the doctrine of hierarchy of courts may be Chapter II
disregarded (Bar 2011) ..................................................... . 22
Jurisdiction and Venue
Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial
stability (Bar 2011) ......................................................... .. 23 I. Jurisdiction
Constitutional and statutory courts ........................................ .. 23 A. Jurisdiction in General .................................................... . 60
Civil and criminal courts .......................................................... . 24
Jurisdiction; meaning ....................................................... . 60
Superior and inferior courts ..................................................... . 24
Jurisdiction is not the power of the judge ...................... .. 61
Courts of general and special jurisdiction .............................. .. 25
Jurisdiction does not refer to the decision itself ............ .. 61
Courts of original and appellate jurisdiction .......................... .. 25
Aspects of jurisdiction ...................................................... . 61
Original and exclusive jurisdiction distinguished .................. .. 27
Concurrent jurisdiction ............................................................. . 27 B. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter .............................. .. 62
Meaning of 'court' ...................................................................... . 28 Meaning of jurisdiction over the subject matter ............. . 62
Court distinguished from a judge ........................................... .. 28 Duty of a court to dismiss an action for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter ................... .. 62
IV. The Basic Processes of Ordinary Effect oflack of jurisdiction over the subject matter ..... .. 63
Civil Actions Jurisdiction versus the exercise of jurisdiction .............. . 64
Introduction ............................................................................... . 29 Error of jurisdiction versus error of judgment
(Bar 1989) ................................................................ . 65
I. Complaint ........................................................................ .. 32 Test of jurisdiction ........................................................... . 67
A. Right of action and cause of action ........................ .. 33
An erroneous judgment is not void ................................. .. 67
B. Jurisdiction .............................................................. . 36
Jurisdiction and cause of action (Bar 1988) ................... .. 68
C. Venue ........................................................................ . 37
How jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred .. .. 68
D. Parties ...................................................................... . 38
Consequences of the rule that jurisdiction is
E. Prescription and conditions precedent ................... . 39
F. Preparation of the complaint .................................. . 41
conferred by law ...................................................... .. 69
G. Provisional remedies ............................................... . 43 The law applicable to the case ........................................ .. 70
H. Filing of the complaint ........................................... .. 44 How jurisdiction over the subject matter is
I. Possible scenarios after the filing of the determined (Bar 2014; 2015) ................................... . 70
complaint ......................................................... . 45 Caption of the case is not controlling .............................. . 71
The amount awarded does not determine
II. Summons ......................................................................... .. 48 jurisdiction (Bar 2015) ............................................ .. 72
A. Motion for bill of particulars ................................... . 50 Doctrine of primary jurisdiction (primary
B. Motion to dismiss .................................................... .. 51 administrative jurisdiction) .................................... . 73
III. Answer ............................................................................. .. 51 Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
A. Default ...................................................................... . 53 remedies and doctrine of primary
B. Counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party jurisdiction ............................................................... . 74
complaint, reply and intervention .................. . 54 Exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction ......... . 75
IV. Pre-trial. ........................................................................... .. 56 Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction
V. Trial .................................................................................. . 57 (continuity of jurisdiction) ...................................... .. 76
VI. Judgment ......................................................................... .. 57 Doctrine of ancillary (incidental) jurisdiction ................ .. 78
VII. Post-judgment remedies .................................................. .. 58 Doctrine of judicial stability ........................................... .. 79
VIII. Execution and satisfaction of judgments ....................... .. 59 Objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter ......... .. 79

viii ix

J........__
 Effect of estoppel on objections to jurisdiction................. 80 G. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals................................. 104
Jurisdiction over the subject matter and the Original exclusive jurisdiction of the
omnibus motion rule................................................. 82 Court of Appeals ...................................................... 104
Original concurrent jurisdiction of the
C. Jurisdiction over the Parties............................................ 83
Court of Appeals ...................................................... 105
Meaning of jurisdiction over the person;
Power to try and conduct hearings like a
jurisdiction in personam........................................... 83
trial court (Bar 2008)................................................ 106
How jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties is acquired (Bar 2009).................................. 84 H. Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals ................. ........ 107
Voluntary appearance of the defendant (Bar 2017) ........ 84
I. Jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts............................. 109
Effect of pleading additional defenses aside from
Explanatory note............................................................... 109
lack of jurisdiction over the person of
Demand not exceeding P2 million ................ .................... 110
the defendant; prior rule re-examined .................... 85
Meaning of interest ..... .... ................. ................................. 112
When jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
Totality Rule (Bar 2014; 2015) ......................................... 112
is required ................................................................. 86
Actions involving personal property................................. 113
Necessity for service of summons..................................... 88
Probate proceedings.......................................................... 114
D. Jurisdiction over the Issues.............................................. 90 Granting provisional remedies......................................... 114
Meaning of jurisdiction over the issue ............................. 90 Delegated jurisdiction....................................................... 114
How jurisdiction over the issue is conferred Special jurisdiction............................................................ 115
and determined......................................................... 90 Summary procedure; small claims cases
Distinction between a question of law and a (Bar 2013; 2014; 2018).............................................. 115
question of fact (Bar 2004) ....................................... 91 Actions for forcible entry and unlawful
When an issue arises even if not raised detainer (Bar 2009; 2014; 2018)............................... 117
in the pleadings......................................................... 92 Actions involving title to, possession of or any
E. Jurisdiction over the Res.................................................. 93 interest in real property; meaning........................... 119
Meaning of jurisdiction over the res; actions Basis is assessed value (Bar 2008; 2009) ......................... 127
in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem.................... 93 The need to allege the assessed value; when failure
How acquired..................................................................... 96 to allege assessed value is not fatal......................... 131
Extent of relief when jurisdiction is only Allegation of assessed value is immaterial on appeal..... 132
over the res................................................................ 97 Inquiring into the primary relief or ultimate
objective of the complaint......................................... 133
F. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Bar 2014) ................ 98 Accion publiciana; accion reiuindicatoria (Bar 2010) ..... 134
Basic principles in relation to the jurisdiction Real actions (actions involving title to, possession of,
of the Supreme Court ............................ ... ................ 98 or any interest in real property) are also
Original exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court .... 100 incapable of pecuniary estimation .......................... 137
Original concurrent jurisdiction of the Jurisdiction over appeals from judgments
Supreme Court ......................................................... 101 of the MTC ................................................................ 139
Appellate jurisdiction........................................................ 102
Original cases cognizable by the Supreme J. Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts (Bar 2016)...... 139
Court.......................................................................... 102 Exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC ................ ....... 139
Appeal to the Supreme Court........................................... 103 Concurrent original jurisdiction of the
Cases which must be heard En Banc............................... 103 Regional Trial Court................................................. 140
Procedure when the opinion of the Supreme Court Appellate jurisdiction........................................................ 140
En Banc is equally divided (Bar 2012) .................... 104 Special jurisdiction to try special cases............................ 141

X xi
 ,~
1

When court may make a motu proprio

Jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies ............. . 141 dismissal based on improper venue......................... 182
Effect on jurisdiction when an intra-corporate case is Denial of a motion to dismiss based on
erroneously assigned by raffle to a regular improper venue; no appeal....................................... 184
branch of the Regional Trial Court ......................... . 146 Improper venue is not jurisdictional;
RTC is a court of general jurisdiction ............................. . 147 waiver of improper venue......................................... 184
Actions incapable of pecuniary estimation Authority of the Supreme Court in relation
(Bar 1997; 2003; 2009) ............................................. . 149 to venue of cases .... ............................. ...... ................ 185
Action for partition of real property ................................ . 156
Action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage ............... . 157 Chapter III
Action to enforce the payment of
damages under a penal clause ............................... . 157 Causes of Action, Actions, and Parties
Extent of trial court's jurisdiction when I. Cause of Action (Rule 2)
acting as a probate court (Bar 2011) ...................... . 157
Importance of a cause of action................................................. 186
K. Jurisdiction of the Family Courts .................................... . 158
Meaning and elements of a cause of action.............................. 186
L. Jurisdiction of Shari'a Courts .......................................... . 159 The need to state the cause of action ....................................... 187
Shari'a courts; types ......................................................... . 159 The test on whether or not the complaint states
Original jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts .............. . 160 a cause of action................................................................. 190
Concurrent jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts ........ . 161 Failure to state a cause of action and lack of a cause
Appellate jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts ............ . 161 of action.............................................................................. 192
Finality of decisions .......................................................... . 161 Importance of the allegations in the complaint........................ 194
Original jurisdiction of Shari'a Circuit Courts ............... . 162 Effect of a finding that the complaint states a
Rules applicable ................................................................ . 162 cause of action.................................................................... 195
Cause of action as applied to administrative cases.................. 195
II. Venue (Rule 4) Cause of action arising from law............................................... 195
Meaning of venue.............................................................. 162 Cause of action based on contracts........................................... 196
Venue in civil cases; venue in criminal cases.................. 163 Cause of action based on the vicarious liability
Some specific distinctions between jurisdiction of an employer................................................................... 196
(over the subject matter) and venue (Bar 2006) ..... 164 Cause of action in environmental cases.................................... 197
Basic venue analysis......................................................... 165 Cause of action for partition raising issue
Venue in personal actions (Bar 2011; 2017) .................... 166 of ownership....................................................................... 197
Venue in real actions (Bar 2009; 2018) ............................ 168 Action distinguished from cause of action (Bar 1999) ............. 198
Venue of actions against non-residents affecting the Splitting a single cause of action (Bar 1996; 1999;
personal status of the plaintiff; actions 2005; 2017); reason for prohibition................................... 198
affecting property of the non-resident in Anticipatory breach................................................................... 208
the Philippines.......................................................... 171 Effect of splitting a single cause of action
When the rules on venue do not apply............................. 172 (Bar 1998; 1999) ................................................................. 209
Stipulations on venue (Bar 1997; 2001; 2012) ................. 173 Joinder of causes of action (Bar 1996; 1999; 2000;
A restrictive stipulation on venue is not binding 2005; 2011; 2012; 2015)..................................................... 209
when the validity of the contract is assailed........... 178 Joinder when there are multiple parties ................................. 211
Venue in a contract of adhesion........................................ 179 Joinder of claims in small claims cases.................................... 213
Complementary-contracts-construed-together rule........ 180 Remedy in case of misjoinder of causes of action..................... 213
Adopted illustrations......................................................... 181
Xlll

xii
 II. Actions Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties .......................... . 255
Effect of non-joinder of indispensable parties ......................... . 256
Definition ...................... •··············· ·········· ························ ··········· 214
Failure to implead an indispensable party;
Civil actions and criminal actions ............................................ . 214
not a ground for dismissal (Bar 2010) ............................. . 256
Actions distinguished from special proceedings
Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties (Bar 2009; 2010) ......... . 257
(Bar 1996; 1998) ............................................................... . 215
Necessary parties ...................................................................... . 258
The special proceedings under the Rules of Court;
Distinction between an indispensable and a
applicability of rules in ordinary civil actions ................ . 215
necessary party ................................................................. . 258
Special civil actions in the Rules of Court ............................... . 217
Duty of pleader if a necessary party is not joined;
Real and personal actions (Bar 2004; 2006) ............................ . 218 effect (Bar 1998) ............................................................... . 259
Significance of the distinction between a personal When court may order joinder of a necessary
action and a real action (Bar 2016) ................................. . 221 party (Bar 1998) ............................................................... . 259
In personam, in rem and quasi in rem actions Effect of failure to comply with the order of the
(Bar 1994; 2009; 2014) ..................................................... . 224 court (Bar 1998; 2011) ...................................................... . 260
Significance of distinction between actions in rem, Effect of a justified non-inclusion of a necessary
in personam, and quasi in rem ........................................ . 229 party (Bar 1998) ............................................................... . 260
Requirement of notice or summons .......................................... . 232 Unwilling co-plaintiff ................................................................ . 260
Example of when an action in rem or quasi in rem is Alternative defendants (Bar 2011) ........................................... . 261
treated as in personam ..................................................... . 234 Unknown identity or name of the defendant .......................... . 261
When summons by publication may be made in an Effect of death of a party on the attorney-client
action in personam ........................................................... . 234 relationship; duty of counsel (Bar 2016) ........................ . 262
Action of court upon notice of death; effect of death
III. Parties (Rule 3) on the case (Bar 2009) ...................................................... . 262
Parties to a civil action ............................................................. . 235 Importance of substitution of the deceased ............................ . 263
No requirement for amendment of complaint
Who may be parties .................................................................. . 236
or service of summons ...................................................... . 264
Juridical persons as parties ...................................................... . 236
Purpose and importance of substitution of the deceased ........ . 264
Entities authorized by law to be parties .................................. . 238
Examples of actions which survive the death of a
Entity without a juridical personality as a defendant ............ . 239
party (Bar 2011) ............................................................... . 265
Effect when a party impleaded is not authorized
Actions for the recovery of money arising from
to be a party ...................................................................... . 240 contractual obligations ..................................................... . 267
Averment of capacity to sue or be sued ................................... . 240 Action for recovery of money arising from contract,
Minor or incompetent as a party .............................................. . 241 expressed or implied ......................................................... . 268
Real party in interest (Bar 1988; 1989; 2015) ......................... . 241 Incompetency or incapacity of a party during the
Determining the real party in interest .................................... . 242 pendency of the action ...................................................... . 268
Doctrine of locus standi ............................................................ . 245 Transfer of interest ................................................................... . 268
Plaintiff in environmental cases .............................................. . 248 Indigent parties (Bar 2016) ...................................................... . 269
Affirmative defense when a party is not the real Role of the 'Solicitor General' ................................................... . 269
party in interest ................................................................ . 248 Suit by or against spouses ........................................................ . 270
Representative parties .............................................................. . 249 Class suit; requisites ................................................................. . 271
Citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for Commonality of interest in the subject matter ....................... . 271
Environmental Cases ....................................................... . 250 No class suit when interests are conflicting ............................ . 273
Standing of marine mammals .................................................. . 251 No class suit by a corporation to recover property
Indispensable parties (Bar 1996; 2015; 2017) ......................... . 253 of its members ................................................................. . 273

xiv xv
No class suit to recover real property How a pleading is verified................................................. 290
individually held................................................................ 274 Significance of a verification............................................. 291
No class suit to recover damages for personal Effect of lack of a verification or of a defective
reputation ...... ..... ... ......... ............. .................... ... ..... .......... 27 4 verification (Bar 2011) .............................................. 292
Common or general interest in the environment Other requirements........................................................... 293
and natural resources....................................................... 274 Certification against forum shopping
Dismissal or compromise of a class suit ................................... 275 (Bar 2000; 2009; 2010; 2014).................................... 294
Class suit distinguished from representative suit................... 276 Purpose of the certification............................................... 295
Meaning of forum shopping .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. .... 295
Chapter IV The certification is not a jurisdictional requirement....... 296
Pleadings and Motions Three ways of committing forum shopping...................... 297
Determination of the existence of forum
I. Pleadings shopping .................................................................... 297
A. General Principles on Pleadings ...................................... . 277 There is no forum shopping in simultaneously
Nature of pleadings ......................................................... .. 277 filing a quo warranto petition and a
Necessity and purpose of pleadings ................................ .. 277 complaint for impeachment .............. ................ .... ... 300
Construction of pleadings ................................................ . 278 Who executes the certification against forum
Construction of ambiguous allegations in pleadings ...... . 278 shopping (Bar 2000); exception................................ 300
Pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court (Bar 1996) ...... . 279 Signing the certification when the plaintiff is a
Pleadings allowed under the Rules on Expedited juridical entity .......................................................... 301
Rule if there are several plaintiffs or
Procedures in the First Level Courts .................... .. 279
petitioners; exception (Bar 2016) ............................. 305
Pleadings in the Rule of Procedure for Small
Pleadings requiring a certification against
Claims Cases ............................................................ . 280
forum shopping .... .. ... ... .. .... .. .. .... .. .... .. .. ... .. .. .... .... .... .. 306
Pleadings not allowed in a petition for a Applicability to special civil actions .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .... . 307
Writ of Amparo or Habeas Data ............................ .. 281 Effects of non-compliance with the rule on
Pleadings in the Rules of Procedure for certification against forum shopping
Environmental Cases ............................................. .. 282 (Bar 1996).................................................................. 307
Nature of a pleading; how determined ............................ . 282 Effect of willful and deliberate forum
B. Parts of a Pleading .......................................................... .. 284 shopping; dismissal of all pending claims .... .. .. .. .. .. . 308
Caption of the pleading ................................................... .. 284 Effect of submission of a false certification 309
Title of the action .............................................................. . 284 Effect of non-compliance with the undertaki~~~::::::::::::: 309
Body of the pleading ......................................................... . 284 Summary of guidelines respecting non-
compliance with the requirements of or
Headings; designation of causes of actions
submission of defective, verification and
joined in one complaint ............................................ . 284
certification against forum shopping....................... 310
Allegations of ultimate facts ............................................ . 285
Relief ................................................................................. . 286 C. Allegations in Pleadings .................. ,................................ 311
Contents ............................................................................ . 287 Allegations of conditions precedent.................................. 311
Signature and address .................................................... .. 287 Effect of failure to comply with a condition precedent.... 312
Effect of an unsigned pleading ........................................ . 288 Pleading a judgment......................................................... 312
Significance of the signature of counsel Pleading an official document or act................................ 313
(Bar 1996; 2013) ...................................................... .. 289 Pleading capacity to sue or be sued.................................. 313
Verification in a pleading (Bar 2018) .............................. . 290 Pleading fraud, mistake or condition of the mind........... 314

xvi
xvii
 Pleading alternative causes of actions or defenses.......... 314 Effect of failure to pay docket fee on
Pleading actionable documents (Bar 1991; supplemental complaint.......................... 334
2004; 2005; 2017) ...................................................... 317 Payment of docket fees for cases on appeal.... 334
How to contest an actionable document; 2. Answer.............................................................. 335
oath required (Bar 2010; 2017) ................................ 318 Nature of an answer........................................ 335
When an oath is not required (Bar 1987; 2017)............... 319 Kinds of defenses in the answer...................... 336
Meaning of admission....................................................... 319 Effect of absence of a specific denial ...... .... ..... 338
Defenses cut off by the admission of Purpose of a specific denial.............................. 338
genuineness and due execution ...... ...... ........ ...... ..... 320 Kinds of specific denials (Bar 2011; 2015) ...... 339
Defenses not cut off by the admission of Negative pregnant ........................................... 341
genuineness and due execution (Bar 2017) ............. 320 When a specific denial must be coupled
D. Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments with an oath (Bar 2010) .......................... 342
and Other Papers in Civil Cases.............................. 320 Matters not deemed admitted by the
Meaning of 'filing' .... .. .................. ........... ........................... 320 failure to make a specific denial .. .... ....... 344
Affirmative defenses .. .... ............ .. .. .......... .... .... 345
Meaning of 'service'........................................................... 321
Periods to file an answer to a complaint......... 34 7
Upon whom service shall be made................................... 321
2(a). Default.............................................................. 348
Service upon counsel representing several parties ......... 322 Nature of default (Bar 2013; 2014;
Service upon several counsels representing 2015; 2017)............................................... 348
one party ........... .................................................. ...... 322 Requisites before a defending party may be
Manner of filing.................................................................. 322 declared in default (Bar 1999; 2013;
How to prove filing .... ...... .......... .. ...... ........ ........ ...... ....... ... 323 2015)......................................................... 350
Papers required to be filed and served............................. 324 No motu proprio declaration of default........... 350
Modes of service................................................................. 324 Failure to serve the answer to the
Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions .... ........ 325 adverse party ........ .... .......... .. ...... .. .... ....... 351
Conventional service or filing of orders, Effect of a declaration/order of default
pleadings and other documents ............................... 325 (Bar 2012) ................................................ 352
Court-issued orders and other documents....................... 326 Effect of partial default (Bar 2011) ................. 353
Personal service................................................................. 326 Action of the court after the declaration/
When personal service is deemed complete..................... 327 order of default ...................... .......... ........ 353
Service by mail .. ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ........ ...... ........ ...... ...... 327 Court not required to receive evidence
When service by mail is deemed complete....................... 328 personally................................................. 354
Substituted service............................................................ 328 Admission of answer filed out of time............. 354
When substituted service is complete.............................. 328 Extension of the time to answer...................... 355
Service by electronic means and facsimile....................... 328 Remedies of a defending party declared
Presumptive Service.......................................................... 330 in default (Bar 1998; 2012; 2013) ........... 356
How to prove service (Bar 2011; 2012)............................. 330 Current judicial trend on defaults.................. 357
Implied lifting of the order of default.............. 358
E. Kinds of Pleadings............................................................. 331 Extent of relief in a judgment by default........ 359
1. Complaint......................................................... 331 Cases where a declaration/order of default
Meaning of complaint...................................... 331 cannot be made........................................ 359
Filing of the complaint; significance............... 331 Judgment by default for refusal to comply
Payment of docket fees and acquisition of with the modes of discovery.................... 360
jurisdiction............................................... 332

xviii xix
 Failure to file response under the Rules 5. Third (Fourth, etc.)-Party Complaint ............ . 378
of Procedure for Small Claims Case Nature of a third-party complaint .................. . 378
(Bar 2012) ............................................... . 360 Leave of court ................................................. .. 380
Failure to file a return under the Rules Answer to a third-party complaint ................ .. 380
on the Writ of Amparo ............................ . 361 6. Intervention ..................................................... . 381
Failure to file a return under the Rules Nature of intervention (Bar 2011) ................ .. 381
on the Writ of Habeas Data ................... . 361 Requisites for intervention (Bar 2000) ......... .. 382
Failure to file an answer under the Rules on Meaning oflegal interest.. ............................. .. 383
Expedited Procedures in the First Procedure for intervention .............................. . 385
Level Courts (Bar 2012; 2017) ............... . 361 Time for intervention ..................................... .. 386
Counterclaim ................................................... . 362 7. Reply ................................................................ . 386
3.
Nature of a counterclaim (Bar 1999; 2007; Nature of a reply ............................................ .. 386
2010); kinds ............................................ .. 362 Filing of reply, not mandatory ....................... .. 387
Compulsory and permissive counterclaims ... . 363 When filing ofreply is advisable ................... .. 388
Period to file a reply ........................................ . 388
Compulsory counterclaim; tests ..................... . 363
F. Amendment of Pleadings (Rule 10) ................................ .. 388
The need to set up a compulsory
How pleadings are amended;
counterclaim in the same action ............ . 366
reason for allowing amendment.. ........................... .. 388
Incompatibility between a compulsory Amendment as a matter of right (Bar 2000; 2012) ........ . 389
counterclaim and a motion to dismiss .... 367 Applicability of mandamus ............................................. .. 390
Permissive counterclaim (Bar 2011) .............. . 368 Amendment made during the pendency of a
Distinctions between a compulsory and a motion to dismiss (Bar 1979; 2005; 2014) .............. . 390
permissive counterclaim ....................... .. 369 Amendment by leave of court (Bar 1986; 1994; 2014) .... . 390
How to set up an omitted counterclaim ........ .. 372 Amendment to cure a failure to state a cause
How to set up a counterclaim arising of action (Bar 2004; 2013) ....................................... .. 391
after the answer ...................................... . 372 Amendment to conform to the evidence
Period to answer a counterclaim ................... .. 372 (Bar 2004; 2013) ....................................................... . 393
Effect of the dismissal of a complaint No amendment where no cause of action
on the counterclaim already exists ......................................................................... . 394
set up (Bar 2010) ................................... .. 373 Amendment to correct a jurisdictional defect
Options of the defendant who has before a responsive pleading is served
pleaded a counterclaim ......................... .. 375 (Bar 2005) ................................................................. . 396
4. Cross-claim ...................................................... . 375 Amendment to correct a jurisdictional defect
Nature of a cross-claim .................................. .. 375 after a responsive pleading is served ..................... .. 397
No cross-claim for the first time Effect of the amendment on the original pleading ......... . 399
on appeal ................................................ .. 376 Effect of the amendment on admissions made
Distinctions between a counterclaim in the original pleading ........................................... . 399
and a cross-claim (Bar 1999) ................. .. 377 Summons after complaint is amended; when
How to set up a cross-claim arising required and when not required ............................ .. 400
after the answer ...................................... . 377 Supplemental pleadings ................................................... . 401
Cause of action in supplemental pleadings ..................... . 401
How to set up an omitted cross-claim ............ . 377
Answer to a supplemental pleading;
Period to answer a cross-claim ...................... .. 377
not mandatory .......................................................... . 402

xx xxi
 II. Motions in Civil Cases Se~ce upon spouses ................................................................ . 427
Definition of a motion ............................................................... . 403 Service upon a domestic private juridical entity ..................... . 428
Form of motions ........................................................................ . 403 Old rule on service upon a domestic
. t . .d. 1 .
priva e Juri ica entity ..................................................... . 429
Contents of a motion ................................................................. . 403
Non-litigious motions ................................................................ . 404 Serv~ce up?n a foreign private juridical entity ........................ . 432
Litigious motions ....................................................................... . 404 Foreign private juridical entities not registered in the
Notice of hearing on litigious motions; discretionary ............. . 406 Philippines or have no resident agents ........................... . 434
Proof of service .......................................................................... . 406 Service upon an unincorporated government agency ............. . 434
Motion day ................................................................................. . 406 Duty of counsel on record 435
Motion for leave to file a motion ............................................... . 406 A. Service in person on defendant
The Omnibus motion rule (Bar 2010; 2011) ............................ . 406 (formerly personal service of summons) ................ . 435
Prohibited motions under 2019 Amendments B. Substituted service of summons
to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure ............................... . 407 (Bar 2004; 2006; 2013; 2016; 2017; 2018) ............... . 438
Prohibited motions under the Rules on Expedited How substituted service is made 441
Procedures in the First Level Courts .............................. . 408 Effect if defendant does not actu~iiy receive ··
Prohibited motions in the Rules on the Writs of the summons ............................................................ . 444
Amparo and Habeas Data ................................................ . 411 When defendant prevents service of summons
C. Summo b bl" t· ............... . 444
Prohibited motions under the Rules of Procedure ns y pu ica ion .................................................. . 447
for Small Claims Cases, as amended .............................. . 411 Service upon a defendant whose identity or
Prohibited motions under the Rules of Procedure whereabouts are unknown ..... 448
for Environmental Cases ................................................. . 412 Service upon a resident temporarily out
of the Philippines ..................................................... . 449
ChapterV Extraterritorial service of summons ............................... . 451
Actions involved in extraterritorial service
Summons of summons .............................................................. . 452
Purpose and importance of summons ...................................... . 413 Modes of extraterritorial service (Bar 2008; 2013) ......... . 455
Service of summons applies to any action ............................... . 414 Application of principles .................................................. . 457
Summons in actions in personam (Bar 2016) ......................... . 414 Suits against non-resident defendants who have
Effect of knowledge of the filing of the action .......................... . 416 properties in the Philippines but are outside
Purpose of summons in actions in rem and quasi in rem ....... . 416 of the country ........................................................... . 459
Voluntary appearance by the defendant (Bar 2017) ............... . 417
Who issues the summons .......................................................... . 422 Chapter VI
When summons is issued .......................................................... . 422 Proceedings after Service of Summons
To whom summons is directed ................................................. . 422 and Dismissal of Actions
Who serves summons (Bar 2012) ............................................. . 422
Contents of the summons ......................................................... . 423 Preliminary statements ................................................... . 461
Validity of summons and issuance of alias summons ............. . 424 A. Motion for Bill of Particulars ........................................... . 462
Return and proof of service (Bar 2012) .................................... . 424 When to file the motion
·····················································462
Uniformity of the rules on summons ....................................... . 425 Purpose of the motion ...................................................... . 463
Service upon an entity without a juridical personality .......... . 426 Purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in a
Service upon a prisoner ............................................................ . 426 criminal case (Bar 2018) .......................................... . 464
Service consistent with international conventions ................. . 427 Requirements for the motion ........................................... . 465
Service upon a minor and an incompetent .............................. . 427 Action of the court (Bar 2008; 2010; 2012) ...................... . 465

xxii
xxiii

L.....__
 Compliance with the order ............................................... . 465
Bill of particulars as part of the pleading ...................... .. 466
Effect of non-compliance or insufficient compliance
with the order of the court ...................................... . 466
Stay of period to file responsive pleading ........................ . 466
467
B. Motion to Dismiss ............................................................ ..
A motion to dismiss is not a pleading ............................ .. 468
Omnibus motion (Bar 2010) ............................................ .. 469
Contents and form of the motion to dismiss .................. .. 470
Notice of hearing on litigious motions; discretionary .... .. 470
When a motion to dismiss may be filed even after
the answer has been served and filed ..................... . 470
Res judicata as a ground for a motion to dismiss;
aspects of res judicata (Bar 2011) .......................... .. 471
Elements of res judicata (in relation to the concept
of "bar by a prior judgment") (Bar 2011) ................ . 473
Elements of res judicata (in relation to
"conclusiveness of judgment") .............................. .. 473
Distinctions between the two types of res judicata ........ . 474
Application of res judicata to quasi-judicial
proceedings ............................................................... . 475
No res judicata in criminal proceedings .......................... . 475
Dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia .................... .. 476
Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses ...................... . 476
Remedy of the defendant if the motion is denied .......... .. 477
When certiorari is available ............................................. . 478
Remedies of the plaintiff if the motion to dismiss
is granted ................................................................. . 478
480
When complaint cannot be refiled (Bar 2011) ............... ..
481
C. Dismissal by the Plaintiff ................................................ .
Dismissal by mere notice of dismissal
(Bar 2017; 2018) ...................................................... . 481
Dismissal without prejudice; exceptions ........................ .. 481
Two-dismissal rule (Bar 1989; 2017; 2018) .................... .. 482
Dismissal by filing a motion to dismiss .......................... .. 483
Dismissal without prejudice (Sec. 2, Rule 17) ............... .. 483
Dismissal due to the fault of plaintiff
(Sec. 3, Rule 17) ...................................................... .. 483
Dismissal with prejudice (Sec. 3, Rule 17) ...................... . 485
Effect of dismissal upon a counterclaim already
pleaded (Bar 2008; 2010) ........................................ .. 485
Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint ............................................. .. 486
Chapter VII
Pre-Trial and Modes of Discovery
A. Pre-Trial............................................................................. 487
Concept, nature, and purpose of a pre-trial
(Bar 2009).................................................................. 487
Preliminary conference ..................................................... 490
Effect of failure to conduct a pre-trial.............................. 490
Referral to the Philippine Mediation Center................... 491
Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) ................................... 492
How pre-trial is called; filing of motion by
plaintiff (Bar 1999) ................................................... 493
The meaning of 'last pleading' .... .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .... .. .... .. .. .. .. .. 493
Notice of pre-trial (Bar 1977)............................................ 494
Appearance of parties and counsels in the pre-trial
(Bar 1992).................................................................. 495
Effect of failure to appear by the plaintiff
(Bar 1980; 1981; 1989); remedy............................... 495
Effect of failure to appear by the defendant
(Bar 2011); remedy................................................... 496
How non-appearance is excused....................................... 497
Pre-trial brief; filing and contents.................................... 499
Identification and marking of evidence............................ 499
Legal effect of representations and statements
in the pre-trial brief.................................................. 500
Effect of failure to file a pre-trial brief............................. 500
No termination of pre-trial for failure to settle............... 501
One Day Examination of Witness Rule
(Bar 2009; 2016)........................................................ 502
Most Important Witness Rule (Bar 2016) ........................ 502
Questions are to be asked by the judge............................ 502
Pre-trial order.................................................................... 503
Implied issues are deemed included in the
pre-trial order........................................................... 504
Judgment after pre-trial................................................... 504
Distinctions between pre-trial in ciyil cases
and pre-trial in criminal cases (Bar 1997) .............. 505
Preliminary conference under the Rules on Expedited
Procedures in the First Level Courts
(A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC)................................................. 507
Preliminary conference in the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court ................ ............................... ... 509

xxiv XXV
B. Modes of Discovery............................................................ 510 Deferment of compliance........................................................... 527
Meaning and purpose of "discovery"................................ 510 Withdrawal of admission........................................................... 527
Duty of the court in relation to the modes
of discovery................................................................ 510 IV. Production or Inspection of Documents or
Modes of discovery under the Rules of Court Things (Rule 27)
(Bar 2000) ................................................................. 511 Purpose (Bar 2012) .................................................................... 527
Filing of a motion; order of the court ........................................ 528
I. Depositions (Rules 23-24; Bar 2010) Privileged documents................................................................. 529
Depositions pending action; when leave of court
is required.......................................................................... 512 V. Physical and Mental Examination of Persons
Scope of the examination; manner of examination.................. 513 (Rule 28)
Attendance of the deponents/witnesses; sanctions.................. 513 Applicability ............................................................................... 530
Oral Deposition.......................................................................... 515 Procedure ................................................................................... 530
Salient guidelines in the taking of an oral deposition............. 516 Waiver of privilege..................................................................... 531
Deposition upon written interrogatories.................................. 518
Before whom taken.................................................................... 519
VI. Refusal to Comply with the Modes of Discovery
Use of depositions pending action............................................. 519
(Rule 29)
Effect of substitution of parties................................................. 520
Effect of the taking of deposition of a person ........................... 520 A. Refusal to answer any question upon oral
Effect of using the deposition of a person................................. 521 examination .............................................................. 531
Depositions before action........................................................... 521 B. Refusal to answer designated or particular questions
Perpetuation of testimony before action................................... 521 or refusal to produce documents or things or
Depositions pending appeal....................................................... 522 to submit to physical or mental examination.......... 532
C. Refusal to be sworn........................................................... 533
II. Interrogatories to Parties (Bar 2016) (Rule 25) D. Refusal to admit................................................................ 533
Purpose of interrogatories to parties (Bar 2012; 2016)............ 522 E. Failure to attend depositions or to serve
Distinguished from a bill of particulars.................................... 523 answers to interrogatories (Bar 2010) ..................... 533
Distinguished from written interrogatories in a
deposition........................................................................... 523 Chapter VIII
Procedure (Bar 2016) ................................................................. 524 Trial, Demurrer to Evidence, and Judgment
Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories ..................... 524 A. Trial
III. Admission by Adverse Party Meaning of 'trial' ........................................................................ 535
(Bar 2016; 2018) (Rule 26) Trial and hearing ................................................. ...................... 535
When trial is necessary/unnecessary (Bar 1996) ..................... 535
Purpose of admission by adverse party .................................... 525
Schedule of Trial........................................................................ 537
When request is made ............................................................... 525
Calendaring of cases ................................. :................................ 539
Effect of not filing a written request for admission
Session hours.............................................................................. 539
(Bar 2012) .......................................................................... 525
Effect of failure to file and serve a sworn statement Adjournments and postponements ........................................... 539
of denial (Bar 2018) .......................................................... 526 Limitation on the authority to adjourn..................................... 540
Effect of admission..................................................................... 526 Postponement or continuance; not a matter of right............... 540
Postponement on the ground of illness..................................... 541
Reception of evidence................................................................. 541
xxvi xxvii

i>
Issues in the trial ............. ..................... ... ........ .................... ...... 541 Judgments of the Supreme Court; precedents......................... 561
Oral offer of exhibits .... .... .. .. .. .... .... .. .. .. .. .. .... .... .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 542 Rule on stare decisis; applies only to Supreme
Agreed statement of facts.......................................................... 542 Court decisions .................................................................. 562
Order of trial; modification of the order of trial; Pro hac vice rulings.................................................................... 563
hot tub hearing .. ...... .... ...... ...... .... .... .. .. .... ...... .. ...... .... .. .. .... 542 The principles of stare decisis and res judicata
Reopening the case of a party for the purpose of compared............................................................................ 564
introducing further evidence .... .... ...................... ...... ........ 544 Obiter dictum ...... ...................... .............. ............. .. ............. ....... 564
Consolidation or severance (Bar 2011) ..................................... 545 When a judgment becomes final................................................ 565
Kinds of consolidations.............................................................. 546 Effect of final judgments; res judicata .......................... .... ........ 566
Amendment of judgment; supplemental judgment.................. 568
B. Demurrer to Evidence Doctrine of immutability of judgments (Bar 2011) .................. 569
Reasons for the rule on immutability of judgments................. 570
Stage of the proceedings when demurrer to evidence Remedies against a final and executory judgment;
is availed of........................................................................ 548 exceptions to the doctrine of immutability
Ground for a demurrer to evidence........................................... 548 of judgments ...................................................................... 570
Effect of denial of the demurrer to evidence............................. 549 Meaning of "judgment on the merits"....................................... 573
Effect of granting the demurrer to evidence............................. 550 Doctrine of law of the case......................................................... 573
Failure to state a cause of action as distinguishes Several judgment....................................................................... 575
from failure to prove cause of action .............. .............. .... 550 Separate judgment..................................................................... 575
Demurrer in a civil case as distinguished from Conditional judgment................................................................ 575
a demurrer in a criminal case (Bar 2007) ........................ 551 Judgment sin perjuicio .............................................................. 576
Judgment nunc pro tune (literally, "now for then")
C. Judgment (Bar 2012; 2014) ................................................................ 576
Meaning of a judgment.............................................................. 552 Judgment upon a compromise (Bar 1996; 2012) ...................... 577
Judgment and decision.............................................................. 552 Judgment upon a confession (cognovit actionem) .................... 579
Requisites of a valid judgment.................................................. 552
Orders granting or denying a motion to dismiss...................... 554 D. Judgment on the Pleadings
Conflict between the dispositive portion and (Bar 1978; 1993; 1999; 2014; 2015; 2016)
body of the decision .. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... .... .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. . 554 Nature of judgment on the pleadings ....................................... 579
Ambiguity in the judgment; clarificatory judgment................. 555 Motion required; resolving the motion .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .... .. . 580
Resolutions of the Supreme Court .... .............. ...... ............ ........ 555 Cases where judgment on the pleadings will not apply........... 581
Interlocutory orders................................................................... 556
Questioning interlocutory orders.............................................. 557 E. Summary Judgment
Memorandum decisions (Bar 2012) .......................................... 557
Meaning of rendition of judgment............................................. 558 Nature of summary judgment (Bar 1986; 1989;
Period within which to render a decision ...... ........................... 558 1996; 1999; 2014; 2015; 2016)........................................... 581
Extension of the period to render a decision .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 559 Distinctions between a judgment on the pleadings and a
Judgment penned by a judge who did not hear summary judgment (Bar 1989; 2016)............................... 583
the evidence ....................................................................... 559 Judgment against an entity without a juridical
Judgment penned by a judge who had ceased to personality......................................................................... 584
be a judge........................................................................... 561 Entry of judgment; date thereof................................................ 584
Judgment penned by a judge who was transferred................. 561 Relevance of knowing the date of the entry
of a judgment .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. .. .... .. .. .... .. .... .. ... .... .. .... .. ...... 585

xxviii xxix
-
Chapter IX Motion for new trial in small claims cases....................... 600
Motion for new trial in environmental cases................... 600
Post Judgment Remedies
When to file ......... .... ................. ............... .... ...... ...... .. 600
I - Remedies before a Judgment Becomes Final Effect of the filing of the motion on the period
and Executory to appeal........................................................... 600
Form of a motion for new trial .............................. ... 601
Post judgment remedies available to the aggrieved Grounds for a motion for new trial (Bar 2011)........ 601
party (Bar 2006) ........................................................... ..... 586 Non-compliance with this requirement would
A. Motion for Reconsideration (Rule 37; reduce the motion to a
Bar 2009; 2014) mere proforma motion .................................... 601
Object of the motion .......................................................... 587 Affidavit of merit....................................................... 601
Motion for reconsideration in cases covered by Newly-discovered evidence; requisites .................... 602
summary procedure.................................................. 588 Gross negligence of counsel not a
Motion for reconsideration in small claims cases............ 588 ground for new trial ..... ..... ......... ..................... 602
Motion for reconsideration in petitions for Resolution of the motion........................................... 603
writ of amparo and habeas data .............................. 588 Denial of the motion; the "Fresh Period" Rule........ 603
Motion for reconsideration in environmental cases ........ 588 Order of denial, not appealable................................ 603
When to file........................................................................ 589 Remedy when motion is denied............................... 603
Effect of the filing of a motion on the period to appeal ... 589 Effect of granting the motion for new trial
Grounds for a motion for reconsideration; (Bar 2011) ......................................................... 604
what to allege............................................................ 590 Partial new trial........................................................ 604
Second motion for new trial ..................................... 604
Proforma motion (Bar 2011) ............................................ 590
New trial in appealed cases..................................... 605
Resolution of the motion ................................................... 591
Remedy against the order denying a
APPEALS
motion for reconsideration..................................... 591
Remedy when motion is denied........................................ 592 General principles on appeal .............. ..................... 605
The "Fresh Period" rule; Neypes rule ............................... 592 Judgments or orders that are appealable ............... 608
The Neypes rule has no application to non-judicial Judgments or orders that are not
proceedings................................................................ 595 appealable (Bar 2014) ...................................... 608
Application of the Neypes rule to criminal cases............. 595 Remedy in case the judgment or final order
Order of denial, not appealable ........................................ 597 is not appealable .............................................. 611
Effect of granting a motion for reconsideration............... 597 Remedy against an order of execution;
Partial reconsideration ..................................................... 598 exceptions......................................................... 612
The "Single Motion" rule (Bar 2013) ................................ 598 Issues that may and may not be raised
Motion for reconsideration in appealed cases; on appeal........................................................... 613
stay of execution (Rule 52; Bar 2012; Role of the appellee................................................... 614
Errors to be considered by the appellate court....... 615
2013; 2016) ············································• ..·"·············· 598
Harmless errors (Bar 2017) .... ,................................. 616
B. Motion for New Trial (Rule 37) Appeals in criminal cases......................................... 61 7
Nature of a new trial......................................................... 599 Payment of docket fee; liberal construction............ 618
Motion for new trial in cases covered by Record on appeal; notice of appeal........................... 619
summary procedure.................................................. 599 Dismissal of an appeal.............................................. 620
Withdrawal of the appeal......................................... 622

XXX xxxi

_&.......___
 A. Appeal from Municipal Trial Courts to the Questions oflaw; questions of fact (Bar 2014) ......................... 639
Regional Trial Courts (Rule 40) Findings of facts, not ordinarily reviewed;
"factual-issue-bar" rule..................................................... 641
Where to appeal from a judgment or final Examples of issues of fact which cannot be raised
order of a Municipal Court (Bar 2014) ............................. 622 under Rule 45 .. .. .. .... ..... .. .. .. .. .. .... .. ... ....... ........ ... .. ..... .... .... . 642
When to appeal........................................................................... 622 Referral to the Court of Appeals .. .. .... ... .. ........... .. .. .... .. .. .. .. .. ..... 645
How to appeal; contents of notice of appeal.............................. 623 When questions of fact may be passed upon in
Perfection of the appeal............................................................. 623 a Rule 45 petition .... ..... .. ... .... .. ..... .. ..... .. ... .. .. .. ....... .... .. ...... 646
Duty of the clerk of court of the RTC .... .............. ...... ......... ....... 624 Appeals in criminal cases .... .. .. .. .... .. .... .. .. .... .. .... .. .. .. .. ... .... .. .. .... . 648
Submission of memorandum..................................................... 624 Appeal from a judgment in a petition for a Writ of Amparo
When case is deemed submitted for decision .............. ...... ....... 624 or Writ of Habeas Data; Writ of Kalikasan......... ..... ........ 648
Basis of the decision .. ...... .... ................ .... .. ......... ...... ........ ...... .. . 625 Certiorari under Rule 45 is not the certiorari
Appeal from an order dismissing a case for lack of under Rule 65 (Bar 1998; 1999)........................................ 649
jurisdiction (Bar 2014) ...................................................... 625 When a Rule 65 petition is treated as a Rule 45 petition........ 651
When to appeal........................................................................... 652
B. Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts When extension of period to file is allowed............................... 652
to the Court of Appeals (Rule 41) How to appeal............................................................................. 652
Modes of appeal from the decision of the Regional
E. Other Appeals/Reviews
Trial Court (Bar 2009; 2014; 2017) .................................. 626
Modes of appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Appeals from quasi-judicial bodies (Rule 43) ........................... 653
Court of Appeals (Bar 2009; 2014) ................................... 627 Award or judgment not stayed by the appeal.......................... 654
Mode of appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Review of decisions of the National Labor Relations
Supreme Court .......... ... .. ..... ... ... ............ ... ... ... ... ... .. ...... ... .. 627 Commission [NLRC] (Bar 2006; 2013; 2017) ................... 655
Application of Rule 41 on ordinary appeal............................... 628 Decision not stayed by the filing of the petition ...................... 657
When to appeal (Bar 2011)........................................................ 629 Appeal to the Supreme Court ................................................... 657
How to appeal............................................................................. 629 Review of decisions of voluntary arbitrators
Questions that may be raised on appeal................................... 631 in labor cases .... .. .. ... ... ..... .. ..... .. .... ... .... .. ..... .. .. .. ..... .. ..... .. .. . 658
Residual jurisdiction.................................................................. 631 Appeals from the Sandiganbayan........ ............. ........................ 658
Review of the rulings of the Ombudsman
C. Petition for Review from the Regional Trial (Bar 2006; 2015) ................................................................ 659
Courts to the Court of Appeals (Rule 42) When decision of the Ombudsman is final and
unappealable ................ ........... ........................... ... ........... 662
Application of Rule 42................................................................ 632
Injunction orders by the Court of Appeals against the
When to appeal........................................................................... 633
Office of the Ombudsman.................................................. 662
How to appeal............................................................................. 633 Appeals from judgments of the Court of Tax Appeals
Residual jurisdiction.................................................................. 635
(Bar 2006) .. .. ..... .. .. .... ...... .. .. .... .. ..... .. .. ... .. ...... .. .. ... .. ..... .. .. ... 663
Stay of judgment........................................................................ 635 Review of judgments of the Commission on Elections
(Bar 2011) .......................................................................... 664
D. Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court Review of judgments of the Commission on Audit
or Petition for Review on Certiorari (Bar 2011) .......................................................................... 666
(Rule 45) Appeals from judgments of the Civil Service Commission
Application of Rule 45 (Bar 2014) ............................................. 636 (Bar 2014) .......................................................................... 667
Provisional remedies.................................................................. 638 Appeals from judgments of the Office
Not a matter of right.................................................................. 638 of the President ... ............ ...... ................ ...... ............. ......... 667

xxxn xxxiii
Review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice; C. Certiorari (Rule 65)
rule for violations of tax and tariff laws........................... 667 Nature of the remedy (Bar 2013) .............................................. 688
Appeal to the Office of the President from the decision Certiorari under Rule 65 is not an appeal .......... .............. ....... 692
of the DOJ.......................................................................... 669 Judicial discretion...................................................................... 693
Motion for reconsideration ..... ............. ......... ............................. 693
F. Mode of Appeal to the Supreme Court Exceptions to the rule requiring a motion for
II - Remedies after a Judgment Has Become Final reconsideration.................................................................. 694
and Executory Material Data (Date) Rule......................................................... 695
Certification against forum shopping ....... ........... ............... ...... 696
A. Petition for Relief from Judgments Orders
Jurisdiction (Bar 2012); observance of hierarchy
or Other Proceedings (Rule 38) of courts.............................................................................. 696
Nature of the petition................................................................ 671 Certiorari does not interrupt the principal case .. .................... 697
Grounds for a petition for relief; proper court.......................... 672 Remedy in order to interrupt the course of the
Extrinsic fraud; concept (Bar 2011) .......................................... 673 principal case..................................................................... 697
Petition is available only to the parties.................................... 673 Certiorari under the Constitution and the Rules
Petition is available to proceedings after the judgment .......... 673 of Court; the expanded concepts of certiorari and
When to file................................................................................ 674 prohibition in relation to the power of judicial review.... 697
Form of the petition; affidavit of merit..................................... 675 When a petition for declaratory relief is proper and
Order to answer......................................................................... 675 not a petition for certiorari ........................... ............... ..... 702
Hearing of the petition............................................................... 676
Action of the court...................................................................... 676
Preliminary injunction pending the petition for relief............ 676 D. Collateral Attack of a Judgment
No petition for relief in the Supreme Court and
Distinction between a direct attack from a collateral
Court of Appeals................................................................ 677
attack................................................................................. 703
No petition for relief in summary procedure, small claims..... 678
Petition for relief in environmental cases................................. 679
ChapterX
B. Annulment of Judgments, Final Orders or Execution and Satisfaction of Judgments
Resolutions (Rule 4 7)
Meaning of execution................................................................. 704
Nature of the action................................................................... 679 Part of the judgment to be executed ..... .................................... 704
Court in which action is commenced ................... ..................... 682 When execution shall issue ......................... .......... .................... 704
Grounds for annulment (Bar 2014; 2016)................................. 682 How execution shall issue ...... .......................................... ......... 705
Extrinsic fraud........................................................................... 683 Where application for execution made...................................... 706
Forgery or perjury...................................................................... 684 No appeal from an order of execution....................................... 707
Lack of jurisdiction .. ..... ... ... ....... ........... ...... ........ ... .................... 684 Form and contents of writ of execution .................................... 707
Period for filing the action ......................................................... 685 Duty of the sheriff...................................................................... 707
Who may file the action ............................................................. 685 Writ of execution should conform to the !lispositive
Effect of a judgment of annulment............................................ 686 portion of the judgment..................................................... 707
Remedy when the questioned judgment has already Lifetime of the writ of execution (Bar 1995)............................. 708
been executed..................................................................... 687 When execution will be denied.................................................. 708
Application of Rule 4 7; annulment of Quashal of a writ of execution (Bar 2009) ....... ......................... 709
judgments of the MTC....................................................... 687 Modes of execution of a judgment
Annulment of judgments of quasi-judicial bodies.................... 687 (Bar 1982; 1987; 1997) ...................................................... 711

xxxiv XXXV
 rf
Revival of judgment (Bar 1997) ................................................ . 712 Effect if no redemption is made ........ .... ......................... ........... 745
Venue of an action to revive a judgment ................................. . 718 Rents, income and earnings of the property
When the five-year period is interrupted (Bar 1993) .............. . 719 pending the redemption.................................................... 746
When the five- and 10-year periods do not apply .................... . 720 Remedy when the judgment is unsatisfied
Stay of execution of a judgment; exceptions ........................... .. 721 (Bar 1983; 2002; 2008) ...................................................... 746
Judgments not stayed by appeal.. ............................................ . 721
Discretionary execution (Bar 1991; 1995) ............................... . 723 Chapter XI
Requisites for discretionary execution ..................................... . 723
Discretionary execution is to be strictly construed ................. . 725 Miscellaneous Rules
Good reasons ............................................................................. . 725 A. Small Claims Cases (Basic Features)
Frivolous appeal as reason for discretionary execution .......... . 727
Posting of bond as reason for discretionary A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC (The Rules on Expedited Procedures
execution (Bar 1991) ........................................................ . 728 in the First Level Courts)................................................. 748
Financial distress as reason for discretionary Purpose/Objectives .................................................................... 750
execution ........................................................................... . 729 Inapplicability of strict procedural rules .......... ....................... 750
Jurisdiction................................................................................ 750
Where to file an application for discretionary execution ........ . 729
Commencement of the claim; Statement of claims ................. 752
Remedy where the judgment subject to discretionary
Venue......................................................................................... 754
execution is reversed or annulled ................................... .. 729
Action of the court; dismissal ................................................... 754
Execution in case the judgment obligee dies .......................... .. 730
Summons and Notice of Hearing............................................... 755
Execution in case the judgment obligor dies .......................... .. 730
Electronic Filing and Service.................................................... 756
How to execute judgments for money; summary .................... . 730
Response..................................................................................... 756
Money judgments are enforceable only against
Hearing/Postponement ............................................................. 758
property of judgment debtor ............................................ . 732
Resort to alternative videoconferencing platform.................... 759
Garnishment of debts and credits ............................................ . 733
Decision/Execution..................................................................... 760
Levy of encumbered property ................................................... . 734
Appeal......................................................................................... 760
Effect of levy and sale of property ............................................ . 734 Reminders.................................................................................. 761
Execution of a judgment for the performance
of a specific act .................................................................. . 735 B. Basic Features of the Barangay
Execution for a judgment for the delivery or Conciliation Proceedings
restitution of real property (Bar 1995) ............................ . 735
Contempt is not a remedy ........................................................ . 736 Basic Principles ......................................................................... 762
Removal of improvements on the property subject Proceedings before the barangay are not judicial
of execution ....................................................................... . 737 proceedings ....................................................................... 763
Property exempt from execution (Bar 1981) ........................... . 737 Importance of barangay conciliation proceedings
When the property mentioned is not exempt (Bar 2012) ......................................................................... 763
from execution .................................................................. . 739 No motu proprio dismissal........................................................ 765
Proceedings when property levied upon is claimed Rule in relation to cases covered by summary procedure ....... 765
by third persons; terceria (Bar 1982; 1984; Non-compliance with conciliation proceedings is not
1993; 2011) ........................................................................ . 739 jurisdictional...................................................................... 766
Miscellaneous principles to be remembered in Subject matters for settlement (Bar 2009) ...... .. ....................... 767
execution sales .................................................................. . 743 Venue.......................................................................................... 771
Sale and redemption of real property (Bar 2009) .................... . 745 Initiation of proceedings............................................................ 772

xxxvi xxxvii
Personal appearance of parties ................................................ 772
Parties to the proceedings ........... ......................... ... ... ........ ....... 772
Form of settlement ....... ............... ....... .......... ... ..... ........... .......... 772
Effect of amicable settlement and award; repudiation ........... 773
Repudiation of the settlement ............. ................. .................... 77 4
Execution of award or settlement (Bar 2012)........................... 775
Chapter I
Case Title Index ............ ............................. ... ........... .................. 777
GENERAL PRINCIPLES

I. REMEDIAL LAW AND THE RULES

OF COURT

Concept of remedial law; sources

1. Remedial law, as commonly understood, refers
to the rules which provide the system for the protection of
rights, the prevention of the violation of such rights and the
means of redress for such violations. Such rules also provide
the methods for the enforcement of obligations recognized by
law and lay out the procedure by which suits are filed, tried,
and decided upon by the courts of justice.
2. Stated in some other way, remedial law provides
the "means and methods whereby causes of action may be
effectuated, wrongs redressed and reliefs obtained" (Black's
Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1162, citing Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck
Lines, Inc., 260 Iowa 556, 149 N. W.2d 789, 792).
3. The Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC, promulgated by the Supreme Court, constitutes
the main source of remedial law in the Philippines. It is not,
however, the only source. Rules of procedure may come from
circulars and administrative issuances of the Supreme Court.
Procedural rules are also embodied in some provisions of the
Philippine Constitution and even in. some statutes passed by
the legislature.

Substantive law distinguished from remedial law (Bar 2006)

1. Remedial law is not substantive law. Substantive law
creates, defines, and regulates rights and duties concerning

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life, liberty, or property (See Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil.
446, 452). Remedial law does not create rights or obligations
but lays down the methods by which the rights and obligations
arising from substantive law are protected, enforced and given
effect (See Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640, 653-654). Remedial
law, in other words, is that aspect of law which provides a
method for enforcing rights, preventing the violation of such
rights and obtaining redress for their violations. Remedial
law, also known as adjective law, prescribes the practice,
method, and procedure by which substantive law is enforced
and made effective.
2. Recall that, under the Civil Code, those who, in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of, among others,
fraud or negligence, are liable for damages in favor of the
persons aggrieved by such acts (See Art. 1170, Civil Code).
While this provision clearly creates a right to damages on the
part of the victim of fraud or negligence, it does not outline
the means by which damages may be obtained from the erring
party. It is remedial law, specifically civil procedure, which
provides the methods by which the aggrieved party may
recover damages.
Recall too that, under the Revised Penal Code, a person
who shall kill another with evident premeditation or in
consideration of a price, reward or promise, shall be guilty
of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua (See
Art. 248, Revised Penal Code). The Revised Penal Code,
however, does not lay down the procedure for the punishment
of the perpetrator. For this, recourse has to be made to the
provisions of the rules on criminal procedure, another part of
remedial law.
Major aspects of remedial law
Remedial law has the following major aspects: (a) Civil
Procedure, (b) Criminal Procedure, (c) Special Proceedings,
and (d) Evidence. In addition to these aspects, there are some
special rules of procedure emanating from various circulars
issued by the Supreme Court.
CHAPTER I 3
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Scope of civil procedure in the Rules of Court
Civil procedure includes:
(a) ordinary civil actions (Rules 1-56);
(b) provisional remedies (Rules 57-61); and
(c) special civil actions (Rules 62-71).
The Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC, as a whole, has reference to the body of rules governing
pleading, practice and procedure promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making powers under
the Constitution. Since such rules do not originate from the
legislature, they cannot be called laws in the strict sense of
the word. However, since they are promulgated by authority
of law, they have the force and effect of law (Alvero v. De la
Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 434) if not in conflict with positive law.
The Rules are subordinate to statute, and in case of conflict,
the statute will prevail (Shioji v. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333, 342;
Inchausti v. De Leon, 24 Phil. 224, 226; Altavas v. Court of
Appeals, 106 Phil. 940, 943).
Prospective effect of the Rules of Court (Bar 2011)
1. The rules embodied in the Rules of Court are not
penal laws and are not to be given retroactive effect (Bermejo
v. Barrios, 31 SCRA 764, 776).
2. The rules shall govern cases brought after they take
effect, and also to pending cases, except if, in the opinion of
the court, their application would not be feasible or would
work injustice, in which event, the former procedure shall
apply (See Rule 144, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
Rules of procedure, may be made applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and
are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent (See
In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon
Datumanong, 497 SCRA 626, 636-637). The rules are
retroactive only in this sense (PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.
v. Go Ko, 454 SCRA 586, 592; See also Go v. Sunbanon, 642
SCRA 367, 383).
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It need be mentioned that Rule 144 expressly makes
the rules under the Rules of Court applicable also to "further
proceedings in cases then pending'' when the Rules of Court
took effect. For instance, the Court applied to pending actions,
a rule promulgated through a case (Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
469 SCRA 633) which standardized the period for appeal by
allowing a 'fresh period' of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
Declared the Court:
"x x x Being procedural in nature, Neypes is deemed
to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of its effectivity and is thus, retroactive in that
sense and to that extent" (First Aqua Traders, Inc. v.
Bank of the Philippine Islands, 514 SCRA 223, 226-227).
3. The Administrative Matter No. 19-10-20-SC or the
2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall
govern all cases filed after their effectivity on May 1, 2020,
and also all pending proceedings, except to the extent that
in the opinion of the court, their application would not be
feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure
under which the cases were filed shall govern (See Rule 144,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
When procedural rules do not apply to pending actions
While a procedural rule may be made applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and is
retroactive in that sense, the rule does not apply:
(a) where the statute itself or by necessary
implication provides that pending actions are excepted
from its operation;
(b) if applying the rule to pending proceedings
would impair vested rights;
(c) when to do so would not be feasible or would
work injustice; or
CHAPTER I 5
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(d) if doing so would involve intricate problems
of due process or impair the independence of the courts
(Tan v. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 524, 537).
Actions or proceedings governed by the Rules of Court
The Rules of Court shall govern the procedure to be
observed in civil actions, criminal actions, and special
proceedings (Sec. 3, Rule 1, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) and shall also apply in all courts,
except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court (Sec. 2,
Rule 1, Rules of Court, as amended byA.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Actions or proceedings not governed by the Rules of Court
1. Sec. 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC. clearly provides that the Rules shall
not apply to the following cases:
(a) election cases;
(b) land registration cases;
(c) cadastral cases;
(d) naturalization cases; and
(e) insolvency proceedings.
2. The use of the Rules of Court is not totally
prohibited in the cases enumerated in the preceding number.
The Rules may apply to the above cases by: (a) analogy, or
(b) in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient (Sec. 4, Rule 1, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. It has also been held that rules of procedure
imposed in judicial proceedings are unavailing in cases before
administrative bodies. Accordingly, administrative bodies
are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure
and the rules obtaining in the courts of law (Department
of Agrarian Reform v. Uy, 515 SCRA 376, 399). Even the
""""""'
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COMELEC, a quasi-judicial body, is not bound to strictly
adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation
of evidence (Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
207264, June 25, 2013). It has similarly been declared that
the rules on evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the Board of Medicine
(Atienza v. Board of Medicine, 642 SCRA 523, 529, February
9, 2011).
4. Jurisprudence has actually long affirmed the
principle that the judicial rules of procedure do not apply to
non-judicial proceedings, among others, labor disputes.
Labor disputes are not governed by the strict and technical
rules on evidence and procedure observed in the regular courts
of law. Technical rules of procedure are not applicable in
labor cases, but may apply only by analogy or in a suppletory
character, as when there is a need to attain substantial justice
and an expeditious, practical and convenient solution to a
labor problem (Sime Darby Employees Association v. NLRC,
510 SCRA 204, 222; See also Panuncillo v. CAP Phils., Inc.,
515 SCRA 323, 341). That is why a reliance on the technical
rules on evidence in labor cases is misplaced. To apply, for
instance, the concept of judicial admissions in such cases, is to
exact compliance with technicalities contrary to the demands
of substantial justice (Mayon Hotel and Restaurant v. Adana,
458 SCRA 609, 629).
An earlier labor case held that although mere affidavits
are hearsay, when used in court proceedings, the argument
that the affidavits attached to the case are hearsay because
the affiants were not presented in the labor case for cross-
examination, was deemed not persuasive. This is because,
the rules on evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings
before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions
may be reached on the basis of position papers only. Rules
that prevail in judicial proceedings are not controlling before
the labor arbiter and the NLRC (Bantolino v. Coca-Cola
Bottlers Phils., Inc., 403 SCRA 699, 703). Even in appeals
in labor cases, the requirement of proof of service may be
CHAPTER I 7
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
dispensed with since, in such appeals, non-service of copy of
the appeal or appeal memorandum to the adverse party is
not a jurisdictional defect which calls for the dismissal of the
appeal (Millennium Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes, 634
SCRA 708, 713-714).
5. In a much earlier case, the petitioner argued against
the order of the appellate court admitting a documentary
evidence not formally offered in evidence in the trial court.
The petitioner, invoking Sec. 34 of Rule 132, argued that only
evidence which has been formally offered shall be considered
by the court and that such formal offer is made in the trial
court and not for the first time in the appellate court. The
contention, however, was ruled by the Supreme Court as
bereft of merit. The Court emphasized that the rule on formal
offer of evidence is not applicable to a case involving a petition
for naturalization (Ong Chia v. Republic, 328 SCRA 749, 756).
6. In another case of a more recent vintage, the Court
brushed aside the respondent's objection to the submission
of mere photocopies in a quasi-judicial proceeding involving
issues in intellectual property. The Court reiterated the rule
that quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are not bound
by the technical rules of procedure, that technicalities should
never be used to defeat the substantive rights of a party, and
that every litigant should be afforded the opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities (Birkenstock Orthopaedie GMBH
and Co. KG v. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation,
G.R. No. 194307, November 20, 2013).
The need to follow fundamental evidentiary rules
The Supreme Court, however, emphasized that "While
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies x x x, are not bound
by the technical rules of procedure, this rule cannot be taken
as a license to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the
decision of the administrative agencies and the evidence it
relies upon must, at the very least be substantial" (Primo v.
Mendoza Vda. de Erederos, G.R. Nos. 172532 and 172544-45,
November 20, 2013).
_...------------- - - -- - ---------------------------
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II. RULE-MAKING POWER OF
THE SUPREME COURT
Constitutional authority to promulgate rules
1. Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines
expressly confers upon the Supreme Court the power to:
"x x x Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice oflaw, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court."
2. The rule-making power of the Supreme Court
specifically includes the constitutional power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure (Sec. 5[5],
Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines). Describing its rule-
making power under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme
Court explained:
"x x x The rule-making power of th[e] Court has
expanded. Th[e] Court for the first time, was given the
power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies. But most important, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by
th[e] Court with Congress, more so with the executive xx x"
(Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96, 112; See
also Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15,
2017).
The Court, in further describing its rule-making power,
also held that "It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal, or
i........__
-....
------:---
CHAPTER! 9
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive
process, and the speedy disposition of cases" (Neypes v. Court
of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633, 643-644; italics supplied). Such
power is now the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court
(Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017).
3. The other branches of government are said to
trespass upon the rule-making power of the Supreme Court if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or
modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court
(Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017).
For example, in Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals
(6th Division), G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, the
Court declared the first paragraph of Sec. 14 of R.A. 6770
as ineffective. This provision prohibits courts, except the
Supreme Court, from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an
investigation of the Ombudsman, unless the subject matter of
the investigation is outside its jurisdiction. The Court ruled
the same to contravene the rule-making authority of the
Court. It held that the authority of a court to issue injunctive
writs is embodied in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC, and is part of its inherent power to
issue all auxiliary writs and other means necessary to carry
its jurisdiction into effect under Sec. 6 of Rule 135 of the same
Rules.
Also, in Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September
16, 1998, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Sec.
27, R.A. 6770 as unconstitutional. The provision states that
decisions or orders of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within 10
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive
or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This provision,
ruled the Court, had the effect of increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court. Under the Constitution, ''No law
shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its
advice and concurrence." Since it was passed without its
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advice and concurrence, its passage was in violation of Sec. 30,
Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.Moreover, this provision was
found to be inconsistent with Sec. 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Procedure which applies only to a review of "judgments or
final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts
authorized by law." This remedy does not apply to a review of
judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies, such as
the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy being a Rule 43
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In an earlier case, in Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna
West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 172204, July
2, 2014, the Court ruled that the Cooperative Code cannot
provide for rules on summons and service of processes which
are contrary to those provided in the Rules of Court. Service of
summons in civil, criminal, or special proceedings is a matter
of procedure which cannot be replaced by the Cooperative
Code.
Limitations on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court
The following limitations are imposed by the Constitution
on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court:
(a) The rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases;
(b) The rules shall be uniform for courts of the
same grade; and
(c) The rules shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights (Sec. 5[5],Art. VIII, Constitution of the
Philippines).
Power to amend and suspend the rules
1. The Supreme Court has the power to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases
(Neypes v. Court of Appeals, supra; Makati Insurance Co., Inc.
v. Reyes, 561 SCRA 234, 245). The constitutional power of the
CHAPTERI 11
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure
and to amend or repeal the same necessarily carries with it the
power to overturn judicial precedents on points ofremedial law
through the amendment of the Rules of Court (Pinga v. Heirs
of Santiago, 494 SCRA 393, 398). The Court is invested with
the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure
as a necessary complement to its power to promulgate the
same (Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15,
2017).
2. "The courts have the power to relax or suspend
technical or procedural rules or to except a case from their
operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when the
purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes good and
sufficient cause that would merit suspension of the rules is
discretionary upon the courts" (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, 504 SCRA 484, 496).
Thus, it is within the power of the Supreme Court to make
exceptions to the Rules of Court. It may permit the full and
exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions
despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its
alleged procedural flaws (Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No.
226679, August 15, 2017).
3. The power to suspend technical rules is observed
to be broader and more pervasive when exercised by the
Supreme Court. For instance, one jurisprudential rule that
has been followed with remarkable consistency is the principle
that when a decision becomes final, the same can, and should,
never be disturbed. The rule is grounded on the fundamental
principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk
of occasional error, the judgment of courts must become final
at some definite date fixed by law (See_Gonzalo Puyat & Sons,
Inc. v. Alcaide, G.R. No. 167952, October 19, 2016; Tomas v.
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group [CIDGJ, G.R. No.
208090, November 9, 2016). Nevertheless, the rule has not
been spared from the Court's power to suspend a rule. From
the point of view of the Court, "[T]he power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter
even that which the Court itself had already declared to be
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12 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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final" (Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
632 SCRA 727, 762-763; For further readings, see Sumbilla v.
Matrix Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015).
4. The power to suspend procedural rules or relax the
application of such rules, has also been exercised in criminal
cases. Note that under Sec. 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, an order denying a demurrer to evidence shall not be
reviewable by certiorari or appeal before judgment. However,
when the Sandiganbayan, in one celebrated case, denied
a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused, a petition for
certiorari was entertained by the Supreme Court. It granted
the petition and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying the demurrer to evidence as having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. The Court, in the case, declared that
the "exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be
thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake
of the convenience of one side" (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People,
G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016).
The Court, on April 18, 2017, in denying the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration in the same case held that "[T]he
prohibition contained in Sec. 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
is not an insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of the
denial of the demurrer to evidence through certiorari."
5. Another principle, that has guided trial courts on
the matter of bail, is that a person charged with an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall
not be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong (See
Sec. 7, Rule 114, Rules of Court). The tenor of the provision,
which merely echoes the Constitution, allows the denial or
the granting of bail on the basis of the evidence. The accused
is not entitled to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong;
otherwise, he may be allowed bail. In one case, however, the
Court granted bail to the accused, not necessarily on the basis
of the evidence, but on the basis, among others, of his age
CHAPTER I 13
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
and fragile health. The decision was guided, not only by the
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance
of the accused at the trial, but also by what the Court described
as the "national commitment to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as the value and dignity of every person
xx x" (See Enrile v. Sandiganbayan [Third Division], G.R. No.
213847, August 18, 2015).
6. The suspension of the Rules by the Court is not
based on whim, caprice or flimsy reasons. Jurisprudence cite
important factors that would warrant such suspension, like:
(a) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances;
(b) the merits of the case;
(c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
rules;
(d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; and
(e) the rights of the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby (Sarmiento v. Zaratan, 514 SCRA
246, 260, citing Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA
540; See also People v. Layag, G.R. No. 214875, October
17, 2016).
7. The Court could take cognizance of a petition despite
its pr~cedural infirmities, as when the petitioner has no legal
standmg_to file the same. Being a mere procedural technicality,
the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court
in the exercise of its discretion gi_ven the transcendental
importance of the constitutional issues it raises as when the
pet~tion challenges the constitutionality of the manner by
which the President of the Philippines makes appointments
to the judiciary (Aguinaldo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302,
November 29, 2016).
8. It has been consistently held that litigations should,
as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
14 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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technicalities. For example, in one case, the Court allowed
the perfection of the appeal of the Republic, despite the delay
of six days, since the Republic stands to lose hundreds of
hectares of land already titled in its name. This was done
in order to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice. Also, in
another case, the Court suspended the rule that a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration in the CA
does not toll the 15-day period to appeal. The Court held that
the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the
fault of the petitioner and there was lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory. Similarly,
in a later case, the Court permitted the delay of seven days
in the filing of the motion for reconsideration in view of the
CA's erroneous application of legal principles to prevent the
resulting inequity that might arise from the outright denial of
the petition (Mitra v. Sablan-Gevarra, G.R. No. 213994, April
18, 2018; Citations of the Court, omitted).
Pro hac vice rule
When the Court, in certain exceptional circumstances,
suspends a procedural rule in a particular case, the decision
therein cannot be relied on as a precedent since the ruling is
for that particular case only or pro hac vice. Jurisprudence has
described pro hac vice as a Latin term meaning "for this one
only." When the ruling is qualified as such, the same cannot
be used as a precedent to govern other cases (Highpoint
Development Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No. 224389,
November 7, 2018).
The rule on liberal construction; purpose (Bar 1998)
1. The rule is expressed in Sec. 6 of Rule 1 of the Rules
of Court, thus:
"SEC. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective
of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding."
CHAPTER I 15
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
2. While jurisprudence recognizes the importance
of procedural rules in ensuring effective enforcement of
substantive rights, the law abhors technicalities that impede
the cause of justice (See for further readings, Miranda v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 144760-61, August 2, 2017).
Hence, the rule is that courts should not be unduly strict
on procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. The higher objective of procedural
rules is to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are
protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided
on the merits and not on technicalities (Regulus Development,
Inc. v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 198172, January 25, 2016; See also
Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 196890, January 11, 2018).
3. A fundamental rule recognized by the Court with
consistency, hence, worth remembering, is that "Procedural
rules are set not to frustrate the ends of substantial justice
but are tools to expedite the resolution of cases on the merits"
(Pilipinas Makro, Inc. v. Coco Charcoal Phils., Inc., G.R. No.
196419, October 4, 2017). Hence, matters of procedure normally
take a backseat when issues of substantial or transcendental
importance are present (Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No.
226679, August 15, 2017). The rule on liberal construction
involves a relaxation of the procedural rules when their rigid
application would hinder substantial justice. This is because
the rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. In sum, the rule means that a strict
and rigid application of the rules of procedure, especially on
technical matters, which tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must be avoided (The Manila Banking
Corporation v. Bases Conversion Development Authority, G.R.
No. 230144, January 22, 2018).
General rule on compliance with procedural rules; exceptions
1. Although the Court has invariably relaxed the rule
on technicalities in order to afford litigants their day in court,
liberal application of procedural rules is still the exception
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(Melendres v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 194346, June 18, 2018). In
other words, the zealous observance of the rules is still the
general course of action as it serves to guarantee the orderly,
just and speedy disposition of cases (Ben Line Agencies
Philippines, Inc. v. Madson, G.R. No. 195887, January 10,
2018).
2. It has been emphasized that "invocation of substantial
justice is not a magical incantation that will automatically
compel" the Court to suspend procedural rules. Such rules
"are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their
non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's
substantive rights" (Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals, 479 SCRA
594, 604; Indoyon, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 693 SCRA 203, 208-
209, March 12, 2013; Philcontrust Resources, Inc. v. Santiago,
G.R. No. 174760, July 26, 2017; See also Cortal v. Inaki A.
Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017).
The phrase, "in the interest of justice" is not "a magic wand
that would automatically compel the suspension of procedural
rules" (Ramos v. Alvendia, 568 SCRA 239, 249; See also Cortal
v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107, August
30, 2017).
It needs to be reiterated that compliance with the
procedural rules is still the general rule, and abandonment
thereof should only be done in the most exceptional
circumstances (See Pilapil v. Heirs of Briones, 514 SCRA
197, 201). Earlier, the Court cautioned litigants that there
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality
to explain his failure to abide by the rules (See Abrenica v.
The Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan, 502 SCRA
614, 622). In other words, parties praying for the liberal
interpretation of the rules must be able to hurdle that heavy
burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment.
It was never the Court's intent "to forge a bastion for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity'' (Prieto v. Alpadi
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 191025, July 31, 2013;
See also Magsino v. De Ocampo, G.R. No. 166944, August 18,
2014; See also Philcontrust Resources, Inc. v. Santiago, G.R.
No. 174760, July 26, 2017).
17
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
III. NATURE OF THE PHILIPPINE COURTS
Courts of law and equity; application of equity jurisdiction
1. Philippine courts are courts of both law and equity.
Hence, both legal and equitable jurisdictions are dispensed
with in the same tribunal (U.S. v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321,
327). When the Court relaxes the strict application of the rules
where strong considerations of justice are manifest, the court
is said to be in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction (Lefebre
v. A Brown Company, Inc., G.R. No. 224973, September 27,
2017). Thus, when the Court justifiably disregards procedural
lapses, it does so in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
2. Equity is "justice outside legality'' (Ocampo v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, August 8, 2017). The various
rulings of the Court suggest that the term; equity jurisdiction,
is used to describe the power of the court to resolve issues
presented in a case, in accordance with the natural rules of
fairness and justice, and in the absence of a clear, positive law
governing such issues.
Equity administers justice according to the basic tenets
of fairness. Equity denotes a concept of fairness, justness,
and right dealing among men (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
Ed., 540). Equity seeks to reach and do complete justice
where the courts of law are incompetent to do so because of
the inflexibility of the rules and the lack of power to adapt
their judgments to the special circumstances of cases. Equity
regards the spirit of the law and not its letter, the intent and
not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance (Air
Manila v. Court of Industrial Relations, 83 SCRA 579, 589).
When equity does not apply
1. Equity is not to be applied in all cases. Equity does
not apply when there is a law applicable to a given case (Smith
Bell Co. v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530, 542). For all its
conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law
and not as its replacement (Tankiko v. Cezar, 302 SCRA 559,
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570, citing Aguila v. Court of First Instance of Batangas, 160
SCRA 579; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, August 8,
2017). It is never availed of against statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Velez v. Demetria, 387 SCRA 232, 238; Bell
v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530, 542; David-Chan v. Court
of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677, 687; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No.
225973, August 8, 2017).
2. One case is illustrative. Here, the petitioner, upon
sensing the inadequacy of her legal arguments, pleaded that
"those who have less in life should have more in law." She also
sought the application of the Filipino values of pakikisama
and pakikipagkapwa-tao in resolving her case. In reaction to
her plea, the Court declared:
"Such appeal of petitioner is based on equity which
has been aptly described as 'justice outside legality.'
However, equity is applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
As found by respondent court x x x such equitable
arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings" (David-
Chan v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677, 687).
3. In an action to annul a contract of sale of a land,
the buyer moved for the court to order the seller to deposit in
court the amount initially given to the seller as consideration
for the land to prevent the dissipation of the amount paid.
The seller opposed the motion arguing that a deposit is not
among the provisional remedies enumerated in the Rules
of Court. The Court, nevertheless, granted the motion. The
Court considered the case as one that clearly showed a hiatus
in the Rules of Court and in the law because deposit is not
so provided under the Rules as a provisional remedy. If the
hiatus is left alone, it will result in unjust enrichment in
favor of the seller at the expense of the buyer. It may also
imperil the obligation of restitution, a precondition to the
annulment of a contract. This is a case of insufficiency of the
law and Art. 9 of the Civil Code mandates a ruling despite
the "silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws." This calls
I
CHAPTER I 19
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
for the application of equity, which fills the open spaces of the
law. In ordering the deposit, the court accordingly exercised
its "equity jurisdiction" (Reyes v. Lim, 408 SCRA 560, 566).
Judicial power
1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government (Sec. 1, Art. VIII,
Philippine Constitution).
2. By constitutional fiat, judicial power is not only
vested in the Supreme Court. It is also vested in the lower
courts created by law. Because judicial power includes the duty
to settle actual controversies, courts are generally constrained
to rule upon moot and academic cases. In other words, to
merit judicial review, the cases should present conflicting or
opposite legal rights, with real and substantial controversies
admitting of specific reliefs (For further readings, see Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 206150, August 9, 2017). An issue becomes moot
and academic when any declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value such as there is no actual substantial
relief to which the parties would be entitled (Ocampo v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, August 8, 2017).
It is vital to remember that judicial review does not
only extend to matters that require the duty to settle actual
controversies. It also includes the duty to determine whether
or not any branch or instrumentality of the government
has committed acts constituting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. That government
instrumentality subject to judicial review may be one exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, executive or legislative powers. The
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nature of the functions of the branch or instrumentality of
the government, committing acts constituting grave abuse
of discretion, is irrelevant (See Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R.
No. 209287, July 1, 2014; Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan [SPARK] v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August
8, 2017).
Doctrine of hierarchy of courts {principleof judicial hierarchy)
{Bar 2011; 2017)
1. Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, where
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a subject matter, such
concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant the party seeking
relief the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of
his choice. Pursuant to this doctrine, a case must be filed
first before the lowest court possible having the appropriate
jurisdiction, except if one can advance a special reason which
would allow a party a direct resort to a higher court.
2. Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction is that which
is exercised by different courts over the same subject matter
(See Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284, April 18,
2017). It is the concurrence of jurisdiction among several
courts which triggers the application of the doctrine. For
instance, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus, and injunction is not exclusive. Its jurisdiction
is concurrent with the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Court. But a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special reasons for
doing so, clearly set out in the petition. The principle requires
that resort must first be made to the lower-ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. Hence,
the petition must, as a rule, be filed first with the Regional
Trial Court (See Osmeiia III v. Abaya, G.R. No. 214756,
January 13, 2016; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973,
November 8, 2016; See also Chiquita Brands, Inc. v. Omelio,
G.R. No. 189102, June 7, 2017). Also, while the Supreme
Court has concurrent original jurisdiction with Regional Trial
CHAPTER I 21
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Courts in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls (Sec. 5, Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines;
Sec. 21[2], B.P. 129), the better procedure is to file the action
with the Regional Trial Court. In other words, the rule is that
such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give a litigant an
unbridled freedom of choice of forum (Lanao del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. v. Provincial Government of Lanao del Norte,
G.R. No. 185420, August 29, 2017; For further readings, see
Roldan v. Barrios, G.R. No. 214803, April 23, 2018).
In one relatively recent case, several petitions for certiorari
and prohibition were filed directly in the Supreme Court
raising, among others, the issue on whether or not officials of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines committed grave abuse
of discretion when they issued directives to comply with the
verbal order of the president to have the remains of former
President Ferdinand Marcos interred at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. In relation to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the
Supreme Court explained, thus:
"x x x [P]etitioners cannot simply brush aside
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such
petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can
also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original
and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue
restraining order and injunction when proven necessary"
(Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8,
2016).
3. The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy
of courts was created to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient
manner. A disregard of the doctrine may result in the denial
of a petition (See De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781,
October 10, 2017; citations of the Court, omitted; Trillanes
IV v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018;
for further readings, see Roldan v. Barrios, G.R. No. 214803,
April 23, 2018).
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When the doctrine of hierarchy of courts may be disregarded
(Bar 2011)
1. The policy on the hierarchy of courts is not to be
regarded as an ironclad rule. There were instances when its
application has not been absolute and direct resort to a higher
court was allowed (See Rama v. Moises, G.R. No. 197146,
August 8, 2017). The policy may be disregarded if warranted by
the nature and importance of the issues raised in the interest
of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations (Declarador v.
Bansales, 499 SCRA 341, 348, citing Fortich v. Corona, 289
SCRA 624; For further readings, see Roldan v. Barrios, G.R.
No. 214803, April 23, 2018).
2. Jurisprudence allowed a direct resort to a higher
court in certain cases like:
(a) when there are special and important
clearly stated in the petition;
(b) when dictated by public welfare and
advancement of public policy;
(c) when demanded by the broader interest
justice;
(d) when the challenged orders were
nullities;
(e) when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified the immediate and
direct handling by the Court (Republic v. Caguioa, 691
SCRA 306, 316-317, February 20, 2013);
(f) when there are genuine issues of constitu-
tionality that must be addressed at the most immediate
time (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015; Chiquita Brands,
Inc. v. Omelia, G.R. No. 189102, June 7, 2017; See also
Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Provincial
Government of Lanao del Norte, G.R. No. 185420, August
29, 2017); or
CHAPTER I 23
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(g) when the issues raised are of transcendental
importance (Rama v. Moises, G.R. No. 197146, August 8,
2017; For further readings, see Roldan v. Barrios, G.R.
No. 214803, April 23, 2018).
Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability
(Bar 2011)
1. The doctrine of non-interference (doctrine of
judicial stability) holds that courts of equal and coordinate
jurisdiction cannot interfere with each other's orders (Lapu-
Lapu Development and Housing Corporation v. Group
Management Corporation, 388 SCRA 493, 508, citing People
v. Woolcock, 244 SCRA 235). Hence, a Regional Trial Court
has no power or authority to nullify or enjoin the enforcement
of a writ of possession issued by another Regional Trial Court
reasons (Suico Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA
212, 213). The principle also bars a court from reviewing or
the interfering with the judgment of a co-equal court over which
it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review (Villamar
v. Salas, 203 SCRA 540, 543; Maiialac v. Gellada, A.M. No.
of RTJ-18-2535, October 8, 2018).
2. The doctrine of non-interference applies with equal
patent force to administrative bodies. When the law provides for an
appeal from the decision of an administrative body to the
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, it means that such body
is co-equal with the Regional Trial Court in terms of rank
and stature, and logically beyond the control of the latter
(Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Cagayan Electric Power and
Light Co., Inc., 381 SCRA 582, 591).
Constitutional and statutory courts·
1. A constitutional court is one created by a direct
constitutional provision. An example of this court is the
Supreme Court of the Philippines. It owes its creation from
the Constitution itself (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, Constitution of the
Philippines). In the Philippines, only the Supreme Court is a
constitutional court.
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2. A statutory court is one created by a law other than
the constitution. All courts in the Philippines, except the
Supreme Court, are statutory courts. They have been created
by statutory enactments. Even the Sandiganbayan is not a
constitutionally-created court. It was not directly created
by the Constitution but was created by law pursuant to a
constitutional mandate. The 1973 Constitution required the
then Batasang Pambansa to create a special court to be known
as the Sandiganbayan (Sec. 5, Art. XIII, 1973 Constitution). Its
existence continues to be recognized by the 1987 Constitution.
While· its existence is mandated by the Constitution, its
creation was through and by P.D. 1486, issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his legislative powers under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Philippine Constitution.
Civil and criminal courts
1. Civil courts are those which determine controversies
between private persons. Criminal courts are those which
adjudicate offenses alleged to have been committed against
the State (21 C.J.S., Courts, §4).
2. Philippine courts exercise both civil and criminal
jurisdictions because of the principle in Art. 100 of the Revised
Penal Code that every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.
Superior and inferior courts
1. In the general sense, a court is 'superior' or 'inferior'
in relation to another court. Hence, a Municipal Trial Court is
inferior to a Regional Trial Court while the latter is inferior to
the Court of Appeals. All courts in the Philippines are inferior
to the Supreme Court.
2. A superior court is one with controlling authority
over other courts, and with an original jurisdiction of its own.
An inferior court is one which is subordinate to another court,
the judgment of which may be reviewed by a higher tribunal
(21 C.J.S., Courts, §28).
CHAPTER I 25
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Courts of general and special jurisdiction
1. Courts of general jurisdiction are those with
competence to decide on their own jurisdiction and take
cognizance of all cases, civil and criminal, of a particular
nature.
Courts of special (limited) jurisdiction are those which
have jurisdiction only for a particular purpose or are clothed
with special powers for the performance of specified duties
beyond which they have no authority of any kind (21 C.J.S.,
Courts, §3). It is, in other words, that which is confined to
particular causes or which can be exercised only under
limitations and circumstances prescribed by statute (Unduran
v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284, April 18, 2017).
2. A court may also be considered 'general' if it has
the competence to exercise jurisdiction over cases not falling
within the jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person, or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions (Secs. 19{6] and
20, B.P. 129, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). It is in
this context that the Regional Trial Court is considered a
court of general jurisdiction.
Courts of original and appellate jurisdiction
1. A court is one with original jurisdiction when actions
or proceedings are originally filed with it. A court is one with
appellate jurisdiction when it has the power of review over the
decisions or orders of a lower court (21 C.J.S., Courts, §3).
2. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, and Municipal Trial Courts are courts of original
jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court is, likewise, a court
of original jurisdiction with respect ·to cases originally filed
with it but is also a court of appellate jurisdiction with respect
to cases decided by the Municipal Trial Courts within its
territorial jurisdiction (Sec. 22, B.P. 129).
The Regional Trial Court is also a court of original
jurisdiction, for instance, with respect to a petition for a writ
of amparo (Sec. 3, The Rules on the Writ of Amparo) or a

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petition for a writ of habeas data (Sec. 3, The Rules on the
Writ of Habeas Data). There are in fact, various cases which
cannot be filed originally in any other court, but only with the
Regional Trial Court like actions for specific performance and
real actions involving real property with an assessed value of
P400,000.00.
3. The Court of Appeals is primarily a court of appellate
jurisdiction with competence to review judgments of the
Regional Trial Courts and specified quasi-judicial agencies
(Sec. 9[3}, B.P. 129). It is also a court of original jurisdiction
with respect to cases filed before it involving issuance of
writs of certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus,
and prohibition. It is also a court of original and exclusive
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
Regional Trial Courts (Sec. 9[11[2},B.P. 129).
It is also a court of original jurisdiction with respect to
a petition for a writ of amparo (Sec. 3, The Rules on the Writ
of Amparo) or a petition for a writ of habeas data (Sec. 3, The
Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data). Note that these petitions
may be filed originally not only with the Regional Trial Court,
the Sandiganbayan or the Supreme Court but also with the
Court of Appeals.
4. The Supreme Court is also fundamentally a jurisdiction, the court first taking cognizance of the case
court of appellate jurisdiction but it may also be a court of
original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, public
ministers and consuls, and in cases involving petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus (Sec. 5[1}, Art. VIII,
Constitution of the Philippines). It may also be a court of
original jurisdiction in a petition for a writ of amparo (Sec.
3, The Rules on the Writ of Amparo) or a petition for a writ of
habeas data (Sec. 3, The Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data).
Note: The Supreme Court en bane is not an appellate court
to which decisions or resolutions of a division of the Supreme
Court may be appealed. Bar 1990
Note: It will be observed that appellate courts have "dual
jurisdictions" in the sense that they are not only appellate
courts but also courts with original jurisdiction.
CHAPTER I 27
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Original and exclusive jurisdiction distinguished
1. Original jurisdiction means jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a case at its inception, try it and pass judgment
upon the law and facts, while exclusive jurisdiction precludes
the idea of co-existence and refers to jurisdiction possessed to
the exclusion of others (Cubero v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperatives, Inc., 509 SCRA 410, 416).
2. A court may be conferred both original and exclusive
jurisdiction over a particular subject matter. Examples: (a) The
Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer (Sec. 33[2], B.P.
129, as amended); (b) The Regional Trial Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject
matter of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation
(Sec. 19[1}, B.P. 129, as amended); (c) The Court of Appeals
has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment
of judgments of the Regional Trial Court (Sec. 9[2], B.P. 129,
as amended).
Concurrent jurisdiction
1. Concurrent jurisdiction, also called coordinate
jurisdiction, is the power of different courts to take cognizance
of the same subject matter. Where there is concurrent
assumes jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other courts.
Examples:
(a) The Supreme Court has concurrent original
jurisdiction with Regional Trial Courts in cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls (Sec. 5,
Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines; Sec. 21[2], B.P.
129);
(b) The Supreme Court has concurrent original
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the
Regional Trial Courts (Sec. 5, Art. VIII, Constitution of
the Philippines; Sec. 9[1}, B.P. 129);

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(c) The Supreme Court has concurrent original
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts in petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus against lower courts and bodies and in
petitions for quo warranto and habeas corpus (Sec. 5, Art.
VIII, Constitution of the Philippines; Sec. 9[1], B.P. 129;
Sec. 21[1], B.P. 129).
2. As earlier mentioned, the concurrent jurisdiction
among courts of different ranks is subject to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts.
Meaning of 'court'
A court is an organ of government belonging to the
judicial department the function of which is the application
of the laws to controversies brought before it as well as the
public administration of justice (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
Ed., 356). A court is called upon and authorized to administer
justice. Sometimes, it refers to the place where justice is
administered (20 Am Jur 2d, Courts, §1, 1965; 21 C.J.S.,
Courts, §1).
Court distinguished from a judge
Although the terms, "court" and "judge," have often been
erroneously used interchangeably, they have the following
marked distinctions:
(a) A court is a tribunal officially assembled under
authority of law; a judge is simply an officer of such
tribunal (Wagenhorst v. Philadelphia Life Insurance Co.,
358 Pa. 55, 55 A2d 762, cited by Black's Law Dictionary,
5th Ed.).
(b) A court is an organ of the government (Black's
Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 318) with a personality separate
and distinct from the person or judge who sits on it (People
v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 543).
(c) A court is a being in imagination comparable
to a corporation, whereas a judge is a physical person
CHAPTER I 29
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(People ex rel. Herndon v. Opekl, 188 Ill 194, 58 NE 996,
cited by Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.).
(d) A judge is a public officer (Todd v. United States,
158 US 278, 39 L Ed 982, 15 S ct. 889, cited by Black's
Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.) while a court is an office.
(e) Jurisdiction does not attach to the judge but to
the court. The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its
proceedings are not affected by the death, resignation, or
cessation from the service of the judge presiding over it. In
other words, the judge may resign, become incapacitated,
or be disqualified to hold office, but the court remains
(ABC Davao Auto Supply, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 284
SCRA 218,222).
IV. THE BASIC PROCESSES OF ORDINARY
CMLACTIONS
Introduction
At the outset, the reader needs to be cautioned that
the rules on civil procedure, embodied in the Rules of Court,
as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC are not arranged in
accordance with how they are usually employed in litigation.
Hence, to a beginner, the various principles in the Rules of
Court, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC, may appear to
be a mere mishmash of rules, scattered and unrelated. It is,
therefore, understandable for him to be initially perplexed
by the rules especially when he wonders how such rules are
to be applied in the real world. The impression is, however,
only initial and does not reflect what procedural law really
is. Gradually but steadily, however, the student of procedure
will realize that procedural law is far from being the difficult
subject it has traditionally been portrayed to be. Inevitably,
as he gains mastery of the fundamentals on the subject, he
will soon learn to appreciate how the subject has been molded
by the Court into a system with a logic of its own that is both
rhythmic and fascinating.
30 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Experience has told us fairly well that it is the ability
to conceptualize the relationships among procedural rules,
which enables one to respond with ease to the unexpected
twists in the field oflitigation and to even the most cerebrally-
formulated questions in the bar. As a first step to develop such
ability, the principles in this material have been rearranged
not only to enable the reader to approximate the application of
procedural rules in both the bar examinations and litigation
situations but also to prevent his being mired in mere
technicalities.
This work represents a deliberate and an honest attempt
to demystify procedural law, bring civil procedure to a more
understandable and workable level, and dispel the impression
that remedial law is a subject that is either abstract or too
circuitous for comfort. If the reader finds many phrases in
this work stripped of the usual legal jargon, this is because
emphasis has been made on bringing civil procedure to a more
practical dimension. The writer believes that another critical
step to achieve this purpose is to avoid the use of impenetrable
legalese or to reduce its use to the barest minimum.
As the title of this topic indicates, this work has no
pretensions of being complete, comprehensive and exhaustive.
This is not written for the seasoned lawyer and more so, for
the bench. Any material for both the experienced litigator and
the bench requires a more profound analysis of the rules and
a treatment that expertly blends the philosophical and the
legal. Such material will, and should, ultimately furnish the
reader with the reasons behind every procedural principle. In
addition, it requires a language that is uniquely regal, yet far
from being abstract or snobbish.
This material is, on the contrary, humbly written for
those who want to start exploring the field of procedure. It is,
in short, written for the novice and the inexperienced. This
material may not be able to take you into every "rabbit hole"
since the rules found in this work attempt to mirror only the
most fundamental aspects of the civil litigation process. The
principles included in this work do not embody all the possible
CHAPTER I 31
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
issues which may arise in litigation. Every experienced
lawyer knows that there are certain situations in the course
of litigation which unexpectedly occur in the course of the
proceedings and which cannot be reasonably foreseen even
by the most comprehensive material on procedure. Besides,
there are topics which, due to the demands of both scope and
priorities, have to be intentionally left out. This work contains
only those topics deemed indispensable to the acquisition of
the core knowledge required to pass the bar examinations
and start a career in trial practice. The more complicated
situations and the finer aspects in civil procedure would
automatically present themselves to the new lawyer as he
acquires experience in the field.
The reader needs to be also reminded that although there
are aspects of the Rules, in fact quite a substantial number of
them, which have to be committed to memory, route memory
has never been the key to success in both litigation and the
bar examinations. Much depend on one's understanding of
the relationships among the isolated principles in the Rules
of Court, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC. The mastery
of these relationships will allow the reader to grasp the most
essential procedural principles, so he may later on proceed to
a level of understanding beyond mere fundamentals.
As he wades through the topics included in this material, it
should not come as a surprise to the reader to find that several
tenets of substantive law have been included in the discussion
of the principles found in this work. This is intentional and for
an important reason. It is imperative for the student of the law
to realize that substantive law constitutes the very foundation
of procedural law. In other words, without substantive law,
procedural law cannot exist.
That procedural law owes its existence to substantive
law is not difficult to understand. For example, substantive
law provides, through Art. 1170 of the Civil Code, that
those obligors who are guilty of fraud, negligence, delay or
contravention of the tenor of the obligation are liable for
damages. While the liability for damages is clearly provided
32 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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for by substantive law, the Civil Code fails to lay down the
procedure by which an obligor could be made liable for the
mandated liability. This omission is supplied by the rules of
civil procedure which requires the filing of a complaint before
a court. Also, while substantive law, through Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that one who commits murder
shall be penalized by reclusion perpetua, the same law does
not establish the procedure by which an offender may be made
answerable for the offense committed. The answer is not found
in the Revised Penal Code. It is found in the rules of criminal
procedure which similarly requires, among others, the filing
of a criminal information before the court.
I. Complaint
At this stage, it is necessary for the student to fully
understand that the rules of civil procedure in the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, are not self-
executing. Even a court, vested by law with jurisdiction
over certain subject matters, cannot, on its own initiative,
take cognizance of a case and try to settle conflicting claims
between and among individuals. Without someone going to
court to invoke the rules and the jurisdiction of the court, such
rules would be nothing but mere dark letters written on a
white background. It is the act of filing the initiatory pleading
called a complaint, that triggers both the practical application
of procedural rules and the laws on jurisdiction.
The complaint is the first document, technically called a
pleading, which is filed in court by a party called the plaintiff.
It is the filing of this complaint in court which signifies the
commencement of a civil action.
The primary purpose of this pleading is to sue another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong. Through his complaint, the plaintiff
apprises the adverse party, called the defendant, of the nature
and basis of the claim. Most important, it is the filing of the
complaint which enables the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the plaintiff. This jurisdiction is implied from
CHAPTERI 33
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
the fact that by seeking affirmative relief from the court, he
recognizes the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, by the
mere filing of the complaint, the plaintiff, in a civil action,
voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
A. Right of action and cause of action
1. From the point of view of the plaintiff, the need for
the application of the rules of civil procedure starts when he
believes that someone has violated his rights. A complaint
is filed not because one simply wants to file a complaint.
The litigation process involves much more than the mere
mechanical act of drafting the complaint and filing the same
with the court. The filing of a complaint requires a prior
determination whether or not the plaintiff possesses a legal
right to file the desired complaint. This, in turn, requires
knowing whether or not the plaintiff has a cause of action
enforceable against the defendant.
A cause of action arises when someone violates the rights
of another. This cause of action has its origins in substantive
law. While it is procedural law which outlines the methods and
processes by which one may sue another for the enforcement
or protection of his rights, it is substantive law which supplies
the legal basis for the existence of the right itself and the
corresponding legal prerogative to demand its protection. In
other words, an inquiry into substantive law is imperative
because, as it has been previously said, such law is the very
foundation of procedural law.
Everyone who is conscious of the intimate relationship
between substantive law and remedial law knows that the
causes of action in civil proceedings actually arise from the
traditional sources of a civil obligation, like law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts. For instance, a
creditor who is not paid by his debtor a just and lawful debt
despite a valid demand, may have a cause of action against
the latter for breach of a contract of loan. A victim of the
negligent act of another may have a cause of action against
the negligent defendant based on a quasi-delict. A person
34 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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victimized by robbery may have a cause of action against the
perpetrator of the crime based on the principle that a person
criminally liable is also civilly liable. A person whose money
or goods were delivered by mistake to another may have a
cause of action against the latter for the return of what was
received. The government may have a cause of action against
a taxpayer who refuses to pay the taxes which, under the law,
he is supposed to pay. Hence, every cause of action must be
predicated upon a provision of substantive law. So, if a person
wants to recover damages from another, he should anchor
his claim, for instance, upon Art. 11 70 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which makes a person, who commits fraud,
negligence or delay, liable for damages.
2. A cause of action involves a right of the plaintiff and
a violation of this right by the defendant. The rules refer to
it as an act or omission by which a party violates the rights
of another. Without a violation of this right, there can be no
cause of action and, without this cause of action, there would
be no right to invoke the rules of procedure and file a suit
against the defendant. This right to file a suit is called a right
of action. The right of action, which is procedural in character,
is the consequence of the violation of the right of the plaintiff.
Hence, the rule: There is no right of action where there is no
cause of action.
Jurisprudence, however, as will be seen later within
the pages of this material, declares, in no uncertain terms,
that it is not enough that a party has a cause of action. The
rules require the plaintiff to sufficiently allege those ultimate
facts, including the evidence on which the plaintiff relies his
or her claim, which, taken together, constitute one's cause of
action. In other words, the plaintiff, in his complaint, should
state a cause of action and include his or her evidence against
the defendant. Accordingly, the test of the sufficiency of the
averments in the pleading is whether the court can render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
in the complaint, assuming that the facts, as alleged, are true.
CHAPTER I 35
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
presented the shift from ultimate facts to evidentiary facts.
Rule 8, Sec. 1 now provides that, "Every pleading shall contain
xxx statement of the ultimate facts, including the evidence
on which the party pleading relies xxx." The rationale behind
this amendment is to lay the cards on the table at the earliest
opportunity to cut delay and facilitate speedy resolution of
cases.
Even if there is a shift from ultimate facts to evidentiary
facts, a complaint must still state a cause of action, the rules
must emphasize the sufficiency of such allegations. The
failure of the complaint to state the elements of his cause of
action supplies a ground for the dismissal of the complaint,
even if the actual truth discloses that the plaintiff has a cause
of action against the defendant.
Take the example of a debtor who refuses to pay a just
and valid debt despite demand upon him by his creditor on
the due date of the obligation. Clearly, under the facts, the
creditor has a cause of action against the defendant. Because
he knows he has a cause of action, the creditor files a complaint
for a sum of money. The complaint alleges the following: That
the debtor borrowed from the creditor a specified amount of
money; That said debt was incurred five years before the filing
of the complaint; That despite the lapse of five years, the debt
remained unpaid. Query: May the complaint be dismissed
on the basis of its allegations? The answer should be in the
affirmative. The complaint may be dismissed, not because
of a lack of a cause of action, but because of the failure of
the complaint to state that cause of action. While it is true
that the creditor has a cause of action against the debtor, his
complaint miserably failed to state the· elements of his cause
of action. First, the complaint failed to allege that the debt
has matured. Second, it failed to allege that on the maturity
date or thereafter, the creditor demanded upon the debtor the
payment of the obligation, and; third, that despite demand
no payment was tendered by the debtor. The absence of these
allegations resulted in the failure of the complaint to "state a
cause of action."
36 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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3. While a plaintiff may have a legitimate cause of
action, as a result of a violation of his rights, he is precluded
by the Rules from instituting more than one suit for a single
cause of action. He cannot, in other words, split a single cause
of action into several parts and make each part the subject of
a separate complaint. He cannot, for instance, sue for a sum
of money in one complaint and sue separately for recovery of
interest arising from the same cause of action that gave rise to
the collection suit. The reason for the rule is the judicial policy
of preventing the clogging of the court dockets which normally
arises from the filing of multiple of suits based on the same
cause of action.
Following general procedural principles, if a debtor owes
a creditor the unpaid amounts of P350,000.00 and P300,000.00
under separate promissory notes, the creditor has two causes
of action against the debtor. Hence, he may file two separate
actions against the debtor to collect the sums owed in his favor.
However, based on the same judicial policy of easing the court
dockets, a plaintiff, under certain circumstances, is allowed
to assert in one complaint as many causes of action he may
have against the same opposing party. Thus, if he so desires,
he may join the collection of the amounts of P350,000.00 and
P300,000.00 in a single complaint. The joining of two causes
of action in one complaint is, in procedural jargon, termed
"joinder of causes of action."
B. Jurisdiction
1. If a cause of action exists, the plaintiff is now ready
to consider the preparation of the complaint. But before
doing so, he proceeds to determine which court should take
cognizance of the action. This involves an inquiry into the
laws onjurisdiction because the plaintiff is, as a fundamental
principle, obligated to file his complaint with the court vested
with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Filing
the complaint with the wrong court is a ground for dismissal
of the complaint either upon proper motion by the adverse
party or upon the court's own motion (motu proprio). The
dismissal is inevitable because any judgment rendered by a
court without jurisdiction over the subject matter is a nullity.
CHAPTER I 37
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
2. The student of procedure needs to be reminded, at
this stage, that the rules on jurisdiction over the subject matter
are not found in the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC, the principles therein being merely procedural.
Jurisdiction of this type is a matter of substantive law, not of
mere procedure. Substantive law, for instance, will tell the
reader that jurisdiction over civil actions where the demand
or claims exceeds P2 million shall be within the jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts under R.A. 11576.
Probate proceedings is determined by the gross value of
the estate, in which case, if the same exceeds P2 million, it
shall be within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
The law will also tell the student that jurisdiction over
real actions, i.e., those which involve title to, possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value exceeds P400,000.00 shall be within the jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Court under R.A. 11576. A reading of
substantive law will also reveal that jurisdiction, likewise,
speaks of delegated jurisdiction and special jurisdiction and
that there are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, i.e.,
where the demand is one other than for a sum of money.
C. Venue
1. The court with the appropriate jurisdiction having
been determined, the plaintiff goes on to determine the place
where the action is to be filed. In procedural terms, this place
is called the venue of the action. A complaint filed, even in the
court with the appropriate jurisdiction, runs the risk of being
dismissed if commenced in the wrong place. Improper venue
may be raised by the defendant as an arfirmative defense in his
answer. The court shall motu proprio resolve such affirmative
defense within thirty (30) calendar days from the filing of the
answer. Under the Rules on Expedited Procedures in First
Level Courts, the court may dismiss the case outright on any
of the grounds for the dismissal of a civil action.
2. In determining the venue of an ordinary civil action,
the plaintiff will, inevitably, have to initially consider whether
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or not the action to be filed is a real action or a personal action.
If the action is real (one that affects title to, possession of, or
any interest in real property), the action shall be commenced
and tried in the place where the real property involved or a
portion thereof is situated. If the action is personal, the action
may be commenced and tried in the place where the plaintiff
resides or where the defendant resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff.
3. The plaintiff will have to look into any possible
restrictive stipulations on venue. If the parties have agreed in
writing on the exclusive venue prior to the filing of the action,
then the place stipulated is the only venue. This restrictive
type of stipulation precludes the filing of the action in some
other place. Where, however, the parties stipulated on a
place not intended to be the exclusive venue for the action,
such stipulation is deemed merely permissive. A permissive
stipulation operates to provide an additional venue for the
action in addition to those set by the rules. Thus, where the
stipulation restricts the venue to a particular place as when it
provides, "only in Manila" or similar words, the venue of the
action is Manila, and no other place. On the other hand, where
the stipulation provides "shall be filed in Manila," without
any restrictive words accompanying the same, Manila will
be deemed only an additional venue aside from the possible
venues provided for by the Rules.
D. Parties
1. Not anyone could be a plaintiff. To be a plaintiff,
one should be a real party in interest. There is now a need
to ascertain whether or not the plaintiff is a real party in
interest. A plaintiff, who claims to be one, must sufficiently
allege ownership of a right violated by the adverse party.
In the words of the Rules, he must be one who "stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit."
CHAPTER I 39
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
2. The plaintiff then will find himself expanding
his analysis by determining those who are to be impleaded
as defendants. This determination is vital because, as a
rule, a suit can be commenced only against one averred to
have violated the plaintiffs rights. In doing so, he identifies
whether the defendant is an indispensable party or a mere
necessary party. The distinction is vital because where the
party is indispensable, his joinder is compulsory. Without an
indispensable party, no final determination of an action could
be had. On the contrary, the non-inclusion of a necessary
party does not prevent the court from proceeding with the
action although, without such party, no complete relief may
be accorded as to those already parties.
3. All the above determinations mean that the party
or his counsel sees to it that the rules on parties are complied
with. In short, as parts of his initial preparations for the case,
the plaintiff, preferably through a lawyer, meticulously pours
over the principles governing actions, right of action, causes of
action, jurisdiction, venue, and parties.
E. Prescription and conditions precedent
1. All the above principles having been considered,
plaintiff will be obligated to thoroughly and carefully verify
from the substantive laws whether or not there still exists a
sustainable cause of action by confronting himself with a very
basic question: Is the action already barred by the statute of
limitations? If it is, then, the right of action has ceased. It has
ceased because it has prescribed and prescription is one of the
well-recognized grounds for the dismissal of a complaint, the
same being a mode of extinguishment of a legal obligation.
One principle consistently applied by courts is: When it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
action has prescribed, the court is mandated by the Rules to
dismiss the claim outright. When dismissed on the ground of
prescription, the refiling of the same action or claim is barred.
For example, under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, actions upon a written contract, an obligation

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created by law, or a judgment, prescribe after 10 years from
the time the cause of action accrues. The same Code provides
in Art. 1147 that actions for forcible entry, unlawful detainer
and defamation must be commenced within one year from the
accrual of the cause of action.
2. There are actions which require the performance
of conditions precedent. Compliance with such conditions is
imperative and cannot be conveniently ignored. For instance,
there are certain cases where parties are required to avail of
barangay conciliation proceedings before invoking judicial
intervention. Also, parties need to undergo arbitration
processes before seeking judicial relief when so required
by contractual stipulations. Compliance with conditions
precedent is not, however, sufficient. Compliance therewith
must be alleged in the complaint for it to sufficiently state a
cause of action.
3. There are conditions precedent which actually
constitute elements of the plaintiffs cause of action. An action
for collection of a sum of money, for example, must be preceded
by a demand to pay pursuant to Art. 1169 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Under this provision, the debtor, as a rule,
incurs no delay unless there be a prior demand made by the
creditor.
Pursuant to Sec. 2 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, an
action for unlawful detainer predicated upon the non-payment
of rentals must, likewise, come only after a demand upon the
defendant to pay and vacate the premises is made, and such
demand is not heeded by the latter.
Actions between members of the same family must be
preceded by attempts to have the controversy settled and
compromised by virtue of Art. 151 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. The Family Code declares, in unequivocal
language, that no suit between members of the same family
shall prosper, unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, and that such efforts have failed. If it is
CHAPTER I 41
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
shown that no such efforts were made, the case, pursuant to
Art. 151 of the Family Code, "must be dismissed."
F. Preparation of the complaint
1. The preparation of a complaint requires recognition
and mastery of certain principles. The 2019 Amendments to
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides the rule that the
complaint or any other pleading shall contain in a methodical
and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts, including the evidence on which the party
pleading relies for his or her claim or defense, as the case
may be. Before such amendment, rule required alleging only
the ultimate facts, statements of evidentiary facts are to be
omitted.
2. There are situations where the suit is predicated
upon the alleged fraudulent acts of the defendant. If this be
so, the rule requires that the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake be stated with particularity to enable the court to
determine the type of fraud committed by the defendant and
his subsequent liability, if there be any. Under the Civil Code,
depending on the kind of fraud committed, fraud may be a
cause for the annulment or rescission of a contract. It may also
be a ground for liability for damages alone. It may even be a
cause for an action for the reformation of an instrument. The
same rule mandating a particular narration of circumstances
offraud applies to averments of mistake. Averments of malice
intent, knowledge or other condition of the mind of a person '
may, however, be averred generally.
3. An action filed may, sometimes, be based upon
a document, as when a collection suit is based upon a
promissory note executed by the defendant. Such document
needs to be properly pleaded in the complaint by setting
forth the substance of the instrument in the complaint and
attaching the original or a copy thereof as an integral part of
the complaint.
The defending party may opt to deny the genuineness and
due execution of the promissory note. When he does so, the
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rule is established that a mere specific denial of such matters
would not be a sufficient denial. The rule requires the denial
to be under oath; otherwise, the defendant will be deemed to
have admitted the genuineness and due execution of the note.
It is also possible that a complaint is filed to recover
usurious interest. If the defending party desires to deny the
usurious interest, he must do so under oath because a mere
specific denial of such interest is not sufficient. The allegations
of usury in the complaint are deemed admitted if not denied
under oath.
4. The complaint must specify the relief sought
although the rule allows the addition of a general prayer for
such other reliefs as the court may deem just or equitable.
Although part of the complaint, the relief or prayer is not
largely determinative of the cause of action. The nature of the
cause of action is primarily determined by the allegations in
the body of the complaint and not by the prayer alone.
5. The complaint must be dated. It must, likewise,
be signed by the party or by the counsel representing him.
Signing the complaint is mandatory because an unsigned
pleading produces no legal effect.
6. When it is the counsel who signs the pleading, his
signature constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief, there are good grounds to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay.
7. The complaint must designate the address of the
party or his counsel. This address should not be a post office
box.
8. Should every complaint or any other pleading be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit? The general
rule on the matter is that a pleading need not be verified, unless
specifically mandated by law or a particular rule. For example,
all pleadings under the Rules on Expedited Procedures in First
Level Courts, particularly summary procedure, have to be
verified. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
must, likewise, be verified.
CHAPTER I 43
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a
certification of the truthfulness of the allegations in the
pleading. A pleading required to be verified that contains
a verification based on 'information and belief,' or upon
'knowledge, information and belief,' or lacks a proper
verification shall be treated as unsigned pleading.
9. The complaint and other initiatory pleading must
contain or be accompanied by a certification against forum
shopping in which the plaintiff or principal party certifies,
among others, that he has not commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues pending in, or already
resolved, in any other tribunal. Absolute non-compliance
with· this requirement is incurable and a ground for outright
dismissal of the complaint without prejudice to refiling of the
same. A defective certification against forum-shopping falls
under substantial compliance, wherein the court may choose
to proceed or direct the party to submit a compliance. The act
of forum-shopping itself would result to dismissal of the case
and would give rise to criminal and administrative sanctions
as well as contempt.
G. Provisional remedies
1. Depending upon the nature of the action, the
plaintiff may avail of any of the provisional remedies provided
for under the Rules like preliminary attachment, preliminary
injunction, receivership, replevin or support pendente lite.
Provisional remedies are not permanent or final reliefs. They
are, as the name indicates, merely temporary reliefs that may
be availed of by a party in the meantime that the main action
is being litigated and there is yet no final judgment in the
case.
In an action for forcible entry, for instance, the plaintiff
may ask for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to
restore him in the possession of his land during the pendency
of the main case. In an action for collection of a sum of money,
the plaintiff may, at the commencement of the action, apply
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment of the
defendant's properties where it is shown that the defendant
 CML PROCEDURE
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THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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is about to depart from the Philippines with the intention of
defrauding the plaintiff-creditor. This attachment is obtained
to secure the future execution of the judgment and avoid the
sad spectacle of a winning party literally holding an empty
bag because the sheriff cannot find properties of the losing
party to satisfy the judgment.
In an action for support where the resolution thereof may
possibly come only after a protracted litigation, the plaintiff
may ask the court to order the defendant to give support to
the plaintiff during the pendency of the action. This remedy is
known in the Rules as support pendente lite. In an action for
damages against an electric company which wrongly cut off
the power supply to the plaintiffs factory, the latter may ask
the court to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
to restore power in the meantime that litigation on the main
action is in progress.
H. Filing of the complaint
1. After all those mentioned above have been considered
and duly complied with, the complaint shall now be filed. The
filing of the complaint is the act of presenting and submitting
the same to the court.
2. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action
is filed, the filing must be accompanied by the payment of the
requisite docket and filing fees. The fees must be paid because,
as a rule, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only
upon payment of the prescribed fees. Without payment, the
general rule is that the complaint is not considered filed.
Payment of the full amount of the docket fee is mandatory
and jurisdictional.
This rule was, however, relaxed by the Supreme Court in
some cases in which payment of the fee within a reasonable
time, but not beyond the prescriptive period, was permitted. If
the fees are not paid at the time of the filing, the court acquires
jurisdiction only upon full payment of the fees within a
reasonable time, as the court may grant, barring prescription.
Even on appeal, the general rule is that payment of
docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the
CHAPTER I 45
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
perfection of the appeal although there were instances when
the rule had been applied with liberality. It is well-established
that, as a general rule, the payment of docket fees within the
required period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal.
3. When the complaint is filed and the prescribed fees
are paid, the action is deemed commenced. The court, then,
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff and the
running of the prescriptive period for the action is interrupted.
I. Possible scenarios after the filing of the complaint
1. Dismissal of the complaint by the plaintiff
Sometimes, after the complaint has been duly filed, the plaintiff
may, for reasons personal or otherwise, entertain doubts as to
the need to pursue the complaint filed against the defendant.
In this case, he may exercise the option of dismissing his own
complaint. If the dismissal is made before the adverse party
has served an answer or a motion for summary judgment,
he may have his own complaint dismissed by the mere filing
of a notice of dismissal. A motion to dismiss is not required.
Upon such notice, the court shall issue an order confirming
the dismissal. The dismissal by notice of dismissal is without
prejudice to its being refiled later, unless otherwise stated in
the notice of dismissal or when the refiling is barred by, what
jurisprudence calls, 'the two-dismissal' rule because the action
had already been previously dismissed twice by the plaintiff
in a competent court in an action based on or including the
same claim.
After service of the answer or a motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff can no longer have his action dismissed
by mere notice. The plaintiff now has to file a motion to dismiss
his complaint. The grant or denial of the motion to dismiss is
now a matter addressed to sound judicial discretion because
this type of dismissal is no longer a matter of right.
If the court allows the dismissal of the complaint, only the
complaint is dismissed. A counterclaim, already pleaded prior
to the service upon the defendant of the motion for dismissal,
is not affected by the dismissal of the complaint and is without
46 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. A dismissal,
under this rule, is deemed a dismissal without prejudice to the
refiling of the complaint, unless otherwise stated in the order
of dismissal.
2. Dismissal by the court - The court shall, on its own
motion, dismiss the complaint ifit appears from the complaint
or the pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by the statute limitations.
The court may, on its own motion, or upon motion of
the adverse party, dismiss a complaint for causes due to the
fault of the plaintiff. This happens when the plaintiff, without
justifiable cause, fails to appear on the date of the presentation
of his or her evidence in chief, to prosecute his or her action for
an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with the Rules
or any order of the court. This dismissal will have the effect
of an adjudication upon the merits, unless the court declares
otherwise. This means that, as a rule, the complaint can no
longer be refiled if the dismissal is anchored on any of the
grounds mentioned in this paragraph.
3. Amendment of the complaint - Instead of dismissing
his or her complaint, as explained in the preceding number,
it frequently happens that the plaintiff finds the need to
amend his or her complaint. The plaintiff amends his or
her complaint, for example, by correcting a mistaken or an
inadequate allegation therein.
Amendment of the pleading is a matter of right as long
as it is made before the other party has served a responsive
pleading. So, if the plaintiff desires to amend his complaint
before the defendant serves his answer, the amendment may
be done as a matter of right and the court has no discretion on
the matter. In such a case, the amendment has to be accepted
by the court as a ministerial duty, the amendment being made
as a matter of right. Amendment may even be done to correct
an error in jurisdiction or to effect a change in the cause of
J....-.___.
CHAPTER I 47
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
action provided the amendment is still a matter of right. Note
that an amendment made as a matter of right may, by the
terms of the Rules, be availed of only once.
It has often been asked whether or not the plaintiff may
amend his complaint as a matter of right even after a motion
to dismiss has been served. The logical answer is that, he
may do so and this is because a motion to dismiss is not a
responsive pleading. Hence, his right to amend his complaint
is not affected by the service of a motion to dismiss. After a
responsive pleading has been served, amendment must be
with leave of court. This means that after an answer has been
served, an amendment may be done only with the approval of
the court. The amendment, in this case, is no longer a matter
of right and becomes a matter of judicial discretion.
Although existing jurisprudence adopts a liberal policy
on amendments, such amendment shall be refused if it
appears to the court that the amendment is intended for
delay, made to confer jurisdiction on the court or the pleading
stated no cause of action from the beginning which could be
amended. Under current rules, the fact that the amendment
substantially alters the cause of action is not a ground for the
court to refuse the amendment. It is an amendment with the
intent to delay the proceedings which would justifies the court
in refusing any motion for leave to amend the pleading. Also,
when the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the complaint and the amendment is for the purpose of
conferring jurisdiction upon the court where the amendment
is no longer a matter of right, the amendment shall not be
allowed. Common reason suggests that, in this case, since
the court is without jurisdiction ove~ the complaint, it has no
jurisdiction to act on the motion for leave to amend.
An amendment may also arise by implication when
matters not raised in the pleadings are tried with the express
or implied consent of the parties, as when no objection is
interjected on the evidence offered on a matter not in issue
in the pleadings. When this occurs, the issues tried with the
consent of the parties shall be treated as if they had been
48 CNIL PROCEDURE
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raised in the pleadings. No amendment of such pleadings
deemed amended is necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence. An actual amendment need not be made because
failure to do so will not affect the result of the trial on said
issues.
II. Summons
1. Unless the complaint is on its face dismissible for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
and that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment
or by the statute of limitations, the court shall, within five
(5) calendar days from receipt of the initiatory pleading and
proof of payment of the requisite legal fees, direct the clerk of
court to issue the corresponding summons to the defendant.
For the defendant, the service of summons represents the
usual beginning of civil procedure. The summons orders
the defendant to file an answer to the complaint and also
reminds him that, unless he does so, the court may render a
judgment against him by default and grant to the plaintiff the
relief applied for. Attached to the summons is a copy of the
complaint.
The summons may be served by the sheriff, his or her
deputy, or other proper officer, and in case of failure of service
of summons by them, the court may authorize the plaintiff
together with the sheriff. The summons and copy of the
complaint are to be served upon the defendant in person but,
if he cannot be served despite diligent efforts, summons may
be served by an alternative mode called substituted service.
This consists in serving the summons at the residence of the
defendant to a person at least 18 years of age and of sufficient
discretion residing therein or his regular place of business with
a person qualified to so receive the summons in accordance
with the Rules, or with any of the officers of the homeowners'
association or condominium corporation, or its chief security
officer in charge of the community or the building where the
defendant may be found, or by sending an electronic mail
if allowed by the court. Subject to certain exceptions, the
CHAPTER I 49
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
long-standing rule is that summons by publication is not
a recognized mode of service for the purpose of acquiring
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
2. Recall that the filing of the complaint enables the
court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff.
This jurisdiction, however, does not extend to the person
of the defendant. Absent a voluntary appearance, it is the
service of summons upon the defendant which enables the
court to acquire jurisdiction over his person in those actions
traditionally called actions in personam. The summons is a
coercive process which places the person, even of the unwilling
defendant, under the jurisdiction of the court. Service of
summons, likewise, represents a compliance with the rule on
notice - an essential element of constitutional due process.
3. The rules on summons mandate specific procedures
for service upon certain classes of defendants. When, for
instance, the defendant is a minor, insane or otherwise an
incompetent person, service of summons shall be made upon
him or her personally and on his or her legal guardian if he
or she has one, or, if none, upon his or her guardian ad litem
whose appointment shall be applied for by the plaintiff. In the
case of a minor, service shall be made on his or her parent or
guardian.
If the defendant is a domestic corporation or partnership
or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with
a juridical personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel of the corporation wherever
they may be found, or in their absence or unavailability, on
their secretaries.
When the defendant is a prisoner confined in a jail or
institution, service shall be effected upon him or her (the
prisoner) by the officer having management of the jail or
institution. Such officer is deemed deputized as a special
sheriff for said purpose. The reader, therefore, has to go
through all the modes of service of summons clearly spelled
out in the Rules.
50 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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4. One rule that stands out under the topic on
summons is the rule that service of summons is not the only
way by which the court acquires the requisite jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant in certain actions. Service
of summons may be dispensed with if the defendant makes
a voluntary appearance. Under the Rules, the defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. Also, in some special civil actions, an
order to comment served upon the respondent would enable
the court to acquire jurisdiction over his person.
5. It is noteworthy that the 2019 Amendments to the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure introduced a new provision
wherein the summons is improperly served and a lawyer
makes a special appearance on behalf of the defendant to,
among others, question the validity of service of summons,
the counsel shall be deputized by the court to serve summons
on his or her client.
A. Motion for bill of particulars
1. Although the summons directs the defendant to
file an answer to the complaint, he is procedurally under no
obligation to outrightly file an answer since the rule allows
him certain procedural options.
For instance, if after reading the complaint, the defendant
finds that, because of the ambiguity in certain material
allegations in the complaint, he cannot possibly serve an
intelligent answer, he need not serve his answer unless and
until the alleged ambiguities are clarified by the plaintiff.
These ambiguities may be sought to be clarified through a
bill of particulars submitted by the plaintiff, upon order of the
court and upon motion of the other party. It must be clarified
that a motion for bill of particulars is not solely directed to the
complaint. Any other pleading may be the object of a motion
for bill of particulars.
2. Upon being notified of the motion by the clerk of
court, the court may either deny or grant the motion outright,
CHAPTER I 51
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
or allow the parties the opportunity to be heard. The court,
therefore, is not obliged to conduct a hearing on the motion.
3. If the motion is granted, the party directed to submit
a bill of particulars must comply with the order within 10
calendar days from notice. If the order is not obeyed, or in case
compliance is insufficient, the court may order the striking
out of the pleading or the portions thereof or make such other
order as it may deem just.
4. A motion for bill of particulars is not filed in order to
discover the evidence of the other party. For this purpose, the
movant should avail of the various modes of discovery under
the Rules of Court, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC. The
purpose of a motion for bill of particulars is plainly to enable
the movant to properly prepare his responsive pleading.
B. Motion to dismiss
The provisions under Rule 16 have either been deleted
or transposed by the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Subject to certain exceptions, motion
to dismiss shall not be allowed under the new rules. When
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, litis
pendentia, res judicata, and prescription appears from the
pleading and its attached evidence, the court shall effect a
motu proprio dismissal of the complaint.
III. Answer
1. If there exists no ground for a motion to dismiss or
if the motion is rightfully denied, the defendant has to file
his answer. The answer is the responsive pleading to the
complaint. The answer gives notice to the plaintiff as to which
allegations in the complaint the defendant decides to contest
and put in issue. The answer may invoke both negative and
affirmative defenses.
2. A negative defense is the specific denial of the material
fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential
to his or her cause of action. Not every denial qualifies as a
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correct denial. The denial is required to be a specific denial.
The answer must specifically deny the material averments in
the other party's pleading because material averments not
specifically denied are deemed admitted. If the answer, for
example, admits all the material averments in the complaint,
the answer is deemed to have failed to tender an issue. Since
there is no triable issue, a trial is completely unnecessary.
The claiming party may then file a motion for a judgment on
the pleadings and the court may direct a judgment based on
the pleadings already filed.
3. An affirmative defense essentially consists of a
hypothetical admission of the material allegations in the
pleading of the claimant but, nevertheless, prevents or bars
recovery by him or her. For instance, a defendant may admit
that his negligence caused the injuries of the plaintiff but he
can no longer be held liable because the plaintiff had previously
been fully compensated for all the injuries he sustained. The
defendant may also argue, in his defense, that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint or that
the action has already prescribed.
4. A defendant shall raise his or her affirmative
defenses in his or her answer which shall be limited to fraud,
statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of
frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy,
any other matter by way of confession and avoidance, lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
that the action is barred by a prior judgment, that the court
has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party,
that the venue is improperly laid, that the plaintiff has no
legal capacity to sue, that the pleading asserting the claim
states no cause of action, and that a condition precedent for
filing the claim has not been complied with.
5. The filing of an answer is important. Failure of the
defending party to file an answer entitles the claiming party
to file a motion to declare him in default.
CHAPTER I 53
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. Default
1. When he is declared in default, the defending party
loses his standing in court and is not allowed to take part
in the trial. After issuing an order of default, the court may
proceed to render judgment granting the claiming party such
relief as his complaint may warrant unless, in its discretion,
it requires the plaintiff to submit evidence on his claim.
2. An important principle in this regard is the rule
that the court's declaration of default should be preceded by a
motion to declare the said party in default together with proof
of such failure. The rule, therefore, precludes the court from
declaring the defending party in default on its own motion.
3. A party declared in default shall not take part in the
trial. Hence, he can no longer appear as a party in the case.
Although barred from participating in the proceedings, he is,
however, still entitled to notices of subsequent proceedings.
He is also accorded a relief from the order from the order of
default. He may, at any time after notice thereof and before
judgment, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
default. The motion must show that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and
that he has a meritorious defense. The order of default may
be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may
impose in the interest of justice.
4. It is, likewise, important to emphasize that a default
order will not be issued in certain cases like in an action for
annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage,
or legal separation, even if the defendant fails to answer.
Instead, the court shall order the Solicitor General or his or
her deputized public prosecutor to investigate whether or not
collusion exists between the parties and prevent fabrication of
evidence.
5. When the order of default ripens into a judgment by
default, there is a limit imposed by the Rules on the extent of
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relief to be awarded in the judgment. A judgment rendered
against a party in default shall not exceed or be different in
kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
B. Counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party complaint, reply
and intervention
1. It happens frequently enough that the defendant
has his own claim against the plaintiff. When the defendant
files his answer to the complaint, said answer may be coupled
with a counterclaim, which is a pleading in its own right. A
counterclaim is a pleading which sets forth a claim a defending
party may have against an opposing party. A counterclaim is
always directed against an opposing party, not against a co-
party.
The counterclaim may be one that is compulsory or
one that is permissive. A compulsory counterclaim, which a
defending party has at the time he files his answer, shall be
contained therein. A permissive counterclaim does not have
to be raised in the same proceedings because, by its nature, it
could be invoked as an independent action. The reader should
know the important differences between these two types of
counterclaims. The differences are explained within the pages
of this work.
2. There are instances when two or more defendants
are named in a complaint. It also happens that one defendant
has a claim against his co-defendant, arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the
complaint. The claiming defendant may, then, in his answer,
interpose a pleading against his co-defendant. This pleading
is known as a cross-claim. This is a pleading containing the
claim by one party against a co-party. Thus, if P files an action
for a sum of money against A and B, A may file a cross-claim
against B, his co-defendant. In his cross-claim, he may assert
that it was actually B who benefitted from the proceeds of the
loan, A being merely an accommodation party. If A or B files
a claim against P, such claim is called a counterclaim, not a
cross-claim.
CHAPTER I 55
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
3. There are also cases when a defendant, named in the
complaint, has a cause of action against one who is not a party
to the action. This cause of action is a claim against a third
person either for contribution, indemnity, subrogation, or any
other relief in respect of the plaintiffs claim. The defendant
may bring in the third person into the suit and implead him as
a party by filing, with leave of court, a third-party complaint
against him, thus, making him a party to the action.
4. Recall that the defendant files an answer to the
complaint. This answer is the responsive pleading to the
complaint. May the plaintiff, likewise, make his own response
to the answer? Under the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, all new matters alleged in the answer are
deemed controverted, the plaintiff can respond to the answer
only if the defending party attaches an actionable document
to his or her answer. Upon receipt of the answer of the
defendant with an attached actionable document, the plaintiff
may respond to the answer. This response is done through
a pleading called a reply. The purpose of a reply is to deny
or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged
in, or relating to, said actionable document. May the plaintiff
file a reply if he wants to controvert the new matters alleged
in the answer even though the defendant did not attach an
actionable document? Since reply is now a prohibited pleading,
the plaintiff can no longer file a reply. Instead, the plaintiff
can file an amended or supplemental complaint.
5. Recall, also, that a person, not a party to the original
action, may be impleaded by an original party and brought into
the action through a pleading called a third-party complaint.
Now, what if a person, not a party to the complaint, wants to
be a party to the action, and no party is impleading him as a
defendant through a third-party complaint? How could this be
procedurally possible?
There are provisions in the Rules that adequately meet
the above situation. This is made possible through a process
called intervention. Under the Rules, if, at any time before
judgment, a person, not a party to the action, believes that
he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation in a case
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in which he is not a party, he may, with leave of court, file
a complaint-in-intervention if he asserts a claim against one
or all of the parties. On the other hand, if he unites with the
defending party in resisting a claim against said party, he
may file an answer-in-intervention.
IV. Pre-trial
1. After the last responsive pleading has been served
and filed, the branch clerk of court shall issue, within 5 calendar
days from filing, a notice of pre-trial. A pre-trial is mandatory
and failure to appear thereat by either party will result in
adverse consequences for the absent party. In a pre-trial, the
parties shall, among others, consider the possibility of an
amicable settlement or submission of the case to alternative
modes of dispute resolution. A pre-trial has several purposes.
Hence, the mere failure of the parties to effect a compromise
is not a ground for the court to terminate the pre-trial.
2. During the pre-trial stage and, generally, at any
time even before pre- trial or trial, the parties may obtain
information from each other through the employment of
devices, collectively known as discovery procedures.
3. The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or
on the party himself if such party has no counsel. The counsel
served with such notice is charged with the duty of notifying
his client.
4. Appearance in the pre-trial is the duty of both the
counsel and the parties. When duly notified, the failure of the
plaintiff and counsel to appear without valid cause when so
required, shall be cause for the dismissal of the action. The
dismissal is with prejudice unless otherwise ordered by the
court. A similar failure of the defendant and counsel shall be
a cause for the court to allow the plaintiff to present his or her
evidence ex parte. The judgment of the court shall be based on
the evidence offered by the plaintiff.
5. At least 3 calendar days before the date of the pre-
trial, the parties are required to file with the court and serve
CHAPTER I 57
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
upon each other their respective pre-trial briefs. Failure to file
the same shall be equivalent to failure to appear at the pre-
trial.
6. After the pre-trial, the court shall issue a pre-trial
order. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent
course of the action, unless the same is modified for reasons of
justice.
V. Trial
1. Should there be no amicable settlement or
compromise forged between the parties, the case will be set for
trial. During the trial, the parties present their evidence on
their claims and defenses. The plaintiff presents his evidence
first. After he rests his case, the defendant will present his
own evidence.
However, if the defendant believes that, upon the facts
and the law, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief he may
' '
instead of presenting his own evidence, move for the dismissal
of the case. He does so by way of a demurrer to evidence. If
the demurrer is denied, the defendant still has the right to
present his evidence. If the demurrer is granted but on appeal
the order of dismissal is reversed, the defendant is deemed to
have waived his right to present evidence.
2. A trial is not an indispensable stage of a civil action.
A judgment may be rendered even without a trial as when a
case is permanently dismissed based on prescription or bar
by a prior judgment. A judgment may also be rendered based
on the pleadings. Here, no trial is required because the basis
of the decision would merely be the· pleadings of the parties.
A judgment upon a compromise may also be rendered even
without a trial.
VI. Judgment
1. A judgment is rendered after the submission of the
evidence of the parties has been concluded. It is the decision
-
58 CML PROCEDURE CHAPTER I 59
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES GENERAL PRINCIPLES
VOLUME I

of the court and represents its official determination of the
respective rights and obligations of the parties to the case.
2. There is no oral judgment under the Rules. It has to
be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly the facts and the law on which it is based,
signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.
its date of entry, file a motion for the execution of the judgment
rendered in his favor. The losing party may, however, avail of
extraordinary remedies at this stage like: (a) a petition for
relief, (b) an action to annul the judgment, (c) certiorari, or
(d) even an attack against the judgment collaterally when the
nullity of the judgment is plain and evident on its face.

3. Central to the concept of a judgment is the date of VIII. Execution and satisfaction of judgments
entry of the judgment which, under current procedure, is also
the date of the finality of the judgment. The date of entry of the When all the remedies available to a party have been
judgment finds relevance when the judgment is to be executed exhausted and the case is finally decided, the judgment of the
by motion. A final and executory judgment may be executed court shall then be subject to execution. This is the remedy
on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. The afforded by procedural rules for the enforcement of the
date of the entry of judgment is also relevant when a litigant judgment. It is the fruit, as well as the end of the action.
files a petition for relief from judgment which is filed within Postscript: A separate second volume of this material will
60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order discuss provisional remedies and special civil actions.
or other proceeding, and not more than six months after such
judgment or final order was entered.
-oOo-
VII. Post-judgment remedies
1. The judgment will inevitably declare that a party
wins and the other party loses the litigation. The judgment is
not the end for the losing party because he is afforded remedies
against the adverse judgment.
These remedies may be categorized into: (a) remedies
before the judgment becomes final and executory, and (b)
remedies after the judgment becomes final and executory.
2. Before the judgment becomes final and executory,
the aggrieved party may file: (a) a motion for reconsideration,
(b) a motion for new trial, or (c) an appeal. If the motion for
new trial or the motion for reconsideration is denied, the
aggrieved party may appeal from the judgment within the
period for appeal following the so-called "fresh period" rule.
3. After the judgment becomes final and executory, a
party may no longer appeal because the period for appeal has
already lapsed. The judgment has become final and executory
and the prevailing party may, at any time within 5 years from
 - ---------- ---------------------
.........
Chapter II
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
I. JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdiction in General
Jurisdiction; meaning
1. Jurisdiction has, traditionally, been referred to as
the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide
a case (See Continental Micronesia, Inc. v. Basco, G.R. Nos.
178382-83, September 23, 2015; Mendez v. Shari'a District
Court, 5th Shari'a District, Cotabato City, G.R. No. 201614,
January 12, 2016; Barangay Mayamot v. Antipolo City, G.R.
No. 187349, August 17, 2016; Spouses Sanchez v. Vda. de
Aguilar, G.R. No. 228680, September 17, 2018).
The power of a court to hear and decide a controversy
"x xx includes the power to determine whether or not it has the
authority to hear and determine the controversy presented,
and the right to decide whether or not the statement of facts
that confer jurisdiction exists, as well as all other matters that
arise in the case legitimately before the court. Jurisdiction
imports the power and authority to declare the law, to expound
or to apply the laws x x x, to hear and determine issues of
law and of fact, the power to hear, determine, and pronounce
judgment on the issues before the court, and the power to
inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to pronounce
the judgment" (Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 195834,
November 9, 2016; See also Bilag v. Ay-Ay, G.R. No. 189950,
April 24, 2017).
2. The traditional concept of jurisdiction has tradition-
ally been referred to as the authority of the court to hear,
try, and determine a case. This definition has, however, been
60
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CHAPTER II 61
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
expanded to include the authority of the court to execute its
decisions. It was held that the power to control the execution
of the decision of the court is an essential aspect of jurisdiction
and that the most important part of a litigation, whether civil
or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions (Echegaray
v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96, 108). Quite recently, the
Court explained that the execution of a judgment is incidental
to the jurisdiction already acquired by the trial court (Mejia-
Espinoza v. Carino, G.R. No. 193397, January 25, 2017).
Note: Common usage tells us that, when a legal treatise
makes reference to the term "jurisdiction," without it specifying
the type or aspect of jurisdiction, the same should be construed
as referring to jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Jurisdiction is not the power of the judge
It is the court, not the judge, which by law, is vested with
jurisdiction. The judge merely presides over the court. Thus,
jurisprudence holds that jurisdiction is not the authority of
the judge but of the court. Jurisdiction does not attach to
the court but to the judge. Hence, the continuity of a court
and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by the
death, resignation, or cessation from the service of the judge
presiding over it (See ABC Davao Auto Supply, Irie. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 113296, January 16, 1998).
Jurisdiction does not refer to the decision itself
Jurisdiction is the authority of the court to decide a
case, and not the decision rendered therein (Republic v. "G"
Holdings, Inc., 475 SCRA 608, 619). The authority of the court
to decide a case, and not the decision rendered therein, is what
makes up jurisdiction (Lim v. Pacqu'ing, 236 SCRA 211, 219;
citations omitted).
Aspects of jurisdiction
In discussing jurisdiction, its several aspects need to be
considered, namely:
(a) jurisdiction over the subject matter;
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(b) jurisdiction over the parties;
(c) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and
(d) jurisdiction over the res or thing involved in
the litigation (Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013).
B. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
Meaning of jurisdiction over the subject matter
As earlier mentioned, jurisdiction over the subject matter
is ref erred to as the power of a particular court to hear the
type of case that is then before it. The term also refers to
the jurisdiction of the court over the class of cases to which
a particular case belongs (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.,
767; citations omitted; De Pedro v. Romasan Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014). Following
this definition, "real actions," "personal actions" or "actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation" are to be considered as
subject matters.
Duty of a court to dismiss an action for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter
1. When a complaint is filed in court, the basic questions
that ipso facto are to be immediately resolved by the court on
its own are: (a) What is the subject matter of the complaint
filed before the court? (b) Does the court have jurisdiction over
the said subject matter? Answering these questions inevitably
requires looking into the applicable laws on jurisdiction.
Jurisprudence, therefore, teaches that "it is important
that a court or tribunal should first determine whether or not
it has jurisdiction over the subject matter presented before it,
considering that any act that it performs without jurisdiction
shall be null and void, and without any binding legal effect
(Bilag v. Ay-Ay, G.R. No. 189950, April 24, 2017).
2. Under the Rules of Court, as amended by AM. No.
19-10-20-SC, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action
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whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter (Tagalog v. Lim Vda. de Gonzalez, G.R.
No. 201286, July 18, 2014; See also De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26,
2014).
The relevant provision of the Rules of Court, as amended
by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC, provides that: "x xx when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, x x x the court
shall dismiss the claim" (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Italics supplied).
3. Even if the question of jurisdiction over the subject
matter was not raised by either of the parties, the courts
will have to first address such question before delving into
the procedural and substantive issues of the case. Courts are
bound to take notice of the limits of their authority and, even if
such question is neither raised by the pleadings or suggested
by counsel, they may recognize the want of jurisdiction and
act accordingly by staying pleadings, dismissing the action, or
otherwise noticing the defect, at any stage of the proceedings
(Bureau of Customs v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253,
September 8, 2015). Bar 1992
Effect of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
1. The general rule is that proceedings conducted or
decisions made by a court are legally void where there is an
absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter. This is true
even where the court in good faith believes that the subject
matter is within its jurisdiction. A court devoid of jurisdiction
over the case cannot make a decision in favor of either party.
It can only dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. A decision
rendered by a court devoid of jurisdiction may be the subject
of a collateral attack, if that jurisdictional defect appears on
the face of the record. And where lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter appears on the face of the record, an appellate
court may, on its own initiative, dismiss the action (See Am
Jur 2d, §97, 1965 Ed.; citations by Am Jur omitted; See also
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Tagalog v. Lim Vda. de Gonzalez, G.R. No. 201286, July 18,
2014; See also Bilag v. Ay-Ay, G.R. No. 189950, April 24, 2017).
2. The Court, in another case, clearly instructs:
"Indeed, a void judgment for lack of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right, nor
the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant
to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution
based on it is void" (Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. v.
Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc., G.R. 191527,
August 22, 2016; See also Aichi Forging Company of Asia,
Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, En Banc, G.R. No. 193625,
August 30, 2017).
Hence, if a complaint should have been filed with the
MTC, but the RTC took cognizance of the case erroneously
filed with it, the RTC seriously erred in proceeding with the
case. Note: When the court dismisses the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is performing the only
authority that it has under the circumstances, i.e., to order
such dismissal. It would be error for that court to refer or
forward the case to another court with the proper jurisdiction.
Bar 2004
Jurisdiction versus the exercise of jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction.
As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction
is the authority to decide a case. Jurisdiction is the power or
authority of the court (Arranza v. B.F. Homes, Inc., 333 SCRA
799, 812). The exercise of this power or authority is called
the exercise of jurisdiction and where there is jurisdiction
over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all
other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that
jurisdiction (See Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 195834,
November 9, 2016).
Thus, when a complaint for unlawful detainer is filed with
the Municipal Trial Court, the question as to why it was filed
with such court is a matter of jurisdiction. When the court acts
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according to such jurisdiction, renders a decision on the case
and executes its decision, such acts constitute the exercise
of jurisdiction. Of course, implied from the above distinction
is the rule that a valid exercise of jurisdiction presupposes
that the court exercising jurisdiction has jurisdiction over the
nature of the action.
Error of jurisdiction versus error of judgment (Bar 1989)
1. An error of jurisdiction is one which occurs when the
court exercises a jurisdiction not conferred upon it by law. It
may also occur when the court or tribunal, although vested
with jurisdiction, acts in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
(See GSIS v. Oliza, 304 SCRA 421, 426; for further readings,
see also Cabrera v. Lapid, 510 SCRA 55, 66).
Take for instance, a Municipal Trial Court which
assumed jurisdiction over a criminal information for murder,
tried the accused and subsequently rendered a judgment
thereon. Whether the judgment it rendered be one of acquittal
or conviction is of no consequence because, by assuming
jurisdiction over a murder case, the court committed an error
of jurisdiction. By law, it has no jurisdiction over the offense
of murder since the same is punishable by reclusion perpetua
by virtue of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Under Art. 27
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
involves imprisonment for "twenty years and one day to forty
years." Under current law, a Municipal Trial Court has no
exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses punishable by
imprisonment exceeding six years (Sec. 32, B.P. 129as amended
by R.A. 7691). Here, there is lack of jurisdiction because the
court or tribunal is not vested by law with authority or power
to take cognizance of the case.
Another instance when the court may be deemed to
have acted without jurisdiction is when, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, it acted beyond the power conferred upon it, i.e.,
it acted in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law
(For further readings, see Vette Industrial Sales Company,
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Inc. v. Cheng, 509 SCRA 532, 543). Take, a Regional Trial
Court which assumed jurisdiction over an action for specific
performance, an action deemed to be one incapable of
pecuniary estimation. In taking cognizance over the case, the
court is not deemed to have committed an error of jurisdiction.
It has, by law, jurisdiction over actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation (Sec. 19[1], B.P. 129 as amended by R.A. 7691).
However, if during the course of the proceedings, the court,
issued orders clearly contrary to the facts and the law, and
whimsically and capriciously refused to reconsider said
orders despite having the opportunity of doing so, the court is
deemed to have been deprived of the jurisdiction it originally
had since its acts are deemed to be tainted with a grave abuse
of discretion "amounting to lack of jurisdiction."
2. An error of judgment is not to be equated with an
error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment presupposes that
the court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action but, in the process of exercising that jurisdiction, it
committed mistakes in the appreciation of the facts and the
evidence leading to an erroneous judgment. These mistakes
are mere errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction
because the decision, although erroneous, was rendered by a
court vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any
alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion
will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment
(Cabrera v. Lapid, 510 SCRA 55, 66; Heirs of Maura So v.
Obliosca, 542 SCRA 406, 417). It must also be noted that the
mere fact that the court misapplied the facts and the evidence
and made erroneous conclusions, does not necessarily give
rise to errors of jurisdiction. Such errors are merely errors of
judgment (See Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 144760-
61, August 2, 2017). Errors of jurisdiction are correctible by
certiorari while errors of judgment are correctible by appeal
(See Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Co, G.R. No. 171172,
November 9, 2015; See also, Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., G.R.
No. 195834, November 9, 2016).
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Test of jurisdiction
The test of jurisdiction is not whether or not the judgment
of the court is legally correct. The test is whether or not, under
the law, it has the power or authority to take cognizance of
a particular subject matter. If the court has such authority,
then the court has jurisdiction even if its conclusions turn out
to be erroneous. The erroneous conclusion of the court would
be merely an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction.
As the Court puts it:
"The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the court
or tribunal had the power to enter on the inquiry, not
whether or not its· conclusions, in the course thereof,
were correct, for the power to decide necessarily carries
with it the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly.
In a manner of speaking, the lack of the power to act at
all results in a judgment that is void; while the lack of
the power to render an erroneous decision results in a
judgment that is valid until set aside. That the decision
is erroneous does not divest the court or tribunal that
rendered it of the jurisdiction conferred by law to try the
case. Hence, if the court or tribunal has jurisdiction over
the civil action, whatever error may be attributed to it
simply one of judgment, not of jurisdiction; appeal, not
certiorari, lies to correct the error" (Salvador v. Patricia,
Inc., G.R. No. 195834, November 9, 2016).
An erroneous judgment is not void
1. Where a court has jurisdiction, an erroneous decision
cannot be deemed void (20 Am Jur 2d §90, 1965), although the
error may be the subject of an appeal brought by the aggrieved
party.
A very early case clearly explained that, if the court has
jurisdiction, it is altogether immaterial how grossly irregular
or manifestly erroneous its proceedings may have been. The
judgment cannot be considered a nullity, and cannot, therefore,
be collaterally impeached. Such a judgment is binding on the
parties unless it is reversed or annulled in a direct proceeding
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(Herrera v. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245, 256, citing Miller v. Rowan,
25 Ill., 344; For further readings, see Salvador v. Patricia,
Inc., G.R. No. 195834, November 9, 2016).
2. On the contrary, if there is a total want of jurisdiction
in a court, its proceedings are an absolute nullity, confer no
right and afford no protection but will be pronounced void
when collaterally attacked (Herrera v. Barretto, ibid., citing
Miller v. Rowan, ibid.). The judgment may be struck down at
any time, even on appeal; the only exception is when the party
raising the issue is barred by estoppel (Suntay v. Gocolay,
470 SCRA 627, 638; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. ALS
Management & Development Corporation, 427 SCRA 564,
575).
Jurisdiction and cause of action (Bar 1988)
1. Jurisdiction is the power or authority of a court
(Cuenca v. PCGG, 535 SCRA 102, 114). It is the authority
to hear and determine a cause - the right to act in a case
(Arranza v. B.F. Homes, Inc., 333 SCRA 799, 812).
2. A cause of action does not refer to the authority of
the court. A cause of action is the act or omission of a person
violative of the rights of others. Under Sec. 2, Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, a cause
of action "is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another."
How jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by
law (Spouses Sanchez v. Vda. de Aguilar, G.R. No. 228680,
September 17, 2018). The conferring law may be the
Constitution, or the statute organizing the court or tribunal,
or the special or general statute defining the jurisdiction of an
existing court or tribunal. That law must be that which is in
force at the time of the commencement of the action (Salvador
v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 195834, November 9, 2016; Ku v.
RCBC Securities, G.R. No. 219491, October 17, 2018). Hence,
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if one wants to know the court with jurisdiction over a
complaint for forcible entry, accion publiciana, or partition of
real party, one must look into the laws on jurisdiction, not the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, or any
procedural rule.
Consequences of the rule that jurisdiction is conferred by
law
1. Since jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law, its existence
does not depend upon the regularity of its exercise by the
court or tribunal (Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 195834,
November 9, 2016). It is not dependent on the consent or
objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or anyone of
them (Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. v. Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc, G.R. No. 193625, August 30, 2017).
It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the parties;
(2) acquired, waived, enlarged, or diminished by any act or
omission of the parties; or (3) conferred by the acquiescence of
the courts (Republic v. Estipular, 336 SCRA 333, 340; De Jesus
v. Garcia, 19 SCRA 554, 558; De la Rosa v. Roldan, 501 SCRA
34, 51; Buenaflor v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 201607, February 15,
2017).
Because jurisdiction is conferred by law, it cannot be
conferred by the administrative policy of any court (Arranza
v. B.F. Homes, Inc., 333 SCRA 799, 812). Also, it cannot be
conferred by a court's unilateral assumption of jurisdiction
(Tolentino v. Social Security Commission, 138 SCRA 428,434).
Jurisdiction may not be changed by the mere agreement of the
parties (Atlas Developer & Steel Industries, Inc. v. Sarmiento
Enterprises, Inc., 184 SCRA 153, 155): It cannot be the subject
matter of a contract (Luna v. Carandang, 26 SCRA 306, 309).
Bar 1992
2. A case of more recent vintage teaches: "x x x
jurisdiction cannot be presumed or implied, but must appear
clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist, but it may
be conferred on a court or tribunal by necessary implication
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as well as by express terms. It cannot be conferred by the
agreement of the parties; or by the court's acquiescence; or
by the erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction;
or by the waiver of objections; or by the silence of the parties"
(Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 195834, November 9,
2016; Italics supplied).
The law applicable to the case
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court (Barangay Mayamot v. Antipolo City, G.R. No. 187349,
August 17, 2016; Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 195834,
November 9, 2016; Ku v. RCBC Securities, G.R. No. 219491,
October 17, 2018).
How jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined (Bar
2014; 2015)
1. While jurisdiction is conferred by law, jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, as well as by
the character of the relief sought (See Geronimo v. Calderon,
G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014; Cabling v. Dangcalan,
G.R. No. 187696, June 15, 2016; French v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 220057, July 12, 2017; Spouses Sanchez v. Vda. de
Aguilar, G.R. No. 228680, September 17, 2018).
The allegations in the complaint determine both the
nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court (Balibago
Faith Baptist Church, Inc. v. Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist
Church, Inc., G.R. No. 191527, August 22, 2016; French v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 220057, July 12, 2017; See also
Hidalgo v. Velasco, G.R. No. 202217, April 25, 2018).
2. Since it is axiomatic that what determines the
nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over
said action is determined by the allegations in the complaint,
the evidence presented and the character of the relief sought,
in ascertaining, for instance, whether an action is one for
forcible entry, only such averments of the complaint, evidence
presented and the relief sought are to be examined.
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This means that in determining whether or not a court
has jurisdiction over the complaint before it, the court should
consider the material allegations in the complaint, the
evidence presented and the relief sought.
Caption of the case is not controlling
1. Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint's
caption. Hence, a complaint merely bearing the caption,
"recovery of possession," is actually an unlawful detainer case
if it contains the jurisdictional facts of said action (Spouses
Erorita v. Spouses Dumlao, G.R. No. 195477, January 25,
2016).
Even an alleged action for a sum of money may also
actually be an action for unlawful detainer based on the
material allegations of the complaint. In one case, a complaint
was titled, "Collection of a Sum of Money with Damages"
filed with the Regional Trial Court. The complaint arose out
of the failure of the defendant to pay the rentals in arrears,
amounting to more than P900,000.00, on certain leased
commercial spaces. A reading of the complaint showed that
the demand made upon the defendant was for the latter to pay
and vacate the premises. The type of demand made was held
to make out a cause of action for unlawful detainer, not a mere
collection of a sum of money (Barrazona v. RTC of Baguio, 486
SCRA 555, 561). The reason for the ruling is not difficult to
comprehend because whether or not the defendant pays, the
complaint sought for an order to have said defendant vacate
the property. Hence, the complaint was truly one for ejectment.
The result would have been different had the demand been,
"to pay or vacate." In this type of de.n;i.and,the defendant need
not vacate ifhe is able to pay the amount owed to the plaintiff.
Bar 2011
2. In summary of the above-mentioned principles, the
Supreme Court, in one case clearly explains:
"[J]urisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in
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the complaint which comprise a concise statement of
the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action. The nature of an action, as well as which court
or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on
the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
The averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by
the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains
vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. x x x" (Medical Plaza Makati Condominium v.
Cullen, G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013; See also
Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284, October 20,
2015; North Greenhills Association, Inc. v. Morales, G.R.
No. 222821, August 9, 2017).
The amount awarded does not determine jurisdiction (Bar
2015)
1. Jurisdiction does not depend on the amount
ultimately substantiated and awarded by the trial court
(Dionisio v. Sison Puerto, 60 SCRA 471, 477).
2. Thus, where a complaint seeking for the payment
of P2.5 million is filed with the Regional Trial Court, but
after considering the evidence presented, the court rendered
a judgment for only Pl million, an amount within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court if originally filed, the
Regional Trial Court did not lose jurisdiction over the action.
It, therefore, has the authority to render a judgment for
Pl million.
Where a complaint for the recovery of a loan of P300,000.00
is filed with the Municipal Trial Court, but after consideration
of the evidentiary facts alleged in the complaint, it is shown
that the amount recoverable is P2 million, an amount within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court if originally
filed, the Municipal Trial Court cannot render judgment for
P2 million for lack of jurisdiction, the MTC should dismiss the
case outright.
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Doctrine of primary jurisdiction (primary administrative
jurisdiction)
1. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells us that the
courts cannot, and will not, resolve a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact
(International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia [Philippines],
G.R. No. 209271, December 8, 2015; See Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004, August 8, 2017).
2. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain
from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of
some question arising in the proceeding before the court (For
additional readings, see Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No.
181284, April 18, 2017).
3. Examples:
(a) In agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction
is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), as provided for in Sec. 50
of R.A. 6657 (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dalauta,
G.R. No. 190004, August 8, 2017).
(b) Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended
by Sec. 26 of P.D. 1445, it is the Commission on Audit
which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against
government agencies and instrumentalities. This power
includes the settlement of all debts and claims of any
sort due from or owing to the government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. Thus, it is
the Commission on Audit, not the Regional Trial Court,
which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon money claims
against a local government unit (The Province of Aklan v.
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Jody King Construction and Development Corporation,
G.R. Nos. 197592 and 202623, November 27, 2013).
(c) The MWSS is in the best position to evaluate and
decide which bid for a waterworks project was compatible
with its development plan (Concerned Officials of the
MWSS v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502);
(d) The Civil Service Commission is better equipped
in handling cases involving the employment status of
employees as it is within its field of expertise (Paloma v.
Mora, 470 SCRA 711);
(e) The determination of factual issues in labor
situations is vested in the Mediator-Arbiter and the
Department of Labor and Employment. Pursuant to
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the Court should
refrain from resolving such controversies unless the case
falls under recognized and well-established exceptions.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a
court to arrogate unto himself the authority to resolve as
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence (Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. !locos and Technical
Employees Union [IPTEUJ, G.R. No. 193798, September
9, 2015).
(f) Disputes regarding the validity of circulars
implementing the GSIS law should first be brought
to the GSIS Board, and not to the courts, as required
by law. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
courts are precluded from resolving a controversy over
which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence (Garcia v.
Tolentino, G.R. No. 153810, August 12, 2015).
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
doctrine of primary jurisdiction
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
may be considered corollary to the doctrine of primary
jurisdictionorviceversa. It would be more accurate to state that
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the doctrines complement each other. The distinction lies on
what the doctrines give more emphasis.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction emphasizes the
initial conferment of jurisdiction over a particular matter to an
administrative body before a court could exercise jurisdiction
over the same. The doctrine is based on the theory that there
are some controversies which demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, before
passing on the controversy to the courts for adjudication.
For example, in agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction
is vested in the DAR, more specifically in the DARAB as
provided for in Sec. 50 of R.A. No. 6657. The provision gives
the DARAB quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
land reform matters.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
although may also involve administrative jurisdiction over a
specific matter, gives emphasis to procedural requirements
which a party should follow before seeking judicial relief.
As jurisprudence declares: "x x x [U]nder the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is mandated that
where a remedy before an administrative body is provided
by statute, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy
prior to bringing the action in court in order to give that
administrative body every opportunity to decide a matter
that comes within its jurisdiction" (Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 198146, August 8, 2017).
Exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are
based on sound public policy and practical considerations,
are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions,
such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the
party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged
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administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official
inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted
acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (i)
when there is no other plain, speedy and .adequate remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and (I) in quo
warranto proceedings. x x x" (International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia [Philippines], G.R. No. 209271, December 8,
2015; See also The Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction
and Development Corporation, G.R. Nos. 197592 and 202623,
November 27, 2013).
Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction (continuity of
jurisdiction)
1. The doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction means
that once jurisdiction has attached, it cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of a character
which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the
first instance. The court, once jurisdiction has been acquired,
retains that jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case
(Bantua v. Mercader, 350 SCRA 86, 96; Aruego, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, 254 SCRA 711, 719-720; San Miguel Corporation
v. Sandiganbayan, 340 SCRA 289, 321; Padlan v. Dinglasan,
694 SCRA 91, 98-99, March 20, 2013). Otherwise stated, once
jurisdiction attaches, it shall not be removed from the court
until the termination of the case (Ambassador Hotel, Inc. v.
Social Security System, G.R. No. 194137, June 21, 2017).
2. Because of the doctrine, if, in an action for ejectment,
the defendant voluntarily surrenders the premises subject of
the action to the plaintiff, the surrender of the property does
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not divest the court of jurisdiction (Pamintuan v. Tiglao, 53
Phil. 1, 4).
Also, if the court has jurisdiction to act on a motion at
the time it was filed, that jurisdiction to resolve the motion
continues until the matter is resolved and is not lost by the
subsequent filing of a notice of appeal (Asmala v. COMELEC,
289 SCRA 746, 752).
3. It was ruled that the jurisdiction which the court
had at the time of the filing of the complaint is not lost by
the mere fact that the respondent judge ceased to be in office
during the pendency of the case (Victory Liner v. Belosillo, 425
SCRA 79, 89).
4. In another case, it was held that the trial court did
not lose jurisdiction over the case involving a public official
by the mere fact that said official ceased to be in office during
the pendency of the case (Flores v. Sumaljag, 290 SCRA 568,
579-580). Likewise, the fact that the complainant resigned
after the filing of the administrative complaint did not affect
the case because jurisdiction had already been acquired over
the case upon the filing of the complaint. Jurisdiction, once
acquired, is not lost by the resignation of the complaining
party; it continues until the case is terminated (Basilio v.
Dinio, 634 SCRA 516, 523).
Also, the retirement from the service of a public official
during the pendency of an administrative case against him,
does not render the case moot and academic. Once jurisdiction
attaches, "it cannot be defeated by the acts of the respondent,
save only when death intervenes and the action does not
survive" (Office of the Ombudsman v. Dechavez, G.R. No.
176702, November 13, 2013).
5. Even the finality of the judgment does not totally
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the case. What the court
loses is the power to amend, modify, or alter the judgment.
Even after the judgment has become final, the court retains
jurisdiction to enforce and execute it (Echegaray v. Secretary
of Justice, 301 SCRA 96, 106; Republic v. Atlas Farms, 345
SCRA 296, 300).
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6. In People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267, 288, the Court
had the occasion to declare:
"x x x Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may
not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events,
such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under
the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only recognized
exceptions to the rule x x x arise when: (1) there is an
express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is
clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its
enactment."
Doctrine of ancillary (incidental) jurisdiction
1. This power refers to the authority of an office or
tribunal to do all things necessary for the administration
of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the
enforcement of its judgment and mandate (University of the
Immaculate Conception v. Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, G.R. Nos. 178085-178086, September 14, 2015).
In other words, ancillary jurisdiction refers to the power
of every court to adopt such means and perform such acts
necessary to carry its jurisdiction into effect. The tenor of Sec.
6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court is explicit:
"x xx When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court
or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in
the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed
out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode
of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable
to the spirit of said law or rules."
2. Corollary to the above provision is Sec. 5 of Rule
135 which enumerates the inherent powers of a court, among
which are: "x xx To compel obedience to its judgments, orders
and processes xx x" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 135, Rules of Court); and
"x x x To amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice" (Sec. 5[g], Rule
135, Rules of Court).
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Doctrine of judicial stability
1. The doctrine of judicial stability is one which
precludes a court from interfering by injunction with the
regular orders of a co-equal court. "The rationale for the rule
is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires
jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other
coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents,
and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with that judgment"
(Tan v. Cinco, G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016; See also Del
Rosario v. Ocampo-Ferrer, G.R. No. 215348, June 20, 2016).
2. If a court violates the law or the rules on the issuance
of a writ, the appropriate action is to assail the writ before
the issuing court. Upon failure to seek redress from the said
court, the remedy is not to resort to a co-equal body but to a
higher court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing
court (Barroso v. Omelia, G.R. No. 194767, October 14, 2015;
also cited in Del Rosario v. Ocampo-Ferrer, ibid.). Thus, under
the doctrine, a Regional Trial Court is precluded from issuing
an injunction against a writ issued by another Regional Trial
Court. The remedy is to go to a higher court to enjoin the acts
of the court if the latter refuses to correct its error and denies
any motion assailing the writ it issued.
Objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter
1. Jurisprudence explains that the prevailing rule is
that jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal (See
Calimlim v. Ramirez, 118 SCRA 399, 406; Pangilinan v. Court
of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51, 59; Francel Realty Corporation v.
Sycip, 469 SCRA 424, 431; Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, G.R. No. 180434, January 20,
2016; Erorita v. Spouses Dumlao, G.R. No. 195477, January
25, 2016). Even if the parties did not raise the issue of
jurisdiction, the reviewing court, on appeal, is not precluded
from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the
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case (See Regulus Development Corporation v. De la Cruz,
G.R. No. 198172, January 25, 2016). Hence, the issue may
even be tackled motu propio for the first time on appeal (Narra
Nickel Mining and Development Corporation v. Redmont
Consolidated Mines Corporation, G.R. No. 202877, December
9, 2015). Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This
defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even
after final judgment (Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo City v.
Antipolo City, G.R. No. 187349, August 17, 2016).
The reason for the above rule is that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and lack ofit affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of and render judgment on the action
(Asiatrust Development Bank v. First Aikka Development, Inc.
and Univac Development, Inc., 650 SCRA 172, 184; Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November
10, 2015). Jurisdiction over the subject matter, being conferred
by law, is not for the courts or the parties to conveniently set
aside (Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo City v. Antipolo City,
G.R. No. 187349, August 17, 2016).
Effect of estoppel on objections to jurisdiction
1. While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings since
it is conferred by law, it is, nevertheless, settled that a party
may be barred from raising it on the ground of estoppel (La'o
v. Republic, 479 SCRA 439, 446).
The doctrine of estoppel by laches was initially emphasized
by the Court in the leading case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
23 SCRA 29, 35. Here, the Supreme Court barred a belated
objection to jurisdiction that was raised by a party only when
an adverse decision was rendered by the lower court against it
and because it raised the issue only after almost 15 years and
after seeking affirmative relief from the court and actively
participating in all stages of the proceedings. The doctrine,
as declared by the Supreme Court in Tijam, is ''based upon
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grounds of public policy x x x and is principally a question of
the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted."
2. The Court, however, cautioned that estoppel by
laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of ·
jurisdiction if the factual milieu is analogous to Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy (Spouses Erorita v. Spouses Dumlao, G.R. No.
195477, January 25, 2016). The contention that the defense
of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through
active participation in the trial is not the general rule, but an
exception, best characterized by the circumstances in Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy (Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, 474 SCRA
153, 162). Where the factual settings attendant in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy are not present, the application of estoppel by
laches would not be justified (Vda. de Herrera v. Bernardo,
650 SCRA 87, 97-98).
3. Aside from a belated objection to jurisdiction,
one fact pattern common among the cases, wherein the
Court invoked estoppel to prevent a party from questioning
jurisdiction, is a party's active participation in all stages of a
case. This participation includes invoking the authority of the
court in seeking affirmative relief, and questioning the court's
jurisdiction only after receiving a ruling or decision adverse to
his case, for the purpose of annulling everything done in the
trial in which he has actively participated.
After voluntarily submitting a case and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser
to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. The Court
frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting
his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse (United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v.
,, Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc., 67 4 SCRA 92, 104,
June 20, 2012; Maxicare PCIB Cigna Healthcare v. Contreras,
689 SCRA 763, 772, January 30, 2013; See also Heirs of Jose
I
Fernando v. De Belen, G.R. No. 186366, July 3, 2013).
'
.
..
.
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It is settled that the active participation of a party before
a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's jurisdiction
and willingness to abide by the court's resolution (Torres v.
Aruego, G.R. No. 201271, September 20, 2017).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter and the omnibus motion
rule
1. An omnibus motion is a motion attacking a pleading,
order, judgment, or proceeding (Sec. 8, Rule 15, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
The same rule requires an omnibus motion to include all
objections then available, and all objections not so included
shall be deemed waived.
2. The omnibus motion rule, however, is, by the terms
of Sec. 8 of Rule 15, "Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of
Rule 9."
The pertinent provision of Sec. 1 of Rule 9 declares:
"x xx However, when it appears from the pleadings
or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or
that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute
of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim."
The above provision, in relation to Sec. 8 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC, clearly
spells out the corollary rule that there are certain defenses
which are not waived even if not invoked in the motion to
dismiss. Such non-waivable defenses, stated in their simplest
terms, are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b)
litis pendencia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription. The 2019
Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure only allows
the filing of the motion to dismiss based on the aforesaid
grounds. Hence, if a motion to dismiss was filed and the issue
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was not raised
therein, a party may, when he files an answer, still raise the
lack of jurisdiction as an affirmative defense because this
defense is not barred by the omnibus motion rule. Bar 2011
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C. Jurisdiction over the Parties
Meaning of jurisdiction over the person; jurisdiction in
personam
Jurisdiction over the parties refers to the power of the
court to make decisions that are binding on persons (De Pedro
v. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751,
November 26, 2014). It is the legal power of the court to render
a personal judgment against a party to an action or proceeding
(Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 767, citing Imperial v. Hardy,
La, 302 So.2d 5, 7). Also called 'jurisdiction in personam," it
is the power which a court has over the defendant's person
which is required before a court can enter a personal or an
in personam judgment (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 766,
citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565).
"Jurisdiction over the person or jurisdiction in personam
xx xis an element of due process that is essential in all actions,
civil or criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem" (Guy
v. Gacott, G.R. No. 206147, January 13, 2016). Jurisdiction
over the person of a litigant is vital for the enforcement of an
order or judgment of the court against such person. A person
not within the jurisdiction of the court is not bound by the
judgment of that court.
Thus, when it is the partnership that is sued for money
and a partner was not impleaded in the action and never made
a party to the case, the property of said partner could not be
the object of the execution to satisfy a judgment rendered
against the partnership. "The power of the court in executing
judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belong-
ing to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued
only against a party and not against one who did not have
his day in court" (Guy v. Gacott, ibid.). Also, where the action
filed is against a stockholder of a corporation, let us say, in a
suit for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, the failure to implead
the corporation cannot bind said corporation since the court
did not have jurisdiction over it. Otherwise, the fundamen-
tal right to due process will be violated (Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc. [COCOFEDJ v. Republic, G.R. Nos.
84 CML PROCEDURE
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177857-58, October 5, 2016). This ruling is a recognition of the
separate personalities of a partnership and a corporation (See
Art. 44, Civil Code), such that the liability of a partnership or
a corporation is not the liability of the partner or stockholder,
vice versa.
How jurisdiction over the persons of the parties is acquired
(Bar 2009)
1. The manner by which the court acquires jurisdiction
over the parties depends on whether the party is the plaintiff
or the defendant.
2. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired as soon
as he files his complaint or petition (De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26,
2014; Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. Cebrero, G.R. No. 222737,
November 12, 2018)because bythemerefilingofthecomplaint,
the plaintiff, in a civil action, voluntarily submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court (Guy v. Gacott, supra; See also
Onstott v. Upper Tagpos Neighborhood Association, Inc., G.R.
No. 221047, September 14, 2016). Bar 1981; 1994; 2009
3. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil
cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court
and his submission to its authority or by service of summons
(Sec. 23, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC; Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013;
Guy v. Gacott, supra; Onstott v. Upper Tagpos Neighborhood
Association, Inc., ibid.; KT Construction Supply, Inc. v.
Philippine Savings Bank, G.R. No. 228435, June 21, 2017).
Voluntary appearance of the defendant (Bar 2017)
1. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant without service of summons or despite a
defective service of summons. This aspect of jurisdiction may
be acquired when the defendant voluntarily appears in the
action. "The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons" (Sec. 23, Rule 14,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2. To constitute voluntary appearance, it must be
the kind that amounts to a voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court. Submission to the court's jurisdiction
takes the form of an appearance that seeks affirmative relief
except when the relief sought is for the purpose of objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.
3. Generally, a person voluntarily submits to the
court's jurisdiction when he or she participates in the trial
despite improper service of summons (De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation, supra). As a general proposition,
one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court like the filing of
motions to admit answer, for additional time to file an answer,
for reconsideration of a default judgment or to lift the order of
default. The concept of conditional appearance, wherein a party
who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others,
the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered
to have submitted to its authority, has been nullified by the
2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall be
deemed a voluntary appearance.
Effect of pleading additional defenses aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; prior rule re-
examined
1. Under the former procedure, if the defendant raises
the objection of lack of jurisdiction over his person in a motion
to dismiss, the motion must rely only on that particular ground.
If the defendant appears in court, objects to its jurisdiction
over his person and, at the same time, alleges other grounds,
the appearance would be deemed a general appearance which
was, in effect, a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court (Republic v. Ker & Company, Ltd., 18 SCRA 207, 213-
214).
In Wang Laboratories v. Mendoza, 156 SCRA 44, 54, for
instance, the Court has ruled that "even though the defendant
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objects to the jurisdiction of the court, if, at the same time,
he alleges any non-jurisdictional ground for dismissing the
action, the court acquires jurisdiction over him."
2. The above rule was reexamined in La Naval Drug
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78. This leading
case appropriately held that if a plaintiff may assert two or
more causes of actions, a defendant should also be allowed,
under the Rules of Court, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-
SC, to put up his own defenses alternatively or hypothetically.
The Court stressed that it should not be the invocation of
available additional defenses that should be construed as a
waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, but the failure to raise the defense.
The pronouncements in La Naval are embodied in the
then Sec. 20 of Rule 14 which provides:
"x x x The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of
other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance."
3. The 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure reverted back to the old rule. As it now stands, the
raising of defenses in addition to lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, creates an inference of a voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court (Sec. 23, Rule 14,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
When jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required
1. Jurisprudence suggests that jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is required in an action in personam.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite in an action in rem and quasi in rem.
As recently held by the Court:
·"x x x In actions in personam, the judgment is for
or against a person directly. Jurisdiction over the parties
is required in actions in personam because they seek to
impose personal responsibility or liability upon a person.
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Courts need not acquire jurisdiction over parties on
this basis in in rem and quasi in rem actions. Actions in
rem or quasi in rem are not directed against the person
based on his or her personal liability xx x" (De Pedro v.
Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751,
November 26, 2014).
Another case similarly holds:
"x x x In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided
that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction
over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into
actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution
of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective. The service of summons
or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting
the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the
due process requirements" (Alba v. Court of Appeals, 465
SCRA 495, 505-506).
"Jurisdiction over the person or jurisdiction in personam
- the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to
subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and
other rulings rendered in the action - is an element of due
process that is essential in all actions, except in actions in
rem or quasi in rem." Hence, a judgment should be executed
only against the persons who were parties to the case and not
against one not a party and who did not have his day in court.
The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment
debtor, not that of a third person (See Guy v. Gacott, G.R. No.
206147, January 13, 2016).
2. An action in personam is an action against a person
on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an
action against the thing itself, instead of against the person.
An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named
as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject
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his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the
property (Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA
539, 552).
Petitions directed against the "thing'' itself or the res,
which concerns the status of a person like a petition for
adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries
in the birth certificate, are actions in rem (Alba v. Court of
Appeals, supra).
3. Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem. "These
proceedings do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty
but merely in the forfeiture of the properties either acquired
illegally or related to unlawful activities in favor of the State.
As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself
instead of against the person. x x x For this purpose, service
may be made by publication as such mode of service is allowed
in actions in rem and quasi in rem" (Republic v. Glasgow
Credit and Collection Services, Inc., 542 SCRA 95, 112).
4. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try
and decide the case (Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 296
SCRA 539, 552). On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or
quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided
that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. However,
summons must be served upon the defendant, not for the
purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements (Asiavest Limited v.
Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 554; For related readings,
see Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 425 SCRA 98; PCI Bank v.
Alejandro, 533 SCRA 738; Biaco v. Philippine Countryside
Rural Bank, 515 SCRA 106).
Necessity for service of summons
1. The fact that the action is one in rem or quasi in
rem does not mean that the persons interested in the subject
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matter of the action need not be summoned. In order to
satisfy the requirements of due process, summons upon such
persons is required regardless of the nature of the action. The
summons in such actions is not for the purpose of acquiring
jurisdiction over such persons but to serve the ends of due
process. If, however, they appear in the action, as when the
proper pleadings is served and filed, it is as if the action is one
in personam. Such appearance enables the court to acquire
personal jurisdiction over them.
2. Take the case of an action to annul a certificate of
title. Jurisprudence holds that:
"An action for annulment of certificate of title is
quasi in rem. It is not an action against a person on the
basis of his personal liability, but an action that subjects
a person's interest over a property to a burden. The
action for annulment of a certificate of title threatens
petitioner's interest in the property. Petitioner is entitled
to due process with respect to that interest. The court
does not have competence or authority to proceed with an
action for annulment of certificate of title without giving
the person, in whose name the certificate was issued, all
the opportunities to be heard.
Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper
service of summons is imperative. A decision rendered
without proper service of summons suffers a defect in
jurisdiction. Respondent's institution of a proceeding for
annulment of petitioner's certificate of title is sufficient
to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res, but it is
not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case with
authority and competence.
Personal service of summons ,is the preferred mode
of service of summons. Thus, as a rule, summons must
be served personally upon the defendant or respondent
wherever he or she may be found. If the defendant or
respondent refuses to receive the summons, it shall be
tendered to him or her (De Pedro v. Romasan Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014; italics
supplied).
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D. Jurisdiction over the Issues
Meaning of jurisdiction over the issue
1. Jurisdiction over the issue is the power of the court
to try and decide the issues raised in the pleadings of the
parties (Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 487).
2. An issue is a disputed point or question to which
parties to an action have narrowed down their several
allegations and upon which they are desirous of obtaining a
decision (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 745, citing Muller v.
Muller, 235 Cal. App. 2d, 341, 45 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184). Where
there is no disputed point, there is no issue.
How jurisdiction over the issue is conferred and determined
1. Generally, jurisdiction over the issues is conferred
and determined by the allegations in the pleadings of the
parties. The pleadings present the issues to be tried and
determine whether or not the issues are of fact or oflaw (61A
Am Jur 2d, Pleadings, §1).
An issue arises because a material allegation of a claiming
party is specifically denied by the defending party. The denial,
to be specific, must conform to any of the denials prescribed in
Sec. 10 of Rule 8. A denial, made not in accordance with the
said rule, is to be construed as an admission, a circumstance
which does not give rise to an issue. Thus, where the defendant
admits all the material allegations of fact of the claiming
party, there is no controverted issue between the parties.
Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, as amended by AM.
No. 19-10-20-SC, where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, a judgment on the pleadings may be rendered
by the court upon a motion properly filed.
2. Jurisdiction over the issues may also be determined
and conferred by stipulation of the parties as when, in the pre-
trial, the parties enter into stipulations of facts and documents
or enter into an agreement simplifying the issues of the case
(See Sec. 2, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
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3. Jurisdiction over the issues may also be conferred
by waiver or failure to object to the presentation of e~idence
on a matter not raised in the pleadings. Here, the parties try,
with their express or implied consent, issues not raised in the
pleadings. The issues tried shall be treated in all respects as
if they had been raised in the pleadings (See Sec. 5, Rule 10,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Distinction between a question of law and a question of fact
(Bar 2004)
1. The issue in a case may be either one of law or of
fact.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts. There is
a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of the alleged facts (Spouses Santos v. Court
of Appeals, 337 SCRA 67, 74). For a question to be one ofl~w,
the same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact (Velayo-Fong v. Spouses Velayo,
51 O SCRA 320, 329-330; Alicando v. People, G.R. No. 181119,
July 31, 2013; International Hotel Corporation v. Joaquin, Jr.,
G.R. No. 158361, April 10, 2013). In short, the test of whether
a question is one of law or of fact is whether the court ~an
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluatmg
the evidence. If there is no need for such evaluation, the issue
is one of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact (National
Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms u. Manila
Electric Company, G.R. No. 191150, October 10, 2016).
Thus where the question disputed by the parties is
whether ;r not the debtor has paid the debt, the issue is one
of fact. Where the question is whether or not the manner
of payment is of the type which produces the legal effect of
extinguishing the obligation, the issue becomes one of law.

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Also, when, under a given set of facts, the issue is whether or
not the law on double sales applies, there is a question of law.
When in a case, the issue is the genuineness or due execution
of a document, the question is one of fact.
2. Where the threshold issue is whether certain
paragraphs in an agreement are void for being contrary to
law or public policy, it is obvious that the issue is a question of
law (Avon Cosmetics, Inc. v. Luna, 511 SCRA 376, 388).
When an issue arises even if not raised in the pleadings
1. While it is a rule that an issue arises from the
pleadings of the parties, an issue may arise in the case without
it having been raised in the pleadings. This occurs when the
parties try an issue with their consent. Under Sec. 5 of Rule
10 of the Rules of Court, as amended by the 2019 Amendments
to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, when issues not raised in
the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of
the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings (Estolas v. Acena, 448 SCRA 233,
245). Under the same rule, no amendment of such pleadings
deemed amended is necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence.
2. The consent of the parties may be inferred from the
failure to interpose an objection to the presentation of evidence
on a matter not alleged in the pleadings. Thus, where the
issue, as determined in the complaint and answer, is one of
mere possession of property, any evidence showing ownership
must be objected to, ownership not being an issue raised in
the pleadings. However, if the evidence is not objected to
seasonably, the matter of ownership will be deemed to have
been raised by the parties in their pleadings and the evidence
becomes admissible.
3. If the complaint did not allege a claim for salary
differential, but no objection was interposed on the evidence
presented to prove the claim for salary differential, the Labor
Arbiter correctly considered the evidence (Cindy and Lynsy
Garment v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 38, 45).
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4. If, in a complaint for a sum of money filed before ~he
Regional Trial Court, the plaintiff did not allege the mak~ng
of a demand for payment before commencing suit but, durmg
the trial, plaintiff duly offered in evidence a letter of demand
to prove the making of an extrajudici_al d~mand o~ the
defendant, and the letter was admitted m evidence without
objection of the defendant, it is as if the m~tter of demand was
raised in the pleadings. The court committed no procedural
error in admitting the letter of demand in evidence. Bar 2004
E. Jurisdiction over the Res
Meaning of jurisdiction over the res; actions in personam, in
rem, and quasi in rem
1. ''Res," in civil law, is a 'thing,' an 'object.' It means
everything that may form an object of rights, in oppo~ition to
'persona' which is the subject of rights. The ,term, res,_1~cludes
an object, subject-matter or status (Blacks Law Dictionary,
5th Ed., 1172; citations omitted).
2. Actions in personam and in rem or quasi in rem
differ in that an action in personam is directed against a
specific person and seeks a personal judg~~nt ag~in~t him.
On the other hand, an action in rem or quasi in rem 1s directed
against the thing or property or status ~f a person and seeks
a judgment with respect thereto as agamst the whole wor~d
(Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, 401 SCRA 762, ~~O). Th~s
means that a judgment in an action in rem or quasi in ~em 1s
one rendered for or against the thing itself and not agamst a
person.
3. Jurisdiction over the res refers to the court's
jurisdiction over the thing or the property which is the subject
of the action. This type of jurisdiction is necessary when the
action is one in rem or quasi in rem. When the action is one_in
personam, jurisdiction over the res is not sufficient to authorize
the court to render a judgment against the defendant. In
an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is required.
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Thus, jurisprudence holds that if the action is in rem or
quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
not required for the court to proceed with the action. What
is required is jurisdiction over the res although summons
mus~ also be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the
reqmrements of due process (Gomez u. Court of Appeals, 425
SCRA 98, 104).
4. Where the action is in personam, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly
try and decide the case. This is because the action is one
brought on the basis of the personal liability of the defendant
(Bari:c_o
de Brasil u. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 545, 557; for
additional readings, see Romualdez-Licaros u. Licaros, supra).
Take a very simple example of an action for a sum of
money, an action in personam. When a plaintiff files such an
action against the defendant, he asks the court for a judgment
ordering the defendant to pay him the amount owed. In
order for the court to be vested with the authority to order
~he defe~dant to pay the sum demanded by the plaintiff, it is
imperative for the court to have jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant. This is achieved by a valid service of summons
upon him or by his voluntary appearance in the action.
Without such authority, the court is devoid of any power to
command the defendant to pay.
5. When the action is either in rem or quasi in rem,
the action is directed against a specific property or "res" and
not against a particular person. Hence, jurisdiction over the
"res" is sufficient as long as summons is properly served upon
the defendant or persons who stand to be benefited or injured
by the judgment. It has to be emphasized that the service of
summons in either of these actions, is made to comply with
the demands of due process and not necessarily to acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant.
Consider a case involving a former Filipino and resident
of Manila. After the death of his parents, from whom he
inherited several prime residential lots, he left for the United
States. After several years, he became an American citizen
and now permanently resides in New York. While on vacation
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in Manila, he borrowed P2 million from his cousin but he failed
to pay the debt on the due date despite repeated demands.
After a complaint for a sum of money was filed against him by
his cousin, the sheriff, serving the summons, discovered that
the defendant had already left the country. Notice that the
defendant is a non-resident who, at the same time, is no longer
found in the Philippines. Under the facts, the court will not be
able to acquire jurisdiction over his person, an indispensable
requirement in an action in personam. As will be discussed in
a later chapter of this treatise, service in person or substituted
service cannot be availed of to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the non-resident who, at the same time, is absent
from the country.
There is, however, a remedy supplied by the Rules. Under
Rule 57, the plaintiff may obtain from the court a writ of
preliminary attachment over his property in the Philippines.
When the writ is issued, and the property is attached, the
defendant may, with leave of court, have the defendant served
with summons pursuant to the rules on extraterritorial
service of summons. This mode of service becomes available
since the action for a sum of money, an action in personam,
has been converted into an action quasi in rem by virtue of the
attachment of the defendant's property in the Philippines. Now,
once the property has been attached, the plaintiff may initiate
the proceedings against the property of the defendant even if
the defendant is not subject to the in personam jurisdiction
of the court. Viewed from another perspective, the property
takes the place of the defendant who cannot be or refuses to
be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court. Since jurisdiction
over the "res" has already been acquired as a consequence of
the attachment of the defendant's property, trial may proceed
against the property of the defendant. The proceedings will be
one, not against the person of the defendant, but against his
property.
Similarly, where the proceeding is quasi in rem like
an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage against a non-
resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines, the
jurisdiction of the court over the res, which is the property

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mortgaged, is sufficient for the court to order the foreclosure
of the mortgage. Summons must be served, however, upon
the mortgagor to comply with the demands of due process. If
the mortgagor does not appear in the action, the jurisdiction
and the subsequent judgment of the court, in this case, will
be limited to the foreclosed property or its value since its
jurisdiction extends only to the property foreclosed.
Where the proceeding is the allowance or probate of a will,
an in rem proceeding, jurisdiction over the res, i.e., the will and
the estate mentioned therein, is sufficient for jurisdictional
purposes. Personal jurisdiction over the persons of those
interested in the will is not necessary because the proceeding
is not intended to impose a personal liability against them.
However, the court is mandated to notify the heirs, legatees,
devisees of the time and place for proving the will to comply
with the requirements of due process.
How acquired
1. Jurisdiction over the res may be acquired by the
court by placing the property or thing under its custody
(custodia legis) or constructive seizure. Example: Attachment
of property in which property is placed in the actual custody
of the court.
It may also be acquired by the court through statutory
authority conferring upon it the power to deal with the
property or thing. Example: Suits involving the status of the
parties; suits involving the property in the Philippines of non-
resident defendants.
The Court more clearly explains:
"Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject
of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into
the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the
institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions oflaw, the power of the court over the property
is recognized and made effective. In the latter case, the
property, though at all times within the potential power
of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at
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all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual
seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the
property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some
subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide with
the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what
[th]e [Court] term[s] potential jurisdiction over the res, is
found in the proceeding to register the title of land under
[the] system for the registration ofland. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over the property
assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be
owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the prop~rty
and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner agamst
all the world" (Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca, 37
Phil. 921, 927-928; italics supplied).
2. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and
jurisdiction over the res, in this case, cannot be acquired,
unless there is a constructive seizure of the land through
publication and service of notice (Republic v. Herbieto, 459
SCRA 183, 196). The seizure in this case, is not an actual
seizure of the land.
Extent of relief when jurisdiction is only over the res
1. The court exercising an in rem or quasi in rem
jurisdiction has limited powers. Its jurisdiction extends only
to the value of the property over which its jurisdiction is
based. If the proven claim exceeds the value of the property,
the court has no authority to render a deficiency judgment.
Stated in another way, any relief granted in rem or in
quasi in rem actions must be confined to the res, and the court
cannot lawfully render a judgment against the defendant
(Banco de Brasil v. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 545, 558) where
jurisdiction has not been acquired bythe court over the person
of the defendant. Thus, if in an action to foreclose a real estate
mortgage, where the jurisdiction acquired by the court is only
over the res and not over the person of the defendant (because
the debtor-mortgagor is a non-resident who is also outside of
the Philippines), the relief of the creditor extends only to the
property foreclosed or to its value. If in the foreclosure sale,
there arises a deficiency, a deficiency judgment, authorized
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by Sec. 6 of Rule 68, against the debtor-mortgagor would not
be feasible. This is because the collection of the deficiency is
a proceeding in personam which requires jurisdiction over
the person of the debtor-mortgagor. There being no personal
jurisdiction over his person, a deficiency judgment cannot be
rendered against him.
2. In the earlier example, where the property of a
non-resident was attached to convert the action from one
in personam to one quasi in rem, the judgment of the court
will extend only to the property attached or its value. If the
plaintiffs claim, for instance, is P2 million but the property
attached has a value of only Pl.5 million, the judgment
of the court would be limited only to the latter amount. It
cannot order the defendant to pay the difference since it has
no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It has only
acquired jurisdiction over the property attached.
Remember, that summons to the defendant is required
whatever be the nature of the action. The defendant who
learns of the attachment of his property is now confronted
with two choices - let his property answer for his alleged
obligation or personally appear and put up a full-blown
defense. If he unequivocally appears in the action or performs
acts constituting voluntary appearance in the action, like
filing an answer to the complaint, the court will now acquire
jurisdiction over his person. In such a case, the action is
deemed to reacquire the status of an action in personam.
Under the facts, the court has also acquired jurisdiction to
render judgment ordering the defendant to pay the difference
because it has acquired jurisdiction over the person of said
defendant.
F. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
(Bar 2014)
Basic principles in relation to the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court
1. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court only questions of law are generally
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reviewed by the Court. Questions of fact are not entertained
(See Caranto v. Bergesen D. Y. Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 170706,
August 26, 2015; Multi-International Business Data System,
Inc. v. Martinez, G.R. No. 175378, November 11, 2015; DST
Movers Corporation v. General Insurance Corporation, G.R.
No. 198627, January 13, 2016; Divine Word College of Laoag
v. Mina, G.R. No. 195155, April 13, 2016).
It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze
and weigh all over again evidence already considered in
the proceedings below (Gatan v. Vinarao, G.R. No. 205912,
October 18, 2017) since such matters are issues of fact. The
appreciation and resolution of factual issues are the functions
of the lower courts, whose resulting findings are received
with respect and binding on the Supreme Court, especially
when such findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(Republic v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 170966, June 22, 2016; See
Bacalso v. Aca-ac, G.R. No. 172919, January 13, 2016) and
cannot be reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court as long
as such findings are supported by the records, or are based
on substantial evidence (Terelay Investment and Development
Corporation v. Yulo, G.R. No. 160924, August 5, 2015). Also,
factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, when
they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, if supported by
substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality
by the Court (Dasco v. Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc.,
G.R. No. 211141, June 29, 2016).
Hence, if an appeal by certiorari is taken to the Supreme
Court from the Regional Trial Court raising or submitting
issues of fact, such appeal may be referred to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action (Sec. 6, Rule 56, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The Supreme Court
does not have to dismiss an improper appeal.
2. "A question ofla w exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to
a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented,
the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of

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fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of
the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence or relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probability of the situation" (Ligtas u. People,
G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015).
Where the issue brought is whether or not a lower court
has the power or authority to hear and determine a cause of
action or where the issue concerns the correct interpretation
or application of relevant laws and rules, the question posed
is one of law, hence, cognizable by the Supreme Court (See
Gomez u. Montalban, 548 SCRA 693, 702). However, a
challenge against the findings of the Court of Appeals, that
the petitioner had a homicidal instinct when he hacked the
victim, raises a question of fact which the Court would not,
as a rule, entertain (See Abella u. People, G.R. No. 198400,
October 2, 2013).
Jurisprudence, however, has carved out some recognized
exceptions to the above rule. For example, when the
findings of facts of the trial court and the reviewing court
are conflicting, factual issues may be resolved by the Court,
as when the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
are frontally inconsistent with the findings of the Court of
Appeals (See Caranto u. Bergesen D. Y. Phils., Inc., G.R. No.
170706, August 26, 2015). Another exception, among others, is
when the findings of the court below are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Sabellina u. Buray, G.R.
No. 187727, September 2, 2015). Note: A more comprehensive
discussion of the topic is found in a later chapter of this
material.
Original exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against
the:
(a) Court of Appeals (Sec. 17, Judiciary Act of
1948);
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(b) Commission on Elections (Sec. 7, Art. IX, 1987
Constitution of the Philippines);
(c) Commission on Audit (Sec. 7, Art. IX, 1987
Constitution of the Philippines);
(d) Sandiganbayan (P.D. 1606 as amended); and
(e) Court of Tax Appeals.
Original concurrent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
1. The Supreme Court has concurrent original
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus against the:
(a) Regional Trial Court (Sec. 21[1], B.P. 129);
(b) Civil Service Commission (R.A. 7902);
(c) Central Board of Assessment Appeals (Note:
Because the decisions of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals are now appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals
under Sec. 7[5] of R.A. 9282, it is submitted that the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over such
petitions is concurrently exercised with the Court of Tax
Appeals);
(d) National Labor Relations Commission (St.
Martin Funeral Homes u. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494; R.A.
7902); and
(e) Other quasi-judicial agencies (B.P. 129; R.A.
7902; Heirs of Hinog u. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460).
This jurisdiction is subject to the doctrine of hierarchy
of Courts (Liga ng mga Barangay National u. Atienza, 420
SCRA 562, 572; Lacson Hermanas, Inc. u. Heirs of Ignacio,
462 SCRA 290, 294).
2. Concurrent original jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court in petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus against lower courts and bodies,
and in petitions for quo warranto and habeas corpus. This
jurisdiction is subject to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
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(Secs. 9[1], 21[1}, B.P. 129; Sec. 5, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
of the Philippines).
3. Concurrent original jurisdiction with the Regional
Trial Court in cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers,
and consuls (Sec. 21[2], B.P. 129; Sec. 5, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution of the Philippines).
2. A petition for a writ of amparo may also be filed
directly with the Supreme Court (Sec. 3, The Rules on the Writ
of Amparo) aside from the other courts mentioned. A petition
for a writ of habeas data may also be filed directly with the
Supreme Court (Sec. 3, The Rules on the Writ of Habeas
Data).

Appellate jurisdiction Appeal to the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction by way of
petition for review on certiorari (appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45) against the: (a) Court of Appeals, (b) Sandiganbayan,
(c) Regional Trial Courts on pure questions oflaw (Sec. 1, Rule
45) and in cases involving the constitutionality or validity
of a law or treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance or regulation, legality of a tax, impost, assessment,
toll or penalty, jurisdiction of a lower court (Sec. 5, Art. VIII,
Constitution of the Philippines), and (d) Court of Tax Appeals
in its decisions rendered en bane (Sec. 11, R.A. 9282).
Original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court
1. As a rule, cases are not filed originally with the
Supreme Court. The rule is, however, subject to certain
exceptions. Subject to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, only
the following may be filed originally with the Supreme Court:
a. petition for certiorari;
b. petition for prohibition;
c. petition for mandamus;
d. petition for quo warranto;
e. petition for habeas corpus;
f. disciplinary proceedings against members
the judiciary and attorneys; and
g. cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls (Sec. 1, Rule 56, Rules of Court),
1. An appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken only
by a petition for review on certiorari, except in criminal cases
where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment (Sec. 3, Rule 56, Rules of Court). The mode
of appeal to the Supreme Court referred to under Sec. 3 of
Rule 56 is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 (also called
petition for review on certiorari).
2. The appeal is made by filing with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari raising only
questions of law (Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Again, it needs to be remembered
that, as a rule, questions of fact are not to be raised in an
appeal by way of Rule 45.
Cases which must be heard En Banc
Under the Constitution of the Philippines, the following
cases should be heard by the Supreme Court En Banc:
(a) All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, international or executive agreement, or law (Sec.
4[2}, Art. VIII);
(b) All cases which, under the Rules of Court, are
required to be heard en bane (Sec. 4[2], Art. VIII);
of (c) All cases involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and
other regulations (Sec. 4[2],Art. VIII);
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(d) Cases heard by a division when the required
number in the division is not obtained (Sec. 4[3}, Art.
VIII);
(e) Cases involving a modification or reversal of a
doctrine or principle of law laid down previously by the
Supreme Court in a decision rendered En Banc or by a
division (Sec. 4[3}, Art. VIII);
(f) Cases involving the discipline of judges of lower
courts (Sec. 11, Art. VIII);
(g) Contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice President (Sec. 4,
last paragraph, Art. VII).
Procedure when the opinion of the Supreme Court En Banc
is equally divided (Bar 2012)
Where the opinion of the Supreme Court en bane is
equally divided, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the
case shall again be deliberated on. If after such deliberation
no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the
court shall be dismissed. In appealed cases, the judgment or
order appealed from shall stand affirmed. On all incidental
matters, the petition or motion shall be denied (Sec. 7, Rule
56, Rules of Court).
G. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
1. Unlike the Supreme Court which could sit En
Banc in order to resolve cases, the Court of Appeals may sit
En Banc only for the purpose of exercising administrative,
ceremonial, or other non-adjudicatory functions (Sec. 4, B.P.
129, as amended).
Original exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in actions for the annulment of the judgments of
Regional Trial Courts (Sec. 9[2], B.P. 129, as amended).
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Original concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
1. The Court of Appeals has concurrent and original
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus against the (a) Regional Trial
Court, (b) Civil Service Commission, (c) Other quasi-judicial
agencies mentioned in Rule 43, and (d) National Labor
Relations Commission (St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC,
295 SCRA 494, 509). Following the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts, the petition for certiorari against the NLRC must first
be filed with the Court of Appeals.
2. The Court of Appeals has concurrent and original
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial
Court to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
against lower courts and bodies and also writs of quo warranto
and habeas corpus. Bar 2011
Note: Under the law, the original jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes may be exercised whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction (Sec. 9[1], B.P. 129, as amended).
Previously, the Court of Appeals could issue these writs only
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
3. The Court of Appeals has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction by way of ordinary appeal from the judgments of
the Regional Trial Court and the Family Courts (Sec. 9[3},
B.P. 129, as amended; Sec. 14, R.A. 8369).
4. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction by way of petition
for review from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction (See Sec.
22, B.P. 129, as amended; Rule 42, Rules of Court, Sec. 9, B.P.
129).
5. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction by way of petition
for review from the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
the Civil Service Commission, and other bodies mentioned in
Rule 43 (Sec. 9[3}, B.P. 129).
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The decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases are appealable to the Court
of Appeals (Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, 419 SCRA
82, 90; Gonzales v. Rosas, 423 SCRA 488, 494).
Note that under R.A. 9282, the judgments and final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals are no longer appealable by
way of petition for review to the Court of Appeals. Judgments
of the Court of Tax Appeals rendered en bane are appealable
to the Supreme Court by way of Rule 45 (Sec. 11, R.A. 9282).
6. Appellate jurisdiction over decisions of Municipal
Trial Courts in cadastral or land registration cases pursuant
to its delegated jurisdiction because decisions of Municipal
Trial Courts in these cases are appealable in the same manner
as decisions of Regional Trial Courts (Sec. 34, B.P. 129, as
amended).
Power to try and conduct hearings like a trial court (Bar 2008)
1. Even if the Court of Appeals is not basically a trial
court, unlike the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial
Court, which are actually trial courts, under the law, it has
the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence,
and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues in cases falling not only within its original jurisdiction
but also in cases falling within its appellate jurisdiction. This
authority includes the power to grant and conduct new trials
or further proceedings (Sec. 9[3], B.P. 129, as amended by R.A.
7902).
It has been held that the Court of Appeals may pass upon
the evidence to factual issues as when a petition for certiorari
is filed before it (Alcazaren v. Univet Agricultural Products,
Inc., 475 SCRA 636, 650). The court may even act like a trial
court in resolving motions for new trial, petitions for writ of
amparo, habeas data, habeas corpus or, in actions to annul
the judgment of the RTC over which the Court of Appeals has
original jurisdiction. Bar 2008
2. Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, as amended, provides:
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"The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try
cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform
any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues
raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct
new trials or further proceedings x x x" (See Philippine
National Bank v. Pasimio, G.R. No. 205590, September
2, 2015).
3. The authority granted by law to the Court of Appeals
to conduct trials or hearings is subject to the following
limitations:
(a) trials or hearings must be continuous;
(b) trials and hearings must be completed within
three months, except when extended by the Chief Justice
(Sec. 9[3], B.P. 129 as amended).
H. Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals
Aside from its jurisdiction over certain criminal offenses,
Sec. 7 of R.A. 9282 provides that the Court of Tax Appeals
shall exercise:
A. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where
the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific
period of action, in which case the inaction shall be
deemed a denial;
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3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional
Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in
cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other
money charges, seizure, detention or release of property
affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law
or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property originally decided by the provincial or city board
of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on
customs cases elevated to him automatically for review
from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which
are adverse to the Government under Sec. 2315 of the
Tariff and Customs Code; and
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry,
in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or
article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article, involving
dumping and countervailing duties under Secs. 301 and
302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and
safeguard measures under R.A. 8800, where either party
may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said
duties.
B. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection
cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes,
fees, charges and penalties: Provided, however, That
collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and
fees, exclusive of charges and penalties claimed, is less
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than One million pesos (Pl,000,000) shall be tried by the
proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
and Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection
cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolu-
tions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax
collection cases originally decided by them, in their
respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments
resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts i~
the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax
c_ollectio~ cases originally decided by the Metropo-
litan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective
jurisdictions.
I. Jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts
Explanatory note
. 1.. ~-A 11576 (An Act Further Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, Amending for the Purposes Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, Otherwise Known as 'The Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980,' As Amended) amended the jurisdictional provisions
of B.P. 129 and, in effect, expanded the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The succeeding paragraphs
treat of the jurisdiction of said courts which shall be referred
to as the "MTC."
2. R.A. 11576 increased the jurisdictional amount
cognizable by the RTCs in all civil actions which involve the
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
from the previous amount of P20,000.00 (P50,000.00 in Metr~
Manila) to P400,000.00, except for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands and buildings, original jurisdiction
over which remains with the first-level courts.
110 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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R.A. 11576 also increased the jurisdiction of the RTCs
in all actions and maritime jurisdiction where the demand
or claims exceeds P2 million, from the previous amount of
P300,000.00 (P400,000.00 in Metro Manila); in all matters
of testate and intestate probate where the gross value of
the estate exceeds P2 million, from the previous amount of
P300,000.00 (P400,000.00 in Metro Manila); and in all other
cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs
or the value of the property in controversy exceeds P2 million.
The new law likewise delegates to the Supreme Court
the authority to adjust the jurisdictional amount for first-
and second-level courts to: (1) reflect the extraordinary
supervening inflation and deflation of currency; (2) reflect
change in the land valuation; or (3) maintain the proportion
of caseload between first- and second-level courts, without
prejudice on the part of the Congress to adjust the amounts
when the circumstances warrant.
3. The basic barometer of the jurisdiction of the MTC is
the jurisdictional amount. The jurisdictional amount referred
to is the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of
the demand involved in the civil action or proceedings (Sec.
33, B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 11576).
Demand not exceeding P2 million
1. The MTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions where the value of the personal property,
estate or amount of the demand does not exceed P2 million.
Where the demand exceeds the amount mentioned, the
Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction (Sec.
19[8}, B.P. 129, as amended).
Note: The amount of P2 million is the result of adjustments
under Sec. 5 of R.A. 11576 as previously discussed.
2. The jurisdictional amount does not include the
following:
(a) interest;
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
(b) damages of whatever kind;
(c) attorney's fees;
(d) litigation expenses; and
(e) costs (Sec. 33[1}, B.P. 129, as amended; See also
Cabrera v. Francisco, supra).
Although excluded in determining the jurisdiction of
the court, the above items, however, shall be included in
determining the filing fees (Sec. 33[1}, B.P. 129, as amended).
3. In Administrative Circular No. 09-94, it was made
clear that "The exclusion of the term 'damages of whatever
kind' in determining the jurisdictional amount under Sec.
19(8) and Sec. 33(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or
a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action or·
one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shali be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court."
4. In one case, the issue presented was: Should the
amount of moral damages prayed for in the complaint be the
sole basis for determining which court has jurisdiction or
should the total amount of all the damages claimed regardless
of kind and nature, such as exemplary, nominal damages,
attorney's fees, and other claims be used? The Court held,
that based on the allegations of the complaint, it was clear
that the main action was for damages. Hence, the other forms
of damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses and costs,
were not merely incidental to or consequences of the main
action but constituted the primary relief prayed for.
Ruled the Court:
"x xx The exclusion of the term damages of whatever
kind in determining the jurisdictional amount x x x
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental
to or consequence of the main cause of action. However,
in cases where the main claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount
 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court" (Sante v. Claravall, G.R. No.
173195, February 22, 201 O;italics supplied).
Meaning of interest
In Gomez v. Montalban, 548 SCRA 693, the debtor
expressly agreed to pay the principal amount of the loan, plus
15% monthly interest to the creditor. When the agreed amount
was not paid, the creditor sued for a sum of money in the RTC.
The principal amount of the loan was P40,000.00 incurred
in 1998 but the amount of the demand, per allegation of the
complaint, was P238,000.00. The latter amount was inclusive
of accrued interest since 1998 up to the time the complaint
was filed. Note that, at the time the complaint was filed, the
amount alleged was still within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As to whether or not the interest should be included in
the determination of the jurisdiction of the court, the Supreme
Court ruled that:
XXX
"Since the interest on the loan is a primary and
inseparable component of the cause of action, not merely
incidental thereto, and already determinable at the
time of the filing of the Complaint, it must be included
in the determination of which court has jurisdiction over
petitioner's case. Using as basis the P238,000.00 amount
being claimed by petitioner from respondent for payment
of the principal loan and interest, this Court finds that it
is well within the jurisdictional amount fixed by law for
RTC's."
Totality Rule (Bar 2014; 2015)
1. Under the totality rule, where there are several
claims or causes of actions between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes
L
CHAPTER II 113
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions (Sec. 33[1], B.P. 129,
as amended) or whether they arose from a single cause of
action or several causes of action (See Pajares v. Remarkable
Laundry and Dry Cleaning, G.R. No. 212690, February 20,
2017).
2. The totality rule presupposes that the various claims
of the same or different parties are allowed to be embodied
in the same complaint, or that the different causes of action,
which are joined, accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and
against the same defendant/sand that no misjoinder of parties
is involved. If so, then the total amount of the claims shall
be the basis of the court's jurisdiction and not the amount of
the individual claims. This rule is applied in relation to the
rules on permissive joinder of parties in Sec. 6 of Rule 3 and
the rules on joinder of causes of action under Sec. 5 of Rule
2 (Please refer to discussions in the succeeding chapter; See
also Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Buncan, 453 SCRA 482,
489).
Illustration: DD owes PP the following: P800,000.00
representing the balance on the purchase price of a car;
P850,000.00 based on a simple loan; P875,000.00 also based
on another loan. All debts are due and a demand to pay went
unheeded. If an action is filed and the causes of action are
joined, the basis of jurisdiction would be the total amount due.
The RTC, in this case, has jurisdiction. If each debt is made
the subject of a separate complaint, the MTC, by reason of the
amount, has jurisdiction.
Actions involving personal property·
The MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions where the value of the personal property in controversy
does not exceed P2 million (Sec. 33[1], B.P. 129, as amended;
R.A. 11576). If the value of the property exceeds the said
amounts, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction (Sec. 19[8],
B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 11576).
114 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Probate proceedings
The MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, where the gross value of
the estate does not exceed P2 million (Sec. 2, R.A. 11576; Sec.
19[4], B.P. 129, as amended; Sec. 33[1], B.P. 129, as amended).
Where the gross value of the estate exceeds the amount
mentioned, the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction (Sec. 19[4], B.P. 129, as amended).
A petition for probate of a will involving an estate valued
at Pl million falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC. Bar 1997
Granting provisional remedies
The MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction to grant
provisional remedies in proper cases (Sec. 33[1], B.P. 129,
as amended by R.A. 11576). This rule presupposes that the
MTC has jurisdiction over the principal action. The power
to grant provisional remedies depends upon which court has
jurisdiction over the principal action.
Delegated jurisdiction
1. The MTC also exercises delegated jurisdiction in
cadastral and land registration cases covering lots where there
is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots the value of
which does not exceed Pl00,000.00, as may be delegated by
the Supreme Court (Sec. 34, B.P. 129; Sec. 4, R.A. 7691). A
delegation of the cases to the MTC needs to be made by the
SC.
'' :C::)iear and decide applications for bail in criminal cases in the
2. The value of the lot shall be ascertained by the (a)
affidavit of the claimant, or (b) agreement of the respective
claimants if there are more than one, or (c) from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property (Sec. 34,
B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691).
3. The decision of the MTC shall be appealable in the
same manner as the decision of the Regional Trial Court (Sec.
34, B.P. 129, as amended; Sec. 4, R.A. 7691). Hence, the MTC,
acting under its delegated jurisdiction, may be deemed to be
CHAPTER II 115
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
. 8 a Regional Trial Court. The decision of the MTC
?ctm~ :tral and land registration cases, therefore, shall be
m ca laable to the Court of Appeals following the procedure in
appea
Rule 41. Bar 2009
4 _ The jurisdiction is only a delegated one because it
:18th Regional Trial Court (formerly Court of First Instance)
h" .~ normally has jurisdiction over cadastral and land
W ·~ctration cases. Without such delegation made by the
regis
.•·· reme Court, the MTC cannot exercise . Juris
. . d"iction
. over
S up d . .
cadastral and Ian registration cases.
A relatively recent case held:
"Presently, jurisdiction over an application for
land registration remains with the RTC where the land
is situated, except when such jurisdiction is delegated
by the Supreme Court to the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts under certain circumstances" (City of Dumaguete
v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August
24, 2011).
I,:l'i''z:.~pecial
"'• ./1
jurisdiction
1. The MTC has also been conferred by law a special
Jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas
Corpus in the absence of all the Regional Trial Court judges in
the province or city (Sec. 35, B.P. 129, as amended).
.... .. . 2. The special jurisdiction includes the authority to
\province or city where the absent Regional Trial Court judges
'~t€'(Sec. 35, B.P. 129, as amended). Bar 2012
).1mmary procedure; small claims cases (Bar 2013; 2014;
J)18)
" The MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over summary
_cedure cases (Sec. 36, B.P. 129, as amended) and small
1ms cases (Sec. 1, Rule 1, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
116 CNIL PROCEDURE
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The Supreme Court increased the limit of small claims
cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial Courts from
P300,000.00 to P400,000.00, and before the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities (MTCCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) from P200,000.00 to
P300,000.00 beginning April 1, 2019. As a consequence, money
claims filed before the first level courts outside Metro Manila
were all covered by the Revised Rules of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases, whereas those filed before the Metropolitan
Trial Courts were considered either as small claims cases for
claims of up to P300,000.00, or proceeded under the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, for claims above P300,000.00 to
P400,000.00.
The Supreme Court, during its En Banc deliberation
on March 1, 2022, approved the procedural rules expediting
criminal and civil actions filed before the first level courts.
This effectively amended the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and 2016 Revised Rules on Small Claims Cases.
Entitled Rules on Expedited Procedures in First Level
Courts (AM. No. 08-8-7-SC), the same recalibrates, reconciles,
and harmonizes the coverage of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and Small Claims cases following the enactment
of R.A. 11576, which expanded the jurisdictional amount
cognizable by the first level courts to P2,000,000.00 for civil
actions monetary claims. The Rules provide for a more efficient
and expedited procedure governing small claims cases.
The provisions on prohibited pleadings and motions
and service pursuant to international conventions under the
2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure have
also been incorporated, and videoconferencing hearings have
been authorized at any stage of the proceedings. The salient
features of the Rules pertinent to small claims include:
The Rules increase the threshold amount of small
claims cases to Pl,000,000.00 and no longer makes a
distinction whether the claim is filed before the first
level courts within or outside Metro Manila. The claim
or demand may be for money owed under contracts of
CHAPTER II 117
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
lease, loan and other credit accommodations, services,
and sale of personal property. The recovery of personal
property is excluded, unless made subject of a compromise
agreement between the parties. Nevertheless, the
enforcement of barangay amicable settlement agreements
and arbitration awards where the money claim does not
exceed Pl,000,000.00 is likewise covered.
The Rules allow the service of summons by the
plaintiff if returned unserved by the sheriff or proper
court officer, or if it shall be served outside the judicial
region of the court where the case is pending. If the case is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to serve summons,
the case may be re-filed within one year from notice of
dismissal, subject to the payment of a reduced filing fee
of P2,000.00.
Notices may now be served through mobile phone
calls, SMS, or instant messaging software applications.
While videoconferencing hearings should be conducted
using the Supreme Court-prescribed platform, the court
may allow the use of alternative platforms or instant
messaging applications with video call features, under
certain conditions. The 30-day period within which to set
the hearing was extended to 60 days if one of the defendants
resides or is holding business outside the judicial region
of the court. There shall only be one hearing day, with
judgment rendered within 24 hours from its termination.
The Small Claims Forms have also been updated and
improved for ease of use, with translations in Filipino.
The Rules maintained that the decision rendered by the
first level courts in small claims shall be final, executory
and unappealable.
The Rules shall likewise have a ~rospective application.
Actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer {Bar 2009;
2014; 2018)
1. The MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases (Sec. 33[2], B.P.
129, as amended; Sec. 1, R.A. 11576). These are both ejectment
cases, otherwise known as accion interdictal.
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2. The issue in unlawful detainer and forcible entry
is possession, not ownership of real property. May the court,
however, resolve an issue of ownership in either action? The
law on the matter is quite clear. It instructs that when the
defendant, in an unlawful detainer case or a forcible entry
case, raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
the issue of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the court may resolve the issue
of ownership but only for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession (Sec. 33[2], B.P. 129, as amended; Sec. 3,
R.A. 7691). In other words, when the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to that of possession, the court may pass
upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the
better right to possess the property (Baleares v. Espanto, G.R.
No. 229645, June 6, 2018). This means that when the court
can resolve the issue of possession without dealing with the
issue of ownership, the court will refrain from resolving the
issue of ownership.
The Court explains that any issue on ownership arising
in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only
provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal
issue of possession (Echanes v. Spouses Hailar, G.R. No.
203880, August 10, 2016). In other words, the adjudication
of the issue of ownership is not final and binding. The same
is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of ownership.
Otherwise stated, the adjudication of the issue of ownership is
only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property (Baleares v. Espanto,
G.R. No. 229645, June 6, 2018).
3. As a reminder, an action for unlawful detainer is one
the purpose of which is to recover possession of real property
from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration
of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer
is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration
or termination of the right to possess (Bulalacao-Soriano v.
Papina, G.R. No. 213187, August 24, 2016). In forcible entry,
the purpose is to recover any land or building by a possessor
CHAPTER II 119
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth (See Sec. 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court). The possession
by the defendant in forcible entry is illegal from its inception.
Actions involving title to, possession of or any interest in
real property; meaning
1. An action "involving title to real property'' means
that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that
he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have
exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the
same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns
property, and (2) the property itself' (Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs
of Sevilla, 603 SCRA 395, 404; See also Vda. de Herrera v.
Bernardo, G.R. No. 170251, June 1, 2011; Padlan v. Dinglasan,
694 SCRA 91, 100, March 20, 2013).
"Title" is different from a "certificate of title." The latter
is the document of ownership under the Torrens system of
registration issued by the government through the Register
of Deeds. While title is the claim, right or interest in real
property, a certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.
Another way of looking at it is that, while "title" gives the
owner the right to demand or be issued a "certificate of title,"
the holder of a certificate of title does not necessarily possess
valid title to the real property. The issuance of a certificate
of title does not give the owner any better title than what he
actually has in law. Thus, a plaintiffs action for cancellation
or nullification of a certificate of title may only be a necessary
consequence of the defendant's lack of title to real property.
Further, although the certificate of title may have been lost,
burned, or destroyed and later on reconstituted, title subsists
and remains unaffected unless it is tra.nsferred or conveyed to
another or subjected to a lien or encumbrance (Heirs of Sebe v.
Heirs of Sevilla, 603 SCRA 395, 404-405).
2. Under Sec. 33[3] of B.P. 129 as amended by R.A.
11576, the MTC has jurisdiction over actions involving title
to, or possession of real property, or any interest therein,
depending on the assessed value of the property involved.
Where the assessed value of the property does not exceed four
120 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), it is the MTC which
has jurisdiction. If the assessed value of the property exceeds
such amount, the RTC has jurisdiction (Sec. 19[2], B.P. 129,
as amended by R.A. 11576).
Before the amendments, brought about by R.A. 7691, such
actions, called real actions, with the exception of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases, were subject to the jurisdiction
of the RTC. As it stands, under the amendments, jurisdiction
over real actions is now shared between the MTC and the RTC
depending on the assessed value of the property.
3. One significant Supreme Court decision (Heirs of
Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso, 540 SCRA 1),
involving three complaints, incisively discussed the effects
of the changes in the law on jurisdiction, brought about by
R.A. 7691 on actions involving "title to, possession of and any
interest in real property." Note that, at the time the complaint
was filed, the amount alleged was still within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
The three complaints, filed with the RTC, involved
actions for reconveyance and/or annulment of transfer
certificate of titles which, according to the plaintiffs, were
obtained by the defendants through "fraud, deceit, bad faith,
and misrepresentation." The defendants argued, among
others, that the court had no jurisdiction over the complaints
pursuant to Sec. 19[2] ofB.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, the
assessed value of the subject lots being less than P20,000.00.
The petitioners countered that the nature of their
complaints, were suits for reconveyance and/or annulment of
certificates of title, the subject matters of which are incapable
of pecuniary estimation, which, under the law, fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Puno, agreed
with the trial court that the common allegations in the three
complaints, were actually actions for reconveyance of real
property. Significantly, the Court declared that the actions for
reconveyance in the subject cases were also actions to remove
cloud on a title (otherwise commonly known as quieting of
CHAPTER II 121
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
title under Sec. 1 of Rule 63) jurisdiction over which would be
determined by the assessed value of the property.
The Court instructed:
"These cases may also be considered as actions to
remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure
the cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on
petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex
them in the enjoyment of their alleged title.
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance
or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable
law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section
19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz.:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
XXX
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein:
where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible
en_tr_yint? ~nd_ u?-lawful detainer of lands or buildings,
orig:mal Jur1sd1ction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts·
'
XXX
In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject
lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed
values are less than P20,000.00 x x x
XXX
Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over
the instant cases.
. Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is
mca,pable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1)
of B.P. 129 is erroneous." (Supra, pp. 15-16; emphasis
supplied).
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The Court continued, thus:
. "In a number of cases, [the Court] ha[s] held that
;ct10ns ~or r~conveyance of or for cancellation of title to
r ~o quiet title. over. real property are actions that fall
un er the_ class1ficat10n of cases that involve 'title to
o(,;possess10~ of, real property, or any interest therein:
upra, p. 16, Emphasis supplied).
To emphasize the distinction between the old and the
::;;i::~: the Court, through Chief Justice Puno, succinctly
XXX
. "The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well
as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R A 296
th R · · , as amended
ga_v~ e. T_Cs_(formerly courts of first instance) exclusiv~
or1g1~al Jur1sd1ction ''.[i]n all civil actions which involve
the ti~le to, or poss_ess10nof, real property, or any interest
ther~m, except act10ns for forcible entry into and unla fi I
d~~~e: of la~ds or buildings, original jurisdiction :v~r
w IC is con err~d. upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,
[MTCs], a~d Mumc1pal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred
upon the city and municipal courts under RA 296
amended)." Thus, under the old law ther.e. ' as
s u b s t an t·Ia 1 e ffeet on Jurisdiction
. , was
wh e th er a case no
· h . actions involving property with an assessed value of less
:~ one, t .e subJe~t m~tter of which was incapable
it pecum~ry estimation, under Section 19(1) of B p
9 603 SCRA 395, 402-403).
or ?n~ mv?lving title to property under Section 19(2) ·
e _d1sti~ction between the two classes becam~
cruci_al with the amendment introduced by R A N
!69_1 I~ 1~94 which expanded the exclusive o;i~inZi
J'!-r~sdwt_1onof t~e first level courts to include "all
civil actions which involve title to o . title to, or possession of real property, or any interest therein,
£ 1 , r possession
o 'rea property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20 000 00) o . . ·1
t· · M , · r, 1n c1v1
:c wns m e~ro Manila, where such assessed value does
ot exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50 000 00) I .
f · t , • exc us1ve
_m ~rest, damages of whatever kind, attorne 's fees
Ihtigat10n • . expenses
. . .and. costs ·" Th us, un d er t h e ypresent '
aw, original Jurisd1ct10n over cases the subject matter
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or
any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is
divided between the first and second level courts, with
the assessed value of the real property involved as the
benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog
the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in
the speedier administration of justice." (Supra, pp. 17-18;
Emphasis made by the Court).
In a subsequent case involving a determination of
whether or an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation or a
real action, the Court had the occasion to clarify the anew the
distinction between the old and the new law on jurisdiction.
The Court explained:
If this case were decided under the original text
of Batas Pambansa 129 or even under its predecessor,
Republic Act 296, determination of the nature of the case
as a real action would have ended the controversy. Both
real actions and actions incapable of pecuniary estimation
fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
But, with the amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. 7691,
the distinction between these two kinds of actions has
become pivotal. The amendment expanded the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include real
than P20,000.00 xx x" (Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla,
4. Note that, the following cases were filed prior to the
effectivity R.A. 11576. The prevailing rule before under R.A.
7691 is that the MTC has jurisdiction over actions involving
depending on the assessed value of the property involved.
Where the assessed value of the property does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) outside Metro Manila,
or does not exceed fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in Metro
Manila, it is the MTC which has jurisdiction. If the assessed
value of the property exceeds such amounts, the RTC has
jurisdiction.
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The ruling in the Valeriano Concha case treated in the
immediately preceding number was adopted in a subsequent
controversy. In San Pedro u. Asdala, 593 SCRA 397, the
respondents filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 42, a complaint against the petitioners
for accion reinuindicatoria, quieting of title and damages,
with prilyer for preliminary mandatory injunction involving
a property alleged to have an assessed value of P32,100.00.
The petitioners, for their part, filed a motion to
dismiss said complaint on the ground that the MeTC had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, as the
subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The motion to dismiss was denied. The denial was anchored
on the relevant provisions of B.P. 129, as amended, declaring
that the MeTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions
involving title to or possession of real property of small value.
The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also denied.
The RTC sustained the MeTC ruling, stating that, in
accordance with Sec. 33(3) of R.A. 7691, amending B.P. 129,
the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for accion
reinuindicatoria, as it involves recovery of ownership and
possession of real property, located in Quezon City, with an
assessed value not exceeding P50,000.00.
The Supreme Court, in sustaining the lower courts,
merely reiterated its ruling in Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha,
Sr. u. Spouses Lumocso, 540 SCRA 1, which had previously
ruled that an action for quieting of title over real property, like
an action for reconveyance of or cancellation of title to real
property, falls under the classification of cases that involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.
It further held that original jurisdiction over cases involving
such subject matters is divided between the first and second
level courts (MTC and RTC), depending on the assessed value
of the real property.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
125
5. Prior to Concha, the Court, through Justice Chico-
Nazario had ruled:
"The mortgage of the subject property to the Bb~n~
of Commerce annotated on the Spouses San Pa . o s
TCT constit~tes a cloud on their title_ to the sub~ect
'
property wh"1ch may, at first , appear valid . and effective,
d
but is aliegedly invalid or voidable for havmg bee~ ma :
without their knowledge and. authority as registere
We thus have established that the case filed
owners. S ' Pablo before the MTC is actually an
by the spouses an . • d" ·
action for quieting of title, a real action, the J~ris i~t~~n
over which is determined by the assessed. va ue o t e
ro erty The assessed value of the subJect pr~per _Y
ioc:ted i~ Mandaue City, as alleged in _th~ c~mplamt, is
P4 900 00 which aptly falls within the JUr1sd1ct1onof the
MTC'' (Bdnk of Commerce v. Spouses San Pablo, Jr., 522
SCRA 713, 723-724; Emphasis ours).
6 In a case involving friar lands, the Court, spe~~ing
throu~h Justice Bersamin, clearly instr~ctet tha~ t;.e o~,:~~!
and exclusive jurisdiction over comp~ai~ ~:~~rT:~!1 Court
and reconveyance belongs to either t e egi . S ouses
[RTC] or the Municipal Trial Court [MTC] (Heir) of . ;p th
Reterta u. Spouses Mores, 655 SCRA 580, 585 usmg e
assessed value as basis (Supra, p. 598). .
7 A more recent pronouncement of the Court, howeve~,
. .h . ·t· g In Snouses Sabitsana, Jr. u. Muertegui,
is wort rev1s1 m . ¥ d
G.R. No. 181359, August 5, 2013, the Court dee1are :
"On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear ~nd~r the
Rules that an action for quieting of title may be mstitut~d
in the RTCs regardless of the assessed value of t e
. d" te Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,
property m ispu . . 1 d
an action to quiet title to real propert! or rem~,ve c ou
therein may be brought in the appropriate RTC.
In Sabitsana, the Court observed that t~e action for
uietin of title was filed to prevent a cloud ?emg cast u~on
ihe plafntiffs application for title and to obtam a declaration
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VOLUME I
of his rights. In this sense, ruled the court, "the action is one for
declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction
of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules." Note that in
this case, it is evident that the ruling was analyzed based on
the purpose for which the action was filed. Since the purpose
was to obtain "a declaration of rights," it was treated as one
for declaratory relief, hence, within the jurisdiction of the
Re~ional Trial Court. It should also be noted that Sabitsana
rulmg was rooted on Rule 63 of the Rules of Court not on the
mandatory provisions of B.P. 129, as amended.
. 8. 1:1-
previous pronouncement of the Supreme Court is
enhghtenmg, thus: · determining jurisdiction, the trial court must interpret and
"The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the
reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles
1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title
authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code· and
(3) an action to consolidate ownership required by kticle
1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase.
Th~se three remedies are considered similar to declaratory
rehef b_ecause they also result in the adjudication of the
legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of
execution to carry the judgment into effect.
"To determine which court has jurisdiction over the
actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read
together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended.
"It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of
the_ Rules of_Court does not categorically require that an
action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly
uses the word may [which means] that an action for
qui~~ing of title may be brought under [the] Rule on
pet1t10ns _f~r declaratory relief, and a person desiring to
file_a ~etit10n for declaratory relief may x x x bring an
action m the appropriate Regional Trial Court. The use
?fthe word may in a statute denotes that the provision
1s merely_ permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an
opportumty or an option.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
"In contrast, the mandatory provision of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions which involve title to or possession of real property
where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00
xx x" (Malana v. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17,
2009; Italics supplied).
9. The pronouncements in Malana v. Tappa were
reiterated by the Court in a more recent case. Here, the
Court explained, by way of reminder, that for the purpose of
apply the law on jurisdiction in relation to the averments
or allegations of the ultimate facts in the complaint. For
example, the RTC has jurisdiction over the cause of action for
injunction because it is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
But the same cannot be true in the case of quieting of title,
which is in the nature of a real action - that is, an action that
involves the issue of ownership or possession of real property,
or any interest in real property - in view of the expansion of
the jurisdiction of the first level courts under R.A. 7691. As
such, the determination of which trial court had jurisdiction
over the real action is dependent on the assessed value of the
property in dispute. Since in the controversy at hand, the
complaint did not contain any averment of the assessed value
of the property, such failure left the trial court bereft of any
basis to determine which court could validly take cognizance
of the cause of action for quieting of title (Salvador v. Patricia,
Inc., G.R. No. 195834, November 9, 2016).
Basis is assessed value {Bar 2008; ~009)
1. The basis of jurisdiction in real actions is the assessed
value of the property involved as alleged in the complaint
(Salvador v. Patricia Inc., G.R. No. 195834, November 9, 2016).
Illustrativeof the application of the law is the case of Geonzon
Vda. de Barrera v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi, 565 SCRA 192.
Note however, that this case was filed prior to the effectivity
of R.A. 11576.
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Th~ facts point to a complaint for reconueyance of
possession of real property with preliminary injunction and
damages filed with the Regional Trial Court. One of the defenses
raised by the defendants was the court's lack of jurisdiction
ov~r the complaint, the assessed value of the subject property
bemg only Pll,160.00 as reflected in the uncontroverted
tax declaration. The trial court, in its decision, rejected the
contention of the defendant holding that since the complaint
alleged the estimated value of the land as P50,000.00, such
all~gation must prevail over the assessed value of Pll,160.00
rehed upon by the defense. What determines the nature of
t~e action and the jurisdiction over the complaint, said the
trial court, are the facts alleged in the complaint and not
those alleged in the answer of the defendants. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's disposition on the issue of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In a subsequent petition for review on certiorari, the
Supreme Court held:
"The subject land has an assessed value of Pl 1 160 as
reflected in Tax Declaration No. 7565, a common ~xhibit
of the parties. The bare claim of respondents that it has
a value of P50,000 thus fails. The case, therefore falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the mu~icipal
trial court.
It was error then for the RTC to take cognizance of
the complaint based on the allegation that 'the present
estimated value [of the land is] P50,000' x x x The
estimated value, commonly referred to as the fair market
value is entirely different from the assessed value of the
property" (Italization ours).
2. One later case is, likewise, illuminating. Here,
the plaintiffs filed, in the Regional Trial Court, an action
for annul~ent of documents, reconveyance and recovery
of possess10n of two lots which had a total assessed value
of ~9,~10.0~. The complaint also prayed for damages. The
plamtiffs claimed that they owned the subject lots but, through
fraud, the defendant allegedly succeeded in having them sign
CHAPTER II 129
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
the documents (affidavits of quitclaim) conveying the lots to
him. Being illiterate, they relied on the explanation of the
defendant that what they signed were "deeds of real estate
mortgage" covering a loan that they got from him. Although
it appeared that the documents, which turned out to be deeds
conveying ownership over the two lots, were notarized, the
plaintiffs claimed that they did not appear before any not~ry
public. Using the affidavits of quitclaim, the defendant apphed
for and obtained free patent titles covering the two lots.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter because accordingly, the ultimate relief
sought by the plaintiffs was the reconveyance of title and
possession over two lots that had a total assessed value of
less than P20,000.00. The RTC concluded that the complaint
should have been filed with the Municipal Trial Court.
In their motion for reconsideration, which was denied,
the plaintiffs pointed out that the RTC should have classified
their complaint as one for annulment of documents, an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and not one involving title
to or possession of real property because, in their complaint,
they asked the court, not only to resolve the dispute over
ownership and possession of the lots, but also to rule on the
validity of the affidavits of quitclaim, the subsequent deeds
of confirmation of sale, and the titles over the properties.
The plaintiffs claimed that their action was, first, for the
declaration of nullity of the documents of conveyance that
the defendant tricked them into signing and, second, for the
reconveyance of the certificate of title for the two lots that the
defendant succeeded in getting. The subject of their action is,
they conclude, incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, the
RTC should try the case as provided in Sec. 19[1] of B.P. 129,
as amended.
The Court identified the issue as whether or not the
action involving the two lots valued at less than P20,000.00
falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The Court, in ruling on the issue, started with a
restatement of the principle that whether a court has
 130 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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VOLUME I
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular action is
determined by the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint
and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that
apportions the jurisdiction of courts.
The Court found, on the basis of the allegations in the
complaint, that the action is not about the declaration of the
nullity of the documents or the reconveyance to the plaintiffs
of the certificates of title covering the two lots. The Court
emphasized that, "[T]hese would merely follow after the trial
court shall have first resolved the issue of which between
the contending parties is the lawful owner of such lots, the
one also entitled to their possession. Based on the pleadings,
the ultimate issue is whether or not defendants defrauded
the plaintiffs of their property by making them sign the
documents of conveyance rather than just a deed of real estate
mortgage to secure their debt to him. The action is therefore
'
about ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful owner'
of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is determined by
the assessed value of such lots."
Here, as observed by the Court, the total assessed value of
the two lots subject of the suit was only P9,910.00, an amount
which does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold value of
P20,000.00 fixed by law (Heirs of Sebe u. Heirs of Sevilla, 603
SCRA 395, 402-403).
3. When parties disagree on the correct boundary
of adjacent lots, the controversy must be treated as one for
ownership, not mere possession. The Court in one case
explained:
"x x x [A] boundary dispute must be resolved in
the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment
case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but
encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed
x_x x formed part of the plaintiffs property. A boundary
dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to
unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer,
the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of
CHAPTER II 131
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
the premises upon the expiration or termination of his
right to hold such possession under any contract, express
or implied. The defendant's possession was lawful at
the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the
expiration or termination of his right of possession. In
forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal
from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which
between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior
possession de facto" (Manalang v. Bacani, G.R. No.
156995, January 12, 2015;Javier v. De Guzman, G.R. No.
186204, September 2, 2015).
Note: Cases mentioned were filed before the effectivity
of R.A. 11576.
The need to allege the assessed value; when failure to allege
assessed value is not fatal
1. The Court in Quinagoran u. Court of Appeals, 531
SCRA 104, 113-114, unequivocally ruled that the compl~int
has to allege the assessed value of the property. A complamt,
ruled the Court in Quinagoran, "must allege the assessed
value of the property x x x to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the same. This is because th~ n~tu~e ~f ~he
action and which court has original and exclusive Jur1sd1ct10n
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the
law in effect when the action is filed x x x" (See also Padlan u.
Dinglasan, 694 SCRA 91, 100-101, March 20, 2013).
More recent pronouncement echoes the same rule
governing real actions. In real actions, held the Court, "[T]he
complaint must allege the assessed value of the real prope~ty
subject of the complaint or the inter~st t~ereon _to_detern::i-me
which court has jurisdiction over the act10n. This 1s reqmred
because the nature of the action and the court with original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed
for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is
filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
some or all of the claims asserted therein" (Supapo u. Spouses
de Jesus, G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015).
 132 CNIL PROCEDURE
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2. "x x x If the assessed value is not alleged in
the complaint, the action should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The reason behind this rule is that the trial court
is not afforded the means of determining from the allegations
of the basic pleading whether jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action pertains to it or to another court. After all,
courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market
value of lands" (Cabling v. Dangcalan, G.R. No. 187696, June
15, 2016). Note: In cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of the property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent lot (Sec. 33[3], B.P. 129 as
amended; Cabling v. Dangcalan, ibid.).
3. Note, however, that the non-inclusion of the assessed
value on the face of the complaint is not fatal if attached to the
complaint is a tax declaration showing the assessed value of
the property. Annexes to the complaint have been held to be
part of, and should be considered together with the complaint
in determining the jurisdiction of the court. The ruling that
the court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed value of
the land does not apply to a case in which attached to the
complaint is a tax declaration or some other document showing
the assessed value of said land (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 205966, March 2, 2016).
Allegation of assessed value is immaterial on appeal
The amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the
RTC's appellate jurisdiction. Cases decided by the MTC are
generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount
involved. Sec. 22 of B.P. 129 as amended vests upon the RTC
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions.
One case explained: "It is true that under the prevailing
law, x x x in actions involving title to or possession of real
property or any interest therein, there is a need to allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the action, or
CHAPTER II 133
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
interest therein, for purposes of determining which court
x x x has jurisdiction over the action. However, it must be
clarified that this requirement applies only if these courts are
in the exercise of their original jurisdiction x x x the assessed
value of the disputed lot is immaterial for the purpose of
x x x appellate jurisdiction (Heirs of Arrienda v. Kalaw, G.R.
No. 204314, April 6, 2016).
Inquiring into the primary relief or ultimate objective of the
complaint
1. It was held that where the ultimate objective of
the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should
be filed with the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof (Barangay
Piapi v. Talip, 469 SCRA 409, 413). Also, a complaint brought
primarily to enforce a contractual right to repurchase a real
property previously sold to the buyer, is an action for specific
performance and thus, must be filed with the Regional Trial
Court. Bar 2017
2. In one case, the Court sustained the Court of
Appeals when it ruled that an action for reconveyance of real
property, as gleaned from the allegations of the complaint,
located in Bolinao, Pangasinan, with an assessed value of
P54,370.00, is cognizable by the RTC, the assessed value
being over P20,000.00. Here, the Court looked into the
material allegations of the complaint which showed the
primary purpose of the action as one for reconveyance of real
property (De Vera v. Spouses Santiago, G.R. No. 179457, June
22, 2015). This case was filed prior to the effectivity of R.A.
11576.
3. In a case of a more recent ·vintage, the Court ruled
that a complaint denominated as one for "Breach of Contract
& Damages" is neither an action for specific performance nor
a complaint for rescission of a contract where the complaint
primarily prays for the payment of damages as a means of
enforcing the penal clause embodied in the contract between
the parties (See Pajares v. Remarkable Laundry and Dry
Cleaning, G.R. No. 212690, February 20, 2017).
 134 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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4. In another case, although the action was denomi-
nated as one for cancellation of deeds of sale, transfer
certificates of title and of the joint venture agreement, since
the complaint, based on the allegations therein, actually
sought for the recovery of real properties, the complaint, held
the Court, involved a real action and, thus, the assessed value
should be considered in computing the fees (Serrano v. Delica,
465 SCRA 82, 88-89).
5. In another case, a complaint for rescission or
annulment of a contract was held to be one not susceptible
of pecuniary estimation even if it may eventually result in
the recovery of real property, taking into consideration the
allegations and the nature of the relief sought (De Leon v.
Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 94 as cited in Home Guaranty
Corporation v. R-II Builders, Inc., 652 SCRA 649, 657).
6. In one case, a complaint was filed with the MTC
for reconveyance of real property (with an assessed value of
Pl2,400.00) with declaration of nullity of original certificate of
title (OCT), having been allegedly obtained by fraud. On the
issue of whether or not the case should have been filed with
the RTC because it involved a subject matter incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the Court held that the same was a real
action because the primary relief was to recover ownership
of real property. Considering its assessed value, the MTC
had properly exercised jurisdiction over the action (Maslag v.
Monzon, G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013). The action was filed
before the effectivity of R.A. 11576.
Accion pub/iciana; accion reivindicatoria (Bar 2010)
l. Accion publiciana is a plenary action for recovery
of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding, in order to
determine the better and legal right to possess, independently
of title. The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to
recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the
parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon
the issue to determine who between the parties has the right
to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a
final and binding determination of the issue on ownership; it is
1
CHAPTER II 135
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession where
the issue on ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being
provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property (Catindig v. Vda. de Meneses,
641 SCRA 350, 359-360).
Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment
suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the
grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when
possession has been lost for more than one year and can no
longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
(Modesto v. Urbina, 633 SCRA 383, 391). In other words, if at
the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession
or defendant's possession had become illegal, the action will
be an accion publiciana (Velasquez v. Cruz, G.R. No. 191479,
September 21, 2015; for further readings, See Zaragoza v.
Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc., G.R. No. 224022, June 28, 2017).
2. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for
its object the recovery of possession over the real property as
owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based
on said ownership.
The determining jurisdictional element for accion
reinvindicatoria is the assessed value of the property in
question. For properties outside Metro Manila, the RTC has
jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00, and
the MTC, if the assessed value is P20,000.00 or below. An
assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the
municipality where the property is located, and is contained in
the tax declaration. It is elementary that the tax declaration
indicating the assessed value of -the property enjoys the
presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper
government agency (See Hilario v. Salvador, 457 SCRA 815,
827).
3. The rule that accion publiciana lies within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
regardless of the value of the property, no longer holds true.
 136 CML PROCEDURE
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As things now stand under R.A. 11576, a distinction must
be made between those properties the assessed value of
which does not exceed P400,000.00, in which case, an accion
publiciana should be filed with the MTC. Where the assessed
value is greater than the amount mentioned, the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction (R.A. 11576; Quinagoran v. Court
of Appeals, 531 SCRA 104, 112-114). Bar 2010
4. In a later case, decided in accordance with
Quinagoran, the Court sustained the filing of a complaint for
accion publiciana in the MeTC of Caloocan City on the basis
of the allegation that the assessed value of the subject lot,
located in Metro Manila, is only P39,980.00. Given that the
plaintiffs duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements,
the Court held that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana (Supapo
v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015). Note
that this case was filed before the effectivity of R.A. 11576.
In a more recent case, the Court of Appeals surprisingly
ruled, despite jurisprudence to the contrary, that the MTC
had no jurisdiction over a complaint for accion publiciana.
The Court, in clear language struck down the pronouncement
and held: "It is no longer good law to consider that all cases
for accion publiciana lie with the RTC regardless of the value
of the property." The jurisdiction of the court over said action
would now be determined by the assessed value of the property
(Cabling v. Dangcalan, C.R. No. 187696, June 15, 2016).
5. It must be emphasized that the jurisdiction of the
court, under R.A. 11576, over an action involving title to or
possession of land is not determined by the market value of
the property but by the assessed value thereof. The assessed
value of real property is the fair market value of the real
property multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous
to taxable value. The fair market value is the price at which
a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to
sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy (See
Hilario v. Salvador, 457 SCRA 815, 826).
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6. The law should now be clear at this point. The M:C
has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil ~ctions involv1?-g
title to or possession of real property, or any 1?-terest there1?-,
where the assessed value of the property or mteres~ there~n
does not exceed P400,000.00. The amount mentrnned 1s
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs (Sec. 33[3], B.P. 129, as
amended by Sec. 2, R.A. 11576). In cases ofland not declared
for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots (Sec. 2,
R.A. 11576; Sec. 33[3], B.P. 129, as amended). Bar 2008
The above rule excludes the real actions of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer which are within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the MTC, regardless of the assessed value of
the property involved (Sec. 33[2], B.P. 129, as amended).
Real actions (actions involving title to, possession of! or
any interest in real property) are also incapable of pecuniary
estimation
1. One must be reminded that jurisprudence does
not deny that actions like reconveyance of ~e~l proper_ty,
quieting of title to real property, accion publiciana, a~c~on
reivindicatoria foreclosure of real estate mortgage, partition
of real propert; and similar actions, are also actions inca~able
of pecuniary estimation. They are, however, also real actions.
The landmark case of Russel v. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738, 745-
746, acknowledged that actions involving title to, possession
of or any interest in real property in Sec. 33[3] of B.P. 129 are
also incapable of pecuniary estimation. However, because of
the new law the assessed value of the property should now be
considered i~ determining jurisdiction if actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation are also real actions.
The Court, in very succinct language, declared:
"While actions under Sec. 33[3] of B.P. 129 as
amended are also incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable
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by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value
of the real property involved x x x. If the value exceeds
P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the
Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec.
19[2] xx x" (Underscoring ours).
While the aforesaid case was filed before the effectivity
of R.A. 11576, actions like reconveyance of real property,
quieting of title to real property, accion publiciana, accion
reivindicatoria, foreclosure of real estate mortgage, partition
of real property and similar actions, are considered incapable
of pecuniary estimation and at the same time real actions still
holds true.
2. Thus, it may be gleaned from jurisprudence that if
the action is real, based on the allegations in the complaint,
even if the same be one incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the assessed value of the property becomes determinative of
jurisdiction. Consider also the following pronouncements by
the Court, note however, that these cases were filed before the
effectivity of R.A. 11576:
(a) "Based on the amendments introduced by
R.A. 7691, real actions no longer reside under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. Under the
said amendments, Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs),
Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (MCTCs) now have jurisdiction over real
actions if the assessed value of the property involved does
not exceed P20,000.00, or in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed P50,000.00. Otherwise, if
the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00, as
the case may be, jurisdiction is with the RTC" (Heirs of
Arrienda v. Kalaw, G.R. No. 204314, April 6, 2016),
(b) that while civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, are
also incapable of pecuniary estimation xx x the court's
jurisdiction will be determined by the assessed value
of the property involved. (Roldan v. Barrios, G.R. No.
214803, April 23, 2018).
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Jurisdiction over appeals from judgments of the MTC
Judgments of the MTC shall be appealable to the Regional
Trial Courts (Secs. 22 and 38, B.P. 129 as amended; Sec. 1,
Rule 40, Rules of Court).
J. Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
(Bar 2016)
Exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC
Under Sec. 19 of B.P. 129, as amended, and other
pertinent provisions of the same law, the Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over the
following cases:
1. All civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2. All civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property or an interest therein, where
the assessed value of such property involved exceeds
P400,000.00;
Note: Excepted from the above rule are actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer of land or buildings,
exclusive original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the MTC.
3. All actions in admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds
P2 million; Bar 2010
4. All matters of probate, both testate and
intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds
P2 million; ·
5. In all actions involving the contract of marriage
and marital relations;
Note: This jurisdiction is deemed modified by Sec.
5 of R.A. 8369, the law which established the Family
Courts. However, under Sec. 17 of R.A. 8369, in areas
where there are no Family Courts, the cases referred to
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in Sec. 5 of the law shall be adjudicated by the Regional
Trial Court.
6. All cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
Note: This jurisdiction is often described as the
'general' jurisdiction of the RTC making it a court of
'general jurisdiction.'
7. All civil actions and special proceedings falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of
Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
Note: The jurisdiction of the RTC over cases under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court is subject to R.A. 8369, the law
establishing Family Courts.
8. All other cases in which the demand or the
value of the property in controversy exceeds P2 million,
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs.
Concurrent original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
1. Concurrent and original jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court in actions affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls (Sec. 21[2], B.P. 129, as amended; Sec.
5, Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines).
2. Concurrent and original jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals in petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus against lower courts and bodies
and in petitions for quo warranto and habeas corpus (Sec.
21[1], B.P. 129; Sec. 9[1], B.P. 129).
Appellate jurisdiction
1. The Regional Trial Court exercises appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions (Sec. 22,
B.P. 129, as amended).
2. The decisions of the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be appealable by
petition for review to the Court of Appeals. The appeal shall
be given due course only when the petition shows prima facie
that the lower court has committed an error of fact or law
that would warrant a reversal or modification of the decision
or judgment sought to be reviewed (Sec. 22, B.P. 129, as
amended).
3. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the RTC
does not have the authority of the Court of Appeals in Sec. 9
of B.P. 129 as amended, to try cases, conduct hearings or new
trials, receive evidence and such other acts to resolve factual
issues. The basis of the decision of the Regional Trial Court
in a case appealed to it shall be (a) the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin, and (b) such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required
by the court (Sec. 22, B.P. 129, as amended).
Special jurisdiction to try special cases
Certain branches of the Regional Trial Court may be
designated by the Supreme Court to handle exclusively
criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian
cases, urban and land reform cases which do not fall under the
jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such
other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in
the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice
(Sec. 23, B.P. 129, as amended).
Jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies
1. By virtue of Item 5.2 of Sec. 5 of The Securities
Regulation Code (R.A. 8799), jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Sec. 5 of P.D. 902-A, was transferred from
the Securities and Exchange Commission to the "Courts of
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general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court."
The same provision also provided that the Supreme Court
may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall
exercise jurisdiction over said cases.
In other words, "[U]pon the enactment of R.A. 8799,
jurisdiction over intracorporate disputes, including derivative
suits, is now vested in the RTC's designated as special
commercial courts by this Court pursuant to AM. No. 00-11-
03 SC promulgated on November 21, 2000" (Forest Hills Golf
and Country Club, Inc. u. Fil-Estate, Inc., G.R. No. 206649,
July 20, 2016; Ku u. RCBC Securities, G.R. No. 219491,
October 17, 2018).
It was held that the word "or" in Item 5.2, Sec. 5 of R.A.
8799 was intentionally used by the legislature to particularize
the fact that the phrase, "the Courts of General jurisdiction"
is equivalent to the phrase, "the appropriate Regional Trial
Court." In other words, ruled the Court, "the jurisdiction of
the SEC over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD
902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction,
that is to say (or, otherwise known as), the proper Regional
Trial Courts" (Gonzales u. GJH Land, Inc., G.R. No. 202664,
November 10, 2015).
The cases under Sec. 5 of P.D. 902-A, the exclusive and
original jurisdiction over which were transferred from the
Securities and Exchange Commission to the Regional Trial
Court are the following:
(a) Devises or schemes employed by or any acts, of
the board of directors, business associates, its officers or
partnership, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation
which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/
or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations
or organizations registered with the Commission;
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members or associates; between any or all of them and the
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
corporation, partnership or association of which they are
stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership or association and
the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise
or right to exist as such entity;
(c) Controversies in the election or appointments
of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corpo-
rations, partnerships or associations; and
(d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or
associations to be declared in the state of suspension of
payments in cases where the corporation, partnership
or association possesses sufficient property to cover all
its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them
when they respectively fall due or in cases where the
corporation, partnership or association has no sufficient
assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the management
of a Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee.
2. One case gives light to the jurisdiction of the RTC
in intra-corporate controversies. Here, respondent purchased
a condominium unit which was covered by a duly registered
certificate of title. Later, the petitioner demanded from the
respondent, payment for alleged unpaid association dues and
assessments. Respondent disputed this demand, claiming
that he had been religiously paying his dues, shown by the
fact that he was previously elected president and director of
the petitioner. Consequently, the respondent was prevented
from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the
2002 election of the petitioner's Board of Directors, allegedly
because he was a delinquent member of the petitioner.
This prompted respondent to demand from petitioner an
explanation why he was considered a delinquent payer
despite the settlement of the obligation. When the petitioner
failed to make the explanation requested, he filed a complaint
for damages against the petitioner in the RTC, acting as a
regular court.
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One of the main issues sought to be resolved by the
Supreme Court was whether or not the controversy involves
intra-corporate issues as would fall within the jurisdiction of
the RTC sitting as a special commercial court, an ordinary
action for damages within the jurisdiction of regular courts,
or one falling under the jurisdiction of the Housing Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
The Court's explanation is illuminating, thus:
"In determining whether a dispute constitutes an
intra-corporate controversy, the Court uses two tests,
namely, the relationship test and the nature of the
controversy test.
"An intra-corporate controversy is one which
pertains to any of the following relationships: (1) between
the corporation, partnership or association and the public;
(2) between the corporation, partnership or association
and the State insofar as its franchise, permit or license
to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation,
partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders,
partners or associates themselves. Thus, under the
relationship test, the existence of any of the above intra-
corporate relations makes the case intra-corporate.
"Under the nature of the controversy test, the
controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of
an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain
to the enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal
and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.
In other words, jurisdiction should be determined by
considering both the relationship of the parties as well as
the nature of the question involved.
"Applying the two tests, we find and so hold that the
case involves intra-corporate controversy. It obviously
arose from the intra-corporate relations between the
parties, and the questions involved pertain to their rights
and obligations under the Corporation Code and matters
relating to the regulation of the corporation.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
"Admittedly, petitioner is a condominium corpo-
ration duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws, charged with the management of the Medical Plaza
Makati. Respondent, on the other hand, is the registered
owner of Unit No. 1201 and is thus a stockholder/member
of the condominium corporation. Clearly, there is an
intra-corporate relationship between the corporation and
a stockholder/member.
"The nature of the action is determined by the
body rather than the title of the complaint. Though
denominated as an action for damages, an examination
of the allegations made by respondent in his complaint
shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety
of the assessment made by petitioner against respondent
as well as the validity of petitioner's act in preventing
respondent from participating in the election of the
corporation's Board of Directors. Respondent contested
the alleged unpaid dues and assessments demanded by
petitioner.
"The issue is not novel. The nature of an action
involving any dispute as to the validity of the assessment
of association dues has been settled by the Court x x x
that the dispute as to the validity of the assessments is
purely an intracorporate matter between petitioner and
respondent and is, thus, within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court x x x"
(Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corporation v.
Cullen, G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013; For further
readings, see also Dy Teban Trading, Inc. v. Dy, G.R. No.
185647, July 26, 2017; See also Tumagan v. Kairuz, G.R.
No. 198124, September 12, 2018; Ku v. RCBC Securities,
G.R. No. 219491, October 17, 2018).
3. Under the relationship test, where the controversy
involves shareholders of record of the corporation, even where
the ownership of shares by one of them is questioned, the
matter is an intra-corporate controversy. Under the nature of
the controversy test, where the purpose of the litigation is to
prevent a stockholder from inspecting the corporate books on
the ground that he is not the true owner of his alleged shares,
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the controversy is intra-corporate (Belo Medical Group, Inc. v.
Santos, G.R. No. 185894, August 30, 2017).
4. There are no intra-corporate relations between the
parties where the plaintiff petitioner is neither a stockholder,
partner, member or officer of the defendant corporation.
Moreover, the questions involved neither pertain to the parties'
rights and obligations under the Corporation Code, if any, nor
to matters directly relating to the regulation of the corporation.
The action for a sum of money, specific performance and
damages springs from the parties' relationship as an investor
and a securities broker. The case is not an intra-corporate
dispute and, instead, is a mere ordinary civil action (Ku v.
RCBC Securities, G.R. No. 219491, October 17, 2018).
Effect on jurisdiction when an intra-corporate case is
erroneously assigned by raffle to a regular branch of the
Regional Trial Court
In one case, the plaintiffs filed an intra-corporate case
with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, which is the official station of the designated special
commercial court. The case, however, was raffled to a branch
of the RTC which is not a special commercial court. Later,
the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out that the
case involves an intra-corporate dispute which should be tried
by the special commercial court of Muntinlupa City, not by a
regular RTC. The court agreed and dismissed the case.
The essential issue brought to the Supreme Court for its
resolution is whether or not the court erred in dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In reversing and setting aside the order of dismissal of
the case by the trial court, the Court ruled that the erroneous
raffling of the case to a regular branch was only a matter
of procedure. Having filed the intra-corporate case with the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
II
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
which is also the official station of the special commercial
court, the court had acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the nature of the action upon the filing of the
complaint. The Court further explained that the objective
behind the designation of special commercial courts is to
promote expediency and efficiency in the exercise of the RTC's
jurisdiction over the cases enumerated under Sec. 5 of P.D.
902-A. Such designation has nothing to do with the statutory
conferment of jurisdiction because the power to define,
prescribe and apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule, a
matter of legislative prerogative.
In such a scenario in which the case was erroneously
raffled to a regular court, the proper course of action, ruled
the Court, was not for the commercial case to be dismissed
but to refer the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as
a commercial case and assigning the same to the designated
special commercial court. Docket fees already paid shall be
duly credited, and any excess, refunded (Gonzales v. GJH
Land, Inc., G.R. No. 202664, November 10, 2015; See also Forest
Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. v. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc.
v. Dy, G.R. No. 206649, July 20, 2016; Dy Teban Trading, Inc.,
G.R. No. 185647, July 26, 2017).
RTC is a court of general jurisdiction
1. Sec. 19[6] of B.P. 129, as amended, includes as part
of the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, cases "not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."
On the basis of the above provision, jurisprudence
declares that unlike the Municipal Trial Court, which is a court
of limited jurisdiction because it can only take cognizance of
cases expressly provided by law, the Regional Trial Court is a
court of general jurisdiction because all cases, the jurisdiction
of which is not specifically provided by law to be within the
jurisdiction of any other court falls within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court (Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. Court of
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Appeals, 377 SCRA 353; Sec. 19[6], B.P. 129; See also Gonzales
v. GJH Land, Inc., supra).
2. The designation of certain courts as special
commercial courts is only to streamline the workload of the
Regional Trial Courts. Such courts designated as special
commercial courts are still considered courts of general
jurisdiction. The designation does not, in a way, limit their
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of all nature, whether
civil, criminal or special proceedings. Such courts still
have the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of specific
performance (Majestic Plus Holding International, Inc. v.
Bullion Investment and Development Corporation, G.R. No.
201017, December 5, 2016).
This designation was not made by statute but only by an
internal Supreme Court rule under its authority to promulgate
rules governing matters of procedure and its constitutional
mandate to supervise the administration of all courts and the
personnel thereof. Certainly, an internal rule promulgated
by the Court cannot go beyond the commanding statute. But
as a more fundamental reason, the designation of Special
Commercial Courts is, to stress, merely an incident related to
the court's exercise of jurisdiction, which, as first discussed,
is distinct from the concept of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The RTC' s general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases
is, therefore, not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining
court procedure (Majestic Plus Holding International, Inc. v.
Bullion Investment and Development Corporation, ibid.).
3. The designation of a branch of the RTC as a special
commercial court does not diminish its power as a court of
general jurisdiction. It could still take cognizance of a petition
for injunction (Concorde Condominium, Inc. v. Baculio, G.R.
No. 203678, February 17, 2016). In another case, it was also
held that the fact than an action for injunction was raffled to,
and heard by, an RTC sitting as a commercial court is more an
issue of procedure than one of jurisdiction. Where a party has
submitted to the authority of the RTC without objecting to the
procedural impropriety, an objection to the same is deemed
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
waived and cannot [be] raised for the first time on appeal (Dy
Teban Trading, Inc. v. Dy, G.R. No. 185647, July 26, 2017).
Actions incapable of pecuniary estimation (Bar 1997; 2003;
2009)
1. It is, at this point, necessary to reiterate a consistent
refrain in jurisprudence: That the nature of the action is not
determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint
but by the allegations in the complaint and the relief prayed
for. The ultimate objective of the complaint must be inquired
into. For instance, an action for reconveyance of real property
will not be deemed one incapable of pecuniary estimation
where the ultimate objective is to obtain title to the property.
The Court, thus, held:
"Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs, x x x
is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value
of the property subject thereof' (Barangay Piapi v. Talip,
469 SCRA 409, 413).
2. The reader is advised to always look into the facts
of the case, review the evidence presented in the pleadings
and likewise determine the primary purpose of the action.
This is because an action denominated as one for specific
performance may not really be one for specific performance
but one for recovery or acquisition of ownership of property.
This analysis will have effect on venue, jurisdiction and the
amount of docket fees.
An early case clearly explained, thus:
"Although appellant's complaint is entitled to be one
for specific performance, yet the fact that he asked that
a deed of sale of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City
be issued in his favor and that a transfer certificate of
title covering said land be issued to him shows that the
primary objective and nature of the action is to recover
the parcel of land itself because to execute in favor of
appellant the conveyance requested there is need to make
a finding that he is the owner of the land which in the
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last analysis resolves itself into an issue of ownership"
(National Steel Corporation u. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
123215, February 2, 1999).
In other words, in order to determine if an action is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, it is necessary to ascertain
the nature of the principal remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, it is capable of pecuniary
estimation. Jurisdiction over the action would then depend
upon the amount of the claim. Where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or
the money claim is merely incidental to the principal relief,
the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation (Russel v.
Vestil, 304 SCRA 739, 744; Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of
Pastor, 334 SCRA 127, 132-133; Ungria v. Court of Appeals,
654 SCRA 314, 324-325). Examples: An action for reformation
of an instrument; rescission of a contract; action for specific
performance.
Hence, where the main purpose of filing the action is to
collect the commission allegedly promised by the defendant
should the plaintiffs be able to sell a particular lot, and also
for recovery of compensation for services rendered, the action
is principally for the collection of a sum of money and not one
incapable of pecuniary estimation (Cabrera v. Francisco, G.R.
No. 172293, August 28, 2013).
3. In Genesis Investment, Inc. v. Heirs of Ebarasabal,
G.R. No. 181622, November 20, 2013, the action filed was
denominated as one for "Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees."
The case involved a parcel of land with an assessed value of
Pl 1,990.00. One important issue that reached the Supreme
Court was whether or not the action is primarily one which
is incapable of pecuniary estimation or one which primarily
affects title to, possession of, or an interest in real property. If
it be the former, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. If it
be the latter, either the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal
Court has jurisdiction, depending on the assessed value of the
property.
'
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To resolve the issue, the Supreme Court used as criterion
the ascertainment of the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. The Court found that the principal relief
sought was the nullification of the Extrajudicial Settlement
with Sale, a relief that is one other than the recovery of a sum
of money hence, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation,
jurisdiction over which is lodged in the Regional Trial Court.
The Court found the case to be a "joinder of causes of action
which comprehends more than the issue of partition of or
recovery of shares or interest over the real property in question
but includes an action for declaration of nullity of contracts
and documents which is incapable of pecuniary estimation"
(Genesis Investment, Inc. v. Heirs of Ebarasabal, supra).
4. A complaint for expropriation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. An expropriation suit does not involve
the recovery of money. Rather it deals with the exercise by the
government of its authority and right to take private property
for public use (Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, 334
SCRA 127, 133). The subject of the expropriation suit is the
government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation (Barangay San Roque v.
Heirs of Pastor, ibid.).
5. An action seeking to annul a resolution of a
government-owned and controlled corporation is an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation (Polomolok Water District
v. Polomolok General Consumers Association, Inc., 636 SCRA
647, 652-653).
6. An action for the annulment of an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of real property with an assessed value
of P50,000.00 located in Laguna is .incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Bar 2000
7. An action for specific performance is one generally
considered incapable of pecuniary estimation (Russel v. Vestil,
304 SCRA 738, 745).
The amount of damages that may be claimed in addition
to the prayer for specific performance is not determinative
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of jurisdiction. Thus, an action for specific performance and
damages of P200,000.00 is cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court even if the amount of damages sought to be recovered is
within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
Where, however, the demand is in the alternative, as
in an action to compel the defendant to deliver the house by
completing its construction or to pay a certain sum, the action
is one that is capable of pecuniary estimation (Cruz v. Tan, 87
Phil. 627, 629). Thus, an action for specific performance, or, in
the alternative, for damages, in the amount of P180,000.00 is
one capable of pecuniary estimation because of the alternative
prayer which is for a sum of money. Here, the amount of
damages is determinative of jurisdiction. Bar 1997
8. If, as gleaned from the complaint, the principal
relief sought is for the court to issue an injunction against the
adverse party and his representatives to permanently enjoin
them from preventing the survey of the subject land, the
complaint is not a possessory action but one for injunction. As
such, the subject matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and properly cognizable exclusively by the Regional
Trial Court under Sec. 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A.
7691 (Bokingo v. Court of Appeals, 489 SCRA 521, 532-533;
See also Republic v. Principalia Management and Personnel
Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 198426, September 2, 2015).
9. An action for a writ of injunction is within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. It is an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Bar 1997; 2009
10. An action for the replevin of a motorcycle valued at
P150,000.00 is capable of pecuniary estimation. The basis of
jurisdiction is the value of the personal property sought to be
recovered. The stated value is within the jurisdiction of the
MTC. Bar 1997
11. An action for interpleader is capable of pecuniary
estimation where the subject matter is either real or personal
property. If the subject of interpleader is real property, then
the jurisdictional amount is determined by the assessed value
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
of the land. If it be personal property, then the value of the
property.
However, if the subject matter of the case is the
performance of an obligation, the subject matter is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation and the MTC has no
jurisdiction (See Feria and Noche, Provisional Remedies
and Special Civil Actions, 2007, p. 147). Hence, an action
for interpleader to determine who between the defendants
is entitled to receive the amount of P190,000.00 from the
plaintiff is within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Bar 1997
12. One early case decided by the Court is Russel v.
Vestil, 304 SCRA 738. This case was filed in September 1994,
barely five months after R.A. 7691 took effect. The action
was denominated as one for "Declaration of Nullity and
Partition" and filed with the RTC under the theory that the
same is incapable of pecuniary estimation under Sec. 19[1]
of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691. The document, which
the plaintiffs sought to be annulled, was the "Declaration of
Heirs and Deed of Confirmation of Previous Oral Partition"
executed among the defendants, a document which, according
to the plaintiffs, had the effect of excluding them from their
rights over the property as co-heirs. The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint harking on the court's alleged
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the land sought
to be partitioned having an assessed value of only P5,000.00
which under Sec. 33[3] of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691,
falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
In deciding the issue of jurisdiction, the Court resorted
to an examination of the pertinent portions of the complaint
which, according to the Court, disclosed that the primary relief
sought by the plaintiffs was to have the document in question
annulled. Citing previous pronouncements, the Court stressed
in Russel v. Vestil that in determining whether an action is
one the subject matter of which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, it is imperative to ascertain "the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought." Since the main purpose of
the plaintiffs was to have the document annulled, the action
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filed was one incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court,
likewise, observed that, "[W]hile the complaint also prays for
the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main
action, which is the nullity of the document above-described.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations
in the complaint and the character of the relief sought x x x"
(Russel v. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738, 745- 746).
It is significant that the Court, in Russel v. Vestil, did not
consider as erroneous what was implied from the contention
of the defendants: That an action for partition should consider
the assessed value of the property in determining jurisdiction.
What the Court merely declared was that, since partition was
not the main, but merely an incidental part of the action, the
main relief sought, i.e., the annulment of the document was
determinative of jurisdiction.
13. In a later case, although the end result of the
plaintiffs claim was the transfer of the subject property to his
name, the suit was still essentially for specific performance,
a personal action, because it sought from the defendant the
execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which
they had previously made. Here, the action is primarily to
enforce the contract to execute a deed of sale (Spouses Saraza v.
Francisco, G.R. No. 198718, November 27, 2013). Similarly, an
action for specific performance to enforce a right to repurchase
lots previously sold to the buyer in accordance with the Public
Land Act is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation (Heirs
of Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014). In
other words, not all actions involving real property are real
actions. Where the main objective of the suit, as gleaned from
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, is to compel the adverse party to perform a specific
act, like the execution of written instruments pursuant to a
previous agreement, the action is one for specific performance
(Specified Contractors & Development, Inc. v. Pobocan, G.R.
No. 212472, January 11, 2018).
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An action for specific performance to compel the defendant
to execute a deed of conveyance covering a parcel of land with
an assessed value of P19,000.00 is an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation and is cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court because the main issue is whether or not there is a right
to compel specific performance (Suggested Answer, UP Law
Center). Bar 2003; 2017
14. In one case, an action for specific performance and
damages was filed by the buyers of a lot in the RTC against
the seller praying that the latter be ordered by the court to
execute a deed of sale over the property in their favor. Upon
realizing, however, that the property had already been sold
by the seller to a third person and that the latter had already
caused the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in her name,
the plaintiff amended the complaint to specific performance,
reconveyance and damages. The amended complaint also
impleaded the third person as additional defendant and
prayed that the seller be ordered to execute a deed of sale
in their favor, that the new certificate of title issued in the
name of the additional defendant be cancelled and that the
property be reconveyed to them. The Court ruled that the
primary purpose of the plaintiffs, in the amended complaint,
was to secure their claimed ownership and title to the subject
property. The purpose qualifies the case as a real action and
not one for specific performance (Spouses Trayvilla v. Sejas,
G.R. No. 204970, February 1, 2016). Hence, the assessed value
should be considered to determine the court with jurisdiction.
15. Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions
as incapable of pecuniary estimation, namely: (a) action for
specific performance; (b) action for support which will require
the determination of the civil status; (c) right to support of
the plaintiff; (d) annulment of decisions of lower courts; (e)
rescission or reformation of contracts; (f) interpretation of a
contractual stipulation (Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo, supra).
This ruling presupposes that the enumerated actions are the
primary purposes of the complaints based on their material
allegations.
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16. A complaint for collection of an agent's compensation
and commission in the sale of a parcel of land is principally
for the collection of a sum of money. It is neither an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation or a real action. Jurisdiction
should, hence, be based on the amount of the claim (Cabrera u.
Francisco, G.R. No. 172293, August 28, 2013).
17. Where the allegations in the complaint indicate
that the action is one for reconveyance of real property, the
same may be filed with the Regional Trial Court or Municipal
Trial Court depending on the assessed value of the property
involved (See Toledo u. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167838,
August 5, 2015).
18. In connection with actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the following reminders of the Court are highly
instructive:
"A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates
that in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.
Necessarily, the determination must be done on a case-
to-case basis, depending on the facts and circumstances
of each" (Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development
Corporation v. Formaran III, 578 SCRA 283, 305; citations
omitted).
Action for partition of real property
The MTC has jurisdiction over an action for partition of
real property with an assessed value of PS,080.00. A motion
to dismiss on the ground that the action is one incapable
of pecuniary estimation was correctly denied by the MTCC
because contrary to the defendant's contention, "the MTCC has
jurisdiction to take cognizance ofreal actions or those affecting
title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for
the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on real property'' (Barrido u. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October
20, 2014).
....
-...---------~
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Action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage
Foreclosure ofreal estate mortgage is a real action. Hence,
it is the assessed value of the property which determines the
court's jurisdiction. Where the assessed value of the property
is only Pl3,380.00, the MTC has jurisdiction, not the RTC.
While Russel u. Vestil, included foreclosure as one of those
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the same case also
declared that under B.P. 129, as amended, where the action
involves title to, or possession of real property or any interest
therein, the court's jurisdiction will be determined by the
assessed value of the property involved (Roldan u. Barrios,
G.R. No. 214803, April 23, 2018). Note: Cases mentioned
were filed prior to the effectivity of R.A. 11576.
Action to enforce the payment of damages under a penal
clause
A complaint primarily seeking to enforce the accessory
obligation contained in the penal clause is actually an action
for damages capable of pecuniary estimation. The argument
that the complaint is one incapable of pecuniary estimation
cannot be sustained (See Pajares u. Remarkable Laundry and
Dry Cleaning, G.R. No. 212690, February 20, 2017).
Extent of trial court's jurisdiction when acting as a probate
court (Bar 2011)
1. Jurisprudence teaches that the jurisdiction ~f the
trial court as a probate court relates only to matters havmg to
do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate
of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination
of questions of ownership that arise- during the proceedings
(Ignacio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 213192, July 12, 2017). All that
the court could do is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties
to be administered. For the purpose of determining whether
a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass_ upon t~e title_ thereto
but such determination is not conclusive and 1s subJect to a

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final determination in a separate action (Cuizon u. Ramolete,
129 SCRA 495, 499; Bolisay u. Alcid, 85 SCRA 213, 220;
Pacioles, Jr. u. Chuatoco-Ching, 466 SCRA 90, 97-98).
2. However, if the interested parties are all heirs, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and third parties are not prejudiced or injured
thereby, the probate court may decide questions on ownership
(Coca u. De Pangilinan, 171 Phil. 246; Cunanan u. Amparo, 80
Phil. 227). Bar 2011
K. Jurisdiction of the Family Courts
Under R.A. 8369, the Family Courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over the following civil cases:
1. Petitions for guardianship, custody of children
and habeas corpus involving children;
2. Petitions for adoption of children and the
revocation thereof;
3. Complaints for annulment of marriage, decla-
ration of nullity of marriage and those relating to sta-
tus and property relations of husband and wife or those
living together under different status and agreements,
and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of
gains;
4. Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
5. Summary judicial proceedings brought under
the provisions of E.O. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code of the Philippines";
6. Petitions for declaration of status of children
as abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions
for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children,
the suspension, termination or restoration of parental
authority and other cases cognizable under P.D. 603,
E.O. 56 (Series of 1986) and other related laws;
7. Petitions for the constitution of the family
home;
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8. Cases against minors cognizable under the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;_
9. Violations of R.A. 7610, otherwise known as
the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act"; and
10. Cases of domestic violence against:
a. Women - which are acts of gender-based
violence that results, or are likely to result, in
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering
to women; and other forms of physical abuse such
as battering or threats and coercion which violate
a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom
movement; and
b. Children - which include the commission
of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation,
violence, discrimination and all other conditions
prejudicial to their development.
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or
batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the cor-
responding penalties. If any question involving any of the
above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending
in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that
court (Sec. 5, R.A. 8369).
In areas where there are no Family Courts, the above-
enumerated cases shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial
Court (Sec. 17, R.A. 8369).
L. Jurisdiction of Shari'a Courts
Shari'a courts; types
1. The Shari'a courts were created under Art. 137 of
P.D. 1083 dated February 4, 1977. Their creation, as stated in
Art. 2 of the Decree, is a recognition of "the legal system of the
Muslims in the Philippines as part of the law of the land and
seeks to make Islamic institutions more effective."
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2. The courts created under the Decree are the
(a) Shari'a District Courts, and the (b) Shari'a Circuit Courts
(Art. 137, P.D. 1083). Under the same article, the Shari'a courts
and the personnel thereof are subject to the administrative
supervision of the Supreme Court. (For further readings, see
The Municipality of Tangkal v. Balindong, G.R. No. 193340,
January 11, 2017).
3. The Shari'a District judges receive the same
compensation and enjoy the same privileges as the judges of
the Regional Trial Courts (Art. 142, P.D. 1083). Shari'a Circuit
Court judges receive the same compensation and enjoy the
same privileges as judges of Municipal Trial Courts (Art. 154,
P.D. 1083).
Original jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts
By virtue of Art. 143 of P.D. 1083, the Shari'a District
Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship,
legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws;
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution
and settlement of the estate of the deceased Muslims,
probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of
the nature or the aggregate value of the property;
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and
death and for the cancellation or correction of entries in
the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two
of the Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in
which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified
which law shall govern their relations; and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition,
injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other
auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Concurrent jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts
Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a
District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of
a family home, change of name and commitment of an
insane person to an asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not men-
tioned in paragraph (d) of the immediately preceding
topic, wherein the parties involved are Muslims except
those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which
shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Circuit Court; and
(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or
declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims or the
property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims (Art.
143[2], P.D. 1083).
Appellate jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts
1. Shari'a District Courts shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari'a Circuit Courts
within their territorial jurisdiction.
2. The Shari'a District Court shall decide every
case appealed to it on the basis of the evidence and records
transmitted, as well as such memoranda, briefs or oral
arguments as the parties may submit (Art. 144, P.D. 1083).
Finality of decisions
Under Art. 145 of the decree, the decisions of the Shari'a
District Courts, whether on appeal from the Shari'a Circuit
Court or not, shall be final. Nothing herein contained shall
affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in the Constitution.
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Original jurisdiction of Shari'a Circuit Courts
The Shari'a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:
(1) All cases involving offenses defined and pun-
ished under P.D. 1083.
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties
who are Muslims or have been married in accordance
with Art. 13 of P.D. 1083 involving disputes relating to:
(a) Marriage;
(b) Divorce recognized under the Code (P.D.
1083);
(c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
(d) Customary dower (mahr );
(e) Disposition and distribution of property
upon divorce;
(f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory
gifts (mut'a); and
(g) Restitution of marital rights.
(3) All cases involving disputes relative to commu-
nal properties (Art. 155, P.D. 1083).
Rules applicable
The Shari' a courts shall be governed by special rules of
procedure as the Supreme Court may promulgate (Art. 148
and Art. 158, P.D. 1083).
II. VENUE (Rule 4)
Meaning of venue
Venue is the place, or the geographical area, in which a
court with jurisdiction may hear and determine a case (Black's
Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1396), or the place where a case is to
be tried (20 Am Jur 2d, §89, 1965 Ed.; For additional readings,
see City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority,
G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014).
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Venue in civil cases; venue in criminal cases
1. Venue relates only to the place of trial or the
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should
be brought. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties,
as it relates to the place of trial. It does not equate to the
jurisdiction of the court (Dolot v. Paje, G.R. No. 199199, August
27, 2013).
2. Venue is procedural and not substantive. In civil
cases, venue is not a matter of jurisdiction (Heirs of Lopez v.
De Castro, 324 SCRA 591, 609). In essence, venue concerns a
rule of procedure (Golden Arches Development Corporation v.
St. Francis Square Holdings, Inc., 640 SCRA 227, 230).
3. Venue, however, is treated differently in a criminal
case. Jurisprudence holds that venue in criminal cases is
jurisdictional (Union Bank of the Philippines v. People, 667
SCRA 113, 122; See also Navaja v. De Castro, G.R. No. 182296,
June 22, 2015).
Because venue, in criminal cases, is an essential element
of jurisdiction, where the information is filed in a place
where the offense was not committed, the information may
be quashed for "lack of jurisdiction" over the offense charged
(Sec. 3[b], Rule 117, Rules of Court, See also Navaja v. De
Castro, ibid.) and not merely "improper venue." Also, because
venue is jurisdictional in a criminal case, it cannot be waived
by the parties. This is not so in a civil case where improper
venue is not equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Because it is
merely procedural, the parties to a civil case can waive the
venue of a case.
The Court explained:
"We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is
procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the
defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court thus, expressly stipulates that defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
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the answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the place
of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience
to the parties, rather than to restrict their access to the
courts. In other words, unless the defendant seasonably
objects, any action may be tried by a court despite its
being the improper venue" (BPI Family Savings Bank,
Inc. v. Spouses Benedicto & Yujuico, G.R. No. 175796,
July 22, 2015).
Some specific distinctions between jurisdiction (over the
subject matter) and venue (Bar 2006)
1. Jurisprudence differentiates jurisdiction from venue
as follows:
(a) Jurisdiction refers to the authority of the court
to hear and determine a case; venue refers to the place
where the case is to be heard or tried;
(b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law;
venue, of procedural law (Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., G.R.
No. 195834, November 9, 2016). A wrong venue is a mere
procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional defect (Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.,
G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017).
(c) Jurisdiction, being a matter of substantive law,
cannot be waived by the parties; venue may be waived
if not invoked either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer (City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone
Authority, supra). One Court decision clearly declares:
''Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may
be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the
parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as
it relates to the place of trial" (Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro,
324 SCRA 591, 609);
(d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be
conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the
act or agreement of the parties (Nocum v. Tan, 470 SCRA
639, 645; See also 20 Am Jur, supra, §89; Mendiola v.
Court of Appeals, 677 SCRA 27, 50-51);
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
(e) Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings since it is conferred
by law, although a party may be barred from raising it on
the ground of estoppel (La'o v. Republic, 479 SCRA 439,
446).
Before, subject to the omnibus motion rule, the objection
to an improper venue must be raised either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer because, as a rule, under Sec. 1 of
Rule 9, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. Where the
improper venue was already apparent at the time the motion
to dismiss was filed, the objection to venue should be raised
in the motion to dismiss pursuant to the omnibus motion
rule; otherwise, such objection shall be deemed waived. The
defense of improper venue is not one of those defenses which
are not waived even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer (For further readings, see City of Lapu-Lapu v.
Philippine Economic Zone Authority, supra).
The 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure now prohibits motion to dismiss based on the ground
of improper venue. The rule now is to raise the improper venue
as an affirmative defense in the answer. Failure to raise the
improper venue at the earliest opportunity shall constitute a
waiver thereof. The court shall motu proprio resolve the same
within 30 calendar days from the filing of the answer (See Sec.
12, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
Basic venue analysis
1. The rules on venue do not give a plaintiff the freedom
to bring suits wherever he chooses·. The venue of a case is
circumscribed by specific and definite rules to ensure a fair
procedure by preventing undue harassment of a defendant by
the plaintiff. Such rules are neither circuitous nor complicated.
In order to know the venue of a particular action, the basic
and initial step is to determine if the action is personal or
real. If it is personal, the venue is deemed transitory and
thus, generally depends upon the residences of the parties.
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If it is real, the venue is local and, thus, generally, the venue
is the place where the property or any portion of the same is
situated.
2. "The determinants of whether an action is of a real
or personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and
relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to
or possession of real property, or an interest therein x x x.
In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as
personal actions. Such actions may include those brought for
the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of
some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to person
or property xx x" (Racpan v. Barroga-Haigh, G.R. No. 234499,
June 6, 2018).
Venue in personal actions (Bar 2011; 2017)
1. The venue in personal actions is where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of
the plaintiff (Sec. 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court, Briones v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015). Personal
actions are often referred to as transitory because its venue
'moves' depending on the residences of the parties.
There are cases in which there are several parties and
some of them are merely formal or nominal. Sec. 2 of Rule
4 instructs that when there is more than one plaintiff or
defendant in a personal action, the residences of the principal
parties should be the basis for determining the proper venue.
The word, 'principal' has been used in order to prevent the
plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or
defendant as the venue. Such party would not be expected to
exhibit the degree of interest in actively participating in the
litigation (See Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096,
August 22, 2008).
2. If the defendant is a non-resident, the venue is where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the non-resident defendant may be found, at the election of the
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
plaintiff (Sec. 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC; Briones v. Court of Appeals, supra; United
Alloy Philippines Corporation v. United Coconut Planters
Bank, G.R. No. 179257, November 23, 2015). Example: Thomas
Reed, a Canadian tourist, billeted in a hotel in Quezon City,
is sued for damages by a restaurant owner residing in Manila.
Quezon City is a possible venue. It is the place where the
defendant may be found. The other possible venue is Manila,
the residence of the plaintiff.
3. The term "resides" as employed in the rule on
venue on personal actions means the place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant,
as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning (See Dangwa Transportation Company
v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 1977). Example:
Mr. DD was born in Cebu City. It is in the same place where
he raised a family. He applied for a job and was hired by a
company in Manila where he lives in an apartment adjacent
to his place of work. For purposes of venue, in an action for a
sum of money, Manila is his residence.
4. The residence of a domestic corporation is the place,
within the Philippines, where its principal office is located.
Jurisprudence holds: "A corporation has no residence
in the same sense in which this term is applied to a natural
person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal
office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation
(Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 526 [1916]
Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillo, 19 SCRA 379 [19671).
The Corporation Code precisely requires each corporation
to specify in its articles of incorporation the "place where
the principal office of the corporation is to be located which
must be within the Philippines" (Sec. 14[3]). The purpose of
this requirement is to fix the residence of a corporation in a
definite place, instead of allowing it to be ambulatory" (Davao
Light and Power Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
111685, August 20, 2001). Thus, if the principal office of ABC
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Corporation is located in Makati City, but its branch offices
are situated in Manila and Quezon City, the latter two places
cannot be proper v~nues in a suit by or against the corporation,
such places not bemg the locations of the principal office.
5. Actions for damages and actions to collect a sum of
money _must be filed in either the residence of the plaintiff or
the res1d~nce of the defendant, at the election of the plaintiff.
Such act10ns are personal actions. Hence, an action for
the coll_ection of_Pl million filed by a resident of Lingayen,
Pangasman agamst a resident of San Fernando, La Union
may be filed in either place, at the option of the plaintiff. Ba;
1998
6. Assume that two cars, Car AA and Car AA, collided in
a _highway within the territorial jurisdiction of Mandaluyong
City. The owner of Car AA, a resident of Makati City wants
to file a complaint for damages against the owner of Car BB
a resident of Manila. The complaint may be filed either i~
Ma~ati City or Manila at the election of the plaintiff. The
act10n cannot be instituted in Mandaluyong City since it is
not the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant.
Venue in real actions (Bar 2009; 2018)
1. Actions affecting title to, or possession of, real
property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in
the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated
(Sec. 1, Rule 4, Rules of Court, Briones u. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015).
The rule, in its simplified form, means that if the action
is real,_ the action is local, as opposed to transitory, and the
ven~e 1s the place where the real property involved, or any
portion thereof, is situated (Sec. 1, Rule 4, Rules of Court). In
a real action, the residences of the parties are irrelevant to the
choice of venue.
2. Actions to recover possession or ownership of real
property are real actions and must be filed in the place where
the real property is located. Actions for unlawful detainer
forcible entry, accion publiciana, accion reiuindicatoria, and
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
for reconveyance of real property, are real actions and must
be filed in the place where the subject property is situated.
The same applies to partition of real property and judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Example: Mr. PP, a
resident of Manila, files an action for reconveyance of a real
property located in Makati City, against Mr. DD, a resident of
Pasay City. The proper venue is Makati City, the place where
the property, subject of the action, is located. Manila and
Pasay City are not proper venues.
An action to recover possession of the leased real property
and for the payment of accrued rentals must be filed in Davao
City where the property is located because the action is a real
action. The primary purpose of the action is the recovery of
possession of the real property and the payment of accrued
rentals is merely incidental to the main case. Bar 1987; 1991;
2008.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced
and tried in the municipal court of the municipality or city
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated (Sec. 1, Rule 4, Rules of Court). Bar 2013; 2016
3. In determining venue, one must inquire into the
primary purpose of the action, not the title or heading given
to such action. Thus, where the complaint was captioned as
for the "declaration of the nullity'' of a deed of absolute sale
involving a real property located in Makati City, the venue
for such action is unquestionably the proper court of Makati
City if the action is instituted primarily for the recovery of
the subject property (See Latorre u. Latorre, 617 SCRA 88,
97). However, where the action for the nullification of a deed
of sale is not intended for the reco:very or reconveyance of
real property, since title to the property has not passed to
the respondent, but solely for the annulment of a contract, it
is a personal action that may be filed in the court where the
plaintiff or the defendant resides (Racpan u. Barroga-Haigh,
G.R. No. 234499, June 6, 2018).
4. Where the action is for specific performance and does
not involve recovery of real property, the action is a personal
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action. The action, therefore, may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff
(Spouses Saraza v. Francisco, G.R. No. 198718, November 27,
2013). Where, however, a complaint is denominated as one for
specific performance but, nonetheless, prays for the issuance
of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, to enable the plaintiff to
acquire ownership thereof, its primary objective and nature is
one to recover the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a
real action (Gochan v. Gochan, 372 SCRA 256, 264). The venue
of the action, therefore, is the place where the real property
involved is situated. Bar 2012
5. An action to recover the deficiency after the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgaged is a
personal action, for it does not affect title to, possession of or
any interest in real property (BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.
v. Yujuico, G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015). The action is for
the recovery of money, hence, a personal action. The venue is
the residence of the plaintiff or the residence of the defendant
at the election of the plaintiff.
6. In a case, the plaintiff sought the return of the
portion of the subject property or its value on the basis of
his co-ownership thereof. The Court held that while the
complaint of the petitioner was denominated as one for
recovery of the property or its value, the said complaint is
actually anchored on his claim of ownership over a portion
of the subject property. Hence, his alternative claim for the
value of the property is still dependent on the determination
of ownership, which is an action affecting title to or possession
of real property or an interest therein. Clearly, petitioner's
claim is a real action which should be filed in the court where
the property lies, which in this case, is the RTC of Morong,
Rizal. In this jurisdiction, emphasized the Court, "we adhere
to the principle that the nature of an action is determined by
the allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title
or heading. It is also a settled rule that what determines the
venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the
case x x x" (Samson v. Spouses Gabor, G.R. No. 182970, July
23, 2014).
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. An action to annul a deed of real estate mortgage
filed by the mortgagor is a personal action. Since the mortgagor
is the owner of the property mortgaged, there is no claim of
ownership involved. The venue of the action is the residence
of the plaintiff or that of the defendant at the election of
the plaintiff. Where the property has already been sold on
foreclosure and there has been a change in the ownership of
the land, an action to annul the foreclosure sale is obviously to
recover ownership of the property. Hence, the action becomes
a real action. The venue to annul the foreclosure sale is the
place where the real property is located. Bar 2016
Venue of actions against non-residents affecting the
personal status of the plaintiff; actions affecting property of
the non-resident in the Philippines
1. The rule on venue under Sec. 3 of Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court, applies when:
a. any of the defendants is a non-resident and, at
the same time, not found in the Philippines; and
b. the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff; or
c. the action affects any property of the non-
resident defendant located in the Philippines.
2. The action in the above situations may be commenced
and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides,
or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or
found (Sec. 3, Rule 4, Rules of Court).
3. Under Sec. 3 of Rule 4, if an action for partition of
real property is filed by the plaintiff, a resident of Manila,
naming his co-owner brothers, all residents of Los Angeles,
California, as defendants, and involving a property located in
Makati City, the plaintiff may file the action in Makati City,
the place where the property is situated. However, the tenor
of the rule, as written, appears to give the plaintiff a choice of
venue. This may be liberally interpreted to allow the plaintiff
to commence and have the action tried either in Manila, the
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place where he resides, or in Makati City, the place where the
property is situated.
Comment: Unless the Court declares otherwise, it is
submitted that a liberal interpretation of Sec. 3 of Rule 4
- giving the plaintiff a choice of venue in actions affecting
any property of a non-resident defendant who is not found in
the Philippines - would well serve the interest of a resident
plaintiff, rather than of a possible absconding non-resident
defendant.
Take the example of a plaintiff, a resident of Manila, who
files an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage, instead of
filing an action for a sum of money, against the defendant,
a former Philippine resident and now a permanent U.S.
resident. The defendant, who refuses to pay the debt, leaves the
country with no intent of personally submitting himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Assume that the property mortgaged
is situated in the most southern part of the Philippines. A
liberal interpretation of the rule would save the plaintiff from
going through the rigors of travelling to a distant place just to
file and prosecute the action. A contrary interpretation would
lead to an unfortunate situation in which a defendant, who
refuses to pay a just debt, would have the capacity to cause so
much inconvenience to an aggrieved plaintiff.
When the rules on venue do not apply
The rules on venue are not applicable m any of the
following cases:
a. Where a specific rule or law provides otherwise.
Examples: (i) A quo warranto proceeding commenced
by the Solicitor General and filed, not with the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, is to be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. This particular rule
does not consider the residence of the respondent (Sec. 7,
Rule 66, Rules of Court). (ii) A petition for a continuing
writ of mandamus if filed with the Regional Trial Court,
other than with the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court,
shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect
or omission occurred (Sec. 2, Rule 8, Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases). (iii) The civil (as well as
criminal) action for damages in written defamation shall
be filed with the RTC of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense. However, where one of
the offended parties is a public officer, whose office is in
the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action shall be filed with the RTC of the City
of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous
article is printed and first published. In case such public
officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the
action shall be filed with the RTC of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published. In case one of the offended parties is a private
individual, the action shall be filed with the RTC of the
city or province where he actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published (Art. 360, Revised
Penal Code).
b. Where the parties have validly agreed in
writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive
venue thereof (Sec. 4, Rule 4, Rules of Court).
Stipulations on venue (Bar 1997; 2001; 2012)
1. The parties may agree on a specific venue which
could be in a place where neither of them resides (Universal
Robina Corporation v. Lim, 535 SCRA 95, 99). In real actions,
like unlawful detainer, the parties may stipulate on a venue
other than the place where the real property is situated (Union
Bank of the Philippines v. Maunlad Homes, Inc., 678 SCRA
539, 550, August 15, 2012).
The parties may stipulate on the venue as long as the
agreement is (a) in writing, (b) made before the filing of the
action, and (c) exclusive as to the venue (Sec. 4[b],Rule 4, Rules
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of Court). While the first two requisites rarely pose a problem,
the third has been the source of controversy in the past.
2. Written stipulations as to venue, according to the
Court, are either restrictive (mandatory) or permissive. In
interpreting stipulations, inquiry must be made as to whether
or not the agreement is restrictive in the sense that the suit
may be filed only in the place agreed upon or merely permissive
in that the parties may file their suits not only in the place
agreed upon but also in the places fixed by the rules (Supena
v. De la Rosa, 267 SCRA 1, 11; See also Ley Construction and
Development Corporation v. Sedano, G.R. No. 222711, August
23, 2017; Planters Development Bank v. Ramos, G.R. No.
228617, September 20, 2017). In other words, where the venue
stipulated upon is restrictive or mandatory, the complaint is
to be filed only in the stipulated venue.
Where the stipulated venue is merely permissive, the
complaint may be filed in the place designated by the Rules
or in the place stipulated. The latter place, thus, becomes
a permissible venue in addition to those provided for by
the Rules. This means that "in the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely
an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to
a specified place" (See Planters Development Bank v. Ramos,
G.R. No. 228617, September 20, 2017).
The Court, in one case, clarified:
"The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue,
as held by th[e] Court in the vintage case of Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, (230 SCRA 413, 420)
is that while they are considered valid and enforceable,
venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede
the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules
of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words.
They should be considered merely as an agreement or
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If
the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there
must be accompanying language clearly and categorically
expressing their purpose and design that actions between
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
them be litigated only at the place named by them."
(Pacific Consultants v. Schonfeld, 516 SCRA 209, 229;
See also Ley Construction and Development Corporation
v. Sedano, G.R. No. 222711, August 23, 2017).
3. It must be emphasized that the mere stipulation on
the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude
parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must
be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence
of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be
deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not
as limiting venue to the specified place (Spouses Lantin v.
Lantion, 499 SCRA 718, 722; See also Ley Construction and
Development Corporation v. Sedano, G.R. No. 222711, August
23, 2017). Thus, if the plaintiff, in an action for damages,
resides in Quezon City while the defendant resides in Makati
City, and the agreed venue is Pasay City which, by the terms
of the said agreement, is not exclusive, the venue of the action
may be Quezon City, Makati City or Pasay City, at the election
of the plaintiff. Pasay City would simply be considered as an
additional, not an exclusive, venue.
On the other hand, a stipulation that "any suit arising
from this contract shall be filed only in Quezon City," is
exclusive in character and clear enough as to preclude the filing
of the action in any other place. In this case, the rule that the
residences of the parties are to be considered in determining
the venue of personal actions will not apply because of the
restrictive tenor of the stipulated venue.
4. How about a stipulation that the "parties agree to
sue and be sued in the courts of Manila"?
This was actually the stipulation in a suit subject of the
landmark case of Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, 30 SCRA
187, 191. This stipulation was held not to be restrictive or
exclusive to prevent the filing of the suit in the places provided
for by the rules, i.e., in the residence of the plaintiff or of the
defendant. According to the Court, the plain meaning of the
said provision is that the parties merely consented to be sued
in the courts of Manila considering that there are no qualifying
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or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila, and
Manila alone, is the agreed venue. It simply is permissive a1:d
the parties did not waive their right to pursue the remedy m
the places specifically mentioned in the Rules of Court.
5. The Polytrade doctrine was further applied in
the case of Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 267 SCRA 759, 776, 777, which analyzed the
various jurisprudence rendered after the Polytrade case. In
Unimasters, it was ruled that a stipulation stating that "all
suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed within the
proper Courts of Quezon City" is only permissive and does not
limit the venue to the Quezon City courts.
As the Court explained:
"x x x [U]nless the parties make very clear, by
employing categorical and suitably limiting language,
that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid
only and exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard
the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not
to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely
permissive, or complementary of said rule. The fact that in
their agreement the parties specify only one of the venues
mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions different
from those specified by said rule, does not, without more,
suffice to characterize the agreement as a restrictive one.
There must, to repeat, be accompanying language clearly
and categorically expressing their purpose and design
that actions between them be litigated only at the place
named by them, regardless of the general precepts of Rule
4xxx."
6. The following stipulations were, likewise, treated as
merely permissive and did not limit the venue to the stipulated
place:
a. "x x x The agreed venue for such action is
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines" (Mangila v. Court of
Appeals, 387 SCRA 162, 174-175).
b. "In case of litigation hereunder, venue shall be
in the City Court or Court of First Instance of Manila as
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
the case may be for determination of any and all questions
arising thereunder" (Philippine Bank of Communications
v. Trazo, 500 SCRA 242, 247-248).
c. "It is hereby agreed that in case of foreclosure
of this mortgage under Act 3135, as amended, and
Presidential Decree No. 385, the auction sale shall be held
at the capital of the province, if the property is within the
territorial jurisdiction of the province concerned, or shall
be held in the city, if the property is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the city concerned" (Langkaan Realty
Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 347
SCRA 542, 555-556).
d. "All court litigation procedures shall be
conducted in the appropriate courts of Valenzuela City,
Metro Manila" (Auction in Malinta, Inc. v. Luyaben, 515
SCRA 569, 575).
7. Examples of words with restrictive meanings are:
"only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court
save-," ''particularly," "nowhere else but/ except-," or words
of equal import (Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v.
Schonfeld, 516 SCRA 209, 229).
Another example is: "In the event of suits arising out of
or in connection with this mortgage and/or the promissory
note/s secured by this mortgage, the parties hereto agree to
bring their causes of action exclusively in the proper court of
Makati, Metro Manila or at such other venue chosen by the
Mortgagee, the Mortgagor waiving for this purpose any other
venue" (Spouses Lantin v. Lantion, 499 SCRA 718, 723).
Cases like Hoechst Philippines, Inc. v. Torres, 83 SCRA
297, and Bautista v. De Borja, 18 SCRA 474, and other rulings
contrary to the Polytrade doctrine must be deemed superseded
by current decisions on venue.
In particular, the 1978 case of Hoechst Philippines, Inc.
v. Torres, 83 SCRA 297, 301, involved the stipulation that "in
case of any litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of
action shall be in the competent courts of the Province of Rizal."
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r CHAPTER II
The Supreme Court construed this agreement as sufficient to
limit the venue to the proper court of Rizal and, thus, exclusive
in its import. However, in Supena v. De la Rosa, 267 SCRA
1, 14, it was ruled that Hoechst had been rendered obsolete
by recent jurisprudence applying the doctrine enunciated in
Polytrade (See also Auction in Malinta, Inc. v. Luyaben, 515
SCRA 569, 576).
8. Where the venue stipulated in the deed ofreal estate
mortgage provides for a venue different from a subsequent
restructuring agreement of the loan subject of the mortgage,
and the subsequent agreement was entered into to modify the
entire loan obligation, including the mortgage, the restrictive
venue in the restructuring agreement should prevail. Since
Makati was the exclusive venue agreed upon, Makati is
the proper venue (Paglaum Management & Development
Corporation v. Union Bank of the Philippines, 673 SCRA 506,
513-516).
A restrictive stipulation on venue is not binding when the
validity of the contract is assailed
The instant case arose from a complaint for nullity
of a mortgage contract, promissory note, loan agreement,
foreclosure of mortgage, cancellation of a transfer certificate
of title, and damages against a lending company. In his
complaint, filed in Manila, the plaintiff alleged that he is the
owner of a real property which was sought to be foreclosed
by the defendant despite his not having contracted any loans
from the defendant. He claimed that he has been working
and living in Vietnam since 2007. Essentially, he assailed the
validity of the foregoing contracts claiming his signature to be
forged. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of improper venue. The motion relied on the venue stipulation
in the assailed contracts that all legal actions arising out of
the same shall be brought only in the proper courts of Makati
City.
The Court held that in cases where the complaint assails
only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a written
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
179
instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation
contained therein shall still be binding on the parties, and
thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground
of improper venue. However, a complaint directly assailing the
validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by
the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should
be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue. To
be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of
this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when
it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in
which such stipulation is contained. The plaintiff, therefore,
ruled the Court, is not bound to file the action in Makati City
(Briones v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 204444, January 14,
2015).
Venue in a contract of adhesion
1. The Court had ruled that contracts of adhesion might
be occasionally struck down only if there was a showing that
the dominant bargaining party left the weaker party without
any choice as to be "completely deprived of an opportunity
to bargain effectively'' (Prieto v. Court of Appeals, 673 SCRA
371).
2. Venue stipulations in a contract of adhesion follow
the above rule. At issue in an early case was the validity of the
condition written on a passenger ticket issued by a shipping
company. The condition reads:
XXX
"14. It is hereby agreed and understood that any
and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions
of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be
filed in the competent courts in the ·city of Cebu."
Considering the state of the shipping industry and the
circumstances under which a contract of adhesion is prepared,
the Court considered the condition as "subversive of public
policy on transfers of venue of actions. For, although venue
may be changed or transferred from one province to another
by agreement of the parties in writing xx x, such an agreement
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will not be held valid where it practically negates the action
of the claimants, such as the private respondents herein. The
philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue
of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his
witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. Considering the
expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City
would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would
most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition
will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice" (Sweet
Lines, Inc. v. Teves, 83 SCRA 361, 372).
Complementary-contracts-construed-together rule
The "complementary-contracts-construed-together" rule
is one which mandates that the provisions of an accessory
contract must be read in its entirety and together with the
principal contract between the parties. The basis of this
rule is Art. 137 4 of the Civil Code which provides that, "The
various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result
from all of them taken jointly."
The rule is exemplified by one case where the plaintiff
sought to foreclose the chattel mortgage by filing a complaint
for replevin with damages against the defendants before
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City. After service of
summons, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of improper venue based on a provision in the
promissory note which states that, "all legal actions arising
out of this note or in connection with the chattels subject
hereof shall only be brought in or submitted to the proper
court in Makati City, Philippines."
The plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss and argued
that venue was properly laid in Dagupan City where it has
a branch office based on a provision in the deed of chattel
mortgage which states that "in case of litigation arising out
of the transaction that gave rise to this contract, complete
jurisdiction is given the proper court of the city of Makati or
any proper court within the province of Rizal, or any court in
the city, or province where the holder/mortgagee has a branch
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
office, waiving for this purpose any proper venue."
The controversy stems from the conflicting provisions on
venue in the promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage.
Consequently, the decisive issue is the correct interpretation
of the venue provisions in the two contracts.
The defendant argues that the promissory note should
prevail over the deed of chattel mortgage because this is
the principal contract being sued upon while the deed of
chattel mortgage merely accompanies the promissory note.
The plaintiff counters that the alternative venues provided
under the deed of chattel mortgage may not be disregarded as
meaningless verbiage.
The Court, in deciding the case, conceded that there is no
dispute that the words "shall only" preceding the designation
of venue in the promissory note, standing alone, is mandatory
and restrictive. However, the deed of chattel mortgage
executed to secure the loan obligation provides alternative
venues. The Court posed a question: "Should we disregard
the venue provision in the deed of chattel mortgage as mere
surplusage as contended by petitioners?"
The Court answered its question in the negative holding
that the provisions of an accessory contract must be read in
its entirety and together with the principal contract between
the parties. The plaintiff, hence, is not barred from filing the
case in Dagupan City where private respondent has a branch
office as provided for in the deed of chattel mortgage (Rigor v.
Consolidated Orix Leasing and Finance Corporation, G.R. No.
136423, August 20, 2002).
Adopted illustrations
1. Plaintiff resides in Manila. Defendant resides in
Quezon City. The written contract stipulates that any suit
arising from a violation of the contract "shall be filed only in
Pasay City." Plaintiff sues Defendant for damages arising
from the alleged breach of the same contract. The action is
filed in Quezon City. Is the venue improper? Answer: The
venue is improper. The stipulation to file the action "only
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in Pasay City" is restrictive and, therefore, has the effect of
making Pasay City the sole venue of the action.
Assuming that the stipulation provides ... "shall be filed
in Pasay City," without any restrictive language employed in
the agreement. The action for breach of contract is filed ~n
Quezon City. Is the venue improper? Answer: The venue 1s
proper. The stipulation, "shall be filed in Pasay City" merely
operates to add Pasay City to the regular venues of Manila and
Quezon City and does not preclude the filing of the action in
either the residence of Plaintiff or the residence of Defendant,
at the election of Plaintiff. Bar 1997
2. Defendant, a resident of Angeles City, borrowed
P300,000.00 from Plaintiff, a resident of Pasay City under
an agreement that stipulated that the parties "agree to sue
and be sued in the City of Manila." Is Plaintiff precluded
from filing the action either in Angeles City or Pasay City?
Answer: He is not precluded. The stipulation on venue is not
an exclusive stipulation and its effect is merely to add Manila
as an additional venue. He may even file the action in Manila
which became an added option by virtue of the stipulation.
The same conclusion would be reached had the stipulation
been: "Venue for all suits arising from this contract shall be
the courts in Quezon City." The action may be filed also either
in Angeles City or in Pasay City. It may also be filed in Quezon
City. Bar 1997
If the parties above failed to stipulate on the venue in the
loan agreement, the action may be filed either in Angeles City
or Pasay City, at the election of the plaintiff. The venue of a
personal action, such as one to recover a debt under a loan of
money, is a personal action. Bar 1997
When court may make a motu proprio dismissal based on
improper venue
1. The court may, however, effect a motu proprio
dismissal of the complaint based on improper venue in an
action covered by the rules on summary procedure. In this
CHAPTER II 183
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
type of action, the court may motu proprio dismiss a case,
from (a) an examination of the allegations in the complaint,
and (b) such evidence as may be attached thereto, on any of
the grounds apparent therefrom for the dismissal of a civil
action. The dismissal may be made outright, which means
that the court may do so without need for waiting for the filing
of a motion to dismiss. These grounds include lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, improper venue, lack of legal capacity to
sue, litis pendentia, res judicata, prescription, failure to state
a cause of action, non-submission of a certification against
forum shopping, and lack of compliance with a condition
precedent such as absence of barangay conciliation, among
others. (Sec. A[4}, Rule IIL Rules on Expedited Procedures in
the First Level Courts).
2. In small claims cases, after the court determines
that the action falls under the rules for such cases, it may,
from an examination of the allegations in the Statement of
Claim and such evidence attached thereto, by itself, dismiss
the case outright on any of the following grounds:
(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(b) There is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause;
(c) The action is barred by prior judgment;
(d) The claim is barred by the statute oflimitations;
(e) The court has no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant;
(f) Venue is improperly laid;
(g) Plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(h) The Statement of Claim/s states no cause of
action;
(i) That a condition precedent for filing the claim
has not been complied with; and
184 CML PROCEDURE CHAPTER II 185
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES JURISDICTION AND VENUE
VOLUME I

G) Plaintiff failed to submit the required affidavits cases where venue is also jurisdictional. It is important to
(Sec. 9, Rule N, Rules on Expedited Procedures in the remember that, in a civil case, the concept of venue is entirely
First Level Courts). distinct from the concept of jurisdiction.
3. In actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
Authority of the Supreme Court in relation to venue of cases
the court may dismiss the case outright after examination
of the complaint and such evidence attached thereto. The To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the Supreme Court may
dismissal may be based on any of the grounds for the dismissal order a change of venue (Sec. 5[4], Art. VIIL Constitution of
of a civil action. A motion to dismiss is not required (Sec. 5, the Philippines). Since the constitutional provision does not
Rule 70, Rules of Court). distinguish, this rule could ref er to both civil and criminal
cases.
Denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue; no
appeal -oOo-
Improper venue when raised as an affirmative defense, if
denied, shall not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration
or petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, but may be
among the matters to be raised on appeal after a judgment on
the merits (Sec. l 2[e],Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).

Improper venue is not jurisdictional; waiver of improper

venue
Be reminded that if the facts of the problem show that the
venue is improper, it would not be procedurally correct to file
a motion to dismiss anchored on lack of jurisdiction because
venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction in a civil case. Hence,
if a case for unlawful detainer is filed with MTC San Pablo
City, Laguna when it should have been filed with MTC Cavite
City because the property subject of the action is located in
Cavite City, the action filed in San Pablo City, Laguna may
be dismissed by the court on the ground of improper venue
but not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because every
MTC has jurisdiction over cases of unlawful detainer. It would
be error to inject the concept of territorial jurisdiction in the
analysis of the case. Jurisdiction over the territory is irrelevant
in a civil case. Territorial jurisdiction applies only in criminal
--
Chapter Ill
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS,
AND PARTIES
I. CAUSE OF ACTION (Rule 2)
Importance of a cause of action
In ordinary civil actions, having a cause of action would
be vital if one were to seek the aid of the courts. Without a
cause of action, one cannot, as a rule, seek judicial relief for a
violation of one's rights. This is because Sec. 1, Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court requires that every ordinary civil action must
be based on a cause of action (Turner v. Lorenzo Shipping
Corporation, 636 SCRA 13, 30, November 24, 2010; Anchor
Savings Bank v. Furigay, 693 SCRA 384, 395, March 13,
2013).
Meaning and elements of a cause of action
1. A cause of action is the act or omission by which
a party violates the rights of another (Sec. 2, Rule 2, Rules
of Court, Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168406,
January 14, 2015; CCC Insurance Corporation v. Kawasaki
Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 156162, June 22, 2015).
2. As applied to ordinary civil actions, the following are
the elements of a cause of action:
(a) A legal right in favor of the plaintiff;
(b) A correlative legal duty of the defendant to
respect such rights; and
186
CHAPTER III 187
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
(c) An act or omission by such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting
injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from
the defendant (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 185590, December 3, 2014; See also Ramiscal, Jr.
v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213716, October 10,
2017).
3. Although the first two elements may exist, a
cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of the last
element, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action
in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief
(Turner v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, 636 SCRA 13, 30;
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Ley Construction
and Development Corporation, ibid.). The last element, as
emphasized by jurisprudence, is the violation of the right of
the plaintiff. Without such a violation, a cause of action as
defined in Sec. 1 of Rule 2 will not arise.
The need to state the cause of action
1. For a complaint to be procedurally acceptable,
merely having a cause of action against the defendant is not
sufficient. The complaint must also clearly state that cause
of action. This means that all the elements of the cause of
action required by substantive law must clearly appear from
a reading of the complaint. To avoid a possible early dismissal
of the complaint, the simple dictum to be followed is: "If you
have a cause of action, then by all means, state it! State all the
elements of your cause of action in your complaint!"
Jurisprudence holds that, "A complaint states a cause
of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3)
essential elements of a cause of action xx x. If the allegations of
the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements,
the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action" (Westmont
Bank [now United Overseas Bank Phils.] v. Funai Philippines
Corporation, G.R. No. 175733, July 8, 2015).
-------------~------------
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188 CML PROCEDURE
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Take note that the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure now prohibits motion to dismiss based on
the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action. The rule now is to raise the said ground as an
affirmative defense in the answer. Failure to raise the ground
of failure to state a cause of action at the earliest opportunity
shall constitute a waiver thereof. The court shall motu proprio
resolve the same within 30 calendar days from the filing of the
answer (See Sec. 12, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Put simply, the complaint should completely spell
out the elements of a particular cause of action. For instance,
if in an action for a sum of money arising from a loan, the
complaint fails to allege that the debt is due and demandable,
there is a failure to state a cause of action. Even if it so alleged
that the debt has become due and demandable, if the complaint
contains no allegation that there was a prior demand upon the
debtor to pay and such demand went unheeded, there is also
a failure to state a cause of action. This is so, even if the plain
truth is that the debt is due, a demand to pay has been made,
and was not heeded.
In actions for forcible entry, for instance, three requisites
have to be alleged for the complaint to state a cause of action
and for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction. First,
the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the
property. Second, he must also assert that he was deprived
of the possession of the property either by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, he must file the action
within one year from the deprivation of possession or from the
time he learned of his deprivation of physical possession of the
land or building (De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 51 O SCRA
103, 115; See also Baluyo v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 197058,
October 14, 2015; Diaz v. Spouses Punzalan, G.R. No. 203075,
March 16, 2016). Bar 2013 Even ifit be true that the plaintiff
has a cause of action for forcible entry, if he, in his complaint,
fails to allege the essential elements of a forcible entry case,
his complaint will fail to state a cause of action.
J......__
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CHAPTER III 189
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
A complaint for unlawful detainer, in order to sufficiently
allege a cause of action, should recite the following in the
complaint: (a) the defendant's initial possession of the
property was lawful, either by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff; (b) eventually, such possession became illegal
upon the plaintiffs notice to the defendant of the termination
of the latter's right of possession; (c) thereafter, the defendant
remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment of the property; and (d) the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment within one year from the last demand
to vacate the property (Diaz v. Spouses Punzalan, ibid.).
Be reminded that what determines whether the cause
of action is one for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, is the
nature of defendant's entry to the land. If the entry is illegal,
then the cause of action is one for forcible entry. If, on the
other hand, the entry is legal, but thereafter possession
becomes illegal, the cause of action is one for unlawful
detainer (Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. v. Faith in
Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc., G.R. No. 191527, August
22, 2016). It must be added that the actions for unlawful
detainer and forcible entry are governed by the rules on
summary procedure. Their summary character is designed to
quicken the determination of possession de facto. They are not
proper to resolve ownership of the property and if an issue on
ownership arises in such actions, any pronouncement made
on ownership is provisional in nature and only provisionally
to resolve the issue of possession (Echanes v. Spouses Hailar,
G.R. No. 203880, August 10, 2016).
If the unlawful detainer case is based on the alleged
violation of the terms and conditions of the lease agreement
or failure to pay the rentals, the demand should not be "to
pay or vacate," but should be to pay and vacate (Sec. 2, Rule
70, Rules of Court). The first type of demand does not give
rise to an unlawful detainer case since it is, in essence, an
action for a sum of money. So if the amount of rentals to be
collected is P900,000.00, the action should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the amount
demanded. On the other hand, if the demand is "to pay and
 190 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
vacate," the cause of action is one for unlawful detainer and
should be filed with the Municipal Trial Court. Thus, even
if the complaint is captioned, "Collection of a Sum of Money
with Damages," the action is actually for unlawful detainer
where the demand made by the complaint is for the defendant
"to pay and vacate" (Suggested reading: Barrazona v. RTC of
Baguio, 486 SCRA 555, 561). Note that, at the time the action
was filed, the amount is still within the jurisdiction of the
RTC. Bar 2011
Similarly, if the unlawful detainer case is anchored upon
the failure of the defendant to comply with the conditions of
the lease, the demand must not be "to comply ... or vacate,"
but should be "to comply ... and vacate." The first type of
demand is not one for unlawful detainer but one for specific
performance.
Sec. 2 of Rule 70 (Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer)
declares:
"SEC. 2 .... Unless otherwise stipulated, such action
by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to
pay or comply with the conditions of the lease AND to
vacate is made upon the lessee ... " (Emphasis ours).
The test on whether or not the complaint states a cause of
action
1. In determining whether an initiatory pleading
states a cause of action, "the test is as follows: Admitting
the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer?" To be taken into
account are only the material allegations in the complaint;
extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde
are not considered (Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation, 504
SCRA 126, 131-132; See also Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Equitable
PCI Bank [now Banco De Oro-EPCI, Inc.], G.R. No. 190432,
April 25, 2017; Trillanes IV v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No.
223451, March 14, 2018). In determining whether or not a
cause of action is sufficiently stated in the complaint, the
statements in the complaint are to be considered. It is error
}
CHAPTER III 191
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
for the court to take cognizance of external facts or to hold
preliminary hearings to determine its existence (Diaz v. Diaz,
331 SCRA 302, 316). The sufficiency of the statement of the
cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint and
its existence may be determined only by the allegations in
the complaint, consideration of other facts being proscribed
and any attempt to prove extraneous circumstances not being
allowed (Viewmaster Construction Corporation v. Roxas,
335 SCRA 540, 546; for further readings, see Trillanes IV v.
Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018).
2. The principle, that other matters aside from the
allegations in the complaint are not to be considered, is not,
however, a hard and fast rule.
In some cases, the Court considered the documents
attached to the complaint to truly determine sufficiency of the
cause of action (Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association
v. Nicolas, 567 SCRA 540, 552). The court may consider, in
addition to the complaint, the appended annexes or documents,
other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records
(Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation, supra). The reason is
that such annexes are considered parts of the complaint (Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 135, 140;
Alberto v. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 756).
The case of Alberto v. Court of Appeals, ibid., 768-769 is
enlightening:
"It is only logical for the lower court to consider
all these pleadings in determining whether there was a
sufficient cause of action xx x So long as those attached
pleadings are procedurally responsive to the complaint,
then they may be considered in evaluating the sufficiency
of the cause of action in the co:qiplaint. x x x Strictly
limiting the evaluation of the merits of the complaint to
its averments or allegations would be too constricting an
interpretation of the rule. It must be remembered that
the complaint itself is accompanied by documentary
evidence attached as annexes. The responsive pleadings,
in addition, though not attachments to the complaint,
clarify its merits since they are already part of the records
of the case and should, therefore, be considered."
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192 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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3. The consideration of the documents attached to the
complaint is echoed in the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. The judicial determination now shifts its
consideration from ultimate facts to evidentiary facts.
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of a cause of action
1. A fair reading of jurisprudence shows that a failure
to state a cause of action is not the same as an absence or lack
of a cause of action. Note that under Rule 8, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, the ground for dismissal, in relation to
a cause of action, is not "lack or absence of a cause of action."
The ground is that "the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action" (Sec. 12[5], Rule 8, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC; San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 288 SCRA 115, 126). This provision points merely to
a 'failure to state a cause of action' and not a 'lack or absence
of a cause of action.'
2. The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action
does not mean that the plaintiff "lacks a cause of action.'' It
only means that the complaint's allegations are insufficient
for the court to know that the rights of the plaintiff were
violated by the defendant. Thus, even if it be actually true that
the defendant violated the rights of the plaintiff, causing the
latter to incur damage or injury, if the elements constituting
such violation are not set forth in the complaint, the pleading
will be deemed to have state no cause of action.
3. Jurisprudence aptly explains that failure to state
a cause of action is different from lack of a cause of action.
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
the pleading, and is an affirmative defense under Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC. On the
other hand, lack of a cause of action refers to a situation where
the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the
pleading. The remedy in the first is to move for the dismissal
of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to
the evidence (Butuan Development Corporation v. The Twenty
First Division of the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 197358, April
CHAPTER III 193
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
5, 2017). The terms are not interchangeable (Asia Brewery,
Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank, [now Banco De Oro-EPCI, Inc.],
G.R. No. 190432, April 25, 2017).
A more recent pronouncement explains that failure
to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the
allegations in the pleading. Lack of a cause of action refers to
the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. (Trillanes
IVv. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018).
An earlier case more clearly declares:
"Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as
lack of cause of action; the terms are not interchangeable.
It may be observed that lack of cause of action is not among
the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The dismissal of a
Complaint for lack of cause of action is based on Section
1 of Rule 33 x x x
"If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action,
a motion to dismiss must be made before a responsive
pleading is filed; and the issue can be resolved only on
the basis of the allegations in the initiatory pleading. On
the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause of action,
the motion to dismiss must be filed after the plaintiff has
rested its case.
"In the first situation, the veracity of the allegations
is immaterial; however, in the second situation, the judge
must determine the veracity of the allegations based on
the evidence presented" (Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Equitable
PCI Bank [Now Banco De Oro, EPCI, Inc.], G.R. No.
190432, April 25, 2017).
4. The pronouncements above were based on the Rules
of Court before its amendment brought by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC. The differences between failure to state a cause of action
and lack of a cause of action still hold true, however, failure to
state a cause of action cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss.
The rule now is to raise the said ground as an affirmative
defense in the answer.
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194 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
5. As previously stated, a motion to dismiss grounded on
failure to state a cause of action refers only to the insufficiency
of the pleading (Yap-Co v. Uy, G.R. No. 209295, February
11, 2015; See Trillanes N v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No.
223451, March 14, 2018). Hence, when the affirmative defense
of dismissal is grounded on failure to state a cause of action,
a ruling thereon should be based on the facts alleged in the
complaint (Virata v. Ng Wee, G.R. No. 221135, July 5, 2017)
and not based on the truth of the allegations. The veracity of
the allegations would be material only when the motion to
dismiss is based on lack of a cause of action in a demurrer to
evidence under Rule 33.
Importance of the allegations in the complaint
1. The cause of action in a complaint is not what the
designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in
the body of the complaint define and describe. The designation
or caption is not controlling for it is not even an indispensable
part of the complaint (De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA
103, 117). For instance, a complaint captioned as an unlawful
detainer case could actually be an action for forcible entry
where the complaint alleges that the plaintiff was deprived of
the possession of the premises by force, intimidation, stealth,
threat or strategy.
2. Similarly, a petition denominated as a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 (which is supposed to
raise only pure questions of law) may be considered by the
Court as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because the
petition alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction (Flores v. Office of the Ombudsman, 389 SCRA
127, 132; Ligon v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 73, 84-85).
3. Where, from a reading of the allegations in the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for, the ultimate objective
of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should
be filed with the proper court having jurisdiction over the
assessed value of the property subject thereof even if the
CHAPTER III 195
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
complaint is denominated as an action to annul a deed of sale
to real property. The nature of an action is not determined by
the caption of the complaint, but by the allegations therein
together with the reliefs prayed for (Barangay Piapi v. Talip,
469 SCRA 409, 413).
Effect of a finding that the complaint states a cause of action
A finding that the complaint states no cause of action is
a ground for the dismissal of the said complaint. However,
"x xx A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a cause
of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is
meritorious; it shall only result in x x x the hearing of the
case for presentation of evidence by the parties" (Manaloto v.
Veloso III, 632 SCRA 347, 362-363). In other words, when the
court finds that the complaint states a cause of action, this
means that the same cannot be dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action, but the claiming party has the obligation
to offer evidence to support the allegations constituting the
elements of his cause of action.
Cause of action as applied to administrative cases
While the concept of a cause of action is one that is essen-
tial to the existence of an ordinary civil action, in administra-
tive cases, however, the issue is not whether the complainant
has a cause of action against the respondent, but whether the
respondent has breached the norms and standards of the of-
fice (Mutia v. Pacariem, 494 SCRA 448, 453).
Cause of action arising from law
A cause of action may arise from the violation of a law
or a rule. For example, in illegal strikes, the cause of action
arises from the failure of the labor organization to comply
with the statutory requirements for a legal strike. In illegal
dismissals of employees, the cause of action arises from
dismissals without just or valid causes (Club Filipino, Inc. v.
Bautista, G.R. No. 168406, January 14, 2015).
196 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Cause of action based on contracts
Does a cause of action for breach of contract require
an allegation and proof of the negligence of the defendant?
Jurisprudence consistently answers in the negative. A cause
of action based on breach of contract merely requires the
following elements: (a) the existence of a contract, and (b) the
breach of the contract.
In breach of contract of carriage, for instance, the action
can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract, and the fact that the obligor failed to transport
the passenger safely to his destination (Calalas v. Court of
Appeals, 332 SCRA 356, 361; FGU Insurance Corporation
v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation, 386 SCRA 312,
320). In other words, the mere proof of the existence of the
contract, and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie,
a corresponding right of relief (Guanio v. Makati Shangri-La
Hotel and Resort, Inc., 641 SCRA 591, 596). Bar 2004
Thus, if a carrier is sued based on a breach of contract
of carriage, negligence need not be proven by the plaintiff,
negligence not being an element of the cause of action of a suit
predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage. This is true,
whether or not the defendant is a public or private carrier.
However, where the defendant is a common carrier there is an
additional reason for dispensing with proof of negligence, i.e.,
negligence of the common carrier is presumed (Art. 1735 and
Art. 1756, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Cause of action based on the vicarious liability of an
employer
1. As a rule, negligence, as an element of a quasi-
delict, must be alleged and proved (Art. 2176, Civil Code of
the Philippines) but the negligence of those persons described
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, although based on a quasi-
delict, is presumed.
2. Under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, following the
well-recognized doctrine of vicarious liability, certain persons
CHAPTER III 197
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
like the father, mother, guardian, owners and managers of
an establishment or enterprise, employers, the State, and
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are,
under specified conditions, liable for the acts of persons for
whom they are responsible.
Thus, an employer, for instance, is liable for t~e da~a~e
caused by his employees and household helpers actmg w1thm
the scope of their assigned tasks. The employer's negligence
in the selection and supervision of his employee is presumed,
and his liability shall only cease if he successfully proves
his observance of the diligence required of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
Thus it has been ruled that when an injury is caused
' .
to another by the negligence of the employee, there mstantly
arises a juris tantum presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection
or supervision, or both, of the employee (Manliclic v. Calaunan,
512 SCRA 642, 662-663). The presumption, however, may
be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer
that it had exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
Hence, to escape solidary liability for quasi-delict committed
by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient ~roof
that it exercised such degree of care (Travel & Tours Advisers,
Incorporated v. Cruz, Sr., G.R. No. 199282, March 14, 2016).
Cause of action in environmental cases
In environmental cases, "[T]he complaint shall state that
it is an environmental case, and the law involved" (Sec. 3,
Rule 2, Part 2, Rules of Procedure for. Environmental Cases).
Cause of action for partition raising issue of ownership
A cause of action for partition does not preclude the
settlement of the issue of ownership. An action for partition
is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties. Unless and until the issue of co-
ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to
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198 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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effect a partition of an estate (Spouses Butiong v. Plazo, G.R.
r CHAPTER III
No. 187524, August 5, 2015).
Action distinguished from cause of action (Bar 1999)
An action is the suit filed in court for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
(Sec. 3[a], Rule 1, Rules of Court). A cause of action is the basis
of the action filed. Under the Rules of Court "every ordinary
civil action must be based on a cause of action" (See Sec. 1,
Rule 2, Rules of Court).
Splitting a single cause of action (Bar 1996; 1999; 2005;
2017); reason for prohibition
1. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of
instituting two or more suits on the basis of the same cause
of action (Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court). In splitting a cause
of action, the pleader divides a single cause of action, claim or
demand into two or more parts and brings a suit for each part.
This cannot be done because splitting a single cause of action
is expressly prohibited by the Rules of Court which specifically
mandates that, "A party may not institute more than one suit
for a single cause of action" (See Sec. 3, Rule 2, Rules of Court,
See also Riviera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings, B. V., G.R.
No. 173783, June 17, 2015).
2. The practice of splitting a single cause of action
is discouraged because it breeds multiplicity of suits, clogs
the court dockets, leads to vexatious litigation, operates as
an instrument of harassment, and generates unnecessary
expenses to the parties. As jurisprudence puts it:
"Splitting of a single cause of action violates the
policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary
objective is to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the
court" (Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. [Phil.], Inc.
v. Presbitero, Jr., G.R. No. 174202, April 7, 2015).
3. The rule against splitting a single cause of action
applies not only to complaints but also to counterclaims and
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
199
cross-claims. Thus, it was held that to interpose a cause of
action in a counterclaim, and again invoke it in a complaint
against the same person or party, would be splitting a cause
of action not sanctioned by the Rules (Mariscal v. Court of
Appeals, 311 SCRA 51, 56).
4. A cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but
only one action can be filed, not one action for each relief (For
further readings, see Riviera Golf, Inc. v. CCA Holdings B. V.,
supra). For instance, when one files a complaint for unlawful
detainer on the ground of non-payment of rentals, the
complaint must include the recovery of the rentals in arrears,
such recovery being an integral part of the cause of action for
unlawful detainer.
An action for the recovery of taxes should also include
the demand for surcharges resulting from the delinquency in
the payment of said taxes. The non-payment of taxes gives
rise to two reliefs: (a) the recovery of the unpaid taxes; and (b)
the recovery of the surcharges resulting from non-payment
of the taxes. These two reliefs are results of a single cause of
action which should be pursued in a single complaint (City of
Bacolod v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., 29 SCRA 819, 827).
5. The act of a defendant in taking possession of the
plaintiffs land by means of force and intimidation constitutes
a single act of dispossession but gives rise to two reliefs: (a)
recovery of possession, and (b) damages arising from the
loss of possession. Both of these reliefs result from a single
wrong, hence, constituting but a single cause of action. Each
of them cannot be the subject of two separate actions. Hence,
an action for forcible entry should include not only the plea
for restoration of possession, but also claims for damages
arising out of the forcible entry. The claim for damages cannot
be filed separately. This rule presupposes, however, that the
damages claimed directly arose from the act of dispossession
such as the deprivation of the use of the property and other
consequential damages (For further readings, see Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA
637, 652-653; For further readings, See also Umale v. Canoga
200 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Park Development Corporation, G.R. No. 167246, July 20,
2011; emphasis made by the Court).
It must be emphasized that the claim for damages in
a forcible entry case refers to the damages sustained by the
plaintiff in depriving him of the use and possession of the
property, and not the damages which he may have suffered
by acts which have no direct relation to the loss of material
possession. In other words, where the claim for damages arose
out of separate acts committed by the defendant after the
occupancy of the premises subject of the action, such claim
constitutes a separate cause of action and not an integral part
of a cause of action based on forcible entry.
In one case, the defendant forcibly and unlawfully
entered the leased properties of the plaintiff. Once inside, he
barricaded the entrance to the fishponds and set up a barbed
wire fence along the road going to the fishponds. Then, after
occupying the premises, he harvested several tons of milkfish,
fry and fingerlings owned by the plaintiffs, ransacked and
destroyed a chapel built in the premises, stole religious icons
and even decapitated the heads of some of them. All these
happened after the act of dispossession occurred. The plaintiff
filed a complaint for forcible entry and another complaint
for damages against the defendant. An issue which arose
from the cases filed is whether, during the pendency of the
complaint for forcible entry, the plaintiff can independently
institute and maintain an action for damages which arose
from incidents occurring after the act of dispossession by
the defendant. The Court sustained the separate action for
damages and ruled that there was no litis pendencia involved.
The Court explained that the claim for damages has no direct
relation to the loss of possession of the premises but resulted
from acts separate from the forcible entry (CGR Corporation
v. Treyes, G.R. No. 170916, April 27, 2007).
6. A single act may sometimes violate several rights
of a person. Nevertheless, the plaintiff has only one cause of
action regardless of the number of rights violated. If a car
owner sustains injuries to his person and damage to his car as
CHAPTER III 201
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
a result of the negligent driving of the defen~ant, two ri~hts
of the plaintiffs have been viol~ted, namel~, his personal _right
to be safe in his person, and his property right to have his car
intact and free from any damage.
Under the circumstances, may the plaintiff file a complaint
for the recovery of damages to his person and another complaint
later to recover damages to his car? He could not because to do
so would be to split a single cause of action. If, however, a
passenger in the same car was also i~jured, the injuries_to_the
passenger gives rise to a cause of action separate_ a1;1ddis_tmct
from those sustained by the car owner because distmct rights
belonging to different persons have been violated. The injured
passenger may file a suit against the defendant separate from
the suit filed by the car owner.
7. A tenant illegally ejected from the land is entitled to
two reliefs - one for reinstatement and another for damages.
Since both reliefs arose from the same cause of action,
they should be alleged in one complaint (Gozon v. Vda. de
Barrameda, 11 SCRA 376, 379).
8. A cause of action for the reconveyance of title over
property does not include a cause of action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. They are distinct causes of action. Hence,
the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title does not
divest the Municipal Trial Court of its jurisdiction to try an
ejectment case of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
What is involved in an ejectment case is possession de facto or
material possession. In an action for reconveyance, the issue
is ownership (De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 520,
527; Tecson v. Gutierrez, 452 SCRA 781, 787).
9. A bank cannot file a civil action against the debtor
for the collection of the debt and, then, subsequently file an
action to foreclose the mortgage. This would be splitting a
single cause of action (Danao v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA
446, 448; Industrial Finance Corp. v. Apostol, 177 SCRA 521,
524). Bar 1999; 2017
 202 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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It is important to bear in mind that a loan contract is
f CHAPTER III
an agreement separate from the mortgage even if both refer
to one and the same obligation. These contracts, however, do
not constitute separate causes of action. They are parts of one
and the same cause of action. Hence, there is only one cause
of action.
In loan contracts, secured by a real estate mortgage, the
creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the
debtor-mortgagor with two alternative remedies to recover
the debt - to file a personal action to collect a sum of money
or to file a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.
A remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for
collection or upon the filing of the complaint for foreclosure. If
the plaintiff had already instituted foreclosure proceedings, he
is now barred from availing of an ordinary action for collection
of a sum of money and vice versa (See Marilag v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015).
Marilag v. Martinez further expounds:
"In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage,
the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause
of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the
debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection
of sum of money or the institution of a real action to
foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are
alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy
is complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee
opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the
action for the collection of the unpaid debt, except only for
the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the
outstanding obligation of the debtor-mortgagor xx x. The
availment of the remedy of foreclosure bars recourse to
the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of
the same debt. x x x."
10. In one case, before the lease contract expired, the
lessor filed an unlawful detainer case against the lessee
allegedly for violation of stipulations in the lease contract
regarding the use of the property. Under the contract, the
lessee was allowed to use the leased property as a parking
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
space for light vehicles and as a site for a small drivers'
203
canteen- but may not utilize the subject premises for other
purposes without the respondents prior written consent. The
lessee, however, allegedly in violation of the lease contract,
constructed restaurant buildings and other commercial
establishments on the lot and also subleased the property to
various tenants.
The MTC decided the ejectment case in favor of the lessee.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTC decision but
another RTC, to which the lessor's motion for reconsideration
was assigned, granted the lessor's motion thereby reversing
and setting aside the MTC decision. Interestingly, during the
pendency of the petition for review before the CA, the lessor
filed another case for unlawful detainer against the lessee.
This time, the respondent used as a ground for ejectment
the expiration of the lease contract. Does the second case for
ejectment constitute a splitting of a single cause of action and
hence, dismissible on the ground of litis pendencia?
The Court categorically ruled that the two unlawful
detainer cases involved different causes of action. The Court
explained, thus:
"Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single
cause of action. - If two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or
a judgment on the merits in any one is ground for the
dismissal of the others.
"Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits
relate to a single or common cause of action, such as
whether the same evidence would support and sustain
both the first and second causes of action (also known
as the same evidence test), or whether the defenses in
one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in
the other. Also fundamental is the test of determining
whether the cause of action in the second case
existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.
"Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially
applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause
of action in the second case existed at the time of the
....-----
204 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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filing of the first complaint and to which we answer in
the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of
the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioners
violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the
filing of the second case was based on the expiration of
the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the
first ejectment complaint x x x the lease contract between
the parties was still in effect. x x x It was only at the
expiration of the lease contract that the cause of action
in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made
available to the respondent as a ground for ejecting the
petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case
was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first
ejectment case xx x" (Umale v. Canoga Park Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 167246, July 20, 2011; emphasis
made by the Court).
11. In a case of a more recent vintage, the lessee of a
sugarland continued to use the property for several years even
after the expiration of the lease contract without any express
renewal or extension of the contract. The lessee, however, paid
the lessor the annual compensation for the use and occupancy
of the premises. The lessor, on his part, contended that he was
never apprised of how the annual rentals were determined by
the lessee. He also pointed out that the payments were often
delayed.
In March 2012, the lessor sent to the lessee a final
demand to vacate the property but the lessee, ignoring the
demand, continued to use and occupy the land. This prompted
the lessor to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against the
lessee. During the pendency of the case, the lessor discovered
that, based on the statistics and information provided by the
Sugar Regulatory Administration, the previous payments
made to him by the lessee were less than what he should have
received. Feeling shortchanged, the lessee filed an action for
collection of the sum of more than three hundred thousand
(P300,000.00) representing the balance of annual rentals
due him before the action for unlawful detainer was filed.
The lessee filed a motion to dismiss based on litis pendencia
CHAPTER III 205
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
alleging a splitting of a single cause of action. Should the
second complaint be dismissed on the ground invoked by the
lessee?
The question was answered by the Court in the negative.
While conceding that the two actions involved the same
parties and the same property, the filing of a complaint for
collection of a sum of money, other than that sustained as a
result of the dispossession or that caused by the loss of the
use and occupation of the property, could not be considered
as splitting of a cause of action. There is no splitting because
the complaint for collection prays for the payment of the
differential amount representing the unpaid balance of the
rental fees. The complaint to recover the deficiency has no
direct relation to the loss or possession of the premises and
had nothing to do with the issue of the unlawfulness of the
occupancy or possession in the unlawful detainer case. There
is, therefore, no identity of causes of action.
In unlawful detainer cases, the Court further explained,
the recoverable damages are reckoned from the time the
possession of the property became unlawful. Prior to the lapse
of the period to vacate the property, as stated in the demand
letter, the damages sustained by the plaintiff bear no direct
relation to the lessee's refusal to vacate the property. Such
damages must be claimed in an ordinary action. In the instant
case, the sum sought to be recovered in the second action
refers to the deficiency in the amount of rentals prior to the
lessee's unlawful detention of the property and has no direct
connection to the loss of material possession that gave rise
to the action for unlawful detainer (See Lajave Agricultural
Management and Development Corporation v. Spouses
Javellana, G.R. No. 223785, November 7, 2018).
12. Does a previous final judgment denying a petition
for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity
on the ground of lack of marriage license?
One early case answered this question in the affirmative.
Here, the petitioner filed a petition seeking a declaration
206 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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of nullity of his marriage to respondent citing respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity. The trial court denied the
petition for failure to prove the material allegations in the
petition. After the dismissal became final, the petitioner
filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage,
this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was
null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license. The respondent filed an answer with
a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the petition
on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. In its
barest essentials, the motion to dismiss was predicated on the
splitting of a single cause of action. The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the petitioner
argued that while the reliefs prayed for in the two cases were
the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was
distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present
case because the operative facts upon which they were based
were different. Also, the evidence necessary to sustain the
first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological
incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence
necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored
on the purported absence of a marriage license. Hence, there
was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule
which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
In holding that the arguments of the petitioner
untenable, the Court declared, in no uncertain terms:
"Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply
invoking different grounds for the same cause of action.
By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission
by which a party violates the right of another. In both
petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is
the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated.
These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the
various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key
to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual
status of petitioner and respondent's marriage.
CHAPTER III 207
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
"Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the
claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid
celebration of the same took place due to the alleged
lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage
had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with
law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The
alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner
raises now could have been presented and heard in the
earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound
not only as regards every matter offered and received to
sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any
other admissible matter which might have been offered
for that purpose and of all other matters that could have
been adjudged in that case.
"It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade
or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying
the form of his action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case.
XXX
"In sum, litigants are provided with the options on
the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial
relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in
court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant
issues therein. The losing party who files another action
regarding the same controversy will be needlessly
squandering time, effort and financial resources because
were he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy
all over again.
"Therefore. having expressly and impliedly conceded
the validity of their marriage celebration. petitioner
is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For
this reason, the Court finds that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack
of marriage license is barred x x x" (Mallion v. Alcantara,
G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006).
Note: Instead of relying on the theory of the "implied
admission of the validity of marriage," the dismissal could
have been also justified by considering whether the cause of
208 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the
first complaint. Obviously, the absence of a marriage license
supporting the second action for declaration of nullity, is a
ground that already existed at the time of the filing of the
first action. Hence, it should have been invoked when the first
action was filed.
Anticipatory breach
As a general rule, a contract to do several things at
several times is divisible in its nature. This kind of obligation
authorizes successive actions and a judgment recovered for
a single breach does not bar a suit for a subsequent breach.
However, if the obligor manifests an unqualified and positive
refusal to perform a contract, though the performance of the
same is not yet due, and the renunciation goes to the whole
contract, it may be treated as a complete breach, which will
entitle the injured party to bring his action at once. In this
case, the breach is considered a total breach and there can only
be one action and the plaintiff must recover all his damages
therein (Blossoms & Co. v. Manila Gas Corporation, 55 Phil.
226, 240-241).
Assume that Mr. DD undertook to pay his debt of P5
million in five equal annual installments with each installment
due on the last day of every year without need for a demand.
The obligation of Mr. DD is a divisible one and each breach
is a cause of action in itself. Hence, if the first installment is
not paid, the failure to pay authorizes the creditor to file a
suit for such amount corresponding to the first installment.
If the next installment is not paid and the first case has
been finally adjudicated upon, a second suit may be filed for
the next unpaid installment and would not be barred by res
judicata. If before the due date of the first installment, Mr.
DD, for whatever personal reason he may have, unequivocally
manifests to the creditor his absolute refusal to comply with
any of the promised installments, there is an anticipatory
breach which would entitle the creditor to file a single action
to collect the entire debt.
CHAPTER III 209
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
Effect of splitting a single cause of action (Bar 1998; 1999)
1. If two or more suits are instituted for a single cause
of action, "the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits
in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others" (Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court). The remedy then of the
defendant is to file a motion to dismiss.
Hence, if the first action is pending when the second action
is filed, the latter may be dismissed based on litis pendentia,
i.e., there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause (Sec. 12 [a{2}],Rule 15, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). If a final judgment had
been rendered in the first action when the second action is
filed, the latter may be dismissed based on res judicata, i.e.,
that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment (Sec. 12
[a{3}1,Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC).
2. Note that it need not be the second action filed that
should be dismissed. The phraseology of the present rule
(Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court) does not necessarily confine
the dismissal to the second action. A defendant may move for
the dismissal of the first case and as to which action should
be dismissed would depend upon judicial discretion and the
prevailing circumstances of the case.
Joinder of causes of action (Bar 1996; 1999; 2000; 2005;
2011; 2012; 2015)
1. Joinder of causes of action is the assertion of as
many causes of action as a party may have against another
in one pleading alone (Sec. 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court). It is the
process of uniting two or more demands or rights of action
in one action (1 C.J.S., Actions §61; See Unicapital, Inc. v.
Consing, Jr., G.R. No. 192073, September 11, 2013).
Illustration: D is the debtor of C for P350,000.00 due
on January 5, 2018. D likewise owes C P350,000.00 due on
February 13, 2018. Both debts are evidenced by distinct
promissory notes and incurred for different reasons. D has not
paid the debts despite demand. Each debt is a separate cause
210 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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of action because each is the subject of a different transaction.
However, under the rule on joinder of causes of action, C may
file a single suit against D for the collection of both debts,
despite the claims being actually separate causes of action
and having arisen out of different transactions.
2. When the causes of action accrue in favor of the same
plaintiff and against the same defendant, i.e., there is only one
plaintiff and one defendant, it is not necessary to ask whether
or not the causes of actions arose out of the same transaction
or series of transactions and that there exists a question of
law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants. This
question is only relevant when there are multiple plaintiffs or
multiple defendants. In the hypothetical just discussed in par.
1, is C obliged to join the causes of action against D? Answer:
No. C is not obliged to do so. He may file a single suit for each
of the claims, if he desires, because each debt is a separate
cause of action. Joinder of causes of action is not compulsory.
It is merely permissive. Bar 1999 The rule uses the word
"may," not "shall" (Sec. 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
In the example, in case C decides in favor of a joinder, the
suit shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court because the
total amount of the debts is within that court's jurisdiction.
Under the Rules, where the claims in all the causes of action
are principally for the recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction (Sec. 5[d],
Rule 2, Rules of Court, Sec. 33[1], B.P. 129, as amended).
This situation follows the so-called totality test for purposes
of jurisdiction.
3. Assume that aside from the above claims, C, as
lessor, also wants to eject D from the apartment occupied by
D as his lessee. May the action be joined with the claims for
money? Answer: No. An action for ejectment is a special civil
action. This kind of action cannot be joined with ordinary
civil actions. The rule is clear: "The joinder shall not include
special civil actions or actions governed by special rules" (Sec.
5[b], Rule 2, Rules of Court). Confusion in the application of
procedural rules would certainly arise from the joinder of
ordinary and special civil actions in a single complaint.
CHAPTER III 211
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
4. An action for injunction and quieting of title to
real property cannot be joined in a single complaint. While
injunction is an ordinary civil action, quieting of title is
I governed by Rule 63, making it a special civil action (Salvador
v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 195834, November 9, 2016).
I 5. Assume that C has the following causes of action
against D: (a) Pl million based on a note; (b) Pl million based
I
on torts; and (c) foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. May the
causes of action be joined? They can be joined except the action
for foreclosure of real estate mortgage which is a special civil
}; action.
II
6. An action for collection of a sum of money cannot be
properly joined with an action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a
full-blown trial, while the latter two are special civil actions
ii which require a summary procedure (Lajave Agricultural
1'~ Management and Development Enterprises, Inc. v. Spouses
Javellana, G.R. No. 223785, November 7, 2018).
Joinder when there are multiple parties
If there is only one plaintiff and one defendant, the rule
on joinder of parties does not apply. The reason is simple.
There are no parties to be joined. It is when the fact pattern
of the case indicates the presence of multiple parties (like two
or more plaintiffs or two or more defendants or both) that
the joinder of causes of action becomes subject to the rule on
joinder of parties under Sec. 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Specifically, before causes of action and parties can be
joined in a complaint involving multiple parties, the following
must be complied with: (a) the right to relief must arise out
of the same transaction or series · of transactions and (b)
there must be a question of law or fact common to all parties
(Central Bank Board of Liquidators v. Banco Filipino Savings
and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 173399, February 21, 2017). To
reiterate, this rule applies only when there are two or more
plaintiffs and/or two or more defendants. It does not apply
when there is only one plaintiff and one defendant.
212 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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There are multiple parties, for instance, if C is the creditor
of D for P350,000.00 and also of E for P375,000.00. Both debts
are due and these debts have been contracted separately. May
C join D and E as defendants in the same complaint? Answer:
No. Where a party sues two or more defendants, it is necessary
for the causes of action to arise out of the same transaction or
series of transactions and that there should be a question of
law or fact common to them. The debt of D is a transaction
different from the debt of E. Hence, they cannot be sued under
a single complaint. Each cause of action should be the subject
of a separate complaint.
Suppose P is a passenger in a bus owned by O and driven
by D. Because of the negligence ofD, P sustained injuries when
the vehicle fell into a ditch by the roadside. May P, as plaintiff,
join O and D as defendants in the same complaint based on
a quasi-delict? Answer: Yes. The liability of O and that of D
arose out of the same accident which gave rise to a common
question oflaw or fact. Note that the existence of a contractual
relationship does not preclude a suit based on a quasi-delict.
0 may be sued under a quasi-delict, as an employer ofD if P so
desires (Art. 2180, Civil Code of the Philippines; Air France v.
Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). In the same accident, two or more
injured passengers in the same mishap, may join as plaintiffs
against the driver and the common carrier as joint defendants.
If A and B both sign a promissory note for Pl million and
bind themselves to be jointly liable for the debt in favor of C,
there are two distinct obligations within the same promissory
note, namely: (a) the obligation of A to C for P500,000.00; and
(b) the obligation of B to C for P500,000.00. Under Art. 1208 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, unless otherwise indicated
by the nature of the obligation or by law, the debt or credit
shall be presumed divided into as many equal shares as there
are creditors or debtors. In other words, the obligation under
the promissory note in the illustration is presumed to be joint,
not solidary. If the obligation is joint, C may sue A alone or sue
B alone. This is because the debts are separate and distinct
CHAPTER III 213
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
causes of action. May C, however, join A and B under one
complaint and thereby join the causes of action against them?
Answer: C may join A and B under one complaint. The debt
of A and B arose out of the same transaction, i.e., the same
promissory note and would necessarily give rise to a common
question of law or fact.
Joinder of claims in small claims cases
The plaintiff may join, in a single statement of claim, one
or more separate small claims against a defendant provided
that the total amount claimed, exclusive of interests and costs,
does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of the concerned
court (Sec. 8, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, as amended).
Remedy in case of misjoinder of causes of action
1. When there is a misjoinder of causes of action,
the erroneously joined cause of action can be severed and
proceeded with separately upon motion by a party or upon
the court's own initiative. Misjoinder of causes of action is not
a ground for dismissal of an action (Sec. 6, Rule 2, Rules of
Court).
For example, if an action for forcible entry is joined in
one complaint with the causes of action based on several
promissory notes, the complaint should not be dismissed
based on the misjoinder of the forcible entry case. Instead, the
cause of action predicated on forcible entry merely needs to be
severed from the complaint upon motion of a party or by the
court motu proprio and proceeded with separately in another
action.
The applicable provision is unequivocal:
"SEC. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder
of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an
action. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of
a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and
proceeded with separately."
214 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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2. While a misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground
for dismissal, yet if the plaintiff refuses to sever the misjoined
cause of action as ordered by the court, the complaint may
be dismissed conformably with the mandate of Sec. 3 of Rule
17 which authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for, among
others, failure to comply with the order of the court (Salvador
v. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 195834, November 9, 2016).
II.ACTIONS
Definition
1. An action is the legal and formal demand of one's
right from another person made and insisted upon in a court
of justice (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. I, 128, 8th Ed.; Words
and Phrases, Vol. 2, 25).
2. In this jurisdiction, it is settled that the terms
"action" and "suit" are synonymous but the operative act
which converts a claim into an "action" or "suit" is the filing of
the same with a court of justice. Filed elsewhere, as with some
other body or office not a court of justice, the claim may not be
properly categorized under either term (Lopez v. Compania de
Seguros, 16 SCRA 855, 859).
Civil actions and criminal actions
1. A civil action "is one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong'' (Sec. 3[a], Rule 1, Rules of Court). A
criminal action "is one by which the State prosecutes a person
for an act or omission punishable by law" (Sec. 3[b], Rule 1,
Rules of Court).
2. It has been ruled that "... proceedings are to
be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily
punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or remedial . . ." (People v. Godoy, 243 SCRA
64, 78).
CHAPTER III 215
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
Actions distinguished from special proceedings (Bar 1996;
1998)
1. The purpose of an action is either to protect a right
or prevent or redress a wrong if the action is civil. If it is a
criminal action, the purpose is to prosecute a person for an act
or an omission punishable by law (Sec. 3[a[b], Rule 1, Rules of
Court).
2. The purpose of a special proceeding is to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact (Sec. 3[c], Rule 1, Rules of
Court).
Example: The determination of who the legal heirs of the
deceased are must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court and not in an ordinary suit for the recovery of ownership
and possession of real property. The court, in such an ordinary
action, cannot make a declaration of heirship, because such
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Also,
matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be
ventilated in the proper special proceeding instituted precisely
for the purpose of determining such rights. The status of an
illegitimate child, who claims to be an heir to a decedent's
estate, could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action like
recovery of property (Heirs of Magdaleno Ypori v. Ricaforte,
G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013; Alcantara v. Belen, G.R. No.
200204, April 25, 2017).
The special proceedings under the Rules of Court; applica-
bility of rules in ordinary civil actions
1. Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the
following cases under Sec. 1 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court:
a. Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
b. Escheat;
c. Guardianship and custody of children;
d. Trustees;
e. Adoption;
216 CIVIL PROCEDURE CHAPTER III 217
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
VOLUME I

f. Rescission and revocation of adoption; establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a
g. Hospitalization of insane persons; civil nor a criminal action. The summary nature of the
petition does not make the Revised Rule on Summary
h. Habeas corpus;
Procedure applicable (De Lima v. Gatdula, G.R. No.
1. Change of name; 204528, February 19, 2013).
J. Voluntary dissolution of corporations; d. A verified petition for approval of the bond
k. Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of filed by a parent to exercise legal guardianship over the
minor natural children; property of his emancipated children shall be docketed
1. Constitution of family home; as a summary special proceeding (Art. 225, The Family
Code of the Philippines).
m. Declaration of absence and death; and
e. A liquidation proceeding involving a bank is
n. Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
a special proceeding involving the administration and
registry.
disposition of an insolvent's assets for the benefit of its
2. The rules of ordinary civil actions have suppletory creditors (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v.
application in special proceedings. The rule is clear: "In the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169457, October 19, 2015).
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special Special civil actions in the Rules of Court
proceedings" (Sec. 2, Rule 72, Rules of Court). A demurrer to
The following are the special civil actions as presently
evidence in Rule 33 may apply to special proceedings. Bar
embodied in the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
2015
10-20-SC:
3. The enumeration of special proceedings in the
a. Interpleader;
Rules of Court, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC, is not
exclusive. Special proceedings are also provided for in cases b. Declaratory relief and similar remedies;
aside from those mentioned in the Rules.
c. Review of judgments and final orders or
Examples: resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit;
a. Arbitration, under Sec. 22 of R.A. 876 (The
Arbitration Law), is deemed a special proceeding. d. Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus;
b. Proceedings for recognition and enforcement of e. Quo warranto;
an arbitration agreement or for vacation, setting aside, f. Expropriation;
correction or modification of an arbitral award, and any
g. Foreclosure of real estate mortgage;
application with a court for arbitration assistance and
supervision shall be deemed as special proceedings (Sec. h. Partition;
47, Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, R.A. 9285).
1. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer; and
c. A petition for a writ of amparo is also a special
J. Contempt.
proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to
- 218 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Real and personal actions (Bar 2004; 2006)
1. An action is 'real' when it affects title to or possession
of real property, or an interest therein (Sec. 1, Rule 4, Rules of
Court, BPI Family Savings Bank v. Yujuico, G.R. No. 175796,
July 22, 2015). All other actions are personal actions (Sec. 2,
Rule 4, Rules of Court). Bar 1994
. Examp!e~: Actions for unlawful detainer, forcible entry,
accwn publiciana, accion reinvindicatoria, quieting of title or
removal of a cloud on a title.
2. An action is real when it is founded upon the privity
?freal est_ate. That means that realty, or an interest therein,
is the subJect matter of the action.
Not every action, however, involving a real property is a
"re~l action" because the realty may only be incidental to the
subJect mat~er of the suit. To be a "real" action, it is not enough
that the act10n must deal with real property. It is important
that the ~att~r in lit~g~tion must also. involve or affect any of
~he followmg issues: title to or possession of real property or
mterest therein" (Sec. 1, Rule 4, Rules of Court). Sec. 2 ofR~le
4 of the 19_64Rules of Court was more specific, and referred
to real ~ct10ns as tho~~ "affecting title to, or for recovery of
possess10n, or for partit10n or condemnation of, or foreclosure
of mortgage, on real property." Hence, an action for damages
to real property, while involving realty, is a personal action
because, a~though it in:olves real property, it does not involve
any of the issues ment10ned.
3. An acti~n to recover possession of real property
plus damages (hke accion publiciana and damages) is
~ui:idamentally _a~eal action be?ause possession ofreal property
~s mvolved. This is t~ue even if the recovery of damages is, in
~ts~lf, a personal act10n. The aspect of damages is merely an
mcidental part of the main action, i.e., recovery of possession
ofreal property. Hence, in determining the venue of the action
the rule on venue of real actions shall be applied even if th~
recovery of damages is included in the recovery of possession
of the realty. However, an action to recover possession of a
personal property is a personal action.
CHAPTER III
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
219
4. An action for a declaration of the nullity of marriage
is a personal action. As such, it may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where any of the principal defendants resides, at the election
of the plaintiff (Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584, 588).
5. An action for specific performance with damages
is a personal action as long as it does not involve a claim of
or recovery of ownership of or title to real property (Siasoco
v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 186, 196, citing La Tondefia
Distillers v. Ponferrada, 264 SCRA 540).
Where a complaint is denominated as one for specific
performance but, nonetheless, prays for the issuance of a deed
of sale for a parcel of land, to enable the plaintiff to acquire
ownership thereof, its primary objective and nature is one to
recover the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a real
action (Gochan v. Gochan, 372 SCRA 256, 264).
An action for specific performance to enforce a right to
repurchase lots previously sold to the buyer in accordance
with the Public Land Act is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation (Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232, March
10, 2014). In an earlier case, although the end result of the
plaintiffs claim was the transfer of the subject property to his
name, the suit was still essentially for specific performance,
a personal action, because it sought from the defendant the
execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which
they had previously made. Here, the action is primarily to
enforce the contract to execute a deed of sale (Spouses Saraza
v. Francisco, G.R. No. 198718, November 27, 2013).
6. Where the allegations, as well as the prayer, in the
complaint do not claim ownership of the lots in question, or
ask for possession of the same, but, fostead, merely seeks for
the execution of a deed of sale by the defendants in favor of
the plaintiff, the action is a personal action (Adamos v. J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., 25 SCRA 529, 534).
7. Where it is alleged in the complaint that the
defendant breached the contract so that the plaintiff prays
that the contract be rescinded, and that the defendant be

220 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
ordered to return possession of the hacienda to the plaintiff,
the ultimate purpose or end of the action is to recover pos-
session of real property, and not a mere breach of contract (De
Jesus v. Coloso, 1 SCRA 272, 273-27 4).
8. Where the action, captioned as one to annul or
rescind a sale of real property has, as its fundamental and
prime objective, the recovery of real property, the action is
real. The venue, therefore, of the action is where the real
property subject of the action is situated. Hence, in Emergency
Loan Pawnshop, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 89, 91,
the Court sustained the Court of Appeals in dismissing a
complaint for annulment of sale of real property and damages
filed in Davao City involving a property located in Baguio
City, the place where the proper venue lies.
9. Where an award of a house and lot to the plaintiff
was unilaterally cancelled, an action that seeks to annul the
cancellation of the award over the said house and lot, is a
personal action. The action does not involve title to, ownership,
or possession of real property. The nature of the action is one
to compel the recognition of the validity of the previous award
by seeking a declaration that the cancellation is null and void
(Hernandez v. Development Bank of the Philippines, 71 SCRA
290, 293). Bar 1976; 1978
10. An action to foreclose a real estate mortgage is a
real action, but an action to compel the mortgagee to accept
payment of the mortgage debt and release the mortgage is a
personal action (Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., 81
SCRA 75, 84).
11. An action to annul a contract ofloan, and its accessory
real estate mortgage, is a personal action. In a personal
action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property,
the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In
contrast, in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
real property, or, as indicated in Sec. 2(a), Rule 4 of the then
Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to real
property, or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property
CHAPTER III 221
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
(Chua v. Total Office Products and Services [Topros], Inc., 471
SCRA 500, 507).
12. Although the main relief sought in the action is the
delivery of the certificate of title, said relief, in turn, depends
upon who, between the parties, has a better right to the lot
in question. It is not possible for the court to decide the main
relief without passing upon the claim of the parties with
respect to the title to and the possession of the lot in question.
The action is a real action (Espineli v. Santiago, 107 Phil. 830,
833).
13. Where the sale is fictitious, with absolutely no
consideration, it should be regarded as a non-existent contract.
There being no contract between the parties, there is nothing
in truth to annul by action. The action, therefore, cannot be
an action for annulment of a sale of a fishpond but one for the
recovery of a fishpond, a real action (Pascual v. Pascual, 73
Phil. 561, 562).
14. An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure
sale is a real action because the action is closely intertwined
with the issue of ownership, the recovery of which is the
primary objective of the plaintiff. "The prevalent doctrine is
that the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does
not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective
and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property''
(Paglaum Management and Development Corporation v.
Union Bank of the Philippines, 673 SCRA 506, 511-512, citing
Muiioz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737). The case should be construed
to operate under the theory that ownership has already been
transferred. Hence, the primary purpose of the action becomes
the recovery of said ownership. However, where the action is
merely to annul a deed of real estate mortgage, the action is
a personal action if ownership has not yet passed to another.
Bar 2016
Significance of the distinction between a personal action
and a real action (Bar 2016)
1. The distinction between a real action and personal
action is important for the purpose of determining the venue
222 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
of the action. Questions involving the propriety or impropriety
of a particular venue are resolved by initially determining
the nature of the action, i.e., if the action is personal or real.
Knowing whether or not an action is real is also important
to know which court has jurisdiction over a complaint. As
discussed in an earlier chapter, jurisdiction over real actions
will involve determination of the assessed value of the
property.
2. A real action is 'local,' i.e., its venue depends upon
the location of the property involved in the litigation because
"Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and trie~ in the proper
court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated" (See Sec. 1,
Rule 4, Rules of Court, Italics supplied).
3. A personal action is 'transitory,' i.e., its venue
depends upon the residence of the plaintiff or the defendant.
A personal action "may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at
the election of the plaintiff' (Sec. 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court,
Italics supplied). Bar 1994
4. If the question involves the venue of an action, the
analysis will necessarily involve the following steps:
(a) a determination whether the action is real or
personal; and
(b) an application of the rules on venue under Rule
4 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, if the action is one for a sum of money, it is a
personal action. If it is instituted by a resident of Manila
against a resident of Quezon City, the venue of the action is
either Manila or Quezon City, at the election of the plaintiff.
If the action is one for forcible entry, the action is real.
If it is instituted by a resident of Manila against a resident
CHAPTER III 223
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
of Quezon City, the venue of the action is neither of these
places if the property subject of the action is located in Makati
City, in which case, Makati City is the venue. "Forcible entry
and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the
municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated" (Sec.
1, Rule 4, Rules of Court).
5. An action for the recovery of possession of the leased
premises located in Davao City, and the payment of accrued
rentals, is a real action. The venue of the action is Davao City.
Bar 1991
6. An action to annul a sale of a land located in Baguio
City, where recovery of ownership is essentially the material
issue in the case, must be filed in Baguio City. The action is a
real action, and must be filed in the place where the property is
situated, regardless of the residence of the parties (Emergency
Loan Pawnshop, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 353 SCRA 89, 93).
7. Where an award of a house and lot to the plaintiff
was unilaterally cancelled, an action that seeks to annul the
cancellation of the award over the said house and lot is a
personal action. The action does not involve title to, ownership
or possession of real property. The nature of the action is
one to compel the recognition of the validity of the previous
award by seeking a declaration that the cancellation is null
and void. The venue is the residence of the plaintiff or that
of the defendant, at the option of the plaintiff (Hernandez v.
Development Bank of the Philippines, 71 SCRA 290,293). Bar
1976;1978
8. An action to recover the deficiency after the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a
personal action because it does not affect title to or possession
of real property, or any interest therein (BPI Family Savings
Bank v. Yujuico, G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015). Hence, the
venue is the residence of the plaintiff or that of the defendant,
at the option of the plaintiff, not the location of the property
mortgaged.
224 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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In personam, in rem and quasi in rem actions (Bar 1994;
2009; 2014)
1. "An action in personam is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights and obligations brought against the person
and is based on the jurisdiction of the person x x x. Its
purpose is to compose, through the judgment of the court,
some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the
defendant x x x."
The following are some of the examples ·of actions in
personam: Actions for collection of a sum of money and
damages; action for unlawful .detainer or forcible entry; action
for specific performance; action to enforce a foreign judgment
in a complaint for breach of contract" (Frias v. Alcayde, G.R.
No. 194262, February 28, 2018). Frias v. Alcayde further
instructs: "In actions in personam, the judgment is for or
against a person directly. Jurisdiction over the parties is
required in actions in personam, because they seek to impose
personal responsibility or liability upon a person."
2. Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself.
They are binding upon the whole world. The phrase, "against
the thing," to describe in rem actions is a metaphor. It is not
the "thing'' that is the party to an action in rem; only legal or
natural persons may be parties even in in rem actions.
The following are examples of actions in rem: 'x x x
petitions x x x which concern the status of a person like a
petition for adoption, correction of entries in the birth certifi-
cate or annulment of marriage, nullity of marriage, petition to
establish illegitimate filiation; registration of land under the
torrens system; and forfeiture proceedings" (Frias v. Alcayde,
G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018). A land registration case
or probate of a will is also an action in rem. Bar 1994
Traditional jurisprudence referred to an action in rem
as one brought against the whole world (Romualdez-Licaros
v. Licaros, 401 SCRA 762, 770). An example of this action
is a probate of a will (Munoz v. Yabut, Jr., 650 SCRA 344,
367; In Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 162). Thus, it has
been held that the probate of a will being a proceeding in rem,
CHAPTER III 225
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
with the corresponding publication of the petition, the court's
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in
the settlement of the estate of the decedent (Alaban v. Court
of Appeals, 470 SCRA 697, 706).
Another example is a land registration proceeding. Hence,
by virtue of compliance with the publication requirement, all
claimants and occupants of the subject property are deemed
to be notified of the existence of a cadastral case involving
the property (First Gas Power Corporation v. Republic, G.R.
No. 169461, September 2, 2013). Since a land registration
proceeding is an action in rem, the failure to give a personal
notice to the owners or claimants of the land is not a
jurisdictional defect. It is the publication of such notice that
brings in the whole world as a party in the case, and vests the
court with jurisdiction (Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
212 SCRA 623, 628; Ting v. Heirs of Diego Lirio, 518 SCRA
334,338).
A petition for the correction of an entry in the birth
certificate, like date of birth, is an action in rem, an action
against a thing and not against a person. The proceeding
is validated essentially by publication of the proceeding to
give notice to the whole world and to those who might be
minded to make objections of any sort to the right sought
to be established. It is this publication which brings in the
whole world as a party. The decision of the court, after having
attained finality, binds not only the parties, but the whole
world. Everyone is now legally bound to acknowledge and
give effect to the judgment. Thus, when the order to correct
an entry in the birth certificate is ordered under a final
judgment, a government agency is bound to give effect to the
said judgment (Civil Service Commission v. Magoyag, G.R.
No. 197792, December 9, 2015).
One case of note, likewise, held: "x x x [An] action in
personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself
instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a
person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's
226 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation
(Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011).
Lucas continued:
"In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or
quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court,
provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) a&a result of
the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
the court is recognized and made effective.
"The x x x petition to establish illegitimate filiation
is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition
to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over
the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. Publication is notice to the whole
world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through
publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of
the petition."
3. "A proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against
persons seeking to subject the property of such persons in the
discharge of x x x claims x x x. In an action quasi in rem, an
individual is named as a defendant and the purpose of the
proceedings is to subject his interest therein to the obligation
or loan burdening the property xx x. Unlike suits in rem, a
quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties.
The following are some of the examples of actions quasi in rem:
suits to quiet title, actions for foreclosure; and attachment
proceedings. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named
as a defendant" (Frias v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, February
28, 2018).
CHAPTER III 227
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
Additional examples of actions quasi in rem are: action
for partition and action for accounting. Such actions are
essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant's interest
in the property and not to render a judgment against him
(Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 92, 101-102).
In another case, the Court similarly held that attachment
and foreclosure proceedings are both actions quasi in rem.
As such, jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident
defendant is not essential. Service of summons on a non-
resident defendant who is not found in the country is required,
not for the purpose of physically acquiring jurisdiction over
his person, but simply in pursuance of the requirements of
fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the
action against him and the possibility that property belonging
to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a
judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may thereby be
accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, should he be
so minded (Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, 515
SCRA 106, 118).
An action for annulment of certificate of title is quasi
in rem. It is not an action "against a person on the basis of
his personal liability," but an action that subjects a person's
interest over a property to a burden. The action for annulment
of a certificate of title threatens petitioner's interest in the
property (De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014).
4. An in personam or an in rem action is a classification
of actions according to the object of the action. A personal and
real action is a classification according to foundation. It is in
rem when directed against the whole-world, and in personam
when directed against a particular person. Bar 1994 Hence,
an action in personam is not necessarily a personal action.
Nor is a real action, necessarily an action in rem. For instance,
an action to recover title to or possession of real property is a
real action, but it is an action in personam. It is not brought
against the whole world, but against the person upon whom
the claim is made.
228 CML PROCEDURE
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r
I
An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action, but
it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual
only, although it concerns the right to a tangible thing
(Republic v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 600, 606).
"The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon
the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration
case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is
binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest
but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to
deliver possession of a property to another is in personam;
it is binding only against the parties and their successors-
in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of
the action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and
recovery of ownership of real property, or reconveyance, is
a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a
particular individual only although it concerns the right
to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only
upon the parties properly impleaded" (Mufioz v. Yabut,
Jr., 650 SCRA 344, 367).
5. An action for the declaration of nullity of a marriage
is a personal action (Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584, 588;
Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, 401 SCRA 762, 765) because
it is not founded on real estate. It is, at the same time, an in
rem action because the issue of the status of a person is one
directed against the whole world. One's status is a matter that
can be set up against anyone in the world. On the other hand,
an action for damages is both a personal action and an action
inpersonam.
6. An action for specific performance is an action in
personam (Jose v. Boyon, 414 SCRA 216, 225). It is not an
action in rem (Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 425 SCRA 98, 105).
Bar 1997; 2003
7. Cases involving an auction sale of land for the
collection of delinquent taxes are actions in personam. Mere
publication of the notice of delinquency does not suffice. Notice
by publication, although sufficient in proceedings in rem, does
not satisfy the requirements of proceedings in personam.
Because it is in personam, it is still necessary to send the
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CHAPTER III
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
229
notice of tax delinquency directly to the taxpayer in order to
protect his interests (Talusan v. Tayag, 356 SCRA 263, 276).
8. An action for reconveyance is an action in personam
available to a person whose property has been wrongfully
registered under the Torrens system in another's name
(Mufioz v. Yabut, Jr., 650 SCRA 344, 365-366, citing Heirs of
Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, 449 SCRA 173). Bar 2014
9. An action for injunction is a personal action, as well
as an action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in
rem (Kawasaki Port Service Corporation v. Amores, 199 SCRA
230, 237). Mufioz v. Yabut, Jr., 650 SCRA 344, also ruled that
a suit for injunction partakes of an action in personam. Bar
1997
10. The proceedings under the Financial Rehabilitation
Rules of Procedure of 2013 are proceedings in rem as provided
for under Sec. 4 thereof. Examples of the proceedings under
the Financial Rehabilitation Rules of Procedure are petitions
for rehabilitation of corporations, partnerships and sole
proprietorships as well as proceedings in suspension of
payment.
11. A petition for annulment of a judgment is in
personam. The court's decision in this petition will not be
enforceable against the whole world. Any judgment therein
will eventually bind only the parties properly impleaded (See
Frias v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018).
Significance of distinction between actions in rem, in
personam, and quasi in rem
1. The distinction is important to determine whether
or not jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required
and consequently to determine the type of summons to be
employed.
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 425 SCRA 98, 103, is clear on
the matter:
"To resolve whether there was valid service of
summons on respondents, the nature of the action filed
230 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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against them must first be determined. As the Court
explained xx x it will be helpful to determine first whether
the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because
the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court of the Philippines apply according to the
nature of the action."
Against a resident defendant in an action in personam,
this jurisdiction is acquired by service in person on the
defendant (Sec. 5, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC) or, in case he cannot be served in person
within a reasonable time, by substituted service of summons
(Sec. 6, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC). Without a valid service of the summons, the court
cannot obtain jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
unless he voluntarily appears in the action. This voluntary
appearance is equivalent to service of summons (Sec. 23, Rule
14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
The case of Afdal v. Carlos, 636 SCRA 389, 396, 1s
instructive:
"x x x Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired
either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's
voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not
voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired
by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out
under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court."
2. "In an action in personam against a non-resident
who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of
the court, personal service within the state is essential to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. This method,
is possible, if such defendant is physically present in the
country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and, therefore, cannot validly try
the case against him" (Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals,
296 SCRA 539, 554).
Following the ruling in Asiavest, because an action for
specific performance is in personam, service of summons upon
him in person, while he is within the territory, is essential
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CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
for the court to acquire jurisdiction over him. In an action for
specific performance against a non-resident who is not found
in the Philippines, summons by publication will not enable
the court to acquire jurisdiction over him (Gomez v. Court of
Appeals, 425 SCRA 98, 106).
3. The Supreme Court sums up the basic rules on the
matter, in the following words, thus:
"The question of whether the trial court has
jurisdiction depends on the nature of the action, i.e.,
whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in
rem. The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, likewise, apply according to the nature
of the action.
"An action in personam is an action against a person
on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is
an action against the thing itself instead of against the
person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual
is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding
is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien
burdening the property.
"In an action in personam. jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or
quasi in rem. jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not a prereguisite to confer jurisdiction on the court
provided that the court acguires jurisdiction over the
res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of
the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
the court is recognized and made effective.
"Nonetheless, summons must ·be served upon the
defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.
"A resident defendant who does not voluntarily
appear in court, must be personally served with summons
as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
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(Note: Now Sec. 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). If she cannot be
personally served with summons, substituted service may
be effected (Note: There must be at least 3 attempts on 2
different dates before substituted service may be resorted
to under Section 6, Rule 14, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC):
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence to a person at least eighteen (18)
years of age and of sufficient discretion then residing
therein;
(b) By leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. A competent person
includes, but is not limited to, one who customarily
receives correspondences for the defendant;
(c) By leaving copies of the summons, ifrefused entry
upon making his or her authority and purpose known,
with any of the officers of the homeowners' association
or condominium corporation, or its chief security officer
in charge of the community or the building where the
defendant may be found; and
(d) By sending an electronic mail to the defendant's
electronic mail address, if allowed by the court (Biaco
v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, 515 SCRA 106;
underscoring and notes ours).
Requirement of notice or summons
A proceeding which is rem or quasi in rem, as earlier
mentioned does not, as a rule require jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, and this rule becomes very apparent
when the defendant is a non-resident and is not found in the
Philippines. For instance, as earlier discussed, his property
found in the Philippines may be attached and, by so doing, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the property or res, even if it
has no personal jurisdiction over the defendant. A Philippine
court, thus, will have the jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case because it has jurisdiction over the res by virtue of the
attachment.
CHAPTER III 233
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
This should not be taken to mean, however, that notice
or summons to the parties interested in the action is not
necessary. Due process requires that those with interests in
the thing in litigation be notified and given an opportunity
to defend those interests. Their rights to be heard cannot be
denied. This means that jurisdiction over the res is not suffi-
cient for a valid judgment. Such judgment also requires notice
or service of summons to all interested parties to satisfy the
due process requirement of the fundamental law. Hence,
notice to those interested in the action is necessary whatever
the action is, in rem, quasi in rem or in personam. Only the
manner by which the notice is made may differ, depending
on the nature of the action, but such notice or summons
need be sent. Hence, in in rem or quasi in rem actions, where
the defendant is a non-resident and is not found in the
Philippines, this notice is effected through extraterritorial
service of summons under Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC. In actions against
residents of the Philippines, the rule mandates the use of
service in person on the defendant in Sec. 5, Rule 14, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, and in default
thereof, substituted service of summons under Sec. 6, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC.
For instance, in a probate of a will, a proceeding in rem, while
no person is sought to be held liable by the proceeding and the
rule does not mention the term, 'summon,' the rule requires
that the heirs, devisees, legatees and executors be notified by
mail or personally. If the testator asks for the allowance of his
own will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs (See
Sec. 4, Rule 76, Rules of Court).
One pronouncement even declares:
"Hence, regardless of the nature of the action, proper
service of summons is imperative. A decision rendered
without proper service of summons suffers a defect in
jurisdiction. Respondent's institution of a proceeding for
annulment of petitioner's certificate of title is sufficient
to vest the court with jurisdiction over the res, but it
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is not sufficient for the court to proceed with the case
with authority and competence" (De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November
26, 2014).
Example of when an action in rem or quasi in rem is treated
as in personam
An action in rem or quasi in rem is treated as an action in
personam if the defendant presents himself in the action. This
has been clarified by jurisprudence, thus:
"If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly
a suit in personam, with the added incident, that the
property attached remains liable, under the control of the
court, to answer to any demand which may be established
against the defendant by the final judgment of the court.
But, if there is no appearance of the defendant, and
no service of process on him, the case becomes, in its
essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only effect of
which is to subject the property attached to the payment
of the defendant which the court may find to be due to the
plaintiff' (See Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil.
921, 929 citing Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308).
When summons by publication may be made in an action in
personam
Summons by publication, as a general rule, will not
enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant (Pantaleon u. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761, 765;
See also Citizens Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. u. Melencio-
Herrera, 38 SCRA 369; Magdalena Estate u. Nieto, 125 SCRA
758; Consolidated Plywood u. Breua, 166 SCRA 589). This
jurisprudential rule is, however, subject to the exceptions laid
down under the amended rules which took effect on July 1,
1997.
(a) In Sec. 16 of Rule 14, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC if the identity of the defendant is unknown
or whose whereabouts are unknown, service may, with
leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
CHAPTER III 235
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
newspaper of general circulation. Note the words "in any
action" in Sec. 16 of Rule 14, as amended (Sec. 16, Rule
14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC;
Santos u. PNOC Exploration Corporation, 566 SCRA 272,
278).
(b) In Sec. 18 of Rule 14, as amended by AM. No.
19-10-20-SC, if the resident defendant is temporarily
out of the country, he may be served by publication with
leave of court.
While the phrase "summons by publication" does not
appear in Sec. 18, the way it expressly appears in Sec. 16,
the rule makes reference to Sec. 17 of Rule 14 which allows
summons by publication. Note also the words "any action" in
Sec. 18 of Rule 14 making the rule applicable even to actions
in personam (Sec. 18, Rule 14 in relation to Sec. 17, Rule
14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC;
Suggested reading: Asiauest Limited u. Court of Appeals, 296
SCRA 539).
III. PARTIES (Rule 3)
Parties to a civil action
1. It is inconceivable to have a civil action without
parties to the same. The rule gives two main categories of
parties to a civil action namely, the plaintiff and the defendant
(Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
2. The plaintiff is the claiming party and is the
one who files the complaint. The term, however, does not
exclusively apply to the original plaintiff. It may also apply
to a def end ant who files a counterc,laim, a cross-claim or a
third-party complaint. The rule (Sec. 1, Rule 3) defines the
term 'plaintiff,' as the claiming party, the counter-claimant,
the cross-claimant or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff
(Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
3. The defendant does not only refer to the original
defending party. If a counterclaim is filed against the original
plaintiff, he becomes a defendant and the original defendant,
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236 CML PROCEDURE
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a plaintiff in the counterclaim. Under the Rules (Sec. 1, Rule 3,
Rules of Court), the term 'defendant' refers also to a defendant
in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth,
etc.)-party defendant.
Who may be parties
The following may be parties to a civil action:
(a) natural persons,
(b) juridical persons, and
(c) entities authorized by law (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules
of Court, Association of Flood Victims v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 203775, August 5, 2014).
Juridical persons as parties
1. The juridical persons who may be parties to a civil
action are those enumerated in Art. 44 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, namely:
(a) The State and its political subdivisions;
(b) Other corporations, institutions and entities for
public interest or purpose, created by law; and
(c) Corporations, partnerships and associations
for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of
each shareholder, partner or member.
Where the complaint is commenced by a plaintiff not
authorized to be a party to a case, because it is not a natural
person or a juridical person or an entity authorized by law, it
becomes dismissible on the ground of lack of legal capacity to
sue (Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc. v.
The Quezon City Government, G.R. No. 230651, September 18,
2018).
2. Juridical persons have personalities separate and
distinct from those of the natural persons that compose them.
Thus, a suit against a stockholder of a corporation is not a suit
against the latter. A judgment in a suit for recovery of ill-gotten
CHAPTER III 237
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
wealth against a corporate shareholder, is not a judgment
against the corporation and the enforcement of the judgment
against the latter is a violation of its right to due process and
a disregard of its distinct and separate personality (Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. Nos.
177857-58, G.R. No. 178193, October 5, 2016). The converse is
also true. A judgment rendered against the corporation is not
a judgment rendered against a corporate stockholder.
When the corporate offices have been illegally searched,
the right to contest the transgression does not belong to any
corporate officer. It belongs to the corporation alone which has
a personality of its own separate and distinct from that of an
officer or a stockholder. The objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third persons (See Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383).
One early famous case, aptly demonstrates the separate
personality of a corporation particularly well. Here, a collection
suit was filed by a bank against a corporation and its president.
Some stockholders of the corporation filed a motion for leave
to intervene in the case, alleging that the corporate president
was not authorized to enter into the loan agreement with the
bank and that there was a collusion between the bank and
the corporation. The stockholders argued that their right to
intervene is based on their right to protect their interests as
stockholders.
The Court denied the intervention and held: "[T]he interest
which entitles a person to intervene in a suit, between other
parties, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain
or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment."
The interest of the stockholders, rule~ the Court, is "indirect,
contingent, remote, conjectural, consequential and collateral.
At the very least, their interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer
expectancy of a right in the management of the corporation
x x x." The Court, in the same case went on to explain that
while a share of stock represents a proportionate or aliquot
interest in the corporation, it does not vest the owner thereof
with any legal right or title to any of the corporate property.
This is because shareholders are not the owners of such
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property which is owned by the corporation as a distinct legal
person (Saw v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 740, 745, citing
Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266).
However, even if the cause of action belongs to the
corporation, if the board refuses to sue despite demand by the
stockholders to sue and protect or vindicate corporate rights,
a stockholder is allowed by law to file a derivative suit in the
corporate name. In such a suit, the real party in interest is
actually the corporation and the stockholder filing the action
is a mere nominal party (Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of
Appeals, 300 SCRA 579, 614).
Entities authorized by law to be parties
One need not be a natural or juridical person to be a party
to a civil action. Sec. 1 of Rule 3 adds a third possible party to
a civil action aside from natural persons and juridical persons.
Said provision recognizes "entities authorized by law." As long
as an entity is authorized by law to be a party, such entity
may sue or be sued or both. Consider the following examples:
(a) Under Sec. 21 of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, a corporation by estoppel is precluded from
denying its existence and the members thereof can be
sued and be held liable as general partners.
(b) A contract of partnership having a capital of
three thousand pesos or more but which fails to comply
with the registration requirements is, nevertheless, liable
as a partnership to third persons (Art. 1772 in relation to
Art. 1768 of the Civil Code of the Philippines).
(c) The estate of a deceased person is a juridical
entity that has a personality of its own (Nazareno v.
Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 637, 653, citing Limjoco v.
Intestate Estate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776). Since it has a
personality of its own, it may be a party to an action.
(d) A legitimate labor organization may sue and be
sued in its registered name (Art. 242[e], Labor Code of the
Philippines).
i
CHAPTER III 239
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
(e) The Roman Catholic Church may be a party
and as to its properties, the archbishop or diocese, to
which they belong, may be a party (Barlin v. Ramirez, 7
Phil. 41; Versoza v. Fernandez, 49 Phil. 627, 633-634).
(f) A dissolved corporation may prosecute and
defend suits by or against it provided that the suits (i)
occur within three years after its dissolution, and (ii) the
suits are in connection with the settlement and closure of
its affairs (Sec. 139, Corporation Code of the Philippines).
(g) "[A] partnership for the practice of law,
constituted in accordance with the Civil Code of the
Philippines acquires a juridical personality by operation
of law. Having a juridical personality distinct and
separate from its partners, such partnership is the real-
party-in-interest in connection with a contract entered
into in its name and by a person authorized to act in its
behalf xx x [O]ur law on partnership does not exclude
partnerships for the practice of law from its coverage
xx x Under Article 1771, a partnership may be constituted
in any form x x x" (Saludo v. Philippine National Bank,
G.R. No. 193138, August 20, 2018).
Entity without a juridical personality as a defendant
1. An example of an entity that is neither a natural nor
juridical person but is allowed by the Rules of Court to be a
party to an action, although as a defendant, is the one treated
in Sec. 15 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
2. Under Sec. 15, "when two or more persons not
organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into
a transaction, they may be sued under the name by which
they are generally or commonly known." Under the same
provision, the responsive pleading of the entity sued must
disclose the names and addresses of its members since they
are the persons ultimately liable to the plaintiff.
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Thus, if A, B, C, D, and E, without incorporating
themselves or without registering as a partnership, enter
into transactions using the common name, "Sea Quest Corp.,"
they may be sued as "Sea Quest Corp." When the defendant
"corporation" answers, the names of A, B, C, D, and E and
their addresses must be revealed. Note, however, that the
authority to be a party under this section is confined only to
being a defendant and not as a plaintiff. This is evident from
the words, they may be sued.
Effect when a party impleaded is not authorized to be a
party
1. Where the plaintiff is not a natural or a juridical
person or an entity authorized by law, a motion to dismiss m_ay
be filed on the ground that "the plaintiff has no legal capacity
to sue" (Sec. 12 [a]3, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended _by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Where the plaintiff has a legal capacity
to sue but is not the person who should sue because he is not
the real party in interest, the complaint is dismissible on the
ground that the complaint "states no cause of action."
2. Where it is the defendant who is not a natural or a
juridical person or an entity authorized by law, t~e compla_int
may be dismissed on the ground that the "pleadmg assertmg
the claim states no cause of action" or "failure to state a cause
of action" (Sec. 12 [a{4}],Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amende~ by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC), because a complaint cannot possibly
state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a
civil action.
Averment of capacity to sue or be sued
Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or
the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity, or the legal existence of an organized association of
persons that is made a party, must be averred (Sec. 4, Rule 8,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
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CHAPTER III 241
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
Minor or incompetent as a party
A minor or an incompetent may sue or be sued. He can
be a party, not through, but with the assistance of his father,
mother, guardian, or ifhe has none, a guardian ad litem (Sec.
5, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Real party in interest (Bar 1988; 1989; 2015)
1. "A real party in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit" (Sec. 2, Rule 3, Rules
of Court, Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R.
No. 181293, February 23, 2015; Spouses Laus v. Optimum
Security Services, Inc., G.R. No. 208343, February 3, 2016;
Virata v. Ng Wee, G.R. No. 221135, July 6, 2017).
To be a real party in interest, the interest must be 'real,'
which is a present substantial interest as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or a future, contingent subordinate or
consequential interest (Rayo v. Metrobank, 539 SCRA 571,
579; Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 624, 649). It is an interest
that is material and direct, as distinguished from a mere
incidental interest (Mayor Rhustom Dagadag v. Michael C.
Tongnawa, 450 SCRA 437, 443-444).
2. Unless otherwise authorized by law or by the Rules,
"every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest" (Sec. 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court,
Hacbang v. Alo, G.R. No. 191031, October 5, 2015; See also
Ang v. Pacunio, G.R. No. 208928, July 8, 2015). If a suit is not
brought in the name of or against the real party in interest,
a motion to dismiss may be filed qn the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action (Spouses Laus v. Optimum
Security Services, Inc., supra). Like the need for a cause of
action in ordinary civil actions, this requirement is not a mere
technical matter because it goes into the very substance of the
suit. If either of the parties is not the real party in interest,
the court cannot grant the relief prayed for because that party
has no legal right or duty with respect to the other. Litigation
242 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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then becomes a mere academic exercise that eventually settles
nothing and thus, a waste of time (Hacbang v. Alo, G.R. No.
191031, October 5, 2015).
3. The rule on real party in interest ensures that the
party with the legal right to sue brings the action and to bring
to court a party rightfully interested in the litigation so that
only real controversies shall be presented to the court (For
further readings, see Philippine Numismatic and Antiquarian
Society v. Aquino, G.R. No. 206617, January 30, 2017).
Determining the real party in interest
1. The determination of who the real party in interest
is, requires going back to the elements of a cause of action. A
cause of action involves the existence of a right and a violation
of such right. Evidently, the owner of the right violated stands
to be the real party in interest as plaintiff and the person
responsible for the violation is the real party in interest as
defendant. Thus, in a suit for violation of a contract, the
parties in interest would be those covered by the operation
of the doctrine of relativity of contracts under Art. 1311 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, namely, the parties, their
assignees and heirs.
"The basic principle of relativity of contracts is that
contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and
cannot favor or prejudice a third person xx x. Hence, one who
is not a party to a contract, and for whose benefit it was not
expressly made, cannot maintain an action on it" (Vda. de
Rojales v. Dime, G.R. No. 194548, February 10, 2016). Bar
2011 For example, in a suit for annulment of a contract, the
real parties in interest would be those who are principally
or subsidiarily bound by the contract (Art. 1397, Civil Code
of the Philippines). A third party, who has not taken part
in a compromise agreement, has no right to ask for the
enforcement of the agreement (Westmont Bank v. Shugo Noda
& Co. Ltd., 307 SCRA 381, 391). Neither can such person seek
the amendment or modification of the same (Periquet, Jr. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 238 SCRA 697, 713).
L
CHAPTER III 243
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
2. While, ordinarily, one who is not privy to a contract
may not bring an action to enforce it, there are recognized
exceptions to this rule. For example, if a contract contains
a stipulation pour autrui (a stipulation expressly conferring
benefits to a third person), such person, in whose benefit the
stipulation was conferred by the parties, may demand the
fulfillment of the contract, and even sue under such contract
provided he accepted and communicated his acceptance of the '
beneficial stipulation prior to its revocation (Art. 1311, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
3. A mere agent, who is not an assignee of the principal,
cannot bring suit under a deed of sale entered into in behalf of
his principal because it is the principal, not the agent, who is
the real party in interest (Uy v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA
69, 77). If a complaint is filed by an agent for and in behalf of
the principal, the agent is not the real party in interest (Africa
v. Insurance Savings and Investment Agency, Inc. [ISIAJ, G.R.
No. 206540, April 20, 2015).
Where an agent acts in his own name and for the benefit
of an undisclosed principal, the agent may sue or be sued in
his own name, without joining the principal, except when the
contract involves things belonging to the principal (Sec. 3,
Rule 3, Rules of Court).
"The power to collect and receive payments on behalf
of the principal is an ordinary act of administration covered
by the general powers of an agent. On the other hand, the
filing of suits is an act of strict dominion. Under Article 1878
(15) of the Civil Code, a duly appointed agent has no power to
exercise any act of strict dominion on behalf of the principal
unless authorized by a special power. of attorney. An agent's
authority to file suit cannot be inferred from his authority to
collect or receive payments; the grant of special powers cannot
be presumed from the grant of general powers. Moreover, the
authority to exercise special powers must be duly established
by evidence, even though it need not be in writing'' (V-Gent,
Inc. v. Morning Star Travel and Tours, G.R. No. 186305, July
22, 2015).
244 CML PROCEDURE
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4. Should a lawful possessor be disturbed in his
possession, it is the possessor, not necessarily the owner of the
property, who can bring the action to recover the possession.
The argument that the complaint states no cause of action
because the suit was filed by a mere possessor and not by the
owner is not correct (Philippine Trust Company v. Court of
Appeals, 320 SCRA 719, 729).
In an action for forcible entry, the possessor/lessee is the
real party in interest as plaintiff and not the owner/lessor.
The issue in an action for forcible entry is mere possession.
But in an action to recover damages for injury caused by the
deforciant on the property, the owner/lessor is the real party
in interest as plaintiff.
5. In an action for ejectment, any one of the co-owners
may bring the action (Art. 487, Civil Code of the Philippines).
6. Under Art. 1768 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
a partnership has a juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of each of the partners. Hence, if the
contract was entered into by the partnership in its name, it
is the partnership, not its officers or agents, which should be
impleaded in any litigation involving property registered in
its name. A violation of this rule will result in dismissal of the
complaint (Aguila v. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 246,254) for
failure to state a cause of action.
7. The real party in interest in a criminal prosecution
is the "People of the Philippines." The interest of the private
offended party is only in the civil aspect of the case (For further
readings, see Ablud Metal Recycling Corporation v. Ang, G.R.
No. 182157, August 17, 2015; Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde, G.R.
No. 217456, November 24, 2015).
8. The condominium unit owners and residents of a
condominium building, affected by an oil leak in the pipelines
of the defendant, which made the place inhabitable for them,
are real parties in interest (West Tower Condominium on
behalf of the Residents of West Tower Condominium and in
representation of Barangay Bangkal, and others, including
CHAPTER III 245
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
inors and generations yet unborn v. First Philippine
'Fndustrial Condominium, G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015).
9. Where the cause of action is based on a breach of
contract of carriage, the liability of the common carrier is direct
and primary since the contract is between the carrier and the
passenger. The driver of the carrier cannot be made liable since
he is not a party to the contract of carriage. It is erroneous
to hold the carrier and the driver jointly and severally liable
(Sanico v. Colipano, G.R. No. 209969, September 27, 2017).
Doctrine of locus standi
1. The doctrine of locus standi or legal standing refers
to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of
the challenged governmental act (Osmeiia III v. Abaya, G.R.
No. 211737, January 13, 2016; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R.
No. 225973, November 8, 2016; For further readings, see also
Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July
25, 2017; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, August 8,
2017).
For example, when a quo warranto proceeding is brought
by a private person to question the constitutionality of the
appointment made by the President of the Philippines and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment, the petitioner must show
a clear right to the contested office. The right to the office
must be clear. A mere preferential right to be appointed does
not lend a legal ground to proceed with the action. Hence, a
mere nominee to a position in the judiciary cannot claim a
clear legal right to the position. Being included in the list of
nominees, submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council, only
gives the petitioner a possibility, ·not certainty, of being
appointed to the position, considering the discretionary power
of the appointing power of the President of the Philippines.
The petitioner, hence, has no legal standing to file the petition.
The same principle as above applies to a ·quo warranto
petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to
oust certain appointees of the President to the Judiciary. The
246 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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IBP does not qualify under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court as an
individual claiming to be entitled to the positions in question
(See Aguinaldo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302, November 29,
2016).
2. As a rule, locus standi requires a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy. Hence, a party will be allowed
to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (a) he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because
of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (b) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (c) the
injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.
Otherwise he/she would not be allowed to litigate (See Umali
v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017).
3. The rule on locus standi is a mere procedural
technicality, hence, the Court, in a catena of cases, has waived
or relaxed the same rule, allowing persons who may not have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
governmental act. The Court, therefore, has laid out the bare
minimum norm to extend the standing to sue to the so-called
"non-traditional suitors," thus:
"(a) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(b) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the law in question;
(c) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing
that the issues raised are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and
(d) For legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained ofinfringes on their prerogatives
as legislators" (Funa v. Agra, 691 SCRA 196, 208-209,
February 19, 2013; See also Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll
Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015;
Republic u. Cortez, Sr., G.R. No. 197472, September 7,
2015; Forfurther readings, see Aguinaldo v. Aquino IIL
G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016). "Otherwise stated,
CHAPTER III 247
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
whenever the acts affect the powers, prerogatives and
privileges of Congress, anyone of its members may validly
bring an action to challenge the same to safeguard and
maintain the sanctity thereof' (Umali u. Judicial and
Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017).
4. The concept of legal standing or locus standi has
been broadened more by recent Court pronouncements. One
case instructs:
"x xx [E]very citizen has the right, if not the duty, to
interfere and see that a public offense be properly pursued
and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.
When a citizen exercises this "public right" and challenges
a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or
legislative action, he represents the public at large, thus,
clothing him with the requisite locus standi. He may not
sustain an injury as direct and adverse as compared to
others but it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates
in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief
from the Court in the vindication of a public right.
''Verily, legal standing is grounded on the petitioner's
personal interest in the controversy. A citizen who files a
petition before the court asserting a public right satisfies
the requirement of personal interest simply because
the petitioner is a member of the general public upon
which the right is vested. A citizen's personal interest
in a case challenging an allegedly unconstitutional act
lies in his interest and duty to uphold and ensure the
proper execution of the law (Padilla v. Congress of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017).
5. The concept of 'standing,' because of its constitu-
tional underpinnings, is very different from questions
7el~ting to whether or not a particular party is a real party
m mterest. Although both are directed towards ensuring that
only ~ertain parties can maintain an action, the concept of
stand:ng requires an analysis of broader policy concerns. The
quest10n, as to who the real party in interest is, involves only
248 CML PROCEDURE
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a question on whether a person would be benefited or injured
by the judgment or whether or not he is entitled to the avails
of the suit (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, 562).
While standing is a constitutional law concept (Hontiveros-
Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February
23, 2015), in private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to
be a "real party-in-interest" (United Church of Christ in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc.,
674 SCRA 92, 114, June 20, 2012; citations omitted). In other
words, in private suits, standing is governed by the "real
parties in interest" rule found in Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court (Baltazar v. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74, 83).
Plaintiff in environmental cases
Any real party in interest, including the government and
juridical entities authorized by law, may file a civil action
involving the enforcement or violation of any environmental
law (Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases).
Affirmative defense when a party is not the real party in
interest
1. It will be observed that Rule 8 does not provide for
an affirmative defense which directly states that 'the plaintiff
or the defendant is not the real party in interest.' Instead, the
ground provided for in Sec. 12 [a]4, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as
amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC) is:
"That the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action."
2. It must, likewise, be reiterated that the rule does
not consider 'lack' of a cause of action or 'absence' of a cause
of action. What it supplies is that the pleading asserting the
claim "states no cause of action.'' It is the failure to state the
cause of action, not its absence or lack, which could be invoked
as an affirmative defense.
CHAPTER III 249
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
3. Thus, if the plaintiff, for instance, has capacity to
sue but he is not the 'real party-in-interest,' the ground for
dismissal is a 'failure to state a cause of action' or that the
complaint 'states no cause of action.'
The case of Aguila v. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 246,
253, is enlightening:
"Any decision rendered against a person who is not
a real party-in-interest in the case cannot be executed.
Hence, a complaint filed against such person should be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action."
The ruling in Balagtas v. Court of Appeals, 317 SCRA 69,
76-77, likewise, clearly states that if the suit is not brought in
the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to
dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action (See Philippine Numismatic and Antiquarian
Society v. Aquino, G.R. No. 206617, January 30, 2017; See also
Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 208426, September 30,
2017).
4. The foregoing pronouncements were issued before
the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
A motion to dismiss based on the ground that the pleading
asserting the claim states no cause of action is now a prohibited
pleading under Sec. 12 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as
amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC. Such ground must ' be
raised as an affirmative defense in the answer pursuant to
Sec. 12, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Representative parties
1. Some actions may be allowed to be prosecuted or
defen~ed ~Y a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity hke a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an
executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or by
the Rules (Sec. 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
2. Even where the action is allowed to be prosecuted
or defended by a representative party or someone acting in
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a fiduciary capacity (like the trustee of an express trust, an
executor, or administrator), the beneficiary shall be included
in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party
in interest (Sec. 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court, Aron v. Realon, 450
SCRA 372, 388). The phraseology of Sec. 3, Rule 3 leaves no
doubt as to what the rule is. Impleading the beneficiary as a
party is mandatory since said beneficiary is deemed to be the
real party in interest.
For example, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (PDIC) may prosecute or defend the case by or against a
bank as a representative party while the bank, which is un-
der conservatorship, will remain as the real party in interest
(Balayan Bay Rural Bank, Inc. v. National Livelihood Devel-
opment Corporation, G.R. No. 194589, September 21, 2015).
3. In derivative suits, the corporation concerned must
be impleaded. It is actually its cause of action that is being
litigated (Florete, Jr. v. Florete, Sr., G.R. No. 174909, January
20, 2016).
Citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases
1. A citizen suit may be filed by any Filipino citizen in
representation of others, including minors or generations yet
unborn, to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws (Sec. 5, Rule 2, Part IL Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases). This is a unique rule which authorizes
a suit in representation of generations yet unborn even if those
represented are, at the time of the filing of the suit, neither
conceived nor born.
2. When the suit is filed, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain the following: (a) a brief description of the
cause of action; (b) a brief description of the reliefs prayed for,
and (c) an order requiring all interested parties to manifest
their interest to intervene in the case within 15 days from
notice thereof (Sec. 5, Rule 2, Part II, Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases).
.L
CHAPTER III 251
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
Note that under the Rules of Court, in ordinary civil
actions, the court does not issue an order requiring interested
parties to manifest their intention to intervene. Instead, it is
the intervenor who asks for leave of court to intervene and his
intervention rests on judicial discretion (See Sec. 1, Rule 19,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. The order mentioned in the preceding number may
be published, by the plaintiff, once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines or copies of said order may be
furnished to all affected barangays (Sec. 5, Rule 2, Part II,
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases).
Standing of marine mammals
An interesting case had the occasion to rule on the
legal standing of marine mammals being represented in
a suit. There were two petitioners in the petition. The first
were the mammals collectively referred to as the "Resident
Marine Mammals." Said mammals were the toothed whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit
the waters in and around the Tanon Strait. They were joined
and represented by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-
Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians
and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards")
who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
aforementioned marine species.
The procedural issue raised in the case was whether or not
the Resident Marine Mammals had locus standi or were real
parties-in-interest. The Resident Marine Mammals, through
the Stewards, "claimed" that they had the legal standing to
file this action since they stood to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in this suit. In this regard, they propounded
that they have the right to demand that they be accorded
the benefits granted to them in multilateral international
instruments that the Philippine Government had signed,
under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.
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As to the Stewards who are natural persons, the Court
ruled that they have legal standing. The Court explained:
"It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined
as real parties in the petition and not just in representation
of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and
Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there
may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat
of the Resident Marine Mammals, therefore, are declared
to possess the legal standing to file this petition."
As to the Resident Marine Mammals, it was prayed that
the Court lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise
of epistolary jurisdiction. In opposition, the public respondents
argued that the Resident Marine Mammals had no standing
because Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to
an action to be either natural or juridical persons. The public
respondents contend that since petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards' petition was not brought in the name
of a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action.
The petitioners, Resident Marine Mammals, through the
Stewards, countered by citing the 1972 United States case
Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton, wherein Justice Willia~
0. Douglas, dissenting to the conventional thought on legal
standing, opined that since even inanimate objects, like a ship
or a corporation, are sometimes parties in litigation, the same
r~le should apply with respect to "valleys, alpine meadows,
rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees,
swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of
modern technology and modern life."
The Court, while conceding that environmental laws in
t~e P~ilip~ines have adopted a liberal approach through the
s1mphficat10n of procedures and facilitating court access in
environmental cases (like citizen suits), held that
."x. x x [D]evelopments in Philippine legal theory
and Jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice
Douglas's paradigm oflegal standing for inanimate objects
I
CHAPTER III 253
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
x x x." Besides, the Court explained that, the need to give
the resident marine mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases which allow any Filipino citizen, to bring a suit
to enforce environmental laws through the filing of a
"citizen's suit" (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Tafion Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises,
and other Cetacean Species, Joined in and Represented
herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-
Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal Guardians
of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards
of God's v. Reyes, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015).
Note: Although the Court did not rule in favor of the
legal standing of the marine mammals, the petition was,
nevertheless, not dismissed on procedural grounds because
the Stewards, in their personal capacities, joined in the suit
and were declared to have the required standing.
Indispensable parties (Bar 1996; 2015; 2017)
1. An indispensable party is a real party in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action
(Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court, St. Luke's College of Medicine v.
Spouses Perez, G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016; Enriquez
v. Vilar, G.R. No. 225309, March 6, 2018; Tumagan v. Kairuz,
G.R. No. 198124, September 12, 2018).
An indispensable party is one whose interest in the subject
matter of the suit and the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence
as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. On the
contrary, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest
in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible
from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily
be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to
the parties in court (Benedicto-Munoz v. Cacho-Olivares, G.R .
No. 179121, November 9, 2015; See also Philippine Veterans
Bank v. Spouses Sabado, G.R. No. 224204, August 30, 2017).

254 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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_2. In a _sui~based on breach of contract, the contracting
parties are mdispensable parties (St. Luke's College of
Medicine v. Spouses Perez, supra).
3. The registered owner of a lot whose title the plaintiff
seeks to nullify is an indispensable party (Cagatao v. Almonte,
G.R. No. 17 4004, October 9, 2013; See also Tumagan v. Kairuz,
G.R. No. 198124, September 12, 2018).
4. . T?e one who holds legal title to the property is
not an mdispensable party in a suit between parties to an
unlawful detainer suit where the issue is mere possession and
not ownership (Philippine Veterans Bank v. Spouses Sabado,
G.R. No. 224204, August 30, 2017).
5. Also, where the persons who built a structure, like
a church, are sought to be prohibited to use the same the
buil~ers are indispe~sable parties. They will be affect~d by
the Judgment and without them, no final determination of
the case can be had (Geronimo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 201781,
December 10, 2014).
6. . In a p~ti~ion ~or a substantial correction or change
of entry m the civil registry under Rule 108 it is mandatory
that t_he civil registrar, as well as all other ~ersons who have
or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby be
made respondents because they are indispensable parties (In
~heMatt_erfor the_Correction of Entry [Change of Family Name
in the Birth Certificate of Felipe C. Almojuela as Appearing in
the Records of the National Statistics Office] v. Republic, G.R.
No. 211724, August 24, 2016).
7. In act_ion for partition of real property, all persons
who are co-heirs and persons having an interest in the
prop~rty are indispensable parties. An action for partition will
not he without their joinder (Divinagracia v. Parilla, G.R. No.
196750, March 11, 2015). Bar 2017
. . 8. A transferee of a property pendente lite is not an
mdispensable party, as he would, in any event be bound
by the judgment against his predecessor (San;iago Land
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 79
8~. ,
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CHAPTER III 255
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
9. The person whose right to the office is challenged
is an indispensable party. No action can proceed unless he is
joined (Galarosa v. Valencia, 227 SCRA 726).
10. In an action for reconveyance of a property,
the persons against whom reconveyance is asserted are
indispensable parties (Lozano v. Balesteros, 195 SCRA 681,
690).
From the above jurisprudence, it may be inferred that
a person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest
of the other parties. In a joint obligation, for instance, the
interest of one debtor is separate and distinct from that of his
co-debtor. This is because the credit or debt is presumed to be
divided into as many equal shares as there are creditors or
debtors. Hence, a suit against one debtor does not make the
other an indispensable party to the suit (See Art. 1208, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties
1. "x x x [T]he joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory and the responsibility of impleading all the
indispensable parties rests on the plaintiff. Without the
presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment
of the court cannot attain real finality. Otherwise stated, the
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act
not only as to the absent party but even as to those present"
(Tumagan v. Kairuz, G.R. No. 198124, September 12, 2018).
It is only the joinder of indisp·ensable parties which is
mandatory (See Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Clearly, the
rule directs a compulsory joinder of indispensable parties (See
Crisologo v. JEWN Agro-Industrial Corporation, G.R. No.
196894, March 3, 2014). The joinder of other parties is merely
permissive (See Sec. 6, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

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f·.......
256 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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2. One decision of the Court declares that whenever
it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an
indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the
court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actuations of the court null and void, for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those
present. Accordingly, the responsibility of impleading all the
indispensable parties rests on the plaintiff. The defendant
does not have the right to compel the plaintiff to prosecute
the action against a party if he does not wish to do so, but the
plaintiff will have to suffer the consequences of any error he
might commit in exercising his option (Uy v. Court of Appeals,
494 SCRA 535, 545). Bar 2010
Effect of non-joinder of indispensable parties
The inclusion of indispensable parties is a jurisdictional
requirement. Any decision rendered by a court without first
obtaining the required jurisdiction over indispensable parties
is null and void for want of jurisdiction (Florete, Jr. v. Florete,
Sr., G.R. No. 174909, January 20, 2016), not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present (People v. Go, G.R.
No. 201644, September 24, 2014). The reason is not difficult
to see. Indispensable parties are those without whom no final
determination can be had of an action (See Sec. 7, Rule 3,
Rules of Court).
Failure to implead an indispensable party; not a ground for
dismissal {Bar 2010)
1. If a complaint or petition is not brought in the name
of or against an indispensable party, outright dismissal is
not the immediate remedy authorized by the Rules because,
under the Rules, the non-joinder (or misjoinder) of parties is
not a ground for dismissal of an action. Instead, parties may
be dropped or added by the court on motion of any party or on
its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms
as are just (Sec. 11, Rule 3, Rules of Court, See also Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Cacayuran, G.R. No. 191667, April 22,
2015).
·'
···
! CHAPTER III 257
tI
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
2. The rule is consistent with the options available to
the court when faced with failure to implead an indispensable
party. The court may order the amendment of the pleading.
It is when the order of the court to implead an indispensable
party goes unheeded may the case be dismissed. The court is
fully clothed with the authority to dismiss a complaint due
to the fault of the plaintiff as when, among others, he does
not comply with any order of the court (Sec. 3, Rule 17, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Plasabas v.
Court of Appeals, 582 SCRA 686, 692-693; Spouses Laus v.
Optimum Security Services, Inc., G.R. No. 208343, February
3, 2016; citations omitted).
3. Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action, as the remedy in such
a case is to implead the party claimed to be indispensable,
considering that parties may be added by order of the court,
on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action (Galido v. Magrare, G.R. No. 206584, January
11, 2016). It is error for the court to order the dismissal of
the case. The Court definitively explained that in instances
of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the proper remedy is
to implead them and not to dismiss the case. The non-joinder
of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at
such terms as are just, parties may be added on the motion
of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the
order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for
the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order (Divinagracia
v. Parilla, G.R. No. 196750, March 12, 2015; See also Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Cacayuran, supra).
Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties {Bar 2009; 2010)
1. A party is misjoined when he is made a party to the
action although he should not be impleaded. A party is not
joined when he is supposed to be joined but is not impleaded
in the action.
 258 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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2. To reiterate, neither misjoinder nor non-joinder
of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of
any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and on such terms as are just. If there is any claim against
a party misjoined, the same may be severed and proceeded
with separately (Sec. 11, Rule 3, Rules of Court, Almendras v.
Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 540, 544).
3. Even if neither misjoinder nor non-joinder is a
ground for dismissal of the action, the failure to obey the order
of the court to drop or add a party is a ground for the dismissal
of the complaint under Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court as
amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC. One case holds: "It is only '
upon the plaintiffs refusal to comply with the order to join
indispensable parties that the case may be dismissed" (Florete,
Jr. v. Florete, Sr., G.R. No. 174909, January 20, 2016).
Necessary parties
1. A necessary party is one who is not indispensable
but who ought to be joined as a party to the case if complete
relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of
the action (Sec. 8, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
2. The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not
prevent the court from proceeding in the action (See Sec. 9,
Rule 3, Rules of Court). Hence, a final determination of the
case can be had but only among the parties already impleaded
even if a necessary party, for some justifiable reason, is not
joined. But it would be better that all necessary parties are
joined so the parties may obtain complete relief.
Distinction between an indispensable and a necessary party
1.An indispensable party must be joined under any
and all conditions while a necessary party should be joined
whenever possible (Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348).
CHAPTER III 259
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
Stated otherwise, an indispensable party must be joined
because the court cannot proceed without him. Hence, his
presence is mandatory. The presence of a necessary party is
not mandatory because his interest is separable from that of
the indispensable party. He has to be joined only whenever
possible to afford complete relief to the parties and to avoid
multiple litigations.
2. A final decree can be had in a case even without a
necessary party because his interests are separable from the
interest litigated in the case (Chua v. Torres, 468 SCRA 358,
367; Seno v. Mangubat, 156 SCRA 113, 119).
A joint debtor is merely a necessary party. If AA and BB
are the joint debtors of CC for Pl million, the latter who wants
to collect only from AA in the meantime, may file an action
for collection against AA alone. In the suit against AA, BB is
a necessary party because without him, CC cannot collect the
entire debt but only half of it. Thus, he cannot have complete
relief by impleading only one debtor. In the suit against AA,
BB is not an indispensable party because even without him
being impleaded, the suit can proceed against AA. It is AA
who is an indispensable party to the suit filed by CC because
without AA being impleaded, CC cannot collect from AA.
Duty of pleader if a necessary party is not joined; effect (Bar
1998)
Whenever, in any pleading in which a claim is asserted,
a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth the
name of the necessary party, if his name is known, and state
why such party is omitted (Sec. 9, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
When court may order joinder of a necessary party (Bar
1998)
If the reason given for the non-joinder of the necessary
party is found by the court to be unmeritorious, it may order
the pleader to join the omitted party if jurisdiction over his
person may be obtained (Sec. 9, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
 260 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Effect of failure to comply with the order of the court (Bar
1998; 2011)
The failure to comply with the order of the court to include
a nec_essary party, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed
a waiver of the claim against such party (Sec. 9, Rule 3, Rules
of Court).
Effect of a justified non-inclusion of a necessary party (Bar
1998)
1. The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not
~revent the court from proceeding in the action, and the
J';1dgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the
rights of such necessary party (Sec. 9, Rule 3, Rules of Court
Agro Conglomerates, Inc. u. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 450:
460; Hemedez u. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 347, 375). ·
2. Assume that B bought a car from S on an installment
basis. A chattel mortgage was executed on the car in favor of
S to secure the obligation. Before the payment was completed
B sold the car to D. It was agreed solely between Band D that
D would be responsible for the monthly installments. D failed
to pay three installments.
May S sue D alone in the foreclosure suit or replevin
~ui~? Answer: He cannot. B must be made a defendant. B is an
md1spensable party in relation to S. The foreclosure or replevin
suit is premised on the default of B, the debtor. S would have
no right to foreclose the mortgage or repossess the car without
establishing the default of B, unless the obligation of B to S
wa~ as~igned to D with the consent of S, thereby novating the
obhgat10n by substituting the person of the debtor.
Unwilling co-plaintiff
~n _unwilling co-plaintiff is a party who is supposed to be
a plamtiffbut whose consent to be joined as a plaintiff cannot
be obtained as when he refuses to be a party to the action.
Under Sec. 10 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court said unwilling
co-plaintiff (a) may be made a defendant, and (b) the reason
therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Ji.........____
CHAPTER III 261
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
Alternative defendants (Bar 2011)
1. Where the plaintiff cannot definitely identify who
among two or more persons should be imp leaded as a defendant,
he may join all of them as defendants in the alternative. Under
Sec. 13 of Rule 3, "where the plaintiff is uncertain against who
of several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any or
all of them as defendants in the alternative, although a right
to relief against one may be inconsistent with a right of relief
against the other" (Sec. 13, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Just as the
rule allows a suit against defendants in the alternative, the
rule also allows alternative causes of action and alternative
defenses (See Sec. 2, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Assume that Mr. X, a pedestrian, was injured in
the collision of two vehicles. He suffered injuries but does not
know with certainty which vehicle caused the mishap. What
should Mr. X do ifhe wants to sue? Answer: He should sue the
vehicle drivers/owners in the alternative.
3. P sent some goods to D pursuant to a contract. The
goods were delivered to E, the known agent of D. D did not
pay P. D contends that he has not received the goods. P claims
otherwise and insists that D had received the goods. Should
P sue D or should he sue E? Answer: P should sue both but in
the alternative.
4. Plaintiff may sue the shipping company and the
arrastre operator alternatively for the recovery of damages
to goods shipped through a maritime vessel (Rizal Surety
& Insurance Company u. Manila Railroad Corporation, 70
SCRA 187).
Unknown identity or name of the defendant
Whenever the identity or name of the defendant is
unknown, he may be sued as the unknown owner, heir,
devisee, or by such other designation as the case may require;
when his identity or true name is discovered, the pleading
must be amended accordingly (Sec. 14, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
 262 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Effect of death of a party on the attorney-client relationship;
duty of counsel (Bar 2016)
1. The death of the client extinguishes the attorney-
client relationship and divests the counsel of his authority
to represent the client. Accordingly, a dead client has no
personality and cannot be represented by an attorney (Lavina
v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 691, 702). Neither does he
become the counsel of the heirs of the deceased unless his
services are engaged by said heirs (Lawas v. Court of Appeals,
146 SCRA 173, 176).
2. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, it is the
duty of the counsel of the deceased party to inform the court
of such fact within 30 days after such death. The counsel has
also the obligation to give the name and address of the legal
representative of the deceased. This duty is mandatory and
failure to comply therewith is a ground for disciplinary action
(Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court, Cordova v. Tornilla, 246
SCRA 430, 432; Heirs of Maximo Regoso v. Court of Appeals,
211 SCRA 348, 351). Note that this duty is imposed upon the
counsel of the deceased party, not upon the counsel of the
surviving party.
Action of court upon notice of death; effect of death on the
case (Bar 2009)
1. Upon receipt of the notice of death, the court shall
determine whether or not the claim is extinguished by such
death. If the claim survives, the court shall order the legal
representative or representatives of the deceased, named in
the information given by counsel, to appear and be substituted
for the deceased within 30 days from notice (Sec. 16, Rule 3,
Rules of Court). The substitution of the deceased would not
be ordered by the court in cases where the death of the party
would extinguish the action because substitution is proper
only when the action survives (Suggested reading: Aguas v.
Llemos, 5 SCRA 959). Bar 1999; 2014
CHAPTER III 263
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
2. Under the present rule, the heirs of the deceased
may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs (Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
The above rule is plain and explicit. The heirs may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased. Where an heir
appears as substitute for the deceased, there is no more need
to require the appointment of an executor or administrator.
Thus, it has been held that an heir does not need to first
secure the appointment of an administrator of the estate of
the deceased because, from the very moment of death, he
steps into the shoes of the deceased and acquires his rights
as devisee/legatee (See San Juan v. Cruz, 497 SCRA 410, 425-
426).
It is, however, possible that any of the following may
occur: (a) the counsel for the deceased does not name a legal
representative, or (b) there is a representative named but he
fails to appear within the specified period. When any of the
above happens, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for
the estate of the deceased, within a specified time. All court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs (Sec. 16, Rule 3,
Rules of Court). Bar 2016
Importance of substitution of the deceased
The purpose of the rule on substitution, when proper,
is to apprise the heir or substitute ~hat he is being brought
to the jurisdiction of the court in lieu of the deceased party
by operation of law. It is for the protection of the right of
every party to due process. Prior substitution is effected for
the trial court to obtain jurisdiction over the persons and to
obviate any future claim that he or she was not apprised of
the litigation (Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. Cebrero, G.R. No.
222737, November 12, 2018).

264 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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No requirement for amendment of complaint or service of
summons
The court, under Sec. 16 of Rule 3 is not required to
issue an order to amend the complaint upon being notified of
the death of a party but to issue an order requiring the legal
representative to appear and be substituted for the deceased.
It is not the amendment of the pleading, but the order of
substitution and its service, that are the steps towards the
substitution of the deceased by his representative or heir.
Neither is the issuance and the service of summons required.
Nothing in Sec. 16 of Rule 3 mandates service of summons.
Instead of issuing summons, the court shall, under the
authority of the same provision, order the legal representative
of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the said
deceased within 30 days from notice. It is the service of the
order of substitution upon the substitute that enables the
court to acquire jurisdiction over said substitute (For further
readings, see Ferreria v. Vda. de Gonzales, G.R. No. L-11567,
July 17, 1958). Bar 1999
Purpose and importance of substitution of the deceased
1. The purpose behind the rule on substitution of the
deceased is to apprise the heir or substitute that he is being
brought to the jurisdiction of the court in lieu of the deceased
party by operation of law. It is to ensure that the deceased
would continue to be properly represented in the suit through
the duly appointed legal representative of the estate (Vda. de
Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 305, 308). Bar 2014
Non-compliance with the rules on substitution of a deceased
party renders the proceedings of the trial court infirm because
the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the legal
representative or heirs of the deceased (Brioso v. Rili-Mariano,
396 SCRA 549, 556-557). A party to be affected by a personal
judgment must have a day in court and an opportunity to
be heard (Suggested readings: Vda. de Haberer v. Court of
Appeals, 104 SCRA 534; Ferreria v. Vda. de Gonzales, G.R.
No. L-11567, July 17, 1958; Ibanez v. Harper, G.R. No. 194272,
February 17, 2017). Bar 1999
CHAPTER III 265
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
2. However, in a case involving ejectment, _it was
that the non-substitution of the deceased by his legal
rue1 d .
tatives because of the failure of counse 1tom. £orm th e
re pre Sen , · h f
court of the death of his client, does ~ot deprive t e cb~urd~ o
jurisdiction. The decision of the court is, neverthe 1~ss, m i~g
n the successors-in-interest of the deceased. A Judgment m
upo · ctment case may be enforced not only against defendants
an eJe • £ ·1 th ·
therein but also against th_e memb_ers_of their ami_y, eir
relatives, or privies who derived their right of possession from
the deceased defendant (Florendo, Jr. u. Coloma, 129 SCRA
304, 309-311). Bar 2011
3. Formal substitution is, however, n~t necess_ary
when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared m the action,
participated therein and presented evidence in defense of
the deceased defendant (Vda. de Salazar u. Court of Appe?'ls,
250 SCRA 305, 309). In the absence of a formal substitut10n,
the court can acquire jurisdiction ov~r the p~rso1: of the
decedent's representative if he voluntarily submits himself to
said jurisdiction (Cordova v. Tornilla, ~46 SCRA 430, 432;_For
further readings, see Cardenas v. Heirs of Spouses Aguilar,
G.R. No. 191079, March 2, 2016; Ibanez v. Harper, G.R. No.
194272, February 17, 2017).
Examples of actions which survive the death of a party (Bar
2011)
1. Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates
actions that survive against a decedent's executors or
administrators, and they are:
(a) actions to recover real and personal property
from the estate;
(b) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and
(c) actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property.
Hence an action for damages filed against the defendant
should not' be dismissed upon his death. The action against
 266 CMLPROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
such defendant survives since it is one to recover damages for
an injury to the plaintiff (Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 216756,
August 8, 2018).
2. Actions to recover personal property like replevin
and actions to recover real property like forcible entry,
unlawful detainer, accion publiciana, accion reivindicatoria,
are examples of actions that survive. So are actions to enforce
a lien on the property, like foreclosure of mortgages. Also, an
action for quieting of title with damages is an action involving
real property. It survives and the claim is not extinguished by
the death of a party (Saligumba v. Palanog, 573 SCRA 8, 17).
An ejectment case survives the death of a party. It
continues until judgment because the issue concerning the
illegality of the defendant's possession is still alive, and upon
its resolution depends the corollary issue of whether and
how much damages may be recovered (Tanhueco v. Aguilar,
33 SCRA 233, 237; Vda. de Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 250
SCRA 305,311; Florendo, Jr. v. Poloma, 129 SCRA 304,310).
The Court teaches:
"An ejectment case is a real action that is not
extinguished by the death of a party. The judgment in
an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and
their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action. Hence, it is enforceable by
or against the heirs of the deceased. The judgment entitles
the winning party to: (a) the restitution of the premises,
(b) the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,
and (c) attorney's fees and costs" (Rivera-Calingasan v.
Rivera, G.R. No. 171555, April 17, 2013).
3. The action to recover damages arising from delicts
also survives. Under the last paragraph of Sec. 4 of Rule 111,
if the accused dies before arraignment, while the criminal case
shall be dismissed, such dismissal is without prejudice to any
civil action the offended party may file against the estate of
the deceased. If the accused dies after arraignment and during
CHAPTER III 267
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
the pendency of the criminal action, the civ~l liability aris~n~
from the crime is extinguished but any mdependent civil
action (that action arising from other sources of obliga~ions)
may be continued against the estate or legal represe~tative of
the accused upon proper substitution, or against said estate,
as the case may be.
Actions based on the tortious conduct of the defendant
survive the death of the latter (Melgar v. Buenviaje, 179 SCRA
196, 201; Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, 20 SCRA 987, 1000).
4. If the action does not survive like legal separation,
the proper action of the court is to simply dis~iss the case. It
follows then that substitution will not be reqmred.
Actions for the recovery of money arising from contractual
obligations
1. When the action is for the recovery of money arising
from contract, express or implied, and the defendant di~s before
entry of final judgment in the court in which the act10_nw:as
pending at the time of such death, the cour_t shall n?t d1sm1ss
the suit. The case shall be allowed to contmue until entry of
final judgment (Sec. 20, Rule 3, Rules of Court). 'Before entry
of final judgment' means the case is on trial or on appeal. In
any of these situations, there is yet no final judgment to be
entered.
If the plaintiff obtains a favorable judgment, ~aid
judgment shall be enforced following the procedure provided
for in the Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a
deceased person (Sec. 20, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Becaus~ of
the rule mandating compliance with the rule for prosecutmg
claims against the estate, the prevailing plaintiff is n~t
supposed to file a motion for the issuance of ~n o:der an~ writ
of execution of the judgment. Since the act10n 1s a claim for
money, the judgment for money favorable to the plaintiff shall
be filed as a money claim against the estate of the decedent
(Sec. 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court, For rela~ed readings, ~ee Heirs
of Spouses Maglasang v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R.
No. 171206, September 23, 2013). Bar 2000; 2009; 2012; 2014
268 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Action for recovery of money arising from contract,
expressed or implied
The action need not literally arise from contracts. The
term, "implied" accordingly, may mean a claim arising from law
or a quasi contract (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,
Volume IL 2008 Ed., pp. 76-77, citing Leung Ben v. O'Brien,
38 Phil. 182). The term does not include money claims arising
from a crime or a quasi-delict.
Incompetency or incapacity of a party during the pendency
of the action
In case a party becomes incapacitated or incompetent
during the pendency of the action, the court, upon motion with
notice, may allow the action to be continued by or against the
incompetent or incapacitated party with the assistance of his
legal guardian or guardian ad litem (Sec. 18, Rule 3, Rules of
Court).
Transfer of interest
1. In case of transfer of interest, the action may be
continued by or against the original party, unless the court,
upon motion, directs the person to whom the interest is
transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the
original party (Sec. 19, Rule 3, Rules of Court). A transferee
pendente lite is a proper party that stands exactly in the shoes
of the transferor, the original party.
2. Transferees are bound by the proceedings and
judgment in the case, such that there is no need for them to
be included or impleaded by name. The Court has even gone
further by saying that the transferee is joined or substituted in
the pending action by operation of law from the exact moment
when the transfer of interest is perfected between the original
party and the transferee. The Court has, likewise, recognized
that the trial court is given wide discretion and enough leeway
to determine who may be joined in a proceeding, or whether a
party may properly be substituted by another due to a transfer
of interest (Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. v.
Chua, G.R. No. 191170, September 14, 2016).
CHAPTER III 269
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
Indigent parties (Bar 2016)
1. A party may be authorized ~o litigate as an indigent
if the court is satisfied that the party is one who has no mon~y
erty sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic
or for himself and his family (Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of
propi·ti·es
necess
Court).
The application and hearing to litigate as an indigent
litigant is made ex parte (Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
2. If one is authorized to litigate as an indigent, such
authority shall include an exemption from the pay~ent of
(a) docket fees; (b) other lawful fees; and (c) transcri~ts of
stenographic notes, which the court may order to be furmshed
him (Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
However, the amount of the docket and other lawful fees,
which the indigent was exempted from paying, shall ~e li_enon
the judgment rendered in the case favorable to the mdig~nt.
A lien on the judgment shall not arise if the court provides
otherwise (Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
3. While the rule allows an ex parte application and
hearing to litigate as an indigent, at any time before judgment
is rendered by the trial court, any adverse party may contest
the grant of the authority to a party to litigate as an indigent.
If the court should determine that the party, declared as
an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income and
property, the proper docket and lawful fees shall be assessed
and collected by the clerk of court (Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of
Court).
In case the grant of the authority to litigate as an indigent
is contested by any party, the determination of the court on
whether or not the grant of the earlier authority is proper is
to be made after hearing, not ex parte (Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules
of Court).
Role of the 'Solicitor General'
1. The rule is that only the Solicitor General can
bring and defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
270 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Philippines and that actions filed in the name of the Republic
or its agencies and instrumentalities, if not initiated by the
Solicitor General, will be summarily dismissed. The authority
of the Solicitor General is embodied in Sec. 35(1), Chapter
12, Title III, and Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, 382 SCRA 552, 565).
2. Also, in any action involving the validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, executive order, presidential decree,
rule or regulations, the court, in its discretion, may require
the appearance of the Solicitor General who may be heard in
person or through a representative duly designated by him
(Sec. 22, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
3. In criminal actions brought before the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the
State is solely vested in the OSG. This is pursuant to Sec. 35(1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of
1987, as amended, providing that the OSG shall represent the
Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
all criminal proceedings. Only the Solicitor General may bring
or defend actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines
once such actions are brought before the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court (Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, supra).
Suit by or against spouses
Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law (Sec. 4, Rule 3, Rules of Court). An instance
when a spouse need not be joined in a suit involving the other
is when the litigation pertains to an exclusive property of a
spouse. In such a case, the owner-spouse may appear alone
in court to litigate with regard to the same (Art. 111, Family
Code of the Philippines).
There may be instances when, despite the separation
of property, one spouse may end up being sued and held
answerable for the liabilities incurred by the other spouse
because "The liability of the spouses to creditors for family
CHAPTER III 271
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
expenses shall, however, be solil~dary'.'(A~t.b~l~6,Famhily Codef
h Philippines). Under a so 1 anty 1ia 1 1ty, eac one o
ohf t e ses is bound to render entire compliance with the
tobligation(Arts.
e spou 1207and 1216, c·wi"l Codeo f th e Ph i.l.ippines.
. )
Class suit; requisites
1 A class suit is an action where one or more may
sue fo~ the benefit of all if the requisites for said action are
complied with.
2. An action does not become a class suit merely
because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the
suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attendant facts
(Mathay v. Consolidated Bank & Trust Company, 58 SCRA
559; Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345).
3. For a class suit to prosper, the following requisites
must concur:
(a) The subject matter of the controversy must be
of common or general interest to many persons;
(b) The persons are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties;
(c) The parties actually before the court are
sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully
protect the interests of all concerned; and
(d) The representatives sue or defend for the benefit
of all (Sec. 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court, Sulo ng Bayan, Inc.
v. Araneta, 72 SCRA 347, 356-357).
Commonality of interest in the subject matter
1. A class suit does not require a commonality of
interest in the questions involved in the suit. What is required
by the Rules is a common or general interest in the subject
matter of the litigation. The 'subject matter' of the action is
meant the physical, the things real or personal, the money,
lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to the suit which
is prosecuted and not the delict or wrong committed by the
272 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
defendant. It is not also a common question oflaw that sustains
a class suit but a common interest in the subject matter of the
controversy (Mathay u. Consolidated Bank & Trust Co., 58
SCRA 559, 571).
2. There is no class suit in an action filed by 400
residents, initiated through a former mayor, to recover
damages sustained due to their exposure to toxic wastes
and fumes emitted by the cooking gas plant of a corporation
located in the town. Each of the plaintiffs has a separate and
distinct injury not shared by other members of the class. Each
supposed plaintiff has to prove his own injury. There is no
common or general interest in the injuries allegedly suffered
by the members of the class. Bar 1994
3. There is no class suit in an action for damages filed
by the relatives of the fatalities in a plane crash. There is
no common or general interest in the injuries or death of all
passengers in the plane. Each has a distinct and separate
interest which must be proven individually. Bar 1991
4. There could possibly be a class suit in the closure of a
road. In one case, residents of various subdivisions instituted a
class suit against a developer and its affiliates. The complaint
alleged that the plaintiffs were regular commuters and
motorists who constantly travel using the entry and exit toll
gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing through
a right-of-way public road; that they had been using said road
for more than 10 years; that the defendants excavated, broke
and deliberately ruined and closed the road that led to SLEX;
that the act of the defendants in excavating the road caused
damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of
precious hours to them, to the commuters and motorists
because traffic was re-routed to narrow streets that caused
terrible traffic congestion and hazard; and that its permanent
closure would not only prejudice their right to free and
unhampered use of the property but would also cause great
damage and irreparable injury.
The defendants, among other defenses, argued that the
case was improperly instituted as a class suit. The Court,
CHAPTER III 273
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
however, ruled that there was a class suit because the
necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit were
present. Accordingly, the suit is clearly one that benefits all
commuters and motorists who use the road and the closure
affected all those who use the same (Juana Complex I
Homeowners Association, Inc. u. Fil-Estate Land, Inc., G.R.
No. 152272, March 5, 2012).
No class suit when interests are conflicting
When the interests of the parties in the subject matter
are conflicting, a class suit will not prosper. Hence, an action
brought by 17 residents of a town with a population of 2,460
persons to recover possession of a holy image was held not to
qualify as a class suit because the plaintiffs did not represent
membership of the churches they purport to represent and
that the interests of the plaintiffs conflict with those of the
other inhabitants who were opposed to the recovery (!banes u.
Roman Catholic Church, 12 Phil. 227, 241).
No class suit by a corporation to recover property of its
members
A non-stock corporation may not institute an action, in
behalf of its individual members, for the recovery of certain
parcels of land allegedly owned by its members and for the
nullification of the transfer of certificates of title issued
in favor of defendants. The corporation, being an entity
separate and distinct from its members, has no interest in the
individual property of its members, unless transferred to the
corporation. Absent any showing of interests, a corporation has
no personality to bring an action for the purpose of recovering
property, which belongs to the members, in their personal
capacities. Moreover, "a class suit does not lie in actions
for the recovery of property where several persons claim
ownership of their respective portions of property, as each one
could allege and prove his respective right in a different way
for each portion of the land, so that they cannot all be held to
have identical title through acquisitive prescription" (Sulo ng
Bayan, Inc. u. Araneta, 72 SCRA 347, 356-377). Bar 1978
274 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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No class suit to recover real property individually held
1. A class suit would not lie where each of the parties
has an interest only in the particular portion of the land he is
occupying and not in the portions individually occupied by the
other defendants (Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v.
Ruiz, 148 SCRA 326, 339, citing Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil.
473).
2. A class suit does not lie in an action for recovery
of real property where separate portions of the same parcel
of land were occupied and claimed individually by different
parties to the exclusion of each other, such that the different
parties had determinable, though undivided, interest in
the property in question since they do not have a common
or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy
(Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA
559, 571-572).
No class suit to recover damages for personal reputation
There is no class suit in an action filed by associations of
sugar planters to recover damages in behalf of individual sugar
planters for an allegedly libelous article in an international
magazine. There is no common or general interest in the
reputation of a specific individual. Each of the sugar planters
has a separate and distinct reputation in the community not
shared by the others (Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 142 SCRA 171, 176-177).
Common or general interest in the environment and natural
resources
There is a class suit in an action filed by minors,
represented by their parents, in behalf of themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the preservation of the
country's resources, their generation, as well as generations
yet unborn, to compel the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to: (1) cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country; and (2) cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. The Court agreed
CHAPTER III 275
CAUSES OF ACTION, ACTIONS, AND PARTIES
that the subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous,
it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all
of them before the court. Hence, the Court found that all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Sec. 12, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court are present in the action.
In what could be deemed a novel ruling, which recognized
that even minors and generations yet unborn may be
represented in a class suit, the Court held:
"[Th]e [Court] find[s] no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of inter-generational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." x x x Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put
a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come" (Oposa v. Factoran,
224 SCRA 792, 802-803).
Dismissal or compromise of a class suit
A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court (Sec. 2, Rule 17, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). This provision
is obviously intended to protect the common interests of all
those who initiated the class suit.
276 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Class suit distinguished from representative suit
Representative suits are not the same as class suits. A
class suit is a representative suit only insofar as the persons
who institute it represent the entire class of persons who have
the same interest or who suffered the same injury. However,
unlike representative suits, the persons instituting a class
suit are not suing merely as representatives. They themselves
are real parties in interest directly injured by the acts or
omissions complained of. There is a common cause of action in
a class. The group collectively - not individually- enjoys the
right sought to be enforced (Paje v. Casino, G.R. No. 207257,
February 3, 2015). In representative suits, the beneficiary is
deemed to be the real party in interest, not the representative
(Sec. 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
-oOo-
Chapter IV
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
I. PLEADINGS
A. General Principles on Pleadings
Nature of pleadings
Pleadings are the formal statements by the parties of
the operative facts which constitute their respective claims
and defenses (61A Am Jur 2d §1, 1981). Under the Rules of
Court, pleadings are the written statements of the respective
claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court
for appropriate judgment (Sec. 1, Rule 6, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Since pleadings are
described as "written statements," it is obvious, that in this
jurisdiction, there can be no oral pleadings. Equally clear in
the definition is what pleadings are supposed to contain, i.e.,
the "claims" and "defenses" of the parties.
Necessity and purpose of pleadings
1. Pleadings are designed to develop and present the
precise points in dispute between the parties. Their office is to
inform the court and the parties of the facts in issue. The object
of pleadings, in a more restricted and commonly accepted
sense, is to notify the opposite party of the facts which the
pleader expects to prove, so that he may not be misled in the
preparation of his case (61AAm Jur 2d, §3, 1981).
2. Pleadings are intended to secure a method by which
the issues may be properly laid before the court (Santiago
v. De los Santos, 61 SCRA 146, 150). Pleadings supply the
277
278 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
framework that guides the court in conducting the proceedings.
The actions of the court primarily depend upon the parties'
allegations in their pleadings. When, for example, objections
to the materiality of evidence are raised by one party, the
court inevitably has to refer to the pleadings to determine
whether or not the evidence objected to has relevance to the
issues raised in the pleadings.
Construction of pleadings
1. In this jurisdiction, all pleadings shall be liberally
construed so as to do substantial justice (Concrete Aggregate
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 88, 95). Pleadings
should receive a fair and reasonable construction in accordance
with the natural intendment of the words and language used
and the subject matter involved. The intention of the pleader
is the controlling factor in construing a pleading and should be
read in accordance with its substance, not its form (71 C.J.S.,
Pleading, §53).
2. While it is the rule that pleadings should be liberally
construed, it is also a rule that a party is strictly bound by the
allegations, statements or admissions made in his pleadings
and cannot be permitted to take a contradictory position.
Thus, it has been held that an admission in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission
and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted
by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be
ignored, whether objection is interposed or not (See Santiago
v. De los Santos, 61 SCRA 146, 149).
Construction of ambiguous allegations in pleadings
In case there are ambiguities in the pleadings, the same
must be construed most strongly against the pleader and that
no presumptions in his favor are to be indulged in. This rule
proceeds from the theory that it is the pleader who selects
the language used and if his pleading is open to different
constructions, such ambiguities must be at the pleader's peril
(61 Am Jur, Pleading, §57).
CHAPTERIV 279
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
Pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court (Bar 1996)
The following are the pleadings allowed by the Rules of
Court: (a) complaint; (b) answer; (c) counterclaim; (d) cross-
claim; (e) third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint; (f) complaint-
in-intervention; and (g) reply, only if the defending party
attaches an actionable document to the answer (Sec. 2, Rule
6, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Under the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the filing of a reply is no longer allowed except if
the defendant attaches an actionable document to the answer.
The purpose of allowing the reply is to give the plaintiff an
opportunity to deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the actionable document because it will be deemed
admitted if it is not denied under oath.
An "actionable document" is a written instrument or
document upon which an action is based. The pleader of such
document is required either to set forth the substance of such
instrument or document in the pleading, and to attach the
original or a copy thereof to the pleading as an exhibit, which
shall then be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or to set
forth a copy of the pleading (Fernando Medical Enterprises,
Inc. v. Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 207970,
January 20, 2016).
Pleadings allowed under the Rules on Expedited Procedures
in the First Level Courts
1. When a case falls under the Rules on Summary
Procedure, the only pleadings allowed to be filed are: (a)
complaint; (b) compulsory counterclaim pleaded in the answer;
(c) cross-claim pleaded in the answer; (d) answers thereto; and
(e) reply (Sec. l[AJ, Rule III, Rules on Expedited Procedures in
the First Level Courts). All new matters alleged in the answer
shall be deemed controverted. The plaintiff may file a reply to
a counterclaim only when an actionable document is attached
to the answer. The reply shall be filed within 10 calendar
days from receipt of the answer (Sec. 8[A], Rule N, Rules on
280 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts). The same
are the only pleadings allowed in actions for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer (Sec. 4, Rule 70, Rules of Court), such
actions being governed by the rule on summary procedure,
irrespective of the amount of damages and rentals sought to
be recovered (Sec. 3, Rule 70, Rules of Court).
2. A permissive counterclaim (See Sec. l[AJ, Rule III,
Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts), third-
party complaint and pleading-in-intervention are prohibited
under the Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level
Courts (Sec. 2, Rule II, Rules on Expedited Procedures in the
First Level Courts) and also in actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer (Sec. 13, Rule 70, Rules of Court).
Pleadings in the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases
1. Following the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC), the pleadings are expressed in
specific forms described therein.
For instance, instead of filing a complaint, as in an
ordinary civil action, a small claims action is commenced by
filing with the court an accomplished and verified Statement
of Claim (Form 1-SCC). No other formal pleading is necessary
to initiate a small claims action (Sec. 6, Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
2. Instead of filing an answer, the defendant shall file
with the court and serve on the plaintiff a duly accomplished
and verified Response (Form 3-SCC) (Secs. 12 and 13, Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC). Any
claim, which the defendant has against the plaintiff, shall be
filed as a counterclaim in the Response where the counterclaim
is compulsory as described in Sec. 15 of the Rule of Procedure
For Small Claims Cases. The defendant may, however, elect
to file a counterclaim (permissive) against the plaintiff even
if it does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject of the plaintiffs claim provided its amount and
nature are covered by the Rule (Sec. 15, Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC).
CHAPTER IV 281
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
3. The following pleadings, motions or petitions shall
not be allowed in the cases covered under the Rule of Procedure
for Small Claims Cases:
(a) Motion to dismiss the Settlement of Claim/s;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a
judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits, or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
G) Reply and rejoinder;
(d) Third-party complaints; and
(e) Interventions (Sec. 16, Rule of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, as amended).
Pleadings not allowed in a petition for a Writ of Amparo or
Habeas Data
In a petition for a writ of amparo or habeas data, the
following pleadings and motions are not allowed:
(a) Motion to dismiss
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return,
opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
 282 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
G) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for Reconsideration of interlocutory
orders or interim relief orders; and
(1) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
against any interlocutory order. (Sec. 11, The Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, October 24, 2007; Sec. 13, The Rule on
Habeas Data, February 2, 2008). The same provisions
prohibit the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus
or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
Pleadings in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases
1. The pleadings that may be filed are the (a) complaint;
(b) answer which may include a compulsory counterclaim
and cross-claim (Sec. 1, Rule 2, Part IL Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC). A reply and
rejoinder and a third-party complaint are prohibited pleadings
(Sec. 2, Rule 2, Part IL Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC).
2. A pleading in intervention may also be filed in a
citizen suit. Under Sec. 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, upon the filing of a citizen suit, the
court shall issue an order requiring all interested parties to
manifest their intention to intervene in the case within 15
days from notice.
Nature of a pleading; how determined
1. It is axiomatic that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition and
the character of the relief sought (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No.
CHAPTERIV 283
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
204 589, November 19, 2014) and not its title (Fong v. Duenas,
G.R. No. 185592, June 15, 2015).
Thus a complaint labeled as an action for a sum of money
d d ma~es could actually be a complaint for rescission based
an th a allegations of the complaint (Fong v. Duenas, G.R. No.
~~55;2, June 15, 2015). Also, i~ the p:titi~~er filed bef~re th_:,
Supreme Court a petition captioned Petit10n for Certi?rari
b ase d On R ule 65 , but the allegations state that the
. issues
.
· d are pure questions of law, the cause of act10n 1s not
raise
one based on Rule 65 which raises_ issues of Juris
· · d"1ct·10n, b u t
on Rule 45 which raises pure questions of law (See Sanchez v.
People, supra).
2. In one case, while the complaint was denominated
:~e
one for specific performance, the allegations therein and
relief prayed for actually and ultimately sought for
the execution of a deed of conveyance to effect a tran~fer
of ownership of the real property in question. The act10n,
therefore, is a real action (Gochan v. Gochan, 372 SCRA 256,
263-264).
3. Be reminded that it is not only the nature of a ca~se
of action that is determined by the allegations of the complamt
and the character of the relief sought. Such allegations and
relief also determine the body or court which has jurisdiction
over the action (Ching v. Subic Bay Golf and Country Club,
Inc., G.R. No. 174353, September 10, 2014). Thus, where the
allegations of the complaint clearly indicate the desire ~f t~e
plaintiff to eject the lessee from the premises, the action 1s
one for unlawful detainer cognizable by the MTC and not
one for collection for sum of money (For related readings, see
Barrazona v. RTC of Baguio, Branch 61, 486 SCRA 555).
4. The above pronouncements were made before the
2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Note
that the rules now include the evidence on which the party
pleading relies for his or her claim in the determination of
the nature of a pleading (See Sec. 1, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).

284 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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B. Parts of a Pleading
Caption of the pleading
The caption contains the following: (a) name of the court·
(b) title of the action; and (c) docket number, if assigned (Sec'.
1, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended byA.M. No.19-10-20-SC).
Title of the action
The tit~e. of t~ie a?tion contains the names of the parties
whose participation m the case shall be indicated. This
means the parties shall be indicated as either plaintiff or
defen~~nt. The~ shall all be named in the original complaint
?r petition; but m subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient
if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an
appropriate indication whether there are other parties (Sec. 1,
Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Example: Pedro Reyes, et al.
Body of the pleading
1. T~e body of the pl~ading sets forth its designation,
the allegations of the party s claims or defenses, the relief
prayed for, and the date of the pleading (Sec. 2, Rule 7, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. The allegations in the body of the pleading shall be
~ivid~d in!o para~raphs and shall be so numbered for ready
~dentification. This numbering scheme is significant because,
m ~ubsequent p~eadings, a paragraph may be referred to only
?Y its number without need for repeating the entire allegations
m th~ paragraph. Each paragraph shall contain a statement
of a smgle set of circumstances so far as that can be done with
convenience (Sec. 2, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Headings; designation of causes of actions joined in one
complaint
When ~wo or more causes of action are joined, the first
cause of action shall be prefaced with the words, "first cause
285
CHAPTERIV
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
of action," of the second cause of action by the words, "second
cause of action," and so on for the others (Sec. 2, Rule 7, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Allegations of ultimate facts
1. Every pleading, including the complaint, is not
supposed to allege conclusions. A pleading must only aver
facts because conclusions are for the courts to make. Thus,
it was clearly declared by the Court that "a bare allegation
that one is entitled to something is not an allegation but a
conclusion'' (Lim v. Gamosa, G.R. No. 193964, December 2,
2015).
2. The rule requires that a pleading need only contain
the allegations of "ultimate facts," i.e., the facts essential to
a party's cause of action or defense (Sec. 1, Rule 8, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC), or such facts
as are so essential that they cannot be stricken out without
leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate (Canete
v. Genuino Ice Company, 542 SCRA 206, 217). The ultimate
facts are to be stated in a methodical and logical form, and
in a plain, concise and direct manner (Sec. 1, Rule 8, Rules
of Court; See Lim v. Gamosa, G.R. No. 193964, December 2,
2015).
3. The 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure now requires that every pleading shall contain
in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts, including the evidence on
which a party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the
case may be (Sec. 1, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
4. Similarly, a complaint in an environmental
case, requires that the complaint must state that it is an
environmental case, and the law involved, the rule requires
also that all evidence proving the cause of action consisting
of affidavits, documents, and if possible, object evidence, shall
be attached to the verified complaint (Sec. 3, Rule 2, Part II,
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases). Thus, one cannot

286 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
avoid making statements or allegations of evidentiary facts.
In s~all claims cases, the statement of claim (complaint) is
reqmred to be accompanied by the affidavits of witness and
other evidence to support the claim, aside from photocopies of
the actionable document to support the claim (Sec. 6, A.M No.
08-8- 7-SC). Similarly, a statement of evidentiary facts may
not be avoided in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
since under Sec. 5 of Rule 70, matters of evidence are allowed
to be attached to the complaint.
Relief
1. Following the averments of the cause of action of the
plaintiff, the complaint must contain a statement of the relief
so~ght fr?m the court and to which he believes he is entitled.
This port10n of the complaint is oftentimes referred to as the
"prayer."
2. Sec. 2(c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by ~.M. No. !9-10-20-SC, requires that the pleading shall
specify the rehef sought. It is a settled rule that a court cannot
grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of
t~at_ being sought (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Philippine
Airlines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc., G.R.
No. 201073, February 10, 2016; Martinez v. Buen, G.R. No.
187342, April 5, 2017; China Trust [Phils.] Commercial Bank
v. Turner, G.R. No. 191458, July 3, 2017).
However, although the rule mandates that the relief
~rayed fo~, be specified, the same rule allows a pleader to
mclude a general prayer for such further or other relief as
may be deemed just or equitable" (See Sec. 2[c], Rule 7, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Because of the
rule allowing the inclusion of a general prayer, it was ruled
that under Sec. 2(c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court "a court can
grant. t~e _relief war~anted by the allegations ;nd the proof
~ven 1~1t 1s not specifically sought by the injured party; the
n~clus10n of a general prayer may justify the grant of a remedy
different from or_together with the specific remedy sought, if
the facts alleged m the complaint and the evidence introduced
CHAPTERIV 287
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
so warrant" (Prince Transport, Inc. v. Garcia, 639 SCRA 312,
30; See also Philippine Airlines, Inc._ v. Philippine Airlines
3
Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc., supra).
contents
In addition to those mandated by Sec. 2, Rule 7, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, every plea_ding
stating a party's claims or defenses shall state the followmg:
(a) Names of witnesses who will be presented to prove a
party's claim or defense;
(b) Summary of the witnesses' intended testimonies,
provided that the judicial affidavits of said witnesses shall be
attached to the pleading and form an integral part thereof.
Only witnesses whose judicial affidavits are attached to the
pleading shall be presented by the parties during the trial.
Except if a party presents meritorious reasons as basis for
the admission of additional witnesses, no other witness or
affidavit shall be heard or admitted by the court; and
(c) Documentary and object evidence in support of the
allegations contained in the pleading (Sec. 6, Rule 7, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
The foregoing are mandatory allegations under the
2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For
summary of witnesses' intended testimonies, reference must
be made with the Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12-8-8-
SC). The court may allow only once the late submission of
the judicial affidavit provided, the delay is for a valid reason,
would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the
defaulting party pays a fine of not less than Pl,000.00 nor
more than P5,000.00 at the discretion of the court (Sec. 10,
Judicial Affidavit Rule).
Signature and address
1. Every pleading and other written submissions to the
court must be signed by the plaintiff or counsel representing
 288 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
him or her (Sec. 3, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M
No. 19-10-20-SC).
In the absence of a proper notice to the court of a change
of address, service upon the parties must be made at the
last address of their counsel of record (Garrucho v. Court of
Appeals, 448 SCRA 165, 172).
2. A signed pleading is one that is signed either by
the party himself or his counsel. Sec. 3, Rule 7 is clear on
this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by
the party or counsel representing him. Therefore, only the
signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates
to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one
that is signed (Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,
498 SCRA 220, 229).
Effect of an unsigned pleading
Under the Rules of Court, if the court determines,
on motion or motu proprio and after notice and hearing,
that Sec. 3, Rule 7, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC,
has been violated, it may impose an appropriate sanction
or refer such violation to the proper office for disciplinary
action, on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the
rule, or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional
circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly and severally
liable for a violation committed by its partner, associate or
employee. The sanction may include, but shall not be limited to,
non- monetary directive or sanction; an order to pay a penalty
in court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part
or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses
directly resulting from the violation, including attorney's fees
for the filing of the motion for sanction. The lawyer or law firm
cannot pass on the monetary penalty to the client (Sec. 3, Rule
7, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Lawyers, as officers of the court, have an obligation to
owe candor, fairness and good faith to the court (Canon 10,
Code of Professional Responsibility). A lawyer shall exert
CHAPTERIV 289
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
f£ t and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
every
nd ;fic~;nt administration of justice (Can_on 12, Code of
e . al Responsibility). If the contrary is proven
a .,.esswn and t a
Pro 1 ·
· · established the court would deem it proper of
.olat10n is ' . . 1 .
~i
unpose a sanction because it will be,
.b. . m effect, a v10 ation o
the Code of Professional Responsi i 1ity.
Significance of the signature of counsel (Bar 1996; 2013)
1. The signature of a coun~el in a plea~ing is significant.
His signature constitutes a certificate by him or her that he
h ha s read the pleading and document, that to the best of
ors
his ore her knowledge, informat10n
• and behe, · f £orme d a ft er an
inquiry reasonable to the circumstances:
(1) It is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation;
(2) The claims, defenses a1_1d_other legal contentions
are warranted by existing law or Jurisprudence, or by a n?n-
frivolous argument for extending, modifying or reversmg
existing jurisprudence;
(3) The factual contentions have evide~tiar~ support or,
if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentrnry support
after availment of the modes of discovery under these rules;
and
(4) The denials of factual co~tent~ons are warranted
on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on belief or a lack of information (Sec. 3[b], Rule 7, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty
formality nor even a mere means of identific~tion. Through
the counsel's signature, a lawyer asserts his competence,
credibility, and ethics. Signing a pleading is such a sol_emn
component of legal practice that the Court had, on oc~asio~s,
decried the delegation of this task to nonlawyers as a v10lation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Intestate Estate of
Jose Uy v. Maghari III, ibid.).
 290 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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2. It has been held that counsel's authority and duty
to sign a pleading are personal to him. "The preparation and
signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice
of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the
legal profession. Accordingly, however, counsel may delegate
the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in
favor of one who is not xx x" (Republic v. Kenrick Development
Corporation, 498 SCRA 220, 230; Tapay v. Bancolo, 694 SCRA
1, 9-10, March 20, 2013).
Verification in a pleading (Bar 2018)
Pleadings need not be under oath, verified (Sec. 4, Rule 7,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Re: Letter
of Dimaano Requesting Investigation of Justice Lantion, A.M.
No. 17-03-03-CA, July 1, 2017). Examples: The statement of
claim in small claims cases requires a verification (Sec. 6, A.M.
No. 08-8-7-SC, February 1, 2016). All pleadings in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer actions need to be verified (Sec.
4, Rule 70, Rules of Court). Bar 2018 Petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus require a verification (Secs. 1-3,
Rule 65, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC). So does a petition for quo warranto (Sec. 1, Rule 66, Rules
of Court). A complaint in an environmental case must also be
verified (Sec. 3, Rule 2, Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases).
How a pleading is verified
1. A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an affiant
duly authorized to sign said verification. The authorization of
the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of
a secretary's certificate or a special power of attorney, should
be attached to the pleading, and shall allege the following
attestations:
(a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct
based on his or her personal knowledge, or based on authentic
documents;
(b) The pleading is not filed to harass, ca use unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and
CHAPTERIV 291
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
(c) The factual allegations therein have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, will likewise have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
discovery.
The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a
certification of the truthfulness of the allegations in the
pleading.
A pleading required to be verified that contains a
verification based on 'information and belief,' or upon
'knowledge, information and belief,' or lacks a proper
verification shall be treated as unsigned pleading (Sec. 4, Rule
7, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC).
A verification cannot be based on mere "belief." The
amendment to Sec. 4 of Rule 7 removed any reference to
"belief' to ensure that the pleading is based on facts, not on
mere imagination (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Apo
Cement Corporation, G.R. No. 193381, February 8, 2017).
Thus, a verification based on "information and belief' or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading (Sec. 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court; For further
readings, see Letter of Dimaano Requesting Investigation of
Judge Lantion, A.M. No. 17-03-03-CA, July 11, 2017).
2. The verification requirement is "deemed sub-
stantially complied with when one who has an ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct" (Vda. de Formoso v. Philippine National
Bank, 650 SCRA 35, 44, G.R. No. 154704, June 1, 2011; See
also William Go Que Construction l<•Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 191699, April 19, 2016).
Significance of a verification
The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended
to secure an assurance that the allegations in a pleading are
true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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faith (Sarmiento v. Zaratan, 514 SCRA 246, 257; Bank of the
Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 569 SCRA 510, 523;
Presidential Commission on Good Government [PCGGJ v.
Dumayas, G.R. No. 209447, August 11, 2015; Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Apo Cement Corporation, G.R. No.
193381, February 8, 2017; See also De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R.
No. 229781, October 10, 2017).
Effect of lack of a verification or of a defective verification
(Bar 2011)
1. A pleading required to be verified but lacks the
proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading
(Sec. 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC; Re; Letter of Dimaano Requesting Investigation of
Justice Lantion, A.M. No. 17-03-03-CA, July 1, 2017).
2. It has, however, been held that the absence of a
verification, or the non-compliance with the verification
requirement, does not necessarily render the pleading
defective. It is only a formal and not a jurisdictional
requirement. The requirement is a condition affecting only
the form of the pleading (Benguet Corporation v. Cordillera
Caraballo Mission, Inc., 469 SCRA 381, 384; Fuji Television
Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, C.R. Nos. 204944-45, December 3,
2014; Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. v. Ledesma,
G.R. No. 197556, Mach 25, 2015). The court may order its
submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may
be served (Vda. de Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, 650
SCRA 35; Regulus Development, Inc. v. De la Cruz, G.R. No.
198172, January 25, 2016). The rule is in keeping with the
principle that rules of procedure are established to secure
substantial justice and that technical requirements may
be dispensed with in meritorious cases (Pampanga Sugar
Development Company, Inc. v. NLRC, 272 SCRA 737, 743)
The Court emphasized that a defective verification
amounts to a formal defect which is neither jurisdictional or
CHAPTERIV 293
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
. h the court may order a correction (Cortal v.
h
fatal .and
A L or w ICbal Enterprises, G.R. No. 19 9107 , A ugust 30 ,
fi ·
Ina k i . arraza . G
. For additional readings, see also De Lima v. uerrero,
2017
G.R. 'No. 229781, October 10, 2017).
Other requirements
1. All pleadings, motions, and_ papers filed in ?ourt
by counsel shall bear, in addition to his current P:ofessio~al
T ax Receipt Number (PTR), his current1 IBP Official Receipt
Number indicating its date of issue. P ea d"mgs, mot10ns,
. an d
papers which do not comply with this requirement may not
be acted upon by the court, without prejudi~e to whate:er
disciplinary action the court may take agamst the erri_ng
counsel who shall, likewise, be required to comply with
the re~uirement within five days from notice. Failure to
comply with such requirement shall be a ground for further
disciplinary sanction and contempt of court (Circular No. 10,
July 24, 1985; Bar Matter No. 287, September 26, 2000).
2. On November 12, 2002, the Supreme Court granted
the request of the Board of Governors of the IBP and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte to require all
lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorneys Number in all
papers and pleadings filed in judicial and quasi-judicial bodies,
in addition to the previously required current Professional
Tax Receipt (PTR) and the IBP Official Receipt Number.
The requirement was meant to protect the public by making
it easier to detect impostors who represent themselves as
members of the bar. Non-compliance with this requirement
has the same effect as the failure to indicate counsel's IBP
Receipt Number. This requirement is_directed only to lawyers
and not to be construed as precluding a party, who is not a
lawyer, from signing a pleading himself (Bar Matter No.
1132, April 1, 2003). The requirement is intended to protect
the integrity of legal practice (Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v.
Maghari III, A.C. No. 10525, September 1, 2015).
3. All practicing members of the bar are also required
to indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-
 294 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate
of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. Failure to disclose
the required information would cause the dismissal of the
case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records
(Bar Matter No. 1922, En Banc Resolution, June 3, 2008). Per
En Banc Resolution of the Supreme Court dated September
2, 2008, the effectivity date of the implementation of this rule
was moved from August 25, 2008 to January 1, 2009.
The i~clusion of information regarding compliance with,
or exempt10n from, the MCLE seeks to ensure that legal
practice is reserved only for those who have complied with
the recognized mechanism for "keeping abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintaining the ethics of the profession, and
enhancing the standards of the practice of law" (Intestate
Estate of Jose Uy v. Maghari III, supra).
Certification against forum shopping (Bar 2000; 2009· 2010·
2014) ' '
1.The certification against forum shopping is a sworn
statement in which the plaintiff or principal party certifies in
a complaint or initiatory pleading to the following matters:
(a) that he or she has not commenced any action
or_filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or
her know ledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein;
(b) that if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
and
(c) that if he or she should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within 5 calendar days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
CHAPTERIV 295
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of
a party, whether in the form of a secretary's certificate
or a special power of attorney, should be attached to
the pleading (Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC see also Asia United Bank v.
Goodland Company, Inc., 637 SCRA 691, 696).
2. The requirements involving the certification against
forum shopping apply both to natural and juridical persons
since no distinction is made between natural and juridical
persons by the Rules of Court (Societe Des Produits, Nestle,
S.A. v. Puregold Price Club, Inc., G.R. No. 217194, September
6, 2017; citations of the Court, omitted).
Purpose of the certification
1. The certification constitutes an assurance given to
the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending
cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes
of action (Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173186, September
16, 2015). The purpose of prohibiting forum shopping is also
to prevent contradictory decisions of two or more courts on the
same controversy (Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Santos, G.R.
No. 185894, August 30, 2017).
2. The rationale against forum shopping is that a
party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies
in two different fora. Filing multiple petitions or complaints
constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade
the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts (Huibonhoa v. Concepcion, 497
SCRA 562, 569-570; Heirs of Cesar Marasigan v. Marasigan,
548 SCRA 409, 435).
Meaning of forum shopping
1. Forum shopping is the act by a party of repetitively
availing of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded
 296 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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on the same transactions and the same essential facts or
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
either pending or already resolved adversely by some other
court (Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, G.R.
No. 109645, January 21, 2015; Tomas v. Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, G.R. No. 208090, November 9, 2016;
See also Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018).
2. Specifically, there is forum shopping where there
exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
r~present the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on t~e sam~ facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars Is such that any judgment rendered in the pending
case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other case (Young v. Spouses Sy, 503
SCRA 151, 166; Commissioner of Customs v. Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 205002, April 20, 2016;
See also Grace Park International Corporation v. East West
Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 210606, July 27, 2016; Tomas
v. Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, G.R. No.
208090, November 9, 2016; Spouses Reyes v. Spouses Chung,
G.R. No. 228112, September 13, 2017; City Government of
Baguio v. Masweng, G.R. No. 195905, July 4, 2018; Republic
v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018).
3. The act of splitting a single cause of action is a mode
of forum shopping (See also Lajave Agricultural Management
and Development Enterprises, Inc. v. Spouses Javellana, G.R.
No. 223785, November 7, 2018).
The certification is not a jurisdictional requirement
The certification is mandatory under Sec. 5 of Rule 7 but
not_ ju~isdictional since jurisdiction over the subject of the
act~on_IS conferred by law (Robert Development Corporation v.
Quitain, 315 SCRA 150, 160). The absence of the certification
would not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the action.
CHAPTERIV 297
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
Three ways of committing forum shopping
The Supreme Court enumerated the ways by which
forum shopping may be committed, thus:
(1) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause
of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not
having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal
is litis pendentia);
(2) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause
of action and the same prayer, the previous case having
been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is
res judicata); and
(3) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause
of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis
pendentia or res judicata) (Commissioner of Customs v.
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 205002,
April 20, 2016; Republic v. Bolante, G.R. No. 190357,
April 17, 2017).
Determination of the existence of forum shopping
1. To determine whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping, the most important question to
ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or
whether a final judgment in one case will result to res judicata
in another. Otherwise stated, to determine the existence of
forum shopping, the test is to see whether in the two or more
cases pending, there is: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of
rights or causes of action; and (c) identity of reliefs sought
(Huibonhoa v. Concepcion, 497 SCRA 562, 569-570; for further
readings, see Pulumbarit v. Court' of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
153745-46, October 14, 2015; See also Lajave Agricultural
Management and Development Enterprises, Inc. v. Spouses
Javellana, G.R. No. 223785, November 7, 2018).
2. Where the reliefs sought in the two actions are
different, there is no forum shopping even if the parties in
the actions are the same. Where one action is for a permanent

298 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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injunction and the other is a petition for certiorari, there is no
identity of reliefs (Huibonhoa v. Concepcion, ibid.).
3. Where the reliefs sought in two courts involving
the same parties is to restrain a government official from
implementing the same order, there is forum shopping
because there is identity of reliefs (Montes v. Court of Appeals,
489 SCRA 432, 440).
4. The filing of six appeals, complaints or petitions for
the same purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment
is a clear case of forum shopping (Millare v. Montero, A. C. No.
3283, July 19, 1995).
5. To file an ordinary appeal and petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals is to engage in forum shopping.
When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months
had elapsed prior to her filing of the Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. The elements of
litis pendentia are present between the two suits. Both suits
are founded on exactly the same facts, and ref er to the same
subject matter - the RTC orders which dismissed the civil
case for failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is
seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights
asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are
all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one forum may
amount to res judicata in the other (Young v. Spouses Sy, 503
SCRA 151, 166).
Where a party's petition for certiorari and subsequent
appeal seek to achieve one and the same purpose, there is
forum shopping which is a sufficient ground for the dismissal
of the certiorari petition (Espiritu v. Tankiansee, 651 SCRA
706, 707).
6. In a case, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer
case against the defendant based on violations of the terms
of the lease contract which, at that time, had not yet expired.
During the pendency of the case and after the lease contract
had expired, a second case for unlawful detainer was filed by
CHAPTERIV 299
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
the same plaintiff against the same defendant. The second
complaint disclosed the existence of the first case. The second
suit was based on the expiration of the lease contract. The
Court found no forum shopping under the facts since the
suits were based on different grounds. At the time the first
complaint was filed, the ground of expiration of the lease
was not yet available (Umale v. Canoga Park Development
Corporation, 654 SCRA 155, 161-163).
7. There is no forum shopping in a case where the
subsequent purchaser of foreclosed property filed a petition
for issuance of a writ of possession after previously filing an
action for ejectment against the same defendant where the
latter action was dismissed for being the wrong remedy and the
appeal from its dismissal having been withdrawn. There is no
identity or similarity of actions between the two proceedings,
the petition being just an incident to the transfer of title.
The Court also explained that having realized the erroneous
resort to the wrong remedy, an error having been committed
in good faith, the raising of a matter to the correct forum by
the petitioner does not constitute forum shopping. Quoting
the Court of Appeals with approval, the Court reiterated:
"x x x Raising a matter to the correct forum,
employing the wrong mode or remedy, and then later
resorting to the correct one, does not make an instance of
forum shopping x x x" (Spouses Reyes u. Spouses Chung,
G.R. No. 228112, September 13, 2017).
8. There may be situations where a landowner, whose
land is subject to land reform, has a pending case before the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for determination of
just compensation. Still, he files a petition before the RTC,
designated as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the same
purpose. Such recourse is not strictly a case of forum shopping,
since the administrative determination is not binding on the
Special Agrarian Court (See Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004, August 8, 2017).
300 CML PROCEDURE
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There is no forum shopping in simultaneously filing a quo
warranto petition and a complaint for impeachment
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed
independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as
to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to
initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. The crux of
the controversy, a quo warranto petition, is the determination
of whether or not the respondent legally holds the position. On
the other hand, impeachment is for respondent's prosecution
for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while the
respondent's title to hold a public office is the issue in quo
warranto petition, impeachment necessarily presupposes that
the respondent legally holds the public office. The only issue
in impeachment is whether or not the respondent committed
impeachable offenses to warrant removal from office.
The reliefs sought are different. The respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding
a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. A conviction
for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the
removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is
legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove
a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not
and cannot legally hold or occupy.
Also, there can be no forum shopping because the
impeachment proceedings before the House is not the
impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination
of probable cause. The process before the House is merely
inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person
may be reasonably charged with a crime (Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018).
Who executes the certification against forum shopping (Bar
2000); exception
1. It is the plaintiff or principal party who executes
the certification under oath (Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court).
Jurisprudence also affirms the rule (Agustin v. Cruz-Herrera,
CHAPTERIV 301
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
GR No. 174564, February 2, 2014; Department of Public
Works and Highways v. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint
Venture, G.R. No. 179732, September 13, 2017).
It must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for justifiable reaso~s, the party-pleader
is unable to sign, he must execute a special power of attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign in his behalf (UY_v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173186, September 16, 2015; Lenou
v. Longa, G.R. No. 203923, October 8, 2018).
Reason: It is the petitioner and not the counsel who is
in the best position to know whether he or it actually filed or
caused the filing of a petition. A certification signed by counsel
is a defective certification and a valid cause for dismissal (Far
Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 30,
53; Anderson v. Ho, 688 SCRA 8, 17, January 7, 2013). This is
the general rule and the prevailing rule.
2. In one case, Go v. Rico, 488 SCRA 137, 145-
146, petitioners admitted that neither of them signed the
certification against forum shopping. Only their counsel
did. The Court, in this case, emphatically stressed that a
certification by counsel, and not by the principal party himself,
is no certification at all. The reason for requiringthat it must
be signed by the principal party himself is that he has actual
knowledge whether he has initiated similar action/sin other
courts, agencies or tribunals. Their lawyer's explanation that
they were out-of-town at the time their petition was filed with
the Court of Appeals was considered bereft of basis. That
explanation was an afterthought as it was not alleged by
counsel in her certification against forum shopping.
Signing the certification when the plaintiff is a juridical entity
1. A juridical entity, unlike a natural person, can
only perform physical acts through properly delegated
individuals. A corporation can exercise its power to sue only
upon authority of its board of directors or trustees, the latter
being the body which exercises corporate powers (Sec. 22 in
relation to Sec. 35, Corporation Code of the Philippines). The
302 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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corporate officers and agents, therefore, cannot exercise any
corporate power pertaining to the corporation without any
authority from the board of directors. Corollarily, in order for a
person to represent a corporation in a suit, a board resolution
authorizing the former to represent the latter is necessary
(Meatworld International, Inc. v. Hechanova, G.R. No. 208053,
October 18, 2017). Therefore, a board resolution authorizing
a corporate officer to execute the certification against forum
shopping is a necessary requirement under the Rules (Societe
Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Puregold Price Club, Inc., G.R.
No. 217194, September 6, 2017); otherwise, the complaint
will have to be dismissed (Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc.
v. Kemper Insurance Company, G.R. No. 179488, April 23,
2012).
A certification signed by a person who was not authorized
by the board of directors renders a petition subject to
dismissal. The exercise of corporate powers including the
power to sue is lodged with the board of directors which acts
as a body representing the stockholders. For corporations,
the authorized representative to sign the certification against
forum shopping must be selected or authorized collectively
by the board of directors (Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A.
v. Puregold Price Club, Inc., G.R. No. 217194, September 6,
2017).
2. The above rule is perfectly consistent with the
fundamental tenets of corporation law. However, the rule has
been liberally interpreted by the Court in several cases.
The Court itself declared that "In several instances, the
Court has considered a Secretary's Certificate sufficient proof
of authority for a person named to represent a corporation in
a suit" (See Meatworld International, Inc. v. Hechanova, G.R.
No. 208053, October 18, 2017). In a more liberal interpretation
of the rule, the Court, in the earlier case of Cagayan Valley
Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
No. 151413, February 13, 2008, ruled that the following
officials or employees of a company can sign the verification
and certification against forum shopping without need of a
CHAPTER IV 303
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
b ard resolution: (a) Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (b)
p:esident of the corporation, (c) General Manager or Acting
General Manager, (d) Personnel Officer, and (e) Employment
Specialist in a labor case. Accordi1:1gly,the r~tionale _b_ehind
this rule is that the officers mentioned are m a position to
verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in
the petition (Also cited in Yap v. Siao, G.R. No. 212493, June
1 2016). The same case, however, clarified that appending
the board resolution to the complaint or petition is the better
procedure to obviate any question on the authority of the
signatory to the verification and certification. The required
submission of the board resolution is grounded on the basic
precept that corporate powers are exercised by the board of
directors and not solely by an officer of the corporation. Hence,
the power to sue and be sued in any court or quasi-judicial
tribunal is necessarily lodged with the said board (See also
South Cotabato Communications Corporation v. Sto. Tomas,
G.R. No. 173326, December 15, 2010).
3. A more recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court
conceded that a corporation exercises its powers and transacts
its business through its board of directors or trustees.
Accordingly, unless authorized by the board .of directors
or trustees, corporate officers and agents cannot exercise
any corporate power pertaining to the corporation. A board
resolution authorizing the corporate officers and agents is,
therefore, required. The Court, in the same case, using a more
liberal approach, declared that jurisprudence has allowed the
corporate president to sign the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping even without a board resolution because
the said officer is presumed to have sufficient knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations·stated in the complaint
or petition (Colegio Medico-Farmaceutico De Filipinas, Inc. v.
Lim, G.R. No. 212034, July 2, 2018).
4. A liberal interpretation of the rule was made in
another case, where the Court allowed the signature of an
academic dean in a case involving a faculty member in his
college. While the Court recognized that as a general rule,
304 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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the Board of Directors or Board of Trustees of a corporation
must authorize the person who signs the verification and
certification against forum shopping, such authorization,
ruled the Court, is not necessary when it is self-evident that
the signatory is in a position to verify the truthfulness and
correctness of the allegations in the petition (University of the
East v. Pepanio, G.R. No. 193897, January 23, 2013).
5. Also, even a belated submission of the written
authority of the board was found to be a substantial compliance
with Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court especially when
the acts of the officer in filing the petition were also ratified
by the board (Swedish Match Philippines v. The Treasurer
of the City of Manila, G.R. No. 181277, July 3, 2013).
Procedural lapses, in relation to the certification against
forum shopping, have, in some cases, been disregarded by
the Court for compelling reasons, such as the prima facie
merits of the petition. Accordingly, the rules on forum
shopping are not to be interpreted with "absolute literalness"
as to subvert the ultimate purpose of achieving substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible (See Steamship Mutual
Underwriting Association [Bermuda] v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 196072, September 20, 2017).
6. Despite the liberal interpretation of the rule in
some cases, one must not lose sight of the general rule
consistent with the general principles of corporate law. "In
case the petitioner is a private corporation, the verification
and certification may be signed, for and in behalf of this
corporation, by a specifically authorized person, including its
retained counsel, who has personal knowledge of the facts
required to be established by the documents. The reason is
that: A corporation x x x has no powers except those expressly
conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that
are implied by or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a
corporation exercises corporate powers, through its board
of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents.
Physical acts, like the signing of documents can be performed
only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by
CHAPTERIV 305
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
corporate by laws or by a specific act of the board of directors"
(Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association [Bermuda] v.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 196072, September 20, 2017).
7. The 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure mandates that the authorization of the affiant to
act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of a secretary's
certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached
to the pleading (Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Rule if there are several plaintiffs or petitioners; exception
(Bar 2016)
1. The certification against forum shopping must be
signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise,
those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case.
Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest
and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature
of only one of them substantially complies with the Rule (Vda.
de Formoso u. Philippine National Bank, 650 SCRA 35, 44-45;
Basan v. Coca-Coca Bottlers Philippines, G.R. Nos. 174365-
66, February 4, 2015; For further readings, see Yap v. Siao,
G.R. No. 212493, June 1, 2016). Bar 2016
In a case involving co-owners of property where the
said property is the subject matter of the suit, the failure of
the other co-owners to sign the verification and certificate of
forum shopping is not fatal, as the signing by only one or some
of them constitutes substantial compliance of the rule (Gloria
Builders Savings and Loan Association, Inc., G.R. No. 202324,
June 4, 2018).
2. The above rule will not be applied if dishonesty
attended the signing of the certification as when it was made to
appear that one of the petitioners had signed the certification
against forum shopping despite his having passed away seven
years before (Heirs of Francisco Retuya v. Court of Appeals,
647 SCRA 299, 309-310).
306 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Pleadings requiring a certification against forum shopping
1. The certification against forum shopping applies to
the complaint and other initiatory pleadings asserting a claim
for relief (Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC). These initiatory pleadings include not only
the original complaint but also a permissive counterclaim,
cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, complaint-
in-intervention, petition or any application in which a party
asserts his claim for relief.
It bears stressing that the Rule distinctly provides
that the required certification against forum shopping is
intended to cover an initiatory pleading, meaning an incipient
application of a party asserting a claim for relief. If the answer
with a counterclaim is filed merely to counter petitioners'
complaint, and is a claim for relief that is derived only from,
or is necessarily connected with, the main action or complaint,
it is not an initiatory pleading (Spouses Carpio v. Rural Bank
of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, 489 SCRA 492, 497; See also Torres
v. De Leon, G.R. No. 199440, January 18, 2016).
2. A comment is not an initiatory pleading. A comment
required by an appellate tribunal is merely an expression of
the views and observations of a respondent for the purpose
of giving the court sufficient information as to whether the
petition is legally proper as a remedy to the acts complained
of. It does not require a certification against forum shopping
(Torres v. De Leon, ibid.).
The rule does not require a certification against forum
shopping for a compulsory counterclaim because it cannot
be the subject of a separate and independent adjudication,
as when the counterclaim is for damages, moral, exemplary
or attorney's fees, by reason of the alleged malicious and
unfounded suit filed against the defendant. It is, therefore,
not an initiatory pleading (Santo Tomas University v. Surla,
294 SCRA 382, 392-393).
An ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
is not an initiatory pleading. Although denominated as a
CHAPTERIV 307
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
petition, it does not aim to initiate a litigation but is an incident
to or a consequence of certain proceedings like foreclosure
cases (De Guzman v. Chico, G.R. No. 195445, December 2016).
Applicability to special civil actions
The Court held that the rule requiring a certification
against forum shopping applies as well to special civil actions
since a special civil action is governed by the rules for ordinary
civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a
special civil action. Such specific rule, for example, appears
under Rule 46, Sec. 3 which requires that every petition for
certiorari be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping (Wacnang v. COMELEC, 569 SCRA 799, 809;
Presidential Commission on Good Government [PCGGJ v.
Dumayas, G.R. No. 209447, August 11, 2015).
Effects of non-compliance with the rule on certification
against forum shopping (Bar 1996)
1. A violation of the rule requiring the certification
against forum shopping does not authorize the court to dismiss
a case on its own motion or initiative (De Leon v. Chu, G.R.
No. 186522, September 2, 2015). The rule requires that the
dismissal be upon motion and after hearing (Sec. 5, Rule 7,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. If the case is dismissed for failure to comply with
the certification requirement, the dismissal is, as a rule,
"without prejudice," unless the order of dismissal otherwise
provides (Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC). Hence, where the dismissal is silent as to
the character of the dismissal, the dismissal is presumed to be
without prejudice to the refiling of the complaint.
If a complaint is dismissed for failure to comply with the
required certification against forum shopping, may the plaintiff
appeal from the order of dismissal where such dismissal is
one without prejudice? Answer: He cannot appeal from the
order. This is because an order dismissing an action without
308 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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prejudice is, as a rule, not appealable. The remedy provided
for under Sec. 1 of Rule 41 is to avail of the appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65 (Sec. l[g], Rule 41, as amended,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. The failure to submit a certification against forum
shopping is a ground for dismissal, separate and distinct from
forum shopping as a ground for dismissal. A complaint may
be dismissed for forum shopping even if there is a certification
attached and, conversely, a complaint may be dismissed for
lack of the required certification even if the party has not
committed forum shopping. Compliance with the certification
against forum shopping is separate from, and independent of,
the avoidance of forum shopping itself (Juaban v. Espina, 548
SCRA 588, 605-606).
The general rule is that non-compliance or a defect in
the certification is not curable by its subsequent submission
or correction. However, there were cases when the Court
exercised leniency and relaxed the rules on the ground of
substantial compliance, the presence of special circumstances
or compelling reasons (Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
173186, September 16, 2015; Mathaeus v. Spouses Medequiso,
G.R. No. 196651, February 3, 2016).
If there are objections relating to noncompliance with the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, the same
should be raised in the proceedings below, and not for the first
time on appeal (GSIS Family Bank-Thrift Bank, Inc. v. BPI
Family Bank, G.R. No. 175278, September 23, 2015).
Effect of willful and deliberate forum shopping; dismissal of
all pending claims
1. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be a ground for summary dismissal. Here, no motion
and hearing are required. The dismissal in this case is with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as cause
for administrative sanctions (Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
CHAPTERIV 309
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
2 . Jurisprudence holds that if the forum shopping is not
·dered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall
consl
be dismissed without preJu . d'ice on t.h e groun d of eit. h e~ l'it~s
.
dentia or res judicata. However, if the forum shoppmg is
p~~ful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two)
w;tions shall be dismissed with prejudice (Phil. Pharmawealth,
;nc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 635 SCRA 140, 161). For instance, if one
petition is pending before the Supreme Cou~t and the ot~er
case is pending in a lower court, both cases will be summarily
dismissed once there is a finding of forum shopping. This is so
because the twin dismissal is the punitive measure to those
who trifle with the orderly administration of justice (Fontana
Development Corporation v. Vukasinovic, G.R. No. 222424,
September 21, 2016).
Effect of submission of a false certification
It may happen that the pleading has been filed with
the required certification against forum shopping but the
allegations therein or the matters certified to therein are
false. Under the Rules, the submission of a false certification
shall constitute indirect contempt of court without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions
(Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC).
Effect of non-compliance with the undertakings
Failure to comply with the undertakings in the
certification against forum shopping has the same effect as
the submission of a false certification (Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Oliveros
v. Sison, 548 SCRA 265, 271). Hence, such failure shall
constitute indirect contempt of court without prejudice to the
corresponding sanctions (Sec. 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The administrative and
criminal actions would apply to the non-compliance with the
undertakings.
310 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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Summary of guidelines respecting non-compliance with the
requirements of or submission of defective, verification and
certification against forum shopping
XXX
"x xx For the guidance of the bench and bar, the
Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential
pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-
compliance with the requirements on, or submission of
defective, verification and certification against forum
shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission
of defective verification, and non-compliance with
the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. The Court
may order its submission or correction or act on
the pleading if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may
be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint
or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith
or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping,
non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,
unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
"substantial compliance" or presence of "special
circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping
must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners
in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
CHAPTER IV 311
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest
and invoke a common cause of action or defense,
the signature of only one of them in the certification
against forum shopping substantially complies with
the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum
shopping must be executed by the party-pleader,
not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf' (Vda. de Formoso v. Philippine National
Bank, 650 SCRA 35, 44-45, citing Altres v. Empleo,
573 SCRA 583; Fuji Television Network, Inc. v.
Espiritu, G.R. Nos. 204944-45, December 3, 2014;
Bureau of Customs v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253,
September 8, 2015; Bacolor v. VL Macabali Memorial
Hospital, Inc., G.R. No. 204325, April 18, 2016).
C. Allegations in Pleadings
Allegations of conditions precedent
1. Common usage refers to conditions precedent as
matters which must be complied with before a cause of action
arises. When a claim is subject to a condition precedent, its
compliance or performance is not sufficient. The compliance
of the same must be alleged in the complaint or petition.
2. The following are examples of conditions precedent:
(a) A tender of payment is required before making
a consignation (Art. 1256, Civil Code of the Philippines).
(b) Exhaustion of administrative remedies is
required in certain cases before resorting to judicial
action (Lopez v. City of Manila, 303 SCRA 448; Dy v.
Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 331).
(c) Prior resort to barangay conciliation proceedings
is necessary in certain cases (Chapter 7, Title I, Book III,
Local Government Code of 1991).
312 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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(d) Earnest efforts toward a compromise must be
undertaken when the suit is between members of the
same family and if no efforts were in fact made, the
case must be dismissed (Art. 151, Family Code of the
Philippines). Bar 2011
(e) Arbitration may be a condition precedent when
the contract between the parties provides for arbitration
first before recourse is made to judicial remedies.
Effect of failure to comply with a condition precedent
The 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure now prohibits motion to dismiss based on the
ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not
been complied with. Such shall be raised as an affirmative
defense in the answer. Failure to raise the ground of failure to
comply with a condition precedent at the earliest opportunity
shall constitute a waiver thereof. The court shall motu proprio
resolve the same within 30 calendar days from the filing of the
answer (See Sec. 12, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). To reiterate, such compliance must
be alleged in the pleading.
Pleading a judgment
In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or
foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or a board or
officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision. There
is no need to allege matters showing the jurisdiction to render
the judgment or decision (Sec. 6, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
The above rule is consistent with the evidentiary
presumption that "a court, or judge acting as such, whether in
the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise
of jurisdiction" (Sec. 3/n], Rule 131, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). That jurisdiction is presumed is,
however, only a disputable, not a conclusive presumption
(Sec. 3/n], Rule 131, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
CHAPTER IV 313
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
19_10-20-SC). Hence, not being a conc~usive p_res:imption, a
defending party is allowed ~o file a mot10n to d1s.m1ssfor lack
of jurisdiction over the subJect matter of the claim (Sec. l[b],
Rule 16 Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Even the court, on its own motion, is authorized to dismiss the
claim on the same ground (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Pleading an official document or act
In pleading an official document, it is sufficient to aver that
the document was issued in compliance with law. With respect
to an official act, it is, likewise, sufficient to allege that the act
was done also in compliance with law (Sec. 9, Rule 8, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Note that under
the Rules on Evidence, "the written official acts, or records
of official acts, of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of
a foreign country'' are, for the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, considered public documents (Sec. 19/a], Rule 132,
Rules of Court). Public documents are admissible in evidence
without further proof of their due execution and genuineness,
and has, in their favor, the presumption of regularity (Pen
Development Corporation v. Martinez Leyba, Inc., G.R. No.
211845, August 9, 2017).
Pleading capacity to sue or be sued
Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued
must be averred. If a party is suing or sued in a representative
capacity, his authority must also be averred. If a party is an
organized association of persons, its legal existence must
likewise be averred (Sec. 4, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). For instance, if PP is suing as an
agent of 00, his being an agent has to be alleged; otherwise,
he shall be deemed to be suing in his personal capacity. If it is
a corporation that is suing, its having been legally organized
in accordance with law has to be alleged in order to leave no
doubt as to its legal existence.

314 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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Pleading fraud, mistake or condition of the mind
1. When making averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting such fraud or mistake must be
stated with particularity (Sec. 5, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Villalon v. Lirio, G.R. No.
183869, August 3, 2015).
The provision clearly suggests that it is not enough,
therefore, for the complaint to allege that the plaintiff was
defrauded by the defendant. Under this provision, the
complaint must state with particularity the fraudulent acts of
the adverse party. These particulars which would necessarily
include the specific acts of fraud committed against the
plaintiff would help apprise the judge of the kind of fraud
involved in the complaint. Note that under the Civil Code
of the Philippines, there are various types of frauds, each of
which has its own legal effects (See Arts. 1170, 1330, 1390,
1344, 1359, 1381 of the Civil Code of the Philippines). The
same is true with acts constituting mistake (See Arts. 1331-
1334).
The mere failure, for example, to comply with one's
obligation to pay the storage fees agreed upon, does not
necessarily amount to fraud, absent any showing that such
failure was due to insidious machinations and intent on
his part to defraud the other party of the amount due it
(Watercraft Venture Corporation v. Wolfe, G.R. No. 181721,
September 2015).
2. Malice, intent, knowledge or other conditions of
the mind of a person may be averred generally (Sec. 5, Rule
8, Rules of Court; Villalon v. Lirio, supra). Unlike in fraud
or mistake, they need not be stated with particularity. The
rule is borne out of human experience. It is difficult to state
the particulars constituting these matters. Hence, a general
averment is sufficient.
Pleading alternative causes of actions or defenses
1. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 8, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC, a party may set forth two or more statements of a
CHAPTERIV 315
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
claim or defense, alternatively or hypothetically, either ~none
cause of action or defense or in separate causes of action or
defenses.
2. The subject provision recognizes ~hat the liability of
the defendant may possibly be based ?n.either one of two or
more possible causes of action. The pl~mtiff may, for exa~ple,
. e that the liability of the carrier may be based either
b e1iev
a breach of contract of carriage or quasi-· d e1·
1ct, b u t h e may
:t be certain which of the causes of act~on would square~y
fit the set of facts alleged in the complamt, although he 1s
tain that he is entitled to relief. He may, therefore, state
cer Th. . . . ft ct
his causes of action in the alternative. 1s prov1s10n me e ,
also relieves a party from being compelled to choose only one
cause of action.
The landmark case of La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals,
17 SCRA 739, 744-7 45, illustrates this rule particularly wel~.
Here the plaintiffs were allowed to sue based upon a quas1-
delict theory and in the alternative, upon a breach of contract,
where the death of their child occurred when they were no
longer on board the bus of the com3:10~carrier b~t ~t the time
the father was in the process of retrievmg the family s personal
belongings from the bus. Although, ultimately, the case was
ruled to be a breach of contract of carriage, the procedural
device of pleading alternative causes of action was clearly
applied in this case.
3. The same provision has affinity to the rule (Sec. 13,
Rule 3, Rules of Court) which authorizes suing two or ~o~e
defendants in the alternative. For instance, the plamtiff
insurance company, which paid for the loss of the goods
insured, may sue, in the alternative, the shipping company
that transported the goods and the yvareho~se co.mpany that
stored the goods if the plaintiff is uncertam which between
the defendants is responsible for the loss.
In Hanover Insurance Company v. Port Service and
Manila Railroad Company, 19 SCRA 69, 73, the Court
allowed the alternative suit, against the arrastre operator
and the owners and agents of the carrying vessels, filed by
the insurance company which paid the consignee for the lost

316 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
merchandise,- The joinder of the two causes of action against
the alternative defendants, according to the Court avoids
unnecessary ~ult~plicity of suits and, without sa~rificing
a~iy substant1_al rights of the parties, removes the undue
d1sadv:antage ~n w?ich plaintiff would be placed by having to
p~ov~ its case m ~1fferent courts by means of evidence that is
w1thm the exclusive knowledge of said defendants.
4. _Plead~ng alternative causes of action normally
leads to mc?ns1stent claims. For instance, the elements of a
c8:use of action based on a contractual theory are inconsistent
with_ those o~ a cause of action based on a quasi-delict. As
previo~sly discussed, a suit based on a breach of contract
of carriage, ±:orexample, does not require an allegation and
proof of negligence because it is not an element of a breach
of contract suit (Calalas v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 356;
FGU ln~urance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking
Corporatw_n, 386 SCR~ 312). On the other hand, negligence,
as~ rule, 1s an essential element of a suit based on a quasi-
dehct (Art. 2176, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Und~r ~ec. 2 of Rule 8, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC, th1~ s1~uation is yermissible as long as the allegations
pl_eaded w1thm a particular cause of action are consistent
~1th the caus~ of action relied upon as an alternative. Thus,
if the ~lternative_ cause of action is a breach of contract, the
allegat10ns therem must support the facts constituting the
breach of the contract.
5. Under the same provision (Sec. 2, Rule 8, as amended
by A.M._ No. 19-10-20-SC), the pleading which contains
~lterna~1ve causes of action is not made insufficient by the
msuffic1ency of one or more of the alternative statements
as lo1:g as 01:eof them, if made independently, would be
sufficient. Thi~ means that the rule does not require that all
of the alt~rnative c8:uses of action be sufficient for the plaintiff
~o be entitled to relief. It is enough that one of them, if made
mdependently, would be sufficient to support a cause of action.
The relevant rule provides: "When two or more
state~ents are made in the alternative and one of them if
made mdependently would be sufficient, the pleading is not
317
CHAPTER IV
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
lternative statements" (Sec. 2, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as
:mended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
6. Sec. 2 of Rule 8 authorizes not only alter~ative causes
of action. The rule, likewise, permits alternative defenses.
Under said rule, a party may set forth two or more defenses
alternatively or hypothetically. Thus, a defe~d~nt may assert
the defense of payment of the debt or prescr1pt1on thereof.
The rule allowing alternative defenses is consistent
·th even the Omnibus Motion Rule which requires that all
:otions attacking a pleading shall include all objections then
available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived (Sec. 9, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
Pleading actionable documents (Bar 1991; 2004; 2005; 2017)
1. A substantial number of cas~s reaching the cour\s
show that the plaintiffs cause of action or the defendants
defense is based upon a written instrument or document.
The document used in such cases is what is commonly
termed an "actionable document'' which, in current usage,
is an instrument or document on which an action or defense
is founded (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Ley
Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 185590,
December 3, 2014).
For example, in an action for collection of a sum of
money, the actionable document would be th~ p:omissory n?te
executed by the defendant in favor of the plamtiff. In an action
for foreclosure of a mortgage, the actionable document would
be the deed of mortgage. On the other hand, if the defendant
alleges that the debt has been paid, the receipt of payment
issued by the plaintiff would be the actionable document.
2. Whenever an actionable document is the basis of
a pleading, the rule specifically directs the ~leader to: (a)
set forth in the pleading the substance of the mstrument or
document, and attach the original or the copy of the document
to the pleading as an exhibit and which shall form part of the
 318
CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
pl~ading; or (b) with like effect, to set forth in the pleading
said copy of the instrument or document (Sec. 7, Rule 8, Rules
of C?urt, as am~nded by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Fernando
Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University Philippines
Inc., ~J.R. No. 207970, January 20, 2016). This manner of
pleadmg a document applies only to an actionable document
~.e.,one which is the basis of an action or a defense. Hence'.
if the document does not have the character of an actionable
docum_ent, it need not be pleaded strictly in the manner
~~~;~_ibed by Sec. 7 of Rule 8, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-
How to contest an actionable document· oath required (Bar
2010; 2017) '
. 1. When the action is founded upon a document pleaded
m the manner required by Sec. 7 of Rule 8, as amended by AM.
No. 19-1~- 20-SC, the party, who has no intent of admitting
the genumeness and due execution of the document, must
contest the same by (a) specifically denying the genuineness
and due executio~ of the document under oath; and (b) setting
forth what he claims to be the facts (Sec. 8, Rule 8, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC).
. 2. P:,mere specific denial of the actionable document
1s msufficient. The denial must be coupled with an oath. In
current usage, this means that the denial must be verified.
The absence of an oath will result in the implied admission of
the due execution and genuineness of the document (Sec 8
Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC/
For i13:stance, in a complaint for a sum of money based
on ~ro~mssory note duly pleaded in the complaint by the
plamtiff m accordance with Sec. 7 of Rule 8, as amended by
AM: No. 19-10-20-SC, the defendant will be deemed to have
admitted t~e genuineness and due execution of the promissory
note eve~ if he ma~es a specific denial of such matters in his
a~swer if the demal is not under oath. Hence, during the
trial, the de~endant will not be allowed to prove the forgery
of the promissory note over the objection of the plaintiff,
CHAPTER IV 319
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
its genuineness and due execution having been previously
admitted due to his failure to make a denial under oath. Note
also that the oath is necessary only when the pleader questions
and specifically denies the genuineness and due execution of
the document. Such oath is not required if what he denies is
the truth of a particular part or stipulation in the document.
When an oath is not required (Bar 1987; 2017)
The requirement of a specific denial under oath will
not apply in either of the following cases, even if it is the
genuineness and due execution of the document is sought to
be denied.
(a) When the adverse party does not appear to be a
party to the instrument, or
(b) When compliance with an order for an inspection
of the original instrument is refused (Sec. 8, Rule 8, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Thus if a son is sued as a substitute party under a
document' signed by his deceased father, a specific denial
made by the son is sufficient without the same being und~r
oath because the son is not a party to the document. Also, if
the court grants a motion filed by a party for the inspection of
the original document in the possession of the adverse party,
and the latter refuses to comply with the order, the former
may deny the genuineness of the document without an oath.
Meaning of admission
By the admission of the genuineness and du~ executio~
of an instrument is meant that the party whose signature 1t
bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another
for him with his authority; that, at the time it was signed, it
was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleadings
of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered;
and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a
seal, acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are
waived by him (Hibberd v. Rohde and Mcmillian, 32 Phil. 476,
478-479).
 320 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Defenses cut off by the admission of genuineness and due
execution
When a party is deemed to have admitted the genuineness
and due execution of an actionable document, defenses that
are implied from said admission are necessarily waived like
the defenses of forgery of the document, lack of authority
to execute the document, that the party charged signed the
document in some other capacity than that alleged in the
pleading, or that the document was never delivered (Hibberd
v. Rohde and McMillian, ibid.). Also cut off by the admission
is the defense that the document was not in words and figures
as set out in the pleadings (Imperial Textile Mills v. Court of
Appeals, 183 SCRA 584).
Defenses not cut off by the admission of genuineness and
due execution (Bar 2017)
The following defenses, among others, may be interposed
despite the implied admission of the genuineness and due
execution of the document: (a) payment or non-payment;
(b) want of consideration; (c) illegality of consideration; (d)
usury; and (e) fraud. These defenses are not inconsistent with
the admission of the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument and are not, therefore, barred (See also Hibberd
v. Rohde and McMillian, supra, 479-480). It is submitted that
prescription, release, waiver, statute of frauds, estoppel and
former recovery or discharge in bankruptcy are not, likewise,
barred, these defenses having no direct relationship to the
concepts of 'genuineness and due execution.'
D. Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments
and Other Papers in Civil Cases
Meaning of 'filing'
Filing is the act of submitting the pleading or other paper
to the court (Sec. 2, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
CHAPTERIV 321
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
Meaning of 'service'
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the
pleading or any other court submission (Sec. 2, Rule 13, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Upon whom service shall be made
1. If a party has not appeared by counsel, then service
must be made upon him. If a party has appeared_ by counsel,
then service upon said party shall be made up_onhis ?ounsel or
one of them, unless service upon the party himself is o:dehred
by the court (Sec. 2, Rule 13, Rules of C~urt). The_rul~ is t at
h a party is represented by counsel m an act10n m court,
:ot:~es of all kinds, including motions, ~leadin~s, ~nd o~ders
t be served on said counsel and notice to him is notice to
:~sclient (People v. Gabriel, 510 SCI:-A 197, _202). ~otice to
the counsel is effective notice to the client, while notice to the
client and not his counsel is not notice in law (Waterfront Cebu
City Casino Hotel, Inc. v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 197556, ~arch
25, 2015), unless, for instance, when the cour~ or tribun~l
orders service upon the party or when the techmcal defect m
the manner of notice is waived (Heirs of Benjamin Mendoza v.
Court of Appeals, 565 SCRA 506, 512-513).
Subject to compelling reasons involving substantial
justice service of a petition upon a party, when that party
is rep;esented by counsel of record, is a patent nullity _and
is not binding upon the party wrongfully served (Republic v.
Caguioa, 691 SCRA 306, 317, February 20, 2013). The rea~on
is simple - the parties, generally, have no formal education
or knowledge of the rules of procedure, specific~lly, the
mechanics of an appeal or availment _oflegal r_emedies_;~hus,
they may also be unaware of the rights and ~uties of a hti~a~t
relative to the receipt of a decision. More importantly, it is
best for the courts to deal only with one person in the interest
of orderly procedure - either the lawyer retained by the party
or the party himself if he does not intend to hire a lawyer (De
los Santos v. Elizalde, 514 SCRA 14, 27).
 322 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Service upon counsel representing several parties
Where one counsel appears for several parties, service
shall be made upon said counsel but he shall be entitled only
to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side
(Sec. 2, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC). Hence, if he represents three parties in the same
case, he cannot insist on being served with three copies of the
paper served upon him.
Service upon several counsels representing one party
Where several counsels appear for one party, such party
shall be entitled to only one copy of any pleading or paper to be
served upon the lead counsel if one is designated, or upon any
of them if there is designation of a lead counsel (Sec. 2, Rule
13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC).
Manner of filing
1. There are four (4) modes of filing, to wit:
(a) by submitting personally the original copy of the
pleading, and other court submissions, plainly indicated
as such, to the court; or
(b) by registered mail
(c) by accredited courier; or
(d) by transmitting them by electronic mail or
other electronic means as may be authorized by the court
in places where the court is electronically equipped (Sec.
3, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC).
2. In the first mode, the clerk of court shall indicate or
endorse on the pleading or paper filed the date and hour of
filing (Sec. 3, Rule 13, Rules of Court, a; amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
3. . In the se_cond and third modes, the date of mailing
of mot10ns, pleadmgs, [and other court submissions, and]
payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the
CHAPTERIV 323
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
envelope or registry receipt, shall be considered as th~ date of
filing, payment or deposit in court. The rule also reqmres that
the envelope be attached to the record of the case (Sec. 3, Rule
13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
4. In the fourth mode, the date of electronic transmission
shall be considered as the date of filing (Sec. 3, Rule 13, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
5. Under Sec. 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, where the filing of
pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments,
and all other papers with the court/tribunal is made by
registered mail, the date of mailing, as shown by the post
office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be
considered as the date of filing, payment, or deposit in court.
Thus, the date of filing is determinable from two sources:
from the post office stamp on the envelope or from the registry
receipt, either of which may suffice to prove the timeline~s
of the filing of the pleadings. If the date stamped on one 1s
earlier than the other, the former may be accepted as the
date of filing. This presupposes, however, that the envelope
or registry receipt and the dates appearing thereon are duly
authenticated before the tribunal where they are presented
(GSIS v. NLRC, 635 SCRA 251, 257).
How to prove filing
1. The filing of a pleading or any other court
submission shall be proved by its existence in the record of
the case. If it is not in the record, but is claimed to have been
filed personally, the filing shall be proven by the written or
stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of court on a
copy of the same (Sec. 16, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.·M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. If the pleading or any other court submission is filed
by registered mail, proof of filing is by the registry receipt and
the affidavit of the person who mailed it, containing a full
statement of the date and place of deposit of the mail in the
post office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with
postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster
 324 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
to return the mail to the sender after 10 calendar days if not
delivered (Sec. 16, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. If the pleading or any other court submission was
filed through an accredited courier service, the filing shall be
prove? by an affidavit of service of the person who brought the
pl_eadmg or ot~er, docum_ent to the service provider, together
with the couriers official receipt and document tracking
number (Sec. 16, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
4. If the pleading or any other court submission was
filed b:y electronic .mail, the same shall be proven by an
affidavit of electromc fili~g of the filing party accompanied by
a pa~er copy of the pleadmg or other document transmitted or
a written or stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk
of c?urt. If th~ paper copy sent by electronic mail was files by
:~t
registered mail, paragraph (b) of this Section applies (Sec. 16,
13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-
5. If the pleading or any other court submission was
filed through other authorized electronic means, the same
shall be proven ?Yan affidavit of electronic filing of the filing
party accompamed by a copy of electronic acknowledgment
of its filing by the court (Sec. 16, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Papers required to be filed and served
The following papers are required to be filed with the
court and _served upon the parties affected: (a) judgments,
(b) resolut10ns, (c) orders, (d) pleadings subsequent to the
complaint, ~e)written ~otions, (f) notices, (g) appearances, (h)
demands, (1) offers of Judgment, or G)similar papers (Sec. 4,
Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
Modes of service
Under Sec. 5 of Rule 13, there are 6 modes of service
of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other
CHAPTER IV 325
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
court submissions: (a) personally or (b) by registered mail,
(c) accredited courier, (d) electronic mail, (e) facsimile
transmission, or (f) other electronic means as may be
authorized by the court or as provided for in international
conventions to which the Philippines is a party (Sec. 5,
Rule 13, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). However, if
personal service and service by mail cannot be made, service
shall be done by 'substituted service' (Sec. 8, Rule 13, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Note that
facsimile transmission is allowed only for service, not for filing
or submission to court.
Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions
Specifically, when what is to be served are judgments,
final orders or resolutions, the same shall be served either (a)
personally, or (b) by registered mail. Upon ex parte motion
of any party in the case, a copy of the judgment, final order,
or resolution may be delivered by accredited courier at the
expense of such party. When a party summoned by publication
has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or
resolutions against him or her shall be served upon him or her
also by means of publication at the expense of the prevailing
party (Sec. 13, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC; See also Republic v. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, G.R. No. 203039, September 11, 2013; See also Riguer
v. Mateo, G.R. No. 222538, June 21, 2017).
Conventional service or filing of orders, pleadings and other
documents
Notwithstanding the provisions on Sec. 13, Rule 13,
as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC, the following orders,
pleadings, and other documents must be served or filed
personally or by registered mail when allowed and shall not
be served or filed electronically, unless express permission is
granted by the court:
(a) Initiatory pleadings and initial responsive
pleadings, such as an answer;

326 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
(b) Subpoena, protection orders, and writs;
(c) Appendices and exhibits to motions, or other
documents that are not readily amenable to electronic
scanning may, at the option of the party filing such, be
filed and served conventionally; and
(d) Sealed and confidential documents or records
(Sec. 14, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
These are required to be served personally or by
registered mail. Note that initiatory pleadings, initial
responsive pleadings, subpoena, protection orders and writs
have an effect to the private rights of the parties involved,
thus, service must be imbued with presumption of regularity
and cannot be entrusted to courier or be sent electronically.
Court-issued orders and other documents
The court may electronically serve orders and other
documents to all the parties in the case which shall have the
same effect and validity as provided herein. A paper copy of
the order or other document electronically served shall be
retained and attached to the record of the case (Sec. 18, Rule
13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
This provision pertains to outgoing papers from the court. The
latter may electronically serve orders and other documents to
all the parties in the case which shall have the same effect and
validity as personal service or by registered mail.
Personal service
Court submissions may be served by personal delivery
of a copy to the party or to the party's counsel, or to their
authorized representative named in the appropriate pleading
or motion, or by leaving it in his or her office with his or her
clerk, or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is
found in his or her office, or he or she has no office, then by
leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning
and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's residence,
CHAPTERN 327
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then
residing therein (Sec. 6, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
When personal service is deemed complete
Upon actual delivery, personal service is deemed complete
(Sec. 15, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
Service by mail
1. The preferred service by mail is by registered mail.
Service by ordinary mail may be done only if no registry
service is available in the locality of either the sender or the
addressee (Sec. 7, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Service by registered mail shall be done by
depositing the copy in the post office, in a sealed envelope,
plainly addressed to the party or ~o the p~rty's counse~ at his
or her office, if known, or otherwise at his or her residence,
if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions
to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after 10
calendar days if not delivered (Sec. 7, Rule 13, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Service by registered
mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mail~ng
office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showmg
compliance with the rule (Alba v. Malapajo, G.R. No. 198752,
January 13, 2016). Both the affidavit and the receipt need to
be appended to the paper being served (Lisandra v. Megacraft
International Corporation, G.R. No. 204275, December 9,
2015).
3. When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the
person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact
of service. The burden of proving notice rests upon the party
asserting its existence. In civil cases, service made through
registered mail is proved by the registry receipt i~~ued by the
mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailmg of facts
 328 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
showing compliance with Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure (now Sec. 17, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC) (Republic u. Resins, Inc.,
639 SCRA 390, 401-402, January 12, 2011).
When service by mail is deemed complete
1. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the
expiration of 10 calendar days after mailing, unless the
court otherwise provides (Sec. 15, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual
receipt by the addressee, or after 5 calendar days from the date
he or she received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever
is earlier (Sec. 15, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Substituted service
1. This mode is availed of only when there is failure to
effect service personally or by mail. This failure occurs when
the office and residence of the party or counsel are unknown
(Sec. 8, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
2. Substituted service is effected by delivering the copy
to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal
service and service by mail (Sec. 8, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
When substituted service is complete
Substituted service is complete at the time of delivery
of the copy to the clerk of court (Sec. 8, Rule 13, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Service by electronic means and facsimile
Service by electronic means and facsimile shall be made if
the party concerned consents to such modes of service (Sec. 9,
L__
CHAPTERIV 329
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. f-!o. 19-10-20_-SC).
We have to into account that not everybody 1s technologically
equipped or technologically adept.
1. Service by electronic means shall be made by
sending an e-mail to the party's _counsel's electronic_ ~ail
address or through other electromc means of transm1ss10n
as the parties may agree on, or upon direction of the court.
Service by facsimile shall be made by sending a facsimile copy
to the party's or counsel's given facsimile number (Sec. 9, Rule
13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. A party who changes his or her electronic mail
address or facsimile number while the action is pending must
promptly file, within 5 calendar days fr~m. such change'. a
notice of change of e-mail address or facs1m1le number with
the court and serve the notice on all other parties. Service
through the electronic mail address or facsimile number of a
party shall be presumed valid unless such party notifies the
court of any change, as aforementioned (Sec. 9, Rule 13, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Parties are
duty bound, if they consent to electronic mail or facsimile, to
inform the court of any change on their electronic address or
facsimile number. The same effect will result if the parties
do not inform the court of any changes, service will still be
deemed valid if made to the official email address or facsimile
number appearing in the records.
3. The subject of the electronic mail and facsimile
must follow the prescribed format: case number, case title
and the pleading, order or document title. The title of each
electronically-filed or served pleading or other document, and
each submission served by facsimile shall contain sufficient
information to enable the court to ascertain from the title:
(a) the party or parties filing or serving the paper, (b) nature
of the paper, (c) the party or parties against whom relief, if
any, is sought, and (d) the nature of the relief sought (Sec. 12,
Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
330 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Presumptive Service
There shall be presumptive notice to a party of a court
setting if such notice appears on the records to have been
mailed at least 20 calendar days prior to scheduled date of
hearing and if addressee is from within the same judicial
region of the court where the case is pending, or at least 30
calendar days if the addressee is from outside the judicial
region (Sec. l 0, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC). If the number of days is satisfied, then a
party will be deemed to have received the notice of hearing
and his or her failure to appear may cause the court to issue
a show cause order.
How to prove service (Bar 2011; 2012)
1. Proof of personal service shall consist of the written
admission of the party served. It may also be proven by the
official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party
serving, containing a statement of the date, place and manner
of service (Sec. 17, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof
shall consist of the affidavit of the person mailing of the facts
showing compliance with Sec. 7 of Rule 13 (Sec. 17, Rule 13,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. If service is by registered mail, the proof shall consist
of such affidavit of the person mailing of the facts showing
compliance with Sec. 7 of Rule 13 and the registry receipt issued
by the mailing office. The registry return card is to be filed
immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or, in lieu thereof,
the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy
of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee (Sec. 17,
Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC;
See Lisondra v. Megacraft International Corporation, supra).
4. If service is by an accredited courier service, proof
shall be made by an affidavit of service executed by the person
CHAPTER IV 331
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
who brought the pleading or paper to the service provider,
together with the courier's official receipt of document tracking
number (Sec. 17, Rule 13, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
5. Electronic mail, facsimile, or other authorized
electronic means of transmission. - Proof shall be made by
an affidavit of service executed by the person who sent the
e-mail, facsimile, or other electronic transmission, together
with a printed proof of transmittal (Sec. 17, Rule 13, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
6. Absent any proof of service of the decision, the period
of 15 days within which a party may file its motion for new
trial does not begin to run against such party. If it admits,
however, that it received the copy of the decision on a certain
date despite absence of proof of service, that date would be the
reckoning date of the 15-day period (Republic v. Bank of the
Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 203039, September 11, 2013).
E. Kinds of Pleadings
1. Complaint
Meaning of complaint
The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiffs or
claiming party's cause or causes of action (Sec. 3, Rule 6, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Filing of the complaint; significance
1. The filing of the complaint is the act of submitting
the said complaint to the court (Sec. 2, Rule 13, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). For the purpose of
filing, the original must be presented personally to the clerk of
court or sent by registered mail or sent by accredited courier;
or by transmitting them by electronic mail or other electronic
means as may be authorized by the court in places where
the court is electronically equipped (Sec. 3, Rule 13, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
332 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
2. The filing of the original complaint in court signifies
the commencement of the civil action (Sec. 5, Rule 1, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). By the filing
of the complaint, the court also acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff. Submission to the jurisdiction of the
court is implied from the very filing of the complaint where
affirmative relief is prayed for by the plaintiff. It also has the
effect of interrupting the prescription of actions pursuant
to Art. 1155 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under the
said provision, "x x x the prescription of actions is interrupted
when they are filed before the court xx x."
Payment of docket fees and acquisition of jurisdiction
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action (Proton
Pilipinas Corporation v. Banque National de Paris, 460 SCRA
260, 276). The court acquires jurisdiction over the case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees (7107 Islands
Publishing, Inc. v. The House Printers Corporation, G.R. No.
193420, October 14, 2015). This is the general rule.
2. The rule on payment of docket fee has, in some
instances, been made subject to the rule on liberal interpreta-
tion. Thus, in a case, it was held that while the payment of
the required docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even
its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically
cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period
(Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation [PAGCORJ
v. Lopez, 474 SCRA 76, 92; See also Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 27 4, 285). Also, if the amount of docket
fees is insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the
party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but
jurisdiction is not automatically lost (Rivera v. Del Rosario,
419 SCRA 626, 635).
CHAPTER IV 333
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
3. The case of The Heirs of Reinoso, Sr. v. Court of
Appeals, 654 SCRA 1, 9-10, clearly summarizes the rule on
the payment of docket fees. Thus:
XXX
"The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees
within the prescribed period is mandatory (Pedrosa v.
Hill, 327 Phil. 153, 158 [19961). In Manchester v. Court
of Appeals (233 Phil. 579 [19871), it was held that a court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this
rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the
case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion (252 Phil.
280 [19891) wherein the Court decreed that where the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This
ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees required. Thus, in the
more recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros (G.R. No.
171532, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 334, 353), the Court
explained that where the party does not deliberately
intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees,
and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by
paying additional docket fees when required by the court,
the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will
apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several
instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-
payment of docket fees in order to afford the parties the
opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits.
In the case of La Balette College v. Pilotin (463 Phil. 785
[20031), the Court stated:
"Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the
requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, [th]
e [Court] also recognize[s] that its strict application is
qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees
within the reglementary period allows only discretionary,
not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be
334 CNIL PROCEDURE
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used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound
discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection
in consideration of all attendant circumstances." (For
further readings, see Ku v. RCBC Securities, G.R. No.
219491, October 17, 2018).
4. One case holds that while the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing
of the complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal
of the complaint provided that (a) the fees are paid within
a reasonable time; and (b) there is no intent to defraud the
government by the failure to pay the correct amount of filing
fees (Sy-Vargas v. The Estate of Ogsos, Jr., G.R. No. 221062,
October 5, 2016; For further readings, see Camaso v. TSM
Shipping [Phils.], Inc., G.R. No. 223290, November 7, 2016).
Effect of failure to pay docket fee on supplemental complaint
In a case, the respondent argued that the failure of the
plaintiff to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint
is fatal to their action. The Court ruled that the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs' action from the moment
they filed their original complaint accompanied by the
payment of the filing fees due on the same. The plaintiffs' non-
payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional
claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had
over the case (Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. v. Security Bank
Corporation, 639 SCRA 39, 45).
Payment of docket fees for cases on appeal
1. Appellate docket and other lawful fees must be paid
within the same period for taking an appeal. This is clear
from the opening sentence of Sec. 4, Rule 41 which states of
the same rule that, "Within the period for taking an appeal,
the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount
of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees" (Italics
L__
CHAPTERIV 335
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
supplied). Note that the appellate docket fee is not paid in the
appellate court but in the court which rendered the judgment
or final order.
2. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
payment of the docket fee within the prescribed period is
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such
payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be
appealed from becomes final and executory (Regalado v. Go,
514 SCRA 616, 634). Hence, non-payment is a valid ground
for the dismissal of an appeal (M.A. Santander Construction,
Inc. v. Villanueva, 441 SCRA 525, 530). However, delay
in the payment of the docket fees confers upon the court a
discretionary, not mandatory, power to dismiss an appeal
(Villamar v. Court of Appeals, 434 SCRA 565, 571-572; See
also Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 193034, July 20, 2015).
2. Answer
Nature of an answer
1. Recall that the initial pleading, in ordinary civil
actions, is the complaint in which the plaintiff sets forth his
claim or claims against the defendant and also his prayer
for relief. Now, when the complaint is filed and the requisite
legal fees are paid, the clerk of court issues the corresponding
summons to the defendant. The summons instructs the
defendant to answer the complaint within the time fixed by
the Rules.
The defendant, upon the service of summons upon him,
may avail of certain options depending on the situation. He
may file a motion for bill of particulars if there are allegations
in the complaint that require clarification or details so he may
be able to intelligently respond to the complaint. He may also
file a motion to dismiss based on specific grounds set forth in
Sec. 12(a), Rule 15, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC. Ifno
ground for either motion exists, the wiser move is to serve and
file his answer to the complaint to prevent his being declared
in default.

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2 .. The answer is a pleading in which a defending party
sets forth his or her defenses (Sec. 4, Rule 6, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). This pleading may be
an answer to the complaint, counterclaim or a cross-claim.
There is no answer to a reply but there could be an answer
to a third-party complaint or complaint-in-intervention. Since
the answer merely responds to a claim, an answer is called a
"responsive" pleading.
Kinds of defenses in the answer
1. An answer contains the defenses of the answering
party. These defenses may either be negative or affirmative.
(Sec. 5, Rule 6, Rules of Court).
2. A defense is negative when its purpose is to
specifically deny the material averments in the pleading of
the claiming party.
Under the Rules, a negative defense is the specific denial
of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the
claimant essential to his or her cause of action or defense
(Sec. 5[a], Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC). A negative defense is stated in the form of a
specific denial and the kinds of specific denials are described
in Sec. 10 of Rule 8. If the denial is not one of those described
under the said provision, the denial is deemed to be general.
A general denial is considered an admission.
3. A defense is affirmative when its purpose is to
prevent or bar recovery by the claiming party even if it
hypothetically admits the material allegations in the pleading
of the claimant. It is, therefore, a defense by way of confession
and avoidance (Sec. 5[b], Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Example: The defendant admits his
debt in favor of the defendant, but he denies his legal liability
because the debt has already prescribed or that the court,
before which the complaint has been filed, has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of
limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds,
--- ----- --- ---------~·
CHAPTER IV 337
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any
other matter by way of confession and avoidance. Affirmative
defenses may also include grounds for the dismissal of
a complaint, specifically, that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment (Sec. 5[b], Rule 6, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). As to the other
affirmative defenses under the first paragraph of Sec. 5(b),
Rule 6, the court may conduct a summary hearing within 15
calendar days from the filing of the answer. Such affirmative
defenses shall be resolved by the court within 30 calendar
days from the termination of the summary hearing (Sec. 12,
Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
(Sec. 5[b], Rule 6, Rules of Court).
A defendant shall raise his or her affirmative defenses
in his or her answer, which shall be limited to the reasons set
forth under Sec. 5(b), Rule 6, and the following grounds:
1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of
the defending party;
2. That the venue is improperly laid;
3. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
4. That the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action; and
5. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has
not been complied with (Sec. 12, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Failure to raise the affirmative. defenses at the earliest
opportunity shall constitute a waiver thereof. The court shall
motu proprio resolve the above affirmative defenses within 30
calendar days from the filing of the answer (Sec. 12, Rule 8,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Affirmative defenses, if denied, shall not be the subject
of a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, but may be among the matters to
338 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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be raised .on appeal after a judgment on the merits (Sec. 12,
Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Effect of absence of a specific denial
1. By authority of Sec. 11 of Rule 8, as amended by AM.
No. 19-10-20-SC, material averments in a pleading asserting
a claim or claims not specifically denied shall be deemed
admitted, except averments as to the amount of unliquidated
damages (See also Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v.
Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 207970,
January 20, 2016).
2. If the allegations are deemed admitted, there is no
more triable issue between the parties and if the admissions
appear in the answer of the defendant, the plaintiff may file
a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 34.
Bar 2018
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings
upon motion of the claiming party when the defending party's
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that
purpose, only the pleadings of the parties are to be generally
considered. A party admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading not only when he expressly confesses
the truth of such allegations, but also when he does not
controvert the same by specific denials (Fernandez Medical
Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc.,
ibid.).
Purpose of a specific denial
1. It is the specific denial of the material allegations
in the complaint which creates the issues in civil litigation.
These issues are to be proven and are the matters to which
every evidence in a case is directed. Without such issues, there
is no necessity for a trial since nothing is to be proven. In
evidentiary terms, there is no factum probandum (the matter
or proposition to be proven).
2. Jurisprudentially, the purpose of requiring the
defendant to make a specific denial is to make him disclose the
CHAPTERIV 339
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
matters alleged in the complaint which he succinctly intends to
disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he relied
upon to support the denial. The parties are compelled to lay
their cards on the table (Philippine Bank of Communications
v. Go, 642 SCRA 693, 707, February 14, 2011, citing Aquintey
v. Tibong, 511 SCRA 414, 432).
Kinds of specific denials (Bar 2011 ; 2015)
1. A general denial does not become specific by the use
of the word "specifically." Merely uttering "specific denial" is
ineffective if the denial does not conform to the methods of
denial provided for by the Rules of Court. It still amounts to
an admission under Sec. 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC. Using "specifically'' in a
general denial does not automatically convert that denial to a
specific one (Republic v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673, January
11, 2016; See Department of Public Works and Highways v.
CMC I Mo nark/ Pacific I Hi-Tri Joint Venture, G.R. No. 179732,
September 13, 2017).
2. The denial in the answer must be definite as to what
is admitted and what is denied, such that the adverse party
will not have to resort to guesswork over what is admitted and
what is denied (Department of Public Works and Highways
v. CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint Venture, G.R. No.
179732, September 13, 2017).
There are three types of specific denials mentioned in
Sec. 10 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, namely: (See Republic
v. Gimenez, ibid.).
(a) The defendant specifies each material allegation
of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever
practicable, sets forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial. This kind of denial
is an absolute denial (Sec. 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Go, supra). Bar 2011
Example: "Defendant denies the truth of the
allegations in par. 7 of the complaint alleging that he
340 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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owes the plaintiff P450,000.00, the truth of the matter
being that it is the plaintiff who owes the defendant the
same amount."
Here, the defendant absolutely denies his liability
and alleges what to him are the actual facts. In making a
specific denial, reference must be made to the paragraph
sought to be denied. Since the rule requires that the
defendant must "specify each material allegation of fact,"
a denial of the allegations in each paragraph is required.
A blanket denial, which reads: "Defendant specifically
denies all the material allegations in the complaint," is
not a specific denial. The use of the word "specific" does not
make the denial specific. The blanket denial is actually a
general denial which, in effect, is an admission.
(b) Another type of a specific denial is where the
defendant does not make a total denial of the material
allegat~ons in a specific paragraph. In this type of denial,
he demes only a part of the averment. If he chooses this
type of denial, he specifies that part the truth of which
he admits and denies only the remainder. This denial is
known as a partial denial.
Example: In an action for damages, the defendant
avers: "Defendant admits the allegations in paragraph 5
of the complaint, that Plaintiff sustained injuries when
his car collided with the herein Defendant's car but
'
denies the allegation that the collision occurred through
Defendant's fault."
(c) One type of a specific denial is where the
defendant alleges that he "is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material averment made in the complaint." This type of
specific denial, called a denial by disavowal of knowledge,
must be made sincerely and in good faith (Warner Barnes
& Co., Ltd. v. Reyes, 103 Phil. 662, 665).
When the defendant alleges having no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations of the other party but such matters are
CHAPTER IV 341
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowledge,
a claim of "ignorance or lack of information" will not be
considered as a specific denial (Aquintey v. Tibong, 515
SCRA 414, 433; Camitan v. Court of Appeals, 511 SCRA
364, 373). Where the fact as to which a lack of knowledge
is asserted is, to the knowledge of the court, so plainly
within the defendant's knowledge that his averment of
ignorance must be palpably untrue (Warner Barnes &
Co., Ltd. v. Reyes, supra).
Example: Mr. D signs a promissory note in favor of Mr.
P. Since Mr. D failed to pay despite demand, suit was brought
against him. The complaint duly pleaded the promissory
note as an actionable document. Mr. D denies the alleged
promissory note by averring lack of knowledge of the note.
This averment appears to be one in bad faith and shall be
considered as an admission because it is absurd for Mr. D not
to know of the promissory note he himself signed. Bar 1978;
1993
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, a denial that the
defendant is without any knowledge of his having signed a
deed of mortgage, when the facts and the actionable document
forming the basis of the claim incontrovertibly show that he
so executed the document denied, is a denial in bad faith. This
denial amounts to an admission. Bar 2004; 2005
Negative pregnant
1. In a pleading, a negative pregnant is a negative
implying also an affirmative and which, although stated in a
negative form, really admits the allegations to which it relates
(Cramer v. Aiken, 63 App. D.C. 16, 68 F. 2d 761, 762, cited in
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 930). It is a form of a negative
expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least
an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party
(Valdez v. Dabon, Jr., A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015).
Examples: (a) The defense alleges: "I had never
borrowed money from the plaintiff from 2011 to 2013,"
may imply that the pleader had borrowed money at some
342 CNIL PROCEDURE
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other time and was only denying that he did so during
the years mentioned.
(b) A complaint alleges: "Plaintiff extended a loan
to Defendant in the amount of P500,000 on July 27, 2016
in Baguio City." The defendant, in his answer, alleges:
"Defendant specifically denies that Plaintiff extended a
loan to Defendant in the amount of P500,000 in Baguio
City."
Notice that the answer is a mere repetition of the
allegations made in the complaint. The answer is vague
as to what it really denies. Is it the existence of a loan
that is denied? Is it the amount? The place? The effect of
this kind of denial may be an admission that he borrowed
the amount alleged although he may be denying the place
where the loan was contracted.
(c) The plaintiff alleged that the defendant evicted
him and the other lawful occupants of the property by
intimidating them with an assault rifle. The defendant
alleged in his answer: "Defendant denies vigorously
that he used or brandished an assault rifle against the
plaintiffs." The answer could be an admission of having
intimidated the plaintiffs but not through the use of an
assault rifle.
2. In one case, the respondent, in a disbarment case,
charged with having extramarital affairs with a married
woman, alleged that the affair did not amount to gross immoral
conduct and that no sexual abuse, threat or intimidation was
exerted upon the woman. The Court interpreted the defense as
an admission of the existence of the affair and that his denial
only pertained to the existence of a forced illicit relationship.
In other words, the denial, ruled the Court, constitutes a
negative pregnant (Valdez v. Dabon, Jr., supra).
When a specific denial must be coupled with an oath (Bar
2010)
1. As a rule, a negative defense is sufficient if made in
the form of a specific denial of the material allegations alleged
CHAPTERIV 343
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
in the pleading of the claimant. There are, however, instances
when a mere specific denial is not sufficient for a negative
defense. In a denial of an actionable document, the specific
denial must be made under oath (Sec. 8, Rule 8, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC), a mere specific
denial is not enough to produce the kind of denial required by
the Rules.
2. Whenever an action or defense is based or founded
upon a written instrument or document, said instrument or
document is deemed an actionable document.
If the pleader has an actionable document, like a
promissory note, under the Rules, the substance of such note
shall be set forth in the pleading and the original or copy
thereof attached to the pleading as an exhibit. When attached
as an exhibit, the promissory note shall be deemed a part of
the pleading. The copy of the note may also with like effect,
be set forth in the pleading (Sec. 7, Rule 8, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). When the manner of
alleging the document is done in accordance with the Rules,
the actionable document is deemed to have been properly
pleaded.
Now, if the adverse party desires to deny the genuineness
and due execution of the actionable document, he must do two
things: (a) specifically deny the genuineness and due execution
of the document, and set forth what he claims to be the facts,
and (b) make the denial under oath (Sec. 8, Rule 8, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
If he does not specifically deny the genuineness and
due execution of the document under oath, he is deemed to
have admitted the genuineness and due execution of that
document. Because of this admission, he can no longer deny
that the note was forged or that the one who executed the
same was not authorized to do so. These defenses are barred
by the admission. May he, however, still defend by showing
fraud in the execution of the note, payment or prescription of
the same? Answer: Yes, he can, because these defenses are not
barred by the admission.
344 CML PROCEDURE
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It was ruled that the failure to deny the genuineness and
due execution of an actionable document does not preclude a
party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake,
compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, and
want of consideration (Acabal v. Acabal, 454 SCRA 555, 569).
Matters not deemed admitted by the failure to make a specific
denial
1. The provisions of Sec. 11 of Rule 8 establish the rule
that material allegations in the complaint not specifically
denied are deemed admitted. The following are nevertheless,
not deemed admitted by the failure to make a specific denial
in a party's responsive pleading:
(a) Amount ofunliquidated damages (Sec. 11, Rule
8, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
(b) Conclusions in a pleading because it is for the
court to make conclusions.
(c) Non-material averments or allegations because
only material allegations have to be denied (See Sec. 11,
Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-
SC).
2. In one case denominated as one for "Quieting of
Title," the plaintiff alleged that the defendant mortgagee
failed to enforce its right as mortgagee through the filing of
a complaint for judicial foreclosure despite the lapse of more
than thirty-five (35) years from the execution by the plaintiff
of a deed of real estate mortgage over his property, and; that
because of such failure, the mortgagee's right to foreclose
has lapsed by extinctive prescription. The plaintiff argued
that since such allegation had not been specifically denied by
the defendant, the allegation of prescription of the right to
foreclose should be deemed admitted by the defendant. Is the
prescription of the right to foreclose deemed admitted?
It is not deemed admitted. The allegation of the
plaintiff concerning the prescription of the right to foreclose
is a conclusion of law. Conclusions of law and fact in the
CHAPTER IV 345
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
complaint are not deemed admitted by the failure to make a
specific denial. Only material allegations of facts need to be
specifically denied. In the same vein, the characterization of
a contract as void or voidable is a conclusion of law (Mercene
v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 192971,
January 10, 2018).
Affirmative defenses
1. A defense is affirmative when it alleges new matters
which, while hypothetically admitting the allegations in the
pleading of the claimant, would, nevertheless, prevent or bar
recovery by the claiming party (Sec. 5[b], Rule 6, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. An affirmative defense is one which is not a denial
of an essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of action,
but one which, if established, will be a good defense, i.e., an
"avoidance" of the claim. An affirmative defense includes
fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality,
statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in
bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and
avoidance. Allegations presented in the answer as affirmative
defenses are not automatically characterized as such. Before
an allegation qualifies as an affirmative defense, it must be of
such nature as to bar the plaintiff from claiming on his cause
of action. When the answer asserts affirmative defenses, there
is proper joinder of issues which must be ventilated in a full-
blown trial on the merits and cannot be resolved by mere
judgment on the pleadings (Pesane Animas Mongao v. Pryce
Properties Corp., 467 SCRA 201, 214; See also Sec. 5[b}, Rule
6, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
If affirmative defenses under the first paragraph of Sec.
5(b), Rule 6, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, are raised,
the court may conduct a summary hearing within fifteen (15)
calendar days from the filing of the answer. Such affirmative
defenses shall be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
calendar days from the termination of the summary hearing
(Sec. 12[d}, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
346 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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3. Affirmative defenses may also include grounds for
the dismissal of a complaint, specifically, that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
or that the action is barred by prior judgment (Sec. 5[b}, Rule
6, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
4. A defendant shall raise his or her affirmative
defenses in his or her answer, which shall be limited to the
reasons set forth under Sec. 5(b), Rule 6, as amended by AM.
No. 19-10-20-SC, and the following grounds:
a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party;
b) That the venue is improperly laid;
c) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
d) That the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action; and
e) That a condition precedent for filing the claim
has not been complied with (Sec. 12[a], Rule 8, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
5. Failure to raise the affirmative defenses at the
earliest opportunity shall constitute a waiver thereof. (Sec.
12[b], Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC).
6. The court shall motu proprio resolve the above
affirmative defenses within thirty (30) calendar days from
the filing of the answer (Sec. 12[c], Rule 8, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). There 2 modes ofresolution
here. The court shall motu proprio resolve the grounds that are
evident from the face of the complaint. However, if the court
determines that the pleadings before it are insufficient and
it needs more enlightenment on the facts that are asserted,
the court may set it for a summary hearing. It would be the
court's duty to issue a notice of summary hearing. Motion to
set affirmative defenses for hearing is a prohibited motion
under Sec. 12, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
CHAPTERIV 347
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC. Such affirmative defenses shall also be
resolved within thirty (30) calendar days reckoned from the
termination of the summary hearing.
7. Affirmative defenses, if denied, shall not be the
subject of a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, but may be among the matters
to be raised on appeal after a judgment on the merits (Sec.
12[e], Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC). Only when a party is appealing the judgment on the
merits can he or she assign as an error the denial of his or her
affirmative defense.
Periods to file an answer to a complaint
1. The defendant shall file his or her answer to the
complaint within 30 calendar days after service of summons,
unless a different period is fixed by the court (Sec. 1, Rule 11,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Where
the plaintiff files an amended complaint as a matter of right,
the defendant shall answer the same within 30 calendar days
after being served with a copy thereof (Sec. 3, Rule 11, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Where the filing of the amended complaint is not a matter
of right, the defendant shall answer the amended complaint
within within fifteen (15) calendar days from notice of the
order admitting the same. An answer earlier filed may serve
as the answer to the amended complaint if no new answer is
filed (Sec. 3, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
2. Where the defendant is a private foreign juridical
entity and service of summons is µiade on the government
official designated by law to receive the same, the answer
shall be filed within within 60 calendar days after receipt of
summons by such entity (Sec. 2, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). In cases where summons
had been served through extraterritorial service under Sec. 17
of Rule 14, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC, the period to
answer is 60 calendar days from service of summons.
 348 CNIL PROCEDURE
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3. A supplemental complaint may be answered within
20 calendar days from notice of the order admitting the same
unless a different period is fixed by the court. The answer t~
the co~pla_int shall serve as the answer to the supplemental
complamt 1f no new or supplemental answer is filed (Sec. 7,
Rule 11, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
4. A defendant may, for meritorious reasons be granted
an additional period of not more than 30 calendar' days to file
an answer. A defendant is only allowed to file one (1) motion
for extension of time to file an answer.
A motion for extension to file any pleading, other than an
answer, is prohibited and considered a mere scrap of paper.
The court, however, may allow any other pleading to be filed
after the time fixed by these Rules (Sec. 11, Rule 11, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2(a). Default
Nature of default (Bar 2013; 2014; 2015; 2017)
1. Default is a procedural concept that occurs when the
defending party fails to file his answer within the reglementary
peri?d. A declaration or order of default is issued as a
pumshment for unnecessary delay in joining issues (Vlason
Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 121662-64
July 6, 1999). Bar 1999; 2012 ' presentation of the evidence of the adverse party amounts not
2. The rule on default clearly establishes the "failure
to answer within the time allowed therefor" as the ground
for a declaration of default (Sec. 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court as
amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC; See Alvarado v. A;ala
Land, Inc., G.R. No. 208426, September 20, 2017). From the
tenor _ofthe Rules, default does not technically occur from
the failure of the defendant to attend either the pre-trial or
the trial (See Sec. 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M No. 19-10-20-SC). Hence, the failure of the defendant to
appear at the pre-trial, while a cause for the court to order the
CHAPTERIV 349
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and for the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof (Sec. 5, Rule 18, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC), is not the ground
for a declaration of default as the term is contemplated under
Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. While the effect of the
failure of the defendant to appear at the pre-trial is similar
to that of default, under the Rules, this consequence is not
to be called a declaration of default. The term "default," in
Rule 9, is not identified with the failure to appear in court, but
with the failure of the defending party to answer within the
reglementary period.
The Court, quite recently, clarified that failure to attend
the pre-trial does not result in the "default" of the defendant.
Instead, the failure of the defendant to attend shall be cause
to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the
court to render judgment on the basis thereof (Aguilar v.
Lightbringers Credit Cooperative, G.R. No. 209605, January
12, 2015; Salvador v. Rabaja, G.R. No. 199990, February 4,
2015; For further readings, see Carson Realty & Management
Corporation v. Red Robbin Security Agency, G.R. No. 225035,
February 8, 2017).
3. The defendant's non-appearance in the hearing and
failure to adduce evidence do not constitute default when
an answer has been filed within the reglementary period.
The failure of the defendant to attend the hearings for the
to a default, but to a waiver of the defendant's right to object
to the evidence presented during such hearings and cross-
examine the witnesses presented (Monzon Spouses Relova v.
Addio Properties, Inc., 565 SCRA 514, 524).
4. Be reminded that under the former Rules (Sec. 2 of
Rule 20 of the 1964 Rules of Court), a party who fails to appear
at the pre-trial conference may be declared non-suited, if he is
the plaintiff, or as in default, ifhe is the defendant. The terms,
'non-suited' or 'as in default,' no longer appear in the present
rules on default.
 350 CML PROCEDURE
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Requisites before a defending party may be declared in
default (Bar 1999; 2013; 2015)
The following are the requisites before a party may be
declared in default:
(a) The court has validly acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the defending party, either by service of
summons or voluntary appearance (Sablas v. Sablas 526
SCRA 292, 296); ' claiming party" (Sablas v. Sablas, supra; See also Tung
(b) The claiming party must file a motion to
declare the defending party in default (Sablas v. Sablas,
5~6 SCRA 292, 297; Momarco Import Company, Inc. v.
Villamena, G.R. No. 192477, July 27, 2016);
(c) The claiming party must prove that the
defending party has failed to answer within the period
provided by the Rules of Court (Sablas v. Sablas, supra;
Momarco Import Company, Inc., supra);
(d) The defending party must be notified of the
motion to declare him in default (Sec. 3, Rule 9, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Momarco
Import Company, Inc. v. Villamena, supra); and
(e) There must be a hearing of the motion to declare
the defending party in default (Spouses de los Santos v
Carpio, 501 SCRA 390, 399-400; for further readings, se~
Carson Realty & Management Corporation v. Red Robbin
Security Agency, G.R. No. 225035, February 8, 2017).
No motu proprio declaration of default
1. It has to be emphasized that the present rule on
default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such motion
to the defending party, it is not enough that the defendant
failed to ans~er the complaint within the reglementary period
to be a sufficient ground for declaration in default. It is plain,
therefore, that the default of a defending party cannot be
d~clared motu proprio (See Momarco Import Company, Inc. v.
Villamena, supra).
_L____
CHAPTER IV 351
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
The Court clearly explains, thus:
"It is not enough that, the defendant fails to answer
the complaint within the reglementary period. The
trial court cannot, motu proprio, declare a defendant in
default, as the rule leaves it up to the claiming party
to protect his or its interests. The trial court should
not, under any circumstances, act as counsel of the
Ho Steel Enterprises Corporation v. Ting Guan Trading
Corporation, G.R. No. 182153, April 7, 2014).
2. A different rule is followed in environmental
cases. Should the defendant fail to answer within the period
provided, the court shall declare the defendant in default and,
upon motion of the plaintiff, shall receive evidence ex parte
and render judgment based thereon and the reliefs prayed for
(Sec. 15, Rule 2, Part II, Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases). It is to be noted that under the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, it is the court which shall, on its
own motion, declare the defendant in default. No motion is
required of the plaintiff. The motion of the plaintiff, however,
is required before the court orders the reception of evidence ex
parte.
In ordinary civil actions, a motion to declare the defendant
in default is required before the court declares the defendant in
default. Where there is no motion, there can be no declaration
of default. Also, when the court, in the exercise of its discretion,
requires the claimant to submit evidence, a prior motion from
the claiming party is not required (Sec. 3, Rule 9, Rules of
Court), unlike the required motion in environmental cases
(Sec. 15, Rule 2, Part IL Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases). ·
Failure to serve the answer to the adverse party
It was held that the defendant who files his answer in
time, but failed to serve a copy thereof upon the adverse party,
may validly be declared in default (Gonzales and Mauricio v.
Francisco, 49 Phil. 747; Banares v. Flordeliza, et al., 51 Phil.
 352 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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786; Cases cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p.
189, 2005 Ed.). This failure is not, however, fatal because the
declaration of default may be set aside by a timely and proper
motion with the requisite affidavit of merit and provided no
loss of time occurs (Banares u. Flordeliza, et al., 51 Phil. 786).
Effect of a declaration/order of default (Bar 2012)
1. The party declared in default loses his standing in
court. The loss of such standing prevents him from taking part
in the trial (Sec. 3[a], Rule 9, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. _19-10-20-SC).He forfeits his rights as a party litigant,
has no right to presen~ evidence supporting his allegations,
to contr?l the proceedmgs or cross-examine witnesses (Lui
Enterprises, Inc. u. Zuellig Pharma Corporation, G.R. No.
193494, March 12, 2014).
2. A party in default shall be entitled to notices of
subsequent proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.
(Sec. 3[a], Rule 9, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC). It is submitted that he may participate in the trial
not as a party, but as a witness.
In a complaint for interpleader, the failure of a claimant
to answer within the time fixed, may, on motion, be declared
in default and thereafter render judgment barring him from
any claim in respect to the subject matter (Sec. 5, Rule 62,
Rules of Court). In an expropriation proceeding, the defendant
who fails to answer may still present his evidence as to the
amount of compensation to be paid for his property. He may
also share in the distribution of the award (Sec. 3, Rule 67,
Rules of Court).
3. A declaration of default is not tantamount to an
admission of the truth or the validity of the plaintiffs claims
(Monarch Insurance u. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 71, 93;
Vlason Enterprises Corp. u. Court of Appeals, 31 0 SCRA 26, 64).
In very clear terms, it was held:
"A judgment of default does not imply a waiver of
rights except that of being heard and presenting evidence
CHAPTERIV 353
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
in defendant's favor. It does not imply admission by the
defendant of the facts and causes of action of the plaintiff
x x x. Nor could it be interpreted as an admission by the
defendant that the plaintiffs causes of action find support
in the law or that the latter is entitled to the relief prayed
for x x x" (Monarch Insurance v. Court of Appeals, 333
SCRA 71, 93).
4. It should be emphasized that the mere fact that
the defendant was not able to answer the complaint does not
automatically mean that the trial court will render a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff. The trial court must still determine
whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs prayed for
(Villongco v. Yabut, G.R. No. 225022, February 5, 2018).
Effect of partial default (Bar 2011)
When a pleading asserts a claim against several defending
parties and some file and serve their answers but the others
do not, the court shall try the case against all the def ending
parties based on the answers filed and render judgment upon
the evidence presented where the claim states a common
cause of action against them (Sec. 3[c], Rule 9, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Because there is a
common cause of action against the defending parties, where
one of them fails to answer, the non-answering defendant
may be declared in default but the court shall refrain from
rendering a judgment by default against such party because
the case shall be tried based on the answers of the other
def ending parties.
Action of the court after the declaration/order of default
1. Under the Rules (Sec. 3, Rufe 9, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC), when a party is declared in default, the
court may do either of two things:
(a) proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant; or
(b) require the claimant to submit evidence ex
parte.
354 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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2. The choice of which action to take is a matter of
judicial discretion (Sec. 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Under the previous rule, the court
had no power to render judgment immediately after the
declaration or order of default. It had to require the reception
of evidence by the plaintiff but done without the participation
of the defendant who has already lost his standing in court.
The court, under current rules may, at its discretion, select
from the options granted to it in Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC.
Court not required to receive evidence personally
The court need not personally receive the evidence if
it decides to hear the evidence of the claiming party. The
reception of the evidence may be delegated to the clerk of
court (Sec. 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC). Bar 2011
Admission of answer filed out of time
1. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court
to permit the defendant to file his answer and be heard on
the merits even after the reglementary period for filing the
answer expires. The Rules of Court provides for discretion
on the part of the trial court not only to extend the time for
filing an answer but also to allow an answer to be filed after
the reglementary period (Sablas v. Sablas, 526 SCRA 292,
297). A defendant may, for meritorious reasons, be granted
an additional period of not more than 30 calendar days to file
an answer. A defendant is only allowed to file one (1) motion
for extension of time to file an answer. A motion for extension
to file any pleading, other than an answer, is prohibited and
considered a mere scrap of paper. The court, however, may
allow any other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by
these Rules (Sec. 11, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Thus, it was held that the appellate court erred
when it ruled that the trial court had no recourse but to
declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed to file
CHAPTERIV 355
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
their answer on or before the reglementary period. It was
also declared in the same case that the trial court correctly
admitted the answer of the petitioner spouses even if it was
filed out of time because, at the time of its filing, they were not
yet declared in default nor was a motion t_odeclare t~e_m in
default ever filed. Neither was there a showmg that petit10ner
spouses intended to delay the case.
It is not correct to say that a trial court has no recourse
but to declare a defending party in default when he fails to
file an answer within the required period. The rule is that
the defendant's answer should be admitted where it is filed
before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to
the plaintiff (Sablas v..Sablas, supra).
3. Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary
period but before the defendant is declared in default and
there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the
case, the answer should be admitted (San Pedro Cineplex
Properties, Inc. v. Heirs of Manuel Humada Enafio, 635 SCRA
421, 424-425). The hornbook rule is that default judgments
are generally disfavored (Paramount Insurance Corp. v. A. C.
Ordonez Corporation, 561 SCRA 327, 334).
Extension of the time to answer
1. A defendant may, for meritorious reasons, be granted
an additional period of not more than 30 calendar days to file
an answer. A defendant is only allowed to file 1 motion for
extension of time to file an answer. A motion for extension
to file any pleading, other than an answer, is prohibited and
considered a mere scrap of paper. The court, however, may
allow any other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by
these Rules (Sec. 11, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Corollarily, Sec. 12, Rule 15, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC, prohibits motion for extension of time to file
pleadings, affidavits or any other papers, except a motion for
extension to file an answer as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 11.

356 CML PROCEDURE
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3. The trial court has the discretion not only to extend
the time for filing an answer but also allow an answer to be
filed nfter the reglementary period. Hence, it is erroneous for
the appellate court to rule that the trial court has no recourse
but to declare the defending party in default for failure to file
a timely answer (Sablas u. Sablas, 526 SCRA 292, 298).
4. To reiterate, the rule is that the defendant's answer
should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of
default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff (Trajano u.
Cruz, 80 SCRA 712, as cited in Sablas u. Sablas, supra).
Remedies of a defending party declared in default (Bar 1998;
2012; 2013)
(a) Remedy after notice of order and before judgment
- A party declared in default may, at any time after notice
thereof and before judgment, file a motion under oath to set
aside the order of default and properly show that (a) the failure
to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence (FAMEN), and (b) he has a meritorious defense
contained in an affidavit of merit (Sec. 3[b], Rule 9, Rules of
Court; See also Villareal u. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 511,
529; Republic u. Sandiganbayan, 540 SCRA 431, 445; Lui
Enterprises, Inc. u. Zuellig Pharma Corporation, G.R. No.
193494, March 12, 2014). Bar 1999; 2000
(b) Remedy after judgment and before judgment
becomes final and executory - If the judgment has already
been rendered when the defendant discovered the default,
but before the same has become final and executory, he may
file a motion for new trial under Rule 37. He may also appeal
from the judgment as being contrary to the evidence or the
law (Lina u. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 637, 642; Republic u.
Sandiganbayan, 540 SCRA 431, 445). The right to appeal from
a judgment by default is not to be denied the party aggrieved
(See Bitte u. Jonas, G.R. No. 212256, December 9, 2015).
(c)Remedy after the judgment becomes final and
executory - The defendant may file a petition for relief from
Judgment under Rule 38 (Republic u. Sandiganbayan, supra;
CHAPTERIV 357
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
for further readings, see Laus u. Cou:t of Appeals, 219 SG_RA
688; Lui Enterprises, Inc. u. Zuellig Pharma Corporation,
supra).
Note: The above remedies presuppose that the defending
party was properly declared in defa~lt. It is submitt~d however,
that certiorari will lie when said party was improperly
declared in default because this would tantamount to a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (For
related readings, see Lui Enterprises, Inc. u. Zuellig Pharma
Corporation, supra).
For instance, a declaration of default by the c~urt before
the defendant's period to file his answer had expired clear-
ly is in excess of and/or wit~out juris~icti~n and, therefore,
properly correctible by a writ of certiorari. The. prem~ture
declaration of default of defendant or the rendermg of Judg-
ment before the expiration of the time for the filing of answer
deprives the defendant of his day in court and the judgment so
rendered may, consequently, be vacated (Viacrusis u. Estenzo,
G.R. L-18457, June 30, 1962). The same remedy ma~ also b~
available where the defendant has been wrongly or improvi-
dently declared in default, as when a timely answer has been
properly filed and served. Under such a situation, t?e co~rt
can be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It is error to declare a defendant in default after the
answer was filed (Cathay Pacific Airways u. Romillo, Jr., 141
SCRA 451, as cited in Sablas u. Sablas, 526 SCRA 292, 299).
Bar 2013 It would be grave abuse of discretion to declare
a defending party in default despite his filing of an answer
(Indiana Aerospace University u. ·Commission on JI_ig_her
Education, 356 SCRA 367, as cited in Sablas u. Sablas, ibid.).
Current judicial trend on defaults
1. The current judicial trend is to avoid defaults and,
thus, courts are enjoined to be liberal in setting aside orders
of default (Ampeloquio u. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 465).
 358 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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The policy of the law is to have every litigant's case tried on
the merits as much as possible. Hence, judgments by default
are frowned upon. A case is best decided when all contending
parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present
their arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof
(Sablas v. Sablas, 526 SCRA 292, 297). Bar 1983; 1999; 2000
2. The issuance of orders of default should be the
exception rather than the rule. Default orders shall be allowed
only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to
comply with the orders of the trial court (Lorbes v. Court of
Appeals, 351 SCRA 716, 724) because suits should, as much
as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities
(See also Samartino v. Raon, 383 SCRA 664, 673). Thus, in
practice, an answer under oath containing the defenses of the
defendant, may, under the rules on liberal interpretation, be
deemed as the equivalent of an affidavit of merit.
Implied lifting of the order of default
May a default order be impliedly lifted? In one case,
former President Marcos was declared in default for failure
to file an answer. He died in Hawaii as an exile while his
case was pending. His representatives failed to file a motion
to lift the order of default. Nevertheless, his son, Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr., the respondent in this case, and as executor of
his father's estate, filed a motion for leave to file a responsive
pleading and three motions for extensions to file an answer
all of which were granted by the anti-graft court. Instead of'
filing a responsive pleading, respondent later filed a motion
for bill of particulars which was also granted.
XXX
"Given the existence of the default order then, what
is the legal effect of the granting of the motions to file
a responsive pleading and bill of particulars? In [the
Court's] view, the effect is that the default order against
the former president is deemed lifted (Italics supplied).
CHAPTERIV 359
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
XXX
While it is true that there was no positive act on the
part of the court to lift the default order because there
was no motion nor order to that effect, the anti-graft
court's act of granting respondent the opportunity to file a
responsive pleading meant the lifting of the default order
on terms the court deemed proper in the interest of justice.
It was the operative act lifting the default order and
thereby reinstating the position of the original defendant
whom respondent is representing, founded on the
court's discretionary power to set aside orders of default
(Underscoring supplied; Republic u. Sandiganbayan, 540
SCRA 431, 444-448).
Extent of relief in a judgment by default
The reliefs that may be granted in default situations are
restricted by Sec. 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. Thus, if
the complaint seeks to recover Pl million but the evidence of
the plaintiff shows a right to recover Pl.5 million, the court has
no authority to grant the latter amount despite the evidence.
This is because, under the Rules, "A judgment rendered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages" (Sec. 3[d], Rule 9, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Cases where a declaration/order of default cannot be made
1. Default is not allowed in the following actions:
(a) annulment of marriage;
(b) declaration of nullity of marriage; and
(c) legal separation (Sec. 3[e], Rule 9, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. If no answer is filed in any of the above actions, the
court shall order the Solicitor General or his or her deputized
public prosecutor to investigate whether or not collusion exists
 360 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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between the parties. If there is no collusion, the court shall
order said prosecuting attorney to intervene for the State in
order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated
(Sec. 3[e], Rule 9, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
Judgment by default for refusal to comply with the modes
of discovery
The rule is that a default order and, consequently, a
default judgment is triggered by the failure of the defending
party to file the required answer (Sec. 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). By way of exception, a
judgment by default may be rendered in the following cases
despite an answer having been filed:
(a) If a disobedient party refuses to obey an order
requiring him to comply with the various modes of
discovery (Sec. 3[c], Rule 29, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC); or
(b) If a party or officer or managing agent of a
party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is
to take his deposition, or a party fails to serve answers
to interrogatories (Sec. 5, Rule 29, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC).
Failure to file response under the Rules of Procedure for
Small Claims Case (Bar 2012)
A motion to declare the defendant in default is a prohibited
motion under Sec. 16(h) of the Rules of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases.
"SEC. 14. Effect of Failure to File Response. -Should
the defendant fail to file his/her/its Response within the
required period, and likewise fail to appear on the date
set for hearing, the court shall render judgment on the
same day, as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
Statement of Claim/s. Should the defendant fail to file his/
CHAPTERIV 361
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
her/its Response within the required period but appears
on the date set for hearing, the court shall ascertain what
defense he/she/it has to offer which shall constitute his/
her/its Response, and proceed to hear or adjudicate the
case on the same day as if a Response has been filed" (Sec.
14, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, Rules of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases as amended).
Failure to file a return under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo
1. The Rules on the Writ of Amparo prohibits, under
Sec. ll(h) thereof, a motion to declare the respondent in
default.
2. Upon the service of the writ of amparo, the
respondent is required to file a verified written return which,
among others, contains his lawful defenses (Sec. 9, Rule on the
Writ of Amparo). In case the respondent fails to file a return,
the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition
ex parte (Sec. 12, Rules on the Writ of Amparo). Obviously,
no motion from the petitioner is required before hearing the
petition.
Failure to file a return under the Rules on the Writ of Habeas
Data
1. The Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data, under Sec.
13(h) thereof, does not allow the filing of a motion to declare
the respondent in default.
2. If the respondent fails to file his return which
contains, among others, his lawful defenses, the court, justice
or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting
the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant, unless
the court, in its discretion, requires the petitioner to submit
evidence (Sec. 14, Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data).
Failure to file an answer under the Rules on Expedited
Procedures in the First Level Courts (Bar 2012; 2017)
A motion to declare the defendant in default is a prohibited
motion under Sec. 2, Rule II of the Rules on Expedited
Procedures in the First Level Courts. Bar 1988
 362 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Under the Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First
Level Courts, the defendant who fails to file an answer within
the reglementary period of 30 calendar days from service of
summons pursuant to Sec. 6[A], Rule III, Rules on Expedited
Procedures in the First Level Courts, is not supposed to be
declared in default. Instead, the court, on its own initiative,
or upon manifestation by the plaintiff that the period for
filing an answer has already lapsed, shall render judgment
(not declare the defendant in default) as may be warranted
by the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments,
and limited to what is prayed for (Sec. 9[AJ, Rule III, Rules
on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts). This rule
represents a principal distinction between the effect of failure
to answer in ordinary civil proceedings and in the rules on
summary procedure. Bar 1988; 2017
3. Counterclaim
Nature of a counterclaim (Bar 1999; 2007; 2010); kinds
1. A counterclaim is any claim which a defending
party may have against an opposing party (Sec. 6, Rule 6,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Alba v.
Malapajo, G.R. No. 198752, January 13, 2016; Sy-Vargas v.
The Estate of Ogsos, Sr., G.R. No. 221062, October 5, 2016). It
partakes of a complaint by the defendant against the plaintiff.
A counterclaim is described by the Rules of Court as any claim.
Hence, this claim may be a claim for (a) money, or (b) some
other relief against an opposing party.
2. A counterclaim is in itself a distinct and independent
cause of action and when filed, there are two simultaneous
actions between the same parties (Padilla v. Globe Asiatique
Realty Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 207376, August 6,
2014). When the defendant files a counterclaim against the
plaintiff, the former becomes the plaintiff in the counterclaim
while the original plaintiff becomes the defendant. The filing
of a counterclaim gives rise to two complaints, namely, the
one filed by the plaintiff by way of an original complaint and
the one filed by the defendant by way of a counterclaim.
CHAPTER IV 363
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
Take an example in which PP files a complaint for
unlawful detainer against DD. The latter files an answer
together with a claim for reimbursement of all the expenses
he incurred in repairing the building subject of the lease.
The claim for reimbursement is a counterclaim and is in the
nature of a complaint by the defendant against the plaintiff.
3. A counterclaim is not intrinsically a part of the
answer because it is a separate pleading. It may, however, be
included in the answer. This inclusion is merely a matter of
form and does not have the effect of fusing the two separate
pleadings into a single pleading. Thus, it is not uncommon
to denominate these two pleadings as: "Answer With A
Counterclaim."
Note, however, that a "Motion to Dismiss With A Coun-
terclaim" is not an accepted way of pleading a counterclaim.
It is sanctioned neither by the Rules nor common usage. Bar
1992;2008
Compulsory and permissive counterclaims
A counterclaim may be compulsory or permissive. A
compulsory counterclaim is one that (1) arises out of (or is
necessarily connected with) the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (2) falls
within the jurisdiction of the court; and (3) does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such counterclaim must
be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount
and the nature thereof (Alba v. Malapajo, supra).
On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it
does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the
subject matter of the opposing party)s claim. It is essentially
an independent claim that may be filed separately in another
case (Sy- Vargas v. The Estate of Ogsos, Jr., supra).
Compulsory counterclaim; tests
1. To be compulsory, the counterclaim, according to the
Rules, must have the following elements:
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364 CMLPROCEDURE
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(a) It arises out of or is necessarily connected with
the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim;
(b) It does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction; and
(c) It is cognizable by the regular courts of justice
and such courts have jurisdiction to entertain the
counterclaim both as to the amount and nature (Sec. 7,
Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC; Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. CPR
Promotions and Marketing, Inc., G.R. No. 200567, June
22, 2015; See also G. Holdings, Inc. v. Cagayan Electric
Power and Light Company, Inc., G.R. No. 226213,
September 27, 2017).
2. Based on the Rules, the Court has devised a more
complete test, thus:
(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the
claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim
rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support
or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant's
counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim
and the counterclaim?
A positive answer to all questions would indicate that
the counterclaim is compulsory (See Lasala v. National Food
Authority, G.R. No. 171582, August 19, 2015). Of the four, the
one compelling test is the logical relation between the claim in
the complaint and that in the counterclaim (Sy- Vargas v. The
Estate of Ogsos, Sr., G.R. No. 221062, October 5, 2016; Alba v.
Malapajo, G.R. No. 198752, January 13, 2016).
CHAPTER IV 365
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
3. A counterclaim is compulsory under the following
facts: Aya sues Lea for recovery of a tract of land. Lea seeks
in turn to be reimbursed the value of the improvements she
has introduced in the same land and the payment of damages
she has sustained as a consequence of the suit. The claim of
Lea arises out of or is necessarily connected with the subject
matter of the complaint. Bar 1985; 1994
In actions to recover possession of real property, it has
been held that a claim for compensation for improvements
on land partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim
(Beltran v. Balbuena, 53 Phil. 697, 701; Meliton v. Court of
Appeals, 216 SCRA 485, 493).
4. The most common compulsory counterclaim filed by
the defendant, in the absence of any other counterclaim, is to
claim in the same suit his expenses for being forced to litigate
in the face of an allegedly unfounded and baseless complaint.
Added to these expenses are the alleged damages he sustained
as a consequence of the unfounded complaint. Bar 2007; 2008
5. The mere logical connection between the complaint
and the counterclaim will not give rise to a compulsory
counterclaim where the counterclaim is not within the
jurisdiction of the court. If the amount of the .counterclaim
exceeds the jurisdiction of the court, the counterclaim should
be deemed permissive, not compulsory. Thus, a counterclaim
for P2.5 million in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
cannot be considered a compulsory counterclaim since the
amount exceeds the court's jurisdiction even if, assuming, it is
intimately connected with the subject matter of the complaint.
If the counterclaim in an amount in excess of the
jurisdiction of the court is interposed i.nthe same action, and the
court finds both the complaint and counterclaim meritorious,
it will not grant the relief in the complaint on the ground that
the defendant has a bigger credit (Calo v. Ajax International,
Inc., 22 SCRA 996, 999; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 38 SCRA
138, 151). It is submitted that if the defendant desires to
have affirmative relief on his counterclaim, he may waive the
amount in excess of the jurisdiction of the court.
-- ---------- --- -------------------
366 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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6. There may be instances when the court has to
dismiss the counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. If, for instance, the counterclaim interposed in
the Regional Trial Court is one for unlawful detainer, the same
cannot be invoked as a counterclaim in the same action even
if the amount of rentals or damages is within the jurisdiction
of such court. A Regional Trial Court cannot adjudicate upon
an unlawful detainer case. Also, a counterclaim for illegal
dismissal cannot be entertained by regular courts for want of
jurisdiction. The subject matter of the counterclaim is within
the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.
The absence of jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim
because of the amount thereof appropriately applies to
a Municipal Trial Court and equivalent courts. Hence, a
Municipal Trial Court in Bulacan or a Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila will not have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of
a counterclaim in excess of P2 million. The rule requires that
the counterclaim "must be within the jurisdiction of the court
both as to the amount and the nature thereof' (Sec. 7, Rule 6,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
The result will differ, however, when the original action
is filed with the Regional Trial Court. In this court, the
counterclaim may be deemed compulsory regardless of the
amount (Sec. 7, Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC). Hence, a counterclaim of Pl million filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila is still a compulsory
counterclaim even if the court would have no jurisdiction over
the amount claimed if it is filed as an original complaint.
Sec. 7 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court leaves no doubt as
to the exact rule. It clearly provides that "x xx in an original
action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may
be considered compulsory regardless of the amount." Bar
2017
The need to set up a compulsory counterclaim in th~ same
action
A compulsory counterclaim not raised in the same action
is barred, unless otherwise allowed by these Rules (Sec. 7,
CHAPTERIV 367
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC). A compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the
time the defending party files his answer; otherwise, it will be
effectively barred (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
CPR Promotions and Marketing, Inc., G.R. No. 200567, June
22, 2015). A~other case similarly declares that a compulsory
counterclaim must be set up in the same action; otherwise,
it would be barred forever. If it is filed concurrently with
the main action but under a separate complaint, it would be
dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia; if it is subsequently
filed after the main action, it would also be dismissed on the
ground of res judicata (Alba v. Malapajo, supra).
Incompatibility between a compulsory counterclaim and a
motion to dismiss
A party who desires to plead a compulsory counterclaim
should not file a motion to dismiss. If he files a motion to dismiss
and the complaint is dismissed, there will be no chance to
invoke the counterclaim. The better move is to file an answer
with a counterclaim and plead the ground for dismissal as an
affirmative defense.
As succinctly put in one case:
"A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the
proceeding in the original suit and derives its jurisdictional
support therefrom. A counterclaim presupposes
the existence of a claim against the party filing the
counterclaim. Hence, where there is no claim against
the counterclaimant, the counterclaim is improper and it
must dismissed, more so where the complaint is dismissed
at the instance of the counterclaimant. In other words, if
the dismissal of the main action res·ults in the dismissal of
the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the
filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint is an implied
waiver of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant
of the motion ultimately results in the dismissal of the
counterclaim.
Thus, the filing of a motion to dismiss and the
setting up of a compulsory counterclaim are incompatible
368 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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remedies. In the event that a defending party has a ground
for dismissal and a compulsory counterclaim at the same
time, he must choose only one remedy. If he decides
to file a motion to dismiss, he will lose his compulsory
counterclaim. But if he opts to set up his compulsory
counterclaim, he may still plead his ground for dismissal
as an affirmative defense in his answer" (Financial
Building Corporation v. Forbes Park Association, 338
SCRA 346, 354).
Permissive counterclaim (Bar 2011)
1. Generally, a counterclaim is permissive if any of the
elements of a compulsory counterclaim discussed previously is
absent. But the most commonly treated feature of a permissive
counterclaim is its absence of a logical connection with the
subject matter of the complaint, i.e., it does not arise out of or
is not connected with the plaintiffs cause of action.
A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of
or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent
claim that may be filed separately in another case (Alba v.
Malapajo, G.R. No. 198752, January 13, 2016). A counterclaim
for damages based on culpa aquiliana in a complaint for
collection of a loan is a permissive counterclaim for not having
a connection with the plaintiffs claim. Such counterclaim may
even be made the subject of an independent action.
2. A counterclaim for damages based on a quasi-delict
cannot be pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in an action
for unlawful detainer. The counterclaim is permissive (Arenas
v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 617, 625-626).
3. A counterclaim for the payment of the price of the
car is not a compulsory counterclaim in an action to recover a
piece of land. Bar 1996
4. One case demonstrates the existence of a compulsory
counterclaim. Here, the plaintiff filed an action to annul a
deed of sale and recover ownership of a real property from
the defendants. He alleged that the deed of sale in favor of
CHAPTER IV 369
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
the defendants was a forgery. The defendants, who denied
the forgery, filed their answer with a counterclaim that, in
case the deed of sale is declared null and void, they be paid
by the plaintiff the amount of the loan extended to the latter
and which were secured by a real estate mortgage covering
the subject property. The plaintiff, who contended that the
counterclaim was permissive, filed a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for the
failure of defendants to pay the required docket fees and to
attach a certification against forum shopping.
The Court held the counterclaim to be connected with
the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim. There is a logical relationship
between the claim and the counterclaim. It is, hence, a
compulsory counterclaim. The same evidence to sustain the
counterclaim would disprove the case of the plaintiff. There
is, therefore, no need for respondents to pay docket fees and
to file a certification against forum shopping for the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaim (Alba, Jr. v.
Malapajo, supra).
Distinctions between a compulsory and a permissive
counterclaim
The following are the most significant distinctions
between a compulsory and permissive counterclaims:
(a) A compulsory counterclaim, which a party has
at the time the answer is filed, shall be contained in the
answer (Sec. 8, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) because a compulsory counterclaim
not set up shall be barred (Sec. ?, Rule 9, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Maltos v. Heirs of
Borromeo, G.R. No. 172720, September 14, 2015).
A permissive counterclaim is not subject to the above
rule. Hence, it may be set up as an independent action
and will not be barred if not contained in the answer to
the complaint (See Sy- Vargas v. The Estate of Ogsos, Jr.,
G.R. No. 221062, October 5, 2016).

370 CNIL PROCEDURE
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(b) A compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory
pleading. A permissive counterclaim is considered an
initiatory pleading.
(c) A permissive counterclaim should be accompa-
nied by a certification against forum shopping and, when-
ever required, also a certificate to file action issued by
the Lupong Tagapamayapa. A compulsory counterclaim,
which cannot be independently set up, does not require
the certificates mentioned because it is not initiatory in
character (Santo Tomas University v. Surla, 294 SCRA
382, 392-393; Ponciano v. Parentela, 331 SCRA 605, 611).
The certificates mentioned are required to be attached
in a permissive counterclaim because it is an initiatory
pleading. Bar 2007
(d) A permissive counterclaim must be answered
by the party against whom it is interposed; otherwise,
he may be declared in default as to the counterclaim.
This is because "Any pleading asserting a claim must be
answered and the failure to do so by the party against
whom the claim is asserted renders him to be declared in
default in respect of such claim" (Sarmiento v. Juan, 120
SCRA 403, 408).
Failure to answer a compulsory counterclaim is
not a cause for a default declaration (Gojo v. Goyala, 35
SCRA 557, 563). A compulsory counterclaim that merely
reiterates special defenses are deemed controverted
even without a reply, or raises issues, which are deemed
automatically joined by the allegations in the complaint,
need not be answered. In such a case, failure to answer
a compulsory counterclaim may not be a cause for a
declaration of default (Gojo v. Goyala, ibid.).
Thus, if the plaintiff files an action to recover
possession of real property against the defendant who
interposed a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees
arising from the filing of the complaint, the counterclaim
need not be answered by the plaintiff. A motion to declare
him in default for failure to answer the counterclaim
CHAPTERIV 371
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
must be denied because the counterclaim is compulsory.
Bar 1996
On the other hand, if the counterclaim is for damages
arising from the alleged tortious conduct of the plaintiff in
a complaint to collect a sum of ~o~ey; the defen~ant m~y
file a motion to declare the plamt1ff m default if he fails
to file an answer to the counterclaim which is permissive.
(e) The docket and other lawful fees should be paid
for a permissive counterclaim (La Tondefia Distillers, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 553, 573-574). !he rule
in a permissive counterclaim is that ~or the_ trial court
to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant 1s bound to
pay the prescribed docket fees. If a part! d~es. no~ ~ay
the docket fees, the court does not acqmre Jur1~d1ct10n
over his permissive counterclaim, and any order m ~av~r
of the counterclaimant arising from the counterclaim 1s
considered null and void, and may be struck down even
on appeal (GSIS v. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, 13-
14).
Traditional jurisprudence has consistently held t~at
docket fees are not paid for a compulsory counterclaim
(Cabaero v. Cantos, 271 SCRA 391, 400; Metals Engineering
Resources Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 273,
285). Bar 2008
Caveat: Be it noted that Rule 141 on Legal Fees was revised
effective August 16, 2004 by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. The re:is~on
included the payment of docket fees not only for pe:m1ss1ve
counterclaims but also for compulsory counterclaims and
cross-claims, third-party complaints, fourth-party complaints,
etc., and complaints-in-intervention_.
One case, Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma, 542
SCRA 1, 16-17, acknowledged:
"On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its
Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES,
it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims
being compulsory in nature. We stress however, that
 372 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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effective August 16, 2004, under Sec. 7 of Rule 141, as
amended by AM. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now
reguired to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-
claims." (Underscoring supplied)
On August 13, 2009, however, the Office of the Court
Administrator, in OCA Circular 96-2009, clarified that
despite the pronouncement in the said case, the payment of
docket fees for compulsory counterclaim has been suspended
as of September 21, 2004. Also, in Sy-Vargas v. The Estate of
Ogsos, Jr., supra, the Court declared that "the prevailing rule
with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees
are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter."
How to set up an omitted counterclaim
A counterclaim not initially set up because of the pleader's
oversight, inadvertence, excusable neglect, or when justice
requires, may be set up, by leave of court, by amendment
before judgment (Sec. 10, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC). If not set up in the action, the
compulsory counterclaim shall be barred (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). A permissive
counterclaim, however, will not be barred.
How to set up a counterclaim arising after the answer
A counterclaim, which either matured or acquired by a
party after serving his pleading, may, with the permission of
the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental
pleading before judgment (Sec. 9, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC).
Period to answer a counterclaim
If a counterclaim is to be answered, the same must be
made within 20 calendar days from service (Sec. 4, Rule 11,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC). This
rule has more relevance to a permissive counterclaim which
has to be answered.
CHAPTERIV 373
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
Effect of the dismissal of a complaint on the counterclaim
already set up (Bar 2010)
1. There are three significant situations involving the
dismissal of a complaint and the effect of such dismissal on
the counterclaim already pleaded by the defending party.
(a) The first is the situation wherein the defend~nt
files an answer and set up certain grounds as affirmative
defenses. Included in the answer is a counterclaim. During
the hearing on the affirmative defenses, the court decides
to dismiss the complaint. The case of Virginia S. Dio and
H.S. Equities, Ltd. v. Subic Bay Maribe Exploratorium,
Inc. (G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014) is enlightening:
"As the rule now stands, the nature of the
counterclaim notwithstanding, the · dismissal of the
complaint does not ipso jure result in the disr_nissal
of the counterclaim, and the latter may remam for
independent adjudication of the court, provided that
such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and
does not labor under any infirmity that may warrant its
outright dismissal. Stated differently, the jurisdiction ?f
the court over the counterclaim that appears to be vahd
on its face including the grant of any relief thereunder,
is not abated by the dismissal of the main action. The
court's authority to proceed with the disposition of the
counterclaim independent of the main action is premised
on the fact that the counterclaim, on its own, raises a
novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the
court based on its own merits and evidentiary support."
(b) The second situation is covered by Sec. 2 of Rule
17 as amended by A.M. No. -19-10-20-SC. Under this
pr~vision, the plaintiff himself files a motion to dismiss
his complaint after the defendant has pleaded an answer
with a counterclaim. The motion is granted by the court.
The rule in this regard is unequivocal:
"... [T]he dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice

374 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action unless within
fifteen (15) calendar from notice of the motion he
or she manifests his or her preference to have his
counterclaim resolved in the same action x x x."
(c) The third situation is covered by Sec. 3 of Rule
17, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC. Here, the
complaint is dismissed through the plaintiffs fault and
at a time when a counterclaim has already been set up.
Like the first two situations, the dismissal is "without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or separate action."
2. The above-described situations have a common
thread running through them. The rules cited recognize the
right of the defending party to prosecute the counterclaim in
the same or separate action notwithstanding the dismissal
of the complaint, and without regard as to the permissive or
compulsory nature of the counterclaim. With the aforestated
rules in effect since July 1, 1997, previous jural pronounce-
ments in conflict with the same have been abandoned (See
Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, 494 SCRA 393, 413; See also
Lim Teck Chuan v. Uy, G.R. No. 155701, March 11, 2015).
As the. rule now stands, the nature of the counterclaim
notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint does not ipso
jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim (Dio v. Subic
Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc., G.R. No. 189532, June 11,
2014).
There is a difference between a dismissal of an action
and a dismissal of the complaint. If only the complaint is
dismissed, not the action, the defendant may still prosecute
his counterclaim. The case of Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, 494
SCRA 393, abandoned the rulings in Metals Engineering
Resources Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 273
(1991); International Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 214 SCRA 456 (1992); and BA Finance Corporation
v. Co., 224 SCRA 163 (1993) (Lim Teck Chuan v. Uy, G.R. No.
155701, March 11, 2015).
CHAPTER IV 375
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
Options of the defendant who has pleaded a counterclaim
The defendant who has pleaded a counterclaim prior to
the service upon him of a motion to dismiss by the plaintiff,
may, prosecute his counterclaim either in a ~eparate acti?n
or in the same action. If he desires to have his counterclaim
resolved in the same action, he must manifest to the court his
or her preference to that effect within 15 calendar days from
notice to him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss. If he makes
no such manifestation, the counterclaim shall be prosecuted
in a separate action (See Sec. 2, Rule 17, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The rule instructs that
the dismissal of the complaint will not automatically result
in the prosecution of the counterclaim in the same action
because the rule requires the defendant to make the proper
manifestation of his desire to have his counterclaim resolved
in the same action in which the complaint was dismissed (For
further readings, see Blay v. Bana, G.R. No. 232189, March 7,
2018).
Quoting Justice Florenz Regalado, the Court teaches:
"Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves
for the dismissal of the complaint to which a counterclaim
has been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to
the right of the defendant to either prosecute his action
or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should
he opt for the first alternative, the court should render
the corresponding order granting and reserving his right
to prosecute his claim in a separate action. Should he
choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same
action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he
must manifest within 15 days from notice to him of the
plaintiffs motion to dismiss xx x" (Blay v. Baiia, G.R. No.
232189, March 7, 2018).
4. Cross-claim
Nature of a cross-claim
1. A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
376 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
subject matter either of the original action or a counterclaim
therein. The cross-claim may cover all or part of the original
claim. (Sec. 8, Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M No.
19-10-20-SC).
2. While a counterclaim is asserted by a defending party
against a claimant, a cross-claim is asserted by a defending
party against a co-defending party so that the latter may be
held liable for the claim which the claimant seeks to recover
from the cross-claimant. If XYZ Bank sues A and B for the
collection of a loan, A, who merely acted as an accommodation
party, may file a cross-claim against his co-defendant, B, by
asserting that it is B who is the actual and true debtor and,
hence, should be ultimately liable for the payment of the loan.
Bar 1997
3. A cross-claim that a party has at the time the
answer is filed shall be contained in said answer (Sec. 8, Rule
11, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). A
cross-claim that is not set up shall be barred (Sec. 2, Rule 9,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
The cross-claim must be set up in the action because, if
not set up, it shall be barred (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Note, however, that the
cross-claim that shall be barred, if not asserted, is the cross-
.claim already existing at the time the answer is filed, not the
cross-claim that may mature or may be acquired after service
of the answer. As to the latter, Sec. 9 of Rule 11, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, declares that it may, by permission
of the court, be presented by supplemental pleading before
judgment.
No cross-claim for the first time on appeal
While a defendant may have a definite cause of action
against a co-defendant, it cannot succeed in seeking judicial
sanction against the latter if the records disclose that no
cross-claim was interposed, nor was there a prayer that the co-
CHAPTERIV 377
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
defendant should be liable for all claims that may be adjudged
in favor of the plaintiff. Under the Rules, a cross-claim not set
up shall be barred. Thus, a cross-claim cannot be set up for
the first time on appeal (Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.
v. Glodel Brokerage Corporation, 639 SCRA 69, 86).
Distinctions between a counterclaim and a cross-claim (Bar
1999)
1. A cross-claim is a claim against a co-party; a
counterclaim is a claim against an opposing party; and
2. A cross-claim must arise from the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the original complaint
or counterclaim (Sec. 8, Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). A counterclaim may or may not
arise out of the subject matter of the complaint. It may be
compulsory or permissive.
How to set up a cross-claim arising after the answer
A cross-claim which either matured or was acquired
by a party after serving his or her pleading may, with the
permission of the court, be presented as a cross-claim by
supplemental pleading before judgment (Sec. 9, Rule 11, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
How to set up an omitted cross-claim
When a pleader fails to set up a cross-claim through
oversight, inadvertence or excusable neglect, or when justice
requires, he or she may, by leave of court, set up the cross-
claim by amendment before judgment (Sec. 10, Rule 11, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Period to answer a cross-claim
A cross-claim must be answered within 20 calendar days
from service (Sec. 4, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
 378
CIVIL PROCEDURE
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5. Third (Fourth, etc.)-Party Complaint
Nature of a third-party complaint
t 1. A th~rd-party complaint is a claim which a defending
par y may, with leave of court, file against a person wh .
no~ yet party to the action for contribution indemn~t~s
s~ .rog(~wn or any other relief, in respect of hi~ opponent'~
aim ec. 11, Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended by AM
o. 19~10-2?-SC). There could also be a fourth, etc.- a~t.
complamt with the same function as a third-party compiain/
Th th· d
de .
2
dd _e . Ir ' (fourth, etc.) - party complaint shall be
t ~uet_ta m1ss10n, and the court shall require the defendant
oms I ute a separate action, where:
b I (a) dth~ t~ird, (fourth, etc.)-party defendant cannot
e ocate w1thm 30 calendar days from the grant of such
Ieave;
(b) ~atters extraneous to the issue in the principal
case are raised; or
(c) the effect w?uld be to introduce a new and
separate controversy mto the action (Sec. 11, Rule 6
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC). '
3: Example of a matter extraneous to the case· A vs B
fior sum of money then B vs C for th . .
b t t I d . e same amount of money
no re ate to the issue between A and B th t. I .
th~rd-party complaint. Let's say that B alleg;s / a:~s~ ass1c
th~~p_arty defen~ant, (note that Bis the origin!! defend!~:
:: C t I~ ~?w a _third-party plaintiff), that he gave the money
. o e Iver It to A. However, C never delivered it to A
that Is the nature of the third (fourth, etc.) - party complai:t
Now C, as a matter of defense, introduces a matter
extraneo1,1s to foregoing. C alleges that he used the mone to
pay for his debt to another person That is a matt h' yh.
extrane t th · · er w 1c 1s
ous o e Issue between A and B and B d C Th
~am~ would be a ground for the court to deny thea:dmi~sio:
!:h1rd, (fourth, et~.)_- party complaint or dismiss it and to
P mpt B and C to litigate it in a separate action.
CHAPTER IV 379
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
4. Example of a new and separate controversy into the
action: Example the third-party plaintiff, who is the original
defendant, alleges that he gave the money to C but then C
alleges that Bowes Ca sum of money. The same would be a
ground for the court to deny the admission of third, (fourth,
etc.) - party complaint or dismiss it and to prompt B and C to
litigate it in a separate action
5. The requisites for a third-party action are:
a) That the party to be impleaded must not yet be
a party to the action;
b) That the claim against the third-party defendant
must belong to the original defendant;
c) The claim of the original defendant against the
third-party defendant must be based upon the plaintiffs
claim against the original defendant; and
d) The defendant is attempting to transfer to the
third-party defendant the liability asserted against him
by the original plaintiff (Philtranco Service Enterprises,
Inc. v. Paras, G.R. No. 161909. April 25, 2012)
6. A third-party complaint is actually a complaint
independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiffs
complaint. Were it not for the above rule, such third-party
complaint would have to be filed independently and separately
from the original complaint. The purpose is to avoid circuitry
of action and unnecessary proliferation oflawsuits and dispose
expeditiously in one litigation all the matters arising from one
particular set of facts .
Trial courts are not especially enjoined by law to admit
a third-party complaint. They are v·ested with discretion to
allow or disallow a party to an action to implead an additional
party. Thus, a defendant has no vested right to file a third-
party complaint (China Banking Corporation v. Padilla, 514
SCRA 35, 42).
7. It is not proper to file a third-party complaint against
one who is already a party to the action such as against the
 380
CML PROCEDURE
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plaintiff or a co-defendant. A claim against the plaintiff is
ass~rted ~Y way of a counterclaim. A claim by the defendant
agams~ his co-defendant is set up by way of a cross-claim.
Thus, if Mr. S sells a car to Mr. B, and later, the real owner
of the car, Mr. 0, files an action against Mr. B to recover the
car, ~r. B may file a third-party complaint against Mr. S to
re~u~re the latter to answer for the breach of warranty against
ev1ct10n (Art. 1558, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Also, if the passenger of a taxicab sues the operator for
?reach .of contract of carriage because of injuries he sustained
m mishap, th~ opera~or may file a third-party complaint
agamst the negligent driver for reimbursement.
_8. B and C borrowed P400,000.00 from A. B, who
received the money from A , gave C P200 ,000 .00 . C, 1n
· t urn,
ga:e by way of loan, Pl00,000.00 to D. C, if sued, can file a
third-party complaint against D. Bar 1997
. A assembles an owner-type jeep for B who, in turn, rents
it to?'-· D~e to faulty brakes, X figures in a vehicular accident
cau~mg him severe injuries. If X files an action for damages
agamst A and B, B cannot file a third-party complaint against
because both are already parties to the action. B should
mstead file a cross-claim against A. Bar 1996
Leave of court
The filing of a third-party complaint requires leave of
court (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M
f
1:'1°•.9-1?-20-B_C) and, hence, its admission is subject to
Jud1c1al d1~cret10n. Leave of court is not required in filing a
counterclaim or a cross-claim because the parties involved are
already parties to the action.
Answer to a third-party complaint
The time to answer a third-party complaint shall be
governed by the same rule as the answer to the complaint
(Sec. 5, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-
10-20-SC); hence, within 30 calendar days from service of
CHAPTERIV 381
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
summons (Sec. 1, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
6. Intervention
Nature of intervention (Bar 2011)
1. Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not
originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right
or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. It is
a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is
permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining
the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint,
or uniting with the defendant in resisting the claims of the
plaintiff, or demanding something adverse to both of them.
It is an act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a
party in a suit pending between others for the protection of
some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such
proceedings (Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Heirs of Miiioza, 641 SCRA 520, 529-530; See also Chipongian
v. Benitez-Lirio, G.R. No. 162692, August 26, 2015; Office of
the Ombudsman v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 189100, June 21, 2017;
National Housing Authority v. Laurito, G.R. No. 191657, July
31, 2017).
2. Intervention is not a matter of right but may be
permitted when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the statute authorizing intervention (SM
Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority,·
G.R, No. 203655, September 7, 2015; Aguinaldo v. Aquino
III, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016). The allowance or
disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. It is not an absolute right (Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Miiioza, 641 SCRA
520, 531-532).
3. Intervention is never an inclependent proceeding but
ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation and in
subordination to the main proceeding (Saw v. Court of Appeals,

382 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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195 SCRA 740, 746). Intervention is never an independent
action, but is only ancillary and supplemental to the existing
litigation. An intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit
in a court of competent jurisdiction. As such, the right of an
intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original
party. Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there
is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of intervention
ceases (Pulgar v. RTC, G.R. No. 157583, September 20, 2014).
4. Intervention is never an independent proceeding
but ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation and
in subordination to the main proceeding (Saw v. Court of
Appeals, 195 SCRA 740, 746).
5. An intervention cannot alter the nature of the action
and the issues already joined (Castro v. David, 100 Phil. 454,
458). Bar 2011
In general, an independent controversy cannot be injected
into a suit by intervention; hence, such intervention will not
be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and
expand the scope of the remedies (Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Heirs of Miiioza, 641 SCRA 520, 531-532).
Simply put, the intervenor is not allowed to raise issues that
are not within the mainstream of the original action. Bar 2011
Requisites for intervention (Bar 2000)
1. Sec. 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, states:
"SECTION 1. Who may intervene. - A person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's
rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding."
CHAPTERIV 383
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
2. Under a b ove Ru 1e, m · t erve nt'i on shall be allowed
when a person has
(a) a legal interest in the matter in litigation; or
(b) a legal interest in the success of any of the
parties; or
(c) an interest against both parties; or
(d) when he is so situated as to be adv~rsely
affected by a distribution or disposition of property m the
custody of the court or an officer the~eof (Ma?!an-Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Minoza, 641
SCRA 520, 530; Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, 691 SCRA
167, 192-193, February 19, 2013; See also, Enriquez Vda.
de Santiago v. Suing, G.R. No. 194814, October 21, 2015).
3. Notice that intervention is not a matter of ri~ht.
It is subject to judicial discretion. In granting or denyu~_g
the intervention, the court is required to balance certam
considerations:
(a) whether or not the intervention ~ill unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties; and
(b) whether or not the interve~or's rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceedmg (Sec. 1, Rule 19,
the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Meaning of legal interest
1. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person ~o
intervene is his possession of a legal interest_ in the m_atter m
litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an mterest
against both; or when he is so situ~ted _a~ to be adverse~y
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property m
the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the
legal interest as qualifying factor, this ~ourt ~as ruled that
such interest must be of a direct and immediate char~cter
so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual
 384 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
and mater!al, a concern which is more than mere curiosity,
or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect or
contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or
collateral.
J:Io~ever,_notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest,
permission to mtervene is subject to the sound discretion of the
court, the exercise of which is limited by considering "whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether
or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding'' (Ongco v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 19081 O,July
18, 2012).
2. The interest contemplated by law must be actual
subs_tantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simpl;
contmgent or expectant. It must be of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or
lose by ~he ?irect legal operation and effect of the judgment.
Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were allowed
to in~ervene, proce~dings would become unnecessarily
complicated, expensive and interminable (Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Miiioza, 641 SCRA
520, 531; See also National Housing Authority v. Laurito, G.R.
No. 191657, July 31, 2017).
3. In an action for foreclosure of mortgage, the alleged
owners of the land sought to be foreclosed may intervene.
They have an interest in the matter in litigation of such direct
and i_mmediate chara?ter that they stand to gain or loss by
the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment (Roxas v.
Dinglasan, 28 SCRA 430, 433).
~- "A corporate stockholder cannot, merely on the basis
of bemg a stockholder, have a legal right to intervene in cases
involving corporate assets. A shareholder is not an owner of
corporate property, which is owned by the corporation as an
entity with a separate personality of its own. While a share of
stock represents a proportionate interest of a shareholder in
the pr~perty of _the corporation, it does not vest upon him any
legal right or title to any of the property of the corporation.
CHAPTER IV ~85
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
The interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit
between other parties must be of such direct and immediate
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the
direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. However,
the interest of a stockholder in corporate property is indirect,
contingent, remote, conjectural, consequential and collateral.
At the very least, the interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer
expectancy of a right in the management of the corporation
and to share in the profits thereof and in the properties and
assets thereof on dissolution, after payment of the corporate
debts and obligations" (Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 58168, December 19, 1989; See also Saw
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90580, April 8, 1991; For
further readings, see Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v.
Department of Transportation and Communications, G.R. No.
169914, March 24, 2008).
5. The justification of one's "sense of patriotism
and a common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine
Constitution" is not sufficient. This is true even if the
intervenors in a quo warranto petition against a sitting justice
of the Supreme Court are Senators of the Republic who would
be sitting in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the
articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate. The
interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial,
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought
in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and
not in any private individual or group. Disputes over title to
public office are viewed as a public question of governmental
legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival
claimants (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,
2018).
Procedure for intervention
1. The motion and pleading shall be served upon the
original parties.
2. The intervenor shall file a motion for intervention
attaching thereto his pleading-in-intervention. fl'he pleading
 386 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
to be filed depends upon the purpose of the intervention. If
the purpose is to assert a claim against either or all of the
original parties, the pleading shall be called a complaint-in-
intervention. If the pleadings seek to unite with the defending
party in resisting a claim against the latter, he shall file an
answer-in-intervention (Sec. 3, Rule 19, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. The answer to the complaint-in-intervention shall
be filed within 15 days from notice of the order admitting the
same, unless a different period is fixed by the courts (Sec. 4,
Rule 19, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
Time for intervention
The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court (Sec. 2, Rule 19, Rules
of Court; Castro v. Mendoza, Sr., G.R. No. 212778, April 26,
2017). Hence, intervention after trial and decision can no
longer be permitted (Yau v. Manila Banking Corporation, 384
SCRA 340, 352; National Housing Authority v. Laurito, G.R.
No. 191657, July 31, 2017). Bar 1991
7. Reply
Nature of a reply
1. A reply is a pleading, the function of which is to
deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters
alleged in, or relating to, an actionable document attached to
the answer (Sec. 10, Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. A reply is the responsive pleading to an answer
with an attached actionable document. It is not a responsive
pleading to a counterclaim or a cross-claim. The proper
response to a counterclaim or cross-claim is an· answer to the
counterclaim or answer to the cross-claim.
CHAPTERIV 387
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
Filing of reply, not mandatory
1. As a rule, the filing of a reply to the answer is
C
not mandatory and will not have an adverse effect on the
plaintiff. Under Sec. 10 of Rule 6, if a party does not file such
reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are de~med
controverted or denied. No admission follows from the failure
to file a reply.
2. Hence, if the answer to the complaint alleges as
a defense the prescription of the action, the failure of the
plaintiff to specifically deny the prescription will not amount
to an admission that the debt has prescribed because the
rule already denies the matter of prescription without the
plaintiff making a specific denial. It is already, as the rule
says, "deemed controverted." Bar 1977; 1996
3. All new matters alleged in the answer are deemed
controverted. If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims
arising out of the new matters so alleged, such claims shall be
set forth in an amended or supplemental complaint. However,
the plaintiff may file a reply ONLY if the defending party
attaches an actionable document to his or her answer (Sec. 10,
Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
If you want to allege new matters to controvert the new
matters allege in the answer, you cannot do it in a reply since ~t
is now prohibited except only when an actionable document 1s
attached to the answer. You remedy now is to file an amended
complaint or supplemental complaint.
4. Contrast this with the rule that the failure to
specifically deny the material allegations in ~he compl<:int
shall mean the implied admission of such material allegations
(Sec. 11, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended bY_A.M. No. _19-1 ?-
20-SC). Thus, the gist of the rule is: The material allegat10ns m
the complaint must be specifically denied but the allegations
of new matters or material allegations in the answer need not
be denied because they are deemed denied by the Rules for the
plaintiff.
388 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
When filing of reply is advisable
When the defense in the answer is based upon a written
instrument or document, said instrument is considered an
actionable document (Sec. 7, Rule 8, Rules of Court). Hence,
the plaintiff has to file a reply under oath if he desires to
deny specifically the genuineness and due execution of the
actionable document, and avoid an admission of such matters.
Sec. 8 of Rule 8 clearly provides:
"... the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth
what he claims to be the facts ... " (Sec. 8, Rule 8, Rules
of Court).
Period to file a reply
A reply, if allowed under Sec. 10, Rule 6, as amended by
AM. No. 19-10-20-SC, may be filed within 15 calendar days
from service of the pleading responded to (Sec. 6, Rule 11,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
F. AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS (Rule 10)
How pleadings are amended; reason for allowing amendment
1. Pleadings may be amended in the following manner:
(1) by adding or striking out an allegation; (2) by adding
or striking out the name of any party; (3) by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party; (4) by correcting a mistaken
or inadequate allegation; (5) by correcting a mistaken or
inadequate description in any other respect (Sec. 1, Rule 10,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Central
Bank Board of Liquidators v. Banco Filipino Mortgage and
Savings Bank, G.R. No. 173399, February 21, 2017).
2. Amendments are allowed so that the actual merits
of the controversy may speedily be determined without regard
to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive
CHAPTERIV 389
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
manner (Sec. 1, Rule 10, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC; Central Bank Board of Liquidators v. Banco
Filipino Mortgage and Savings Bank, G.R. No. 173399,
February 21, 2017).
Amendment as a matter of right {Bar 2000; 2012)
1. A party has the right to amend his pleading as a
matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once
and before a responsive pleading is served. In case of a reply to
which there is no responsive pleading, it may be amended as
a matter of right at any time within 10 calendar days after it
is served (Sec. 2, Rule 10, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC; Spouses Tatlonghari v. Bangko Kabayan-
Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 219783, August 3, 2016).
Thus, before an answer is served on the plaintiff, the latter
may amend his complaint as a matter of right. The defendant
may also amend his answer as a matter of right, before a reply
is served upon him. In either case, there is no need to file a
motion for leave to amend the pleading. After the service of
a responsive pleading, a party can amend his pleading only
upon prior leave of court.
Section 2 of Rule 10 refers to an amendment made
before the trial court, not to amendments before the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is vested with discretion to
admit or deny amended petitions filed before it (Navarro v.
Vda. de Taroma, 478 SCRA 336, 344-345).
2. The right to amend a pleading as a matter of right
may, according to the Rules, be exercised only once (Sec. 2,
Rule 10, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Hence, even if no responsive pleading has yet been served, if
the amendment is subsequent to a previous amendment made
as a matter ofright, the subsequent amendment must be with
leave of court.
3. Before the service of a responsive pleading, a party
has the absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless of
 390 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced
(Bautista v. Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc., 476 SCRA 416, 419).
Applicability of mandamus
The court would be in error if it refuses to admit an
amended pleading when its exercise is a matter of right. This
error is correctible by mandamus (Breslin v. Luzon Stevedo-
ring, 84Phil. 618, 626-627; Ong Peng v. Custodio, 1 SCRA 780,
· ·784-785) because the trial court's duty to admit an amended
complaint made as a matter of right is purely ministerial
(Alpine Lending Investors v. Corpuz, 508 SCRA 45, 48-49).
Amendment made during the pendency of a motion to
dismiss (Bar 1979; 2005; 2014)
If a motion to dismiss is filed, wherein such is allowed, an
amendment to the complaint would still be a matter of right
during the pendency of the motion to dismiss. Such a motion is
not a responsive pleading and its filing does not preclude the
exercise of the plaintiffs right to amend his complaint (Paeste
v. Jaurigue, 94 Phil. 179, 181; Republic v. Ilao, 4 SCRA 106,
112; Remington Industrial Sales v. Court of Appeals, 382
SCRA 499, 506).
Amendment by leave of court (Bar 1986; 1994; 2014)
1. Leave of court is required for an amendment made
after service of a responsive pleading (Sec. 3, Rule 10, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). This rule
assumes more force and effect especially when the amendment
is substantial since substantial amendments, after the service
of a responsive pleading, may be made only upon leave of
court. Bar 1994
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 10, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-
20-SC, "substantial amendments may be made only upon leave
of court." The rule continues: "But such leave may be refused
if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent
to delay or confer jurisdiction on the court, or the pleading
stated no cause of action from the beginning which could be
CHAPTERIV 391
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
amended" (For further readings, see Ola v. People, G.R. No.
195547, December 2, 2015). Hence, a substantial amendment
cannot be made without leave of court. Even if the amendment
be with leave of court, it still stands to be eventually rejected
where such amendment appears to the court to have been
made with the intent to delay the proceedings. Bar 2018
2. As it stands now, a substantial alteration in the
cause of action or defense is not a bar to the amendment of
the original complaint so long as the amendment is not meant
for delay (City State Savings Bank, Inc. v. Aguinaldo, G.R.
No. 200018, April 6, 2015) or confer jurisdiction on the court,
or the pleading stated no cause of action from the beginning
which could be amended (Sec. 3, Rule 10, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Amendment to cure a failure to state a cause of action (Bar
2004; 2013)
1. You cannot amend if the purpose is to plead a cause
of action which was not there in the beginning or in the
original complaint or pleading (Sec. 3, Rule 10, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). A complaint states a
cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three
(3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
a) A right in favour of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
b) An obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and
c) An act or omission on the part of the named
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages. (Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran,
G.R. No. 197380, October 8, 2014).
2. Under Sec. 5 of Rule 10, as amended by AM. No. 19-
10-20-SC, "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
392 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings x x x."
The first part of Sec. 5 of Rule 10 applies to situations
wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings,
is offered by the parties during the trial and not objected to. In
such a case, said issues not found in the pleadings are deemed
to have been tried with the consent of the parties. That being
so, the rule treats the issues as having been raised in the
pleadings even if not actually raised.
Thus, where the pleadings of the parties disclose that the
only issue presented before the court is merely the right of
ownership over a certain property, any evidence to show right
of possession may be objected to as irrelevant to the issue of
the case, the concept of ownership being different from the
concept of possession. An owner may not have the right of
possession as when the property owned is the object of a lease
contract. However, where evidence of right to possession was
offered without objection, the issue of possession shall now be
treated as if the same was raised in the pleadings.
3. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-
20-SC, also covers situations where a complaint insufficiently
states the cause of action. Such insufficiency may be cured
by evidence presented during the trial without objection. Bar
2004
To illustrate: A complaint filed by a guarantor to collect
a sum of money from the debtor fails to state a cause of action
if the complaint does not allege that the creditor of the debtor
has been paid by the guarantor even if in fact there was
payment. However, if, during the course of the proceedings,
evidence is offered on the fact of payment without objection
from the debtor, the defect in the complaint was cured by
the evidence. The plaintiff may, if he desires, then move for
the amendment of his complaint to conform to the evidence
(Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation
v. Philippine Infrastructures, Inc., 419 SCRA 6, 14-15).
Also, if a complaint failed to aver the fact that certain
conditions precedent were undertaken and complied with, the
CHAPTERIV 393
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
failure to so allege the same may be corrected by evidence of
compliance with said conditions without objection from the
other party.
Amendment to conform to the evidence (Bar 2004; 2013)
1. In the event that a party presents evidence on a
matter not in issue, the adverse party has a reason to object.
Common reason dictates that a party cannot breach the basic
procedural rule that the trial court can deal only with matters
raised by the parties in their pleadings. Neither can a court
render judgment on a matter not in issue because a judgment
must conform to the pleadings and the theory of the action
under which the case was tried. But when issues not raised in
the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of
the parties, such as when no objection is made by either, such
issues not raised shall be treated as if they had been put in
issue in the pleadings (See Sec. 5, Rule 10, Rules. of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. In a situation where issues not raised in the
pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of
the parties, Sec. 5 of Rule 10, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC, provides that "No amendment of such pleadings
deemed amended is necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence."
This is because the issues tried shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings even if not
actually previously raised in the pleadings. If the parties fail
to amend the pleadings, such failure will not affect the trial
of these issues because such issues are deemed to have been
raised in the pleadings of the parties (Sec. 5, Rule 10, Rules of
Court as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). This provision
under the Rules virtually authorizes an implied amendment
of the pleadings.
. It was ruled that the failure of a party to amend a pleading
j to conform to the evidence does not preclude an adjudication
I on the basis of such evidence which have embodied issues not
394 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
raised in the pleadings (Philippine National Bank v. Manalo,
G.R. No. 174433, February 24, 2014).
3. Even if the complaint is defective, if the parties go to
trial thereon, and the plaintiff, without objection, introduces
sufficient evidence to constitute the particular cause of
action which it intended to allege in the original complaint,
and the defendant voluntarily produces witnesses to meet
the cause of action thus established, an issue is joined fully
and as effectively as if it had been previously joined by the
most perfect pleadings. Likewise, when issues not raised by
the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings.
Thus, for so long as the basic requirements of fair play
had been met, as where litigants were given full opportunity
to support their respective contentions and to object to or
refute each other's evidence, the court may validly treat the
pleadings as if they had been amended to conform to the
evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the basis of all evidence
before it (Philippine National Bank v. Sps. Manalo, G.R. No.
174433, February 24, 2014).
4. Sec. 5 of Rule 10 envisions two situations: The first
is when evidence is introduced on an issue not alleged in the
pleadings and no objection was interposed by the other party.
The second is when evidence is offered on an issue not raised
in the pleadings but an objection was interjected. The rule
in the second scenario is that the court may, nevertheless,
admit the evidence where the objecting party fails to show
that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in his
defense. The court must, however, give him a continuance to
enable him to meet the new situation (Azola Farms v. Court of
Appeals, 442 SCRA 133, 141).
No amendment where no cause of action exists
1. May a complaint that has no cause of action at the
time it was filed, be cured by the accrual of a cause of action
during the pendency of the case?
I
_J,..__
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PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
The question was raised in an early case (Swagman
Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 455 SCRA 175).
When the case was filed, none of the promissory notes subject
of the action was due and demandable but two of the notes
became due during the pendency of the action.
According to the trial court, as sustained by the Court
of Appeals, Sec. 5 of Rule 10 allows a complaint that does
not state a cause of action to be cured by evidence presented
without objection during the trial. The trial court ruled that
even if the private respondent had no cause of action when he
filed the complaint for a sum of money and damages because
none of the three promissory notes was due yet, he could,
nevertheless, recover on the first two promissory notes which
became due during the pendency of the case in view of the
introduction of evidence of their maturity during the trial.
Speaking through Chief Justice Davide, the Supreme
Court ruled that such interpretation of Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous. The Court further
held:
XXX
"Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule
10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the
actual merits of a case may be determined in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to
technicalities, and that all other matters included in the
case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby
avoiding multiplicity of suits. Section 5 thereof applies to
situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised
in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the
trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are
subsequently amended on motion 'of a party. Thus, a
complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be
cured by evidence presented during the trial.
"However, the curing effect under Section 5 is
applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the
time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective
for failure to allege the essential facts. For example, if a
complaint failed to allege the fulfillment of a condition
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precedent upon which the cause of action depends,
evidence showing that such condition had already been
fulfilled when the complaint was filed may be presented
during the trial, and the complaint may accordingly be
amended thereafter x x x. It thus follows that a complaint
whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured
or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading
alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action
while the case is pending. Such an action is prematurely
brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should
be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably
filed by the defendant. The underlying reason for this rule
is that a person should not be summoned before the public
tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature"
(Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., supra at 185-186;
Underscoring supplied).
2. Similarly, in a fairly recent case, the Court held
that "[I]f no right of action existed at the time the action was
commenced, the suit cannot be maintained, even if the right
of action may have accrued thereafter (Central Bank Board
of Liquidators v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,
G.R. No. 173399, February 21, 2017).
Amendment to correct a jurisdictional defect before a
responsive pleading is served (Bar 2005)
1. A fair reading of jurisprudence recognizes the right
of a pleader to amend his complaint before a responsive
pleading is served even if its effect is to correct a jurisdictional
defect. The argument that the court cannot allow such type
of amendment since the court must first possess jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint before it can act on
any amendment has no application upon an amendment that
is made as a matter of right.
In one case involving a litigation over a parcel of land,
the complaint filed with the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) alleged forcible entry. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction over an action for forcible entry. Without waiting
CHAPTER IV 397
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
for the resolution of the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
filed an amended complaint which transformed the original
allegations of forcible entry into an action for quieting of title,
an action which, at that time, was solely cognizable by the
Court of First Instance. The trial court admitted the amended
complaint, ordered the defendants to answer it, and denied
the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court sustained the trial
court's order as being consistent with the purpose and spirit of
the Rules (Gumabay v. Baralin, 77 SCRA 258).
2. In another case filed before the City Court of Manila to
recover unpaid rentals with a prayer that an order be issued for
the surrender of the premises by the defendant to the plaintiff,
the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
amount sought to be recovered is beyond the jurisdiction of
the court and that there are no allegations in the complaint
showing that the defendant was unlawfully withholding the
premises from the plaintiff. Before action could be taken on
the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff amended the complaint to
include the requisite allegations. The court denied the motion
to dismiss and the opposition to the amended complaint. The
Court ruled that since no responsive pleading was served at
the time of the amendment, the plaintiff had done so as a
matter of course. Reiterating the rule that a motion to dismiss
is not a responsive pleading, the Supreme Court sustained the
trial court (Soledad v. Mamangun, 8 SCRA 11O).
Amendment to correct a jurisdictional defect after a
responsive pleading is served
1. An amendment of the complaint to correct a
jurisdictional error cannot be validly done after a responsive
pleading is served. The amendment, this time, would require
leave of court, a matter which requires the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. The exercise of this discretion requires
the performance of a positive act by the court. If it grants the
amendment, it would be acting on a complaint over which it
has no jurisdiction. Hence, its action would be one performed
without jurisdiction.
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The situation is vastly different from an amendment
made as a matter of right. Here, the court does not act. The
admission of the amended pleading is a ministerial duty of
the court. It requires no positive action from the court. Since
it would not be acting in this regard, it could not be deemed as
acting without jurisdiction.
2. In one case, a former employee filed an action for
recovery of compensation for unpaid holiday and overtime
services with the then Court of Industrial Relations against
his former employer. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss
but was denied. The defendant-employer then filed an answer,
invoking as one of its affirmative defenses, lack of jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter since the complaint did
not allege the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between the parties. The complaint alleged neither illegal
dismissal nor the reinstatement of the plaintiff. Realizing
a jurisdictional error, the plaintiff filed leave to amend his
complaint and admit the amended pleading alleging illegal
dismissal and a claim for reinstatement. The amended
pleading was admitted.
Speaking on the issue of.the propriety of the admission of
the amendment, the Supreme Court ruled that a "complaint
cannot be amended to confer jurisdiction on the court in which
it was filed, if the cause of action originally set forth was not
within the court's jurisdiction" (Campos Rueda Corporation v.
Bautista, 6 SCRA 240, 244).
Note that, in Campos Rueda, an answer has already
been served and filed. The result would have been different
had the amendment been made before the answer had been
served since the original complaint was then amendable. The
amendment could supersede the original pleading, as of right,
without leave of court (See also Rosario v. Carandang, 96 Phil.
845, 851). Bar 2005
Similarly, in an action for damages filed before the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) against
a sheriff for an alleged illegal levy upon the property of the
plaintiff, the latter sought to amend his complaint after an
CHAPTERIV 399
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
answer has been served by the defendant. The amendment was
made when the plaintiff realized that the amount alleged as
damages was below the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme
Court held that it was error to admit the amendment because
the court must first acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the complaint in order to act validly on the same including
its amendment (Gaspar v. Dorado, 15 SCRA 331, 334).
3. These pronouncements are echoed in the 2019
Amendments of the 1997 Rules of Procedure (A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC) which provides that: "But such leave may be refused if
it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent
to delay or confer jurisdiction on the court, or the pleading
stated no cause of action from the beginning which could be
amended."
Effect of the amendment on the original pleading
When a pleading is amended, the original pleading
is deemed to have been abandoned. The original ceases to
perform any further function as a pleading. The case stands
for trial on the amended pleading only (Ascano-Cupino v.
Pacific Rehouse Corporation, G.R. No. 205113, August 26,
2015). As the Rules put it: "An amended pleading supersedes
the original one which it amends" (Sec. 8, Rule 10, Rules of
Court).
Effect of the amendment on admissions made in the original
pleading
1. Admissions in superseded pleadings may be received
in evidence against the pleader (Sec. 8, Rule 10, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Be it noted, however,
that the admissions made in the original pleadings cease to be
judicial admissions (Ching v. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 16,
33). This time, they are now to be considered as extrajudicial
admissions (Torres v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 24, 35). In
order to be utilized against the party making the admissions,
they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in
evidence (See Ching v. Court of Appeals, supra). The original
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pleadings can have no effect unless offered in evidence
(Bastida v. Menzi & Co., Inc., 58 Phil. 188, 222, citing Lucido
v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 148, and Jones on Evidence, Sec. 273).
2. However, admissions in superseded pleadings
may be offered in evidence against the pleader; and claims
or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended
pleading shall be deemed waived (Sec. 8, Rule 10, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Under the
Rules, pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the
record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be judicial
admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against
the pleader as extrajudicial admissions, they must, in order
to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. If not
offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not
be considered (Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110844, 27
April 2000).
Summons after complaint is amended; when required and
when not required
1. Although the original complaint is deemed
superseded by the pleading that amends it, it does not ipso
facto follow that service of new summons is required. Where
the defendants have already appeared before the trial court by
virtue of a summons in the original complaint, the amended
complaint may be served upon them without need of another
summons, even if new causes of action are alleged. A court's
jurisdiction, once it is acquired, continues until the case is
finally terminated.
Conversely, when the defendants have not yet appeared
in court, new summons for the amended complaint must
be served on them. It is not the change of a cause of action
that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the
amended complaint but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the persons of the defendants. If the trial court has not
yet acquired jurisdiction over them, a new summons for the
amended complaint is required (Vlason Enterprises Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 26, 57-58).
CHAPTERIV 401
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
2. However, admissions in superseded pleadings
may be offered in evidence against the pleader; and claims
or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended
pleading shall be deemed waived (Sec. 8, Rule 10, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Under the
Rules, pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the
record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be judicial
admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against
the pleader as extrajudicial admissions, they must, in order
to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. If not
offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not
be considered (Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110844,
April 27, 2000).
Supplemental pleadings
1. A supplemental pleading is one which sets forth
transactions, occurrences, or events which have happened
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented (Sec.
6, Rule 10, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
2. The filing of supplemental pleadings requires leave
of court. The court may allow the pleading only upon such
terms as are just. This leave is sought by the filing of a motion
with notice to all parties (See Sec. 6, Rule 10, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Cause of action in supplemental pleadings
1. When the cause of action in the supplemental
complaint is different from the cause of action mentioned
in the original complaint, the court should not admit the
supplemental complaint (Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of
Appeals, 324 SCRA 533, 546).
2. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading
only serves to bolster or add something to the primary
pleading. A supplemental pleading exists side by side with
the original. It does not replace that which it supplements.
Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original
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pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with the original
pleading remain as issues to be tried in the action. It is but
a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up
new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief
with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy
referred to in the original complaint (Chan v. Chan, 569
SCRA 106). If the supplemental pleading states a new cause
of action, it may be allowed provided that the matter stated
in the supplemental complaint must have a relation to the
cause of action set forth in the original pleading. This means
that the matter must be germane and intertwined with the
cause of action stated in the original complaint so that the
principal and core issues raised by the parties in their original
pleadings remain the same (See also Central Bank Board of
Liquidators v. Banco Filipino Mortgage and Savings Bank,
G.R. No. 173399, February 21, 2017).
Answer to a supplemental pleading; not mandatory
1. Must an answer to a supplemental complaint be
filed? This question was answered in a case.
Declared the Supreme Court:
XXX
the filing of an answer to the supplemental pleading
is not mandatory because of the use of the word "may."
This is bolstered by the express provision of the Rules
that the answer to the original pleading shall serve as
the answer to the supplemental pleading if no new or
supplemental answer is filed. Thus, the Court cannot
declare the respondents in default simply because the
latter opted not to file their answer to the supplemental
petition xx x" (Chan v. Chan, 569 SCRA 106, 116-117;
See Sec. 7, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Under Sec. 7, Rule 11, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC, a supplemental complaint may be answered within
20 calendar days from notice of the order admitting the same,
unless a different period is fixed by the court. The answer to
CHAPTERIV 403
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
the complaint shall serve as the answer to the supplemental
complaint if no new or supplemental answer is filed.
II. MOTIONS IN CIVIL CASES
Definition of a motion
A motion is an application for relief other than by a
pleading (Sec. 1, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
Form of motions
1. All motions shall be in writing. Excepted from this
written requirement are those: (a) motions made in open
court; and (b) motions made in the course of a hearing or trial
(Sec. 2, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
2. A motion made in open court or in the course of a
hearing or trial should immediately be resolved in open court,
after the adverse party is given the opportunity to argue his
or her opposition thereto.
When a motion is based on facts not appearing on record,
the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions
presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony
or depositions (Sec. 2, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. The rules that apply to pleadings shall also apply
to written motions with respect to caption, designation,
signature, and other matters of form (Sec. 10, Rule 15, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19~10-20-SC).
Contents of a motion
Motions are to contain the following: (a) a statement of
the relief sought to be obtained; (b) the grounds upon which
the motion is based; and (c) the supporting affidavits and other
papers. The last requirement applies only when so mandated
404 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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by the Rules or when necessary to prove facts stated in the
motion (Sec. 3, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC). If motion is based on facts not appearing
on record, the court may set it for hearing if necessary or the
court may require the submission of affidavits, depositions or
even oral testimony to resolve the motion.
Non-litigious motions
1. Motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of adverse parties are non-litigious
motions. These motions include:
(a) Motion for the issuance of an alias summons;
(b) Motion for extension to file answer;
(c) Motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for the issuance of a writ of execution;
(e) Motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution;
(f) Motion for the issuance of a writ of possession;
(g) Motion for the issuance of an order directing
the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale; and
(h) Other similar motions.
These motions shall not be set for hearing and shall be
resolved by the court within five (5) calendar days from receipt
thereof (Sec. 4, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. The motion for extension to file answer must be
availed of only once. If it is a second motion for extension to
file an answer, that becomes litigious.
Litigious motions
1. Litigious motions include:
1) Motion for bill of particulars;
CHAPTERIV 405
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
2) Motion to dismiss;
3) Motion for new trial;
4) Motion for reconsideration;
5) Motion for execution pending appeal;
6) Motion to amend after a responsive pleading
has been filed;
7) Motion to cancel statutory lien;
8) Motion for an order to break in or for a writ of
demolition;
9) Motion for intervention;
10) Motion for judgment on the pleadings;
11) Motion for summary judgment;
12) Demurrer to evidence;
13) Motion to declare defendant in default; and
14) Other similar motions (Sec. 5[a], Rule 15, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. All motions shall be served by personal service,
accredited private courier or registered mail, or electronic
means so as to ensure their receipt by the other party (Sec.
5[b], Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC).
3. The opposing party shall file his or her opposition to
a litigious motion within 5 calendar days from receipt thereof.
No other submissions shall be considered by the court in the
resolution of the motion. (Sec. 5[c], Rule 15, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The court may not
act upon these motions ex parte because they will prejudice
the rights of the adverse party. The five-day period given is
automatic once in receipt of the motion. The court will not
issue an order directing a party to file an opposition. The
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motion shall be resolved by the court within 15 calendar days
from its receipt of the opposition thereto, or upon expiration of
the period to file such opposition.
Notice of hearing on litigious motions; discretionary
The court may, in the exercise of its discretion, and if
deemed necessary for its resolution, call a hearing on the
motion. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing.
(Sec. 6, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
Proof of service
Proof of service of the motion is required. No written
motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service
thereof pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 15, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC (Sec. 7, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Motion day
All litigated motions shall be scheduled for hearing on
Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working holiday, in the
afternoon of the next working day. This rule does not apply to
motions requiring immediate action (Sec. 8, Rule 15, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Motion for leave to file a motion
A motion for leave to file a motion shall be accompanied
by the motion sought to be admitted. The same rule applies
to pleadings (Sec. 10, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
The Omnibus motion rule (Bar 2010; 2011)
The omnibus motion rule requires that a motion that
attacks a pleading, judgment, order or proceeding shall include
CHAPTERIV 407
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
all grounds then available, and all objections not so included
shall be deemed waived (Sec. 9, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; See also Capablanca v.
heirs of Pedro Bas, G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017). Since
the rule is subject to the provisions of Sec. 1 of Rule 9, the
objections mentioned therein are not deemed waived even if
not included in the motion. These objections are: (a) the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause
(litis pendentia); (c) the action is barred by a prior judgment
(res judicata); and (d) the action is barred by the statute of
limitations or prescription (Sec. 1, 2nd sentence, Rule 9, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Prohibited motions under 2019 Amendments to the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure
1. The following motions shall not be allowed:
(a) Motion to dismiss except on the following
grounds:
1) That the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim;
2) That there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause; and
3) That the cause of action is barred by a
prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(b) Motion to hear affirmative defenses;
(c) Motion for reconsideration of the court's action
on the affirmative defenses;
(d) Motion to suspend proceedings without a
temporary restraining order or injunction issued by a
higher court;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other papers, except a motion for
extension to file an answer as provide by Sec. 11, Rule
11; and
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(f) Motion for postponement intended for delay,
except if it is based on acts of God, force majeure or
physical inability of the witness to appear and testify.
If the motion is granted based on such exceptions, the
moving party shall be warned that the presentation of its
evidence must still be terminated on the dates previously
agreed upon (Sec. 12, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. A motion for postponement, whether written or oral,
shall, at all times, be accompanied by the original official
receipt from the office of the clerk of court evidencing payment
of the postponement fee under Sec. 21(b), Rule 141, to be
submitted either at the time of the filing of said motion or not
later than the next hearing date. The clerk of court shall not
accept the motion unless accompanied by the original receipt
(Sec. 12, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
3. Note that Sec. 12a(3), Rule 15, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, actually contemplates
2 grounds barred by a prior judgment (res judicata) and
prescription.
4. If an affirmative defense is raised in an answer,
the court will resolve it right away unless the court deems
it necessary to set a summary hearing where facts are still
unclear.
Prohibited motions under the Rules on Expedited
Procedures in the First Level Courts
The following motions shall not be allowed:
a. Motion to dismiss the complaint or the statement
of claim, and in criminal cases, or to quash a criminal
complaint or information; Exception: If the ground is lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter or failure to comply
with the requirement of barangay conciliation, pursuant
to Chapter VII, Title I, Book III of R.A. 7160;
CHAPTER IV 409
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
b. Motion to hear and/or resolve affirmative
defenses;
c. Motion for a bill of particulars;
d. Motion for new trial;
e. Motion for reconsideration of a judgment on the
merits;
f. Motion for reopening of proceedings;
g. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other paper;
h. Motion to declare the defendant in default; and
i. Dilatory motions for postponement. Any motion
for postponement shall be presumed dilatory unless
grounded on acts of God, force majeure, or physical
inability of a counsel or witness to personally appear in
court, as supported by the requisite affidavit and medical
proof;
J. Motion for and Complaint in Intervention;
k. Motion to admit late judicial affidavit/s, position
papers, or other evidence, except on the ground of force
majeure or acts of God;
1. Motion for judicial determination of probable
cause in criminal cases (Sec. 2, Rule IL Rules on Expedited
Procedures in the First Level Courts).
The Supreme Court, during its En Banc deliberation
on March 1, 2022, approved the procedural rules expediting
criminal and civil actions filed before the first level courts.
This effectively amended the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and 2016 Revised Rules on Small Claims Cases.
Entitled Rules on Expedited Procedures in First
Level Courts (AM. No. 08-8-7-SC), the same recalibrates,
reconciles, and harmonizes the coverage of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure and Small Claims cases following the
enactment of R.A. 11576, which expanded the jurisdictional
410 CNIL PROCEDURE CHAPTERIV 411
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VOLUME I

amount cognizable by the first level courts to P2,000,000.00 judgment of the RTC on the appeal shall be final, executory,
for civil actions monetary claims. The Rules provide for a and unappealable.
more efficient and expedited procedure governing summary
procedure cases. Prohibited motions in the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and
Habeas Data
The provisions on prohibited pleadings and motions
and service pursuant to international conventions under the The following motions are prohibited:
2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure have a. Motion to dismiss;
also been incorporated, and videoconferencing hearings have b. Motion for extension of time to file opposition,
been authorized at any stage of the proceedings. The salient affidavit, position paper and other pleadings;
features of the Rules pertinent to summary procedure include:
c. Dilatory motion for postponement;
Civil cases covered by the rule on summary procedure d. Motion for a bill of particulars;
now consist of: 1) forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases; 2) civil actions and complaints for damages where e. Motion to declare respondent in default; and
the claims do not exceed P2,000,000.00; 3) cases for f. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory
enforcement ofbarangay amicable settlement agreements orders or interim relief orders (Sec. 11, The Rules on the
and arbitration award where the money claim exceeds
Pl,000,000.00; 4) cases solely for the revival of judgment
Writ of Amparo; Sec. 13, The Rules on the Writ of Habeas
of any first level court; and 5) the civil aspect of violations Data).
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), if no criminal action
has been instituted. Provisions on the evidentiary nature Prohibited motions under the Rules of Procedure for Small
of pleadings, filing and service, and pre-trial from the Claims Cases, as amended
2019 Amendments have likewise been adopted, unless
The following motions shall not be allowed in the case
inconsistent.
covered by the Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases:
With respect to criminal cases, violation of BP 22 is a. Motion to dismiss the complaint;
explicitly included, and the penalty threshold of all other b. Motion for a bill of particulars;
criminal cases is increased to imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or a fine not exceeding P50,000.00, or both, and a fine c. Motion for new trial;
not exceeding P150,000.00 for offenses involving damage to d. Motion for reconsideration of a judgment;
property through criminal negligence. Arraignment and pre- e. Motion for reopening of trial;
trial shall be scheduled and conducted in accordance with the
Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases. f. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other paper;
The procedure of appeal has also been simplified. Any
g. Motion to declare the defendant in default; and
judgment, final order, or final resolution may be appealed
to the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC) exercising h. Dilatory motions for postponements (Sec. 16,
jurisdiction over the territory under Rule 40 for civil cases Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, as amended,
and Rules 122 for criminal cases, of the Rules of Court. The effective February 1, 2016).
412 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Prohibited motions under the Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases
a. Motion to dismiss the complaint;
ChapterV
b. Motion for a bill of particulars;
c. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, SUMMONS
except to file answer, the extension not to exceed 15 days·
and '
Purpose and importance of summons
d. Motion to declare the defendant in default (Sec.
2, Rule 2, Part II, Rules of Procedure for Environmental 1. Service of summons is a vital and indispensable
Cases). ingredient of due process and compliance with the rules
regarding the service of summons is not only a requirement
-oOo- of due process but also of jurisdiction (See Borlongan v. Banco
De Oro [formerly Equitable PCI Bank], G.R. No. 217617, April
5, 2017).
"Summons is the writ by which the defendant is notified of
the action brought against him or her. Its purpose is two-fold:
to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and
to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced
so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the
claim against him. x x x It is elementary that before a person
can be deprived of his property, he should first be informed
of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim
is premised" (Nation Petroleum Gas, Incorporated v. Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 183370, August
17, 2015). This means that any person with interest in the
thing in litigation must be given an opportunity to defend
that interest. Since the essence of due process lies in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence
the defendant may have in support of his defense, he must
be properly served with summons.· The service of summons
is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process and
compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons
is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction (See
Borlongan u. Banco De Oro [formerly Equitable PCI Bank],
G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017).

413

L
 414 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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2. "x xx Without service of summons, or when summons
are improperly made, both the trial and the judgment,
being in violation of due process, are null and void, unless
the defendant waives the service of summons by voluntarily
appearing and answering the suit" (See Frias u. Alcayde, G.R.
No. 194262, February 28, 2018; citation of the Court omitted).
A previous case similarly holds that if a defendant has
not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction
over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is void
(Express Padala [Italia] S.P.A. u. Ocampo, G.R. No. 202505,
September 6, 2017).
3. An integral part of the summons is a direction that
the defendant should answer the complaint within the period
fixed by the Rules and that, unless he so answers, plaintiff
will take judgment by default and may be granted the relief
applied for (See Sec. 2, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Service of summons applies to any action
Regardless of the type of action - whether it is in
personam, in rem or quasi in rem - proper service of summons
is imperative (Frias u. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, February 28,
2018).
Summons in actions in personam (Bar 2016)
1. "x x x Service of summons upon the defendant is
the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person x x x" (Frias u. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, February 28,
2018; citation of the Court omitted).
2. In an action in personam, the purpose of summons
is not only to comply with due process but also to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It needs to be
noted, at this point, that the mere filing of the complaint does
not enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant. By the filing of the complaint and the payment
CHAPTERV 415
SUMMONS
of the required filing and docket fees, the court acquires
jurisdiction only over the person of the plaintiff, not over
the person of the defendant (For further readings, see Ellice
u. Agro-Industrial Corporation u. Young, 686 SCRA 51, 61,
November 21, 2012). To have jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, where he does not appear voluntarily in the
action, a valid service of summons upon him is required.
3. The principle is plain and simple. "Where the action
is in personam, that is, one brought against a person on the
basis of her person~! liability, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case xx x" (Velayo-Fong u. Velayo, 510 SCRA 320,
331). Without acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant in an in personam action, such as an action for
damages, the court would be without authority to order said
defendant to pay damages in favor of the plaintiff. In an action
for a sum of money, also an in personam action, any judgment
against the defendant rendered without jurisdiction over
his person would not be binding upon him. Common reason
suggests that the court would be devoid of authority to hold a
person liable for the relief prayed for by the plaintiff without
first vesting upon said court jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.
4. On the basis of the principle mentioned above, a
judgment rendered against a corporation, ordering it to pay
the plaintiff, is not a valid judgment, where the corporation
was not summoned to the suit, even if its president knew of the
action in his capacity as counsel for the other defendant. Basic
is the rule that the corporation has a personality separate
and distinct from the people who compose it (See Trimica u.
Polaris Marketing Corp., G.R. No. L-29887, October 28, 1974).
As aptly explained by the Court: "The general rule is that
no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger and strangers in a case are not bound by a judgment
of the court" (Sunrise Garden Corporation u. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015).

416 CML PROCEDURE
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Effect of knowledge of the filing of the action
Knowledge by the defendant of an action filed against
him does not dispense with the need for summons. Summons
must still be issued and served.
Thus, it was ruled that, "x x x jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant cannot be acquired notwithstanding his
knowledge of the pendency of a case against him, unless he
was validly served with summons. Such is the important role
a valid service of summons plays in court actions" (See Frias
v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018, citation of the
Court omitted).
Purpose of summons in actions in rem and quasi in rem
1. As discussed in an earlier chapter and repeated, in
passing, for emphasis, in actions in rem and quasi in rem,
the court is not primarily concerned with the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In these actions,
it is the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the res
which principally matters.
2. Recall that jurisdiction over the res is acquired
either "(a) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b)
as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which
the power of the court is recognized and made effective. The
service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the
purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements" (Alba v. Court of
Appeals, 465 SCRA 495, 505-506; See also Frias v. Alcayde,
G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018).
3. Thus, it has been clearly declared that, in an action
in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the
court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the
res. This does not, however, mean that the service of summons
may be dispensed with. The Court explained that summons
must still be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy
CHAPTERV 417
SUMMONS
the due process requirements (Asiavest Limited v. Court of
Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 554; Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 420
SCRA 98, 104; Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank,
515 SCRA 106, 115-116; Suggested reading: PCI Bank v.
Alejandro, 533 SCRA 738).
4. Take, for purposes of illustration, the proceedings for
the attachment of property of a defending party. Attachment,
it has been ruled, is in the nature of a proceeding quasi in
rem (Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 928)
although sometimes referred to as an action in rem (Valdevieso
v. Damalerio, 451 SCRA 638, 671). While attachment is a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, this classification becomes
significant only when the defendant does not appear in
the action as when he is a non-resident who is at the same
time outside of the Philippines. Where the defendant does
not voluntary appear in the action, the need for acquiring
jurisdiction over the property or res becomes imperative so
the court may have the authority to order that the property
be made to answer for the liability of the non-appearing
defendant.
The Court has, however, clarified that, "If the defendant
appears, the cause becomes mainly a suit in personam, with
the added incident, that the property attached remains liable,
under the control of the court, to answer to any demand
which may be established against the defendant by the final
judgment of the court. But, if there is no appearance of the
defendant, and no service of process on him, the case becomes,
in its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only effect
of which is to subject the property attached to the payment
of the defendant which the court may find to be due to the
plaintiff' (See Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil.
921, 929 citing Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308). When the
defendant appears in the action, even an in rem and a quasi in
rem action are to be treated as actions in personam.
Voluntary appearance by the defendant (Bar 2017)
1. It has been previously stated that the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required in an
action in personam. But how is this jurisdiction acquired?
 418 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired
through a coercive process, generally by the service of
summons issued by the court, or through the defendant's
voluntary appearance or submission to the court (Republic of
the Philippines v. Domingo, 657 SCRA 621, 632; Ellice Agro-
Industrial Corporation v. Young, 686 SCRA 51, 61, November
21, 2012; Uy v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 223610, July 24, 2017).
Stated otherwise, without a valid service of summons, the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
unless he voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the
court (Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 499 SCRA 21, 33). Bar
1999
Thus, while a trial court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant by service of summons, a court may
still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
if he performs acts which could be reasonably construed as
voluntary appearance (See Tujan-Militante v. Nustad, G.R.
No. 209518, June 19, 2017).
2. The applicable provision on voluntary appearance
states:
"SEC. 23. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss
of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance."
The provision is clear. The effects of a valid service of
summons will necessarily flow from the voluntary appearance
of the defendant, such appearance being equivalent to service of
summons. Because of the "principle of voluntary appearance,"
an absence of service of summons or even an invalid service
of summons will not prevent the court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the defendant as long as he performs acts
that could be construed as a voluntary appearance (Please
refer to discussion in Chapter II on Jurisdiction; Uy v. Del
Castillo, G.R. No. 223610, July 24, 2017).
CHAPTERV 419
SUMMONS
As declared by the Court: "While proper service of
summons is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, the lack or defect in the service
of summons may be cured by the defendant's subsequent
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court" (Guy v.
Gacott, G.R. No. 206147, January 13, 2016).
3. When is a defendant deemed to have made a
voluntary appearance? The court in one case held that the
defendant is deemed to have made a voluntary appearance
when he filed an answer to the complaint (Guy v. Gacott,
supra) or actively participated in the case. It is settled that
the active participation of a party against whom the action
was brought, is tantamount to an invocation of the court's
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the
case, and such will bar said party from later on impugning the
court's jurisdiction (Uy v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 223610, July
24, 2017).
In another case, the trial court was held to have acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant when he filed the
"Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Answer." This was equivalent to service of summons and
vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant (Santos v. PNOC Exploration Corporation, 566
SCRA 272, 280). Also, by seeking affirmative relief from the
court, like moving for the discharge of a writ of attachment,
the defendant is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court (Nation Petroleum Gas Corporation
v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 183370,
August 17, 2015).
The Court, in yet another case elucidates, thus: "As a
general proposition, one who seeks' an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is
by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that
the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however,
 420 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such
that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot
be considered to have submitted to its authority" (Reicon
Realty Builders Corporation v. Diamond Dragon Realty and
Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204796, February 4, 2015; italics
supplied; Onstott v. Upper Tagpos Neighborhood Association,
Inc., G.R. No. 221047, September 14, 2016; See also Tujan-
Militante v. Nustad, G.R. No. 209518, June 19, 2017).
4. Jurisprudence clearly explains that seeking affir-
mative relief from the court is equivalent to voluntary
appearance. However, the act of making a conditional or special
appearance in court to object to the jurisdiction of that court
over his person, is not to be deemed a voluntary appearance or
a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence,
if the defendant, without having been served with summons,
files a motion to dismiss the complaint grounded on the court's
alleged lack of jurisdiction over his person, the filing of the
motion is not to be construed as a voluntary appearance. Here,
the defendant's appearance is not to seek for any affirmative
relief from the court but to seek the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground stated.
Jurisprudence referred to this appearance as a "special
appearance," one made for the purpose of objecting to the
court's jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (For
further readings, see Frias v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262,
February 28, 2018).
For an appearance to be deemed as a special appearance,
objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and the failure to do so constitutes
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially
in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative
relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution (Rapid
City Realty and Development Corporation v. Villa, G.R. No.
184197, February 11, 2010).
CHAPTERV 421
SUMMONS
But what if, in the motion to dismiss, the objection to the
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is coupled with
other defenses or grounds for dismissal? Would the inclusion
of other grounds for dismissal be considered a voluntary
submission to the authority of the court?
The second sentence of Sec. 23 of Rule 14 is explicit, thus:
'); x x The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance" (Italics supplied).
Bar 2017
The rule before the 2019 Amendment dictates that
a def ending party may file a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction over his person and add to such ground other
grounds for dismissal. Hence, the defendant, for example,
may include, as grounds for dismissal, failure to state a cause
of action, prescription, improper venue, and other authorized
defenses and objections under the Rules, aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The addition of
such grounds, aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, shall not be considered a voluntary appearance
under Sec. 20 of Rule 14, of the 1997 Rules of Procedure.
The prevailing doctrine now under the 2019 Amendment
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure considers inclusion of
additional grounds in a motion to dismiss, aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, as a voluntary
appearance. Under this doctrinal policy, when the appearance
is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and
separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Hence, if the motion to dismiss invoked prescription as an
added ground, the defendant was considered to have made a
general, not a special or conditional appearance. For the court
to validly decide the defense of prescription, it necessarily
had to acquire jurisdiction upon the defendant's person, who
should be deemed to have abandoned its special appearance
and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court
(For further readings, see Republic v. Ker & Co. Ltd., G.R. No.
L-21609, September 29, 1966).

422 CNIL PROCEDURE
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5. The filing of a motion for more time to file an
answer is considered voluntary appearance on the part of the
defendant, such that the trial court, nevertheless, acquired
jurisdiction over his person despite the defect in the summons
(Carson Realty & Management Corporation v. Red Robbin
Security Agency, G.R. No. 225035, February 8, 2017; Villongco
v. Yabut, G.R. No. 225022, February 5, 2018).
Who issues the summons
Unless the complaint is on its face dismissible under
Sec. 1, Rule 9, the court shall, within five (5) calendar days
from receipt of the initiatory pleading and proof of payment
of the requisite legal fees, direct the clerk of court to issue the
corresponding summons to the defendants. ·(Sec. 2, Rule 14,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for the outright dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res
judicata, prescription.
When summons is issued
Summons shall be issued within 5 calendar days from
receipt of the initiatory pleading and proof of payment of the
requisite legal fees (Sec. 1, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
To whom summons is directed
The summons is a writ that is directed to the defendant,
not the plaintiff (See Sec. 2, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Who serves summons (Bar 2012)
1. The summons may be served by the sheriff, his or
her deputy, or other proper court officer, and in case of failure
of service of summons by them, the court may authorize the
plaintiff - to serve the summons - together with the sheriff
(Sec. 3, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
CHAPTERV 423
SUMMONS
2. In cases where summons is to be served outside the
judicial region of the court where the case is pending, the
plaintiff shall be authorized to cause the service of summons
(Sec. 3, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
3. If the plaintiff is a juridical entity, it shall notify
the court, in writing and name its authorized representative
therein, attaching a board resolution or secretary's certificate
thereto, as the case may be, stating that such representative
is duly authorized to serve the summons on behalf of the
plaintiff (Sec. 3, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
4. If the plaintiff misrepresents that the defendant
was served summons, and it is later proved that no summons
was served, the case shall be dismissed with prejudice, the
proceedings shall be nullified, and the plaintiff shall be meted
appropriate sanctions (Sec. 3, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
5. If summons is returned without being served on any
or all of the defendants, the court shall order the plaintiff to
cause the service of summons by other means available under
the Rules.
Failure to comply with the order shall cause the dismissal
of the initiatory pleading without prejudice (Sec. 3, Rule 14,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Contents of the summons
1. The summons shall contain the following matters:
(a) the name of the court and the names of the parties to the
action; (b) when authorized by the court upon exparte motion,
an authorization for the plaintiff to serve summons to the
defendant; (c) a direction that the defendant answer within
the time fixed by the Rules; and (d) a notice that, unless the
defendant so answers, the plaintiff will take judgment by
default and may be granted the relief prayed for (Sec. 2, Rule
14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
424 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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2. A copy of the complaint (including a copy of an order
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, if necessary) shall
be attached to the original and each copy of the summons (Sec.
2, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
Validity of summons and issuance of alias summons
Summons shall remain valid until duly served, unless it is
recalled by the court. In case ofloss or destruction of summons,
the court may, upon motion, issue an alias summons.
There is a failure of service after unsuccessful attempts
to personally serve the summons on the defendant in his or
her address indicated in the complaint. Substituted service
should be in the manner provided under Sec. 6 of Rule 14 (Sec.
4, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
Return and proof of service (Bar 2012)
1. Within 30 calendar days from issuance of summons
by the clerk of court and receipt thereof, the sheriff or process
server, or person authorized by the court, shall complete its
service. Within 5 calendar days from service of summons, the
server shall file with the court and serve a copy of the return
to the plaintiffs counsel, personally, by registered mail, or by
electronic means authorized by the Rules (Sec. 20; Rule 14,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Should substituted service have been effected, the
return shall state the following:
(1) The impossibility of prompt personal service
within a period of thirty (30) calendar days from issue
and receipt of summons;
(2) The date and time of the three (3) attempts on at
least two (2) different dates to cause personal service and
the details of the inquiries made to locate the defendant
residing thereat; and
CHAPTERV 425
SUMMONS
(3) The name of the person at least eighteen (18)
years of age and of sufficient discretion residing thereat,
name of competent person in charge of the defendant's
office or regular place of business, or name of the officer of
the homeowners' association or condominium corporation
or its chief security officer in charge of the community or
building where the defendant may be found (Sec. 20, Rule
14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. A sheriffs return enjoys the presumption of
regularity in its issuance it contains (1) the details of the
circumstances surrounding the sheriffs attempt to serve the
summons personally upon the defendants or respondents;
and (2) the particulars showing the impossibility of serving
the summons within reasonable time. It does not enjoy the
presumption of regularity if the return was merely pro forma.
Failure to state the facts and circumstance that rendered
service of summons impossible renders service of summons
and the return ineffective. In that case, no substituted service
or service by publication can be valid (De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26,
2014).
4. After the completion of the service, a proof of service
is required to be filed by the server of the summons. The proof
of service of summons shall be made in writing and shall set
forth the manner, place, and date of service; specify any papers
which have been served with the process and the name of the
person who received the same; and be sworn to when made by
a person other than a sheriff or his or her deputy.
If the summons was served by electronic mail, a printout
of said e-mail, with a copy of the s~mmons as served, and
the affidavit of the person mailing, shall constitute [as] proof
service (Sec. 21, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
Uniformity of the rules on summons
The rules on summons apply with equal force in actions
before the Regional Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
426 CNIL PROCEDURE
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Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Courts. This is because the
procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as
in the Regional Trial Courts, except (a) where a particular
provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either of said
courts, or (b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure (Sec. 1, Rule 5, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC). Bar 1989
'I
Service upon an entity without a juridical personality
1. When two or more persons not organized as an
entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they
may be sued under the name by which they are generally or
commonly known (Sec. 15, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Thus, if A, B, and C enter into a transaction under the
name, ABC Corporation, an entity which has actually no
juridical personality, A, B, and C may be sued under the
name, ABC Corporation.
2. How, then, may summons be served upon the
non-existent corporation or upon those who compose the
"corporation"?
Under Sec. 8 of Rule 14, service may be effected upon all
the defendants by serving summons upon (a) any one of them,
or (b) upon the person in charge of the office or of the place
of business maintained in such name. This service shall not,
however, bind individually any person whose connection with
the entity, upon due notice, had been severed before the action
was filed. Bar 2011
Service upon a prisoner
When the defendant is a prisoner confined in a jail or
institution, service shall be effected upon him or her (the
prisoner) by the officer having the management of such jail
or institution. For this purpose, the jail manager is deemed
deputized as a special sheriff (Sec. 9, Rule 14, Rules of Court).
CHAPTERV 427
SUMMONS
The jail warden shall file a return within 5 calendar days from
service of summons to the defendant (Sec. 8, Rule 14, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Service consistent with international conventions
Service may be made through methods which are
consistent with established international conventions to
which the Philippines is a party (Sec. 9, Rule 14, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The Philippines
has become a signatory to many international treaties and
conventions which may have their own specific means for
service of court bound papers. This provision is introduced to
accommodate such specific means.
Service upon a minor and an incompetent
When the defendant is a minor, insane or otherwise an
incompetent person, service shall be made (a) upon him or her
personally and (b) on his or her legal guardian if he or she
has one, or if none, upon his or her guardian ad litem. The
appointment of the guardian ad litem shall be applied for by
the plaintiff. If the defendant is a minor, service may be made
also upon his service shall be made upon his or her parent
or guardian (Sec. 10, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Notice that service upon the legal
guardian, or parents is not a sufficient compliance of the rule.
Service should be made also upon the defendant even if he is
a minor, insane or an incompetent.
Service upon spouses
When spouses are sued jointly, service of summons
should be made to each spouse individually (Sec. 11, Rule 14,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Even
if they are sued jointly and are supposed to have common
interests, they are still separate individuals, they still have
individual rights.
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Service upon a domestic private juridical entity
1. When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with
a juridical personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel of the corporation wherever
they may be found, or in their absence or unavailability, on
their secretaries.
If such service cannot be made upon any of the foregoing
persons, it shall be made upon the person who customarily
receives the correspondence for the defendant at its principal
office (Sec. 12, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
Note that service to the secretaries is only limited to
the principal office unlike service to the designated officers
"wherever they may be found."
2. Should there be a refusal on the part of the persons
above-mentioned to receive summons despite at least three
(3) attempts on two (2) different dates, service may be made
electronically, if allowed by the court, as provided under Sec.
6 of Rule 14 or by substituted service (Sec. 12, Rule 14, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. In case the domestic juridical entity is under
receivership or liquidation, service of summons shall be made
on the receiver or liquidator, as the case may be (Sec. 12, Rule
14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
4. The above enumeration has been held to be limited
to the persons enumerated and summons cannot be served
upon any other person. The earliest pronouncements of the
Court on the matter described the enumeration as "restricted,
limited and exclusive" (E.B. Villarosa & Partner, Ltd. v. Benito,
312 SCRA 65, 73) following the rule on statutory construction
expressio unios est exclusio alterus (Nation Petroleum Gas,
Incorporated v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, G.R.
No. 183370, August 17, 2015).
CHAPTERV 429
SUMMONS
5. Even more recent jurisprudence affirms that Sec. 11
of Rule 14 provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons
authorized to receive summons for juridical entities (See also
Guy v. Gacottt, supra). Service of summons on an officer other
than those enumerated in Sec. 11 of Rule 14 is invalid (7107
Islands Publishing, Inc. v. The House Printers Corporation,
G.R. No. 193420, October 14, 2015).
Old rule on service upon a domestic private juridical entity
1. In construing the provisions of the rule on service of
summons upon a private juridical entity (Sec. 13, Rule 14 of
the 1964 Rules of Court), before its amendment took effect on
July 1, 1997, the Court employed the principle of substantial
compliance.
For instance, in Summit Trading and Development
Corporation v. Avendano, 135 SCRA 397, 400, the Court
upheld the validity of service made upon the secretary of the
corporate president.
The same liberal construction of the rule on summons
was made in a case where service was made upon a mere clerk
of the corporation (G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 158 SCRA 466, 469; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals,
170 SCRA 800, 809-810).
2. It was, likewise, held that service upon the
administrator of the corporate property and recognized as
such by the workers therein is a substantial compliance of the
rule (Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 279 SCRA 312,322).
3. Service of summons upon an operations manager
was held valid (R. Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
241 SCRA 77, 83). Service of summons on a bookkeeper was
also upheld (Pabon v. NLRC, 296 SCRA 7, 14).
Other previous rulings allowed service through a
secretary of the President (Vlason Enterprises Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, 310 SCRA 26, 55-56), or the cashier (Talsan v.
Baliwag Transit, Inc., 310 SCRA 156, 163-164).
430 CNIL PROCEDURE
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4. The case of Millennium Industrial Corporation v.
Tan, 326 SCRA 563, 569-571, although promulgated after the
effectivity of the amendments to the Rules, was decided upon
facts occurring before the effectivity of the 1997 amendments,
and, hence, the ruling therein was guided by the rule of
substantial compliance. In this case, service of summons upon
a "draftsman" was upheld because the defendant corporation
actually received the summons from the employee served.
The much later case of Aboitiz International Forwarders,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 488 SCRA 492, 507-509, which upheld
service of summons upon a customer service representative of
defendant corporation and deemed an "agent" for purposes of
summons, was decided in accordance with facts that transpired
prior to the amendments which took effect on July 1, 1997.
Hence, the ruling in this case did not apply the strict new
rule on summons under Sec. 11 of Rule 14 and was decided in
accordance with the old rule on the matter.
5. The policy of liberal interpretation of the old rule
(then Sec. 13 of Rule 14) was largely due to the presence of
the word "agent" in the provision as one of those upon whom
summons could be served. This term was broad enough to
allow the application of the rule on substantial compliance.
Service upon an agent, however, is no longer provided for
under the present rules on summons as now embodied in Sec.
11 of Rule 14.
6. Finally in 1999, came the first case which interpreted
the new provisions on summons under Sec. 11 of Rule 14.
In E.B. Villarosa & Partner, Ltd. v. Benito, 312 SCRA
65, 73-74, the Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner that
the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served
is "restricted, limited, and exclusive" following the rule on
statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
and that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended
to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have
easily done so by clear and concise language. It further ruled
that "Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon
an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized." Hence,
CHAPTERV 431
SUMMONS
the Court, in this case, ruled against the validity of service of
summons made on a mere branch manager of the defendant
corporation.
7. Villarosa was invoked and confirmed in the
subsequent case of Mason v. Court of Appeals, 413 SCRA
303, 310-311, when the Court ruled as invalid the service
of summons upon a secretary of the corporate president. In
another case, the Court further emphasized that the argument
of substantial compliance is no longer compelling (Paramount
Insurance Corp. v. A. C. Ordonez Corporation, 561 SCRA 327,
333).
A more recent case reiterates the same principle:
"Substantial compliance cannot be invoked. Service of
summons upon persons other than officers specifically
mentioned in Sec. 11, Rule 14, is void, defective and not binding
to said corporation" (Nation Petroleum Gas, Incorporated v.
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 183370,
August 17, 2015).
8. In an action for damages against a domestic
corporation resulting from a vehicular collision, the summons
was served upon the defendant's cost accountant. The Court
agreed with the defendant that jurisdiction was not acquired
over its person because the rule on service of summons upon
a domestic corporation was not complied with. Explaining
the difference between the old and the new rule, the Court
ratiocinated:
"In the past, the Court upheld service of summons
upon a construction project manager, a corporation's
assistant manager, and ordinary clerk of a corporation,
private secretary of corporate -executives, retained
counsel, and officials who had control over the operations
of the corporation like the assistant general manager
or the corporation's Chief Finance and Administrative
Officer. The Court then considered said persons as
"agent" within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably,
under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent
of the corporation is no longer authorized, The rule now
likewise states "general manager" instead of "manager";
432 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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"corporate secretary'' instead of merely "secretary'';
and "treasure" instead of "cashier." It has now become
restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons
enumerated in the aforementioned provision, following
the rule in statutory construction that the express
mention of one person excludes all others, or expressio
unions est exclusio alterius. Service must, therefore, be
made only on the person expressly listed in the rules. If
the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on
service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear
and concise language" (Green Star Express, Inc. v. Nissin-
Universal Robina Corporation, G.R. No. 181517, July 6,
2015).
Service upon a foreign private juridical entity
1. Service upon a foreign private juridical entity
which has transacted or is doing business in the Philippines,
as defined by law, may be made on (a) its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there
be no such agent, (b) on the government official designated by
law to that effect, or (c) on any of the officers or agents of said
foreign entity within the Philippines (Sec. 14, Rule 14, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
It has been held that when a foreign corporation has
designated a person to receive summons on its behalf pursuant
to the Corporation Code, that designation is exclusive and
service of summons on any other person is inefficacious (H.B.
Zachry Company International v. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA
329,346).
2. A foreign corporation may be allowed to transact
business in the Philippines after it shall have obtained a
license to transact business in the country and a certificate
of authority from the appropriate government agency. It
may, however, be granted a license under the principle of
reciprocity. This means that the country under whose laws
it was formed or organized allows Filipino citizens and
corporations to do business in its own country or state (Sec.
140, Revised Corporation Code of the Philippines). Also, as a
condition precedent to the issuance of the license to transact
CHAPTERV 433
SUMMONS
business in the Philippines, the foreign corporation shall
file with the Securities and Exchange Commission a written
power of attorney designating some person who must be a
resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other
legal processes may be served in all actions or proceedings
against such corporation (See Sec. 145, Corporation Code of
the Philippines).
A foreign corporation with a license to do business in the
Philippines may sue or be sued in the country. If a foreign
corporation transacts business in the Philippines without
the required license, it cannot, however, be permitted to
maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in
any court or agency in the Philippines. Such corporation,
may however, be sued or proceeded against before Philippine
courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action
recognized under Philippines laws (See Sec. 150, Corporation
Code of the Philippines). In other words, a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines without a license, cannot
sue in the Philippines but it can be sued.
Only a foreign corporation transacting business in the
Philippines is required to obtain a license to do business in the
country. A foreign corporation not engaged in business in the
Philippines does not need to secure such license. This should
not, however, be taken to mean that foreign corporations not
engaging in business in the Philippines are not allowed to sue
in the country. Jurisprudence allows such corporation to sue
in the country when it is suing under an isolated transaction
(Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood
Processing Corporation, G.R. No. 152228, September 23, 2005)
or (b) to protect its trade name or goodwill which has been
infringed (See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
91332, July 16, 1993).
An unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines may also bring suit in Philippine courts against
a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and
benefited from said corporation. Such a suit is premised on
the doctrine of estoppel. A party is estopped from challenging
the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged
434 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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the same by entering into a contract with it. This doctrine
of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity applies
to foreign as well as domestic corporations. The application
of this principle prevents a person contracting with a foreign
corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance
with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has
received the benefits of the contract (See Agilent Technologies
Singapore [PTEJ Ltd. v. Integrated Silicon Technology
Philippines Corporation, G.R. No. 154618, April 2004).
Foreign private juridical entities not registered in the
Philippines or have no resident agents
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in
the Philippines, or has no resident agent but has transacted
or is doing business in it, as defined by law, such service may,
with leave of court, be effected outside of the Philippines
through any of the following means:
(a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate
court in the foreign country with the assistance of the
Department of Foreign Affairs;
(b) By publication once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country where the defendant may be found
and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by
registered mail at the last known address of th~ defendant;
(c) By facsimile;
(d) By electronic means with the prescribed proof of
service; or
(e) By such other means as the court, in its discretion,
may direct (Sec. 14, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Service upon an unincorporated government agency
Jurisprudence instructs that when a suit is directed
against an unincorporated government agency, which, because
it is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its
CHAPTERV 435
SUMMONS
own, the suit is against the agency's principal, i.e., the State.
"It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the
Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be
made on the Solicitor General." Thus, where the complaint for
specific performance with damages was filed against DPWH
Region III which is a mere agent of the Republic, the summons
in this case should have been served upon the OSG (Republic
of the Philippines v. Domingo, 657 SCRA 621, 636).
Duty of counsel on record
Where the summons is improperly served and a lawyer
makes a special appearance on behalf of the defendant to,
among others, question the validity of service of summons, the
counsel shall be deputized by the court to serve summons on
his or her client (Sec. 13, Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). There is hierarchy in the duties
of counsel, before a counsel's duty to the client, there is
a duty to the court and above the latter is the duty to the
society. As officers of the court, a counsel has to help in the
administration of justice. The inclusion of this new provision
is only fair and logical. If you are already present in court,
it becomes unnecessary to unduly delay the case because of
mere technicality.
A. Service in person on defendant
(formerly personal service of summons)
1. Service in person on defendant is embodied in Sec. 5
of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC which provides:
SEC. 5. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person and informing the
defendant that he or she is being served, or, if he or she
refuses to receive and sign for it, by leaving the summons
within the view and in the presence of the defendant. Bar
2013
436 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Note that, under the present rule, Sec. 5 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC refers to
the mode of service as "Service in person on defendant," not
"personal service." The latter is a mode by which pleadings,
motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers are
served under Sec. 6 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC. In short, 'personal service'
is primarily a concept actually found in Rule 13 and not in
Rule 14 as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC. The terms are
often inaccurately used interchangeably because the mode of
service in Sec. 5 of Rule 14 used to be referred to in Sec. 7 of
Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules as 'personal service of summons.'
The plaintiff does not have a free choice on the mode
of service of summons. Jurisprudence considers service in
person as "the preferred mode of service of summons." Service
of summons other than service in person may be used only
as prescribed and under the circumstances authorized by the
Rules (See Borlongan v. Banco De Oro [formerly Equitable
PCI Bank, G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017).
Thus, it was held that Secs. 6 and 7 (now Secs. 5 and 6 under
the 2019 Amendments of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of
Rule 14 cannot be construed to apply simultaneously and do
not provide for alternative modes of service of summons which
can be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to the
parties. Service of summons in the person of the defendant is
generally preferred over substituted service (Nation Petroleum
Gas, Incorporated v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation,
G.R. No. 183370, August 17, 2015). It is only when summons
cannot be served personally within a reasonable period
of time that substituted service may be resorted to (Chu v.
Mach Asia Trading Corporation, 694 SCRA 302, 308, April 1,
2013).
The impossibility of a prompt service in person must be
shown by stating that efforts have failed before availing of
other modes of service. The rules on service of summons must
be followed "strictly, faithfully and fully'' since other modes
are considered in derogation of the usual method of service
CHAPTERV 437
SUMMONS
(See Borlongan v. Banco De Oro [formerly Equitable PCI
Bank, G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017).
2. Service in person is effected by handing a copy of
the summons to the defendant in person. If he refuses to
receive and sign for it, the remedy of the server is to leave the
summons within the view and in the presence of the defendant
(Sec. 5, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
3. If the defendant refuses the service, the sheriff is
not supposed to resort to substituted service immediately. The
sheriff or the appropriate officer is required by the Rules to
"tender" the summons to the defendant. Tender of summons is
not a separate mode of service. It is a part of service in person
and applies when the defendant refuses to receive and sign for
the summons. Tender of service of summons is defined in the
Sheriffs Handbook as leaving the summons in the view and
presence of the defendant if the latter refuses to receive. Can
the sheriff leave the summons in the mailbox? No, it must be
within the view and in the presence of the defendant.
The prevailing rule now is for the sheriff to hand a copy
of the complaint and the summons to the defendant AND
likewise inform the latter that he or she is being served. Not
everyone knows the implication of the summons being served
to them.
4. Only if service in person cannot be made promptly
can the process server resort to substituted service. The
failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the
foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the
service of summons ineffective (Jose v. Boyon, 414 SCRA 216,
222; Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 278, 283). Bar
2013
For instance, in the above-cited case of Miranda v.
Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 278, the Court found that even
the briefest perusal of the sheriffs return clearly showed no
reason why personal service could not be made. The Court
reiterated the rule that the impossibility of prompt, personal
438 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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service should be shown by stating in the proof of service that
efforts were made to find the defendant personally and that
said efforts failed; hence, the resort to substituted service.
Since no such explanation was made, there was a failure to
faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of
substituted service. This rendered said service ineffective.
The failure to find the defendants in their residence on the
first and only attempt to effect service in person does not justify
the availment of substituted service. There was no attempt
by the sheriff to faithfully comply with the requirements of
service in person on the defendant. Worse, substituted service
was made through a girl who was only 11 to 12 years old (Laus
v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 688). Bar 2017
B. Substituted service of summons
(Bar 2004; 2006; 2013; 2016; 2017; 2018)
1. The general rule in this jurisdiction is that summons
must be served on the defendant in person. Only for justifiable
reasons may other modes of serving summons be resorted
to (See Express Padala [Italia] S.P.A. v. Ocampo, G.R. No.
202505, September 6, 2017). As earlier mentioned, substituted
service is not the preferred mode of service of summons. Resort
to substituted service is permitted only when the summons
cannot be promptly served on the defendant in person and
after stringent formal and substantive requirements have been
complied with (Nation Petroleum Gas, Incorporated v. Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 183370, August
17, 2015; Borlongan v. Banco De Oro [formerly Equitable PCI
Bank], G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017).
2. As previously discussed, the sheriffs return must
show the details of the efforts exerted to personally serve
summons upon the defendant before substituted service
is availed of. The return must contain a narration of the
circumstances showing efforts to personally serve summons
to the defendant and the impossibility of personal service of
summons (See De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014). Hence, a return which
i
CHAPTERV 439
SUMMONS
merely states the alleged whereabouts of the defendants,
without indicating that such information was verified and
without specifying the efforts exerted to serve the summons,
is not enough for compliance. So is a mere general statement
that such efforts were made (Jose v. Boyan, 414 SCRA 216,
223).
3. The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court (Sec.
6, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC) provides that substituted service may be availed of if, "for
justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served personally
after at least three (3) attempts on two (2) different dates.
4. A more recent decision applied the Manotoc case in
an action for annulment of a judgment of the trial court. Here,
the petitioner learned that her marriage to the respondent
was declared void ab initio. The decision stated that summons
was served on petitioner on a certain date in 2002 and that she
failed to file her responsive pleading within the reglementary
period.
Knowing that the facts stated in the decision were
untrue, and that the address given by respondent was not her
address, she filed a petition for annulment of judgment under
Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court. She claimed that she was never
notified of the case filed against her. She further argued that
there was an invalid substituted service of summons because
the process server's return only contained a general statement
that substituted service was resorted to "after several futile
attempts to serve the same personally," without stating the
dates and reasons of the failed attempts.
Finding that the trial court r~ndered judgment without
jurisdiction over the person of the .petitioner, the judgment
was declared null and void, when the petition reached the
Supreme Court. Reiterating its previous pronouncements in
the landmark case of Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court
ruled, once again, that for substituted service of summons
to be available, the impossibility of service in person must
be shown. There must be several attempts by the sheriff to
personally serve the summons within a reasonable period
 :r
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440 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at
least three tries, preferably on at least two different dates.
In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were
unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can
be confirmed or accepted.
After the impossibility of service in person has been
shown, the sheriff must describe in the return of summons
the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and
the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in
detail in the return. The date and time of the attempts on
personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant,
the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house
of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve
the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to
justify substituted service.
The Court added that the sheriff must also determine
if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of
defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship
with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends
the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty
to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify
the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters
must be clearly and specifically described in the return of
summons. The Court found that the server's return utterly
lacked sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the
process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner.
The server simply made a general statement that summons
was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same
personally (Ong v. Co, G.R. No. 206653, February 25, 2015;
See also Borlongan v. Banco De Oro [formerly Equitable PCI
Bank], G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017; for additional readings,
see Frias v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018).
5. By way of summary, the sheriff should perform the
following acts before he can effect a valid service of summons
other than by service in person on the defendant: (a) Establish
CHAPTERV 441
SUMMONS
the impossibility of personal service; and (b) Describe in the
return of summons the facts and circumstances surrounding
his attempts to effect service in person. A single attempt
to serve the defendant in person does not justifying the
availment of another mode of service (See Borlongan v. Banco
de Oro, G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017); (c) After the service,
the sheriff must state that the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion, or who is in charge of
the office or regular place of business of the defendant. All the
requisites must be complied with because, as has always been
explained by the Court, substituted service is in derogation of
the usual method of service and personal service of summons
is preferred over substituted service. Hence, parties have no
unbridled right to resort to substituted service (Carson Realty
& Management Corporation v. Red Robbin Security Agency,
G.R. No. 225035, February 8, 2017).
How substituted service is made
1. On the assumption that substituted service is now
justified, how then may summons be served by substituted
service? The answer is supplied by Sec. 6 of Rule 14. The rule
provides the server with options, to wit:
(a) By leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence to a person at least eighteen (18)
years of age and of sufficient discretion then residing
therein;
(b) By leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. A competent person
includes, but is not limited to, one who customarily
receives correspondences for the defendant;
(c) By leaving copies of the summons, if refused
entry upon making his or her authority and purpose
known, with any of the officers of the homeowners'
association or condominium corporation, or its chief
security officer in charge of the community or the building
where the defendant may be found; and
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442 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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(d) By sending an electronic mail to the defendant's
electronic mail address, if allowed by the court.
The rule does not, however, allow leaving the summons
with anyone else other than those mentioned therein. Thus,
if the summons is left at the defendant's residence, the
summons must be served by leaving the same with a person of
at least eighteen (18) years of age and of sufficient discretion
then residing therein. If served in the defendant's office or
regular place of business, the summons must be left with
some competent person in charge thereof. A competent person
includes, but is not limited to, one who customarily receives
correspondences for the defendant.
2. A person of at least eighteen (18) years of age and of
sufficient discretion is one who is considered to have enough
discernment to understand the importance of summons. The
Manotoc case explains:
"Discretion is defined as the ability to make
decisions which represent a responsible choice and
for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or
wise may be presupposed. Thus, to be of sufficient age
and discretion, such person must know how to read
and understand English to comprehend the import of
the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the
summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest
possible time for the person to take appropriate action.
Thus, the person must have a "relation of confidence" to
the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or
at least be notified of the receipt of summons. The sheriff
must therefore, determine if the person found in the
alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age,
what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is,
and whether said person comprehends the significance of
the receipt of the summons and his duty to deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt
of summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons" (Manotoc u. Court
of Appeals, 499 SCRA 21, 35-36).
1-.....__
CHAPTERV 443
SUMMONS
3. A competent person in charge of the office or regular
place of business must be one managing the office or business
of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such
individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance,
and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons. Again, the details must be contained in the Return
(Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, ibid.).
It is not necessary that the person in charge of the
defendant's regular place of business be specifically authorized
to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be
in charge (Guanzon v. Arradaza, 510 SCRA 309, 318, citing
Gochanco v. CFI of Negros Occidental, 157 SCRA 40).
A competent person includes, but is not limited to, one
who customarily receives correspondences for the defendant
(Sec. 6[b], Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
4. It must be noted too that substituted service
presupposes that the place where the summons is served is the
defendant's current address or office/regular place of business.
Thus, where the defendant neither resides nor holds office
in the address stated in the summons, substituted service
cannot be resorted to. The last known address cannot be the
place of service of summons because it is not the address of
the defendant (See Express Padala [Italia] S.P.A. v. Ocampo,
G.R. No. 202505, September 6, 2017).
Where the defendant's residence or place of business is
unknown and cannot be ascertained with diligent inquiry,
substituted service is not the appropriate mode of service.
The correct mode of service is summons by publication under
Sec. 16 of Rule 14, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC, a
mode which applies "in any action." But if it is known that
he is already a permanent resident of another country and
is no longer found in the Philippines, substituted service will
also no longer apply since he has neither a residence or office/
regular place of business in the country. Neither will Sec. 16 of
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Rule 14 apply since his identity and whereabouts are known.
The plaintiff will have to check on whether or not Sec. 17 of
Rule 14 will apply. This would necessitate determining the
nature of the action. If the action is any of those enumerated
in Sec. 17, then said provision may be availed of.
Effect if defendant does not actually receive the summons
Where the substituted service has been validly served, its
validity is not affected by the defendant's failure to actually
receive the summons from the person with whom the summons
had been left. It is immaterial that the defendant does not in
fact receive actual notice. The rule does not require the sheriff
or any authorized server to verify that the summons left in
the defendant's residence or office was actually delivered to
the defendant (Montalban v. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070, 1079).
Montalban v. Maximo is emphatic:
"It is immaterial then that defendant does not in
fact receive actual notice. This will not affect the validity
of the service. Accordingly, the defendant may be charged
by a judgment in personam as a result oflegal proceedings
upon a method of service which is not personal, "which in
fact may not become actual notice to him," and which may
be accomplished in his lawful absence from the country.
For the rules do not require that papers be served on
defendant personally or a showing that the papers were
delivered to defendant by the person with whom they
were left."
When defendant prevents service of summons
What if diligent efforts were undertaken by the sheriff
to serve summons upon the defendant but he was prevented
from effecting such service by the defendant himself? This
question was addressed in Robinson v. Miralles, 510 SCRA
678. Bar 2016
Here, the plaintiff filed a complaint for a sum of money
against the defendant. Summons was served upon the
defendant at her given address, but per return of service of the
CHAPTERV 445
SUMMONS
sheriff, it was learned that the defendant no longer resided at
such address. Later, the trial court issued an alias summons
to be served at the defendant's new address. Again, the
summons could not be served on the defendant. The Sheriff
explained:
"The Security Guard assigned at the gate of Alabang
Hills refused to let me go inside the subdivision so that I
could effect the service of the summons to the defendant
in this case. The security guard alleged that the defendant
had given them instructions not to let anybody proceed
to her house if she is not around. I explained to the
Security Guard that I am a sheriff serving the summons
to the defendant, and if the defendant is not around,
summons can be received by any person of suitable age
and discretion living in the same house. Despite of all
the explanation, the security guard by the name of A.H.
Geroche still refused to let me go inside the subdivision
and served (sic) the summons to the defendant. The same
thing happened when I attempted to serve the summons
previously.
"Therefore, the summons was served by leaving a
copy thereof together with the copy of the complaint to the
security guard by the name of A.H. Geroche, who refused
to affix his signature on the original copy thereof, so he
will be the one to give the same to the defendant."
Eventually, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare
the defendant in default for her failure to file an answer
seasonably despite service of summons. The trial court granted
the plaintiffs motion declaring the defendant in default and
allowing the plaintiff to present her evidence ex parte. A
judgment by default was rendered and upon the plaintiffs
motion, the trial court issued a writ 0f execution.
The defendant filed with the trial court a petition for relief
from the judgment by default. She claimed that summons
was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings are
void. The defendant contended that the service of summons
upon the subdivision security guard is not in compliance with
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Sec. 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her; neither is he
staying at her residence. Moreover, he is not duly authorized
to receive summons for the residents of the village. Hence, the
substituted service of summons is not valid and that the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
The trial court issued a resolution denying the petition
for relief. The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied by the trial court. ' property (recovery of ownership); to impose responsibility or
Declared the Supreme Court:
"We have ruled that the statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully,
and fully and any substituted service other than that
authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective (Citing
Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank v. King, G.R. No.
78252, April 12, 1989, 172 SCRA 60). However, we frown
upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the
spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules. that
governs.
XXX
"Considering her strict instruction to the security
guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree
with the trial court that summons has been properly served
upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over
her" (Underscoring supplied)
The Court held, that under the facts, summons was,
therefore, properly served (Robinson v. Miralles, 510 SCRA
678, 683-684).
This situation is now covered under Sec. 6, Rule 14, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC. If confronted with such
the sheriff may serve the summons by leaving copies of th;
same, if refused entry upon making his or her authority and
purpose known, with any of the officers of the homeowners'
associa_tion or condominium corporation, or its chief security
officer m charge of the community or the building where the
defendant may be found.
CHAPTERV 447
SUMMONS
C. Summons by publication
1. As a general proposition, summons by publication
is not available as a means of acquiring jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant in an action in personam. Action in
personam affects personal rights and obligations against a
person, though it may involve his right to ownership of real
liability directly on a person (specific performance, pecuniary
actions).
2. Against a resident, the recognized mode of service
is service in person on the defendant under Sec. 5 of Rule
14, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC. In a case where
the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time,
substituted service will apply following Sec. 6, Rule 14, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, Rules of Court, but not
summons by publication.
3. Summons by publication against a resident in
an action in personam is, however, permissible under the
conditions set forth in the following rules:
a. Sec. 16 of Rule 14, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC (where the identity or whereabouts of the
defendant are unknown);
b. Sec. 18 of Rule 14 (when the defendant is a
resident temporarily out of the, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC Philippines).
Both provisions apply to "any action" which necessarily
includes an action in personam.
4. Against a nonresident, in an action in personam,
jurisdiction is acquired over the defendant by service upon his
person while he is within the Philippines. It is a long-standing
rule that when the defendant is a nonresident, personal
service of summons in the state is essential to the acquisition
of jurisdiction over his person (Velayo-Fong v. Velayo, 510
SCRA 320, 331-332; Banco De Brasil v. Court of Appeals, 333
 448 CML PROCEDURE
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SCRA 545, 557). This is, in fact, the only way of acquiring
jurisdiction over his person if he does not voluntarily appear
in the action.
Summons by publication against a non-resident in an
action in personam is not a proper mode of service. Possible
exception: When the defendant is a foreign private juridical
entity not registered or with no resident agent in the
Philippines (Sec. 14, Rule 14, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC as amended by A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC, March 15, 2011).
Bar 2016
Service upon a defendant whose identity or whereabouts
are unknown
1. Where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or the like, or whenever his or her whereabouts are
unknown and canp.ot be ascertained despite a diligent inquiry,
within 90 calendar days from the commencement of the action,
service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him or her by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such
places and for such time as the court may order (Sec. 16, Rule
14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
The rule in Sec. 14 of Rule 14 (now Sec. 16 of Rule 14)
authorizes summons by publication in any action and the
rule obviously does not distinguish whether the action is
in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. The tenor of the rule
authorizes summons by publication whatever the action may
be as long as the identity of the defendant is unknown or his
whereabouts are unknown (See Santos u. PNOC Exploration
Corporation, 566 SCRA 272).
2. Remember, however, that it is not correct to use
summons by publication outright. There is a hierarchy of
rules in the service of summons. First, diligent efforts to
serve the defendant in person must be resorted to. Second,
when summons cannot be served in person on the defendant
within a reasonable period of time, then substituted service
of summons may be availed of. Third, if the defendant's
__j..____
CHAPTERV 449
SUMMONS
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained with
diligent inquiry, summons by publication may now be availed
of (See Borlongan u. Banco de Oro, G.R. No. 217617, April 5,
2017).
3. Under a previous ruling, if the defendant cannot
be served with summons, the remedy is not to dismiss the
case, but to hold the case in the archives (Citizens Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. u. Melencio-Herrera, 38 SCRA 369, 371-
372).
Archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to
temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate
action is expected, but where no grounds exist for their
outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is
kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains
in which action thereon can be taken (Balao u. Ermita, G.R.
No. 186050, June 21, 2016 and August 1, 2017). A case may
be archived, not only when a party cannot be served with
summons, but also for other valid causes as when a party or
a witness cannot appear in court because of threats to his life
(For further readings, see also Sec. 20, The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo).
Service upon a resident temporarily out of the Philippines
1. Under Sec. 18 of Rule 14, as amended by AM.
No. 19-10-20-SC, "When any action is commenced against a
defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but
who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be
also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding
section" (Underscoring supplied).
2. The 'preceding section' referred to in Sec. 18 is
necessarily Sec. 17 on extraterritorial service of summons.
Significantly, one of the modes of service of summons under Sec.
15 is ''by publication in a newspaper of general circulation ... "
Summons by publication, therefore, applies to a resident of
the Philippines who is temporarily out of the country.
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3. Pursuant to Sec. 18 of Rule 14, as amended by AM.
No. 19-10-20-SC service of summons upon a resident of the
Philippines who is temporarily out of the country may, by
leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines, as "under
the preceding section (under the rules on extraterritorial
service in Sec. 17 of Rule 14, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-
20-SC). This suggests that, from the phraseology of the rule,
the service of summons may possibly be any of the following
modes, unless ruled otherwise:
(a) by personal service (service in person) as in Sec.
6 of Rule 14;
(b) as provided for in international conventions to
which the Philippines is a party;
(c) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation together with a registered mailing of a copy of
the summons and the order of the court to the last known
address of the defendant; or
(d) by any manner the court may deem sufficient
(Sec. 18, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
Like in the case of an unknown defendant or one whose
whereabouts are unknown, the rule affecting residents who
are temporarily out of the Philippines applies in any action.
4. Let it be noticed that summons by publication may
be effected against the defendant because publication is one of
the modes of service of summons under Sec. 17 of Rule 14, as
amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC. However, it is respectfully
submitted that this rule authorizing summons by publication
appears superfluous and unnecessary. Even without such
provision, a resident defendant temporarily outside of the
Philippines may still be served through substituted service
under Sec. 7 of Rule 14, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC.
It was thus, ruled that in a suit in personam against
a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent from the
country, the defendant may be served by substituted service
because a man temporarily out of the country leaves a definite
I
CHAPTERV 451
SUMMONS
place of residence or dwelling where he is bound to return. He
also leaves his affairs to someone who protects his interests
and communicates with him on matters affecting his affairs
or business (Montalban v. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070, 1078-
1079; Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 92, 99-100).
Montalban explained:
"A man temporarily absent from this country leaves
a definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, a
local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him
may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where
one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in
the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act
in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect
his interests; and to communicate with him from time to
time any incident of importance that may affect him or his
business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave
at his home or with his business associates information as
to where he may be contacted in the event a question that
affects him crops up" (For additional readings, see also
PCIB v. Alejandro, 533 SCRA 738, 754).
Substituted service to be effective against a resident
temporarily out of the Philippines assumes that the absence
of the defendant is only temporary and that he has a residence
or office or regular place of business in the Philippines. Thus,
where the defendant is already a permanent resident of
another country and is no longer found in the Philippines,
he is no longer a resident defendant temporarily out of the
Philippines. Thus, substituted service of summons upon him
is ineffective. Sec. 17 of Rule 14, as amended by AM. No. 19-
10-20-SC, may apply where the case against him is one in rem
or quasi in rem.
Extraterritorial service of summons
1. Extraterritorial service of summons under Sec. 17 of
Rule 14, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC, applies when
the following requisites concur:
(a) the defendant is a nonresident;
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(b) he is not found in the Philippines; and
(c) the action against him is either in rem or quasi
in rem (Jose v. Boyan, 414 SCRA 216, 224).
2. The phraseology of the rule indicates that a
fundamental concept to be remembered in extraterritorial
service of summons is that it does not apply to a defendant
who is a resident of the Philippines. It does not also apply to
an action in personam (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
A possible exception to this rule is provided for under
Sec. 18 of Rule 14, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC
(Residents temporarily out of the Philippines) where service
may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines as
under the preceding section. The preceding section is Sec. 17
of Rule 14. Note also that Sec. 18 of Rule 14, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, refers to "any action," hence, either an
action in rem, quasi in rem or in personam.
Actions involved in extraterritorial service of summons
1. The specific actions, which are either in rem or quasi
in rem, that will justify the application of extraterritorial
service of summons in actions involving a nonresident are:
(a) actions that affect the personal status of the
plaintiff;
(b) actions which relate to, or the subject matter
of which is property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
(c) actions in which the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from an
interest in property located in the Philippines; and
(d) when the defendant's property has been
attached in the Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Clearly, from the foregoing, extraterritorial service
of summons applies only where the action is in rem, an
i
l
CHAPTERV 453
SUMMONS
action against the thing itself instead of against the person,
or in an action quasi in rem, where an individual is named
as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject
his interest therein to the obligation or loan burdening the
property. This is so inasmuch as, in in rem and quasi in rem
actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res (Banco De Brasil v.
Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 545, 557).
3. Jurisdiction over the person or in personam, which
is the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to
subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and
other rulings rendered in the action, or is an element of due
process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal,
except in actions in rem or quasi in rem.
Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or
quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction
over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the
res that is the subject matter of the action. The purpose of
summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the defendant, but mainly to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of due process (Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759,
June 5, 2013).
4. The Supreme Court, in a later case, explains the
rule on service of summons against non-residents, thus:
"x x x Thus, extraterritorial service of summons
applies only where the action is in rem, that is, an action
against the thing itself instead of against the person, or in
an action quasi in rem, where an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject
his interest therein to the obligation or loan burdening
the property. The rationale for this is that in in rem and
quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction
over the res.
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Where the action is in personam, that is, one
brought against a person on the basis of her personal
liability, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. When the defendant is a non-resident, personal
service of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. Summons on
the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof
to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it,
by tendering it to him. This cannot be done, however, if
the defendant is not physically present in the country,
and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his
person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the
case against him" (Velayo-Fong v. Spouses Velayo, 510
SCRA 320, 331-332; Banco De Brasil v. Court of Appeals,
333 SCRA 545, 557).
5. If the action is in personam, extraterritorial service
of summons will not be available. There is no extraterritorial
service of summons in an action in personam. Hence,
extraterritorial service upon a nonresident in an action for
injunction, which is in personam, is not proper (Kawasaki
Port Service Corporation v. Amores, 199 SCRA 230, 237;
Banco De Brasil v. Court of Appeals, ibid.). Where the action
is in personam, one brought against a person on the basis
of his personal liability, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide a
case. However, when the defendant is a nonresident, personal
service of summons in the state is essential to the acquisition
of jurisdiction over him (Banco De Brasil v. Court of Appeals,
ibid.). Note: See amendment to Sec. 12 of Rule 14, authorizing
summons by publication, facsimile, and other electronic means
on defendants which are foreign private juridical entities.
6. An action for injunction is a personal action, as well
as an action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in
rem. As a personal action, personal or substituted service
of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial service,
is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. In an action
for injunction, the extraterritorial service of summons and
complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject
L
CHAPTERV 455
SUMMONS
them to the processes of the regional trial courts which are
powerless to reach them outside the region over which they
exercise their authority (Kawasaki Port Service Corporation
v. Amores, supra). Bar 2009
Modes of extraterritorial service (Bar 2008; 2013)
1. When the conditions for the applicability of
extraterritorial service of summons are complied with, the
following are the alternative modes of extraterritorial service,
all of which require a prior leave of court:
(a) By personal service as provided for in Sec. 6 of
Rule 14, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC, governing
'service in person on defendant';
(b) or as provided for in international conventions
to which the Philippines is a party;
(c) By publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant; or
(d) In any manner the court may deem sufficient
(Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
2. The last known address of the defendant is the actual
address. In an action for declaration of nullity for marriage,
for example, if the respondent spouse had already actually
left or abandoned the conjugal home, and is now a resident
of another country, the petitioner cannot, in good faith, claim
that the conjugal home is still the last known address of the
respondent (Yu v. Yu, G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016).
The personal service (now service in person on defendant),
using the procedure in Sec. 6 of Rule 14, will not have the
effect of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the non-
resident defendant even if the summons and the copy of the
complaint are personally received by him in the country where
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he may be found and served. The service, in this case, is made
in compliance with the requirements of due process, not for
the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.
3. There is a settled rule that a nonresident defendant
who refuses to come to the country voluntarily remains
beyond the personal processes of the court which, therefore,
cannot acquire jurisdiction over him (Banco Espanol-Filipino
v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 930; Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186,
189).
In the language of Banco Espanol-Filipino:
"Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the
voluntary submission of the defendant or by the personal
service of process upon him within the territory where
the process is valid. If however, the defendant is a non-
resident and, remaining beyond the range of the personal
process of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the
court never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all."
(Banco Espanol-Filipino, supra, 930).
The equally early case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra at 189,
echoes the above rule, thus:
"When the defendant is a non-resident and refuses
to appear voluntary, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction
over his person even if the summons be served by
publication, for he is beyond the reach of judicial process.
No tribunal established by one State can extend its
process beyond its territory so as to subject to its decisions
either persons or property located in another State."
Be reminded that, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
pre-requisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nevertheless,
summons must be served upon the defendant, not for the
purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, but merely for satisfying the due process
CHAPTERV 457
SUMMONS
requirement (Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 296
SCRA 539, 554). Compliance with due process is actually the
underlying purpose of all modes of extraterritorial service.
Application of principles
Example No. 1: An American tourist, while in the
Philippines, incurred hotel bills of P2 million. Without paying
his bills, he surreptitiously left the country. The hotel filed an
action for a sum of money and, with leave of court, effected
summons by publication. The defendant made no appearance
in any form and judgment by default was rendered against
him. Is he bound by the judgment?
Answer: He is not bound by the judgment because the
same was rendered by the court without jurisdiction over his
person. The summons by publication did not enable the court
to acquire jurisdiction over him. Here, the action is one in
personam.
Example No. 2: Mr.Dis a balikbayan, a former Filipino,
and a naturalized Canadian citizen. He visited the country
to attend the funeral of his father from whom he inherited a
parcel ofland. He obtained a loan while in the Philippines and
executed a real estate mortgage on his inherited land. He left
without paying the debt. An action to foreclose the mortgage
was filed. How may the court obtain jurisdiction over the
person of Mr. X?
Answer: There is no way. He is already out of the country.
However, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
not necessary and, hence, irrelevant under the facts of the
case because the action for foreclosure is not an action in
personam. A foreclosure suit is a quasi in rem action. In this
kind of action, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is not required. Summons by publication or other modes of
extraterritorial service under Sec. 17 of Rule 14 is enough to
acquire jurisdiction over the res. May the court, therefore,
validly render a judgment in the foreclosure proceedings? The
court can; It has jurisdiction over the res as long as summons
458 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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by any of the means allowed under the rules on extraterritorial
service is effected. If however, upon learning of the suit he
appears in the action, the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person. The suit, in effect, becomes one in personam
Example No. 3: Mexicano, a tourist in the Philippines,
by his employment of force and intimidation, contracted a
marriage with Filipina, a hotel receptionist. When Mexicano
left for Mexico to visit his parents, Filipina filed an action
for annulment of the marriage with damages of P3 million.
With leave of court, extraterritorial service of summons by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation was effected.
A copy of the summons and order of the court were also sent
by registered mail to the last known address of Mexicano. The
manner of summons was determined by the court to be the
most sufficient under the circumstances. Mexicano did not
appear in the action. The court later decreed the annulment
of the marriage and awarded damages after all procedural
and substantive requirements were complied with. Was the
judgment validly rendered?
Answer: The judgment was validly rendered in so far as
the decree of annulment is concerned. The action is one in rem
since it affects the personal status of the plaintiff. In this kind
of action, jurisdiction over the res is sufficient. Jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not essential in this case
so, whether or not there was jurisdiction over the person of
Mexicano, this fact did not affect the authority of the court to
decide on the issue of annulment.
However, the judgment of the court awarding damages
to Filipina is void as to the defendant. By its nature, a claim
for damages is in personam. The court is without jurisdiction
to award damages unless it has first acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Mexicano. The only way by which this type
of jurisdiction may be acquired in the case at bar is either
through service in person upon Mexicano in the Philippines
or by his voluntary appearance in the action. Neither of these
occurred in the case under consideration.
CHAPTERV 459
SUMMONS
Suits against non-resident defendants who have properties
in the Philippines but are outside of the country
1. There are situations where a non-resident defendant
has properties in the Philippines probably because he used to
be either a citizen or a resident of the country. If the suit is
in personam, as when the suit is for a sum of money, and the
non-resident defendant is no longer found in the Philippines,
summons by publication and other modes provided for in Sec.
17 of Rule 14, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC would be
ineffective to acquire jurisdiction over his person. The modes
of summons under the said provision of the Rules would be
available only in an action in rem or quasi in rem.
As previously discussed, being an action in personam, the
remedy is to file the suit and, at the same time, avail of the
provisional remedy of attachment. Under Sec. l(f) of Rule 57,
one ground upon which the writ of preliminary attachment
may issue is in "an action against a party who does not reside
and is not found in the Philippines."
Following established principles, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant would no longer be required when
the court issues a writ of preliminary attachment against
the defendant's properties and such properties are actually
attached pursuant to the writ. The suit has assumed the
character of an action quasi in rem. In this type of action,
jurisdiction over the res is what is required for the court to
validly try the case. After availing of extraterritorial service of
summons, the suit can then proceed despite the absence of the
defendant because, in this case, the property of the defendant
would now be the object of judicial power.
As held by the Court:
"In case the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines, ... the remedy of the plaintiff, in
order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to
convert the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem
by attaching the property of the defendant ... The service
of summons in this case (which may be by publication
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coupled with the sending by registered mail of the copy
of the summons and the court order to the last known
address of the defendant), is no longer for the purpose
of acquiring jurisdiction but for the compliance with the
requirements of due process" (Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Alejandro, 533 SCRA 738, 752).
2. Attachment is not always needed where the
defendant, in an action in personam, is not found in the
Philippines. Example: Where the defendant is a resident, who
is temporarily out of the Philippines, attachment of his/her
property in an action in personam is not necessary in order for
the court to acquire jurisdiction to hear the case because the
defendant may be served by substituted service. Substituted
service of summons (under the present Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) is the
normal mode of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction
on the court over the person of residents temporarily out
of the Philippines. Meaning, service of summons may be
effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
(a) residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
residing therein, or (b) office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof. Hence, the court
may acquire jurisdiction over an action in personam by mere
substituted service without need of attaching the property of
the defendant (See Montalban v. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070; For
further readings, see Philippine Commercial International
Bank v. Alejandro, 533 SCRA 738, 752-754).
-oOo-
Chapter VI
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE
OF SUMMONS AND DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
Preliminary statements
Recall that the summons served upon the defendant
directs him to answer within the time fixed in the Rules. It is
coupled with a notice that, unless the defendant so answers,
the plaintiff will take judgment by default and may be
granted the relief applied for (Sec. 2, Rule 14, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
The filing of a complaint is not, in all cases, followed by
the filing of an answer (Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R.
No. 208426, September 20, 2017). There are options available
to the defendant other than the filing of an answer to the
complaint.
For instance, if there are allegations or claims in the
complaint that are not spelled out with sufficient clarity or
particularity, the preparation of a reasonably intelligent
responsive pleading is not possible. The more viable option of
the defendant in this case is not to serve and file an answer
but to file a motion for bill of particulars. Under Sec. 1 of
Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, a party may move for a definite
statement, or for a bill of particulars of "any matter which is
not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity." The
purpose of the motion is to enable the movant "properly to
prepare his responsive pleading."
Even if the complaint's averments are clear and definite
enough to allow the filing of an answer, the defendant may
elect not to file an answer. He may, instead, opt to file a motion
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to dismiss the complaint if a ground for the dismissal under
Sec. 1, Rule 9, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC.
Hence, three options are available to the defendant upon
receipt of the complaint, to wit:
(a) Filing of a motion for bill of particulars;
(b) Filing of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res
judicata or prescription; or
(c) Filing of an answer to the complaint.
A. MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS
1. Although, under the Rules, the defendant is required
to answer the complaint within 30 calendar days from service
of summons (Sec. 1, Rule 11, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC), the defendant need not file his
answer to the complaint within the required period if there
are matters in the complaint, which are vague or ambiguous
or not averred with sufficient definiteness. Instead, he may
file a motion for bill of particulars (Rule 12, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. It must be made clear that a motion for bill of
particulars is not directed only to a complaint. It is a motion
that may be addressed to any pleading which, in the perception
of the movant, contains matters which are not alleged with
sufficient definiteness or particularity.
When to file the motion
A motion for bill of particulars is to be filed before
responding to a pleading (Sec. 1, Rule 12, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The period to file the
motion refers to the period for filing the responsive pleading
in Rule 11. Thus, where the motion for bill of particulars is
directed to a complaint, the motion should be generally filed
within 30 calendar days after service of summons, as provided
under Sec. 1 of Rule 11, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC.
L
CHAPTER VI 463
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
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If the motion is directed to a counterclaim or cross-claim, then
the same must be filed within 20 calendar days from service of
the counterclaim or cross-claim which is the period provided
for under Sec. 4 of Rule 11, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC. In case of a reply to which no responsive pleading is
provided for by the Rules, the motion for bill of particulars
must be filed within 10 calendar days from the service of said
reply (Sec. 1, Rule 12, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
Purpose of the motion
1. The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars is to
seek an order from the court directing the pleader to submit
a bill of particulars which avers matters with "sufficient
definiteness or particularity'' to enable the movant to properly
prepare his responsive pleading (Sec. 1, Rule 12, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The motion is
not availed of to enable the movant to prepare for trial or to
discover the evidence of the adverse party. For such purpose,
the appropriate tools are the discovery procedures from Rules
23 to 29 and the mandatory pre-trial under Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court.
2. In less technical terms, a function of a bill of
particulars is to clarify the allegations in the pleading so
an adverse party may be informed with certainty of the
exact character of the cause of action or defense. Without
the clarifications sought by the motion, the movant may be
deprived of the opportunity to submit an intelligent responsive
pleading.
3. It would not be proper for a motion for bill of
particulars to call for the production of the particulars
constituting malice, intent, knowledge or condition of the
mind. Under the Rules (Sec. 5, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) such matters may be
averred generally.
It would not, however, be incorrect to move for a bill
of particulars to require the averment of the particular
circumstances of fraud or mistake. Under the Rules (Sec. 5,
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Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC), such matters must be alleged with particularity. It is
submitted, however, that when the omission of the particulars
constituting fraud results into an absence of one or more
elements of the cause of action involving fraud, such omission
could give rise to a failure to state a cause of action which the
defendant shall raise as an affirmative defense.
4. A motion for bill of particulars to require a pleader to
set forth matters showing the jurisdiction of a court to render
judgment is not proper. The provisions of Sec. 6, Rule 8, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC are clear: In pleading a
judgment or decision, it is sufficient to aver the same without
setting forth matters showing jurisdiction to render it. The
rule applies in pleading a judgment or decision, not only of a
domestic court, but also of a foreign court. It, likewise, applies
to a judgment or decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal, or a
board or officer (Sec. 6, Rule 8, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
5. A motion for bill of particulars filed for the purpose
of requiring the pleader to specify the details leading to the
performance or occurrence of all conditions precedent is not
proper because under Sec. 3 of Rule 8, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC a general averment of the performance or
occurrence of all conditions precedent shall be sufficient.
6. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 540 SCRA 431, 448-
449, the Court ruled that an allegation that the "defendant
acted 'in unlawful concert' with the other defendant in
illegally amassing assets, property and funds in amounts
disproportionate to the latter's income," is a proper subject of
a motion for bill of particulars. Plaintiff is bound to clarify the
specific nature, manner and extent of the alleged collaboration
between the defendants.
Purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in a criminal case
(Bar 2018)
Note that, in a criminal case, the purposes of a motion
for bill of particulars are to enable the movant to (a) properly
CHAPTER VI 465
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
AND DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
plead, and (b) prepare for trial (Sec. 9, Rule 116, Rules of
Court).
Requirements for the motion
Aside from the requirements for a motion as set forth in
Rule 15, the motion shall point out or specify the (a) defects
complained of, (b) paragraphs wherein they are contained, and
(c) details desired (Sec. 1, Rule 12, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Action of the court (Bar 2008; 2010; 2012)
1. Upon receipt of the motion, the clerk of court must
immediately bring the same to the attention of the court (Sec.
2, Rule 12, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
2. The motion having been brought to the attention of
the court, it has three possible options, namely, (a) to deny the
motion outright, (b) to grant the motion outright, or (c) to hold
a hearing on the motion or allow the parties the opportunity to
be heard (Sec. 2, Rule 12, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC). The options available to the court disclose
that a hearing is not mandatory before it denies or grants the
motion, the holding of a hearing being one that is addressed to
judicial discretion.
Compliance with the order
1. If the motion for bill of particulars is granted, in
whole or in part, the court shall order the pleader to submit
a bill of particulars to the pleading ·to which the motion is
directed. The compliance must be effected within 10 calendar
days from notice of the order, unless a different period is fixed
by the court (Sec. 3, Rule 12, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Compliance with the order is not
necessarily within 10 days from notice of the order if the court
fixes a different period for compliance.
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2. In complying with the order, the pleader may file the
bill of particulars or a more definite statement either in (a) a
separate pleading, or (b) in the form of an amended pleading.
In either case, a copy thereof is required to be served upon the
adverse party (Sec. 3, Rule 12, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Bill of particulars as part of the pleading
The bill of particulars submitted becomes part of the
pleading for which it is intended (Sec. 6, Rule 12, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Effect of non-compliance or insufficient compliance with the
order of the court
If the order is not obeyed or if there is an insufficient
compliance of the order, the court has the following options:
(a) to order the striking out of the pleading, (b) to order the
striking out of the portions of the pleading to which the order
was directed, or (c) to make such other order it deems just
(Sec. 4, Rule 12, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
Stay of period to file responsive pleading
1. A motion for bill of particulars is a mere motion and
not a pleading. Whether or not the motion of the movant is
granted, he may still file his responsive pleading. When he
files a motion for bill of particulars, the period to file the
responsive pleading is stayed or interrupted.
2. After service of the bill of particulars or after notice
of the denial of his motion, the movant may file his responsive
pleading within the period to which he was entitled at the
time the motion for bill of particulars was filed. If he has still
11 days to file his responsive pleading at the time the motion
for bill of particulars was filed, then he has the same number
of days to file his responsive pleading from the notice of the
denial of his motion (See Sec. 5, Rule 12, Rules of Court, as
CHAPTER VI 467
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
AND DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). This is because under
Sec. 5 of Rule 12, the filing of a motion for bill of particulars
stays the period to file a responsive pleading.
If the movant has less than five days to file his pleading
after service of the bill of particulars or after notice of the
denial of his motion, the period to file his pleading shall,
nevertheless, be not less than five days in any event (Sec. 5,
Rule 12, Rules of Court, as amended byA.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Thus, from notice of the denial of his motion, the minimum
period he has to serve and file his responsive pleading is five
days even if only one day is left for him to file his pleading at
the time the motion for bill of particulars is filed.
B. MOTION TO DISMISS
Assuming that the allegations in the complaint have
been made clear and particularized by the filing of a bill of
particulars, the defendant may elect not to file his answer
immediately. He may first explore the possibility of filing a
motion to dismiss under Sec. 12, Rule 15, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC. If there is no ground for a motion to dismiss,
he has to file his answer.
While the filing of a motion to dismiss is not prohibited,
the remedy being an integral part of the Rules of Court, the
current policy of the Supreme Court is not to encourage the
filing of a motion to dismiss but, to file an answer to the
complaint. Thus, within one day from receipt of the complaint,
summons shall be prepared which shall contain a reminder
to the defendant to observe restraint in filing a motion to
dismiss and instead allege the grounds thereof as defenses
in the answer (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC.[I Al.I}, July 13, 2004).
This has been embodied in the 2019 Amendments to the 1997
Rules of Procedure. It prohibited the following motions:
(a) Motion to dismiss except on the following grounds:
1) That the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim;
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2) That there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause; and
3) That the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(b) Motion to hear affirmative defenses;
(c) Motion for reconsideration of the court's action on
the affirmative defenses;
(d) Motion to suspend proceedings without a temporary
restraining order or injunction issued by a higher court;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other papers, except a motion for extension
to file an answer as provide by Sec. 11, Rule 11; and
(f) Motion for postponement intended for delay, except
if it is based on acts of God, force majeure or physical inability
of the witness to appear and testify. If the motion is granted
based on such exceptions, the moving party shall be warned
that the presentation of its evidence must still be terminated
on the dates previously agreed upon (Sec. 12, Rule 15, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
A motion to dismiss is not a pleading
A motion to dismiss is not a pleading. It is merely a
motion. Under the Rules, a motion is an application for relief
other than by a pleading (Sec. 1, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
The pleadings allowed under the Rules are: (a) complaint,
(b) answer, (c) counterclaim, (d) cross-claim, (e) third (fourth
etc.)-party complaint, (f) complaint-in-intervention (Sec. 2,
Rule 6, Rules of Court), and (g) reply only if the defending
party attaches an actionable document to the answer (Sec.
10, Rule 6, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC). A motion is not one of those specifically designated as a
pleading under the Rules of Court.
CHAPTER VI 469
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
AND DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
Omnibus motion (Bar 2010)
1. When a motion to dismiss is filed, all grounds for
objection available at the time the motion is filed must be
invoked in the motion. This is required under the "Omnibus
Motion Rule." The objections which are not invoked are
deemed waived.
Sec. 8 of Rule 15 provides that "a motion attacking a
pleading, order, judgment or proceeding shall include all
objections then available, and all objections not so included
shall be deemed waived." A motion to dismiss is an "Omnibus
Motion" and, thus, covered by the "Omnibus Motion Rule"
because, by its nature, it attacks a pleading by praying for its
dismissal.
2. The 'Omnibus Motion Rule' applies only when
a motion to dismiss is filed. The rule now is that motion to
dismiss is considered a prohibited pleading except if it is based
on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia,
res judicata or prescription. The grounds for motion to dismiss
under the previous Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer under
the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, it has been held that if no motion to dismiss has
been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided in the
Rules may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer,
and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may
be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. Based
on the foregoing, a preliminary hearing undeniably is subject
to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court's order
granting or dispensing with the need for a preliminary hearing
may not be corrected by certiorari absent any showing that
the trial court acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof
or with such grave abuse of discretion as would amount to
lack of jurisdiction (Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v.
David, 468 SCRA 63, 71).
While the court may elect to hold a preliminary hearing
on the affirmative defenses raised in the answer, such a
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hearing is not necessary when the affirmative defense is
failure to state a cause of action, and that it is, in fact, error
for the court to hold a preliminary hearing to determine the
existence of external facts outside the complaint. This is
because the sufficiency of the statement of the cause of action
is determined on the basis only of the facts alleged in the
complaint (See Trillanes N v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No.
223451, March 14, 2018; citation of the Court omitted).
Contents and form of the motion to dismiss
The motion to dismiss, like any other motion, shall state
the relief sought and the grounds upon which it is based and,
if required by the Rules or necessary to prove the facts alleged
therein, it shall be accompanied by supporting affidavits and
papers (Sec. 3, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
Notice of hearing on litigious motions; discretionary
The court may, in the exercise of its discretion, and if
deemed necessary for its resolution, call a hearing on the
motion. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing
(Sec. 6, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
When a motion to dismiss may be filed even after the answer
has been served and filed
A motion to dismiss may be filed even after the filing of
the answer, and will not be considered filed out of time if the
ground raised in the motion is either of the following and such
ground appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record:
(a) that there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(b) that there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause;
(c) that the action is barred by a prior judgment; or
CHAPTER VI 471
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
AND DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
(d) that the action is barred by the statute of
limitations (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Baldado v. Mejica, 693 SCRA
1, 12, March 11, 2013; for further readings, see Manuel
Uy & Sons, Inc. v. Valbueco, Inc., G.R. No. 179594,
September 11, 2013; See Edron Construction Corporation
v. Provincial Government of Surigao Del Sur, G.R. No.
220211, June 5, 2017; Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R.
No. 208426, September 20, 2017).
Any of the above grounds for dismissal which supplies a
justification for the court to dismiss a complaint or for filing a
motion to dismiss after an answer has been filed, must appear
either from the pleadings or the evidence on record (See Sec. 1,
Rule 9, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
This rule implies than an action may still be dismissed on a
ground which only became known after the filing of an answer
as when the evidence discloses that the action has already
prescribed.
Under Sec. 1 of Rule 9, defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. The above grounds, it has been recently ruled, do not
only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer are
deemed waived. They are also the grounds which allow courts
to dismiss cases motu proprio provided that the ground for
dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on
record (Heirs of Valientes v. Ramas, 638 SCRA 444, 451; See
Edron Construction Corporation v. Provincial Government
of Surigao Del Sur, G.R. No. 220211, June 5, 2017). Note
again that the ground for dismissal must be evident from the
pleadings or evidence on record before a dismissal may be
effected by the court on its own motion (De Leon v. Chu, G.R.
No. 186522, September 2, 2015). Bar 2012
Res judicata as a ground for a motion to dismiss; aspects of
resjudicata (Bar 2011)
1. In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to a matter
adjudged. This doctrine bars the relitigation of the same
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claim between the parties (claim preclusion or bar by a prior
judgment). It also bars the relitigation of the same issue on a
different claim between the same parties (issue preclusion or
conclusiveness of judgment). It is applicable in civil cases and
is not recognized in criminal proceedings (People v. Escobar,
G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017; For additional readings, see
Hilario v. Miranda, G.R. No. 196499, November 28, 2018).
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment
or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters
determined in the previous suit. The principle upon which the
doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted
to litigate the same issue more than once. When a right or
fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them (Teng v. Ting, G.R. No. 184237, September 21, 2016).
The public at large also has an interest in seeing that
rights and liabilities once established remain fixed. If a court
quiets title to land, for example, everyone should be able to
rely on the finality of that determination. Otherwise, many
business transactions would be clouded by uncertainty. Thus,
the most important purpose of res judicata is to provide repose
for both the party litigants and the public. As the Supreme
Court has observed, "res judicata thus encourages reliance on
judicial decision, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts
to resolve other disputes" (Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan,
G.R. No. 173148, April 6, 2015; See also Tala Realty Services
Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, G.R.
No. 181369, June 22, 2016).
2. The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Sec. 4 7
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This provision comprehends
two distinct aspects: (1) bar by former or prior judgment
(claim preclusion), and (2) conclusiveness of judgment (issue
preclusion).
CHAPTER VI 473
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
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Elements of res judicata (in relation to the concept of "bar
by a prior judgment") (Bar 2011)
1. The concept of res judicata has the following
elements:
(a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) the judgment must be on the merits; and
(d) there must be between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action (Heirs of Dacanay v. Siapno, Jr., G.R. No. 185169,
June 15, 2016).
The application of the doctrine of res judicata does not
require absolute identity of parties but merely substantial
identity of parties. There is substantial identity of parties
when there is community of interest or privity of interest
between a party in the first and a party in the second case even
if the first case did not implead the latter (Heirs of Dacanay v.
Siapno, Jr., ibid.).
Elements of res judicata (in relation to "conclusiveness of
judgment")
The elements of res judicata in relation to the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment are the following:
(a) The judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final;
(b) The decision must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(c) The disposition of the case must be a judgment
on the merits; and
(d) There must be, as between the first and second
action, identity of parties and subject matter but not
identity of causes of action.
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Distinctions between the two types of res judicata
1. Jurisprudentially, res judicata by "bar by a prior
judgment" operates as a bar to the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. It does
not primarily refer to the issues already determined but to
the claim or cause of action which is the same in the first and
second action. In traditional terminology, this aspect is known
as merger or bar; in modern terminology, it is called claim
preclusion. Hence, where in a previous action to collect a sum
of money, the court had already finally resolved the action
in favor of the defendant, a subsequent complaint based on
the same cause of action between the same parties shall be
barred by a prior judgment. Also, if the court has resolved
the case of an accion reivindicatoria in favor of the defendant
with finality, the same case of accion reivindicatoria between
the same parties, if brought later by the losing party, shall be
barred by a prior judgment.
On the other hand, res judicata by "conclusiveness of
judgment" precludes the relitigation of a particular fact
of issue in another action between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action. This is traditionally known
as collateral estoppel; in modern terminology, it is called issue
preclusion (Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, G.R. No. 173148,
April 6, 2015; See also Dacanay v. Siapno, Jr., G.R. No. 185169,
June 15, 2016; For further readings, see Almagro v. Philippine
airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 204803, September 12, 2018). It does
not bar a different case between the same parties since there
is no required identity of causes of action in this type of res
judicata. What it bars is the relitigation of an issue already
resolved with finality in a previous case between the same
parties. Thus, if AA files an action for forcible entry, involving
the same land, against BB, the latter can no longer invoke
ownership of the land as a defense, if the issue of ownership
has already been finally determined in a prior case of accion
reivindicatoria between the parties. The judgment on the
issue of ownership is already conclusive between them. Note
that in this illustration, there is no identity of causes of action
but the matter of ownership can no longer be relitigated in a
CHAPTER VI 475
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
AND DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
subsequent case between the parties even if such case rests on
a different cause of action.
2. There is only identity of parties and subject matter
in res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment but there is no
identity of causes of action. Since there is no identity of causes
of action, the judgment in the first case is conclusive only as
to those matters actually and contravened and determined
(Spouses Rosario v. Alvar, G.R. No. 212731, September 6,
2017).
Conclusiveness of judgment applies where there is a
substantial identity of parties in the first and second cases,
but there is no identity of causes of action. Simply put,
conclusiveness of judgments bars the relitigation of particular
facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties
on a different claim or cause of action. Thus, if in a previous
case between the parties, it has already been determined who
participated in the illegal strike and defied the return-to-work
order, such fact can no longer be relitigated in a subsequent
case between the parties (See Almagro v. Philippine Airlines,
Inc., G.R. No. 204803, September 12, 2018).
Application of res judicata to quasi-judicial proceedings
It has been held that the rule on res judicata, which
forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority, applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of
courts having general judicial powers. The Director of Lands
is a quasi-judicial officer. As such officer, his decisions and
orders rendered pursuant to his quasi-judicial authority,
have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the· Doctrine of Res Judicata
(Heirs of Wenceslao Tabia v. Court of Appeals, 516 SCRA 431,
443).
No res judicata in criminal proceedings
Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and, thus, has no
bearing on criminal proceedings. Hence, the argument that
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the dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation bars a
further reinvestigation because of the doctrine of res judicata
is untenable. Even if the argument were to be expanded to
contemplate "res judicata in prison grey," or the criminal
law concept of double jeopardy, the reinvestigation cannot be
barred by reason of double jeopardy. The dismissal of a case
during preliminary investigation does not constitute double
jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial
(Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415, 423-
424). Bar 2010
Dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia
l. Litis pendencia is a Latin term, which literally
means "a pending suit" and is variously referred to in some
decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground
for dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where
two actions are pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits
(Grace Park International Corporation v. East West Banking
Corporation, G.R. No. 210606, July 27, 2016).
2. The requisites in order that an action may be
dismissed on the ground of litis pendencia are: (a) the identity
of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest
in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in the other (Film Development Council of the
Philippines v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 197937,
April 3, 2013).
Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses
1. Under the 2019 Amendments of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure, motion to dismiss is a prohibited motion save for
certain exceptions. Now, a defendant shall raise his or her
affirmative defenses in his or her answer, which shall be
CHAPTER VI 477
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
AND DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
limited to the reasons set forth under Sec. 5(b), Rule 6, and
the following grounds:
a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party;
b) That the venue is improperly laid;
c) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
d) That the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action; and
e) That a condition precedent for filing the claim
has not been complied with.
The "reasons" under Sec. 5(b), Rule 6 include fraud,
statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality statute of
frauds, estoppel, former recovery, and any other matter by
way of confession and avoidance.
2. Failure to raise the affirmative defenses at the
earliest opportunity shall constitute a waiver thereof. The
court shall motu propio resolve the above affirmative defenses
within 30 calendar days from the filing of the answer.
As to the other affirmative defenses under the first
paragraph of Sec. 5(b), Rule 6, the court may conduct a
summary hearing within 15 calendar days from the filing
of the answer. Such affirmative defenses shall be resolved
by the court within 30 calendar days from the termination
of the summary hearing (Sec. 12, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. Affirmative defenses, if denied, shall not be the
subject of a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, but may_be among the matters to
be raised on appeal after a judgment on the merits (Sec. 12,
Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
Remedy of the defendant if the motion is denied
1. If the motion to dismiss is denied, the movant shall
file his answer within the balance of the period prescribed by
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Rule 11 to which he was entitled, at the time of serving his
motion, but not less than 5 days in any event. This period
shall be computed from the receipt of the notice of denial.
2. As a rule, the filing of an answer and going through
the usual trial process, and later, the filing of a timely appeal
from an adverse judgment are the proper remedies against a
denial of a motion to dismiss. The filing of an appeal from an
order denying a motion to dismiss is not the remedy prescribed
by existing rules. The order of denial, being interlocutory, is
not appealable by express provision of Sec. l(b), Rule 41.
When certiorari is available
The trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss is not a
license for the defendant to file a Rule 65 petition before the
Court of Appeals. An order denying a motion to dismiss cannot
be the subject of a petition for certiorari as the defendant still
has an adequate remedy before the trial court - i.e., to file an
answer and to subsequently appeal the case if he loses the
case (Tung Ho Steel Enterprises Corporation v. Ting Guan
Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 182153, April 7, 2014). This is,
however, only a general rule.
In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have
been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction (Douglas Lu Ym v. Gertrudes Nabua,
452 SCRA 298, 305-306; Lim v. Court of Appeals, 689 SCRA
705, 710, January 30, 2013). Bar 2011
Remedies of the plaintiff if the motion to dismiss is granted
1. If the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed.
The plaintiff, then, has several options.
(a) Depending upon the ground for the dismissal of
the action, the plaintiff may simply refile the complaint.
(b) Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting
a motion to dismiss or an affirmative defense that the
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the
CHAPTER VI 479
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
AND DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
statute of limitations; that the claim or demand set
forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished; or that the claim
on which the action is founded is unenforceable under
the provisions of the statute of frauds shall bar the
refilling of the same action or claim (Sec. 13, Rule 15,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Since the complaint cannot be refiled, the dismissal is
with prejudice. Under Sec. l(g) of Rule 41, it is the order
dismissing an action without prejudice which cannot be
appealed from. Conversely, where the dismissal is with
prejudice, an appeal from the order of dismissal is not
precluded. However, where the ground for dismissal, for
instance, is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action, the plaintiff may simply file the complaint anew
but since the dismissal is without prejudice to its refiling,
the order of dismissal cannot be appealed from under the
terms of Sec. l(g) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Where the ground for dismissal is lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the dismissal is without prejudice
to the refiling of the complaint. Following the tenor of
Sec. l(g) of Rule 41, an order dismissing a complaint for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is a dismissal
without prejudice and, hence, no appeal may be had from
the order of dismissal.
Despite Sec. 1 of Rule 41, appeal may, nevertheless,
be taken from the order dismissing an action for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter in a situation
contemplated under Sec. 8 of Rule 40. This provision
specifically allows, by necessary implication, an appeal
from orders dismissing cases on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. The tenor of Sec. 8
of Rule 40, therefore, operates to furnish an exception
to the general rule enunciated in Sec. 1 of Rule 41. This
situation, it must be noted, applies in a dismissal made
in the Municipal Trial Court and not to a dismissal in the
Regional Trial Court.
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(c) The plaintiff may also avail of a petition for
certiorari. This remedy is available if the court gravely
abuses its discretion in a manner amounting to lack
of jurisdiction and is the appropriate remedy in those
instances when the dismissal is without prejudice (Sec.
1, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
When complaint cannot be refiled (Bar 2011)
1. An order granting a motion to dismiss or an
affirmative defense shall bar the refiling of the same action or
claim if the dismissal is based on any of the following grounds
(Sec. 13, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC). Bar 2012
(a) The cause of action is barred by a prior judgment;
(b) The cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations;
(c) The claim or demand has been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and
(d) The claim, on which the action is founded, is
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of
frauds (Sec. 13, Rule 15, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Where the defendant is barred from refiling the
action, the remedy, under the circumstances, is to file an
appeal because, by the clear language of Sec. 5, Rule 16, the
dismissal is subject to the right of appeal. Since under this
provision, the dismissal bars the refiling of the same action
or claim, such dismissal is one with prejudice. This kind of
dismissal is appealable as a consequence of Sec. l(g) of Rule
41. Under this provision, it is an order dismissing an action
without prejudice which is not appealable.
CHAPTER VI 481
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
AND DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
C. DISMISSAL BY THE PLAINTIFF
Dismissal by mere notice of dismissal (Bar 2017; 2018)
1. Before the service of an answer or a motion for
summary judgment, a complaint may be dismissed by the
plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal (Sec. 1, Rule 17, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Upon the filing of the notice of dismissal, the court
shall issue an order confirming the dismissal (Sec. 1, Rule 17,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
It is not the order confirming the dismissal which operates
to dismiss the complaint. As the name of the order implies,
said order merely confirms a dismissal already effected by
the filing of the notice of dismissal. Since the order issued by
the court merely confirms the dismissal, it follows that the
court does not have to approve the dismissal because it has
no discretion on the matter. Before an answer or a motion for
summary judgment has been served upon the plaintiff, the
dismissal by the plaintiff by the filing of a notice is a matter of
right. It is submitted that the dismissal should occur as of the
date the notice is filed by the plaintiff and, not as of the date
the court issues the order confirming the dismissal.
Note that if the action is a class suit, the rule appears to
be different. Its dismissal must be with the approval of the
court even if the defendant has not yet served a responsive
pleading or a motion for summary judgment (See last sentence
of Sec. 2, Rule 17, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
Dismissal without prejudice; exceptions
1. A dismissal made by the filii:igof a notice of dismissal
is a dismissal without prejudice, i.e., the complaint can be
refiled. This is the general rule.
The dismissal will, however, be one with prejudice in any
of the following situations:
(a) the notice of dismissal by the plaintiff provides
that the dismissal is with prejudice; or
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(b) the plaintiff has previously dismissed the same
case in a court of competent jurisdiction based on or
including the same claim (Sec. 1, Rule 17, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. If the plaintiff files a notice of dismissal providing
therein a reason that prevents the refiling of the complaint,
the dismissal must be deemed one with prejudice even if the
notice does not state that the dismissal is with prejudice.
This happens when, for instance, the notice provides that the
plaintiff recognizes the fact of prescription or extinguishment
of the obligation of the defendant or for reasons stated in Sec.
5 of Rule 16 as when the action is barred by res judicata,
statute of limitations or that the claim or demand has been
paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished.
Two-dismissal rule (Bar 1989; 2017; 2018)
1. The 'two-dismissal' rule applies when the plaintiff
has (a) twice dismissed actions, (b) based on or including the
same claim, (c) in a court of competent jurisdiction.
The second notice of dismissal will bar the refiling of
the action because it will operate as an adjudication of the
claim upon the merits. In other words, the claim may only be
filed twice, the first being the claim embodied in the original
complaint. Since, as a rule, the dismissal is without prejudice,
the same claim may be refiled. However, if the refiled claim
or complaint is dismissed again through a second notice of
dismissal, that second notice triggers the application of the
two-dismissal rule and the dismissal is to be deemed one with
prejudice because it is considered as an adjudication upon the
merits.
2. For the above rule to apply, the complaints must
have been dismissed in a court of competent jurisdiction. To
illustrate: PP files, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
an action to collect Pl million from DD. The complaint was
dismissed when PP immediately filed a notice of dismissal.
The same claim was again filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila. Before DD served either an answer or a
CHAPTER VI 483
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
AND DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
motion for summary judgment, PP filed a notice of dismissal.
Does the two-dismissal rule apply? It does not. The first court,
the RTC, was not a court of competent jurisdiction because
the claim was below its jurisdictional amount.
3. "x x x [T]he "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17,
Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply if the
prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant"
(Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014).
Dismissal by filing a motion to dismiss
Once either an answer or a motion for summary judgment
has been served on the plaintiff, the dismissal is no longer
a matter of right and will require the filing of a motion to
dismiss, not a mere notice of dismissal. The motion to dismiss
will now be subject to the approval of the court which will
decide on the motion upon such terms and conditions as are
just (Sec. 2, Rule 17, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC). The dismissal under Sec. 2 of Rule 17 is
no longer a matter of right on the part of the plaintiff but a
matter of judicial discretion.
Dismissal without prejudice (Sec. 2, Rule 17)
The dismissal authorized under Sec. 2 of Rule 17 is a
dismissal without prejudice except if the order of dismissal
specifies that it is with prejudice (Sec. 2, Rule 17, Rules of
Court).
Dismissal due to the fault of plaintiff (Sec. 3, Rule 17)
1. A complaint may be dismissed even if the plaintiff
has no desire to have the same dismissed. The dismissal in
this case will be through reasons attributed to his fault. Sec. 3
of Rule 17 provides the following grounds for dismissal:
(a) the failure of plaintiff, without justifiable
reasons, to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief;
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(b) the failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time, also called non
prosequitur; Bar 2012
(c) the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the
Rules of Court; or
(d) the failure of the plaintiff to comply with any
order of the court.
2. The dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff may be
done by the court on its own motion (motu proprio) or upon a
motion filed by the defendant (Sec. 3, Rule 17, Rules of Court;
AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic,
694 SCRA 118, 123-124, March 20, 2013).
3. A dismissal on the basis of non prosequitur means
that the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in
failing to proceed with reasonable promptness or unwillingness
on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute (Roasters Philippines,
Inc. v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 191874, September 2, 2015). Note
that the failure to prosecute under Sec. 3 of Rule 17 must
be for an "unreasonable length of time." If the delay or the
continuance sought is not for an unreasonable length of time,
a dismissal on the basis of non prosequitur is not proper
(Laurel v. Vardeleon, G.R. No. 202967, August 5, 2015).
The failure to prosecute is called non prosequitur. "The
fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the
circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due
diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.
There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to
prosecute" (Roasters Philippines, Inc. v. Gaviola, supra).
4. When there are no justifiable reasons that explain
the plaintiffs absence during the presentation of his evidence
in chief, the court may dismiss the complaint. The use of the
word, "may'' denotes its directory nature and operates to
confer upon the court the discretion to decide between the
dismissal of the case on this technicality (Republic v. Diaz-
Enriquez, 694 SCRA 102, 112, March 20, 2013).
CHAPTER VI 485
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SERVICE OF SUMMONS
AND DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
Dismissal with prejudice (Sec. 3, Rule 17)
The dismissal, under Sec. 3 of Rule 17, shall have the
effect of an adjudication on the merits, unless otherwise
declared by the court. Hence, as a rule, it is a dismissal with
prejudice. The dismissal under this provision bars the refiling
of the case (Martinez v. Buen, G.R. No. 187342, April 5, 2017).
Hence, if the case was dismissed for failure of the plaintiff
to prosecute the same, the order of dismissal is deemed a final
order. Since the order is a final one, the remedy of the plaintiff
is to appeal from the order of dismissal and not to file a petition
for certiorari (Systems and Plan Integrator and Development
Corporation v. Municipal Government of Murcia, G.R. No.
217121, March 16, 2016; Martinez v. Buen, G.R. No. 187342,
April 5, 2017).
Effect of dismissal upon a counterclaim already pleaded
(Bar 2008; 2010)
1. If a counterclaim has already been pleaded by the
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs
motion to dismiss, and the court grants the said motion to
dismiss, the dismissal "shall be limited to the complaint" (Sec.
2, Rule 17, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC). The phraseology of the provision is clear: the counterclaim
is not dismissed, whether it is a compulsory or a permissive
counterclaim because the rule makes no distinction. The rule
provides:
"x xx The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim xx x"
(Sec. 2, Rule 17, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
2. The defendant, if he so desires, may prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action. If he wants the counterclaim
to be prosecuted in the same action, he should manifest his
preference to the court within 15 days from notice of the
motion to dismiss served by the plaintiff (Sec. 2, Rule 17,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
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3. A similar rule is adopted in Sec. 6, Rule 16 and Sec. 3

of Rule 17 wherein the dismissal of the complaint does not carry
with it the dismissal of the counterclaim. The same provision
also grants the defendant a choice in the prosecution of his Chapter VII
counterclaim. Note: Please refer to discussions in Chapter IV.
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint A. PRE-TRIAL
Rule 17 shall apply also to the dismissal of any
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint. A Concept, nature, and purpose of a pre-trial (Bar 2009)
voluntary dismissal by the claimant by notice of dismissal,
as in Sec. 1 of Rule 17, shall be made before a responsive 1. Specifically, under the Rules, a pre-trial is a
pleading or a motion for summary judgment is served, or, if procedural device held prior to the trial for the court to
there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial consider the following purposes:
or hearing (Sec. 4, Rule 17, Rules of Court, as amended by (a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or a
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
-oOo- (c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to
the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary
proof;
(e) The limitation of the number and identification
of witnesses and the setting of trial dates;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of
issues to a commissioner;
(g) The requirement for the parties to:
1. Mark their respective evidence if not yet
marked in the judicial affidavits of their witnesses;
2. Examine and make comparisons of the
adverse parties' evidence vis-a-vis the copies to be
marked;

487

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3. Manifest for the record stipulations
regarding the faithfulness of the reproductions and
the genuineness and due execution of the adverse
parties' evidence;
4. Reserve evidence not available at the pre-
trial, but only in the following manner:
i. For testimonial evidence, by giving
the name or position and the nature of the
testimony of the proposed witness;
ii. For documentary evidence and
other object evidence, by giving a particular
description of the evidence.
No reservation shall be allowed if not made in the
manner described above.
(h) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the action.
The failure without just cause of a party and counsel
to appear during pre-trial, despite notice shall result
in a waiver of any objections to the faithfulness of the
reproductions marked, or their genuineness and due
execution.
The failure without just cause of a party and/or
counsel to bring the evidence required shall be deemed a
waiver of the presentation of such evidence.
The branch clerk of court shall prepare the minutes
of the pre-trial which shall conform to prescribed form
(Sec. 2, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
Under the former rule (Sec. 3, Rule 20, 1964 Rules of
Court), the court was authorized to render a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment if at the trial the court finds
that facts exist to warrant the rendition of said judgments.
The court under the old rule may do so on its own motion.
j
CHAPTER VII 489
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Sec. 2/g], Rule
18), the court's authority is confined to a mere determination
of the propriety of rendering a judgment on the pleadings or a
summary judgment. It is submitted that the requisite motion
should be filed and heard pursuant to Rule 34 (Judgment on
the Pleadings) and Rule 35 (Summary Judgments) before
either judgment is to be rendered.
Under the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court is again authorized to render a judgment
on the pleadings or a summary judgment subject to the
inclusion in the pre-trial order that the case is being submitted
Rule 34 (Judgment on the Pleadings) and Rule 35 (Summary
Judgments). The court may do so motu proprio.
From the above, it may be inferred that a pre-trial is a
procedural device which ultimately aims to relieve congested
court dockets by encouraging settlement of cases. After the
disclosure and marking of evidence during the pre-trial,
parties become aware of the strength and weaknesses of their
cases. This awareness may make parties feel that settlement
is the only alternative. Even in those cases where parties
refuse to reach an amicable settlement, the pre-trial serves
to facilitate the proceedings by limiting and simplifying the
issues in controversy, limiting the number of witnesses and
dispensing with unnecessary proof through admissions and
stipulations of facts and of documents.
2. Jurisprudence considers a pre-trial is one designed
to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties,
ascertain the facts relative to the issues and enable the
parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before civil trials and, thus, prevent the said trials to
be carried on in the dark. It is intended to make certain that
all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly
raised. Thus, to obviate the element of surprise, parties are
expected to disclose at a pre-trial conference all issues oflaw
and fact that they intend to raise at the trial, except such
as may involve privileged or impeaching matters (Tinio v.
Manzano, 307 SCRA 460, 467; Suggested reading: Mercader v.
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DBP, 332 SCRA 82). A pre-trial is not only intended to clarify
and limit the basic issues between the parties. It also takes
the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering
(Zaldivar v. People, G.R. No. 197056, March 2, 2016).
3. The pre-trial is mandatory in civil cases (Sec. 2, Rule
18, Rules of Court; Interlining Corporation v. Philippine Trust
Company, 378 SCRA 521, 525; Tiu v. Middleton, 310 SCRA
580, 586). It is mandatory in order to realize the objective of
simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting trial (Dinglasan-
De los Santos v. Abejon, G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017).
Bar 1989. The 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure likewise dictates that it should be terminated
promptly (Sec. 2, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
A pre-trial is also held in criminal cases. In all criminal
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, pre-
trial is also mandatory (See Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court).
Preliminary conference
1. A preliminary conference, the equivalent of a pre-
trial in proceedings where no trial is conducted, is, likewise,
mandatory in both civil and criminal cases under the Rules
on Summary Procedure (Par. A, Sec. 10 and Par. B, Sec. 5(b),
Rule III, Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level
Courts).
2. A preliminary conference may be held in the Court
of Appeals, but such conference is not mandatory (Sec. 1, Rule
48, Rules of Court). It may even apply to the Supreme Court
whenever the Court decides to do so. Rule 48 is one of the
provisions applicable to the Supreme Court in original cases
(See Sec. 2, Rule 56, Rules of Court).
Effect of failure to conduct a pre-trial
The failure of a judge to conduct a pre-trial conference in
a civil case is contrary to elementary rules of procedure. "It
I
I
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CHAPTER VII 491
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
is elementary and plain that the holding of such a pre-trial
conference is mandatory and failure to do so is inexcusable.
When the law or procedure is so elementary, such as the
provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know it or to act as
if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. Such ignorance of a basic rule in court procedure, as
failing to conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross ignorance
and warrants a corresponding penalty'' (National Power
Corporation v. Adiong, 654 SCRA 391, 403-404).
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a duty upon
the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set
for pre-trial. On the contrary, the 2019 Amendments to the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now requires the branch clerk
of court to issue, within 5 calendar days from filing, a notice
of pre-trial which shall be set not later than 60 calendar days
from the filing of the last responsive pleading (Sec. 2, Rule
18, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Consideration has been given to the provisions under A.M.
No. 03-1-09-SC or the "Guidelines to be Observed by Trial
Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-trial
and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures."
Referral to the Philippine Mediation Center
At the start of the preliminary conference, the judge is
mandated to refer the parties and/or their counsels to the
mediation unit of the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)
for purposes of mediation. If mediation fails, the judge will
schedule the continuance of the preliminary conference. This
rule applies to Metro Manila, Cebu, Davao City, and other
places where Philippine Mediation Center Units may be
further organized and designated (Administrative Circular
No. 20-2002, March 24, 2002; A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13,
2004).
Section 8, Rule 18, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC, provides that after pre-trial and, after issues are joined,
the court shall refer the parties for mandatory court-annexed
mediation. The period for court-annexed mediation shall not
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exceed 30 calendar days without further extension. Before,
court-annexed mediation precedes pre-trial proper but the
new provision reversed the steps to save time.
AM. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA regards mediation as part
of pre-trial where parties are encouraged to personally attend
the proceedings. The personal non-appearance of a party
may be excused only when the representative, who appears
in his behalf, has been duly authorized to enter into possible
amicable settlement or to submit to alternative modes of
dispute resolution. To ensure the attendance of the parties,
AM. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA specifically enumerates the
sanctions that the court can impose upon a party who fails to
appear in the proceedings which includes censure, reprimand,
contempt, and even dismissal of the action in relation to Sec.
5, Rules 18 of the Rules of Court. The respective lawyers of
the parties may attend the proceedings and, if they do so, they
are enjoined to cooperate with the mediator for the successful
amicable settlement of disputes so as to effectively reduce
docket congestion. (Kent v. Micarez, G.R. No. 185758, March
9, 2011)
Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR)
1. Only if the judge of the court to which the case was
originally raffled is convinced that settlement is still possible,
the case may be referred to another court for judicial dispute
resolution. The judicial dispute resolution shall be conducted
within a non-extendible period of 15 calendar days from notice
of failure of the court-annexed mediation.
If judicial dispute resolution fails, trial before the original
court shall proceed on the dates agreed upon.
All proceedings during the court-annexed mediation and
the judicial dispute resolution shall be confidential.
2. With the new provision, JDR becomes discretionary.
The judge will determine if there is still a possibility of
settlement.
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How pre-trial is called; filing of motion by plaintiff (Bar 1999)
After the last responsive pleading has been served and
filed, the branch clerk of court shall issue, within five (5)
calendar days from filing, a notice of pre-trial which shall be
set not later than sixty (60) calendar days from the filing of
the last responsive pleading (Sec. 1, Rule 18, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). It is now the court
which initiates the setting of the case for a pre-trial.
Before the amendment was introduced by AM. No. 03-1-
09 giving the branch clerk of court authority to issue a notice
of pre-trial, under the previous rule, if the plaintiff failed to
file the motion to set the case for pre-trial for an unreasonable
length of time, his failure to do so could be construed to be a
failure to prosecute his case and was a ground for dismissal
under Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court (See Allied Banking
Corporation v. Madriaga, G.R. No. 196670, October 12, 2016).
The meaning of 'last pleading'
1. The last permissible pleading that a party can file is
the reply to the answer to the last pleading asserting a claim.
The claim could be the original complaint, counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint. Ifan answer is filed and
served in response to these claims, the pleading in response to
these answers is the reply (Sarmiento v. Juan, 120 SCRA 403,
408), if allowed under Sec. 10, Rule 6, as amended by AM. No.
19-10-20-SC which is to be filed within 15 calendar days from
the service of the pleading responded to (Sec. 6, Rule 11, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Where the last pleading has not yet been served and
filed, the case is not yet ready for pre-trial (Pioneer Insurance
& Surety Corporation v. Hontanosas, 78 SCRA 447, 461).
However, the 'last pleading' need not be literally construed as
one having been served and filed. For purposes of the pre-trial,
the expiration of the period for filing the last pleading, without
it having been served and filed, is sufficient (Sarmiento v.
Juan, supra at 409).
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Notice of pre-trial (Bar 1977)
1. The notice of pre-trial shall include the dates
respectively set for:
(a) Pre-trial;
(b) Court-Annexed Mediation; and
(c) Judicial Dispute Resolution, if necessary.
The notice of pre-trial shall be served on the counsel or on
the party if he or she has no counsel. The counsel served with
such notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party
represented by him or her.
Non-appearance at any of the foregoing settings shall be
deemed as non-appearance at the pre-trial and shall merit the
same sanctions under Sec. 5 of Rule 18 (Sec. 3, Rule 18, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. The old rule required that the notice be served not
only upon the counsel but also upon the party (Sec. 1, Rule 20,
1964 Rules of Court; Samson v. Court of Appeals, 105 SCRA
781, 787), and where no separate notice to the party is sent, it
was then the rule that all the proceedings at the pre-trial and
those subsequent thereto are null and void (Barde v. Posiquit,
164 SCRA 304,310).
The present rule simplifies the procedure since the notice
of pre-trial is now served on the counsel, and service is made
on the party only if he has no counsel (Agulto v. Tecson, 476
SCRA 395, 402).
3. Notice is so important that it would be grave abuse
of discretion for the court, for example, to allow the plaintiff
to present his evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant
to appear before the pre-trial who did not receive, through
his counsel, a notice of pre-trial. Accordingly, there is no legal
basis for a court to consider a party notified of the pre- trial
and that there is no longer a need to send notice of pre-trial
merely because it was his counsel who suggested the date of
pre-trial (Agulto v. Tecson, supra at 406).
CHAPTER VII 495
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
Appearance of parties and counsels in the pre-trial (Bar
1992)
1. It shall be the duty of both the parties and their
counsels to appear at the pre-trial, court-annexed mediation,
and judicial dispute resolution, if necessary. The non-
appearance of a party and counsel may be excused only for
acts of God, force majeure, or duly substantiated physical
inability.
A representative may appear on behalf of a party, but
must be fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts
and documents (Sec. 4, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Mediation is a part of pre-trial and failure of the
plaintiff to appear therein merits sanction on the part of the
absent party (Senarlo v. Judge Paderanga, 617 SCRA 247,
253-254; Real Bank, Inc. v. Samsung Mabuhay Corporation,
633 SCRA 124, 134; Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Fadcor, Inc., supra).
Effect of failure to appear by the plaintiff (Bar 1980; 1981;
1989); remedy
1. When duly notified, the failure of the plaintiff and
counsel to appear without valid cause when so required,
pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 18, shall be cause for the dismissal
of the action. This dismissal shall be with prejudice unless
otherwise ordered by the court (Sec. 5, Rule 18, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC;'Mondonedo v. Court of
Appeals, 252 SCRA 28, 30).
The former rule (Sec. 2, Rule 20, 1964 Rules of Court)
provides that the plaintiff who fails to appear in the pre-trial
may be 'non-suited.' These terms no longer appear in the
present Rules.
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2. Since the dismissal of the action shall be with
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, the same shall have
the effect of an adjudication on the merits, thus, final. The
remedy of the plaintiff, therefore, is to appeal from the order
of dismissal. An order dismissing an action with prejudice is
appealable.
Under the Rules, it is only when the order of dismissal is
without prejudice that appeal cannot be availed of (Sec. l{g],
Rule 41, Rules of Court). Since appeal is available, certiorari
is not the remedy because the application of a petition for
certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is conditioned
upon the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Sec. 1, Rule
65, Rules of Court).
Jurisprudence affirms that an order of dismissal based
on failure to appear at the pre-trial is with prejudice unless
the order itself states otherwise. In fact, the trial court is not
required to explicitly state that the dismissal is with prejudice.
A dismissal with prejudice is to be considered an adjudication
on the merits of the case, where the proper remedy is appeal
under Rule 41, not a petition for certiorari (Chingkoe v.
Republic, G.R. No. 183608, July 31, 2013).
Effect of failure to appear by the defendant (Bar 2011);
remedy
1. A similar failure on the defendant to appear in
the pre-trial shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his or her evidence ex parte within 10 calendar days from
termination of the pre-trial, and the court to render judgment
on the basis of the evidence offered (Sec. 5, Rule 18, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company v. Fadcor, Inc., G.R. No. 197970,
January 25, 2016).
The former rule (Sec. 2, Rule 20, 1964 Rules of Court)
provided that the defendant who fails to appear in the pre-
trial may be considered "as in default. " These terms are no
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PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
longer used under the current Rules. As it is now, there is no
default for failure to appear in a pre-trial.
The term "default" is identified with the failure to file
an answer and not failure to appear in court. It bears to
emphasize that as the Rules of Civil Procedure presently
stand, if the defendant fails to appear for pre-trial, a default
order is no longer issued. Initially, the phrase "as in default"
was included in the old rules. With the amended provision,
the phrase "as in default" was deleted, the purpose of which
is "one of semantical propriety or terminological accuracy as
there were criticisms on the use of the word default in the
former provision since that term is identified with the failure
to file a required answer, not appearance in court" (See
Philippine Steel Coating Corporation v. Quinones, G.R. No.
194533, April 17, 2017).
2. The order of the court allowing the plaintiff to
present his evidence ex parte does not dispose of the case with
finality. The order is, therefore, merely interlocutory; hence,
not appealable. Under Sec. l(b) of Rule 41, no appeal may be
taken from an interlocutory order. The defendant who feels
aggrieved by the order may move for the reconsideration of
the order, and if the denial is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, he may file a petition for certiorari.
How non-appearance is excused
1. The non-appearance of a party and their counsel to
appear at the pre-trial, court-annexed mediation, and judicial
dispute resolution, if necessary may be excused only for acts of
God, force majeure, or duly substanti8:ted physical inability.
A representative may appear on behalf of a party, but
must be fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts
and documents (Sec. 4, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
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The phraseology of the provision suggests that it is not
sufficient for the written authority to give the representative
the power to enter into only one of the matters mentioned in
Sec. 4 of Rule 18, as when the only authority granted is to enter
into an amicable settlement. The authority must also confer
upon the representative the power to submit to alternative
modes of dispute resolution, and enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts. An incomplete authority does not satisfy
the requirements of the Rules and should be deemed the
equivalent of having no authority at all.
2. The written authority must be in the form of a special
power of attorney. Entering into an amicable settlement for a
client, who is the principal in the attorney-client relationship,
involves entering into a compromise. Substantive law (Art.
1878[3} of the Civil Code of the Philippines) is explicit: "Special
power(s) of attorney are necessary x x x To compromise, to
submit questions to arbitration xx x" (Italics ours).
Procedural rules (Sec. 23, Rule 138), likewise, prohibit
an attorney to compromise his client's litigation or receive
anything in discharge of a client's claim, but the full amount
in cash, without a "special authority."
3. In a case, the petitioner and its counsel of record
were not present in the scheduled pre-trial, court-annexed
mediation, and judicial dispute resolution, and they likewise
did not file a pre-trial brief, the Court stressed that Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court leaves no room for equivocation; appearance
of parties and their counsel at the pre-trial conference, along
with the filing of a corresponding pre-trial brief, is mandatory.
It is a duty. Non-appearance cannot be excused as Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 6 of Rule 18, allows only 3 exceptions:
(1) acts of God;
(2) force majeure; or
(3) duly substantiated physical inability (Sec. 4,
Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC).
CHAPTER VII 499
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
Pre-trial brief; filing and contents
1. The parties shall file with the court and serve on the
adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt
thereof at least 3 calendar days before the date of the pre-trial
(Sec. 6, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
The pre-trial brief shall contain the following matters:
(a) A concise statement of the case and the reliefs
prayed for;
(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed
stipulations of facts;
(c) The main factual and legal issues to be tried or
resolved;
(d) The propriety of ref err al of factual issues to
commissioners;
(e) The documents or other object evidence to be
marked, stating the purpose thereof;
(f) The names of the witnesses, and the summary
of their respective testimonies; and
(g) A brief statement of points oflaw and citation of
authorities (Sec. 6, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. The pre-trial brief shall include a manifestation of a
party's having availed of or the intention to avail of discovery
procedures (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Miguel
Corporation, G.R. No. 205045, January 25, 2017).
Identification and marking of evidence
It is vital to have the documents and exhibits identified
and marked during the pre-trial. The current rule establishes
the policy that no evidence shall be allowed to be presented
and offered during the trial in support of a party's evidence-
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in-chief other than those that had been earlier identified and
pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the court
for good cause shown (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004;
Cruz u. People, G.R. No. 210266, June 7, 2017). Note that the
same rule confers upon the trial court the discretion to allow
the introduction of additional evidence during the trial other
than those that had been previously marked and identified
during the pre-trial provided there are valid grounds (See
Lara's Gift and Decors, Inc. u. PNB Insurers Co., Inc., G.R.
Nos. 230429-30, January 24, 2018).
Section 2, Rule 18, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC,
emphasizes the importance of marking the evidence: "failure
without just cause of a party and counsel to appear during pre-
trial, despite notice shall result in a waiver of any objections
to the faithfulness of the reproductions marked, or their
genuineness and due execution." If a plaintiff fails to mark his
or her evidence during the pre-trial and the defendant failed
to appear, without just cause and despite notice, the defendant
may later on object to the genuineness and due execution of
the plaintiffs evidence.
Legal effect of representations and statements in the pre-
trial brief
The parties are bound by the representations and
statements in their respective pre-trial briefs (A.M. No. 03-1-
09-SC, July 13, 2004). Such representations and statements
are in the nature of judicial admissions in relation to Sec. 4 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Effect of failure to file a pre-trial brief
1. The failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the
same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial (Sec. 6, Rule 18,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Hence,
if it is the plaintiff and counsel who fails to file a pre-trial
brief, such failure shall be cause for dismissal of the action.
CHAPTER VII 501
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
If it is the defendant and counsel who fails to do so, such
failure shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his or
her evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the
basis of the evidence offered (Sec. 5, Rule 18, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC; For further readings,
see Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company u. Fadcor, Inc.,
G.R. No. 197970, January 25, 2016).
2. The dismissal of a complaint for failure to file a pre-
trial brief is discretionary on the part of the trial court (Sec.
5, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
3. Under Sec. 6, Rule 18, as amended by AM. No. 19-
10-20-SC, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief
shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial,
i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and the
court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.
The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for
reconsideration showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. The
motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant has
a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which
contains his defense is already on record (Saguid u. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003).
No termination of pre-trial for failure to settle
1. The judge should not allow the termination of pre-
trial simply because of the manifestation of the parties that
they cannot settle the case. Instead, he should expose the
parties to the advantages of pre-trial. He must also be mindful
that there are important aspects of the pre-trial that ought to
be taken up to expedite the disposition of the case (A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004).
2. If all efforts to settle fail, the trial judge shall
endeavor to achieve other purposes of a pre-trial like, among
others, obtaining admissions or stipulations of fact. To obtain
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admissions, the judge shall ask the parties to submit whatever
depositions that have been taken under Rule 23, the answers
to written interrogatories under Rule 25 and the answers to
request for admissions by the adverse party under Rule 26.
He may, also, require the production of documents or things
requested by a party under Rule 27 and the results of the
physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28
(A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004).
One Day Examination of Witness Rule (Bar 2009; 2016)
The court shall ask the parties to agree on the specific
dates for continuous trial, adhere to the case flow chart
determined by the court, and use the time frame for each
stage in setting the trial dates. Adherence to the One Day
Examination of Witness Rule shall be required where the
witness shall be fully examined in one day only, subject to the
court's discretion during the trial on whether or not to extend
the examination for justifiable reasons (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,
July 13, 2004).
Most Important Witness Rule (Bar 2016)
Where no settlement has been effected, the court shall
follow the Most Important Witness Rule, where the court shall
determine the most important witnesses, limit the number
of such witnesses and require the parties and/or counsels
to submit to the branch clerk of court the names, addresses
and contact numbers of the witnesses to be summoned by
subpoena. Note, however, that the court may also refer the
case to a trial by commissioner under Rule 32 (A.M. No. 03-1-
09-SC, July 13, 2004).
Questions are to be asked by the judge
During the pre- trial, the judge shall be the one to ask
questions on issues raised by the parties, and all questions or
comments by counsel or parties must be directed to the judge
to avoid hostilities between the parties (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,
July 13, 2004).
CHAPTER VII 503
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
Pre-trial order
1. Upon termination of the pre-trial, the court shall
issue an order within 10 calendar days which shall recite in
detail the matters taken up. The order shall include:
(a) An enumeration of the admitted facts;
(b) The minutes of the pre-trial conference;
(c) The legal and factual issue/s to be tried;
(d) The applicable law, rules, and jurisprudence;
(e) The evidence marked;
(f) The specific trial dates for continuous trial,
which shall be within the period provided by the Rules;
(g) The case flowchart to be determined by the
court, which shall contain the different stages of the
proceedings up to the promulgation of the decision and
the use of time frames for each stage in setting the trial
dates;
(h) A statement that the one-day examination of
witness rule and most important witness rule under A.M.
No. 03-1-09-SC (Guidelines for Pre-Trial) shall be strictly
followed; and
(i) A statement that the court shall render
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, as the
case may be (Sec. 7, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. The direct testimony of witnesses for the plaintiff shall
be in the form of judicial affidavits. After the identification of
such affidavits, cross-examination shall proceed immediately
(Sec. 7, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
3. Postponement of presentation of the parties'
witnesses at a scheduled date is prohibited, except if it is based
on acts of God, force majeure or duly substantiated physical
inability of the witness to appear and testify. The party who
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caused the postponement is warned that the presentation of
its evidence must still be terminated within the remaining
dates previously agreed upon
Should the opposing party fail to appear without valid
cause stated in the next preceding paragraph. The presentation
of the scheduled witness will proceed with the absent party
being deemed to have waived the right to interpose objection
and conduct cross-examination. The contents of the pre-
trial order shall control the subsequent proceedings, unless
modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice (Sec. 7, Rule
18, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
4. These admissions embodied in the pre-trial order
are binding upon the parties and conclusive upon them (Heirs
of Conahap v. Regafia, 458 SCRA 741, 748).
Implied issues are deemed included in the pre-trial order
1. It is true that the issues to be tried between the
parties in a case shall be limited to those defined in the pre-
trial order. This rule should not, however, be construed to
refer only to those issues mentioned in the pre-trial order. It
also includes issues that are implied from those written in the
order.
2. It was, thus, held that a pre-trial order is not intended
to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to
be taken during the trial, for it is unavoidable that there are
issues that are impliedly included among those listed or that
may be inferable from those listed by necessary implication
which are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as
those expressly listed (Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation v. Amalgamated Management and
Development Corporation, 658 SCRA 273-282; See Abagatnan
v. Spouses Clarito, G.R. No. 211966, August 7, 2017).
Judgment after pre-trial
Should there be no more controverted facts, or no more
genuine issue as to any material fact, or an absence of any
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CHAPTER VII 505
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
issue, or should the answer fail to tender an issue, the court
shall, without prejudice to a party moving for judgment on
the pleadings under Rule 34 or summary judgment under
Rule 35, motu proprio include in the pre-trial order that the
case be submitted for summary judgment or judgment on the
pleadings, without need of position papers or memoranda.
In such cases, judgment shall be rendered within ninety (90)
calendar days from termination of the pre-trial.
The order of the court to submit the case for judgment
pursuant to this Rule shall not be the subject to appeal or
certiorari (Sec. 10, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Distinctions between pre-trial in civil cases and pre-trial in
criminal cases (Bar 1997)
1. The motion to set the case for pre- trial in a civil case
is made after the last responsive pleading has been served
and filed (Sec. 1, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). In a criminal case, once the court has
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the arraignment
of the accused and the pre-trial shall be set within 10 calendar
days from the date of the court's receipt of the case for a
detained accused, and within 30 calendar days from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction (either by arrest or voluntary
surrender) over a non-detained accused, unless a shorter
period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular
(A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, Revised Guidelines for Continuous
Trial of Criminal Cases).
2. The pre-trial in a civil case c;onsiders the possibility
of an amicable settlement as an important objective (Sec. 2[a],
Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
The pre-trial in a criminal case does not include considering
the possibility of amicable settlement of criminal liability as
one of its purposes (See Sec. 1, Rule 118, Rules of Court).
3. In a civil case, the agreements and admissions
made in the pre- trial are not required to be signed by both
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the parties and their counsels. Under the Rules of Court, they
are, instead, to be contained in the record of pre-trial and the
pre-trial order (Sec. 7, Rule 18, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The prescribed form of a pre-trial
order requires the conformity of both parties and/or counsel.
In a criminal case, there is a stricter procedure required.
All agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed
by both the accused and counsel; otherwise, they cannot be
used against the accused (Sec. 2, Rule 118, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
4. The sanctions for non-appearance in a pre-trial in
a civil case are imposed upon the plaintiff and the defendant
(Sec. 4, Rule 18, Rules of Court., as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC). The sanctions in a criminal case are imposed upon
the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor (Sec. 3, Rule 118,
Rules of Court).
5. A pre-trial brief is specifically required to be
submitted in a civil case (Sec. 6, Rule 18, Rules of Court., as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). A pre-trial brief is not
specifically required in a criminal case.
6. Under the Rules on Expedited Procedures in the
First Level Courts, the parties shall file with the court and
serve on the adverse party in such a way as to ensure receipt,
at least three calendar days before the scheduled Preliminary
Conference, their respective Preliminary Conference Briefs,
which shall contain, among others:
(a) A summary of admitted facts;
(b) A summary of disputed facts and proposals for
stipulations on the same;
(c) A statement of factual and legal issues; and
(d) A list of testimonial, object, and other
documentary evidence offered in support of the party's
claims or defenses, and their markings, if any.
L
CHAPTER VII 507
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
Failure to submit a Preliminary Conference Brief within
the period given shall merit the same sanction as non-
appearance at the Preliminary Conference (Sec. 11, Rule III,
Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts).
Preliminary conference under the Rules on Expedited
Procedures in the First Level Courts (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC}
1. Within five calendar days after the last responsive
pleading is filed, the Branch Clerk of Court shall issue a
Notice of Preliminary Conference, which shall be held within
30 calendar days from the date of filing of such last responsive
pleading. The Rules on pre-trial under Rule 18 of the 2019
Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall be
applicable to the Preliminary Conference, unless inconsistent
(Sec. 10, Rule IIL Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First
Level Courts).
The Notice of Preliminary Conference shall include the
dates respectively set for:
(a) Preliminary Conference (within 30 calendar
days from the filing of the last responsive pleading);
(b) Court-Annexed Mediation (within an
inextendible period of 30 calendar days from date of
referral for mediation); and
(c) Judicial Dispute Resolution, in the court's
discretion (within an inextendible period of 15 calendar
days from notice of failure of the Court-Annexed
Mediation).
Non-appearance at any of the foregoing, settings shall be
deemed as non-appearance at the Preliminary Conference and
shall merit the same sanctions under Section 12, Rule III of
the Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts.
2. It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel
to appear at the Preliminary Conference, Court-Annexed
Mediation, and Judicial Dispute Resolution, if the latter is
ordered by the court. The non-appearance of a party and/or
counsel may be excused only for acts of God, force majeure, or
duly substantiated physical inability.

508 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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A representative may appear on behalf of a party, but
must be fully authorized through a Special Power of Attorney
or a board resolution, as the case may be, to: (1) enter into
an amicable settlement, (2) to submit to alternative modes
of dispute resolution, and (3) to enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts and documents. An authority which fails
to include all these acts shall be ineffective and the party
represented shall be deemed absent.
The failure despite notice of the plaintiff and/or his or
her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference shall
be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint. The defendant
who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment on the counterclaim, in accordance with Section 9 of
Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts. All
cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant and/or his or her counsel fail to appear
at the Preliminary Conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled
to judgment in accordance with the same Section 9. This shall
not apply, however, where one of two or more defendants
sued under a common cause and who had pleaded a common
defense, shall appear at the Preliminary Conference (Sec.
13, Rule IIL Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level
Courts).
3. Immediately after the preliminary conference
and the issues having been joined, the court shall issue a
Preliminary Conference Order referring the parties to the
mandatory Court-Annexed Mediation, and Judicial Dispute
Resolution, which shall be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC or the 2020 Guidelines
for the Conduct of the Court-Annexed Mediation (CAM) and
Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) in Civil Cases.
The court may, in the same Preliminary Conference
Order, declare the case submitted for judgment if, on the
basis of the pleadings and their attachments, as well as the
stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment
may be rendered without the need of submission of position
papers. In this event, the court shall render judgment within
30 calendar days from issuance of the order. The court's order
CHAPTER VII 509
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
shall not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration or a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, or manda"':"us, but may be
among the matters raised on appeal after a Judgment on the
merits.
If the court however, deems the submission of position
appears still ne~essary, it shall require the parties, in the
Preliminary Conference Order, to submit their _respective
position papers within 10 calendar days from ~eceipt of ~uch
order. No other judicial affidavits or evidence will be admitted
even if filed with the position papers.
Preliminary conference in the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court
1. A preliminary conference may be conducted in the
Court of Appeals, but the same is not mandatory. Sec. 1 of
Rule 48 provides that at any time during the pendency of the
case the court may call the parties and their counsels to a
' .
preliminary conference for the followmg purposes:
"SECTION 1. X X X
(a) To consider the possibility of an amicable
settlement, except when the case is not allowed by law to
be compromised;
(b) To define, simplify and clarify the issues for
determination;
(c) To formulate stipu~a~ions. ~f facts and
admissions of documentary exh1b1ts, hm1t the number
of witnesses to be presented in cases falling w~th~n t~e
original jurisdiction of the court, ?r those w1th1:°-1~s
appellate jurisdiction where a 1?-otion for ~ew trial 1s
granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence; and
(d) To take up such other matters which may aid
the court in the prompt disposition of the case."
2. Rule 48 (Preliminary Conference) is also _m_ade
applicable to the Supre~e. ~ourt by the Rules in original
cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto
and habeas corpus (Sec. 2, Rule 56, Rules of Court).

510 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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B. MODES OF DISCOVERY
Meaning and purpose of "discovery"
1. In general, a discovery is a device employed by a
party to obtain, from the adverse party, information about
relevant matters on the case in preparation for the trial. In
the early days of litigation, a party would learn about the
opponent's evidence only during the trial proper. The rules
of procedure have, however, evolved to their present state in
which litigation has ceased to be a game of surprises. Now,
parties are allowed to have knowledge of relevant facts in
possession of the adverse party and to require the disclosure
of evidence even prior to trial.
2. The broad purpose of discovery procedures is to
permit mutual knowledge before trial of all relevant facts
gathered by both parties so that either party may compel
the other to disgorge facts whatever he has in his possession
(35A C.J.S. §527, 1960). In the practical sense, the modes of
discovery are designed to serve as an additional device for
settlement aside from a pre-trial. The disclosure of relevant
facts in possession of the adverse party may possibly encourage
amicable settlement of the case after a party realizes the
weakness of his position.
The Court explained that "The various modes or
instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device,
along with the pre-trial hearing xx x to narrow and clarify
the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for
ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident
purpose is x x x to enable the parties, consistent with
recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge
of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that
said trials are carried on in the dark" (Fortune Corporation v.
CA, G.R. No. 108119, January 19, 1994).
Duty of the court in relation to the modes of discovery
The modes of discovery are considered by the Supreme
Court as vital components of case management in pre-trial
CHAPTER VII 511
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
courts. Hence aside from preparing the summons within one
day from the ;eceipt of the compl_aint, the ?our~ is required_ to
issue an order requiring the parties to avail of mterrogatories
to parties under Rule 25 and request for admission by adverse
party under Rule 26, ⑧ or, at their discretion, make use of
depositions under Rule 23, or other measures under Rules 27
and 28 within five days from the filing of the answer. A copy
of this order shall be served upon the defendant together with
the summons. A copy of the order shall also be served upon the
plaintiff (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, July 13, 2004). V 1:der the ci~ed
Administrative Matter, the use of interrogatories to parties
(Rule 25) and request for admission (Rule 26) is mandatory
while the availment of other modes of discovery are merely
discretionary on the parties.
-
Modes of discovery under the Rules of Court (Bar 2000)
The following are the modes of discovery under the Rules
of Court:
(a) Depositions pending action (Rule 23);
(b) Depositions before action or pending appeal
(Rule 24);
(c) Interrogatories to parties (Rule 25); Bar 2016
(d) Admission by adverse party (Rule 26); Bar
2018
(e) Production or inspection of documents or things
(Rule 27); and
(f) Physical and mental examination of persons
(Rule 28). Bar 2015
I. Depositions (Rules 23-24; Bar 2010)
1. A deposition is the taking, out of court, of the
testimony of any person, whether he be a party or not, but at
the instance of a party to the action.
This provision does not make any distinction or restriction
as to who can avail of a deposition as long as he/it is a party
512 CML PROCEDURE
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VOLUME I
to the case. Thus, it is immaterial that the plaintiff availing of
the deposition, as a mode of discovery, is a foreign corporation
and all its witnesses are residing abroad (Santamaria v.
Cleary, G.R. No. 197122, June 15, 2016).
2. A deposition may be sought for use in a pending
action (Rule 23), a future action (Rule 24), or for use in a
pending appeal (Rule 24).
If the deposition is for use during a pending action, it is
commonly called a deposition de benne esse and is governed
by Rule 23. If it is to perpetuate a testimony for use in future
proceedings, as when it is sought before the existence of
an action, or for cases on appeal, it is called a deposition in
perpetuam rei memoriam and is governed by Rule 24.
Depositions pending action; when leave of court is required
1. When there is a pending case, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken even before the
trial proper. Such testimony is to be taken at the instance of
any party to the action. The taking of the testimony is called
a "deposition." The person whose testimony is to be taken is
called a "deponent."
The former rule requires leave of court is required before
the service of an answer but after jurisdiction has been acquired
over any defendant or over the property subject of the action.
(See Sec. 1, Rule 23, Rules of Court; Santamaria v. Cleary,
G.R. No. 197122, June 15, 2016; Georg v. Holy Trinity College,
Inc., G.R. No. 190408, July 20, 2016). The 2019 Amendments
to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure removed the distinction
between before and after answer has been served. Now, the
court used the uniform language of only upon ex parte motion
of a party.
However, the, deposition of a person confined in prison
may be taken only by leave of court and upon such terms as
the court prescribes (See Sec. 1, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
CHAPTER VII 513
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
Scope of the examination; manner of examination
1. The deponent may be examined regarding any
matter which is relevant to the subject of the pending action
as long as the subject of the examination does not involve
matters that are privileged. Since the allowable examination
may be on any matter relevant to the pending action, the
deponent may be asked questions relating to the claim or
defense of any party. He may be asked about the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books or documents or other tangible things. He may also be
asked to answer questions as to the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of facts relevant to the case (See
Sec. 2, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC).
2. The rule provides for two methods of taking a
deposition. It may be either by (a) an oral examination, or by
(b) a written interrogatory (Sec. 1, Rule 23, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). During the deposition,
the deponent may be examined and cross-examined following
the rules on examination of witnesses permitted under Secs.
3 to 18 of Rule 132. This means that the examination may be
a trial-type examination (Sec. 3, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). .
Attendance of the deponents/witnesses; sanctions
1. The attendance of witnesses to be examined may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena (Sec. 1, Rule 23, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). In case of
the failure of a witness to attend, the court or judge issuing
the subpoena, upon proof and service thereof and of the
failure of the witness, may issue a warrant to arrest the said
witness and bring him or her before the court or officer where
his attendance is required (Sec. 8, Rule 21, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Also, failure to obey
a subpoena, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a
contempt of the court from which the subpoena is issued (Sec.
9, Rule 21, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
--
514 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
①
2. If a party or other deponent, during the deposition,
refuses to answer any question upon oral examination, the
deposition may continue on other matters or may be adjourned
at the election of the proponent of the question. However, the
② proponent may apply, before the court where the deposition is
③
taken, for an order to compel an answer. If the application is
granted, the court shall require the refusing party or deponent
to answer the question. ⑭If the court finds that the refusal is
not supported by a substantial justification, it may order the
person refusing to answer or the counsel advising the refusal,
or both, to pay to the proponent the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's
fees (Sec. 1, Rule 29, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
The party or deponent who refuses to answer a question
after being ordered to do so by the court, may be held i~
contempt of court. The same rule applies for a refusal to be
sworn as a witness. Under the Rules, a refusal to be sworn or
a re~usal to answer a question after being so ordered, may be
considered contempt of court (Sec. 2, Rule 29, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Effects) 3. A party who unjustifiably refuses to answer questions
wences during the deposition may suffer from other consequences of
Consed such refusal. One consequence of the refusal by a party (not
by a mere witness) to obey an order requiring him to answer
designated questions is that the court may issue an order that 1
the matters regarding which the questions were asked shall
be taken to have been established for the purpose of the action
in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order
from the court (Sec. 3 [a], Rule 29, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC).
The court may also issue an order refusing the disobedient
party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses. The
order may prohibit the disobedient party from introducing
in evidence designated documents or things or items of
testimony, or from introducing evidence of physical or mental
condition (Sec. 3 [b}, Rule 29, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
CHAPTER VII 515
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
It is also possible that the court may issue an order
striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action
or proceedings or any party thereof, or rendering a judgment
by default against a disobedient party (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 29,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC).
In lieu of the above orders or in addition thereto, the court
may issue an order directing the arrest of any party or his
agent for disobeying court orders except an order to submit to
a physical or mental examination (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 29, Rules of
Court).
Note: The above consequences do not only apply to the
refusal to answer designated questions. They also apply to a
refusal to obey an order under Rule 27 to produce any document
or other thing for inspection, copying or photographing or to
permit it to be done; to permit entry upon land or property;
or to obey an order under Rule 28 requiring him to submit to
a mental or physical examination. Such consequences are to
be suffered by any party or an officer or managing agent of a
party (Rule 29, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC).
Oral deposition
1. A party desiring to take the deposition of any person
upon oral examination shall give to every party to the action a
reasonable notice in writing. Such notice is required to contain
the following:
(a) the time and place for taking the deposition;
and
2 (b) the name and address of each person to be
examined, if known; if not known, there must be a
3 general description sufficient to identify him or her or the
particular class or group to which he or she belongs (Sec.
15, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).

516 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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2. After service of the notice, the court, upon motion
by any party or by the person to be examined and for good
cause shown, issue an order for the protection of the parties
and the deponent. For instance, the court may, among others,
order that the deposition be taken only at a designated place
other than the one stated in the notice; that instead of being
orally conducted, the deposition may be taken only on written
interrogatories. The court may also direct that certain matters
may not be inquired into. It may even order that only the
parties and their counsels and the officers presiding in the
deposition could be present in the proceedings or issue any
other order to protect the parties and their witnesses from
annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression (Sec. 16, Rule 23,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Salient guidelines in the taking of an oral deposition
Certain guidelines for oral depositions provided for under
Sec. 17 of Rule 23 must be observed. These are:
(a) The officer before whom the deposition is taken
shall put the witness on oath; he or she shall personally
and in his or her presence record the testimony of the
witness or the recording may be done by someone acting
under his or her direction.
(b) The testimony of the witness or deponent must
be recorded and be taken stenographically, unless the
parties agree otherwise;
(c) All objections made at the time of the
examination shall be noted and evidence objected to shall
be taken but subject to the objections (the applicable
provision does not provide that the officer has to rule on
the objection);
3. In lieu of participating in the oral examination,
parties served with notice of taking a deposition may transmit
written interrogatories to the officers, who shall propound
them to the witness and record the answers verbatim (Sec.
17, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
CHAPTER VII 517
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
4. When the testimony is fully transcribed, the
deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination
and read to or by him or her, unless such examination is
waived by the witness and the parties. The witness may desire
some changes in form and substance, in which case such
changes shall be entered upon the deposition by the officer
with a statement of the reasons of the witness for making
such changes. The deposition shall be signed by the witness,
unless the signing is waived by the parties by stipulation or,
the deposition cannot be signed because the witness is ill,
cannot be found or he refuses to sign (Sec. 19, Rule 23, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
5. If the deposition is not signed by the witness, the
officer shall sign it and state on the record the attendant
facts, together with the reason given for the non-signing of
the deposition. This having been done, the deposition may be
used as fully as though it was signed, unless on a motion to
suppress under Sec. 29(f) of Rule 23 and the court holds that
the reasons given for the refusal to sign require rejecting the
deposition in whole or in part (Sec. 19, Rule 23, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
6. The officer is required to certify on the deposition
that the witness was duly sworn to by him or her and that
the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the
witness. He shall then securely seal the deposition in an
envelope indorsed with the title of the action "Deposition of
(name of witness)." He or she shall, likewise, promptly ~le it
with the court in which the action is pending or send 1t by
registered mail to the clerk thereof for filing (Sec. 20, Rule
23, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). All
parties shall promptly be notified of its filing by the officer
taking the deposition (Sec. 21, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) and upon payment of
reasonable charges, the officer shall furnish a copy of the
deposition to any party or to the deponent (Sec. 22, Rule 23,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).

518 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Deposition upon written interrogatories
1. A deposition need not be conducted through an
oral examination. It may be conducted through written
interrogatories (Sec. 1, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. A party desiring to take the deposition of any person
upon written interrogatories shall serve the interrogatories
upon every other party with a notice stating the name and
address of the person who is to answer them, the name and
descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the
deposition is to be taken (Sec. 25, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. The party served with the interrogatories may
also serve cross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to
take the deposition within 10 calendar days from service of
the written interrogatories. The latter may, 5 calendar days,
serve re-direct interrogatories. Within 3 calendar days after
being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve
re-cross interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the
deposition (Sec. 25, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
4. A copy of the notice and copies of all interrogatories
served shall be delivered by the party taking the deposition
to the officer designated in the notice. He shall proceed
promptly to take the testimony of the witness in response to
the interrogatories and to prepare, certify, and file or mail the
deposition, attaching thereto the copy of the notice and the
interrogatories received by him or her (Sec. 26, Rule 23, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC).
5. When a deposition upon interrogatories is filed, the
officer taking it shall promptly give notice thereof to all the
parties, and may furnish copies to them or to the deponent
upon payment of reasonable charges therefor (Sec. 27, Rule
29, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
CHAPTER VII 519
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
Before whom taken
1. Within the Philippines, a deposition need not be
taken before a judge, although it may be taken before one.
It may also be taken before a notary public (Sec. 10, Rule
23, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) or
before any person authorized to administer oaths if the parties
so stipulate in writing (Sec. 14, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Outside the Philippines, a deposition may be taken
before (a) a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines; (b) such person or officer as may be appointed by
commission or letters rogatory; or (c) a person authorized to
administer oaths by written stipulation of the parties (Sec. 11,
Rule 23, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC;
Sec. 14, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
3. No deposition shall be taken before a person who
is (a) a relative within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or employee or counsel of any of the parties; (b) a
relative within the same degree, or employee of such counsel;
or (c) one financially interested in the action (Sec. 13, Rule 23,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Use of depositions pending action
1. Any part or all of the deposition, so far as admissible
under the rules on evidence, may be used (a) against any party
who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition,
or (b) against one who had due notice of the deposition. The
deposition, or any of its parts, may be used at the trial or upon
the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding (Sec.
4, Rule 23, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
2. The deposition may be used for the following
purposes:

520 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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(a) For contradicting or impeaching the testimony
of the deponent as a witness;
(b) For any purpose by the adverse party where the
deponent is a party or, at the time of taking the deposition
was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or
private corporation, partnership, or association which is
a party;
(c) For any purpose by any party, where the
deponent is a witness, whether or not a party, if the court
finds that (i) the witness is dead; (ii) that the witness
resides more than 100 kilometers from the place of trial
or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears
that his or her absence was procured by the party
offering the deposition; (iii) that the witness is unable to
attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; (iv) that the party offering the deposition
has been unable to procure the attendance of witnesses
by subpoena; or (v) when exceptional circumstances
exists, upon application and notice (Sec. 4, Rule 23, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Effect of substitution of parties
The substitution of parties does not affect the right to
use the depositions previously taken (Sec. 5, Rule 23, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The same
rule also provides that when an action has been dismissed
and another action involving the same subject and between
the same parties, or their representatives or successors in
interest, is afterwards brought, all the depositions lawfully
taken and duly filed in the former action may be used in the
latter as if originally taken.
Effect of the taking of deposition of a person
A person whose deposition is taken by a party does not,
by reason of such deposition, make such person the witness of
said party. Sec. 7 of Rule 23 clearly declares that "[A] party
CHAPTER VII 521
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
shall not be deemed to make a person his or her own witness
for any purpose by taking his or her deposition."
Effect of using the deposition of a person
While the taking of the deposition of a person does not
make that person a witness of the party taking his deposition,
the introduction of the deposition, or any part thereof,
makes the deponent the witness of the party introducing the
deposition if used for a purpose other than that of contradicting
or impeaching the deponent (Sec. 8, Rule 23, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The same provision,
however, does not make this rule applicable to the use by an
adverse party of a deposition mentioned in paragraph (b) of
Sec. 4 of Rule 23, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC.
Depositions before action
This type of deposition is availed of when a person desires
to perpetuate his or her own testimony or that of another
person regarding any matter that may be cognizable in any
court of the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 24, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Perpetuation of testimony before action
1. The perpetuation of a testimony is done by filing a
verified petition in the place of the residence of any expected
adverse party (Sec. 1, Rule 24, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Notices shall be sent in accordance with the Rules
(Sec. 3, Rule 24, Rules of Court) and if the court is satisfied
that the perpetuation of the testimqny may prevent a failure
or delay of justice, it shall make the appropriate order for the
taking of the deposition (Sec. 4, Rule 24, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. The deposition taken under this Rule is admissible
in evidence in any action subsequently brought involving
the same subject matter (Sec. 6, Rule 24, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
522 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Depositions pending appeal
1. If an appeal has been taken from a judgment of a
court, including the Court of Appeals in proper cases, or
before the taking of an appeal if the time therefor has not
expired, the court in which the judgment was rendered may
allow the taking of depositions of witnesses to perpetuate
their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in
said court (Sec. 7, Rule 24, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. The party who desires to perpetuate the testimony
may make a motion in said court for leave to take the
depositions. The notice and service shall be made in the same
manner as if the action is pending (Sec. 7, Rule 24, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. The motion shall state the (a) names and addresses
of the persons to be examined; (b) substance of the testimony
he or she expects to elicit from each of the persons to be
examined; and (c) reason for perpetuating their testimony
(Sec. 7, Rule 24, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
4. The court shall allow the depositions if it finds that
the perpetuation of the testimony is proper to avoid a failure
or delay of justice. The depositions may be taken and used in
the same manner and under the same conditions prescribed
for depositions taken in pending actions (Sec. 7, Rule 24, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC).
II. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES (BAR 2016)
(RULE 25)
Purpose of interrogatories to parties (Bar 2012; 2016)
1. This mode of discovery is availed of by a party to
the action for the purpose of eliciting material and relevant
facts from any adverse party (Sec. 1, Rule 25, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The purpose of written
interrogatories is to assist the parties in clarifying the issues
and in ascertaining the facts involved in a case (Philippine
CHAPTER VII 523
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
Health Insurance Corporation v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital,
G.R. No. 193158, November 11, 2015).
2. The Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court
Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-trial and
Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC)
considers this mode of discovery as important because within
one day from receipt of the complaint, the rule mandates not
only the preparation of the summons but also the issuance of
an order requiring the parties to avail of interrogatories to
parties under Rule 25 and request for admission by adverse
party under Rule 26. The parties, however, may use, at their
discretion, depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under
Rules 27 and 29 within five days from the filing of the answer
(A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, IA, 1, 1.1, 1.2).
Distinguished from a bill of particulars
A bill of particulars is directed to a pleading and is designed
to seek for a more definite statement or for particulars of any
matter not averred with sufficient definiteness in a pleading.
(Sec. 1, Rule 12, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC). Interrogatories to parties are not directed against
a particular pleading. Instead, they seek the disclosure of all
material and relevant facts from a party (See Sec. 1, Rule 25,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Distinguished from written interrogatories in a deposition
Written interrogatories in a deposition are not served
upon the adverse party directly. They are instead delivered
to the officer designated in the notic~ (Sec. 26, Rule 23, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The service
of written interrogatories is a mode of deposition separate
and distinct from interrogatories to parties (See Sec. 1, Rule
23, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Interrogatories to parties are served directly upon the adverse
party (Sec. 1, Rule 25, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
524 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Procedure (Bar 2016)
1. The mode of discovery is availed of by filing and
serving upon the adverse party written interrogatories to
be answered by the party served. If the party is a juridical
entity, the written interrogatories shall be answered by any
of its officers competent to testify in its behalf (Sec. 1, Rule 25,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. No party may, without leave of court, serve more
than one set of interrogatories to be answered by the same
party (Sec. 4, Rule 25, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
3. The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writ-
ing, signed, and sworn to by the person making them. The par-
ty upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall file
and serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the
interrogatories within 15 calendar days after service thereof.
This period may, upon motion and for good cause shown, be
extended or shortened by the court (Sec. 2, Rule 25, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
4. The party against whom it is directed may make
objections to the interrogatories. If he does so, said objections
shall be presented to the court within 10 calendar days after
service of the interrogatories. The filing of the objections shall
have the effect of deferring the filing and service of the answer
to the interrogatories until the objections are resolved (Sec.
3, Rule 25, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories
A party not served with written interrogatories may not
be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open
court, or give deposition pending appeal, unless allowed by
the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice (Sec. 6, Rule 25, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
CHAPTER VII 525
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
III. ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY
(BAR 2016; 2018)
(RULE 26)
Purpose of admission by adverse party
The purpose of this mode of discovery is to allow one
party to request the adverse party, in writing, to admit certain
material and relevant matters which, most likely, will not be
disputed during the trial. To avoid unnecessary inconvenience
to the parties in going through the rigors of proof before the
trial, a party may request the other to:
(a) admit the genuineness of any material and
relevant document described in and exhibited with the
request; or
(b) admit the truth of any material and relevant
matter of fact set forth in the request (Sec. 1, Rule 26,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
When request is made
A party may file and serve the written request at any
time after issues have been joined (Sec. 1, Rule 26, Rules of
Court).
Effect of not filing a written request for admission (Bar 2012)
1. As a consequence of the failure to avail of this mode
of discovery, the party shall not bepermitted to present evidence
on facts that are material and relevant and which are, or ought
to be, within the personal knowledge of the other party, unless
otherwise allowed by the court for good cause shown and to
prevent a failure of justice (Sec. 5, Rule 26, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Note, too, that within one day from receipt of the
complaint, the rule mandates not only the preparation of
526 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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the summons but also the issuance of an order requiring the
parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 25
and request for admission by adverse party under Rule 26.
The parties, however, may use, at their discretion, depositions
under Rule 23 or other measures under Rules 27 and 29 within
five days from the filing of the answer (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,
IA, 1, 1.1, .J.2, July 13, 2004).
Effect of failure to file and serve a sworn statement of denial
(Bar 2018)
1. It is advisable for the party to whom the written
request is directed to file and serve upon the party requesting
the admission a sworn statement either (a) specifically
denying the matters of which admission is requested, or (b) if
he does not deny the same, to set forth in detail the reasons
why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters. This
sworn statement shall be filed and served within the period
designated in the request but which shall not be less than 15
calendar days from the service of such request, or within such
further time as the court may allow (Sec. 2, Rule 26, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. If the party to whom the written request for admis-
sion is directed does not file the required sworn statement,
each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted (Sec. 2, Rule 26, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). A request for admission can be the
basis of a summary judgment. The request can be the basis
thereof when its subject is deemed to have been admitted by
the party as a result of that party's failure to respond to the
request (Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos v. Republic, G.R. No.
213037, January 18, 2017). Bar 2018
Effect of admission
Any admission made by a party as a consequence of the
failure to comply with the request is only for the purpose of
the pending action and shall not be deemed an admission for
CHAPTER VII 527
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
any other purpose. Likewise, the admission cannot be used
against the admitting party in any other proceeding (Sec. 3,
Rule 26, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
Deferment of compliance
To avoid the implied admission, the party requested may
have the compliance of the filing and service of the sworn
statement deferred. This deferment may be effected by the
filing with the court objections to the request for admission.
Compliance shall be deferred until such objections are
resolved by the court (Sec. 2, par. 2, Rule 26, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Withdrawal of admission
Admissions made under this mode of discovery, whether
express or implied, are not final and irrevocable. The court
may allow the party making the admission to withdraw or
amend the admission upon such terms as may be just (Sec.
4, Rule 26, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC). To effect the withdrawal, the admitting party should file
a motion to be relieved of the effects of his admission.
IV. PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION
OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS (RULE 27)
Purpose (Bar 2012)
1. The purpose of this mode of discovery is to allow a
party to seek an order from the court in which the action is
pending to: ·
(a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf
of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
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actiop and which are in his or her possession, custody or
control; and
(b) order any party to permit entry upon designated
land or other property in his or her possession or control
for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant
object or operation thereon (Sec. 1, Rule 27, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. This mode of discovery is not only for the benefit of
a party, but also for the court and for it to discover all the
relevant and material facts in connection with the case before
it. The scope of discovery under this mode is to be liberally
construed so as to provide the litigants with information
essential to the fair and amicable settlement or expeditious
trial of the case. All the parties are required to lay their cards
on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the
case. While the grant of a motion for production of a document
is admittedly discretionary on the part of the trial court
judge, nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably
denied because to do so would bar access to relevant evidence
that may be used by a party-litigant and, hence, impair his
fundamental right to due process. The test to be applied by the
trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents is one
of reasonableness and practicability (Eagleridge Development
Corporation v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.,
G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013; See also Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, G.R.
No. 193158, November 11, 2015).
3. This discovery procedure has a limitation: the
documents to be disclosed and produced should be "not
privileged" (Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013).
Filing of a motion; order of the court
1. A motion must be filed by the party seeking the
production or inspection of documents and things, and the
motion must show good cause supporting the same (Sec. 1,
CHAPTER VII 529
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
Rule 27, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
2. The order shall specify the ti1ne, place and manner
of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs,
and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just (Sec.
1, Rule 27, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
Privileged documents
1. Rule 27 provides that the documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that
may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. The
documents must not be privileged against disclosure. On the
ground of public policy, the rules providing for production
and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the
production or inspection of privileged matter; that is, books
and papers which, because of their confidential and privileged
character, could not be received in evidence. Such a condition
is in addition to the requisite that the items be designated and
must constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in the party's possession,
custody or control (Sec. 1, Rule 27, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. Sec. 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification
by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a) commu-
nication between husband and wife; (b) communication
between attorney and client; (c) communication between
physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and
penitent; and (e) communication of public officers involving
public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters
that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the
following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the
source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to
disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information
contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits (Air
Philippines Corporation v. Pennswell, Inc., 540 SCRA 215).
530 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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V. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION
OFPERSONS(RULE2~
Applicability
This mode of discovery applies to an action in which the
mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy (Sec.
1, Rule 28, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC). Examples of this action would be:
(a) An action for annulment of a contract where the
ground relied upon is insanity.
(b) A petition for guardianship of a person alleged
to be insane.
(c) An action to recover damages for personal
injury where the issue is the extent of the injuries of the
plaintiff.
Procedure
1. A motion must show good cause for the examination,
with notice to the other parties aside from the party to be
examined. The motion shall, likewise, specify the time, place,
manner, conditions and scope of the examination and the
person or persons by whom it is to be made (Sec. 2, Rule 28,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). The
motion is to be filed with the court where the action is pending
(Sec. 1, Rule 28, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
2. The party examined may request the party causing
the examination to be made to deliver to him a copy of a
detailed written report of the examining physician setting out
his findings and conclusions. After such request and delivery,
the party causing the examination to be made shall be entitled
upon request to receive from the party examined a like report
of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the
same mental or physical condition (Sec. 3, Rule 28, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
CHAPTER VII 531
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
If the party examined refuses to deliver the report, the
court may make an order requiring the delivery on such terms
as are just. If it is the physician who fails or refuses to make
a report, the court may exclude his testimony if offered at the
trial (Sec. 3, Rule 28, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
Waiver of privilege
By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination
or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party
examined waives any privilege he or she may have in that
action or any other involving the same controversy, regarding
the testimony of every other person who has examined or may
thereafter examine him or her in respect of the same mental
or physical examination (Sec. 4, Rule 28, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
VI. REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH THE
MODES OF DISCOVERY
(RULE 29)
Aside from those already discussed, the sanctions
for refusal to comply with the modes of discovery may be
summarized as follows:
A. Refusal to answer any question upon oral
examination
(a) If a party refuses to answer any question
upon oral examination, the proponent may apply to the
proper court, for an order to compel an answer. The same
procedure may be availed of when a party or witness
refuses to answer any interrogatory submitted pursuant
to the rules on the modes of discovery (Sec. 1, Rule 2 9, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). If the
application is granted, the court shall order the deponent
or refusing party to answer the question or interrogatory.
If the refusal is unjustified, the court may require the
refusing party or deponent or the counsel advising the
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refusal, or both of them, to pay the proponent the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the
order, including attorney's fees (Sec. 1, Rule 29, Rules
of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Also, a
refusal to answer after being directed by the proper court
may be considered a contempt of that court (Sec. 2, Rule
29, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
(b) If the application for an order to compel a
deponent to answer is denied because of the absence of
a substantial justification, the court may require the
proponent or the counsel advising the application, or
both of them, to pay to the refusing party or deponent the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing
the application, including attorney's fees (Sec. 1, Rule 29,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
B. Refusal to answer designated or particular
questions or refusal to produce documents or things or
to submit to physical or mental examination
(a) The court may order that the matters, regarding
which the questions were asked, shall be taken as
established for purposes of the action in accordance with
the claim of the party obtaining them (Sec. 3[a], Rule 29,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
(b) The court may issue an order refusing to allow
the disobedient party to support or oppose designated
claims or defenses or prohibiting him or her from
introducing in evidence designated documents or things
or items of testimony, or from introducing evidence of
physical or mental condition (Sec. 3[b], Rule 29, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
(c) The court may issue an order striking out
pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings
until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment
by default against the disobedient party (Sec. 3[c], Rule
29, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
CHAPTER VII 533
PRE-TRIAL AND MODES OF DISCOVERY
(d) The court may direct the arrest of any party
or agent of a party for disobeying any of the orders of
the court, except an order to submit to a physical or
mental examination (Sec. 3[d], Rule 29, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
C. Refusal to be sworn
A refusal of a party to be sworn after being directed by
the court may be considered a contempt of that court (Sec. 2,
Rule 29, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
D. Refusal to admit
If a party refuses to admit the genuineness of any
document or the truth of any matter of fact and serves a
sworn denial thereof, and if the other party later on proves
the genuineness of the document or the truth of such matter
of fact, the court, upon proper application, may order the
former to pay the reasonable expenses in making such proof,
including attorney's fees (Sec. 4, Rule 29, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
E. Failure to attend depositions or to serve
answers to interrogatories (Bar 2010)
1. The court may (a) strike out all or any part of the
pleading of that party, (b) dismiss the action or proceeding
or any part thereof, (c) enter a judgment by default against
that party, and, in its discretion, (d) order him or her to
pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including
attorney's fees (Sec. 5, Rule 29, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). .
2. The consequences under Sec. 5 of Rule 29 will
apply if a party refuses to answer the whole set of written
interrogatories, and not just a particular,- question. Where
the party, upon whom the written interrogatories is served,
refuses to answer a particular question in the set of written
interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to answer
534 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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the particular question, still refuses to obey the order, Sec. 3(c)
of Rule 29 will apply (Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation,
504 SCRA 126, 134).
The following are the consequences provided for in
Sec. 3(c) of Rule 29, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC:
(a) The court may issue an order striking
pleadings or parts thereof;
(b) The court may issue an order staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed;
(c) The court may issue an order dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof; or
(d) The court may issue an order rendering
judgment by default against the disobedient party.
3. The matter of how, and when, the above sanctions
should be applied is one that primarily rests on the sound
discretion of the court where the case is pending, having
always in mind the paramount and overriding interest of
justice. For while the modes of discovery are intended to attain
the resolution of litigations with great expediency, they are
not contemplated, however, to be ultimate causes of injustice.
It behooves trial courts to examine well the circumstances of
each case and make their considered determination thereafter
(Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation, supra).
-oOo-
Chapter VIII
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE,
out AND JUDGMENT
A. TRIAL
Meaning of 'trial'
Trial is the judicial examination and determination of
the issues between the parties to the action (Black's Law
a Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1348; Citations omitted). Simply put, a
trial is the judicial process of investigating and determining
the legal controversies between or among the parties. During
the trial, the parties present their respective evidence of their
claims and defenses. Such claims and defenses shall constitute
the bases for the judgment of the court.
Trial and hearing
The terms 'trial' and 'hearing' are sometimes
interchangeably used. There is, however, a marked difference
between these terms. Hearing is a broader term and is not
confined to the trial and presentation of the evidence because
it actually embraces several stages in the litigation. It includes
the pre-trial and the determination of granting or denying a
motion (Trocio v. Labayo, 53 SCRA 97, 100).
When trial is necessary/unnecessary (Bar 1996)
1. Generally, a trial is necessary when there are issues
to be tried as result of the specific denials of the material
allegations in the complaint. Where no issues are presented
in the case because the defending party's answer to the
complaint tenders no issue, there is no reason to conduct a
535
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trial since there is no triable issue. In such a case, the court
may, on motion, render a judgment on the pleadings.
There are also occasions in which it appears from the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions and admissions of the
parties that a legal dispute exists. Such allege legal dispute
turns out, however, not to be a genuine issue since it does not
touch on any material fact involved in the case, as when the
only controversy is the amount of damages, and not whether
or not the claiming party is entitled to such damages. A trial is
not necessary in such a situation·because the court, on motion,
may render a summary judgment. Courts hold trials only on
material and crucial issues. Trials are not conducted to resolve
feigned issues or immaterial or minor matters raised by the
parties.
2. Specifically, a civil case may be adjudicated upon
without the need for a trial in any of the following cases:
(a) Where the pleadings of the parties tender no
issue at all, a judgment on the pleadings may be directed
by the court (Rule 34, Rules of Court).
(b) Where from the pleadings, affidavits, depositions
and other papers, there is actually no genuine issue, the
court may render a summary judgment (Rule 35, Rules of
Court).
(c) Where the parties have entered into a
compromise or an amicable settlement either during the
pre-trial or while the trial is in progress (Rule 18, Rules
of Court; Art. 2028, Civil Code of the Philippines).
(d) Where the complaint has been dismissed with
prejudice, or when the dismissal has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits (Sec. 5, Rule 16; Sec. 3, Rule
17; Sec. 5, last par., Rule 7, Rules of Court).
(e) Where the case falls under the operation of the
Rules on Summary Procedure.
(f) Where the parties agree, in writing, upon
the facts involved in the litigation, and submit the
case for judgment on the facts agreed upon, without
CHAPTER VIII 537
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
the introduction of evidence. If, however, there is no
agreement as to all the facts in the case, trial may be
held only as to the disputed facts (Sec. 6, Rule 30, Rules
of Court).
Schedule of Trial
1. The parties shall strictly observe the scheduled
hearings as agreed upon and set forth in the pre-trial order
(Sec. 1, Rule 30, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC).
2. The schedule of the trial dates, for both plaintiff
and defendant, shall be continuous and within the following
periods:
i. The initial presentation of plaintiffs evidence
shall ·be set not later than 30 calendar days after the
termination of the pre-trial conference. Plaintiff shall
be allowed to present its evidence within a period of 3
months or 90 calendar days which shall include the date
of the judicial dispute resolution, if necessary;
ii. The initial presentation of defendant's evidence
shall be set not later than 30 calendar days after the
court's ruling on plaintiffs formal offer of evidence. The
defendant shall be allowed to present its evidence within
a period of 3 months or 90 calendar days;
iii. The period for the presentation of evidence
on the third (fourth, etc.)-party claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim shall be determined by the court, the total of
which shall in no case exceed 90 calendar days; and
iv. If deemed necessary; the court shall set the
presentation of the parties' respective rebuttal evidence,
which shall be completed within a period of 30 calendar
days (Sec. l[a], Rule 30, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. In an overview, the branch clerk of court, upon the
directive of the judge, shall issue notice of pre-trial within 5

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days from the date of the last pleading or expiration of the
period of filing the last pleading. The pre-trial must be set
within 60 days from the date of the last pleading filed. 30 days
from when the trial has been completed, the court must set
the initial presentation of evidence for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff has 3 months or 90 calendar days maximum
to present all his or her evidence. Note that the 90-day period
will include the period for JDR already. On the day of the
presentation of the plaintiffs last witness, plaintiff must
complete his evidence and offer his evidence orally. The
objections should likewise be made orally. 30 days from the
judge's ruling on the offer of evidence of the plaintiff, the
judge must set the defendant's presentation of evidence. The
same period is given which is 3 months or a maximum of 90
calendar days. If you have 2 or more defendants, the same
period will be given to them if they will not present common
evidence. Oral offer of evidence will follow then oral objection
and then the ruling of the court.
In case there is a third-party complaint or a permissive
counterclaim or a cross-claim, the court shall likewise set the
presentation of evidence on those claims. The same 90-day
period is given to them.
After presentation, parties shall submit the case for
judgment unless the original plaintiff and/or the original
defendant requests that they be allowed to present rebuttal
evidence. In which case, they will be given a chance but 30
days maximum for both of them. Period to decide is still 90
days and the submission of memoranda is discretionary.
4. The trial dates may be shortened depending on
the number of witnesses to be presented, provided that the
presentation of evidence of all parties shall be terminated
within a period of 10 months or 300 calendar days. If there
are no third (fourth, etc.)-party claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim, the presentation of evidence shall be terminated within
a period of six (6) months or one hundred eighty (180) calendar
day (Sec. 1[b}, Rule 30, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
CHAPTER VIII 539
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
The court shall decide and serve copies of its decision to
the parties within a period not exceeding ninety (90) calendar
days from the submission of the case for resolution, with or
without memoranda (Sec. l{c], Rule 30, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Calendaring of cases
In calendaring cases, the clerk of court shall give
preference to habeas corpus cases, election cases, special civil
actions, and those so required by law to be preferred (Sec. 1,
Rule 20, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC).
Session hours
1. The session hours of trial courts shall be from 8:30
a.m. to noon and from 2:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. from Monday
to Friday. The hours in the morning shall be devoted to the
conduct of the trial, while the hours in the afternoon shall
be utilized for the conduct of (1) pre-trial conferences; (2)
writing of decisions, resolutions, or orders; or (3) continuation
of the trial on the merits, whenever rendered necessary as
may be required by the Rules of Court, statute, or circulars in
specified cases. This schedule may be modified upon request
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in multi-sala courts in
places where there are few practicing lawyers (Administrative
Circular No. 3-39, January 15, 1999).
2. Unless the docket of the court requires otherwise,
not more than four cases shall be scheduled for trial daily
(Administrative Circular No. 3-39, January 15, 1999).
Adjournments and postponements
The general rule is that a court may adjourn a trial from
day-to-day, and to any stated time, as the expeditious and
convenient transaction of business may require (Sec. 2, Rule
30, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).

540 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Limitation on the authority to adjourn
The court has no power to adjourn a trial for a period
longer than one month for each adjournment, nor more than
three months in all, except when authorized in writing by the
Court Administrator (Sec. 2, Rule 30, Rules of Court).
Postponement or continuance; not a matter of right
1. "As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for
postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
which should always be predicated on the consideration that
more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties,
the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby.
Furthermore, this discretion must be exercised intelligently"
(Milwaukee Industries u. Court of Tax Appeals, 636 SCRA 70,
77; Go-Bangayan u. Bangayan, Jr., G.R. No. 201061, July 3,
2013; See also Spouses Sibay u. Spouses Bermudez, G.R. No.
198196, July 17, 2017).
2. A motion for postponement should not be filed on
the last hour especially when there is no reason why it could
not have been presented earlier (Republic u. Sandiganbayan,
301 SCRA 237, 245). A party asking for postponement has
no absolute right to expect that his motion would be granted
(Republic u. Sandiganbayan, ibid. at 246; See also Spouses
Sibay u. Spouses Bermudez, G.R. No. 198196, July 17, 2017).
3. The party who caused the postponement is warned
that the presentation of its evidence must still be terminated
on the remaining dates previously agreed upon (Sec. 2, Rule
30, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC).
Whoever causes the postponement must bear the loss in time.
If a party is given 5 days to present his evidence then moved
for a postponement, such party will lose 1 day and would still
need to complete his presentation of evidence on the remaining
4 days.
541
CHAPTER VIII
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
Postponement on the ground of illness
Trial may be postponed on the ground of_illness of either
party or counsel by complying with the followmg:
(a) A motion for postponement must be filed;
(b) The motion must be supported by an affidavit
or sworn certification showing that (1) the presence of the
party or counsel at the trial is indispensable, and (2) tt~t
the character of his or her illness is such as to render if
or her non-attendance excusable (Sec. 4, Rule 30, Rules o
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-l0- 2 0-SC).
Reception of evidence
1 The judge of the court where the case is pending s~all
erso~ally receive the evidence to be adduced by the parties.
keception of the evidence may, nevertheless, be. delegat~d
the clerk of court, who is a member of the bar, many o t
following cases:
(a) in default hearings;
(b) in ex parte hearings; or
(c) in any case by written agreement of the parties
(Sec. 9, Rule 30, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
19-10-20-SC).
2 The clerk of court shall have no power_ t? rule _on
objections to any question or to the admission of exh~bi~s,V:-
hie~
ob'ections shall be resolved by the cou_rt~pon su mission o
hi! or her report and the transcri~ts withm ten (10) c;erda/
days from termination of the hearmg (Sec. 9, Rule 30, u es o
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Issues in the trial
The trial shall be limited to the issues stated in th~ ~re-
trial order. This is the general rule, subject t_othe provisio~s
of Sec. 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court so directs for special
reasons \,rsec. 5, Rule 30, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).

542 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Oral offer of exhibits
1. The offer of evidence, the comment or objection
thereto, and the court ruling shall be made orally in accordance
with Secs. 34 to 40 of Rule 132 (Sec. 5, Rule 30, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. For testimonial evidence, a party shall offer it before
the witness starts testifying. For documentary/object evidence,
a party shall offer it after the presentation of all testimonial
evidence has been completed.
Agreed statement of facts
The parties to any action may agree, in writing, upon
the facts involved in the litigation, and submit the case for
judgment on the facts agreed upon, without the introduction
of evidence, but if the parties agree only on some facts in issue,
the trial shall be held as to the disputed facts in such order
as the court shall prescribe (Sec. 7, Rule 30, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M No. 19-10-20-SC). If the parties have agreed
to submit the case for judgment based on the facts agreed
upon, a trial need not be conducted because presentation of
evidence would no longer be necessary.
Order of trial; modification of the order of trial; hot tub
hearing
1. Sec. 5 of Rule 30, as amended by AM. No. 19-10-20-
SC provides the following order of trial in a civil case:
XXX
"Subject to the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 31,
and unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs,
the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-
trial order and shall proceed as follows:
(a) The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in
support of his or her complaint;
(b) The defendant shall then adduce evidence
in support of his or her defense, counterclaim, cross-
claim and third-party complaint;
543
CHAPTER VIII
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
(c) The third-party defendant, if any, s~all
adduce evidence of his or her defense, counterclaim,
cross-claim and fourth-party complaint;
(d) The fourth-party, and so forth, if any,
shall adduce evidence of the material facts pleaded
by them;
(e) The parties against whom any counter-
claim or cross-claim has been pleaded, shall adduce
evidence in support of their defense, in the order to
be prescribed by the court;
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce
rebutting evidence only, unless the_ co~rt, for go?d
reasons and in the furtherance of Justice, permits
them to adduce evidence upon their original case;
and
(g) Upon admission of the e~i~ence, the case
shall be deemed submitted for decision, unl~ss t~e
court directs the parties to argue or to submit their
respective memoranda or any other pleadings.
If several defendants or third-party defendants, and
so forth, having separate defenses appear ?Y different
counsel, the court shall determine the relative order of
presentation of their evidence."
2. The above order of trial is only the general rule. The
order of trial is (a) subject to the provisions of Sec. 2 of R1;1-le
31, and (b) unless, for special reasons, the court otherwise
directs (Sec. 5, Rule 30, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
Thus, the normal order of tria~ may be m~dified. if ~he
court, in furtherance of convenience and to_avoid preJud~ce,
orders a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim,
or third-party complaint. It may also order, for the same
reasons, a separate trial of any separate issue or of any nm~ber
of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complamts
or issues (Sec. 2, Rule 31, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
 544 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Under the same rule, the court may, likewise order a
modification of the order of trial if it so directs fo; "special
reasons."
3. Note that effective January 1, 2013, the Judicial
Affidavit Rule took effect by virtue of AM. No. 12-8-8-SC. This
rule requires the submission of judicial affidavits in lieu of
dire~t t~stimonies. _T?erule applies to all actions, proceedings,
and mc1dents reqmrmg the reception of evidence.
4. In the exercise of its discretion, it appears that
courts, in receiving evidence, may use a method aside from
the traditional modes mentioned in the Rules of Court. For
instance, in one case, the Court of Appeals used the "hot
tub" m~thod in one of its hearings. "Hot tub hearing" is the
colloqmal term for concurrent expert evidence, a method used
for giving evidence in civil cases in Australia. In a "hot
tub" heari1:1g, the judge can hear all the experts discussing
the same issue at the same time to explain each of their
po~nts_ in . a discussion with a professional colleague. The
obJective 1s to achi~ve greater efficiency and expedition,
by reduced emphasis on cross-examination and increased
emphasis on professional dialogue, and swifter identification
of the c~itical are~s of disagreement between the experts
(lnte~nat_wnal Service for the Acquisition of the Agri-Biotech
Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia [Philippines],
G.R. No. 209271, December 8, 2015).
Reopening the case of a party for the purpose of introducing
further evidence
1. The parties may be permitted by the court to adduce
evidence on their original case even after the presentation of
their original evidence, provided:
(a) there are good reasons, and
(b) such reasons are in furtherance of justice.
CHAPTER VIII 545
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
2. The basis for a motion to reopen a party's case to
introduce further evidence is Sec. 5(f), Rule 30 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
"Sec. 5. xx x
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce
rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good
reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits
them to adduce evidence upon their original case
x x x" (Emphasis supplied).
Consolidation or severance (Bar 2011)
1. Consolidation is a procedural device, granted to the
court, as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be
tried, so that the business of the court may be dispatched
expeditiously while providing justice to the parties (Republic
v. Heirs of Oribello, Jr., 692 SCRA 645, 657, March 6, 2013;
Neri v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 202243, August 7, 2013).
The actions to be consolidated must involve a common
question of law or fact. The rule is clear: ''When actions that
involve a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, the court may order a joint hearing or trial of any
or all the matters in issue in the actions and may order the
consolidation of all the actions" (Sec. 1, Rule 31, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). This means
that the several actions which are pending before the court,
arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the
same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on
the same evidence (Puncia v. Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc., G.R.
No. 214399, June 28, 2016).
The use of the word, "may," indicates that consolidation
or severance of cases is not mandatory and is within the sound
discretion of the court (For further readings, see Republic v.
Heirs of Oribello, Jr., 692 SCRA 645, March 6, 2013).
The rationale for consolidation is to have all cases, which
are intimately related, acted upon by one branch of the court
 546 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
to av?id the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered
an~, m effec~, prevent confusion, unnecessary costs and delay.
It 1~ an act10n _sought to avoid multiplicity of suits; guard
agamst oppress10n and abuse; clear and congested dockets·
and to simplify the work of the trial court in order to attai~
j~~tice with the least expense and vexation to the parties
litigants (Puncia u. Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc., G.R. No. 214399
June 28, 2016). '
2. On the other hand, the court may also order a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third-
party complaint, or issues. The court may do so in fu;therance
of convenience, or to avoid prejudice (Sec. 2, Rule 31, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
Kinds of consolidations
. "In the context oflegal procedure, the term 'consolidation'
1s used in three different senses:
(1) Where all, except one of several of actions are
stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in
the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not
actually consolidation but is referred to as such (quasi-
consolidation).
(2) Where several actions are combined into one
los~ their separate identity, and become a single action i~
which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated
by a situation where several actions are pending between
the same parties stating claims which might have been
set out originally in one complaint (actual consolidation).
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried
toge~her, but each retains its separate character, and
requires _the. entry of a separate judgment. This type
of ?onsohdat10n does not merge the suits into a single
act10n, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to
the other (consolidation for trial)" (Republic u. Heirs of
Oribello, Jr., 692 SCRA 645, 657, March 6, 2013; Neri u.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 202243, August 7, 2013).
CHAPTER VIII 547
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
B. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
1. The regular order of trial requires the plaintiff to
adduce evidence in support of his or her complaint. During the
trial, he presents every evidence available to him - object,
documentary, and testimonial (See Sec. 5[a], Rule 30, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence, the defendant shall, then, adduce evidence in
support of his defense, counterclaim or third-party complaint,
as the case may be (See Sec. 5[b], Rule 30, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
There are, however, occasions in which the defendant
may sincerely feel that the plaintiff has not lived up to his
burden of proving the material allegations of his claim and is,
therefore, not entitled to the relief sought for in his complaint.
In other words, the defendant may honestly believe that the
plaintiff has not proven the elements of his cause of action,
hence, the absence or lack of a cause of action.
3. Instead of presenting his evidence, the defendant
may move for dismissal of the case on the ground that, upon
the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief
(Sec. 1, Rule 33, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-
10-20-SC). This motion for dismissal is called a demurrer to
evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is actually a motion to dismiss
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. It is a remedy
available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence
produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of law to
make out or sustain an issue. The rriain point in a demurrer
to evidence is whether or not the plaintiff had been able to
establish a prima facie evidence (For further readings, see
Republic u. De Borja, G.R. No. 187488, January 9, 2017). In
other words, a demurrer is an objection by one of the parties in
an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient to make out a case or sustain the
...--------------------------------
548 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
issue (Claudio u. Saraza, G.R. No. 213286, August 26, 2015;
Felipe u. MGM Motor Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 191849,
September 23, 2015; For further readings, see Republic u. De
Borja, G.R. No. 187488, January 9, 2017).
Stage of the proceedings when demurrer to evidence is
availed of
1. A demurrer to evidence is availed of by the defendant
after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his or her
evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 33, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain
the judgment. Being considered a motion to dismiss thus a
demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the ' court'
renders its judgment. In a case, respondents demurred to
petitioners' evidence after the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
promulgated its decision. While respondents' motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial was granted, it was for the sole
purpose of receiving and offering for admission the documents
not presented at the trial. As respondents never complied
with the directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence
their motion should be deemed abandoned. Consequently, the'
RTC's original Decision stands (Gonzales, et al. u. Bugaay, et
al, G.R. No. 173008, February 22, 2012).
Ground for a demurrer to evidence
1. The defendant may move for dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right
to relief (Sec. 1, Rule 33, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC). This ground is equivalent to "insufficiency
of evidence."
2. Res judicata is an inappropriate ground for sustain-
ing a demurrer to evidence, even as it stands as a proper
ground for a motion to dismiss. A demurrer may be granted
CHAPTER VIII 549
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
if, after the presentation of plaintiffs evidence, it appears
upon the facts and the law that the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. In contrast, the grounds for res judicata present
themselves even before the presentation of evidence, and it
should be at that stage that the defense of res judicata should
be invoked as a ground for dismissal (Republic u. Tuuera, 516
SCRA 113, 130-131).
Effect of denial of the demurrer to evidence
1. The denial of the demurrer to evidence does not
deprive the defendant of the opportunity to adduce evidence
in his behalf. Under the Rules, if the demurrer is denied, the
defendant shall have the right to present his or her evidence
(Sec. 1, Rule 33, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-
20-SC). Hence, where a court denies a demurrer to evidence,
it should set the date for the reception of the defendant's
evidence in chief. It should not proceed to grant the relief
demanded by the plaintiff (Northwest Airlines, Inc. u. Court of
Appeals, 284 SCRA 408, 416).
2. A demurrer to evidence shall be subject to the
provisions of Rule 15.
The order denying the demurrer to evidence shall not be
subject of an appeal or petition for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus before judgment (Sec. 2, Rule 33, Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
3. Note that a party who files a demurrer to evidence
that is subsequently denied, in an election case, cannot insist
on the right to present evidence. The provision of the Rules
of Court governing demurrer to evidence does not apply to
an election case (Gementiza u. COMELEC, 353 SCRA 724,
730). The Rules of Court, under the express dictum in Sec. 4
of Rule I, "shall not apply to election cases, land registration,
cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings x x x"
(Italics supplied).
 550 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Effect of granting the demurrer to evidence
1. If the demurrer is granted the case shall be
dis~iss~d. However, if, on appeal, th~ order granting the
mot10n 1s reversed, the defendant loses his right to present
evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 33, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 19-10-20-SC; Republic v. Tuvera, 516 SCRA 113, 136).
2. It is not correct for the appellate court reversing the
order granting the demurrer to remand the case to the trial
~ourt for further _proceedings. The appellate court should,
mstead of remandmg the case, render judgment on the basis
of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff.
In a case, the trial court, acting on respondents' demurrer
to ~vi~ence, dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
plamtiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on
appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court because
th~ genuinene_ss and due execution of the disputed pieces of
evidence had, m fact, been admitted by defendants.
The Court clearly instructed:
"Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the
basis of the evidence submitted by the petitioner. While
th~ appellate c?urt correctly ruled that "the documentary
evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been
allowed and appreciated x x x," and that "the petitioner
presented quite a number of documentary exhibits
xx_~ enumerated in the appealed order," we agree with
petit10ner that the CA had sufficient evidence on record
to decide the collection suit. A remand is not only frowned
upon b~ the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on
the basis of the facts on record" (Radiowealth Finance
Corporation v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000;
Underscoring supplied).
Failure to state a cause of action as distinguishes from
failure to prove cause of action
Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure
to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move
CHAPTER VIII 551
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second
is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule
10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure would
consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of
action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial,
to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted
(Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran, G.R. No. 197380, October 8,
2014).
Demurrer in a civil case as distinguished from a demurrer in
a criminal case (Bar 2007)
(a) In a civil case, leave of court is not required before
filing a demurrer. In a criminal case, a demurrer is filed with
or without leave of court (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
(b) In a civil case, if the demurrer is granted, the order
of dismissal is appealable (Sec. 1, Rule 33, Rules of Court).
In a criminal case, the order of dismissal is not appealable
because of the constitutional policy against double jeopardy.
The dismissal is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused.
(c) In a civil case, if the demurrer is denied, the
defendant may proceed to present his evidence (Sec. 1, Rule
33, Rules of Court). In a criminal case, the accused may
adduce his evidence only if the demurrer is filed with leave of
court. He cannot present his evidence if he filed the demurrer
without leave of court (Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Court).
(d) In a civil case, the court cannot, on its own initiative,
make a demurrer. In a criminal case, the court may do so
(Sec. 23, Rule 119, Rules of Court). This distinction is deemed
modified by AM. No. 15-06-10-SC ·(Revised Guidelines for
Continuous Trial in Criminal Cases). After the prosecution
rests its case, the court shall inquire from the accused if he/
she desires to move for leave of court to file a demurrer, or
to proceed with the presentation of his/her evidence. The
guidelines do not provide for the dismissal by the court on its
own initiative.
 552 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
C.JUDGMENT
Meaning of a judgment
1. A judgment is the final ruling by a court of competent
jurisdiction regarding the rights or other matters submitted
to it in an action or proceeding (Macahilig v. Heirs of Gracia
M Magalit, 344 SCRA 838, 848). A judgment is the court's
official and final consideration and determination of the
respective rights and obligations of the parties (46 Am Jur 2d,
Judgments Sec. 1).
2. It is vital to keep in mind that, in the process of
rendering a judgment or in resolving controversies, courts can
only consider facts and issues pleaded by the parties. Courts,
as well as magistrates presiding over them, are not omniscient.
They can only act on the facts and issues presented before
them in appropriate pleadings. They may not even substitute
their own personal knowledge for evidence. Nor may they take
notice of matters except those expressly provided as subjects
of mandatory judicial notice (Social Justice Society v. Atienza,
545 SCRA 92, 114).
Judgment and decision
"Judgment" is normally synonymous with "decision"
(Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, 340 SCRA 765, 774).
Requisites of a valid judgment
1. For a judgment to be valid, the following requisites
must exist:
(a) The court or tribunal must be clothed with
authority to hear and determine the matter before it
(Acosta v. COMELEC, 293 SCRA 578, 580);
(b) The court must have jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter;
(c) The parties must have been given an opportu-
nity to adduce evidence in their behalf (Acosta v. COME-
LEC, ibid.);
CHAPTER VIII 553
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
(d) The evidence must have been considered by
the tribunal in deciding the case (Acosta v. COMELEC,
supra);
(e) The judgment must be in writing, personally
and directly prepared by the judge. A verbal judgment is,
in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective
(Corpus v. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 294,309);
(f) The judgment must state clearly the facts and
the law upon which it is based, signed by the judge and
filed with the clerk of court (Sec. 1, Rule 36, Rules of
Court; Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines;
Mendez v. Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a District,
Cotabato City, G.R. No. 201614, January 12, 2016; North
Cotabato Communications Corporation v. Sto. Tomas,
G.R. No. 217575, June 15, 2016).
The parties to a litigation should be informed of how
it was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court
cannot simply say that the judgment is in favor of X and Y
and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever
for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost,
so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should
he believe that the decision should be reversed (Go v. East
Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corporation, G.R. Nos. 206841-
42, January 19, 2018).
2. Faithful adherence to the requisites of a judgment
as required by the Constitution is a paramount component
of due process and fair play. A decision that does not clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and
is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal (De Leon v. People, G.R. No. 212623, January 11,
2016). A decision, with nothing to support it, is a patent nullity
and should be struck down and set aside as void (Miguel v. JCT
Group, Inc., 453 SCRA 529, 541) and accordingly, the Court

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will not hesitate to strike down decisions rendered which do
not comply with the Constitutional directive (South Cotabato
Communications Corporation u. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 217575,
June 15, 2016).
Orders granting or denying a motion to dismiss
1. It is not only judgments which must distinctly and
clearly state the facts and the law upon which they are based.
This requirement proscribes the common practice of
perfunctorily dismissing a motion to dismiss for lack of
merit. Such cavalier dispositions can often pose difficulty and
misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved party in taking
recourse therefrom and, likewise, on the higher court called
upon to resolve the same, usually on certiorari (Barrazona v.
RTC of Baguio, 486 SCRA 555, 561-562).
2. An example of an order violative of the Rules of
Court is one which reads: "This Court finds that the grounds
stated in the Motion to Dismiss are without merit, hence, the
same is denied" (Barrazona v. Regional Trial Court of Baguio,
ibid. at 561; Italics ours).
Conflict between the dispositive portion and body of the
decision
1. A judgment has two parts, namely, (a) the body of
the judgment or ratio decidendi, and (b) the dispositive portion
of the judgment or fallo.
The body of the decision, called the ratio decidendi, is not
the part of the judgment that is subject to execution but the
fallo because it is the latter which constitutes the judgment of
the court.
As jurisprudence instructs: "The operative part in every
judgment is the dispositive portion or the fallo" (Santos Yllana
Realty Corporation v. Deang, G.R. No.190043, June 21, 2017).
2. The general rule is that where there is a conflict
between the dispositive portion or fallo of the decision and
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the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on
the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion
in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing. However,
where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision
is so clear that there was a mere mistake in the dispositive
portion, the body of the decision will prevail (United Coconut
Chemicals, Inc. v. Valmores, G.R. No. 201018, July 12, 2017).
Ambiguity in the judgment; clarificatory judgment
Where the judgment is difficult to execute because
of ambiguity in its terms, it is suggested that the remedy
one should avail of, for the removal of the ambiguity in the
judgment, is the filing of a motion for clarificatory judgment
and not to assail the judgment as void.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court
1. Resolutions of the Supreme Court, denying petitions
to review decisions of the Court of Appeals, are not "decisions"
within the purview of the Constitution. Accordingly, a petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter
of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so, there is no
need to fully explain the Court's denial (Novino v. Court of
Appeals, 8 SCRA 279, 280).
2. Minute resolutions are, likewise, not decisions
falling within the constitutional requirement (Commercial
Union Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company, 86 SCRA 79, 89, citing Novino v. Court of
Appeals, 8 SCRA 279).
3. When a minute resolution is issued by the Supreme
Court denying or dismissing a petition or a motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the
challenged decision or order, together with all its findings of
fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained (Complaint
of Arrienda Against Justices Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Ynares-
Santiago, et al., 460 SCRA 1, 13-14).
In the case cited, the complainant alleges that the
disposition of his various motions and pleadings through
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minute resolutions amounted to a deprivation of due process.
The Court held that "it is not duty-bound to issue decisions or
resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or
even minute resolutions, depending on its evaluation of a
case as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution
(signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies
or dismisses a petition or a motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit, it is understood that the challenged decision or order,
together with all its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are
deemed sustained."
Interlocutory orders
1. An interlocutory order is one which does not finally
dispose of the case, and does not end the court's task of
adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their
rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the court
(Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. Cebrero, G.R. No. 222737,
November 12, 2018).
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening
between the commencement and the end of the suit which
decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of
the whole controversy (Rudecon Management Corporation
v. Singson, 454 SCRA 612, 627-628). They only determine
incidental matters that do not touch on the merits of the
case or put an end to the proceedings (Silverio, Jr. v. Filipino
Business Consultants, Inc., 466 SCRA 584, 595).
Examples: An order denying a motion to dismiss, an
order granting an extension of time to file a pleading, or one
authorizing an amendment thereof, or granting or denying
applications for postponement or inspection of documents, are
interlocutory orders.
2. Interlocutory orders are not decisions or judgments
within the constitutional definition. It was, thus, held that
judgments, as referred to in Sec. 1 of Rule 36, do not include
resolutions which are interlocutory orders (Amargo v. Court of
Appeals, 53 SCRA 64, 68).
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Questioning interlocutory orders
The proper remedy to question an improvident
interlocutory order is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
not Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 is the proper
mode of redress to question only final judgments (Silverio, Jr.
v. Filipino Business Consultants, 466 SCRA 584, 594). One
cannot appeal from an interlocutory order. Permitting appeals
from such an order may result in multiplicity of appeals
in a single action, thus, prolonging the action (Rudecon
Management Corporation v. Singson, 454 SCRA 612, 629).
Under Sec. l[b] of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, it is clear
that interlocutory orders are not appealable.
Memorandum decisions (Bar 2012)
1. A memorandum decision is one rendered by an
appellate court and incorporates by reference the findings of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision or order
under review.
The reason for allowing the findings of facts and
conclusions of law to be incorporated by reference is to avoid
the cumbersome reproduction and repetition of the decision
of the lower court in the decision of the higher court. To be
valid, however, such decision must not simply incorporate the
findings of facts and the conclusions of law of the lower court
by reference. It must also provide direct access to the facts and
the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement
attached to the decision and made an indispensable part of
the decision (See Francisco v. Permskul, G.R. No. 81006, May
12, 1989).
2. Although a memorandum decision is permitted under
certain conditions, it cannot merely refer to the conclusions of
law of the lower court. The appellate court must make full
findings of fact and conclusions of law on its own (Ong Chia
Kwan v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 586, 589-590).
3. As long as a memorandum decision states the nature
of the case, summarizes the facts with references to the
record, and contains a statement of the applicable laws and
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jurisprudence and the tribunal's assessment and conclusions
on the case, the constitutional requirement of a valid judgment
will not be transgressed (Oil and Natural Gas Commission v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114323, July 23, 1998).
4. Memorandum decisions are authorized by B.P. 129
and Rule 51 of the Rules of Court. Both provide: "Every decision
or final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly
and distinctly state the findings of facts and the conclusions
of law on which it is based, which may be contained in the
decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from
those set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed
from" (Sec. 40, B.P. 129; Sec. 5, Rule 51, Rules of Court).
Meaning of rendition of judgment
1. Rendition of a judgment is the filing of the same with
the clerk of court. It is not the pronouncement of the judgment
in open court that constitutes the rendition.
The Supreme Court stated the rule in this wise:
"The mere pronouncement of the judgment in open
court with the stenographer taking note thereof does not
x x x constitute a rendition of judgment. It is the filing of
the signed decision with the clerk of court that constitutes
rendition" (Ago v. Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 530, 534).
2. A later case confirmed that it is not the writing or
signing of the judgment which constitutes rendition of the
judgment. This case declared that the rule is well-established
that the filing of the decision, judgment or order with the
clerk of court, not the date of the writing of the decision or
judgment, nor the signing or even the promulgation thereof,
that constitutes rendition (Castro v. Malazo, 99 SCRA 164,
170).
Period within which to render a decision
1. All cases filed must be decided or resolved by the
Supreme Court within 24 months from the date of their
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TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
submission for decision, and unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, within 12 months for all lower collegiate courts and
three months for all other lower courts (Art. VIII, Sec. 15,
Constitution of the Philippines).
2. A case is deemed submitted for resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by
the Rules of Court or by the court (Ibid.).
3. The 90-day period for deciding the case commences
from the submission of the case for decision without
memoranda. In case the court requires or allows its filing,
the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon
the filing of the last memorandum, or the expiration of the
period to do so, whichever is earlier. In cases where the court
allows the filing of memoranda, no further orders announcing
the submission of the case for decision is necessary before
they are deemed submitted for decision (Re: Report on the
Judicial Audit of RTC Brs. 29 and 59, Toledo City, 292 SCRA
8, 21-22).
4. As a general principle, rules prescribing the
time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to
the prevention of needless delays and to orderly and speedy
discharge of official business (Plata v. Torres, 570 SCRA 12,
17-18).
Extension of the period to render a decision
An extension of the period to render a decision may be set
by the Supreme Court upon request by the judge concerned
on account of heavy caseload or by other reasonable excuse.
Without an extension granted by the court, a delay in the
disposition of cases is tantamount to gross inefficiency on the
part of the judge (Arap u. Mustafa, 379 SCRA 1, 4-5).
Judgment penned by a judge who did not hear the evidence
1. It is not necessary that the judge who heard the
evidence be the same judge who shall pen the decision.

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The judge trying the case may die, resign, be disabled, or
transferred to another court. In such an eventuality, another
judge has to continue and finish the trial. The succeeding judge
can examine and evaluate the evidence already presented
by the simple expedient of going over the transcripts of the
testimony of the witnesses in the same manner as appellate
courts review the evidence on record (People v. Tumaru, 319
SCRA 515, 528). Such reliance does not violate substantive
and procedural due process (Serna v. Court of Appeals, 308
SCRA 527, 533). The fact that the trial judge who penned the
decision was different from the one who received the evidence
is not one of the exceptions that warrant a factual review of
the case (Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. and Rimport Industries,
Inc. v. Philippine Merchant Marine Academy [PMMAJ, G.R.
No. 188633, April 10, 2013).
2. The validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous
solely because the judge who heard the case was not the same
judge who rendered the decision. In fact, it is not necessary
for the validity of a judgment that the judge who penned the
decision should actually hear the case in its entirety, for he
can merely rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken
during the trial as the basis for his decision (Kummer v.
People, G.R. No; 174461, September 11, 2013).
3. What deserves stressing is that, in this jurisdiction,
there exists a disputable presumption that the RTC decision
was rendered by the judge in the regular performance of his
official duties. While the said presumption is only disputable,
it is satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame by other
evidence. Encompassed in this presumption of regularity is
the presumption that the RTC judge, in resolving the case and
drafting his decision, reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the
evidence on record. That the said RTC judge is not the same
judge who heard the case and received the evidence is of little
consequence when the records and transcripts of stenographic
notes are complete and available for consideration by the
former (Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano, 504 SCRA 378, 412).
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Judgment penned by a judge who had ceased to be a judge
A decision penned by a judge after his retirement
cannot be validly promulgated and cannot acquire a binding
effect. In like manner, a decision penned by a judge during
his incumbency cannot be validly promulgated after his
retirement. When a judge retires, all his authority to decide
any case, i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the decision has
also "retired'' with him (Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 378
SCRA 28, 34-35). In other words, he had lost entirely his
power and authority to act on all cases assigned to him prior
to his retirement (City of Taguig v. City of Makati, G.R. No.
208393, June 15, 2016).
Judgment penned by a judge who was transferred
A judge who was permanently transferred to another
court of equal jurisdiction, before the case heard by him was
decided, may validly prepare and sign his decision on the said
case and send the same to the court where he was originally
assigned (Valentin v. Sta. Maria, 55 SCRA 40). The judge
who pens the decision of a case heard by him before he was
assigned or transferred to another district or branch of the
court of equal jurisdiction is considered an incumbent judge,
albeit assigned to a different branch at the time the decision
was promulgated (Marchadesch v. Vda. de Yepes, 442 SCRA
254,262).
Judgments of the Supreme Court; precedents
1. The decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the
legal system (Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
270 SCRA 82, 92). Hence, every court must take cognizance of
the decisions of the Supreme Court. Said decisions are proper
subjects of mandatory judicial notice. Members of the Bench
have a responsibility to know and apply the latest holdings
of the Supreme Court (Heirs of Felicidad Canque v. Court of
Appeals, 275 SCRA 741, 749).
2. It is the duty of lower courts to obey the decisions of
the Supreme Court and render obeisance to its status as the
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apex of hierarchy of courts. A lower court cannot reverse or
set aside the decisions or orders of a superior court, especially
of the Court, for to do so will nullify the essence of review
and negate the principle of hierarchy of courts. For "there is
only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts
should take their bearings" (Manila Electric Company v.
Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., 37 4 SCRA 262, 277;
Mallari v. Arcega, 379 SCRA 537, 550).
3. Judgments or decisions of the Supreme Court serve
as precedents. The Court defines a "precedent" as "[A] judicial
decision that serves as a rule for future determination in
similar or substantially similar cases. Thus, the facts and
circumstances between the jurisprudence relied upon and the
pending controversy should not diverge on material points"
(Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of
Customs, G.R. No. 195876, June 19, 2017). ·
Rule on stare decisis; applies only to Supreme Court
decisions
1. The rule of stare decisis is entrenched in Art. 8 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: "Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines."
Otherwise called the principle of stare decisis et non
quieta movere, it holds that a point oflaw, once established by
the Court, will generally be followed by the same court and by
all courts oflower rank in subsequent cases involving a similar
legal issue (Cabigon v. Pepsi-Cola Products, Philippines, Inc.,
541 SCRA 149, 156-157; See also Republic v. Rosario, G.R. No.
186635, January 27, 2016; De la Cruz v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No.
219683, January 23, 2018).
2. "The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial prece-
dents and requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of the Supreme Court. That decision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases
by all courts in the land. The doctrine is based on the principle
that once a question of law has been examined and decided,
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TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument"
(Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628, July
25, 2017). It simply means that for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though
the parties may be different. It proceeds from the principle
of justice that, absent any countervailing considerations,
like cases should be decided alike (University of the East v.
Masangkay, G.R. No. 226727, April 15, 2018; See also, Revilla,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan [First Division], July 24, 2018).
3. It should be noted, however, that the doctrine of
stare decisis becomes operative only when judicial precedents
are set by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court to the
exclusion of lower courts. This rule is true regardless whether
the decisions of the lower courts are logically or legally sound.
Only decisions of the Supreme Court become part of the legal
system (United Coconut Planters Bank v. Spouses Uy, G.R.
No. 204039, January 10, 2018).
Pro hac vice rulings
There are instances, when the Court suspends the
application of a rule in a particular case, as when it allows
a second motion for reconsideration contrary to the rule that
forbids a second motion filed by the same party (See Sec. 5[2nd
paragraph], Rule 37, and Sec. 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court) or
when it allows a party to file a notice of appeal beyond the
period allowed by the Rules (Sec. 3, Rule 41, and Sec. 2, Rule
40, Rules of Court). A ruling of such nature is deemed to be
made pro hac vice, a Latin term which refers to one rendered
"for this one particular case." A ruling expressly qualified as
such cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases
(Tadeja v. People, 691 SCRA 252, 267, February 20, 2013).
Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular
occasion only." A pro hac vice ruling cannot be relied upon
as a precedent to govern other cases (Highpoint Development
Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No. 224389, November 7, 2018).

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The principles of stare decisis and res judicata compared
The Court has emphasized the distinction between the
principle of stare decisis and the principle of res judicata.
Accordingly, while the focal point of res judicata is the
judgment, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created.
The Court explains:
"The focal point of res judicata is the judgment.
The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a
previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and
second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action xx x.
The focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine
created. The principle xx x, evokes the general rule that,
for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the
facts are substantially the same, even though the parties
may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.
Thus, where the same questions relating to the same
event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to re-litigate the same issue" (Belgica v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013; Social Justice
Society v. Drilon, G.R. No. 208493, November 15, 2013;
Nepomuceno v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209251, November
19, 2013; emphasis made by the Court).
Obiter dictum
1. An obiter dictum is an opinion expressed by a court,
which is not necessary to the determination of the case before
it (Delta Motors v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 212, 223; Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, G.R. No. 213863, January
27, 2016). It is neither enforceable as a relief nor a source of
a judicially-actionable claim (Republic v. Nolasco, 457 SCRA
400,408).
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2. "x xx It is a remark made, or opinion expressed by a
judge in his decision upon a cause xx x that is, incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or
upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of
the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument. Such is not binding as a precedent" (Italics supplied;
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 463, 463-469; See
for further readings Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty,
346 SCRA 663; Ocean East Agency Corporation v. Lopez, G.R.
No. 194410, October 14, 2015).
When a judgment becomes final
1. The term "final," when used to describe a judgment,
may be used in two senses. In the first, it refers to a judgment
that disposes of a case in a manner that leaves nothing more
to be done by the court in respect thereto. In this sense, a final
judgment is distinguished from an interlocutory order which
does not finally terminate or dispose of the case (Rudecon
Management Corporation v. Singson, 454 SCRA 612, 628).
The finality of a judgment in this sense has the effect of
ending the litigation, and an aggrieved party may then appeal
from the judgment. Under Rule 41 (Sec. 1) of the Rules of
Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case. Under the same rule, an
appeal cannot be taken from an interlocutory order (Sec. l[b],
Rule 41, Rules of Court).
2. By implication from Sec. 1 of Rule 39, the word "final"
may also refer to a judgment that is no longer appealable and
is already capable of being executed because the period for
appeal has elapsed without a party having perfected an appeal
or if there has been an appeal, it has already been resolved
by a highest possible tribunal. In this sense, the judgment is
commonly referred to as one that is "final and executory."
3. "A final order is defined as one which disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined by the court.
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Conversely, an interlocutory order does not dispose of the
case completely but leaves something to be decided upon
by the court. Its effects are merely provisional in character
and substantial proceedings have to be further conducted by
the court in order to finally resolve the issue or controversy"
(Republic v. Heirs of OribeUo, Jr., 692 SCRA 645, 654, March
6, 2013; See also Ignacio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 213192, July 12,
2017).
4. The distinction is important because a final order,
that completely disposes of a case, is appealable (Sec. 1, Rule
41) while an interlocutory order is not appealable (Sec. l[b],
Rule 41, Rules of Court; For further readings, see also Ignacio
v. Reyes, G.R. No. 213192, July 12, 2017).
Effect of final judgments; res judicata
1. When a court of the Philippines has rendered
judgment with jurisdiction, the following are the effects of its
judgment or final order:
(a) If the judgment or final order is on a specific
thing, the same is conclusive upon the title to thing (Sec.
47, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
(b) If the judgment or final order is in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of
a deceased person, the same is conclusive upon the will
or administration but the probate of the will or granting
of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate, and
not a conclusive presumption of death (Sec. 47, Rule 39,
Rules of Court).
(c) If the judgment or final order is in respect to
the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a
particular person or his relationship to another, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the condition,
status or relationship of the person (Sec. 47, Rule 39,
Rules of Court).
(d) In other cases, if the judgment be with respect
to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter
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that could have been raised in relation thereto, the
judgment or final order is conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and the same capacity (Sec. 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
(e) In any other litigation between the same parties
or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
be adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto (Sec. 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court; See also Heirs of
Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691, June 13, 2013).
2. When it is a foreign court or tribunal which renders
a judgment that has become final, and it has jurisdiction to
render such judgment or final order, the same is conclusive
upon the title to the thing in case of a judgment or final order
upon a specific thing.
In case of a final order or judgment against a person,
such judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title. Bar 2007
In either of the above cases, the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of (a) want of jurisdiction, (b)
want of notice to the party, (c) collusion, (d) fraud, or (e) clear
mistake of law or fact (Sec. 48, Rule 39, Rules of Court). Bar
2007
a. Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorces between a Filipino and_ a foreign citizen if they
are successfully proven under the Rules on Evidence. The
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under AM. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) or the rules on
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
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foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Art.
26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
decree abroad (Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June
26, 2013).
Fujiki v. Marinay, likewise, explains that the
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code "is only
a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not
allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow
divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the
effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
effective in the country where it was rendered."
Note: The second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code provides: ''When a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall, likewise, have the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law."
b. Foreign arbitral awards may be enforced under
R.A. 9285, or the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004. The award when confirmed by the RTC shall be
enforced in the same manner as final and executory
decisions of courts of law of the Philippines (Sec. 44, R.A.
9285). Bar 2007
Amendment of judgment; supplemental judgment
1. A judgment may be amended by the court before the
judgment becomes final and executory. For instance, under
Sec. 3, of Rule 37, if the court finds that excessive damages have
been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary
to the evidence or the law, it may amend such judgment or
final order accordingly.
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2. An amended judgment, however, should not be
confused with a supplemental judgment. "x x x The amended
decision x x x is an entirely new decision which supersedes or
takes the place of the original decision. On the other hand, a
supplemental decision does not take the place of the original;
it only serves to add to the original decision" (Solidbank
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166581, December
7, 2015).
Doctrine of immutability of judgments (Bar 2011)
1. Immutability of judgments is the fundamental
principle that a judgment that has become final and executory
is unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of
the land (Multinational Village Homeowners' Association v.
Gacutan, G.R. No. 188307, August 2, 2017; See also Mercury
Drug Corporation v. Huang, G.R. No. 197654, August 30,
2017). Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because
the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrine is not
a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter
of public policy as well as a time-honored procedural policy
(Lanto v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 217189, April 18,
2017).
2. The doctrine. presupposes the existence of a valid
judgment. A void judgment never acquires the status of a final
and executory judgment. Parties may, therefore, challenge
the judgment without running afoul of the doctrine of
immutability of judgments. A direct attack may be brought
either through a petition for annulment of judgment under
Rule 4 7 of the Rules of court or through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. A void judgment may also
be challenged collaterally by assailing its validity in another
action where it is invoked (See Mercury Drug Corporation
v. Huang, G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017; For further
 570 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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readings, see Orlina v. Ventura, G.R. No. 227033, December 3,
2018).
Reasons for the rule on immutability of judgments
1. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public
policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments shall become final at some definite point in time
(Multinational Village Homeowners' Association v. Gacutan,
G.R. No. 188307, August 2, 2017; See also Mercury Drug
Corporation v. Huang, G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017).
2. Specifically, the doctrine of immutability or
inalterability of final judgments has a two-fold purpose, to wit:
(a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice
and, thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business; and
(b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the
risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts
exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The
rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
suspense for an indefinite period of time. This doctrine is
not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a
matter of public policy as well as a time-honored principle
of procedural law (Marcos v. Pamintuan, 639 SCRA 658,
665; Sangguniang Barangay of Pangasugan, Baybay,
Leyte v. Exploration Permit Application of Philippine
National Oil Company, September 2, 2013; Lanto v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 217189, April 18, 2017).
Remedies against a final and executory judgment; exceptions
to the doctrine of immutability of judgments
1. Although as a rule, a final and executory judgment
can no longer be altered, the doctrine of immutability of a
judgment does not preclude an action for annulment of the
same judgment (Rule 47, Rules of Court; See also Diana v.
Balangue, 688 SCRA 22, 34, January 7, 2013).
2. The court may also suspend the strict adherence
to the doctrine under certain circumstances pursuant to its
CHAPTER VIII 571
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
power to suspend procedural rules (Lanto v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 217189, April 18, 2017).
The Supreme Court, in the past, has reversed judgments
and recalled their entries in the interest of substantial justice
and where special and compelling reasons called for such
actions (Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
632 SCRA 727, 760-761). In Apo Fruits Corporation, the
Court declared that, in certain cases, it had reversed its own
judgment on a second motion for reconsideration and even on
a third motion for reconsideration. In some cases, it recalled
the entries of judgment after finding that doing so was in
the interest of justice. In order to serve substantial justice
considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the
merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not
be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
3. Despite the doctrine of immutability of judgments,
certain changes in such judgment may also be effected for any
of the following reasons:
(a) the correction of clerical errors (Ram's Studio
and Photographic Equipment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
346 SCRA 691, 697; Briones-Vasquez v. Court of Appeals,
450 SCRA 482, 491; Filipinas Palmoil Processing, Inc. v.
Dejapa, 641 SCRA 572, 581, February 7, 2011; See also
Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang, G.R. No. 197654,
August 30, 2017).
(b) the so-called nunc pro·tunc entries which cause
no prejudice to any party (Briones-Vasquez v. Court of
Appeals, ibid.; Salting v. Velez, 639 SCRA 124, 131; See
also Multinational Village Homeowners' Association v.
Gacutan, G.R. No. 188307, August 2, 2017).
(c) whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
 572 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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ine~~it~ble (Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, 647 SCRA 207, 236).
(d) in cases of special and exceptional nature as
~hen facts and circumstances transpire which render the
Judg~ent's _execution impossible or unjust, when neces-
sary m the mterest of justice to direct its modification to
harmonize the disposition with prevailing circumstances
(Industrial Timber Corporation v. Ababon, 480 SCRA
171, 181-182, citing Industrial Timber Corporation v.
NLRC, 233 SCRA 597; Lanto v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 217189, April 18, 2017).
. (e) in case of void judgments (Apo Fruits Corpora-
ti~": ~-Land Bank of the Philippines, 647 SCRA 207, 236;
Filipinas Palmoil Processing, Inc. v. Dejapa, supra).
. . (~ when there is a strong showing that a grave
InJustice would result from the application of the Rules
(Almuete v. Peopl~, 693 SCRA 167, 185, March 12, 2013;
For further readings, see Abrigo v. Flores, G.R. No.
160786, June 17, 2013).
. (g) when there are grounds for annulment of the
Judgment or a petition for relief (Gochan v. Mancao, G.R.
No. 182314, November 13, 2013).
. (h) in crim~nal cases, when a law, like R.A. 10951,
1s enacted reducmg the penalties for certain crimes the
entry of judgment may be recalled in order to impos; the
new penalty mandated (In Re: Correction/ Adjustment
of Penalty Pursuant to R.A. 10951, in relation to Hernan
v. S<:,-~diganbayan,G.R. No. 237721, July 31, 2018; For
additional readings, see Orlina v. Ventura, G.R. No.
227033, December 3, 2018).
4. . Whe1: there is an ambiguity caused by an omission
or a mistake m the dispositive portion of the decision the
Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment ~ven
after the judgment has become final (Multinational Village
Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Gacutan, G.R. No. 188307
August 2, 2017). '
CHAPTER VIII 573
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
Meaning of "judgment on the merits"
1. A judgment is "on the merits" when it amounts to
a legal declaration of the respective rights and duties of the
parties based upon the disclosed facts. "Merits," as a matter
of substance in law, as distinguished from a matter of form,
refers to the real or substantial grounds of action or defense,
as contrasted with some technical or collateral matter raised
in the course of the suit. There could be a judgment on the
merits even if there is no trial. A ruling based on a motion to
dismiss, without any trial or formal presentation of evidence,
' can still be a judgment on the merits. A judgment that the
defense was substantial enough to overcome the relief sought
is a judgment on the merits.
What appears to be essential to a judgment on the merits
is that it be a reasoned decision, which clearly states the facts
and the law on which it is based. Thus, where the court, for
example, ruled on the right of the petitioner to foreclose the
property, that the debtor was in default and that the foreclosure
was valid by looking into the law and the facts and pleadings
and applied the law accordingly, the judgment settled the
controversy between the parties (Luzon Development Bank v.
Conquilla, 470 SCRA 533, 544-549).
2. It has been held, however, that a judgment
dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction cannot operate
as res judicata on the merits (Custodio v. Corrado, 435 SCRA
500, 509). Also, where the dismissal was on the ground of the
failure of the petitioner to furnish a copy of her formal offer
of evidence, the decision does not constitute an adjudication
on the merits, but only a resolution of an interlocutory matter
(Page-Tenorio v. Tenorio, 443 SCRA 560, 569).
Doctrine of law of the case
According to this principle, whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between
the same parties in the case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as
the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the court. This principle generally
 574 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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finds application in cases where an appellate court passes on
a question and remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings. The question there settled becomes the law of
the case upon subsequent appeal. Consequently, the court
reviewing the succeeding appeal will not relitigate the case
but, instead, apply the ruling in the previous appeal. This
enables the appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily
and efficiently which would be impossible if a question, once
considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the
same case and upon any and subsequent appeal (See RCPI
v. Court of Appeals, 488 SCRA 306; Samson v. Cabanas, 461
SCRA 545; Guevara v. BPI Securities Corporation, 498 SCRA
613; Mercury Group of Companies v. Home Development
Mutual Fund, 541 SCRA 21 l; Yap v. Siao, G.R. No. 212493,
June 1, 2016; Virata v. Ng Wee, G.R. No. 221135, July 5, 2017;
See Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Cual, G.R. No.
207684, July 17, 2017).
The principle relates merely to questions of law already
settled on appeal and is confined in its operation to subsequent
proceedings in the same case, not questions of fact. It will not
apply when the case is not a continuation of the first case in
which the question of law was determined (See Philtranco
Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Cual, G.R. No. 207684, July 17,
2017). Thus, where the appellate court has already ruled
with finality that the legal relationship between the parties
is one of seller and buyer, instead of donor and donee, such
ruling becomes the law of the case even if, later on, the case is
remanded to a lower court for further proceedings. The ruling
on appeal has become res judicata between the parties.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore,
that when an appellate court has once declared the law in
a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case
even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule
thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. But
the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal
questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal
(Development Bank of the Philippines v. Guarina Agricultural
and Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 160759,
January 15, 2014).
_L_
CHAPTER VIII 575
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
Several judgment
1. A several judgment is one rende~ed by a co~rt
against one or more defendants, but not agamst all, leavmg
the action to proceed against the others (Sec. 4, Rule 36, Rules
of Court).
2. A several judgment is proper when the liabili_ty of
each party is clearly separable and distinct from that ofh1s co-
parties, such that the claims against each of them could ~ave
been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or agamst
one of them will not necessarily affect the other (Fern°:n_do
v. Santamaria, 446 SCRA 136, 142). Debtors under a ~o~nt
obligation have distinct and ~epa_r~ble i;11-terests.In a Jomt
obligation, the credit or debt 1s d1v1ded mto as ~any equal
shares as there are creditors and debtors, the credits or debts
being distinct from one another (Art. 1208, Civil Code of the
Philippines). Where debtors are bound to an obliga~ion jointly,
it is legally feasible for a court to render a several Judgment.
Separate judgment
A separate judgment presupposes that t~ere ar~ several
claims for relief presented in a single action. Aside from
the original complaint, for instance, th~ defend~nt may
have interposed a counterclaim, cross-cla11:1,.or th1rd:party
complaint. The court may, after determmm_g the issues
relative to a claim and considering other c1rcumst~nces,
render separate judgment, let us s~y, on t~e cross-claim_ or
the counterclaim. The judgment will termmate the action
with respect to that claim an~ the actio~ _shall proceed as
to the remaining claims. Despite the rend1t10n of a separate
judgment, the court may stay the execution of the separate
judgment until the rendition of a judgment on all the other
claims (Sec. 5, Rule 36, Rules of Court).
Conditional judgment
A conditional judgment is one the effectivity of which
depends upon the occurrence or the non-occurrence of an
event. Such a judgment is generally void because of the
 576 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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absence of a disposition (Cu-Unjieng v. Mabalacat Sugar Co
70 Phil. 384). .,
Judgment sin perjuicio
1. A judgment sin perjuicio is traditionally understood
to be a brief judgment containing only the dispositive portion
without prejudice to the making of a more extensive discus~
sion of the findings of fact and law to support it. This is not
actually a final decision; it should be avoided and should not
be looked with favor (Director of Lands v. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117).
2. Its current use may also refer to a dismissal of an
action without prejudice to its being refiled on a later date as
in a dismissal in Sec. 1 of Rule 17 and Sec. 5 of Rule 7.
Judgment nunc pro tune (literally, "now for then'? (Bar 2012·
2014) '
1. ''Nunc pro tune" is a Latin phrase that means "now
for then." A judgment nunc pro tune is made to enter into the
rec?rd an. act previously done by the court, which had been
omitted either through inadvertence or mistake. It neither
operates to correct judicial errors nor to supply omitted action
by the court. Its sole purpose is to make a present record of
a judicial actio1;1whic~ has actually been taken. A judgment
nu~c pro tune Is one mtended to enter into the record acts
~h1ch had already been done, but which do not yet appear
~n the record. Parties seeking the issuance of nunc pro tune
Judgments or orders must allege and prove that the court took
particular action and that the action was omitted through
madvertence (Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang, G.R. No.
197654, August 30, 2017).
~- One c_ase explains that the object of a nunc pro
tune Judgment 1s to place in proper form on the record those
matters previously rendered to make the record speak the
~ruth and to reflect deliberations and discussions had on the
issue. In a sense, it is a correction of clerical and not a judicial
error (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco
CHAPTER VIII 577
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
Corporation, G.R. Nos. 167274-75, September 11, 2013; For
further readings, see Magno v. Magno, G.R. No. 206451,
August 17, 2016).
Judgment upon a compromise (Bar 1996; 2012)
1. A judgment upon a compromise is one rendered by
the court on the basis of a compromise agreement entered
into between the parties to the action (Diamond Builders
Conglomeration v. Country Bankers Corp., 540 SCRA 194).
2. Under Art. 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise
agreement is defined as "a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to
one already commenced." A compromise is a form of amicable
settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil
cases (Harold v. Aliba, 534 SCRA 478, 486). A compromise has
upon the parties the effect of res judicata (Cathay Land, Inc.
v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 210209, August 9, 2017). In fact,
there is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement,
solely because it was entered into after final judgment (SM
Systems Corporation (formerly Springsun Management
Systems Corporation v. Camerino, G.R. No. G.R. No. 178591,
March 29, 2017).
Once it has received a judicial imprimatur, it is regarded
as a determination of the controversy between the parties and
has the force and effect of a final judgment (Chiquita Brands,
Inc. v. Omelio, G.R. No. 189102, June 7, 2017). Recall that
under the principle of res judicata, an issue which had already
been laid to rest by the parties themselves can no longer be
relitigated. Under the Civil Code, if one of the parties refuses
to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce
the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand (Art. 2041, Civil Code of the Philippines).
3. Substantive law does not require a court order for
the compromise agreement to have to have a res judicata effect
between the parties. However, the compromise agreement
cannot be executed without the agreement being converted
into a judicial compromise.
 578 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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VOLUME I
Jurisprudence explains the effect of a compromise, thus:
"x x x It has the effect of res judicata between
the parties, but there shall be no execution except in
compliance with a judicial order.
"It is settled that once a compromise agreement is
approved by a final order of the court, it transcends its
identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties
thereto, as it becomes a judgment subject to execution in
accordance with the Rules of [C]ourt. Judges, therefore
have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement
and enforce it.
. '.'~ince theissuanceofa writofexecu tionimplementing
a Judicial compromise is ministerial in nature it cannot
be viewed as a judgment on the merits as cou'templated
by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. To be clear
~t is th~ decision based on a compromise agreement that
1s considered a judgment on the merits not the order
pertaining to its execution" (Cathay Land, Inc. v. Ayala
Land, Inc., G.R. No. 210209, August 9, 2017).
4. To· assail a judgment by compromise, there must
be a proper motion to set aside the judgment on the ground
that the compromise agreement was obtained either by fraud
violence, intimidation, falsity of documents, or some other vice~
of consent (Cadano v. Cadano, G.R. No. L-34998, January 11,
1973; See also Art. 2038, Civil Code of the Philippines).
There is jurisprudence holding that if such motion
is denied, appeal may be taken from the ~rder denying the
motion (Serrano v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-16153, December 29
1960 citing De los Reyes v. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505; Enriquez v~
Pa~illa, .77 Phil. 373; Salvador v. Ortoll, 343 SCRA 658, 668).
This rulmg must be deemed superseded or modified by Sec.
l(d) of Rule 41, which declares as non-appealable an order
denying a motion to set aside a judgment by xx x compromise
o~ ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground
vitiatmg consent.
_5. The doctr~ne of immutability of judgments also
applies to compromise agreements approved by the court in
CHAPTER VIII 579
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
the same manner that it applies to judgments that have been
rendered on the basis of a full-blown trial (Chiquita Brands,
Inc. v. Omelia, G.R. No. 189102, June 7, 2017).
Judgment upon a confession (cognovit actionem)
This is a judgment rendered by the court when a party
expressly agrees to the other party's claim or acknowledges
the validity of the claim against him.
D. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
(Bar 1978; 1993; 1999; 2014; 2015; 2016)
Nature of judgment on the pleadings
1. "Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an
answer to a claim fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading.
Jurisprudence dictates that an answer fails to tender an issue,
if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as
set out in Secs. 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, resulting
in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleadings. As such, it is a judgment that is exclusively
based on the submitted pleadings, without the introduction of
evidence as the factual issue remains uncontroverted" (GSIS
v. Prudential GuaranteeandAssurance, Inc., G.R. No. 165585,
November 20, 2013).
The answer admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading by (a) expressly admitting the truth of such
allegations, (b) failing to make specific denial of the material
allegations, or (c) omitting to deal with them at all (Fernando
Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleya~ University Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 207970, January 20, 2016).
2. The concept of a judgment on the pleadings will not
apply when no answer is filed. It will come into operation when
an answer is served and filed but the same fails to tender an
issue or admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading (See Sec. 1, Rule 34, Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Bar 1999
580 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Motion required; resolving the motion
1. A judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered by
the court motu proprio. It can be done where there is a prior
motion to the effect filed by the claiming party (See Sec. 1,
Rule 34, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-
SC). Bar 1999
2. However, Sec. 2, Rule 34, Rules of Court, as amended
by AM. No. 19-10-20-SC, provides that:
"The court may motu proprio or on motion render
judgment on the pleadings if it is apparent that the answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleadings. Otherwise, the
motion shall be subject to the provisions of Rule 15 of these
Rules.
Any action of the court on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings shall not be subject of an appeal or petition for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus."
The court may motu proprio render judgment on the
pleadings if parties include in the pre-trial order that the case
is being submitted for judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment. It can also be by way of litigious motion. If the court
denies the motion, the party shall complete his or her evidence
presentation since the main case is still pending then just
assign as error the denial of the motion.
3. The essential qu~ry in resolving a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is whether or not there are issues
of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether issues of fact exist
in a case or not depends on how the defending party's answer
has dealt with the ultimate alleged in the complaint. If the
defendant admits all the ultimate facts in the complaint,
then such facts, being undisputed, will no longer require
evidence. Hence, upon proper motion, the court may be asked
to render a judgment based on the pleadings. A trial, in this
case, is dispensed with (Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v.
Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc., supra).
CHAPTER VIII 581
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
cases where judgment on the pleadings will not apply
1. In the following cases, a judgment on the pleadings
will not lie:
(a) actions for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage;
(b) actions for annulment of marriage; and
(c) actions for legal separation (Sec. 1, Rule 34,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
2. In the above cases, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved (Sec. 1, Rule 34, Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
E. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Nature of summary judgment (Bar 1986; 1989; 1996; 1999;
2014; 2015; 2016)
1. A summary judgment, also called accelerated
judgment, is proper where, upon a ~otion filed ~fter the
issues had been joined and on the basis of the pleadmgs and
papers filed, the court finds that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact except as to the amount of damages (Ley
Construction and Development Corporation v. Union Bank of
the Philippines, 334 SCRA 443; Raboca v. Velez, 341 SCRA
543). Bar 1986; 1989; 1996; 1999; 2014; 2015; 2016
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving p~rty is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because while ~he
pleadings, on their face, appear to ra_ise issues, the ~ffidavits,
depositions, and admissions presented by the movi~g party
do not actually present genuine issues (Yap v. Su;w, G.R.
No. 212493, June 1, 2016; See also Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 195876,
December 5, 2016).
2. What triggers a summary judgment is the absence
of a genuine factual issue. It is not proper where there are
 582 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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factual issues to be resolved by the presentation of evidence
Ev~n if there is a complicated question of law, if there i~
no issue as to the facts, a summary judgment is not barred
(Velasco u. Court of Appeals, 329 SCRA 392; Garcia u. Court
of Appeals, 336 SCRA 475).
3. I~ a~ action for foreclosure of mortgage, for example,
the material issues are the existence of the debt and its
demandability. When the defendant admits the existence
of the debt and. raises an issue as to the demandability of
the debt or the mterest rate involved because of an alleged
contemporaneous agreement between the parties the issue
tendered i~ sham, fictitious, or patently unsub~tantial. A
sum~ar~ Judgment would be proper because there is no
genume issue (Spouses Agbada u. Inter-Urban Developers
389 SCRA 430, 432). ' to any material fact (Sec. 3, Rule 35, Rules of Court).
~here only the genuineness and due execution of the
pr_om1ssory note are the matters deemed admitted for the
failure of the defendant to deny the same under oath a
summary judgment is not proper. Bar 1986 ' any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations
In_an action for a sum of money, where the debt and the
fact of its nonpayment is admitted, and the only issue raised
is th: ra~e of interest or the damages payable, there is no
genume issue and a summary judgment may be rendered
upon proper motion.
4. A "g~nuine is~ue" is an issue of fact which requires
the_ ~resentati~n of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictit10us, contrived or false claim. When the facts, as pleaded,
appe~r u~contested or undisputed, then there is no real or
~enume 1~sue or question as to the facts, and summary
~udgment 1s called for. The party who moves for summary
Judgment ha_sth~ burden of demonstrating clearly the absence
of any _gen:ume issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
comp_lai~t 1s patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genume issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to
~ender summary judgments and may do so only when there
1s clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the
CHAPTER VIII 583
TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of
trial (Philippine Bank of Communications u. Go, 642 SCRA
693, 705-706; See also Smart Communications, Inc. v. Aldecoa,
G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013; Yap v. Siao, supra).
Distinctions between a judgment on the pleadings and a
summary judgment (Bar 1989; 2016)
1. In a judgment on the pleadings, there is an absence
of a factual issue in the case because the answer tenders no
issue at all. A summary judgment involves an issue, but the
issue is not genuine (Narra Integrated Corporation u. Court of
Appeals, 344 SCRA 781, 786-787). In a summary judgment,
the issue may only be as to the amount of damages but not as
2. What distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings
from a summary judgment is the presence of issues in the
Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender
in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the
adverse party's pleadings by admitting the truthfulness
thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment
on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when
the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the
complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words
raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that
the issue raised is not genuine. "A 'genuine issue' means an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or
which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial (Iloilo Jar
Corporation u. Comglasco Corporation/ Aguila Glass, C.R.
No. 219509, January 18, 2017).
3. A judgment on the pleadings is based on the
pleadings alone (Sec. 1, Rule 34, Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). A summary judgment is based
on supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions, and the
specific law relied upon (Sec. 3, Rule 35, Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC). Bar 2015; 2016
 CHAPTER VIII 585
584 CIVIL PROCEDURE TRIAL, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, AND JUDGMENT
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Sec. 2 of Rule 36 clearly provides that, "The date of
Judgment against an entity without a juridical personality finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be
A judgment against an entity without a juridical the date of its entry."
personality should be related to Sec. 15 of Rule 3. Under this
provision, when two or more persons not organized as an Relevance of knowing the date of the entry of a judgment
entity with juridical personality, nevertheless, transact with There are some proceedings the filing of which is reckoned
third persons under a common name, they may be sued under from the date of the entry of judgment. Examples: (a) The
the name by which they are generally or commonly known. execution of a judgment by motion is within five years from
Thus, if Jose, Pedro, and Juan, transact with other people the entry of the judgment (Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rul~s of C~urt); (b)
under the name, "ABC Boys," they may be sued under that The filing of a petition for relief has, as one of its per10ds, not
name. Under Sec. 6 of Rule 36, the judgment shall be actually more than six months from the entry of the judgment or final
against the persons who form the entity without a juridical
order (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court).
personality and the judgment shall set out their individual or
proper names, if known.
-oOo-
Entry of judgment; date thereof
1. The entry of judgment refers to the physical act
performed by the clerk of court in entering the dispositive
portion of the judgment in the book of entries of judgment
after the same has become final and executory.
The record shall contain the dispositive portion of the
judgment or final order and shall be signed by the clerk of
court, with a certificate by said clerk that the judgment has
already become final and executory (Sec. 2, Rule 36, Rules of
Court).
2. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Sec. 2, Rule
36), the date of the entry of judgment is the date when the
judgment becomes final and executory regardless of the date
when the physical act of entry was done. Thus, if the judgment
becomes final and executory on March 15, because no appeal,
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration has been
filed, the judgment is deemed entered simultaneously on
March 15 by operation of the rule even if the actual physical
act of entry of the judgment was done on another date like
March 30. This new rule eliminates confusion in determining
the date of entry of a judgment. Prior to this rule, the date when
a judgment becomes final and executory was not necessarily
the date of its entry.

Chapter IX
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
I - REMEDIES BEFORE A JUDGMENT BECOMES
FINAL AND EXECUTORY
Post judgment remedies available to the aggrieved party
{Bar 2006)
1. Imagine the emotional impact which an adverse
judgment can cause to a litigant. The news of defeat is
expectedly devastating especially when the case had dragged
on for years. The normal initial reaction of the losing party
is to inquire from his lawyer the remedies he may avail of
to have the judgment reversed or modified in his favor. The
big query, therefore, is: "What are the remedies of a losing
litigant?"
The answer to the query is not that complicated. One
simply has to first ascertain whether or not the judgment
sought to be assailed is already final and executory. Knowing
whether or not the judgment is final and executory is the key
to unlocking the remedies afforded by the Rules of Court.
2. A summary of the rules will disclose that before a
judgment becomes final and executory, the aggrieved or losing
party may avail of the following remedies:
(a) Motion for reconsideration;
(b) Motion for new trial; and
(c) Appeal. Bar 2014
. 3. After the judgment becomes final and executory, the
losmg party may avail of the following:
(a) Petition for relief from judgment;
(b) Action to annul a judgment;
586
CHAPTERIX 587
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
(c) Petition for Certiorari; and
(d) Collateral attack of a judgment. Bar 2014
4. The next important query is: When does a judgment
become final and executory? A judgment becomes executory
upon the expiration of the period to appeal from a judgment
or order that finally disposes of the action or proceeding, if
no appeal has been duly perfected. A judgment also becomes
executory after an appeal taken from the judgment or order
has been finally resolved (See Sec. 1, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
On the other hand, within the period for appeal,
reckoned from the notice of the judgment or final order, the
said judgment or final order is not yet executory except those
judgments which, under the Rules, are immediately executory,
like those provided for under Sec. 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. Such judgments are enforceable after their rendition
and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom (Sec. 4,
Rule 39, Rules of Court).
Thus, the remedies against a judgment would necessarily
refer to those remedies (a) before a judgment becomes final
and executory, and (b) after the same becomes executory.
A. Motion for Reconsideration
(Rule 37; Bar 2009; 2014)
Object of the motion
The motion for reconsideration referred to under Rule 37
is one that is directed against a judgment or a final order.
It is not the motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory
order which normally precedes a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
An order or judgment of the RTC is deemed final when it
finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can
be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or
judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. On the other
hand, an order which does not dispose of the case completely
and indicates that other things remain to be done by the court
588 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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as regards the merits, is interlocutory (Tongonan Holding
and Development Corporation v. Escano, Jr., G.R. No. 190994,
September 7, 2011).
Motion for reconsideration in cases covered by summary
procedure
A motion for reconsideration of a judgment is a prohibited
motion in a case that falls under the Rules on Expedited
Procedures in the First Level Courts (Sec. 2, Rule II, Rules
on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts). Bar 1989,
1990 The motion is also prohibited in actions for unlawful
detainer and forcible entry (Sec. 13[3], Rule 70, Rules of
Court), such actions being governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure (Sec. 3, Rule 70, Rules of Court).
Motion for reconsideration in small claims cases
A motion for reconsideration of a judgment is prohibited
under Sec. 2(d), Rule II of the Rules on Expedited Procedures
in the First Level Courts (A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC).
Motion for reconsideration in petitions for writ of amparo
and habeas data
In a petition for a writ of amparo (Sec. l l[k], The Rule on
the Writ of Amparo) and habeas data (Sec. 13[k], The Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data), the motion for reconsideration that
is prohibited is one directed against an interlocutory order or
interim relief order. The rule does not proscribe the filing of a
motion for reconsideration of the final judgment or order that
grants or denies a writ of arriparo (Mamba v. Bueno, G.R. No.
191416, February 7, 2017). The same rule applies in a petition
for a writ of habeas data.
Motion for reconsideration in environmental cases
A motion for reconsideration of a judgment is allowed
(Sec. 1, Rule 2, Part IL Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases).
CHAPTERIX 589
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
When to file
1. A motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
order is filed within the period for taking an appeal (Sec. 1,
Rule 37, Rules of Court). No motion for extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration shall be allowed (Sec. 2, Rule 40;
Sec. 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
2. The period for appeal depends on whether the appeal
is by mere notice of appeal or by record on appeal.
Where the appeal is one made by notice of appeal, the
period for appeal referred to in the immediately preceding
number is within 15 days after notice to the appellant of the
judgment or final order appealed from (Sec. 2, Rule 40; Sec. 3,
Rule 41; Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
Where a record on appeal is required, the period is within
30 days from notice of the judgment or final order (Sec. 2, Rule
40; Sec. 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court). A record on appeal shall be
required only in special proceedings and in cases which allow
multiple or separate appeals (Sec. 3, Rule 40, Rules of Court;
Sec. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court; See also Chipongian v. Benitez-
Lirio, G.R. No. 162692, August 26, 2015).
3. The above-mentioned periods begin to run upon
receipt of notice of the decision or final order appealed from.
Such periods begin upon receipt of notice by the counsel of
record, which is considered notice to the parties. Service of
judgment on the party represented by counsel is not considered
the official notice and receipt of the judgment (De los Santos v.
Elizalde, 514 SCRA 14, 27).
Effect of the filing of a motion on the period to appeal
The timely filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts
the period of appeal (Sec. 2, Rule 40; Sec. 3, Rule 41, Rules of
Court).
590 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Grounds for a motion for reconsideration; what to allege
1. The motion for reconsideration must be in writing; a
written notice of which must be served on the adverse party,
and may be anchored on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the damages awarded are excessive;
(b) That the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision or final order; or
(c) That the decision or final order is contrary to
law (Sec. 1, Rule 37, Rules of Court).
2. It is not sufficient to mention the ground relied upon.
It is necessary for the motion for reconsideration to specifically
point out the findings or conclusions of the judgment or final
order which are not supported by the evidence or which are
contrary to law. The rule also requires the motion to make
express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence
or the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such
findings or conclusions (Sec. 2, Rule 37, Rules of Court). Non-
compliance with this requirement would reduce the motion to
a mere proforma motion. Under the explicit provisions of the
rule (See Sec. 2, Rule 37, Rules of Court), a pro forma motion
for reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of
appeal even if timely filed.
Pro forma motion (Bar 2011)
1. A pro forma motion is one which does not satisfy
the requirements of the rules and will be treated as a motion
intended to delay the proceedings (Marikina Development
Corporation v. Flojo, 251 SCRA 87, 93).
2. A motion for reconsideration is deemed pro forma
if the same does not specify the findings or conclusions of the
judgment which are not supported by the evidence or contrary
to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence
or legal provisions. It is settled that, although a motion for
reconsideration may merely reiterate issues already passed
upon by the court, that, by itself, does not make it pro forma
and is immaterial because what is essential is compliance
with the requisites of the Rules.
CHAPTERIX 591
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
3. In the cases where a motion for reconsideration
was held to be proforma, the same was so held because of
any of the following reasons: (a) it was a second motion for
reconsideration, (b) it did not comply with the rule that the
motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be
contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, (c) it failed
to substantiate the alleged errors, (d) it merely alleged that
the decision in question was contrary to law, or (e) the adverse
party was not given notice thereof.
Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent
on the part of the pleader to merely delay the proceedings
and his motion reveals a bona fide effort to present additional
matters or to reiterate his arguments in a different light, the
courts should be slow to declare the same outright as pro
forma (Philippine National Bank v. Paneda, 515 SCRA 639,
649, citing Marina Properties Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
294 SCRA 273).
Resolution of the motion
The motion shall be resolved within 30 days from the
time it is submitted for resolution (Sec. 4, Rule 37, Rules of
Court).
Remedy against the order denying a motion for reconsidera-
tion
1. If the motion is denied, the movant may appeal
from the judgment or final order, not to appeal from the order
denying the motion for reconsideration. Sec. 9 of Rule 37 is
explicit:
"x x x An order denying a x x x motion for
reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an
appeal from the judgment or final order."
2. Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not
always interlocutory orders. A motion for reconsideration may
be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if it puts
an end to a particular matter, leaving the court with nothing
592 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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else to do but to execute the decision. An appeal from an order
denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal
of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal
itself. It is an appeal from a final decision or order (Republic of
the Philippines v. Ortigas Company Limited Partnership, G.R.
No. 171496, March 3, 2014).
Remedy when motion is denied
1. The remedy from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration is not to appeal from the order of denial.
The order is not appealable. The remedy is to appeal from
the judgment or final order itself subject of the motion for
reconsideration (Sec. 9, Rule 37, Rules of Court).
2. May the order denying the motion for reconsideration
be assailed by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65? The
answer used to be in the affirmative. Sec. 1 of Rule 41 clearly
provided then for the proper remedy against the order: "In all
instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65."
However, effective December 27, 2007, it is submitted
that the order denying a motion for reconsideration is no
longer assailable by certiorari because of the amendment
to Rule 41 by AM. No. 07-7-12-SC. Deleted from those
matters enumerated in Rule 41 subject to a Rule 65 petition
is "an order denying a motion for new trial or a motion for
reconsideration." The amendment obviously seeks to prevent
the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based
on an order denying a motion for new trial or a motion for
reconsideration. The remedy available, therefore, would be
that prescribed under Sec. 9 of Rule 37, i.e., to appeal from the
judgment or final order.
The "Fresh Period" rule; Neypes rule
1. As earlier discussed, the party whose motion for
reconsideration is denied may appeal from the judgment
or final order. What is the period for such an appeal? This
CHAPTERIX 593
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
question was settled by the jurisprudence which several
years back adopted the "fresh period" rule. This rule provides
that the movant has a "fresh period" of 15 days from receipt
or notice of the order denying or dismissing the motion for
reconsideration within which to file a notice of appeal.
This new period assumes importance if either a motion for
reconsideration or a motion for new trial has been filed but
was denied or dismissed. It needs to be emphasized that the
ruling shall not be applied where no motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration has been filed, in which case
the 15-day period for l':!-ppealshall run from notice of the
judgment. This "fresh period" rule applies not only to Rule
41 governing appeals from the Regional Trial Courts but
also to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Court to the Regional Trial Court, Rule 42 on petitions for
review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals,
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court
of Appeals, and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court. Accordingly, this rule was adopted to
standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford fair opportunity to appeal their cases, and to give the
trial court another opportunity to review the case, and, in the
process, minimize any error of judgment (See Neypes v. Court
of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633).
The Court, in Neypes, explained:
"The original period of appeal xx x remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh
period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts
to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case
and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch
and to have judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted - from receipt of notice of judgment xx x or from
receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from. x x x
 594 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his
notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional
Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt
of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new
15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is
filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory
after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3" (Neypes v. Court of Appeals, supra;
Underscoring supplied).
2. Following the "fresh period" rule, the period for appeal
of the losing party, who filed a motion for reconsideration, does
not start from the date of the notice to him of the judgment. It
starts from notice to him of the order denying or dismissing his
motion for reconsideration. Thus, assume that Mr. Defendant
received notice of the adverse judgment on May 2. Promptly,
he filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment on May
10. On June 1, the court denied his motion but the notice of
denial was received by Mr. Defendant only on June 10. If
the period for appeal is 15 days, Mr. Defendant has a" fresh
period" of 15 days to appeal from June 10, not from May 2, the
date of the notice of the judgment. If, however, Mr. Defendant
did not file a motion for reconsideration or a motion for new
trial, the period for appeal is to be reckoned from May 2, the
date of notice of the judgment.
The basis for the "fresh period" rule is the period for
appeal embodied in Sec. 2 of Rule 40 and Sec. 3 of Rule 41. In
both provisions the period for appeal is 15 days from notice
of the "judgment or final order" appealed from. Note that the
rule did not provide that appeal may be taken within 15 days
from the notice of the "judgment" only. The appeal may also be
taken from notice of "final order."
The term "final order" finds no significance where the
losing party did not file a motion for reconsideration, in which
case the period for appeal starts from notice of the "judgment".
If the losing party files either a motion for new trial or a
motion for reconsideration, the ruling of the court on that
motion is deemed to be the "final order" of the court. Thus, if
CHAPTERIX 595
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
the court denies the motion, that denial is deemed the "final
order." Hence, the period for appeal is to be reckoned from the
date the denial of the motion (final order) was received by the
movant. The date the denial of the motion was received is the
date of "notice of final order." From that notice, the appellant
has a "fresh period" of 15 days to appeal.
Note: The same rule applies when a motion for new trial
is denied.
3. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a
waiver of the right to appeal. In one case, the respondent in-
sisted that by opting to file a motion for reconsideration, in-
stead of directly appealing, the petitioner accordingly effec-
tively lost the right to appeal. The contention, ruled the Court,
was erroneous and deserved scant consideration because from
the date the petitioner received the resolution denying her
motion, she had a "fresh period" of 15 days within which to
appeal (Gagui v. Dejero, G.R. No. 196036, October 23, 2013).
The Neypes rule has no application to non-judicial
proceedings
The Neypes rule covers only judicial proceedings. Hence,
the rule does not apply to administrative appeals like appeal
from the decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to
the Office of the President (San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and
Developers Group, Inc. v. Bayang, G.R. No. 194702, April 20,
2015) or from the decision of the D ENR Regional Office to
the DENR Secretary (Jocson v. San Miguel, G.R. No. 206941,
March 9, 2016). Also, the Neypes rule does not apply to
appeals from the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA)
to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) since
the Appeal is not judicial but administrative (National Power
Corporation v. The Provincial Treasurer of Benguet, G.R. No.
209303, November 14, 2016).
Application of the Neypes rule to criminal cases
In Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9,
2011, the rule in Neypes has been held to be applicable to
criminal cases. Central to the ruling of the Court in Judith
596 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Yu is the provision of Sec. 39 of B.P. 129, as amended, which
provides that the period for appeal shall be 15 days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment,
or decision appealed from. This period of appeal is, by the
clear tenor of Sec. 39, applicable "in all cases"; hence, covers
criminal cases as well.
The Court explained:
"x x x While Neypes involved the period to appeal in
civil cases, the Court's pronouncement of a "fresh period"
to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in
criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on
which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction
between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a
criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states
that ''[t]heperiod for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases
shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from." Ubi lex non distinguit nee nos distinguere debemos.
When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also
ought not to recognize any distinction.
Second; the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though
differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no
substantial difference between the two provisions insofar
as legal results are concerned - the appeal period stops
running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the
order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration.
It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases.
No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases
cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the
ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6,
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since
it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of
CHAPTERIX 597
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review
from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals
by certiorari to th[e] Court, both of which also apply to
appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure x x x.
XXX
"Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period
rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period
to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and
encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil
case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in
a criminal case - a situation that gives undue favor to civil
litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-
appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment
when we favor a situation where property interests are
at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be
prejudiced x x x."
Order of denial, not appealable
The "Fresh Period" Rule does not refer to the period
within which to appeal from the order denying the motion for
reconsideration, but to the period within which to appeal from
the judgment itself because an order denying a motion for
reconsideration is not appealable (See Sec. 9, Rule 37, Rules
of Court).
Effect of granting a motion for reconsideration
If the court grants the motion for reconsideration, i.e., it
finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the
judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it
may amend such judgment or final order accordingly (Sec. 3,
Rule 37, Rules of Court).
The amended judgment is in the nature of a new judgment
which supersedes the original judgment. It is not a mere
supplemental decision which does not supplant the original
but only serves to add something to it (Esquivel v. Alegre, 172
SCRA 315,325).
598 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Partial reconsideration
If the court finds that a motion affects the issues of
the case as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in
controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it,
the order may grant a reconsideration as to such issues if
severable without interfering with the judgment or final order
upon the rest (Sec. 7, Rule 37, Rules of Court).
The "Single Motion" rule (Bar 2013)
1. As a general rule, a party shall not be allowed to file
a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final
order. The rule states: ''No party shall be allowed a second
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order" (Sec.
5, Rule 37, Rules of Court).
2. A second motion for reconsideration is prohibited
and can only be allowed on extraordinarily persuasive reasons
and only after an express leave shall have first been obtained
(Roasters Philippines, Inc. v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 191874,
September 2, 2015).
3. Where a tribunal renders a decision substantially
reversing itself on a matter, a motion for reconsideration
seeking reconsideration of this reversal, for the first time, is
not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration (Cristobal
v. PAL and Tan, G.R. No. 201622, October 4, 2017).
Motion for reconsideration in appealed cases; stay of
execution (Rule 52; Bar 2012; 2013; 2016)
1. A party may file a motion for reconsideration of
a judgment or final resolution within 15 days from notice
thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party (Sec. 1, Rule
52, Rules of Court). This motion shall be resolved within 90
days from the date when the court declares it submitted for
resolution (Sec. 3, Rule 52, Rules of Court).
2. The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall
stay the execution of the judgment or final resolution sought
CHAPTER IX 599
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
to be reconsidered, provided the motion is filed (a) on time,
and (b) by the proper party. The exception is when the court,
for good reasons, otherwise directs (Sec. 4, Rule 52, Rules of
Court).
3. The court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution. The second
motion that is not allowed refers to the motion filed by the
same party (Sec. 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court). What the provision
prohibits "is a second motion for reconsideration filed by the
same party involving the same judgment or final resolution"
(Buot v. Dujali, G.R. No. 199885, October 2, 2017).
4. Taken in conjunction with Sec. 2 of Rule 56 of the
Rules of Court, the provisions of Sec. 2 of Rule 52, prohibiting a
second motion for reconsideration, also apply to original cases
filed before the Supreme Court, which includes disciplinary
proceedings against judges. The prohibition does not,
however, apply when the Court grants express leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration granted for "extraordinary
persuasive reasons" (Verginesa-Suarez v. Dilag, A.M. No.
RTJ-06-2014, August 16, 2011). Note that, under Rule 56, one
of the rules applicable to the Supreme Court in cases filed
originally before it is Rule 52 (Motion for Reconsideration).
B. Motion for New Trial (Rule 37)
Nature of a new trial
"A new trial is a remedy that seeks to temper the severity
of a judgment or prevent a failure of justice x x x. The grant
of a new trial is, generally speaking, addressed to the sound
discretion of the court which cannot b_einterfered with unless
a clear abuse thereof is shown" (Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon,
G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011).
Motion for new trial in cases covered by summary proce-
dure
A motion for new trial is a prohibited motion in a case that
falls under the Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First
600 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Level Courts (Sec. 2, Rule II, Rules on Expedited Procedures
in the First Level Courts). Bar 1989; 1990
Motion for new trial in small claims cases
A motion for new trial is prohibited under Sec. 16(c) of
the Rule of Procedure in Small Claims Cases, as amended
(A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
Motion for new trial in environmental cases
In environmental cases, a motion for new trial is
allowed in highly meritorious cases or to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice (Sec. 1, Rule 2, Part II, Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases).
When to file
1. A motion for new trial is filed within the period for
taking an appeal (Sec. 1, Rule 37, Rules of Court). No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial shall be
allowed (Sec. 2, Rule 40; Sec. 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court). Bar
1975
2. Where the appeal is by notice of appeal, the period
for appeal is within 15 days after notice to the appellant of the
judgment or final order appealed from (Sec. 2, Rule 40; Sec. 3,
Rule 41; Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
Where a record on appeal is required, the period for
appeal is within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final
order (Sec. 2, Rule 40; Sec. 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court). A record
on appeal shall be required only (a) in special proceedings,
and (b) other cases of multiple or separate appeals (Sec. 3,
Rule 40, Rules of Court).
Effect of the filing of the motion on the period to appeal
The filing of a timely motion for new trial interrupts the
period to appeal (Sec. 2, Rule 40; Sec. 3, Rule 41, Rules of
Court).
CHAPTERIX 601
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Form of a motion for new trial
Like a motion for reconsideration, the motion for new
trial shall be made in writing, stating the ground or grounds
therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the
movant on the adverse party (Sec. 2, Rule 37, Rules of Court).
Grounds for a motion for new trial {Bar 2011)
1. The aggrieved party may move the trial court to set
aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial on
one or more of the following causes materially affecting the
substantial rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negli-
gence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against and, by reason of which, such aggrieved party
has probably been impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly-discovered evidence, which he could not,
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced
at the trial, and which, if presented, would probably alter
the result (Sec. 1, Rule 37, Rules of Court). Bar 1988
2. A motion for the cause mentioned in paragraph "a"
shall be supported by affidavits of merit. A motion based on
the ground in letter ''b" shall be supported by (a) affidavits of
the witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given,
or (b) by duly authenticated documents which are proposed to
be introduced in evidence (Sec. 2, Rule 37, Rules of Court).
Non-compliance with this requirement would reduce the
motion to a mere pro forma motion
Under the explicit provisions of the rule (Sec. 2, Rule 37,
Rules of Court), a proforma motion for new trial shall not toll
the reglementary period of appeal.
Affidavit of merit
1. Under the Rules, the moving party must show
that he has a meritorious defense. The facts constituting the

602 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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~ovant's _g?od and substantial defense, which he may prove
if the petit10n were granted, must be shown in the affidavit
which should accompany the motion for a new trial. Mere
allegations that one has a "meritorious defense" and a "good
cause" are mere conclusions which do not provide the court
with any basis for determining the nature and merit of the
ca~e: An affidavit of merit should state facts, and not mere
opm10n or conclusions of law.
2. An affidavit of merit is required in a motion for
new. trial founded on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence (Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation
503 SCRA 704, 712). ' "fresh period" of 15 days from receipt or no~ice ~f t~e or~er
Newly-discovered evidence; requisites
. Before a 1_1-ewtrial may be granted on the ground ofnewly-
d1scovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence
was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material,
not m~rely c~mulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4)
the ~v1dence 1s ?f such_ weight that it would probably change
th~ Judgment, 1f admitted. If the alleged newly-discovered
e~1dence could.have been very well presented during the trial
with th~ exercise of reasonable diligence, the same could not
be considered newly discovered evidence (Ybiernas v. Tanco-
Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011).
Gross negligence of counsel not a ground for new trial
Petitioner's argument that his counsel's negligence was
so gross th~t he was deprived of due process fails to impress.
Gross ~eghgence is not one of the grounds for a motion for a
new trial. The Court cannot declare his counsel's negligence
as gross as to liberate him from the effects of his failure to
present countervailing evidence. The Court does not consider
as gross negligen~e the counsel's resort to dilat~ry schemes,
su_ch as (1). t~ie filmg of at least three motions to extend the
filmg of petit10ner's answer; (2) his non-appearance during the
603
CHAPTERIX
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
scheduled pre-trials; and (3) the failure to file petitioner's pre-
trial brief, even after the filing of several motions to extend ~he
date for filing (Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation,
503 SCRA 704, 713).
Resolution of the motion
The motion shall be resolved within 30 days from the
time it is submitted for resolution (Sec. 4, Rule 37, Rules of
Court).
Denial of the motion; the "Fresh Period" Rule
If the motion for new trial is denied, the movant has a
denying or dismissing the motion for new trial w1thm which
to file a notice of appeal for the same reasons and grounds as
the "Fresh Period'' Rule governing a denial of a motion for
reconsideration (Neypes v. Court of Appeals, supra).
Order of denial, not appealable
The "Fresh Period'' Rule does not refer to the period
within which to appeal from the order denying the motion for
new trial because the order is not appealable under Sec. 9 of
Rule 37. It refers to the period within which to appeal from
the judgment.
Remedy when motion is denied
May the order denying the motion for new trial be assailed
by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65? The an~wer used to
be in the affirmative. Sec. 1 of Rule 41 clearly provided then for
the proper remedy against the order: "In all instances v:here
the judgment or final order is not a_ppealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65."
However, effective December 27, 2007, an order de1:1yin~
a motion for new trial is no longer assailable by certiorari
because of the amendment to Rule 41 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC. Deleted from those matters from which no appeal can

604 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
be taken, and from which order Rule 65 may be availed of,
is "an order denying a motion for new trial or a motion for
reconsideration." The amendment seeks to prevent the filing
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on an order
denying a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration.
The remedy available, therefore, would be that prescribed
under Sec. 9 of Rule 37, i.e., to appeal from the judgment or
final order.
Effect of granting the motion for new trial (Bar 2011)
If the court grants the motion for new trial, the original
judgment or final order shall be vacated, and the action shall
stand for trial de novo. The recorded evidence taken upon the
former trial shall be used at the new trial without retaking
the same if the evidence is material and competent (Sec. 6,
Rule 37, Rules of Court).
Partial new trial
1. If the court finds that a motion affects the issues of
the case as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in
controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it,
the court may grant a new trial as to such issues if severable
without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the
rest (Sec. 7, Rule 37, Rules of Court). The effect of this order is
a partial new trial.
2. When there is an order for a partial new trial, i.e.,
less than all of the issues are ordered retried, the court may
either enter a judgment or final order as to the rest, or stay
the enforcement of such judgment or final order until after the
new trial (Sec. 8, Rule 37, Rules of Court).
Second motion for new trial
While a second motion for reconsideration is not allowed,
a second motion for new trial is authorized by the Rules. A
motion for new trial shall include all grounds then available.
Those not so included are deemed waived. However, when a
ground for a new trial was not existing or available when the
605
CHAPTERIX
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
first motion was made, a second motion for new t~ial may_be
filed within the period allowed but excl~ding the time dun;;
which the first motion had been pendmg (Sec. 5, Rule '
Rules of Court).
New trial in appealed cases
1 Under Sec. 1 of Rule 53, at any time after the appeal
from the lower court has been perfected and before the Co~~t
of Appeals loses jurisdiction over the case, a party _may
a motion for new trial on the ground of newly-discovere
evidence.
Pursuant to the same provision, to be deemed a new_ly-
discovered evidence, such evidence should be_(a~ one which
ld not have been discovered prior to the trial m the court
~:row even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (b)
one of such a character as would probably change the result.
The motion, in itself, would be insuffic~ent. The ru~e,
likewise requires that the motion be accompamed by affidavits
showing' the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the
newly-discovered evidence.
2. The motion shall be resolved wi_thin 90 days fr?m
the date when the court declares it submitted for resolution
(Sec. 3, Rule 53, Rules of Court).
3. The procedure in the new trial shall be the same as
that granted by a Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals/
may, however, direct otherwise (Sec. 4, Rule 53, Rules o
Court). It may, therefore, adopt its own rules.
4. A new trial does not apply to the Supreme Court
(Rule 56, Rules of Court). It applies, .however, to the Court of
Appeals (Sec. 9, B.P. 129; Rule 53, Rules of Court).
APPEALS
General principles on appeal
1 An appeal is the remedy available to a litigant seeking
to rev~rse or modify a judgment on the merits of a case (Cortal

606 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107, August
30, 2017). In less technical terms, an appeal is used to correct
errors of judgments of a lower court or tribunal such as errors
in the application of the rules of evidence, in the appreciation
of the credibility of the witnesses or in the appreciation of the
facts of the case. It is not designed to correct acts constituting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
other errors of jurisdiction of the court. It is a basic procedural
rule that errors of judgment are correctible by appeal while
errors of jurisdiction are correctible by certiorari.
2. If a losing litigant desires to obtain a reversal or
modification of a judgment adverse to him, the remedy is
to appeal from the judgment. Save certain circumstances
mentioned in this material in a later discussion of Rule 65, it
is generally not correct to question the decision of a court on
the merits by invoking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
It is worth remembering that a petition for certiorari,
under Sec. 1 of Rule 65, is available only when there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Hence, the availability of an appeal
or some other remedy precludes the application of certiorari.
It is vital to remember what jurisprudence has consis-
tently held: "x x x [W]here an appeal is available, certiorari
will not prosper, even if the ground invoked is grave abuse
of discretion (Butuan Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 197358, April 5, 2017; Punongbayan-
Visitacion v. People, G.R. No. 194214, January 10, 2018;
Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 196890, January 11, 2018). ' G.R. No. 215200, July 26, 2017; People u. Delector, October 4,
3. An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have
a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court
authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is
a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege,
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions oflaw (People u. Hilario, G.R. No. 210610,
January 11, 2018; Melendres v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 194346,
June 18, 2018; For additional readings, see Orlina v. Ventura,
G.R. No. 227033, December 3, 2018).
CHAPTER IX 607
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
For instance, the requirement of paying the full amount
of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for
the perfection of an appeal. The rule is not a mere technicality
oflaw or procedure because without such payment, the appeal
is not perfected (Spouses Lee v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 218867, February 17, 2016). This rule is, of course,
subject to the liberal construction rule enunciated in Sec. 6,
Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.
4. It is an oft-repeated doctrine in appeals that
findings of trial courts on the credibility of wit~esses deserve
a high degree of respect. Having observed their deport~ent
in court the trial judge is in a position to determine the issue
of credibility. For this reason, the findings of trial judges ~ill
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showmg
that they have overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could have
altered the judgment (People u. Caballero, G.R. No. 210673,
June 29, 2016; See also People v. Ladra, G.R. No. 221443, July
17, 2017; See also People v. Dillatan, Sr., G.R. No. 212191,
September 5, 2018).
Also, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held _that it is
not necessary to examine, evaluat~ or weig? the evidenc~ all
over again especially where the trial court s factual findmgs
are adopted and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This means
that factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not
be reviewed on appeal (Bacalso v. Aca-ac, G.R. No. 172919,
January 13, 2016; For further readings, see People v. Napoles,
2017; See also, Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan [First Division],
July 24, 2018).
The above rule, however, does not apply when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relev_ant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion. In which case, the Supreme
Court can go over the records and re-examine the evidence
presented by the parties in order to arrive at a much better
 608 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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and just resolution of the case (Baleares v. Espanto, G.R. No.
229645, June 6, 2018).
Judgments or orders that are appealable
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by the Rules to be appealable (Sec. 1,
Rule 41, Rules of Court; Chipongian v. Benitez-Lirio, G.R. No.
162692, August 26, 2016). Hence, an interlocutory order is not
appealable until after the finality of the judgment on the merits
(Sec. l[b], Rule 41, Rules of Court). The purpose of the rule
that only those final orders or judgments that finally dispose
of a c~se are appealable is to avoid multiplicity of appeals. If
even mterlocutory orders were to be made appealable, a party
~o~ld be encouraged to interpose numerous appeals even on
mc1dental questions. This practice would cause considerable
delays in the trial on the merits of a case aside from the
unn~cessary expenses that would inevitably be incurred by the
parties (For further readings, see Miranda v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 144760-61, August 2, 2017).
Judgments or orders that are not appealable (Bar 2014)
1. Certain judgments and orders are specifically
declared as not appealable. Thus, under Sec. 1 of Rule 41, no
appeal may be taken from:
. . (a) A~ order denying a petition for relief or any
s1m1lar mot10n seeking relief from judgment;
(b) An interlocutory order;
· (c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(d) An order denying a motion to set aside a
judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the
g~~u~d of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground
v1tiatmg consent;
(e) An order of execution·
' a certification against forum shopping. The order
CHAPTER IX 609
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
(f) A judgment or final order for or against
one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party complaints,
while the main case is pending, unless the court allows
an appeal therefrom; and
(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice
(See Leviste Management System, Inc. v. Legaspi Towers
200, Inc., G.R. No. 199353, April 4, 2018). Bar 2011
Note: As of December 27, 2007, an aggrieved party may
no longer assail an order denying a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration by way of Rule 65, as per A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC, such ground having been removed from the
enumeration in Sec. 1 of Rule 41. The proper remedy is to
appeal from the judgment pursuant to Sec. 9, Rule 37, Rules
of Court.
2. Examples:
(a) Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on
improper venue. The motion was denied. The denial of
' the motion does not completely dispose of the case; hence,
the order denying the motion is merely interlocutory.
An interlocutory order is not appealable under the clear
terms of Sec. l(b) of Rule 41.
Jurisprudence explains the rationale of the rule:
"An interlocutory order is not appealable until after the
rendition of the judgment on the merits for a contrary
rule would delay the administration of justice and unduly
burden the courts" (Sime Darby Employees Association v.
NLRC, 510 SCRA 204,217).
If the motion to dismiss based on improper venue
is granted, the order of dismissal is an order without
prejudice, i.e., without prejudice to the refiling of the
complaint. Such order, under the unequivocal terms of
Sec. l(g) of Rule 41, as amended, is not appealable.
(b) The RTC, upon proper motion and hearing,
dismissed a complaint for violation of the rule requiring
610 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
dismissing the complaint is generally not appealable.
Under Sec. 5 of Rule 7, a dismissal of this nature is, as a
rule, a dismissal without prejudice. An order dismissing
an action without prejudice is not appealable under Sec.
l(g) of Rule 41, as amended.
(c) In one case, a party filed a petition for relief
from judgment. From the order denying the petition, the
petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. It is obvious that the petitioner availed of the
wrong remedy. A petition under Rule 45 is a mode of
appeal. Under Sec. l(a) of Rule 41, as amended, the denial
of a petition for relief from judgment is subject only to
a special civil action under Rule 65 and not through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a
mode of appeal (Trust International Paper Corporation v.
Pelaez, G.R. No. 164871, August 22, 2006).
(d) Even if the notice of appeal is filed within 15
days from notice of a motion denying a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, if the subject of the motion is an
order dismissing the action without prejudice, the filing
of a notice of appeal is the wrong remedy because an order
dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable.
The order may be the subject of the special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 (Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Reyes, 561 SCRA 234, 249).
(e) If a case is dismissed by the RTC because of
the repeated failure of the plaintiffs to appear in the pre-
trial, the dismissal is not to be assailed in a petition for
certiorari in the CA. The Court ruled that the remedy is
an appeal to the CA under Rule 41. Since the RTC did not
state that the dismissal is without prejudice, it is deemed
to be with prejudice under Sec. 5 of Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court. A dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication on
the merits; hence, appealable. A petition for certiorari is
the wrong mode of judicial review (Chingkoe v. Republic,
G.R. No. 183608, July 31, 2013).
CHAPTER IX 611
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
(f) A dismissal, pursuant to a motion to dismiss,
on the ground of bar by a prior judgment, prescription,
or any of the grounds mentioned. In Sec. 5 of Rule 16,
precludes the refiling of the same action or claim. Hence,
the dismissal is with prejudice. The aggrieved plaintiff
should appeal, not file a petition under Rule 65.
(g) An order of the trial court dismissing a case
for failure to prosecute is a final order. Such order or
dismissal operates as a judgment on the merits because
the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits unless otherwise declared by the court (Systems
' .
and Plan Integrator and Development Corporation v.
Municipal Government of Murcia, G.R. No. 217121,
March 16, 2016; Sec. 3, Rule 17, Rules of Court).
(h) The tenor of Sec. l[f] of Rule 41 instructs that
not every judgment or final order is appealable. When
the judgment or final order does not affect all parties or
all the claims in a case, the same does not completely
dispose of the case, hence, said judgment or final order
is not, as a rule, appealable, unless the court allows an
appeal therefrom. An example of this type of judgment or
final order is a several or a separate judgment provided
for, respectively, in Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule 36 of the Rules
of Court. A several judgment, in Sec. 4, is one rendered
against one or more of the several defendants, leaving
the action to proceed against the others. On the other
hand, a separate judgment is one which disposes of o_nly
one or more claims without disposing of all the claims
in the case. In both several and separate judgments, the
entire case is not yet completely over.
Remedy in case the judgment or final order is not appealable
In those instances where the judgment or final order is
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file the appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65 (Sec. 1, Rule 41, Rules of
Court; Crisologo v. JEWN Agro-Industrial Corporation, G.R.
No. 196894, March 3, 2014).
 612 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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r
1
Remedy against an order of execution; exceptions
1. In a case, the petitioner argued that the CA
should have dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the
respondent against the order of execution of the RTC on the
ground of improper remedy. The petitioner further argued that
the trial court, which issued the order of execution, maintains
a general supervisory control or power over its execution, and
this power, according to the petitioner, carries with it the
right to determine questions of fact and law, which may be
involved in the· execution. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion
or an act in excess of jurisdiction could have been committed
by the trial court that would call for a petition for certiorari.
The Court, calling the argument as "mental acrobatics,"
maintained that Sec. 1 of Rule 41 explicitly provides that no
appeal may be taken from an order of execution and a party
who challenges such order may file a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Esguerra v.
Holcim Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 182571, September 2, 2013).
2. It was held, however, that while an order of
execution is not appealable, the rule is not absolute since a
party aggrieved by an improper or irregular execution is not
without a rem<:ldy. The Court emphasized that to rule that
a special civil action for certiorari constitutes the sole and
exclusive remedy to assail a writ or order of execution would
unduly restrict the remedy available to a party prejudiced by
an improper or illegal execution, as when the writ of execution
varies the judgment, there is a change in the situation of the
parties, the writ of execution is improvidently issued, the writ
is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party.
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice
and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the
party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court.
That mode of elevation may be either by appeal, or by a special
civil action for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus (City
Government of Makati v. Odeiia, G.R. No. 191661, August 13,
2013).
CHAPTERIX
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
613
An order of execution may be challenged under Rule 65
(See also Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v.
Cardline,' Inc., G.R. No. 201417, January 13, 2016). This is
still the general rule.
Issues that may and may not be raised on appeal
1 It is settled that issues that have not been raised
before. the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal (Spouses Erorita v. Spouses Dumlao, G.R. No. 195~77,
January 25, 2016). Raising a new ground for the fi~st time
on appeal contravenes due process, as that act dep~1ves the
adverse party of the opportunity to conte~t the a~sert10n of the
claimant (Heirs of Gilberto Roldan v. Heirs of Silvela Roldan,
G.R. No. 202578, September 27, 2017). In other words, the
assignment of errors of the appellant should refer to the
issues raised by the parties in the trial court. Such a r~l_e
finds expression in Rule 44, Sec. 15 of the 1997 Rules of C1v1l
Procedure, which provides -
"SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. -
Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new
trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment
of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised
in the court below and which is within the issues framed
by the parties."
2. Issues raised for the first time on appeal a~d not
raised in the proceedings below ought not to be considered
by a reviewing court (Ayala Land, Inc. v. G_astill~,G.R. N?.
178110, January 12, 2016). Overriding cons1derat10ns of fair
play, justice and due process dictate the above rule. So, where
the original theory of the case is nullity of a m~rtgage, a party
can no longer raise a new theory on appeal that 1snot connect~d
with the theory invoked in the trial court. If the new theory 1s
allowed the adverse party has no more opportunity to rebut
the neV: claim with contrary evidence because the trial stage
has already been terminated (Cahayag v. Commercial Credit
Corporation, G.R. No. 168078, January 13, 2016).

614 CNIL PROCEDURE
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In the same vein, objections relating to non-compliance
with the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
requirements should not be raised for the first time on appeal
(GSIS Family Bank-Thrift Bank [formerly Comsavings Bank,
Inc.] v. BPI Family Bank, G.R. No. 175278, September 23,
2015). In an earlier case, the appellate court was held to have
committed a reversible error in sustaining the dismissal of a
case based on improper venue because the same was not raised
by the appellant in his appeal (Cruz v. Manila International
Airport Authority, G.R. No. 184732, September 9, 2013).
3. An exception to the rule that a party may not change
his or her theory on appeal was recognized in Lianga Lumber
Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197, wherein the
Court ruled: "In the interest of justice and within the sound
discretion of the appellate court, a party may change his legal
theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not
require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse
party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in
the new theory (Lao v. Yao Bio Lim, G.R. No. 201306, August
9, 2017).
Role of the appellee
The appellee's role in the appeal process is confined only
to the task of refuting the assigned errors interposed by the
appellant. Since the appellee is not the party who instituted
the appeal, the Court explained that he merely assumes a
defensive stance and his interest is solely relegated to the
affirmance of the judgment appealed from. It is, accordingly,
highly erroneous for the appellee to either assign any error, or
seek any affirmative relief or modification of the lower court's
judgment without interposing his own appeal. Citing previous
jurisprudence, the Court, likewise, ruled, among others, that
an appellee cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not
appealed from by him. He cannot assign such errors as are
designed to have the judgment modified. The appellate court
cannot take cognizance of a ground for dismissal interposed by
the appellee who did not appeal. Hence, a dismissal made by
the appellate court on a ground not raised as an error by the
CHAPTER IX 615
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
appellant is a reversible error (Cruz v. Manila International
Airport Authority, supra).
Errors to be considered by the appellate court
1. Another basic rule on appeal is expressed in Sec. 8
of Rule 51: The appellate court shall consider no error unless
stated in the assignment of errors.
The rule, however, that the appellate court sha~l not
consider errors not raised in the assignment of errors 1s not
an absolute one. Sec. 8 of Rule 51 precludes its absolute
application allowing as it does certain errors which, even if
not assigned, may be ruled upon by the appellate court. He~ce,
the court may consider an error not assigned as error or rai~ed
on appeal provided the same falls within any of the followmg
categories:
(a) It is an error that affects the jurisdiction over
the subject matter;
(b) It is an error that affects validity of the judgment
appealed from;
(c) It is an error which affects the validity of the
proceedings;
(d) It is an error closely related t~ or depe?dent ?n
an assigned error, and properly argued m the brief_(Heirs
of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, 541
SCRA 479); and
(e) It is a plain and clerical error (Sec. 8, Rule 51,
Rules of Court; Martires v. Chua, 694 SCRA 38, 52-53,
March 20, 2013).
The fact that the appellant's brief did not raise the issue
of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court should not prevent the
Court from taking up such issue (Dy v. NLRC, 145 SCRA 211,
213). Bar 1993
2. Jurisprudence, significantly holds that an appellate
court has broad discretionary powers to waive the proper lack
616 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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of assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned
(Javines v. Xlibris, G.R. No. 214301, June 7, 2017). This
means that an appellate court may also consider matters not
mentioned in Sec. 8 of Rule 51. Thus it has been held that
the Court of Appeals, for instance, is imbued with sufficient
authority and discretion to review matters, not otherwise
assigned as errors on appeal, provided it finds that the
consideration is necessary in arriving at a complete and just
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to
avoid dispensing piecemeal justice (Asian Terminals, Inc. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 158458, December 19, 2007; Diaz-Enriquez v.
Director of Lands, G.R. No. 168065, September 6, 2017).
A more recent case affirms the above rule and allows a
review of unassigned errors or as long as the consideration
of errors not specifically raised or assigned as errors is
necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case (Digital
Telecommunications Phils., Inc. v. Ayapana, G.R. No. 195614,
January 10, 2018). In the Digital Telecommunications case,
the employee argued that, since the employer failed to file a
motion to reconsider the findings of the NLRC that he was
illegally dismissed, it is now bound by such findings. As such,
he insisted, that the matter of illegal dismissal can no longer be
raised as an issue before the Court of Appeals. The Court held
that the issue of whether the employee was validly dismissed
may be passed upon by the Court of Appeals since the said
issue is pivotal to the employee's entitlement to his prayer for
back wages and separation pay. The resolution of the issue is
necessary to arriving at a just disposition of the case (Digital
Telecommunications Phils., Inc. v. Ayapana, G.R. No. 195614,
January 10, 2018).
Harmless errors (Bar 2017)
1. There are errors committed by the trial court which
do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. These errors
are "harmless" and do not require the automatic reversal of
the judgment of the lower court. In other words, even if an
evidence has been improperly admitted by the trial court,
the error will be disregarded on appeal if the impact of the
CHAPTERIX 617
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
evidence on the case is slight and insignificant (See Sec. 6, Rule
51, Rules of Court). For example, if, despite a timely objection,
evidence of the previous negligent act of the defendant was
erroneously admitted, such evidence will not affect an adverse
judgment against said defendant whose negligence in the case
under consideration was sufficiently proven through evidence
independent of the one erroneously admitted
Also, in an earlier criminal case, the reference by the
trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of the
appellant is a harmless error if the reason for his conviction is
his identification by witnesses with high credibility (See People
v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995).
2. "x xx The harmless error rule obtains during review
of the things done by either the trial court or by any of the
parties themselves in the course of the trial, and any error
thereby found does not affect the substantial rights or even the
merits of the case. The Court has had occasions to apply the
rule in the correction of misspelled name due to clerical error,
the signing of the decedents' names in the notice of appeal
by the heirs, the trial court's treatment of the testimony of
the party as an adverse witness during cross-examination by
his own counsel, and the failure of the trial court to give the
plaintiffs the opportunity to orally argue against a motion. All
of the errors extant in the mentioned situation did not have the
effect of altering the dispositions rendered by the respective
trial courts" (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of
the Philippines [FASAP] v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No.
178083, March 13, 2018; Citations of the Court, omitted).
Appeals in criminal cases
In criminal cases, an appeal opens the entire case
for review. Thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to
correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers
upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
618 CNIL PROCEDURE
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proper provision of the penal law (People v. Diputado, G.R.
No. 213922, July 5, 2017; People v. Ceralde, G.R. No. 228894,
August 7, 2017; People v. Santos, G.R. No. 223142, January
17, 2018; People v. De la Victoria, G.R. No. 233325, April 16,
2018; See also People v. Ejercito, G.R. No. 229861, July 2,
2018; Yap v. People, G.R. No. 234217, November 14, 2018).
Payment of docket fee; liberal construction
1. Payment of docket fees and other legal fees within
the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional;
non-compliance with which is fatal to an appeal. The full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees
must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from. Without the payment
of docket fees, the appeal is not perfected and the appellate
court does not acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal,
thereby rendering the decision sought to be appealed final
and executory. Non-payment of the appellate court docket and
other lawful fees within the reglementary period is a ground
for the dismissal of an appeal (Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals,
479 SCRA 594, 602; Regalado v. Go, 514 SCRA 616, 634; See
also National Transmission Corporation v. Heirs of Ebesa,
G.R. No. 186102, February 24, 2016).
2. Note, however, that in the exercise of its impartial
jurisdiction, the Court allows a liberal construction of the rules
on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals in order to
serve the demands of substantial justice.
The established rule is that the payment in full of the
docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory.
Nevertheless, this rule must be qualified, to wit:
First, the failure to pay appellate court docket fee
within the reglementary period allows only discretionary
dismissal, not automatic dismissal, of the appeal;
Second, such power should be used in the exercise
of the Court's sound discretion "in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play and with great deal of
circumspection considering all attendant circumstances"
CHAPTER IX 619
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
(Republic v. Spouses Luriz, 513 SCRA 140, 151, citing
Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 563, 567).
3. While as a rule, the payment of the appellate docket
fee is mandatory and jurisdictional, the failure to pay the fee
confers upon the court a mere directory power to dismiss an
appeal. Such power must be exercised with sound discretion
and with a great deal of circumspection considering all
attendant circumstances (Co It v. Co, G.R. No. 198127, October
5, 2016).
Record on appeal; notice of appeal
1. An appeal is made by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party (Sec.
2[a], Rule 41, Rules of Court). No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of
multiple or separate appeals where the law or the Rules of
Court so require (Sec. 2[a], Rule 41, Rules of Court).
2. In a case where multiple appeals are allowed, a
party may appeal only a particular incident in the case and
not all of the matters involved in the same case. The others
which are not made the subject of the appeal remain to be
resolved by the trial court. The record on appeal is required
so the appellate court may have a record of the proceedings to
resolve a separate and distinct issue raised in the appeal, and
since the original records remain with the trial court, it still
can resolve the other issues of the case not made subject of the
appeal.
Example: Jurisprudence recognizes the existence of
multiple appeals in a complaint for expropriation because
there are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first
stage is the determination of the lawful right of the plaintiff to
take the property sought to be expropriated culminating in an
order of expropriation (Sec. 4, Rule 67, Rules of Court). This
order of expropriation may be appealed from by any party by
filing a record on appeal (Tan v. Republic, 523 SCRA 203, 211-
212).
620 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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The second stage is the determination by the court of the
just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated.
A second and separate appeal may be taken from this order
fixing the just compensation (Tan v. Republic, ibid. at 212).
Dismissal of an appeal
1. The following are the grounds for the dismissal of an
appeal by the Court of Appeals on its own motion or on that of
the appellee (Sec. 1, Rule 50, Rules of Court):
"An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:
(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its
face that the appeal was taken within the period fixed by
these Rules;
(b) Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record
on appeal within the period prescribed by these Rules;
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and
other lawful fees as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 40 and Sec. 4
of Rule 41;
(d) Unauthorized alterations, omissions or addi-
tions in the approved record on appeal as provided in Sec.
4 of Rule 44;
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the
required number of copies of his brief or memorandum
within the time provided by these Rules;
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the
appellant's brief, or of page references to the record as
required in Sec. 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule
44;
(g) Eailure of the appellant to take the necessary
steps for the correction or completion of the record within
the time limited by the court in its order;
(h) Failure of the appellant to appear at the
preliminary conference under Rule 48 or to comply
CHAPTERIX 621
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
with orders, circulars, or directives of the court without
justifiable cause; and
(i) The fact that the order or judgment appealed
from is not appealable" (Italics supplied).
The use of the term "may'' in Sec. 1 of Rule 50, it is
submitted, indicates that the dismissal is addressed to the
sound discretion of the appellate court.
In People v. Diaz, for instance, the Court, referring to
Sec. l(e) of Rule 50, held that the dismissal of the appeal
upon failure to file the appellant's brief is not mandatory, but
discretionary. Verily, declared the Court, "the failure to serve
and file the required number of copies of the appellant's brief
within the time provided by the Rules of Court does not have
the immediate effect of causing the outright dismissal of the
appeal. This means that the discretion to dismiss the appeal
on that basis is lodged in the CA, by virtue of which the CA
may still allow the appeal to proceed despite the late filing
of the appellant's brief, when the circumstances so warrant
its liberality'' (People v. Diaz, 691 SCRA 139, 148, February
18, 2013; Sibayan v. Costales, G.R. No. 191492, July 4, 2016;
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry Services,
Inc., G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017; For further readings,
see Alejo v. Cortez, G.R. No. 206114, June 19, 2017).
2. The following are the grounds for the dismissal of an
appeal in the Supreme Court motu proprio by the Court or on
motion of the respondent (Sec. 5, Rule 56, Rules of Court):
"(a) Failure to take the appeal within the
reglementary period;
(b) Lack of merit in the petition;
(c) Failure to pay the requisite docket fee and other
lawful fees or to make a deposit for costs;
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements re-
garding proof of service and contents of and the docu-
ments which should accompany the petition;
622 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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(e) Failure to comply with any circular, directive or
order of the Supreme Court without justifiable cause;
(f) Error in the choice or mode of appeal; and
(g) The fact that the case is not appealable to the
Supreme Court."
Withdrawal of the appeal
The withdrawal of an appeal maybe a matter of right
or a matter of judicial discretion. Before the filing of the
appellee's brief, the appeal may be withdrawn as a matter
of right. However, once the appellee's brief has been filed,
the withdrawal may be allowed in the discretion of the court
(See Sec. 3, Rule 50, Rules of Court; Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Nippon Express [Phils.] Corporation, G.R. No.
212920, September 16, 2015).
A. Appeal from Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts (Rule 40)
Where to appeal from a judgment or final order of a Municipal
Court (Bar 2014)
An appeal from a judgment or final order of a Municipal
Trial Court may be taken to the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the area to which the former
pertains (Sec. 1, Rule 40, Rules of Court). However, when the
Municipal Trial Court renders a judgment in the exercise of
its delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration
cases, its decision shall be appealable in the same manner as
decisions of the Regional Trial Court (Sec. 34, The Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended [B.P. 129]). Hence, the appeal
shall be taken to the Court of Appeals.
When to appeal
An appeal may be taken within 15 days after notice to
the appellant of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file
CHAPTERIX 623
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days after
notice of the judgment or final order (Sec. 2, Rule 40, Rules of
Court). Bar 1991
How to appeal; contents of notice of appeal
1. The appeal is taken by (a) filing a notice of appeal
with the court that rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, and by (b) serving a copy of the notice and
record on the adverse party (Sec. 3, Rule 40, Rules of Court).
Thus, if the judgment was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, the notice of appeal must be filed with said court, not
with the Regional Trial Court (Sec. 3, Rule 40, Rules of Court).
In special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate
appeals, a record on appeal shall be required.
The notice of appeal shall (a) indicate the parties to the
appeal, (b) the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed
from, and (c) state the material dates showing the timeliness
of the appeal (Sec. 3, Rule 40, Rules of Court).
2. Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant
shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment thereof
shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the
original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be
(Sec. 5, Rule 40, Rules of Court).
3. Within 15 days from the perfection of the appeal, the
clerk of court of the lower court shall transmit the original
record or the record on appeal, together with transcripts and
exhibits, which he shall certify as GOmplete, to the proper
Regional Trial Court (Sec. 6, Rule 40, Rules of Court).
Perfection of the appeal
1. A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in
due time. A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed
624 CML PROCEDURE
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perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof
upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time
(Sec. 4, Rule 40 in relation to Sec. 9, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
Bar 1999
2. The notice of appeal does not require the approval
of the court. The function of the notice of appeal is merely to
notify the trial court that the appellant was availing of the
right to appeal, and not to seek the court's permission that he
be allowed to pose an appeal. The trial court's only duty with
respect to a timely notice of appeal is to transmit the original
record of the case to the appellate court (Crisologo v. Daray,
562 SCRA 382, 391).
Duty of the clerk of court of the RTC
Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on
appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall
notify the parties of such fact (Sec. 7/a], Rule 40, Rules of
Court).
Submission of memorandum
1. Within 15 days from such notice, it shall be the duty
of the appellant to submit a memorandum, copy of which shall
be furnished the appellee (Sec. 7/b], Rule 40, Rules of Court).
2. For the appellant, the filing of a memorandum is
vital to his appeal. Failure to so file shall be a ground for the
dismissal of the appeal. The memorandum shall briefly discuss
the errors imputed to the lower court. The appellee may, if he
so desires, file his memorandum within 15 days from receipt
of the appellant's memorandum (See Sec. 7/b], Rule 40, Rules
of Court).
When case is deemed submitted for decision
The case shall be considered submitted for decision upon
the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration
of the period to do so (Sec. 7/c], Rule 40, Rules of Court).
CHAPTERIX 625
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Basis of the decision
The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court
of origin and such memoranda as are filed (Sec. 7/c], Rule 40,
Rules of Court).
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the RTC shall
decide the appeal of the judgment of the MTC in unlawful
detainer or forcible entry cases on the basis of the entire record
of the proceedings in the court of origin and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be required by the RTC. There is no
trial de novo of the case (Manalang, et al. v. Bacani, G.R. No.
156995, January 12, 2015).
Appeal from an order dismissing a case for lack of jurisdic-
tion (Bar 2014)
1. A case may be dismissed in the Municipal Trial
Court without a trial on the merits. This occurs, for instance,
when a motion to dismiss is filed and granted in accordance
with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. If an appeal is taken from
the dismissal by the lower court, the Regional Trial Court may
affirm or reverse it, as the case may be.
Under Sec. 8 of Rule 40, if, however, the dismissal in
the Municipal Trial Court is made on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the Regional Trial
Court on appeal affirms the dismissal, the action of the latter
court, if it has jurisdiction, shall not be confined to a mere
affirmation of the dismissal if it has jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Instead, the rule requires the Regional Trial
Court to try the case on the merits as if the case was originally
filed with it.
2. Under the same provision, if the case was tried on
the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not
dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof but shall
decide the case in accordance with the Rules. The court may,
however, admit amended pleadings and additional evidence
in the interest of justice.
 626 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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3. Recall that when a case is dismissed pursuant to
a motion to dismiss or motu proprio for lack of jurisdiction,
the order of dismissal is one without prejudice because the
plaintiff may refile the complaint with the court with the
proper jurisdiction. By the terms of Sec. l(g) of Rule 41, as
amended, the order dismissing an action without prejudice is
not appealable. The tenor, however, of Sec. 8 of Rule 40, on the
other hand, indicates that the rule allows an appeal from an
order of the MTC dismissing a case for lack of jurisdiction. Sec.
8 of Rule 40 should be considered as an exception to Sec. 1 of
Rule 41 which precludes an appeal from an order dismissing
an action without prejudice.
B. Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Court of Appeals (Rule 41)
Modes of appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court{Bar2009;2014;2017)
There are three modes of appeal from the decision of the
. Regional Trial Court, namely:
(a) An ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error,
where judgment was rendered by the court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. This mode of appeal is
governed by Rule 41 and is taken to the Court of Appeals
on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
(b) Petition for review, where judgment was
rendered by the court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. This mode of appeal is covered by Rule 42
and is brought to the Court of Appeals on questions of
fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
(c) Petition for review on certiorari or appeal by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. This mode is brought
to the Supreme Court from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
and only on questions of law (Sec. 2[<;},Rule 41, Rules
CHAPTERIX 627
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
of Court; Five Star Marketing Corp. v. Booe, 535 SCRA
28, 41-43; For further readings, see Quezon City v. ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 567 SCRA 496; Republic
v. Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338, 344; See also Far Eastern
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, C.R. No. 170618,
November 20, 2013; Republic v. Cortez, C.R. No. 187527,
February 7, 2017; Almendras v. South Davao Development
Corporation, C.R. No. 198209, March 22, 2017).
Modes of appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Court
of Appeals {Bar 2009; 2014)
There are two modes of appeal from the RTC to the CA,
thus:
(a) by writ of error (ordinary appeal) - where the
appealed judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal
action by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction; or
(b) by petition for review-where the judgment was
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction (Leynes v. Former Tenth Division of
the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011;
For further readings, see Escoto v. Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation, C.R. No. 192679, October
17, 2016; Magat, Sr. v. Tantrade Corporation, C.R. No.
205483, August 23, 2017). Bar 2010; 2017
Mode of appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme
Court
1. This mode (appeal by certiorari or petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45) is brought to the Supreme Court
from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction and only on questions of law (Sec.
2, Rule 41, Rules of Court; Five Star Marketing Corp. v.
Booe, 535 SCRA 28; Quezon City v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, supra; Republic v. Malabanan, supra).

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2. Recent jurisprudence is explicit when it rules that
there are two modes of appealing a judgment or final order of
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, namely:
(a) An ordinary appeal to the CA, in accordance
with Rule 41, in relation to Rule 44 of the Rules of Court,
if the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law (Philippine National Bank v.
Pasimio, G.R. No. 205590, September 2, 2015);
(b) A petition for review on certiorari to the
Supreme Court, in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, if the issues raised involve only questions of
law (Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 194247, June 19, 2013). To file a petition under
Rule 45 with the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial
Court, raising mixed questions of fact and law, is to avail
of a wrong remedy (Quilo v. Bajao, G.R. No. 186199,
September 7, 2016).
3. An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional
Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions
of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being
reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of
appeal, instead of by petition for review from the appellate
judgment of a Regional Trial Court, shall be dismissed (Sec. 2,
Rule 50, Rules of Court; See also Dy Chiao v. Bolivar, G.R. No.
192491, August 17, 2016). An appeal erroneously taken to the
Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright (Sec. 2, Rule 50, Rules of
Court).
Application of Rule 41 on ordinary appeal
Rule 41 applies to appeals from the judgment or final
order of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. This appeal is called an "ordinary appeal" (Sec.
2[a], Rule 41, Rules of Court).
Example: If a judgment by the Regional Trial Court in
an action for specific performance is to be appealed from,
CHAPTERIX 629
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Rule 41 will govern the appeal. This is because an action
for specific performance is initially filed with the said court.
Any judgment rendered by it on the case would, then, be a
judgment rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
On the other hand, if a litigant loses in the MTC and, on
appeal, loses in the RTC, the mode of appeal to the Court of
Appeals from the RTC is by way of a petition for review under
Rule 42. This is because the decision of the RTC is one in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
When to appeal (Bar 2011)
1. The appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice
of appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days from notice of
the judgment or final order (Sec. 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
2. In habeas corpus cases, the appeal shall be taken
within 48 hours from notice of judgment or final order (Sec. 3,
Rule 41, Rules of Court). Bar 2011
How to appeal
1. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by (a) filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, and (b) serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party
(Sec. 2[a], Rule 41, Rules of Court). Bar 1988
A record on appeal shall be required in special
proceedings and other cases of mul~iple or separate appeals
when so required by law or the Rules (Sec. 2[a], Rule 41, Rules
of Court). Where both parties are appellants, they may file a
joint record on appeal (Sec. 8, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
2. Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant
shall pay to the clerk of the court, which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate
court docket fee (Sec. 4, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
 630 CNIL PROCEDURE
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A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected
as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as
to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the
approval of the record on appeal filed in due time (Sec. 9, Rule
41, Rules of Court).
3. Within 30 days after perfection of all the appeals, the
clerk of court shall verify the correctness and completeness
of the records and, if incomplete, to take such measures to
complete such records, certify to the correctness of the records
.
to transmit the same to the appellate court, and to furnish the
' taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
parties with copies of his letter of transmittal of the records to
the appellate court (Sec. 10, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
4. Upon receiving the original record on appeal and the
accompanying documents transmitted by the lower court, as
well as the proof of payment of the docket and other lawful
fees, the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals shall docket the
case and notify the parties (Sec. 4, Rule 44, Rules of Court).
5. Within 45 days from receipt of the notice of the clerk
of court, the appellant shall file a brief with proof of service
upon the appellee (Sec. 7, Rule 44, Rules of Court).
Within 45 days from the receipt of the appellant's brief,
the appellee shall file his own brief with proof of service to
the appellant (Sec. 8, Rule 44, Rules of Court). Within 20 days
from receipt of the appellee's brief, the appellant may file a
reply brief answering points in the appellee's brief not covered
in his main brief (Sec. 9, Rule 44, Rules of Court). Extension
of time for the filing of briefs will not be allowed, except for
good and sufficient cause, and only if the motion for extension
is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended
(Sec. 12, Rule 44, Rules of Court).
In petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus cases, briefs are not filed. Instead,
the parties shall file their respective memoranda within a non-
extendible period of 30 days from receipt of the notice issued
by the clerk that all the evidences are already attached to the
record (Sec. 10, Rule 44, Rules of Court).
CHAPTER IX 631
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Questions that may be raised on appeal
1. While Rule 44 provides that the appellant may
include in his assignment of errors any question of law or
fact that has been raised in the court below and is within the
issues framed by the parties (Sec. 15, Rule 44, Rules of Court),
an appeal from the RTC to the CA under Rule 41 should not
raise pure questions of law because of Sec. 2 of Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court.
2. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 50, an appeal under Rule 41
raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely
of law not being reviewable by said court.
Under the same provision, an appeal by notice of appeal,
instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment
of a Regional Trial Court, shall be dismissed.
Residual jurisdiction
1. Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of a trial
court to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties, which do not involve any matter litigated
by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with
Sec. 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal provided
these are done prior to the transmittal of the original record
or the record on appeal, even if the appeals have already been
perfected or despite the approval of the record on appeal (Sec.
9, Rule 41, Rules of Court), or in case of a petition for review
under Rule 42 before the Court of Appeals gives due course
to the petition (Sec. 8, Rule 42, Rules of Court; Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Carpio, G.E,. No. 195450, February
1, 2017).
2. The concept of residual jurisdiction of the trial court
is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed
to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter
involved in the appeal. There is no residual jurisdiction
to speak of where no appeal or petition has even been filed
(Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, 458 SCRA 454, 465).
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C. Petition for Review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals (Rule 42)
Application of Rule 42
1. Rule 42 applies to an appeal from the judgment or
final order of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the former in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction (Guzman v. Guzman, 693 SCRA 318, 325, March
12, 2013). Bar 1979; 1990; 1998; 2009; 2014; 2017
Example: The plaintiff received an adverse judgment in
a suit for collection of Pl million filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila. He appealed the judgment of the lower
court with the appropriate Regional Trial Court and lost again.
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court is one rendered by
it in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. If he desires to
appeal from this judgment, he should avail of a petition for
review under Rule 42.
2. In a case, a petition for certiorari was filed with the
RTC which later dismissed the same. From the dismissal, the
petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA. Ruling on
the remedy, the Court emphatically declared that a petition
for certiorari is an original action and, as such, the RTC
took cognizance of the petition in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. Hence, the petitioner should have filed a notice of
appeal with the RTC, instead of a petition for review with the
CA. As a consequence of the failure of the petitioner to file a
notice of appeal with the RTC, the judgment attained finality.
The contention that a petition for review may be treated
as a notice of appeal, since the contents of the former already
include the required contents of the latter, was not accorded
credence by the Court, holding that "these modes of appeal
clearly remain distinct procedures which cannot, absent any
compelling reason therefor, be loosely interchanged with one
another. For one, a notice of appeal is filed with the RTC that
rendered the assailed decision, judgment or final order, while
a petition for review is filed with the CA. Also, a notice of
CHAPTERIX 633
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
appeal is required when the RTC issues a decision, judgment
or final order in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, while
a petition for review is required when such issuance was in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus xx x [the] filing
of the subject petition for review cannot simply be accorded
the same effect as the filing of a notice of appeal" (Yalong v.
People, G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013).
When to appeal
1. The appeal shall be made within 15 days from
notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial
of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in
due time after judgment. The court may grant an additional
period of 15 days only provided the extension is sought (a)
upon proper motion, and (b) payment of the full amount of the
docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the
expiration of the reglementary period. No further extension
shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to exceed 15 days (Sec. 1, Rule 42, Rules of Court; Go
v. BPI Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 199354, June 26, 2013).
2. Motions for extension to file Rule 42 petitions are
permissible. Rule 42 permits a second extension of another
15 days. This second extension shall, however, only be "for
the most compelling reason." In one case, petitioners have
effectively pleaded grounds that warrant the extensions
prayed for. The Court held that they should not be faulted
for maximizing the period that Rule 42 allows. Petitioners
can neither be faulted for the receipt by the ponente's office of
the Rollo. Their Second Motion for Extension was filed two (2)
days before the end of the first 15-day extension. It was filed,
not only within, but in advance of the lapse of the period for
seeking the second extension of Sec. 1, Rule 42 (Magat, et al.
v. Tantrade, et al., G.R. No. 205483, August 23, 2017).
How to appeal
1. The appeal is made by filing a verified petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time
 634 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other
lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party
with a copy of the petition (Sec. 1, Rule 42, Rules of Court).
The appeal is perfected as to the petitioner upon the
timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees (Sec. 8[a], Rule 42,
Rules of Court).
2. The petition shall be filed in the proper form required
in Sec. 2 of Rule 42 stating, among others, a concise statement
of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification
of errors of law or fact, or both, allegedly committed by the
trial court and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the
allowance of the appeal. The petitioner shall, likewise, indicate
the specific material dates showing that the petition was filed
on time (Sec. 2, Rule 42, Rules of Court). The requirement to
indicate the relevant dates is commonly called the material
data rule and applies also to Rule 42, not only to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. This petition also requires a
certification against forum shopping (Sec. 2, 2nd par., Rule
42, Rules of Court).
The failure to comply with any of the requirements in
Sec. 2 of Rule 42 regarding the payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition (Sec. 3, Rule 42, Rules of Court).
3. The Court of Appeals may dismiss the petition if it
finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted merely
for delay, or that the questions raised are too unsubstantial to
require consideration (Sec. 4, Rule 42, Rules of Court).
If the court does not dismiss the petition, it may require
the respondent to file a comment on the petition within 10
days from notice. The respondent shall file a comment, not a
motion to dismiss (Sec. 4, Rule 42, Rules of Court).
CHAPTERIX 635
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
4. If the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the
lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will
warrant a reversal or modification of the appealed decision, it
may, accordingly, give due course to the petition (Sec. 6, Rule
42, Rules of Court).
If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals
may set the case for oral argument or require the partie~ to
submit memoranda within a period of 15 days from notice.
The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the
filing of the last pleading or memorandum required (Sec. 9,
Rule 42, Rules of Court).
Residual jurisdiction
The doctrine of residual jurisdiction also applies to Rule
42. The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the case
upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. However,
the Regional Trial Court, despite the perfection of the appeals,
may still issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated
by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indig~nt
litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance ~1th
Sec. 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal provided
these are done before the Court of Appeals gives due course to
the petition (Sec. 8, Rule 42, Rules of Court). Recall that, in an
ordinary appeal, the residual jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court may be exercised prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal (Sec. 9, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
Stay of judgment
Except in civil cases decided under the Rules on Summary
Procedure (now Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First
Level Courts), the appeal, as a rule, shall stay the judgment
or final order, unless the Court of Appeals, the law or the rules
shall provide otherwise (Sec. 8[b], Rule 42, Rules of Court).
 636 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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D. Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court or
Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45)
Application of Rule 45 (Bar 2014)
1. The mode of appeal under Rule 45 is available from
the judgment, final order or resolution of the (a) Court of
Appeals, (b) Sandiganbayan, (c) Court of Tax Appeals, or (d)
Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by
law (Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
2. Specifically, appeal by certiorari to the Supreme
Court, commonly known as petition for review on certiorari,
applies in the following cases:
(a) Appeal from a judgment or final order of the
Regional Trial Court in cases where only questions of law
are raised or are involved, and the case is one decided by
said court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction (Sec.
2[c], Rule 41, Rules of Court). Bar 1984
This rule applies only when the decision of the
Regional Trial Court is in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction because when the decision is rendered by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, regardless of whether the appellant raises
questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law, the appeal shall be brought to the Court
of Appeals by filing a petition for review under Rule 42
and even if only a question of law is raised (Quezon City'
v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 567 SCRA 496,
508-509).
A decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, as when it was
brought before it from the Municipal Trial Court, should
be elevated to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, instead
of appealing directly before the Supreme Court under
Rule 45, even if it raises a pure question oflaw.
CHAPTERIX 637
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
In Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. v. Booe, 535 SCRA
28, 42-43, the Court clearly taught:
"x xx Clearly, petitioner raises only questions of
law which require the interpretation and application
of the rules of procedure laid down by the Rules
of Court. However, considering that the assailed
decision was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction as it was brought before it
from the MTCC, petitioner should have elevated the
case to the CA under Rule 42 via the second mode
of appeal, instead of appealing directly before this
Court under Rule 45."
(b) Appeal from the judgment, final order, or
resolutions of the Court of Appeals where the petition
shall raise only questions of law distinctly set forth
(Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court). The filing of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 from the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is availing of an improper remedy. The
petition would merit an outright dismissal (Romullo v.
Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound
Homeowner's Association, G.R. No. 180687, October 6,
2010);
(c) Appeal from the judgment, final order, or
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan where the petition
shall raise only questions of law distinctly set forth (Sec.
1, Rule 45, Rules of Court);
(d) Appeal from the decision or ruling of the Court
of Tax Appeals en bane (Sec. 11, R.A. 9282; Sec. 1, Rule 45
as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC; Local Water Utilities
Administration Employees Association for Progress v.
Local Water Utilities Administration, G.R. Nos. 206808-
09, September 7, 2016);
(e) Appeal from a judgment or final order in a
petition for a writ of amparo to the Supreme Court. While
in other cases of appeal under Rule 45, only questions of
law may be raised, here the question raised need not only
r 638 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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be questions of law but also questions of fact, or of both
law and fact (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo [Sec. 19] effective October 24, 2007);
(f) Appeal from a petition for a writ of kalikasan.
The appeal may raise a question of fact (Sec. 16, Rule 7,
Part III, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases).
(g) Appeals from a judgment or final order in a
petition for a writ of habeas data. The appeal may raise
questions of fact or law, or both (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,
Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data [Sec. 19], effective
February 2, 2008).
3. The mode of appeal prescribed under Rule 45 shall be
applicable to both civil and criminal cases, except in criminal
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment (Sec. 9, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
Provisional remedies
Under the latest amendments to Rule 45, the petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 may include an application
for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional
remedies. The petitioner may seek the same provisional
remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or
proceeding at any time during its pendency (Sec. 1, Rule 45,
as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12 SC, effective December 27,
2007).
Not a matter of right
1. An appeal or review under Rule 45 is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when special and important reasons could justify the petition.
2. The following are examples of reasons which the
court may consider in allowing the petition:
(a) When the court below has decided a question of
substance not yet determined by the Supreme Court;
CHAPTERIX
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
639
(b) When the court below decided a question of
substance in a way that is probably not in accord with
law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; and
(c) When the court below has departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so
far sanctioned such departure by a lower court, as to
call for the exercise of the power of supervision of the
Supreme Court (Sec. 6, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
3. Every appeal to the Supreme Court is not a matter
of right, but of sound judicial discretion with the exception of
cases where the death penalty or reclusion perpetua is imposed
(People v. Flores, 481 SCRA 451, 453).
Questions of law; questions of fact (Bar 2014)
1. A question oflaw exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. On the other
hand, a question of law exists when the doubt or difference.
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts (Alburo v.
People, G.R. No. 196289, August 15, 2016). For a question to
be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants
or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely
on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact (Republic v.
Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338; See also F.A. T. Key Computer
Systems v. Online Networks International, Inc., 641 SCRA
390, 408, February 2, 2011; Eastern Shipping Lines v. BPI/
MS Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 193986, January 15,
2014; See also Escoto v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, G.R. No. 192679, October 17, 2016; For further
readings, see Berbeso v. Cabral, G.R. No. 204617, July 10,
2017; Adlawan v. People, G.R. No. 197645, April 18, 2018).
2. The test of whether a question is one of law or of
fact is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
 640 CML PROCEDURE
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raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. If
so, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact
(Cabling v. Dangcalan, C.R. No. 187696, June 15, 2016; Bank
of the Philippines v. Mendoza, C.R. No. 198799, March 20,
2017; Lao v. LOU of Cagayan de Oro City, C.R. No. 187869,
September 13, 2017). Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one
of fact. If the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, it is a question
of law (Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo,
C.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017). For instance, the question
of whether or not a summary judgment was proper does not
involve a review of the evidence. The issue is limited to the
inquiry whether or not the rule or law was properly applied
given the facts and the supporting documents (Republic v.
Pilipinas Shell Corporation, C.R. No. 209234, December 9,
2015; See also Adlawan v. People, C.R. No. 197645, April 18,
2018).
3. A question ofla w exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to
a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented,
the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of
fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of
the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to
the whole, and the probability of the situation.
In one case, the resolution of the question as to who
between petitioner and respondent should be liable for the
damage to the goods is indubitably factual, and would clearly
impose the task of reviewing, examining and evaluating or
weighing all over again the probative value of the evidence
presented (Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. BPI/MS, et al.,
C.R. No. 193986, January 15, 2014).
CHAPTERIX 641
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Findings of facts, not ordinarily reviewed; "factual-issue-
bar" rule
1. Primarily, Sec. 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth (United
Tourist Promotions v. Kemplin, C.R. No. 205463, February
5, 2014; Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Aligway,
C.R. No. 201793, September 16, 2015; Spouses Lam v. Kodak
Philippines, Ltd., C.R. No. 167615, January 11, 2016; See also
Rebultan v. Spouses Daganta, C.R. No. 197908, July 4, 2018).
The rule that only questions of law shall be raised in a
Rule 45 petition, has been referred to as the Factual-Issue-Bar
Rule (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Sta. Teresa,
C.R. No. 179181, November 18, 2013).
2. The above rule is predicated on the principle that
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; only errors of law
are generally reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari
(Guerrero v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., C.R. No.
222523, October 3, 2018).
A Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law since
factual findings of the lower courts are, as a rule, conclusive
on the Supreme Court (Berbeso v. Cabral, C.R. No. 204617,
July 10, 2017; See also Macalanda, Jr. v. Acosta, C.R. No.
197718, September 6, 2017). In other words, in a Rule 45
petition, the scope of the Supreme Court's judicial review is
confined only to errors of law and does not extend to questions
of fact (Maunlad Trans Inc. v. Isidro, C.R. No. 222699, July
24, 2017). The Supreme Court, as a rule, does not try facts
or examine testimonial or documentary evidence on record
(Philippine National Bank v. Dalmacio, C.R. No. 202308, July
5, 2017).
The rule further means that factual findings of the
lower courts will generally not be disturbed (See Evergreen
Manufacturing Corporation v. Republic, C.R. No. 218628,
September 6, 2017) since it is not the Court's function to once
again analyze and calibrate evidence that has already been

642 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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considered in the lower courts (Encarnacion Construction
and Industrial Corporation v. Phoenix Ready Mix Concrete
Development & Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 225402, September
4, 2017). Hence, a petition, which asks the Supreme Court to
review the factual determination of the Court of Appeals, is
not appropriate under Rule 45 since it is not a trier of facts
and is not to review the evidence on record (Riosa v. Tabaco
La Suerte Corporation, G.R. No. 203786, October 23, 2013).
Also, the question of whether there is a tenancy relationship
between the parties is basically a question of fact which cannot
be raised in a Rule 45 petition (Macalanda, Jr. v. Acosta,
G.R. No. 197718, September 6, 2017; For further readings, see
Yamauchi v. Suniga, G.R. No. 199513, April 18, 2018).
3. The above rule applies also to criminal cases. The
Court has consistently held that it is guided by the long-
standing principle that, in the review of a case, the factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
CA, deserve great weight and respect. These factual findings
should not be disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of
weight and substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted
and that would materially affect the disposition of the case
(People v. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 24, 2017).
4. A corollary rule is that the calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses by the trial court, its assessment
of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions on
the credibility of the witnesses on which said findings were
anchored are accorded with great respect. This great respect
rests in the trial court's first-hand access to the evidence
presented during the trial, and in its direct observation of
the witnesses and their demeanor while they testify on the
occurrences and events attested to (People v. Santos, G.R. No.
223142, January 17, 2018).
Examples of issues of fact which cannot be raised under
Rule 45
1. The issue of whether or not probable cause exists
in the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a question of fact (De
Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017).
CHAPTER IX 643
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
2. A petition seeking the review of the award of
damages involves a question of fact and cannot, as a rule, be
reviewed in a Rule 45 petition (Yamauchi v. Suniga, G.R. No.
199513, April 18, 2018).
3. A petition, where the issue presented to the Court
is the correctness of the lower court's appreciation of the
evidence, cannot be raised in a Rule 45 petition, since the issue
is one of fact. The same holds true in a petition which seeks
a review of the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the
parties (Neri u. Yu, G.R. No. 230831, September 5, 2018).
4. The issue of whether or not a mortgagee was in good
faith is a question of fact and cannot be entertained in a Rule
45 petition (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Belle Corporation,
G.R. No. 205271, September 2, 2015).
5. A request in a Rule 45 petition for the Court to
re-examine the testimony of a witness in the transcript of
stenographic notes concerning his alleged testimonial proof
of damages cannot be accommodated and the substantive
issue of whether or not one is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees, is a factual issue which is
beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari (Vda.
de Formoso u. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 154704,
June 1, 2011).
6. The question of whether a person acted with good
faith or bad faith in purchasing and registering real property
is a question of fact (Heirs of Cabigas v. Limbaco, G.R. No.
175291, July 27, 2011; See also Tan v. Jangas, G.R. No.
200285, March 20, 2017).
7. Whether the deed of sale entered into by the parties
is a simulated contract is a question of fact not within the
province of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(Clemente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175483, October 14,
2015).
8. An assertion that no tenancy relationship existed
between the parties is a question of fact beyond the province
 644 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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of the Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, in which only questions of law may be raised (Reyes
v. Mauricio, 636 SCRA 79, 85).
9. The determination of whether or not there exists
a perfected contract of sale is essentially a question of fact
(Hyatt Escalators Corporation v. Cathedral Heights Building
Complex Association, Inc., 636 SCRA 401, 405). Also, the issue
of whether or not a contract is simulated involves questions of
fact (Tanchuling v. Cante la, G.R. No. 209284, November 10,
2015).
10. A determination whether or not a worker abandoned
his work raises a question of fact best left to the lower courts
and not to be raised in the Supreme Court (Tamblot Security
& General Services, Inc. v. Item, G.R. No. 199314, December 7,
2015).
11. Whether or not there was a delay by cine party in the
performance of his obligation involves a question of fact which
the Supreme Court will not take cognizance of (Republic v.
Looyuko, G.R. No. 170966, June 22, 2016).
12. Whether or not a party is liable for poor workmanship,
utilization of inferior materials and delay is an issue which
requires the reexamination of the evidence, hence, raises a
question of fact; not of law (Star Electric Corporation v. R
& G Construction Development and Trading, Inc., G.R. No.
212058, December 7, 2015).
13. A determination whether or not the bus of the
petitioner was "out-of-line" or a holder of a franchise raises
question of facts and does not fall within the review power of
the Court (Travel & Tours Advisers, Incorporated v. Cruz, Sr.,
G.R. No. 199282, March 14, 2016).
14. The issue of negligence, for instance, is factual in
nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of
fact which, as a general rule, will not be passed upon by the
Supreme Court.
15. The issue of whether or not the employer dismissed
an employee for a valid cause is a question of fact not reviewable
CHAPTERIX 645
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
under Rule 45 (See Distribution & Control Products, Inc. v.
Santos, G.R. No. 212616, July 10, 2017).
16. The issue of whether or not it was the plaintiff or the
defendant who did not yield the right of way is a factual one
(Rebultan v. Spouses Daganta, G.R. No. 197908, July 4, 2018).
17. A petition raising as an issue the credib_ili~y.~f the
prosecution witnesses and the relevan?e a~d adm1ss1b1h~y of
the evidence presented by the prosecut10n, mvolves questions
of fact (Adlawan v. People, G.R. No. 197645, April 1~, -~018).
A petition which seeks the reevaluation of !he_ cred1b1hty ?f
witnesses, raises question of fact properly w1thm the domam
of trial courts (Ablaza v. People, G.R. No. 217722, September
26, 2018).
18. A petition asking the Court to revisit and assess
anew the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the
NLRC that the injury of the worker was not work-related
is not proper in a Rule 45 appeal (Guerrero v. Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 222523, October 3, 2018).
Referral to the Court of Appeals
If a Rule 45 appeal, which raises a question of fact, is
taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court,
the appeal may be denied by the Court on its own initiative
because of the settled rule that only questions of law may
be entertained in a petition for review on certiorari (Asian
Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc., 692 SCRA 87, 96,
February 27, 2013).
The Court, however, instead of denying the appeal,
has another option. It may refer the appeal to the Court of
Appeals. "An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court
from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may
be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate
action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether
or not issues of fact are involved shall be final" (Sec. 6, Rule
56, Rules of Court).
646 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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When questions of fact may be passed upon in a Rule 45
petition
1. Remember the general rule that the Supreme Court
cannot pass upon, in a petition for review on certiorari (Rule
45), factual findings of a lower court since its jurisdiction
is limited to reviewing errors of law (Natividad v. MTRCB,
540 SCRA 124, 135; Mendoza v. De los Santos, 694 SCRA
74, 82, March 20, 2013). The review does not extend to the
I (e) The findings of facts are conflicting;
reevaluation of the evidence upon which the lower courts and/
or the quasi-judicial agencies had based their determination
(Mallo v. Southeast Asian College, Inc., G.R. No. 212861,
. October 14, 2015; See also Felicilda v. Uy, G.R. No. 221241,
September 14, 2016).
2. The rule barring the raising of questions of fact is
not an absolute one. For instance, when the findings of facts
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the Regional
Trial Court, the Court may entertain and resolve questions
of facts (See Dutch Movers, Inc. v. Lequin, G.R. No. 210032,
April 25, 2017). The Court, in a Rule 45 petition may be
compelled to examine the evidence on record when, for
instance, the findings of the Labor Arbiter are in conflict with
those of the NLRC and the CA (Maunlad Trans Inc. v. Isidro,
G.R. No. 222699, July 24, 2017). Also, when the findings of
facts are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record and when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion, the general rule that only legal
issues may be raised in a Rule 45 petition, does not apply and
the court retains the authority to pass upon the evidence (The
Heirs of Donton v. Stier, G.R. No. 216491, August 24, 2017).
3. Case law has specified the following instances when
questions of fact may be entertained by the Court in a Rule 45
petition:
(a) The conclusion of the Court of Appeals is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures;
CHAPTERIX 647
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
(b) The inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
(c) There is a grave abuse of discretion;
(d) The judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts;
(f) The Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(g) The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) The findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) The facts set forth in the petition, as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs, are not disputed by
the respondents; or
G) The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record (Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Cristino, G.R. No. 188638,
December 9, 2015; Borromeo v. Family Care Hospital, Inc.,
G.R. No. 191018, January 25, 2016; Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company v. Fadcor, Inc., G.R. No. 197970,
January 25, 2016; Techno Development & Chemical
Corporation v. Viking Metal Industries, Incorporated,
G.R. No. 203179, July 4, 2016; Ambray v. Tsourous,
G.R. No. 209264, July 5, 2016; See also Swire Realty
Development Corporation v. Specialty Contracts General
and Construction Services, Inc.; G.R. No. 188027, August
9, 2017; See also Neri v. Yu, G.R. No. 230831, September
5, 2018).
The above exceptions similarly apply in petitions for
review filed before the Supreme Court involving civil, labor,
tax or criminal cases (Cu v. Ventura, G.R. No. 224567,
September 26, 2018).
648 CNIL PROCEDURE
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Appeals in criminal cases
In criminal cases, the Supreme Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 may deal with questions
of fact. The rule, that only questions of law may be raised in
I
a Rule 45 petition in an appeal of a criminal conviction before
the Supreme Court, is not controlling. This is because the
appeal opens the entire records of the criminal case for review.
The implication is that the Court is not limited to reviewing
questions oflaw. In its review of the case, the Court may even
examine any error even if not assigned by the accused. This
error may include errors of fact (See Casona v. People, G.R.
No. 179757, September 13, 2017).
Appeal from a judgment in a petition for a Writ of Amparo or
Writ of Habeas Data; Writ of Kalikasan
1. Any party, in a petition for a writ of amparo, may
appeal from the final order or judgment of the court to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. Although Rule 45 mandates
raising only questions of law (Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court),
an appeal from a judgment in a petition for a writ of amparo,
by way of exception to the general rule under Rule 45, may
raise not only questions of law but also questions of fact, or
both questions of law and fact (Sec. 19, Rules on the Writ of
Amparo, Effective October 24, 2007).
2. Also, an appeal from a judgment in a petition for
writ of habeas data may be appealed to the Supreme Court
under Rule 45. Said appeal may, likewise, raise questions of
fact or law, or both (Sec. 19, Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data,
Effective February 2, 2008). Bar 2009
3. An appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 in
a petition for a writ of kalikasan may raise questions of fact
(Sec. 16, Rule 7, Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan, Part III, Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases).
CHAPTERIX 649
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Certiorari under Rule 45 is not the certiorari under Rule 65
(Bar 1998; 1999)
The certiorari under Rule 45 (appeal by certiorari or
petition for review on certiorari) should not be confused with
certiorari under Rule 65 (petition for certiorari). The following
are the distinct.ions:
(a) Certiorari under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal
(Sec. 2[c], Rule 41, Rules of Court). It is a continuation of
the case subject of the appeal (Manalo v. Ateneo de Naga
University, G.R. No. 185058, November 9, 2015); A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is a special civil action that
is an original action and not a mode of appeal (Rule 65,
Rules of Court; See KEPCO Philippines Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 636 SCRA 166, 17 4).
It is independent of the case that gave rise to the assailed
ruling (Manalo v. Ateneo de Naga University, G.R. No.
185058, November 9, 2015);
(b) Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to review final
judgments or final orders since it is a mode of appeal;
Certiorari under Rule 65 may be directed against an
interlocutory order or matters where no appeal may be
taken from (Sec. 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
(c) Certiorari under Rule 45 raises only questions
of law (Marasigan v. Fuentes, G.R. No. 201310, January
11, 2016); Certiorari under Rule 65 raises questions of
jurisdiction specifically because a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction (Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
(d) An appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 shall
be filed within 15 days from notice of judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from (Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules
of Court); A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 shall
be filed not later than 60 days from notice of judgment,
order or resolution sought to be assailed. In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
650 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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such motion is required or not, the 60-day period shall
be counted from notice of denial of said motion (Sec. 4,
Rule 65, Rules of Court; Systems Factors Corporation u.
NLRC, 346 SCRA 149, 152; Ong u. Bogfialbal, G.R. No.
149140, 501 SCRA 490).
(e) Certiorari under Rule 45 does not require
a prior motion for reconsideration; Certiorari under
Rule 65 requires, as a general rule, a prior motion for
reconsideration (Progressive Development Corporation,
Inc. u. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 637, 647; Bases
Conversion and Development Authority u. Uy, supra).
(f) Certiorari under Rule 45 stays the judgment
appealed from; Certiorari under Rule 65 does not stay the
judgment or order subject of the petition, unless enjoined
or restrained (Sec. 7, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
(g) In certiorari under Rule 45, the parties are the
original parties with the appealing party as the petitioner
and the adverse party as respondent without impleading
the lower court or its judge (Sec. 4[a], Rule 45, Rules of
Court; Cebu Women's Club u. De la Victoria, 327 SCRA
533, 538); In certiorari under Rule 65, the tribunal, board,
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is
impleaded as respondent (Sec. 5, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
Under Rule 45, the petitioner and respondent are
also the original parties to the action in the lower court;
Under Rule 65, the parties are the aggrieved party
against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency and the
prevailing parties, who thereby respectively become the
petitioner and respondents (Yasuda u. Court of Appeals,
330 SCRA 385).
(h) Certiorari under Rule 45 is filed only with the
Supreme Court (Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court); Certiorari
under Rule 65 may be filed with other courts like the
Regional Trial Court (Sec. 21, B.P. 129 as amended) and
the Court of Appeals (Sec. 9, B.P. 129 as amended) aside
from the Supreme Court (Sec. 5[1],Art. VIIL Constitution
of the Philippines);
CHAPTER IX 651
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
As a rule, a party cannot simultaneously file a petition
both under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court because
said procedural rules pertain to different remedies and have
distinct applications. The remedy of appeal under Rule 45 and
an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive, and not alternative or cumulative. Thus, a party
should not join both petitions in one pleading. When a party
adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed
outright (Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources, Inc.
u. Court of Appeals, 506 SCRA 542, 551; Villamar-Sandoual
u. Cailipan, 692 SCRA 339, 344, March 4, 2013; Guzman u.
Guzman, 693 SCRA 318, 326-327, March 13, 2013).
However, the Court may set aside technicality for
justifiable reasons as when the petition before the court is
clearly meritorious and filed on time both under Rules 45
and 65. In accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades
the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court
may treat the petition as having been filed under Rule 45
(International Corporate Bank, Inc. u. Court of Appeals, 501
SCRA 20, 28-29).
When a Rule 65 petition is treated as a Rule 45 petition
1. The rule is that the filing of a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy should have
been to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
merits the outright dismissal of the petition (Indoyon, Jr. u.
Court of Appeals, 693 SCRA 201,208, March 12, 2013).
2. On several occasions, however, the Court has treated
a petition for certiorari (Rule 65) as a petition for review on
certiorari (Rule 45) when: (a) the petition has been filed within
the 15-day period reglementary period; (b) public welfare and
the advancement of public policy dictate such treatment; (c)
the broader interests of justice require such treatment; (d)
the writs issued were null and void; or (e) the questioned
decision or order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority (Dongon u. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 163431, August 28, 2013; City of Manila u. Grecia-
Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014).
652 CMLPROCEDURE
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When to appeal
The appeal, which shall be in the form of a verified
petition, shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the
judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, or within
15 days from notice of the denial of the petitioner's motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration filed in due time (Sec.
2, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
When extension of period to file is allowed
The Supreme Court may, for justifiable reasons, grant
an extension of 30 days only within which to file the petition
provided (a) there is a motion for extension of time duly filed
and served, (b) there is full payment of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs, and (c) the motion is filed
and served and the payment is made before the expiration of
the reglementary period (Sec. 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
How to appeal
1. The petitioner shall file a verified petition with
the Supreme Court within the reglementary period raising
therein only questions oflaw (Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
2. The petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court of the
Supreme Court the docket and other lawful fees as well as the
deposit in the amount of P500.00 for costs. Proof of service of
a copy of the petition on the lower court concerned and the
adverse party shall be submitted together with the petition
(Sec. 3, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
The petition shall contain all the matters mentioned in
Sec. 4 of Rule 45 including compliance with the material data
rule which requires the petitioner to indicate the material
dates showing when notice of the judgment, final order or
resolution subject of the petition was received and when a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, if any,
was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.
Among others, the petition must also be accompanied by a
certification against forum shopping as provided for in Sec.
2 of Rule 42 (Sec. 4, Rule 45, Rules of Court). The petition
CHAPTERIX 653
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
does not require the attachment of all pleadings filed before
the lower courts. Only the judgment or final order must be
a~tached. Th~ !ower courts or judges are not to be impleaded
either as petitioners or respondents (Nightowl Watchman &
Security Agency, Inc. v. Lumahan, G.R. No. 212096, October
14, 2015).
T~e failu~e of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregomg reqmrements regarding the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for its
dismissal (Sec. 5, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
3 ... The Supreme Court may, on its own initiative, deny
the petition on the ground that (a) the appeal is without merit
(b~ is prosec~ted manifestly for delay, or (c) that the question~
raised therem are too unsubstantial to require consideration
(Sec. 5, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
For purposes of determining whether the petition should
be d_enied or. given due course, the Supreme Court may
reqmre the filmg of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or the
submission of documents as it may deem necessary (Sec. 7,
Rule 45, Rules of Court).
If the petition is given due course, the Supreme Court
may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or
specified parts thereof within 15 days from notice (Sec. 8, Rule
45, Rules of Court).
E. Other Appeals/Reviews
Appeals from quasi-judicial bodies (~ule 43)
1. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-
judic_ial bodies/agencies, enumerated in Rule 43, are now
reqmred to be brought to the Court of Appeals under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43. This rule
was adopted precisely to provide a uniform rule of appellate
procedure from quasi-judicial bodies (Carpio v. Sulu Resource
Dev. Corp., 387 SCRA 128, 138-139; Callo-Trinidad v. Esteban,
654 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
694 SCRA 185, 196, March 20, 2013; See also Bintudan v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211937, March 21, 2017).
It has also been held that Rule 43 is the correct mode
of appeal for decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR
Secretary (Spouses Nicolas and Sarigumba v. Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Association, G.R. No. 179566, October
19, 2016; Cortal v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No.
199107, August 30, 2017).
2. The appeal under Rule 43 may be taken to the Court
of Appeals whether the appeal involves a question of fact, a
question of law, or mixed questions of fact and law (Sec. 3,
Rule 43, Rules of Court). The appeal shall be taken by filing
a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals (Sec.
5, Rule 43, Rules of Court), within 15 days from notice of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution (Sec. 4, Rule 43,
Rules of Court; Cortal v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R.
No. 199107, August 30, 2017).
3. The appeal under Rule 43 presupposes that the issue
raised is one of error of judgment which may be one of fact,
law, or mixed fact and law. But where the act imputed against
the administrative or quasi-judicial body enumerated in Rule
43 is one committed with grave abuse or discretion, Rule 43
does not apply. For instance, it is true that judgments or final
orders of the Office of the President may be brought to the
Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition under Rule 43.
However, where the final order of the Office of the President
modified a decision of a lower body that had already become
final and executory, there is a grave abuse of discretion on its
part. Hence, what is involved here is an error of jurisdiction
that is reviewable by certiorari, and no longer an error of
judgment which is reviewable by appeal under Rule 43
(See Multinational Village Homeowners' Association, Inc. v.
Gacutan, G.R. No. 188307, August 2, 2017).
Award or judgment not stayed by the appeal
The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed, unless the Court
CHAPTERIX 655
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may
deem just (Sec. 12, Rule 43, Rules of Court). This means
that the judgment may be subject to execution despite the
pendency of the appeal, unless execution is enjoined by a writ
of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order.
Review of decisions of the National Labor Relations
Commission [NLRC] (Bar 2006; 2013; 2017)
1. Judicial review of decisions of the National Labor
Relations Commission is permitted. However, this review is
not through an appeal (Manalo v. Ateneo de Naga University,
G.R. No. 185058, November 9, 2015). The remedy of a party
aggrieved by the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is to promptly move for the reconsideration of
the decision and, if denied, to timely file a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 within 60 days from notice of the
decision. In observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts,
the petition for certiorari should be filed with the Court of
Appeals (St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494,
508-509; Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, G.R. Nos.
204944-45, December 3, 2014; Espere v. NFD International
Manning Agents, G.R .. No. 212098, July 26, 2017; Concejero
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 223262, September 11, 2017;
Gabriel v. Petron Corporation, G.R. No. 194575, April 11,
2018).
The review of the decision of the NLRC by the CA under
Rule 65 is not an appeal but a special civil action of certiorari
which is an original action. A special civil action for certiorari
is not the same as an appeal. In an appeal, the appellate court
reviews errors of judgments. On the -other hand, a petition
for certiorari reviews errors of jurisdiction like grave abuse of
discretion (See Philippine National Bank v. Gregorio, G.R. No.
194944, September 18, 2017).
2. The Court of Appeals may review such decision only
when there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. It will not review the entire decision of the NLRC
656 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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for reversible errors on questions of fact and law (Philippine
National Bank u. Gregorio, G.R. No. 194944, September 18,
2017 Gabriel u. Petron Corporation, G.R. No. 194575, April
11, 2018). In other words, factual matters and concerns are
not within the ambit of such judicial inquiry. Issues raised
shall be confined to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion (Espere u. NFD International Manning Agents,
G.R. No. 212098, July 26, 2017). The errors of judgment of the
NLRC are not reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65. The matters reviewed are its acts done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For example, in labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may
be ascribed to the NLRC when, among others: (1) its findings
and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence or
in total disregard of evidence material to, or even decisive of,
the controversy; or (2) the findings of the NLRC contradict
those of the Labor Arbiter (See Almagro u. Philippine Airlines,
Inc., G.R. No. 204803, September 12, 2018).
While the rule is that the Court of Appeals, in the
exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, is limited to determining
whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, such rule should not be
interpreted rigidly. A rigid interpretation of the rule, held the
Court, "does not fully conform with the prevailing case law
x xx." The Court has clarified that the Court of Appeals, in the
exercise of such jurisdiction, can review the factual findings or
even the legal conclusions of the NLRC. There is no dispute
that the Court of Appeals can make a determination whether
the factual findings by the NLRC were based on the evidence
and in accord with pertinent law and jurisprudence (Laya,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 2018).
Such determination could be done because grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence or are
in total disregard of the evidence material to or decisive of the
controversy (See E. Ganzon, Inc. [EGIJ v. Ando, Jr., G.R. No.
214183, February 20, 2017).
CHAPTERIX 657
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Decision not stayed by the filing of the petition
The petition for certiorari filed to review the decisions of
the National Labor Relations Commission shall not stay the
execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining order is
issued by the Court of Appeals (Frondozo v. Manila Electric
Company, G.R. No. 178379, August 22, 2017). The ruling is
consistent with Sec. 7 of Rule 65 which provides that the filing
of the petition for certiorari does not interrupt the course of
the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the
public respondent from further proceeding with the case.
Appeal to the Supreme Court
From the Court of Appeals, the remedy of the aggrieved
party is an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Laya, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 2018). In the
Supreme Court, only questions of law may be raised (Sec. 1,
Rule 45, Rules of Court). Rule 45 limits the review to questions
of law raised against the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals. When the Supreme Court reviews the findings of the
Court of Appeals, it does not, as a rule, determine whether or
not the NLRC decision on the merits was correct. What the
Supreme Court reviews is the correctness of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, i.e., whether or not it correctly determined
the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC decision (E. Ganzon, Inc. [EGIJ v. Ando, Jr., G.R. No.
214183, February 20, 2017). This rule, again, appears to be
only a general precept because if the Court finds it necessary, it
may competently delve into the propdety of the factual review
not only by the Court of Appeals but also by the NLRC. Such
ability, according to the Court, is pursuant to the exercise of
its review jurisdiction over administrative findings of fact (See
Laya, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 205813, January 10,
2018; citations of the Court, omitted).
 t
658 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Review of decisions of voluntary arbitrators in labor cases
At issue in one case was whether or not the decision of a
voluntary arbitrator in labor cases is appealable under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 2 of Rule 43 provides that Rule 43 does not apply
to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of
the Philippines. This provision was invoked by the petitioner
labor union in one case when it questioned before the Supreme
Court the propriety of a petition for review under Rule 43 filed
with the Court of Appeals by the respondent-employer from
the decision of the voluntary arbitrator.
The Court sustained the respondent and held that
such procedural issue is not novel. Citing its previous
pronouncements, the Court categorically declared that a
petition for review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy "just like
those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions
enumerated therein, and consistent with the original purpose
to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of
adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities" (Royal Plant
Workers Union u. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.-Cebu
Plant, G.R. No. 198783, April 15, 2013).
Appeals from the Sandiganbayan
1. Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan
shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by way of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising pure questions
of law. Certiorari under Rule 65 is not the remedy (Sec. 1,
Rule 45, Rules of Court; People u. Espinosa, 409 SCRA 256,
261; See also Republic u. Panganiban, G.R. No. 189590, April
23, 2018).
2. Sec. 7 of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and
R.A. 8249, provides:
"Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan
shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever,
CHAPTER IX 659
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed,
the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in
the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court."
3. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited
only to questions of law. Its factual findings, as a rule, are
conclusive upon the Court (Typoco, Jr. v. People, G.R. No.
221857, August 16, 2017). Issues brought to the Court on
whether the prosecution was able to prove the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, whether the presumption of innocence
was sufficiently debunked, whether or not conspiracy was
satisfactorily established, or whether or not good faith was
properly appreciated, are all, invariably, questions of fact.
Hence, as a rule, the findings of the Sandiganbayan on the
foregoing matters are deemed conclusive (Lihaylihay u.
People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013).
Review of the rulings of the Ombudsman (Bar 2006; 2015)
1. The rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman may
either be in (a) administrative disciplinary cases or (b) criminal
cases.
In administrative disciplinary cases, the rulings of the
Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to the Court of
Appeals via Rule 43 (Jason u. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
Nos. 197433 and 197435, August 9, 2017). In these cases, the
mode of review is appeal. The appeal may raise questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law (Sec. 3, Rule
43, Rules of Court). The appeal, however, shall not stay
the award, judgment, final order or -resolution sought to be
reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise
upon such terms as it may deem just (Sec. 12, Rule 43, Rules
of Court). To stay the judgment, the appellant has to secure
from the Court of Appeals a writ of preliminary injunction or
a temporary restraining order.
The provision of Sec. 27 of R.A. 6770 (The Ombudsman
Act of 1987) insofar as it allowed a direct appeal to the Supreme
660 CMLPROCEDURE
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Court from the Office of the Ombudsman was declared invalid
in Fabian v. Desierto because the statute, which increased
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, was enacted
without the advice and concurrence of the Court. Sec. 30 of
Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that,
"No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without
its advice and concurrence" (Fabian v. Desierto, 295 SCRA
470). Instead, appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions should be brought to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43 (Enemecio v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 419 SCRA 82; Pia v. Gervacio, G.R. No. 172334,
June 5, 2013; See Dator v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 237742,
October 8, 2018). Bar 2006
(a) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only.
It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or
non-administrative cases (Golangco v. Fung, Office of the
Ombudsman, 504 SCRA 321, 334).
(b) In Belongilot v. Cua, 636 SCRA 34, 41, 42, the
mode of review from the decision of the Ombudsman was
reiterated, thus:
XXX
"In Fabian, we ruled that appeals from the decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. This
ruling has been repeatedly reiterated in subsequent cases
and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
Here, petitioner's complaint is criminal in nature.
In Estrada v. Desierto, we held that the remedy of
aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the
Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or
non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse
CHAPTERIX 661
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari
with this Court, not with the Court of Appeals. In cases
when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the
Ombudsman's finding oflack of probable cause, as in this
case, there is, likewise, the remedy of certiorari under
Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court
of Appeals. This rule was subsequently restated in Acuna
v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon where we held that the
remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints
before the Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65" (Underscoring supplied).
Note: Although, as a consequence of Fabian, appeals
from the Ombudsman in administrative cases are cognizable
by the Court of Appeals, nevertheless, in cases in which it
is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed
with the Supreme Court to set aside the Ombudsman's order
or resolution (Nava v. National Bureau of Investigation, 455
SCRA 377, 389).
2. In criminal cases, the ruling of the Ombudsman
shall be elevated to the Supreme Court by way of Rule 65.
The Supreme Court's power of review over resolutions and
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman is restricted only to
determining whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by it. The Court is not authorized to correct every
error or mistake of the Office of the Ombudsman other than
grave abuse of discretion (Villanueva v. Ople, 475 SCRA 539,
550). The remedy is not a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 (Cabrera v. Lapid, 510 SCRA 55, 64) but a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 (Salvador v. Mapa, 539
SCRA 34, 44).
Salvador v. Mapa emphatically declared:
"x x x We have ruled time and again, that a
petition for review on certiorari is not the proper mode
by which resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary
investigations of criminal cases are reviewed by this
Court. The remedy from the adverse resolution of the
662 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Ombudsman is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45" (Citing
Cabrera v. Lapid, 510 SCRA 55; underscoring supplied).
For example, a party aggrieved by the dismissal of a
criminal complaint by the Office of the Ombudsman, may
elevate the case to the Supreme Court via a special civil action
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if there is an allegation
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
(Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197433 and
197435, August 9, 2017). Of course, the same remedy is
available to the respondent against whom probable cause has
been found by the Office of the Ombudsman.
When decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable
The Court recognizes only two instances where a decision
of the Ombudsman is considered final and unappealable and,
thus, immediately executory. The first is when the respondent
is absolved of the charge; and second is, in case of conviction,
where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent
to one month salary (Almario-Templonuevo v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 198583, June 28, 2017).
Injunction orders by the Court of Appeals against the Office
of the Ombudsman
In one case, the Office of the Ombudsman, in assailing
an injunction order issued by the Court of Appeals, argued
that the said court possesses no authority to enjoin the
implementation of its suspension order against a city mayor.
The argument was based on Sec. 14, R.A. 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act, which reads:
"Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction
shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act,
unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of
the Office of the Ombudsman.
CHAPTERIX 663
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
"No court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question oflaw."
The Court, however, sustained the authority of the Court
of Appeals in issuing injunction orders against the Office of
the Ombudsman.
The first paragraph of Sec. 14 of R.A. 6770 which prohi-
bited the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other
than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman, was declared ineffective
pending the issuance by the Court of the appropriate rules. The
Court explained that the first paragraph of Sec. 14, R.A. 6770
took away from the courts their power to issue a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction. It also
encroached upon the Court's constitutional rule-making
authority, undermined the constitutional allocation of powers
and diluted a court's ability to carry out its functions.
The second paragraph of Sec. 14 of R.A. 6770 was declared
unconstitutional mainly because it was enacted without the
advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court in violation of
Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution which provides:
"No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without
its advice and concurrence" (Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015).
Appeals from judgments of the Court of Tax Appeals (Bar
2006)
1. Under Sec. 11 of R.A. 9282, March 30, 2004, no civil
proceeding involving matters arising under the National
Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code, or
the Local Government Code shall be maintained, except as
provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously filed
with the Court of Tax Appeals and disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the Act.
If for example, the Regional Trial Court has ruled on
a local tax case, like one involving real property taxes, the
---
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THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals becomes
operative pursuant to Sec. 7 of R.A. 9282. A taxpayer not
satisfied with the decision of the Regional Trial Court may file
a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals, sitting as
a division. The decision, ruling or resolution of the Court of
Tax Appeals sitting as a division may further be reviewed by
the Court of Tax Appeals en bane (Herarc Realty Corporation
v. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, G.R. No. 210736,
September 5, 2018). A party adversely affected by a resolution
of a Division of the CTA, on a motion for reconsideration or
new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en bane.
Bar 2009. Litigants are reminded that in order for the Court
of Tax appeals en bane to take cognizance of an appeal via a
petition for review, a timely motion for reconsideration or new
trial must first be filed with the Court of Tax Appeals division
that issued the assailed decision or resolution. Failure to do
so is a ground for dismissal of the appeal. The filing of the
proper motion is mandatory, not merely directory (Asiatrust
Development Bank, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 201530, April 19, 2017).
2. Sec. 11 of the same Act further provides that a party
adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CTA en bane
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure (See Herarc Realty Corporation v. The Provincial
Treasurer of Batangas, G.R. No. 210736, September 5, 2018).
Review of judgments of the Commission on Elections (Bar
2011)
1. A judgment, resolution or final order of the
Commission on Elections may be brought by the aggrieved
party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65 (Sec.
2, Rule 64, Rules of Court) by filing the petition within 30 days
from notice of such judgment, resolution or final order (Sec. 3,
Rule 64, Rules of Court). A petition filed beyond said period is
deemed filed out of time (Chua v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 236573, August 14, 2018).
CHAPTER IX 665
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
2. The above rule has been held not to be encompassing
since not all petitions for the review of judgments or final
orders of these commissions should be filed under Rule 64.
For instance, the ruling of the Commission on Elections
en bane choosing the winning bidder for election equipment
are not reviewable under Rule 64 since in this case, the
Commission is not resolving an election controversy but merely
performing its function to procure the necessary election
paraphernalia. Under the protest mechanism of Sec. 58 of
R.A. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act), protests on
the final decision of the head of the procuring entity should
be addressed to the Regional Trial Court under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court explained that "x x x
Though the provision appears unambiguous and unequivocal,
the Court has consistently held that the phrase "decisio~,
order, or ruling'' of constitutional commissions, xx x that may
be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not
all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those rendered in
the commissions' exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers. In the case of the COMELEC, this would limit the
provision's coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued
pursuant to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all
controversies and contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of elective offices." (Querubin v. Commission
on Elections En Banc, G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015).
Thus, in a petition questioning the validity of certain
rules and regulations issued by the Commission on Elections
regulating the carriage of firearms during the election period,
the Court affirmed the rule that Rule 64 applies only to final
orders, rulings and decisions of the Commission en bane in
the exercise of its adjudicatory and· quasi-judicial powers
and not to those rulings or decisions issued under its rule-
making power. It does not apply to the rules issued by the
Commission on the carriage of firearms. The appropriate
remedy to question the validity of the regulations issued by
the Commission is a petition for declaratory relief under Rule
63 (See Philippine Association of Detective and Protective
 666 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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Agency Operators [PADPAO], Region 7 Chapter, Inc., G.R. No.
223505, October 3, 2017).
3. The review by the Supreme Court is limited only
to jurisdictional issues. Findings of fact of the commission,
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-
reviewable (Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 622 SCRA
744, 766-767). In other words, in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, the primordial issue
is whether or not the commission committed a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolution (Albania v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 226792, June 6, 2017). The Court is not a trier of facts and
only steps in when there is a showing that the Commission
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction (Maturan v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017). ' Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10, 2017).
Review of judgments of the Commission on Audit (Bar 2011)
1. A judgment, resolution or final order of the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party
to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65 (Sec. 2, Rule
64, Rules of Court) by filing the petition within 30 days from
notice (Sec. 3, Rule 64, Rules of Court).
2. Jurisprudence affirms that decisions and resolutions
of the COA are reviewable by the Supreme Court, not via an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, but through a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (Reblora v. Armed Forces of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 195842, June 18, 2013). Hence, the filing of a petition
in the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
not the correct remedy (Fontanilla v. The Commission Proper,
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 209714, June 21, 2016).
To warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, and set aside the decision of the Commission on Audit
the petitioner must show that the Commission acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
CHAPTERIX 667
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Nayong Pilipino
Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 213200, September 19, 2017).
Only when the commission has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain a
petition for certiorari (Bintudan v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 211037, March 21, 2017).
3. Not all decisions of the Commission on Audit requires
a review under Rule which should apply only to acts of the
Commission in relation to its constitutional duty as guardians
of the public funds and not to other acts. Hence, Note, in
administrative disciplinary c~se decided by the Commission
on Audit, the proper remedy of the adverse party, in case of an
adverse decision, is an appeal to the Civil Service Commission
and not a Rule 65 petition to the Supreme Court (Galindo v.
Appeals from judgments of the Civil Service Commission
(Bar 2014)
A judgment, final order or resolution of the Civil Service
Commission may be taken to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court (Secs. 1 and 3, Rule 43, Rules of
Court). The appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice
(Sec. 4, Rule 43, Rules of Court). Note the difference between
the mode of review from a judgment of the Civil Service
Commission and the mode of review from the judgments of
other constitutional commissions.
Appeals from judgments of the Office of the President
The judgments, resolutions, or final orders of the Office
of the President may be taken to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43 (Secs. 1 and 3, Rule 43, Rules of Court).
Review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice; rule for
violations of tax and tariff laws
1. It has been held that courts cannot reverse the
findings of the Secretary of Justice except in clear cases of
 669
CHAPTERIX
668 CIVIL PROCEDURE POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
tariff offenses was transferred to the Court of Tax Appeals as
grave abuse of discretion (Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan,
G.R. No. 179367, January 29, 2014). The Court of Appeals is a consequence of R.A. 9282. The declaration by the Co~rt ':'as
made by virtue of Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitut~on
clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the
Secretary of the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under defining judicial power as including the authority to determme
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground of grave
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, in
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (Alcaraz
relation to Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII of the same Constitution vesting
v. Gonzalez, 533 Phil. 796 and Tan v. Matsuura, G.R. No.
179003, January 9, 2013, cited in Spouses Gaditano v. San upon the Court the power to promulgate r~les coi:ic~rning
practice and procedure in all courts. Accordmgly, it 1s the
Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 188767, July 24, 2013; See also
Court of Tax Appeals, not the Court of Appeals, which has
De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016).
jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ
2. A petition for review under Rule 43 cannot be resolution of dismissal of the complaint-affidavit of the Bureau
brought to assail the resolution of the Secretary of Justice of Customs against the private respondents for violation of
dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause. The petition the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (Bureau of
can be brought only to review the decisions, resolutions or Customs v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253, September 8, 2015).
awards by quasi-judicial bodies as specified in Sec. 1 of Rule
43. The Secretary of Justice is not an officer exercising quasi- Appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of
judicial functions (De Lima v. Reyes, ibid.). Earlier, in Alcaraz
the DOJ
v. Gonzalez, 502 SCRA 518, the Court agreed with petitioner's
1. While judicial pronouncements do not allow
contention that the respondent resorted to an improper
an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 from the
remedy when he filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of
resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the appeal referred to
the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition for certiorari
in such pronouncements evidently pertains only to a judicial
under Rule 65.
appeal.
A later case, confirmed the above rule. It was ruled that
2. An administrative appeal is not proscribed by the
the Court of Appeals is clothed with the jurisdiction to review
previously cited jurisprudence. Memorandum Circular N?·. 58
the resolution issued by the Secretary of Justice through a
dated June 30, 1993 provides that appeals from or petition
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
for review of "decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of
solely on the ground that the Secretary committed grave a bus~
Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases ~re
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (Argovan v. San
entertained by the Office of the President" under the followmg
Miguel Corporation, 702 SCRA 191, 197, July 24, 2013).
conditions which have to be established as jurisdictional facts:
3. The rule, that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
(a) The offense involved is punishable by reclusion
to review the resolution of the DOJ through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, does not apply to tax and tariff perpetua to death;
offenses. (b) New and material issues are raised which
were not previously presented before the Department of
It was declared by the Court, in a more recent case, that
the jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ Justice and were not hence, ruled upon;
resolution in a preliminary investigation involving tax and
 670 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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(c) The prescription of the offense is not due to
lapse within six months from notice of the questioned
resolution; and
(d) The appeal or petition for review is filed within
30 days from notice.
From the Office of the President, the aggrieved party may
file an appeal with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 43.
Under Sec. 1 of Rule 43, the final orders or resolutions of the
Offic: of the President is appealable to the Court of Appeals
by filmg a verified petition for review following the procedure
set by Secs. 5 and 6 of Rule 43. Bar 2014
3. The party aggrieved by the judgment, final order or
reso_lutio~ of Court of Appeals may avail of an appeal by
certiorari (petit10n for review on certiorari) to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45.
F. Mode of Appeal to the Supreme Court
1. . ~n appeal _to the Supreme Court may be taken only
by a petit10n for review on certiorari, except in criminal cases
~her_e the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment (Sec. 3/B], Rule 56, Rules of Court; See Sec. 3/e],
Rule 122, Rules of Court). This mode of appeal is that which is
prescribed in Rule 45, also known as "appeal by certiorari to
the Supreme Court" (Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
2. Because of the above rule, "an appeal taken to the
Supreme Court by notice of appeal shall be dismissed" (Sec. 6,
Rule 56, Rules of Court).
3. The mode of appeal in Rule 45 is applicable to both
civil and criminal cases (Sec. 9, Rule 45, Rules of Court).
1·. Note thatthe proper remedy of a party aggrieved by
a dec1s10n of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under
Rule 45, not a p_eti~ionfor certiorari under Rule 65. An appeal
under Rule 45 1s, m essence, a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case (Albor v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 196598, January 17, 2018).
CHAPTER IX 671
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
II - REMEDIES AFTER A JUDGMENT
HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
1. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides the
following remedies for aggrieved parties against a judgment
that is already final and executory, namely: Bar 1995
(a) Petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38;
and
(b) Petition for annulment of a judgment under
Rule 47.
2. In addition to the above, jurisprudence has,
likewise, recognized an additional relief through (a) a direct
action for certiorari under Rule 65, and (b) a collateral attack
of a judgment that is void on its face (Escareal v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc., 455 SCRA 119, 133).
A. Petition for Relief from Judgments
Orders or Other Proceedings (Rule 38)
Nature of the petition
1. Relief from judgment, more popularly known as
petition for relief, is a remedy provided by law to any person
against whom a decision or order is entered through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. This remedy is
equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases where
there is no other available or adequate remedy provided by law
or by the rules (Cagayan Economic Zone Authority v. Meridien
Vista Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 194962, January 27,
2016).
2. When a party has another remedy available to him,
which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented
by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing
such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of
a petition for relief (Trust International Paper Corporation v.
Pelaez, 499 SCRA 552, 561).
 672 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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. Also, a pa~ty who has filed a motion for new trial, but
which _was deme_d, cannot file a petition for relief. These two
remedies are said to be exclusive of each other. It is when
a par~y aggrieved by a judgment has not been able to file
a mot10n for new trial that a petition for relief can be filed
(Francisco v. Puna, 108 SCRA 427, 432).
Grounds for a petition for relief; proper court
1. A petition for relief may be filed on the following
grounds:
(a) When a judgment or final order is entered or
an~ _other. proceeding is thereafter taken against 'the
petit10ner m any court through fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence (Sec. 1, Rules of Court); or
. (b) When the petitioner has been prevented from
taki1:1gan appeal by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence (Sec. 2, Rule 38, Rules of Court).
2. In letter "a," the petition shall be filed with such
court in the same case (not in another or higher court).
The peti~10n shall pray that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside (Sec. 1, Rule 38, Rules of Court).
In let~er ''b," the petition shall, likewise, be filed with such
court and in t~e s<:me~ase (not in another or higher court) but
the prayer this time is that the appeal be given due course
(Sec. 2, Rule 38, Rules of Court).
. 3. Under the present Rules, petitions for relief from a
Judgment, final order or other proceeding rendered or taken
should be filed with and resolved by the court in the same case
fr?m which the petition arose. Thus, a petition for relief from
a Judgment, final order or proceeding involved in a case tried
by a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed with and decided
by the_ same court in the same case, or in the Regional Trial
Court if the ~ase was decided by it (Secs. 1-2, Rule 38, Rules of
Court; Redena v. Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA 389, 400; Afdal
v. Carlos, 636 SCRA 389, 395). The petition must be filed in
the same court and in the same case since it is not a mode of
CHAPTER IX 673
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
appeal. An appeal involves the invocation of the authority of a
higher court.
Extrinsic fraud; concept (Bar 2011)
1. The fraud that is a ground for the filing of a petition
for relief is "extrinsic" fraud. One case refers to extrinsic
fraud as "that fraud which the prevailing party caused to
prevent the losing party from being heard on his action or
defense. Such fraud concerns not the judgment itself but the
manner in which it was obtained. For example, the petition
of a defending party would be justified where the plaintiff
deliberately caused with the process server's connivance the
service of summons on defendant at the wrong address and,
thus, succeeded in getting a judgment by default against him"
(AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Regional Trial Court,
Marikina City, Branch 193, 642 SCRA 720, 727, February 14,
2011).
2. Extrinsic fraud also justifies a motion for new trial,
a motion to set aside an order of default, and an action for
annulment of a judgment.
Petition is available only to the parties
A petition for relief from judgment, together with a
motion for new trial and a motion for reconsideration, are
remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where
the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has been held
that a person, who was never a party to the case, or even
summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for
relief from judgment (Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 470 SCRA
697, 705).
Petition is available to proceedings after the judgment
A petition for relief is available not only against a
judgment or final order. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 38, it is also
available when "any other proceeding is thereafter taken
against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake,
 674 CNIL PROCEDURE
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or excusable negligence." Thus, it was held that a petition for
rel_ief is also applicable to a proceeding taken after the entry
of Judgment or final order such as an order of execution. Rule
38 does not only refer to judgments but also to orders or any
other proceedings (Cayetano v. Ceguerra, 13 SCRA 73: 79).
When to file
. ~- The petition shall be filed within 60 days after the
petit10ner learns of the judgment, final order or proceeding
and not more than six months after such judgment or final
order was entered, or such proceeding was taken (Sec. 3, Rule
38, Rules of Court).
Section 3 of Rule 38 reads:
. "SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and
verification. - A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this Rule must be verified filed
within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns ~f the
judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment 0 ;
final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken;
and must be accompanied with affidavits, showing the
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied
upon and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may
be."
Thus, it is_cl~ar that a petition for relief from judgment
must be filed w1thm: (a) 60 days from knowledge of judgment,
order or other proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six months
from en~ry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. These
two per10ds must concur. Both periods are also not extendible
and never interrupted. Strict compliance with these periods
stems _from the equitable character and nature of the petition
for rehef. Indeed, relief is allowed only in exceptional cases as
when_t~ere is no ~ther available or adequate remedy. As it were,
a p~t_1t10nfor rehef is actually the "last chance" given by law
to litigants to question a final judgment or order. And failure
to avail of such "last chance," within the grace period fixed by
CHAPTER IX 675
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
the Rules, is fatal (Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, 470 SCRA 73,
80). While "strict interpretation" is the norm in applying the
periods mentioned, such rule is always subject to the power
of the Supreme Court to effect a liberal interpretation when
dictated by the circumstances.
2. A party filing a petition for relief from judgment
must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary periods: (a) the
petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge
of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and
(b) within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such
judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with
these periods is required because provision for a petition for
relief from judgment is a final act ofliberality on the part of the
State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the
fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding
must, at some definite time, attain finality in order at last to
put an end to litigation. This court agrees that the petition for
relief from judgment was filed out of time. However, the trial
court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for
relief from the date of finality of the trial court's decision. Rule
38, Sec. 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that
the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns of
the judgment or final order (Madarang, et al. v. Sps. Morales,
G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014).
Form of the petition; affidavit of merit
The petition must be verified and accompanied with
affidavits showing fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as
the case may be (Sec. 3, Rule 38; Ru-Zesof Court).
Order to answer
If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to
justify relief, the court, in which it is filed, shall issue an order
requiring the adverse parties to answer the same within 15
days from the receipt thereof (Sec. 4, Rule 38, Rules of Court).

676 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Hearing of the petition
. After the filing of the answer or the expiration of the
period to file the answer, the court shall hear the petition (Sec
6, Rule 38, Rules of Court).
Action of the court
~ter the hearin~ and the _court finds that the allegations
therem are not true, 1t shall dismiss the petition. If the court
finds the allegations to be tr~e, it shall set aside the judgment,
final order or other proceedmg complained of. The case then
shall stand as if such judgment, final order or proceedi~g had
never been rendered, issued or taken. The court shall then
proceed to ~ear and determine the case as if a timely motion
for a new trial or reconsideration had been granted by it (Sec.
6, Ru_l~38, Rules of Court). This action of the court applies to
a petiti~n for relief praying that the judgment, final order or
pro~~edmg be set aside having been entered or taken against
petit10ner by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
(Sec. 1, Rule 38, Rules of Court).
. Where the prayer of petitioner is to give due course to
his appeal because he was prevented from taking an appeal
through fraud, accident, m~stake or excusable negligence, and
the court finds the allegations of the petition to be true the
court s_hall set aside the previous denial of the appeal' and
shall give due course to the said appeal. It shall then elevate
the records of the appealed case as if a timely and proper
appeal had been made (Sec. 7, Rule 38, Rules of Court).
Preliminary injunction pending the petition for relief
Remember that a petition for relief is a remedy available
after the judgment or final order has become final and
executorY_.Hence, the judgment could be the subject of a writ
of execut10?-. There is nothing in the Rules that precludes
the execut10n of .the_ judgment that is already executory
upon proper apphc~t~on of the prevailing party during the
pendency of the petit10n. The petitioner, therefore, would be
CHAPTER IX 677
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
interested in the preservation of the status quo, as well as the
preservation of the rights of the parties, before the petition is
resolved.
Hence, the petitioner may avail of the remedy allowed
·
him under Sec. 5 of Rule 38. Under this provision, the court,
in which the petition is filed, may grant such preliminary
injunction to preserve the rights of the parties upon the filing
of a bond in favor of the adverse party. The bond is conditioned
upon the payment to the adverse party of all damages and
costs that may be awarded by reason of the issuance of the
injunction or the other proceedings following the petition (Sec.
5, Rule 38, Rules of Court).
No petition for relief in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals
1. Can a petitioner avail of a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
from a resolution of the Supreme Court denying his petition
for review?
The Supreme Court, in Purcon v. MRM Philippines,
Inc., 566 SCRA 645, 651-653, answered the question in the
negative. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available
remedy in the Supreme Court. In summary, the Supreme
Court explains, thus:
"First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that
when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any
court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this
rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which
enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme
Court, thus:
"Section 1. Original cases cognizable. - Only peti-
tions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo war-
ranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary against members of the
judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally
in the Supreme Court.
 678 CNIL PROCEDURE
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"A petition for relief from judgment is not included
in the list of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this
Court.
. "Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court,"
1t refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional
Trial Courts.
XXX
"Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme
Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules
of Court. It may, from time to time, be supplemented
by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the
Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA
allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.
"There is no provision in the Rules of Court making
the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this Court.
The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the
exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court
identifies the remedies available before said Court such
as annulment of judgments or final orders or resolutions
(R;ule 4 7), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new
trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule
38 mentioned.
"If a petition for relief from judgment is not among
the remedies available in the CA, with more reason that
this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme Court.
This Court entertains only questions oflaw. A petition for
relief raises questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence, which are beyond the concerns of
this Court" (Underscoring supplied).
2. Earlier, Mesina v. Meer, 383 SCRA 625, 634, the
Court has ruled that a petition for relief from judgment is not
an available remedy in the Court of Appeals.
No petition for relief in summary procedure, small claims
In one case, the petitioners argued that petitions for
relief from judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases can be filed with the RTC provided that petitioners have
CHAPTERIX 679
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
complied with all the legal requirements to entitle him to avail
of such legal remedy. Clearly, ruled the Court, a petition for
relief from judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases, as in the present case, is a prohibited pleading (Sec. 2[e],
Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts). The
reason for this is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of the cases subject of summary procedure. A
party cannot file the petition for relief from judgment with
the MTC because it is a prohibited pleading in an unlawful
detainer case. A party cannot also file the petition for relief
with the RTC because the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain
petitions for relief from judgments of the MTC.
The petition is not also allowed in small claims cases
(Afdal v. Carlos, 636 SCRA 389, 395; See Sec. 2[e], Rules on
Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts).
Petition for relief in environmental cases
In environmental cases, a petition for relieffromjudgment
shall be allowed in highly meritorious cases or to prevent a
manifest miscarriage of justice (Sec. 1, Rule 2, Part II, Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases).
B. Annulment of Judgments, Final Orders
or Resolutions (Rule 4 7)
Nature of the action
1. An action for annulment of a judgment is a remedy
in equity exceptional in character availed of only when other
remedies are wanting (Spouses Teano v. The Municipality
of Navotas, G.R. No. 205814, February 15, 2016; cita~ions
omitted). It is a remedy granted only under except10n~l
circumstances provided the petitioner has failed to avail
himself of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided
by law without fault on his part. It is never resorted to as
a substitute for the petitioner's own neglect in not promptly
availing himself of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies
(Aquino v. Tangkengko, G.R. No. 197356, August 24, 2016).

680 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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2. The petition should show that the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available. It is important to show
also that such remedies have been made unavailable without
fault on the part of the petitioner (See Sibal v. Buquel, G.R.
No. 197825, January 11, 2016; Spouses Sanchez v. Vda. de
Aguilar, G.R. No. 228680, September 17, 2018). Thus, when a
petitioner had already brought a petition for relief pursuant
to Rule 38 based on extrinsic fraud, he cannot anymore avail
of an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 4 7 based
on the same ground used in the prior remedy (Aquino v.
Tangkengko, supra).
3. Annulment of a judgment is an original action, which
is separate and distinct and independent of the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. It is not a
continuation or progression of the same case. Thus, regardless
of the nature of the original action, in the decision sought to
be annulled, be it in personam, in rem or quasi in rem, the
respondent should be duly notified of the petition seeking to
annul the court's decision over which the respondent has a
direct or indirect interest (Frias v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262,
February 28, 2018).
It needs to be emphasized that annulment of judgment is
independent of the case in which the judgment is sought to be
annulled. It is not like a motion for reconsideration, appeal or
even a petition for relief from judgment, because annulment
of a judgment is not a continuation of the same case. In fact,
the case it seeks to annul is already final and executory. It is
equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases.
When the action to annul a judgment is filed, it involves the
exercise of the original jurisdiction of the court in which it is
filed. This court is the Court of Appeals if the judgment sought
to be annulled is that rendered by the RTC, or the RTC if the
judgment to be annulled is that of the MTC (Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corporation, G.R. No.
199422, June 20, 2016). Annulment of judgment is not a mode
of appeal but an original action.
CHAPTERIX 681
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
4. The purpose of such action is to have the final and
executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal
of litigation (See Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 470 SCRA 697,
707; Spouses Teano v. The Municipality of Navotas, G.R. No.
205814, February 15, 2016; Yu v. Yu, G.R. No. 200072, June
20, 2016).
5. Rule 4 7 limits the applicability of the remedy
of annulment of judgment to final judgments, orders or
resolutions. A final judgment is one which finally disposes
of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do in re~pect
thereto. Rule 4 7 does not apply to an order implementmg a
writ of execution issued over certain real properties since the
order is not a final order as it merely enforces a judicial process
over an identified object. It does not involve an adjudication
on the merits or determination of the rights of the parties
(Baclaran Marketing Corporation v. Nieva and Sibulo, Jr.
G.R. No. 189881, April 19, 2017). Note that the proper remedy
against an order of execution is the appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65 (See Sec. 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
6. The remedy may not be invoked, not only where the
petitioner or party has failed to avail himself of the reme~ies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies through his own fault or negligence, but also where
he has availed himself of such remedies, but lost (See Republic
v. "G" Holdings, Inc., 475 SCRA 608, 617, 618).
7. The remedy of annulment of judgment is also an
exception to the "final judgment rule" (Diana v. Balangue,
688 SCRA 22, 34, January 7, 2013) or to the doctrine of
immutability of judgments (conclusiveness of judgments). This
is because, when the judgment is annulled, the old judgment
will be set aside.
8. An auction sale and a writ of execution are not final
orders. Thus, they cannot be nullified through an action for
annulment of judgment. Corollarily, an order implementing
a writ of execution issued over certain real properties is also
not a final order as it merely enforces a judicial process over
682 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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an identified object. Similar to a writ of execution, a writ of
possession is not a final order which may be annulled under
Rule 47. It is merely a judicial process to enforce a final order
against the losing party (Baclaran Marketing Corporation v.
Nieva and Sibulo, Jr., G.R. No. 189881, April 19, 2017).
Court in which action is commenced
The action is commenced by the filing of a verified petition
with the proper court. If it is the judgment or final order of a
Regional Trial Court which is sought to be annulled, then the
action shall be filed with the Court of Appeals (Sec. 1, Rule
47, Rules of Court). If it is that of a Municipal Trial Court, the
verified petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction over the former (Sec. 10, Rule 47, Rules of
Court).
Grounds for annulment (Bar 2014; 2016)
1. Under the Rules of Court, the grounds for annul-
ment of a judgment are: (a) extrinsic fraud, and (b) lack
of jurisdiction (Sec. 2, Rule 47, Rules of Court; Baclaran
Marketing Corporation v. Nieva and Sibulo, Jr., G.R. No.
189881, April 19, 2017).
2. Although Sec. 2 of Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court
provides that a petition for annulment may be based on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurispru-
dence has recognized denial of due process as an additional
ground (Diana v. Balangue, 688 SCRA 22, 35, January 7,
2013; Gochan v. Mancao, G.R. No. 182314, November 13,
2013; Yu v. Yu, G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016; Baclaran
Marketing Corporation v. Nieva and Sibulo, Jr., G.R. No.
189881, April 19, 2017). The essence of due process is an
opportunity to be heard. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the
demands of due process are sufficiently met. This concept also
applies to administrative proceedings (See South Cotabato
Communications Corporation v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 217575,
June 15, 2016).
CHAPTER IX 683
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
Extrinsic fraud
1. It must be emphasized that not every kind of fraud
justifies annulment of a judgment. The fraud must be one that
is "extrinsic" (Sibal v. Buquel, G.R. No. 197825, January 11,
2016).
Extrinsic fraud in a petition for annulment refers to "any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed
outside the trial of the case where the defeated party is
prevented from fully exhibiting his side by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponents like (a) by keeping him away
from court, (b) by giving him false promise of a compromise,
or (c) where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat. However, mistake or gross negligence
of a lawyer does not amount to extrinsic fraud that would
warrant a grant for annulment (See Cagayan Economic Zone
Authority v. Meridien Vista Gaming Corporation, G.R. No.
194962, January 27, 2016; See also Sibal v. Buquel, G.R. No.
197825, January 11, 2016). It also refers to acts where the
losing party never had knowledge of the suit being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the other party (Baclaran Marketing
Corporation v. Nieva and Sibulo, Jr., G.R. No. 189881, April
19, 2017).
Extrinsic fraud may arise when it is made to appear
that the defendant had been duly served summons even if
no summons had been actually properly served. In effect,
extrinsic fraud results into the absence of a real contest in
the trial or hearing and the overriding consideration is that
the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a
party from having his day in court (Yu v. Yu, supra). It may
arise when by fraud or deception practiced on a party by his
opponent, he is kept away from the court as when he never had
knowledge of the suit because he is kept in ignorance by the
adverse party. There is also extrinsic fraud where his attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat. It is
important to know that the fraud must arise from the act of
the other party and is of such a nature to have deprived the
petitioner of his day in court. When there is extrinsic fraud,
there never has been a real contest in the trial or hearing of
the case. Hence, the former judgment may be set aside and
684 CMLPROCEDURE
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the case opened for a new and fair hearing (Sibal v. Buquel,
supra).
2. Note that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground
if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion
for new trial or petition for relief (Sec. 2, Rule 47, Rules of
Court).
Forgery or perjury
The use of forged instruments or perjured testimonies
during trial is not an extrinsic fraud. Such evidence does not
preclude a party's participation in the trial (Bobis v. Court of
Appeals, 348 SCRA 23, 30; Strait Times v. Court of Appeals, 294
SCRA 714, 723). Offering manufactured evidence is intrinsic
and not extrinsic fraud. Intrinsic fraud is not sufficient to
annul a judgment (Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144
SCRA 144, 153).
Lack of jurisdiction
1. Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of
judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the defendant and over
the subject matter of the case, its decision will not be voided on
the ground of absence of jurisdiction (Republic v. "G" Holdings,
4 75 SCRA 608, 618; Sebastian v. Cruz, G.R. No. 220940, March
20, 2017). The petitioner must show not a mere grave abuse
of discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. The concept
of lack of jurisdiction, as a ground to annul a judgment, does
not embrace abuse of discretion (Republic v. "G" Holdings,
Inc., ibid.). A claim for grave abuse of discretion will support a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but it will not support an
action for annulment of a judgment.
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter presupposes
that the court should not have taken cognizance of the
complaint because the law or the Constitution does not vest
it with jurisdiction (Spouses Sanchez v. Vda. de Aguilar, G.R.
No. 228680, September 17, 2018).
CHAPTERIX 685
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
2. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on
lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show an absolute lack
of authority on the part of the court to hear and decide the
case. There would be no valid ground to grant the petition for
annulment where the error raised pertain to the trial court's
exercise of jurisdiction, not the absence of jurisdiction (Heirs
of Maura So v. Obliosca, 542 SCRA 406, 417-418).
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of
judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim. Thus, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction.
~ack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction; that
1s, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition
because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the
subject matter (Sps. Manila v. Sps. Manzo, G.R. No. 163602,
September 7, 2011).
Period for filing the action
If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within
four years from its discovery. If based on lack of jurisdiction,
the action must be brought before the action is barred by
laches or estoppel (Sec. 3, Rule 47, Rules of Court).
Who may file the action
1. The petitioner need not be a party to the judgment
sought to be annulled to acquire personality to file the action
for annulment of judgment. What is essential is that the
petitioner is one who can prove his allegation that the judgment
was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion, and that he
was affected thereby (Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 470 SCRA
697, 708; Islamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, 178 SCRA 178, 186). An action for annulment can
be filed by one who was not a party to the action in which
the assailed judgment was rendered. It is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled is promulgated (See Villanueva v. Nite, 496 SCRA
459).
686 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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2. A case of more recent vintage explained anew that
the proper party to file a petition for annulment of a judgment
or final order need not be a party to the judgment sought to be
annulled. Nevertheless, it is essential that he is able to prove
by preponderance of evidence that he is adversely affected by
the judgment. It has also been previously ruled that assuming
that the petitioner is not an indispensable party to the case
that is being annulled, he may still file for a petition for
annulment of judgment. The basis of the rule is that what is
essential is that he can prove his allegation, for instance, that
the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion
and that he would be adversely affected thereby (Encarnacion
v. Johnson, G.R. No. 192285, July 11, 2018).
Effect of a judgment of annulment
1. A judgment of annulment based on lack of jurisdiction
shall have the effect of setting aside the questioned judgment
or final order and rendering the same null and void, but the
judgment of annulment is without prejudice to the refiling of
the original action in the proper court (Sec. 7, Rule 47, Rules of
Court). The prescriptive period for the refiling of the original
action shall be deemed suspended from the filing of such
original action until the finality of the judgment of annulment.
This prescriptive period shall not, however, be suspended
where the extrinsic fraud is attributable to the plaintiff in the
original action (Sec. 8, Rule 47, Rules of Court).
This means that the entire proceedings are set aside
without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the
proper court (Spouses Sanchez v. Vda. de Aguilar, G.R. No.
228680, September 17, 2018).
2. Where the judgment or final order is set aside
and annulled on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court,
upon motion, may order the trial court to try the case as if
a motion for new trial was granted (Sec. 7, Rule 47, Rules of
Court; Spouses Sanchez v. Vda. de Aguilar, G.R. No. 228680,
September 17, 2018).
3. Aside from the setting aside of the judgment or
final order and other effects, the judgment of annulment may
CHAPTER IX 687
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
include the award of damages, attorney's fees and other relief
(Sec. 9, Rule 47, Rules of Court).
Remedy when the questioned judgment has already been
executed
If the questioned judgment, final order or resolution had
already been executed, the court may issue such orders of
restitution or other relief as justice and equity may warrant
under the circumstances (Sec. 9, Rule 47, Rules of Court).
Application of Rule 47; annulment of judgments of the MTC
1. Rule 4 7 governs the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts (Sec. 1, Rule 47, Rules of
Court).
2. Secs. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 of Rule 47 shall, likewise,
apply to annulment of judgments or final orders of a Municipal
Trial Court by the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of
the former. This action shall be treated as an ordinary civil
action (Sec. 10, Rule 47, Rules of Court).
Annulment of judgments of quasi-judicial bodies
Notably, Rule 4 7 does not mention jurisdiction over
annulment of judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. Rule 4 7
limits its application to Regional Trial Courts and Municipal
Trial Courts (Imperial v. Armes, G.R. No. 178842, January 30,
2017). The silence of B.P. 129 on the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions
of quasi-judicial bodies, like the DARAB, indicates its lack
of such authority (Springfield Development Corporation v.
RTC of Misamis Oriental, 514 SCRA 326, 340). It is, hence,
submitted that a party aggrieved, who desires an annulment of
a judgment or resolution of a quasi-judicial body, enumerated
under Rule 43, may avail of a petition for review to the Court
of Appeals under said rule and not an action to annul the
judgment or resolution.
688 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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C. Certiorari (Rule 65)
Nature of the remedy (Bar 2013)
1. A petition for certiorari is an original and independent
action, and is not part of the proceedings that resulted in the
order assailed (Sang-an v. Equator Knights Detective and
Security Agency, Inc., 690 SCRA 534, 541, February 13, 2013;
Francisco v. Loyola Plans Consolidated, Inc., G.R. No. 194134,
February 1, 2016).
Not being part of the proceedings that gave rise to the
assailed order, the petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public
respondent from further proceeding with the case (Sec. 7, Rule
65, Rules of Court). Also, because the filing of the petition does
not, as a rule, interrupt the course of the principal case, the
public respondent, in a petition for certiorari, shall proceed
with the principal case within 10 days from the filing of the
petition with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its
expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with
the principal case may be a ground for an administrative
charge (Sec. 7, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Unlike an appeal, a
pending petition for certiorari does not stay the judgment or
order that it assails (De Ocampo v. RPN-9 I Radio Philippines
Network, Inc., G.R. No. 192947, December 9, 2015).
2. Being an original action, there is a need for the court
in which the petition is filed to acquire jurisdiction over the
respondent. This is acquired by the service on him of the order
or resolution of the court indicating its initial action on the
petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction
(See Sec. 4, Rule 46, Rules of Court; Francisco v. Loyola Plans
Consolidated, Inc., G.R. No. 194134, February 1, 2016).
3. The purpose of certiorari is to correct errors of
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep
the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction
CHAPTERIX
689
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
(Bongalan v. People, 694 SCRA 12, 18-19, March 20, 2013;
See also Genpact Services, Inc. v. Santos-Falceso, G.R. No.
227695, July 31, 2017). It does not concern itself with errors
of judgment; its province is confined to issues of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion (Almagro v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 204803, September 12, 2018).
It is a remedy narrow in scope. It is not a general
utility tool in the legal workshop. Its function is to raise only
questions of jurisdiction and no other (Landbank of the Phils.
v. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 455, 479). Do not file certiorari
if your purpose is to raise a factual issue or to ask for a re-
evaluation of the facts and the evidence (PILTEL v. NTC,
410 SCRA 82, 88). This is because the office of certiorari has
been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely
and cannot be legally used for any other purpose (Miranda v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 144760-61, August 2, 2017).
4. A special civil action for certiorari is an extraordinary
remedy that is allowed only and restrictively in truly
exceptional cases. The remedy may be used only when there
is no more appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law (Manalo v. Ateneo de
Naga University, G.R. No. 185058, November 9, 2015; See also
Genpact Services, Inc. v. Santos-Falceso, G.R. No. 227695,
July 31, 2017). Because the petition can be availed of only
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
the Court described the petition as "a limited form of review
and is a remedy of last resort" (Albor v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 196598, January 17, 2018).
5. The existence and availability of the right to appeal
prohibits the resort to certiorari because a requirement for
the latter remedy is there should be no appeal available (Sec.
1, Rule 65, Rules of Court; Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 144760-61, August 2, 2017). Certiorari is not and cannot
be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence
or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or
lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no
available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

690 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even
if the ground invoked is grave abuse of discretion (Butuan
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G;R. No.
197358, April 5, 2017; Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People, G.R.
No. 194214, January 10, 2018).
From one perspective, it is the inadequacy, not the mere
absence of all legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety
of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
the judgment, order or resolution of the lower court or agency
(Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, 691 SCRA 269, 286, February
20, 2013). Hence, if a litigant wants to avail of certiorari
despite the availability of appeal, one way is to show that,
even if available, appeal is not adequate, speedy or equally
beneficial as certiorari (See Landbank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 455, 480-481; Crisologo v. JEWN
Agro-Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 196894, March 3, 2014).
Even if the settled rule is that certiorari is not allowed
as a remedy when appeal is available, jurisprudence carved
out certain exceptions to the rule. In the following situations,
the Court allowed certiorari despite the availability of appeal:
(a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damage and
injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be a
danger of failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow,
inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue is one purely
of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of
urgency (Municipality of Cordova v. Pathfinder Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 205544, June 29, 2016; Martinez v.
Buen, G.R. No. 187342, April 5, 2017; For further readings,
see Orlina v. Ventura, G.R. No. 227033, December 3, 2018).
A more recent case adds to the above exceptions.
Accordingly, recourse to a petition for certiorari, despite the
availability of appeal, may be allowed under the following
exceptions: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy dictate; (b) when the broader interest of justice
!
CHAPTERIX 691
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d)
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise
of judicial authority (Punongbayan- Visitacion v. People, G. R.
No. 194214, January 10, 2018; Citations of the Court, omitted;
Career Executive Service Board u. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 196890, January 11, 2018; For further readings, see
Orlina v. Ventura, G.R. No. 227033, December 3, 2018).
6. To avail of the remedy of certiorari, showing a mere
"abuse of discretion" is not sufficient because the object of
the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion (See Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
Grave abuse of discretion is "the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction x x x
It is not present when the acts are found to be mere errors
of judgment or simple abuse of discretion" (Abdulrahman
v. The Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 175977, August
19, 2013; Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phil., Inc. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013; Republic v. Roque,
G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013; Te u. Breva, G.R. No.
164974, August 5, 2015; Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino, G.R.
No. 210761, June 28, 2016).
"It connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation
of law" (Austria v. Crystal Shipping, Inc., G.R. No. 206256,
February 24, 2016; For further readings, see People u. Castillo,
Sr., G.R. No. 204419, November 7, 2016; See also, Revilla, Jr.,
v. Sandiganbayan [First Division], Ju_ly 24, 2018).
For instance, in labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion
may be ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions
are not supported by substantial evidence or that amount of
relevant evidence adequate to support a conclusion (Quillopa
v. Quality Guards Services and Investigation Agency, G.R. No.
213814, December 2, 2015; Austria v. Crystal Shipping, Inc.,
G.R. No. 206256, February 24, 2016).
692 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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7. The petition shall be filed not later than 60 days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. In case a motion for reconsideration was filed, the
60-day period starts not from the notice of judgment but from
notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration (Sec. 4,
Rule 65, Rules of Court; Docena v. Lapesura, 355 SCRA 658;
Opinaldo v. Ravina, G.R. No. 196573, October 16, 2013).
8. In summary, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires a
petition for certiorari to comply with certain basic requisites,
namely:
(a) The petition is directed against a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(b) Such tribunal, board or officer has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(c) There is no appeal, or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw (Bordomeo
v. Court of Appeals, 691 SCRA 269, 286-287, February
20, 2013).
Certiorari under Rule 65 is not an appeal
At this stage, one must be cautioned against confusing
a special civil action for certiorari with an appeal. A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action, unlike the
certiorari in Rule 45 which is a mode of appeal. Filing a
petition for certiorari is hence, like filing a new action. Since
it is an original and independent action, the judgment in
the petition for certiorari is correctible by an appeal, not by
another petition for certiorari.
Among various differences between appeal and certiorari,
one important distinction may be emphasized. In an appeal,
the appellate court reviews errors of judgment. This error
may be one of fact, oflaw or of both fact and law. On the other
hand, a petition for certiorari is a special civil action where the
reviewing court has jurisdiction only over errors of jurisdiction
because the lower court acted without jurisdiction at all or,
if it has jurisdiction, it acted in excess of its jurisdiction or
CHAPTERIX 693
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
gravely abused its jurisdiction in a manner amounting to
lack of jurisdiction (See for additional readings, Philippine
National Bank v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 194944, September 18,
2017).
Judicial discretion
1. A writ of certiorari is an extraordinary prerogative
writ that is never demandable as a matter of right (Indoyon,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 693 SCRA 201, 209, March 12, 2013).
2. The acceptance of a petition for certiorari, and
the giving of due course thereto, is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. The court may dismiss the petition
when:
(a) There is no showing of a grave abuse of discretion
by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or
(b) There are procedural errors, such as violation
of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court circulars, like the
failure to implead the private respondent, failure to attach
the pleadings and documents relevant to the petition,
failure to file a motion for reconsideration, or failure
to allege material dates in the petition (Abdulrahman
v. The Office of the Ombudsman, supra; For additional
readings, see also Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Acosta,
G.R. No. 195320, April 23, 2018).
Motion for reconsideration
1. The general rule is that before filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner
is mandated to comply with a condition precedent: the filing
of a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order, and
the subsequent denial thereof by the court a quo (Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company v. Lepanto Capataz Union,
691 SCRA 11, 23-24, February 18, 2013; WM. Manufacturing,
Inc. v. Dalag, G.R. No. 209418, December 7, 2015; for further
readings, see also Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015; Genpact Services, Inc. v.
Santos Falceso, G.R. No. 227695, July 31, 2017).
694 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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2. A motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special
civil action for certiorari. The rationale for the rule is that the
law intends to afford a lower tribunal an opportunity to rectify
such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort
to courts of justice can be had (Philippine National Bank v.
Arcobillas, G.R. No. 179648, August 7, 2013; See Ocampo v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, August 8, 2017; See also Joson
v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 197 433 and 197 435,
August 9, 2017). Besides, a motion for reconsideration is also a
plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw
alluded to in Sec. 1 of Rule 65 (Tiorosio-Espinosa v. Hofileiia-
Europa, G.R. No. 185746, January 20, 2016). The special civil
action for certiorari will not lie unless the aggrieved party has
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. If a motion for reconsideration is available, the
motion must first be filed (See Miranda v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 144760-61, August 2, 2017) since such motion is also
a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
Exceptions to the rule requiring a motion for reconsideration
A motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non
for the filing of a petition for certiorari. This is, however, not
an ironclad rule. It admits of well-defined exceptions (Spouses
Larry and Flora Davis v. Spouses Florencio and Lucresia
Davis, G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018). The rule is subject to
the following recognized exceptions:
(a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where
the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court;
(c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
CHAPTER IX 695
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
(d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) Where the petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order
of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable;
(g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process;
(h) Where the proceedings conducted were ex parte
or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and
(i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or
public interest is involved (Spouses Nice v. Equitable
PCI-Bank, 516 SCRA 231, 251-252; Joson v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435, August 9,
2017; City Government of Baguio v. Masweng, G.R. No.
195905, July 4, 2018).
For example, if the trial court issues a writ of preliminary
injunction despite the absence of proof of a legal right and
the injury sustained by the plaintiff, the writ is a nullity. A
motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with (Spouses
Nice v. Equitable PCI-Bank, 516 SCRA 231, 253; For further
readings, see Spouses Latoja v. Lim, G.R. No. 198925, July
13, 2016; Genpact Services, Inc. v. Santos Falceso, G.R. No.
227695, July 31, 2017).
Material Data (Date) Rule
Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that
there are three material dates that must be stated in a petition
for certiorari brought under Rule 65: (1) the date when notice
of the judgment, final order or resolution was received; (2) the
date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was
filed; and (3) the date when notice of the denial thereof was
received. This requirement is for the purpose of determining
the timeliness of the petition The failure to state the material
dates is sufficient ground to dismiss the petition under the
696 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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same rule (Wenceslao v. Makati Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 230696, August 30, 2017; Yu v. SR Metals, Inc., G.R.
No. 214249, September 25, 2017).
The appellate court has the prerogative to dismiss the case
outright for failure to comply with the formal requirements
of an action filed under Rule 65. These requirements, among
others, include a statement by the petitioner indicating the
material dates when the order or resolution subject of the
petition was received (Tiorosio-Espinosa v. Hofileiia-Europa,
supra).
Certification against forum shopping
Rule 65 also requires the pleader to submit a certification
against forum shopping (Sec. 1, Rule 65 in relation to Sec. 3 of
Rule 46).
Jurisdiction (Bar 2012); observance of hierarchy of courts
1. If the petition for certiorari relates to an act or
omission of a municipal trial court, a board, an officer
or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area, as defined
by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of
Appeals or the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in
aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction (Sec. 4, Rule 65, Rules
of Court).
If the petition involves an act or omission of a quasi-
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be filed with and cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals (Sec. 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
In election cases involving an act or omission of a
Municipal or a Regional Trial Court, the petition shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on Elections in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction (Sec. 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
2. In filing a petition for certiorari, the hierarchy of
courts must be observed. Hence, even though the Supreme
Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals
CHAPTERIX 697
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
and the Regional Trial Court to issue a writ of mandamus
prohibition or certiorari, litigants are advised against taking '
direct recourse to the Supreme Court without initially seeking
proper relief from the lower courts (See also Carpio v. Sulu
Resources Dev. Corp., 387 SCRA 128).
Certiorari does not interrupt the principal case
1. The pendency of a petition for certiorari does not
interrupt the course of the principal case (Sec. 7, Rule 65,
Rules of Court; Lu v. Chiong, G.R. No. 2220 70, April 16, 2018).
Hence, if said petition is filed against a court, the proceedings
in that court, as to the case subject of certiorari, have· to
proceed. Bar 2013
2. The respondent court has the duty to proceed
with the principal case within 10 days from the filing of the
petition with a higher court or tribunal. As a rule, failure of
the respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a
ground for an administrative charge (Sec. 7, Rule 65, Rules of
Court).
Remedy in order to interrupt the course of the principal case
The petitioner should secure a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
public respondent from proceeding with the case and for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings. When so secured, the public respondent shall
not proceed with the principal case during the period that
the temporary restraining order or the writ of preliminary
injunction is in effect (Sec. 7, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Bar
2013
Certiorari under the Constitution and the Rules of Court; the
expanded concepts of certiorari and prohibition in relation
to the power of judicial review
1. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that
the respondent in a petition for certiorari is a tribunal board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function' (Sec.'
698 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). The rule, therefore, is that, under
Rule 65, "petitions for certiorari and prohibition may be
invoked only against tribunals, corporations, boards, officers,
or persons exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, and not against those respondents exercising
legislative or quasi-legislative functions (Cawad v. Abad, G.R.
No. 207145, July 28, 2015).
However, pronouncements of the Court have clarified that
a petition for certiorari could be invoked against respondents
the functions of which are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial.
Such pronouncements have, likewise, categorically broadened
the purpose of a petition for certiorari to include raising
constitutional issues and reviewing and/or nullifying the acts
of legislative and executive officials.
2. The expanded concept of certiorari has, as basis, the
power of judicial review enshrined in the Constitution. This
power has been invoked by the Court, on several occasions,
to review, by certiorari, acts of government agencies or
instrumentalities for gravely abusing their discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction even if such agencies or
instrumentalities acted not in the exercise of judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
In Araullo v. Aquino IIL G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014,
a case assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP) and other issuances of the
Department of Budget and Management, the Court ruled:
"With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope
and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may
be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not
only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also
to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by
any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even
if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section
1" (Italics supplied).
i
CHAPTER IX 699
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
The provision invoked by the Court to justify the broad
application of certiorari even to acts which are neither judicial
nor quasi-judicial is the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Art. VIII
of the Philippine Constitution defining judicial power and
which includes the duty "x xx to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." Thus, declared the Court, "the petitions for
certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify
the acts of legislative and executive officials."
Hence, even when an administrative agency does not
perform a judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, the
Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when
there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion (De Lima v.
Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016). This is because the
constitution vests upon the Court, not only the power to settle
actual controversies but also to determine whether or not an
agency of the government commits acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion (Information Technology Foundation of
the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139,
June 6, 2017; for further readings, see also Ifurung v. Morales,
G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018).
3. The expanded concept of judicial review found
expression in yet another case. Here, a candidate for the
position of Associate Justice in the Supreme Court, filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to compel the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to include him in the list of
nominees to be submitted to the President of the Philippines.
He claimed that the JBC acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite
having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for
the position. He also decried his deprivation of his right to
due process when he was not given the opportunity to defend
himself against the objections to his nomination by a member
of the JBC. While the Court agreed with the position of the
JBC that mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of
the latter's discretionary duty, the Court disagreed with the

700 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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VOLUME I
argument that certiorari does not lie against the JBC. Although
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires that the respondent in
such petition must exercise either a judicial or quasi-judicial
function, the Court explained that the concept of judicial
review in the 1987 Constitution allows it to take cognizance
of the petition (Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August
19, 2014; Case also cited in Aguinaldo v. Aquino IIL G.R. No.
224302, November 29, 2016).
4. In another case involving a petition for certiorari
against the Judicial and Bar Council the Court declared that
"it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants,
the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-
judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of
guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner
now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the
JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made
on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing the said policy." The Court took cognizance of the
petition on the basis of the definition of judicial power in the
Philippine Constitution its pronouncements in the earlier
case of Araullo v. Aquino III (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015).
5. In yet another case, the Court also took cognizance of
a petition for certiorari involving the sale by the Power Assets
and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) of a power
plant, which supposedly contravened the policy of competitive
bidding. The PSALM was created by law not to exercise
either judicial or quasi-judicial functions but to undertake
certain mandated privatization of disposable assets of certain
government entities. The basis for assuming jurisdiction over
the petition was the Constitutional mandate on the judiciary
"to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any
CHAPTERIX 701
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
branch or instrumentality of the Government" (Osmeiia I~I v.
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation,
G.R. No. 212686, September 26, 2015).
6. In a later pronouncement, the Cour~, in striking
down the order of the Sandiganbayan denymg a for1:11er
president's demurrer to evidence in the plunder case a?ams:
her, justified, once again, the expanded concept of certiorari,
thus:
"The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure
to the contrary or for the sake of convenience on one side.
This is because the Court has the bounded constitutional
duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever
and wherever it is committed" (Macapagal-Arroyo v.
People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016).
In Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. N_o. 220598, July
19, 2016, a case in which the Court set asid~ the order of
Sandiganbayan denying the demurrer to ev1denc~ o~ the
accused, the Court invoked its power under the Cons_titutio°: to
review capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and ~espotic exer~ise
of discretion by any government agency or mstrumentahty.
The Court, in this case, once again invoked the po~er of
judicial review under Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitu_tion, a
power also invoked in the earlier case of Araullo v. Aquino III,
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014.
7. In a later case, the Court explained th_at a petition
for certiorari is a proper remedy to put into scrutms: the act of
the President of the Philippines in appointi1;1-gc~rtam persons
to the judiciary if it is alleged that th_eac_tc~ns:it~ted a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of Jurisdi~t10n a1;1-d ~v~n
if the act of the President is not an exerc~se_of ~ither a Judicial
or quasi-judicial function. The remedy i_sJ~stified u~der the
definition of judicial power in the Constitut10n (Aguinaldo v.
Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016).
8. In yet another case filed against certain_ Metro
Manila cities to question the validity of certain ordmances
 702 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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VOLUME I
imposing curfew hours on minors, the Court, also sustained, on
procedural grounds, a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
based on the expanded concepts of such special civil actions.
Here, the Court reiterated the principle that" 'Under the 1987
Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice not only 'to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable ' but also 'to
d~ter~ine whethe~ or not there has been a g;ave abuse of
d1scret10n amountmg to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' "
(~amahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan [SPARK] v. Quezon
City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017).
When a petition for declaratory relief is proper and not a
petition for certiorari
It has been held that "petitions for certiorari and
prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
iss':es ~nd to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials" (Francisco, Jr. v. Toll
Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010 as cited
in Araullo v. Aquino III, supra).
The above pronouncements should not, however, be
construed to be the general rule. In a more recent case, the
~ourt ruled that when the petition assails the validity of the
issuances of a department of the government (like that of the
Energy Regulatory Commission), a petition for declaratory
relief is the correct remedy. Held the Court:
. "Since petitioners assail the validity of the ERC
issuances and seeks to declare them unconstitutional
petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules
is the a~propriate remedy. Under the Rules, any person
whose rights are affected by any governmental regulation
~ay, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action
m th~ appropriate Regional trial Court to determine any
question of validity arising, and for a declaration ofrights
thereunder" (Rosales v. Energy Regulatory Commission,
G.R. No. 2001852, April 5, 2016).
CHAPTER IX 703
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES
D. Collateral Attack of a Judgment
Distinction between a direct attack from a collateral attack
1. A direct attack of a judgment is made through an
action or proceeding, the main object of which is to annul, set
aside or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment, if not yet
carried into effect; or if the property has been disposed of, the
aggrieved party may sue for recovery. A collateral attack is
made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment is made as an incident in said action.
This is proper only when the judgment, on its face, is null
and void, as where it is patent that the court, which rendered
said judgment, has no jurisdiction (Co v. Court of Appeals, 196
SCRA 705, 710).
2. An earlier case explains:
"Under existing rules there are three (3) ways by
which a final and executory judgment may be set aside.
The first is by petition for relief from judgment under Rule
38 of the Revised Rules of Court, when judgment has been
taken against the party through fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence, in which case the petition must
be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of
the judgment, but not more than six (6) months after such
judgment was entered. The second is by direct action
to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment.
This remedy presupposes that the challenged judgment
is not void upon its face, but is entirely regular in form,
and the alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon
a its face or from the recitals contained in the judgment.
xx x the third is either a direct action, as certiorari, or by
a collateral attack against the challenged judgment which
is void upon its face, or that the nullity of the judgment is
apparent by virtue of its own recitals x x x" (Macabingkil
v. PHHC, 72 SCRA 326, 343; emphasis supplied).
-oOo-

Chapter X
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION
OF JUDGMENTS
Meaning of execution
Execution is the remedy afforded for the satisfaction
of a judgment. Its object being to obtain satisfaction of the
judgment on which the writ is issued (Cagayan de Oro
Coliseum u. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 731, 754). It is the
fruit and end of the suit, and is the life of the law (Ayo u.
Violago-Isnani, 308 SCRA 543, 551).
Part of the judgment to be executed
1. The dispositive portion (also called ''fallo') of the
judgment is that part which is subject to execution under Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
2. Jurisprudence considers this portion of the
judgment as that which finally vests rights upon the parties
sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and impose~
the corresponding duties and obligations. Hence, if there is
a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and
the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective
of what appears in the body (Globe Telecom, Inc. u. Florendo-
Flores, 390 SCRA 201, 210).
When execution shall issue
1. It is settled that upon the finality of the judgment,
the prevailing party in entitled, as a matter of right, to a writ
of execution to enforce the judgment, the issuance of which
704
j__
CHAPTER X 705
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
is a ministerial duty of the court (Calilung u. Paramount
Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 195641, February 3, 2016).
The right to execution is compellable by mandamus. This
is in accordance with the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments, which states that, as a rule, a judgment that has
become final and executory is immutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modified in any respect (Philippine Trust
Company u. Roxas, G.R. No. 171897, October 14, 2015; For
further readings, see also Yap u. Lagtapon, G.R. No. 196347,
January 23, 2017).
2. As a rule, parties are not allowed to object to the
execution of a final judgment. One exception is when the
terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains
room for interpretation. If the exception applies, the adverse
party may seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ
of execution (Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation u.
Cardline, Inc., G.R. No. 201417, January 13, 2016).
How execution shall issue
1. Execution shall issue as a matter of right on motion.
This is plain from the tenor of Sec. 1 of Rule 39. There is,
therefore, a need to file a motion before the issuance of a writ
of execution.
Hence, a judge may not order execution of the judgment
in the decision itself (Lou u. Siapno, 335 SCRA 181, 187).
2. In Lou u. Siapno, ibid., the Court declared that,
even in judgments which are immediately executory, "there
must be a motion to that effect and a hearing called for the
purpose." Also, "under Supreme Court Circular No. 24-94, a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution must contain a
notice to the adverse party" (Pallada u. Regional Trial Court
of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. I, 304 SCRA 440, 446). Thus, in one
more recent pronouncement, the Court explicitly ruled that
it was wrong for a petitioner's counsel to argue that since the
decision approving the parties' compromise was immediately
executory, there was no need to file a motion for execution
706 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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(flaw Buklod ng Manggagawa [IBM] Nestle Philippines, Inc.
Chapter [lee Cream and Chilled Products Division] v. Nestle
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 198675, September 23, 2015).
3. Because of the present phraseology of Sec. 1 of Rule
39, rulings like those made in De Mesa v. Court of Appeals, 231
SCRA 773, 781, to the effect that where execution is a matter
of right, the judgment debtor need not be given an advanced
notic_eof the application for execution nor be afforded a prior
hearmg thereon, must necessarily be deemed superseded.
Where application for execution made
1. Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin.
If an appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved
the execution may be applied for also in the court of origi~
on motion of the judgment obligee (Sec. 1, Rule 39, Rules of
Court; Regulus Development, Inc. v. De la Cruz, G.R. No.
198172, January 25, 2016).
2. In filing a motion for execution of an appealed
decision, there is no need to wait for the records of the case to
be remanded to the court of origin. All that is required is for
the appeal to have been duly perfected and finally resolved
before execution may be applied for (Bergonia v. Decano, 317
SCRA 660, 665). This is because when the judgment obligee
files motion for execution in the court of origin, all he has
to do 1s to attach the certified true copies of (a) the judgment
of the appellate court, and (b) the entry of the said judgment
with notice to the adverse party (Sec. 1, Rule 39, Rules oi
Court) even if the records have not as yet been remanded to
the court of origin. This procedure prevents needless delays in
the execution of the judgment.
3. Iffor whatever reason, execution cannot be had with
dispatch in the court of origin, the new rules, likewise, afford
the judgment obligee a remedy. He may file a motion with the
appellate court to direct the court of origin, in the interest of
justice, to issue the writ of execution (Sec. 1, Rule 39, Rules of
Court).
CHAPTERX 707
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
No appeal from an order of execution
It is a well-recognized rule that an appeal may be taken
from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case (Sec. 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
The same provision, likewise, provides for matters from
which no appeal may be taken from. One of which is an
order of execution. "No appeal may be taken from an order of
execution" (Sec. l[e], Rule 41, Rules of Court). A party desiring
to assail an order of execution may instead file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 1,
Rule 41, Rules of Court).
Form and contents of writ of execution
The writ of execution is issued in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines and shall state (a) the name of the court
which granted the motion, (b) the case number and title, (c)
the dispositive portion of the judgment or order subject of the
execution, and (d) shall require the sheriff or other proper
officer to whom it is directed to enforce the writ according to
its terms (Sec. 8, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
Duty of the sheriff
A sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely
ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly
to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the
judgment or not. He is mandated to uphold the majesty of the
law as embodied in the decision (Raut-Raut v. Gaputan, A.M.
No. P-14-3214, September 14, 2015). Once the writ is placed in
the hands of the sheriff, he is obligated to execute the order of
the court strictly to the letter and with reasonable promptness
(Olympia-Geronilla v. Montemayor, Jr., A.M. No. P-17-3676,
June 5, 2017).
Writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion
of the judgment
1. A writ of execution derives its validity from the
judgment it seeks to enforce. Hence, it should not vary the

708 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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terms of the judgment or go beyond its terms (Chiquita
Brands, Inc. u. Omelio, G.R. No. 189102, June 7, 2017). The
general rule is that the writ of execution should conform to the
dispositive portion of the decision to be executed, and that the
execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original
judgment or award (Santos u. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 235058, September 4, 2018).
2. The writ may not vary the terms of the judgment to
be executed (Buan u. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 424, 432).
Thus, if the judgment does not provide for the payment of
interest, the writ of execution cannot modify the judgment by
requiring the judgment obligor to pay interest. That part of
the writ imposing interest is void (Solidbank Corporation u.
Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 159, 166).
Lifetime of the writ of execution (Bar 1995)
The writ shall continue in effect during the period within
which the judgment may be enforced by motion (Sec. 14, Rule
39, Rules of Court). Hence, the writ is enforceable within the
five-year period from entry of judgment as provided for in
Sec. 6 of Rule 39 because within that period, the writ may be
enforced by motion.
When execution will be denied
1. After a judgment has become final and executory,
the rule is that execution becomes the ministerial duty of the
court (Fideldia u. Songcuan, 465 SCRA 218, 226).
2. The rule, however, is far from absolute. The trial
court may refuse to have the judgment executed in certain
cases, as:
(a) When the judgment has already been executed
by the voluntary compliance thereof by the parties
(Cunanan u. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 263, 264).
Note: There is no need for execution iri this case
because the judgment has already been satisfied by the
voluntary act of the parties. This is a situation where
CHAPTERX 709
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
there is a satisfaction of the judgment without need for a
writ of execution issued by the court.
(b) When the judgment has been novated by the
parties (Dormitorio u. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 366, 393).
Note: The parties, despite the existence of a
judgment, are at liberty to novate j-~dgment by
entering into a compromise. A compromise i~ contract
recognized by substantive law (Art. 2028, Cwil Code of
the Philippines).
(c) When a petition for rel~ef is filed and_ a
preliminary injunction is granted m accordance wit_h
Sec. 5 of Rule 38. Also, when execution of the judgment is
enjoined by a higher court;
(d) When the judgment sought to be executed
is conditional (Co-Unjieng u. Hijos Mabalacat Sugar
Company, 70 Phil. 380, 384) or when the j_udgm~nt sought
to be executed is incomplete (Del Rosario u. Villegas, 49
Phil. 634, 644; Ignacio u. Hilarion, 76 Phil. 605);
(e) When facts and circumstances t~anspire which
would render execution inequitable or unJust (Bachrach
Corporation u. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 487, 495);
(f) When execution is sought mor~ than five y~ars
from its entry without the judgment havmg been revived
(Cunanan u. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 263, 264).
(g) When execution is sought against property
exempt from execution under Sec. 13 of Rule 39; or
(h) When refusal to ex~cute ~he judgme~t ~as
become imperative in the higher mterest of Justice
(Philippine Veterans Bank v. · Intermediate Appellate
Court, 78 SCRA 645; So u. Court of Appeals, 38_8SCRA
107, 111; For further readings, see Salazar u. Felias, G.R.
No. 213972, February 5, 2018).
Quashal of a writ of execution (Bar 2009)
It is a well-entrenched rule that the execution of final
and executory judgments may no longer be contested and
 710 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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prevented, and no appeal should lie therefrom. Otherwise,
cases would be interminable, and there would be negation of
the over-mastering need to end litigations.
There maybe instances, however, when errors may
be committed prejudicial to the rights of a party and do
c~ll for correction by a superior court. In these exceptional
circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate
that there be some mode available to the party aggrieved
of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of
elevation may be either by appeal or by a special civil action of
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
These exceptional circumstances may prevent the execu-
tion of a judgment or allow the quashal of a writ of execution
already issued. Examples of these grounds are:
(a) when the writ of execution varies the judgment;
(b) when there has been a change in the situation
of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
(c) when execution is sought to be enforced against
property exempt from execution;
(d) when it appears that the controversy has never
been submitted to the judgment of the court;
(e) when the terms of the judgment are not clear
enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof;
(f) when it appears that the writ of execution has
been improvidently issued;
(g) when it appears that the writ of execution is
defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong
party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority
(Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 342, 349,
citing Limpin v. IAC, 147 SCRA 516, 522-523). A recent
case reiterates the above rule and adds that payment or
satisfaction of the judgment debt also constitutes a ground
for the quashal of the writ of execution already issued. A
CHAPTERX 711
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
writ of execution may also be set aside or quashed when
it appears from the circumstances of the case that the
writ was improvidently issued (Chiquita Brands, Inc. v.
Omelio, G.R. No. 189102, June 7, 2017).
Modes of execution of a judgment (Bar 1982; 1987; 1997)
1. There are two modes of executing a final and
executory judgment, to wit:
(a) execution by motion if the enforcement of the
judgment is sought within five years from the date of its
entry; and
(b) execution by independent action if the five-year
period has elapsed and before it is barred by the statute
of limitations (Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court; Spouses
Larry and Flora Davis v. Spouses Florencio and Lucresia
Davis, G.R. No. 233489, March 7, 2018).
The purpose of the rule in prescribing time limitations
for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent litigants
from sleeping on their rights (Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa
[IBM] Nestle Philippines, Inc. Chapter [Ice Cream and Chilled
Products Division] v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 198675;
September 23, 2015).
2. The rule is that the court could issue a writ of
execution by motion within five years from finality of the
decision. A writ of execution issued after the expiration of
that period is null and void. There is a need for the interested
party to file an independent action for revival of judgment.
The reason is that after the lapse of the five-year period,
the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which
judgment must be enforced, as all other ordinary actions, by
the institution of a complaint in the regular form. Such action
must be filed within 10 years from the date the judgment
became final (Terry v. People, 314 SCRA 669, 673; Ilaw Buklod
ng Manggagawa [IBM] Nestle Philippines, Inc. Chapter [Ice
Cream and Chilled Products Division] v. Nestle Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 198675; September 23, 2015) which is now the
date of its entry (Sec. 2, Rule 36, Rules of Court). Bar 2007
 712 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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3. It was held that if the writ of execution was issued
and the levy made within five years from the entry of the
judgment, the auction sale may be made even after the five-
year period. The sale of the property and the application of
the proceeds are merely the means to carry out the writ of
execution and a levy already validly made. Accordingly, the
levy is the essential act by which the property is set apart
for the satisfaction of the judgment (Government v. Echaus,
71 Phil. 318, 320; Vda. de Quiambao v. Manila Motor Co., 3
SCRA 444, 450). The sale must, however, be made within 10
years during which the judgment can be enforced (Ansaldo v.
Fidelity & Surety Company, 88 Phil. 547, 548; Jalandoni v.
PNB, 108 SCRA 102).
Revival of judgment (Bar 1997)
1. An action for revival of judgment is no more than
a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous
judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five
years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing
party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits
of the judgment debtor's case nor the propriety or correctness
of the first judgment. An action for revival of judgment is a new
and independent action, different and distinct from either the
recovery of property case or the reconstitution case, wherein
the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of
the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption
that the decision to be revived is already final and executory
(Saligumba v. Palanog, 573 SCRA 8, 15-16).
Being a mere right of action, the judgment sought to be
revived is subject to defenses like (a) matters of jurisdiction,
(b) prescription, (c) payment, or (d) other defenses arising
after the finality of the first judgment. It may even be subject
to counterclaims arising out of transactions not connected
with the former controversy (See Basilonia v. Villaruz,
G.R. Nos. 1911370-71, August 10, 2015).
The action to revive a judgment must be filed within 10
years from the date the judgment became final because an
I
CHAPTERX 713
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
action to enforce a judgment prescribes in 10 years from the
finality of the judgment (Art. 1144[3] in relation to Art. 152,
Civil Code of the Philippines). Since the date of the finality of
the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be t~e ~ate of_its
entry (Sec. 2, Rule 36, Rules of Court), the prescriptive period
is supposed to run from the date of entry of the judgment.
2. This action to revive a judgment in Sec. 6 of Rule
39 is not the "revival of judgment" referred to in Sec. 34 of
Rule 39 where the terms are actually used in the Rules. In
the latter rule, the revival of judgment is not sought for by
the judgment obligee or the prevailing party. It is sought
for by the purchaser of a real property that was sold in an
execution sale. Despite being the purchaser, he was not able
to acquire possession of the property bought by him or if he
ever did acquire possession, he was evicted therefrom _forone
reason or another as when the judgment under which the
sale was conducted was reversed, or the property sold to him
was actually exempt from execution, or there was a rightful
claimant to the property. The purchaser, under such situation,
is allowed by the Rules to file a motion in the same action or
in a separate action for the purpose of recovering from the
judgment obligee the price he paid (including in~erest) for the
property in the execution sale. He may, as an opt10n, also fil~ a
motion to revive the judgment in his name to recover the price
with interest.
In Sec. 34, the judgment has actually been executed
unlike in Sec. 6 where the judgment has not been executed
on motion within the five-year period set by the Rules. Sec. 34
seeks to revive the judgment that was already executed.
3. When a judgment is reviveq. under Sec. 6 of Rule 39,
such revived judgment may also be enforced by motion wit~in
five years from the date of its entry and t~er~aft_er by act10n
also before it is barred by the statute of hm1tations (Sec. 6,
Rule 39, Rules of Court).
4. A revived judgment is deemed a new judgment
separate and distinct from the original judgme~t. It is no~ a
continuation of the original judgment. The act10n to revive
714 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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the judgment is a new action and results in a new judgment
constituting a new cause of action with a new period of
limitations.
Hence, the 10-year period to revive the revived judgment
shall commence to run from the date of· the finality of the
revived judgment and not from the date of finality of the old,
original judgment (Philippine National Bank v. Bondoc, 14
SCRA 770, 770-772).
The Court in PNB v. Bondoc, explains:
"A judgment is revived only when the same cannot
be enforced by motion, that is, after five years from the
time it becomes final. A revived judgment can be enforced
by motion within five years from its finality. After said
five years, how may the revived judgment be enforced?
Appellee contends that by that time ten years or more
would have elapsed since the first judgment becomes
final, so that an action to enforce said judgment would
then be barred by the statute of limitations.
Appellee's theory relates the period of prescription to
the date the original judgment became final. Such a stand is
inconsistent with the accepted view that a judgment reviving
a previous one is a new and different judgment x x x.
The source of Sec. 6 aforecited is Sec. 44 7 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which in turn was derived from the Code of
Civil Procedure of California. The rule followed in California
in this regard is that a proceeding by separate ordinary action
to revive a judgment is a new action rather than a continuation
of the old, and results in a new judgment constituting a new
cause of action, upon which a new period of limitations begins
to run."
Some rulings (PNB v. Delosa, 32 SCRA 266; Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. v. IAC, G.R. No. 72645, June 30, 1987) held
that the 10-year period should run from the finality of the
original judgment and not from the finality of the revived
judgment. The ruling in Delosa practically abandoned Bondoc
on the matter of the reckoning point of the prescriptive period.
Bondoc, however, was resurrected in the present provision of
CHAPTERX 715
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
Sec. 6 of Rule 39 which declares in its last sentence that "The
revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five
years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before
it is barred by the statute of limitations."
5. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision
enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years from the
date of entry of the judgment, the said judgment is reduced to
a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of
a complaint in a regular court within 10 years from the time
the judgment became final (Bausa v. Heirs of Juan Dino, 563
SCRA 533, 540-541).
6. Jurisprudence also specifically declares that: "x xx a
proceeding by separate ordinary action to revive a judgment is
a new action rather than a continuation of the old, and results
in a new judgment constituting a new cause of action, upon
which a new period of limitation begins to run" (Philippine
National Bank v. Bondoc, 14 SCRA 770, 772).
It bears emphasizing always that an action for revival
of a judgment is a new and independent action. It is different
and distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived
or enforced. A party aggrieved by a decision of the court may
appeal the decision, but only insofar as the merits of the action
for revival is concerned. The new original judgment, which
is already final and executory, may no longer be reversed,
altered or modified (Heirs of Miranda, Sr. v. Miranda, G.R.
No. 179638, July 8, 2013).
7. The purpose of the new action is not to reexamine
and retry issues already decided and the cause of action of
this new action is the judgment to be revived and no identity
of causes of action can be said to exfst between the first and
the second actions (Caiiia v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 252,
262). The consideration of any issue affecting matters that
could have been raised in the previous case must be deemed as
definitely foreclosed (Philippine Reconstruction Corporation,
Inc. v. Aparente, 45 SCRA 217, 222). It is not meant to retry
the case all over again (Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, 372
SCRA 372, 376). ·
716 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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8. Comment: If the action to revive a judgment (or an
action upon a judgment according to Aldeguer v. Gemelo, 68
Phil. 421) is a new cause of action and is not a continuation
of the old, it should not, in this sense, be dependent upon the
previous action for its jurisdictional requirements and does not
necessarily have to be filed in the same court which rendered
the judgment.
It is submitted that the new action, i.e., to revive the
judgment would necessarily raise the fundamental issues of
whether or not the plaintiff has a right to have the judgment
revived and to have a new right of enforcement from its revival,
issues that by nature are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Inevitably, a litigant may find himself in a situation where
he files the action in the Regional Trial Court to revive a
judgment rendered by a Municipal Trial Court, unless of
course, the Supreme Court holds otherwise.
Also, even the venue of the case may be different in an
action to revive a judgment. As the Court held in Aldeguer v.
Gemelo, supra:
"x x x it seems more convenient for the parties that
actions for the collection of judgments for a certain sum
of money be considered transitory in character because,
if for example, a judgment was rendered in the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga eight (8) years ago, and
the parties now reside in Cagayan, it would certainly be
burdensome for them to be compelled to go to Zamboanga
to demand enforcement of the judgment. After all, once a
judgment has become final and executory, the questions
decided therein cannot again be raised, and to determine
whether the same has already been paid or not, it is
unnecessary to examine anew the whole record of the
decided case. Consequently, it is of no advantage at all
that the court where said proceedings were had be the
same to take cognizance of the action for the collection of
the judgment."
It is submitted that it is in this light that the 1957 case
of Torrefranca, et al. v. Albiso, 102 Phil. 732, should be re-
examined.
CHAPTERX 717
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
The facts had their origins in an action to revive a
judgment filed in the same court which more than five years
ago, rendered a judgment in an action for forcible entry
against the defendant. The defendant opposed the action but
the justice of the court declared the judgment revived. The
subsequent appeal to the Court of First Instance was dismissed
and plaintiff went to the Supreme Court on a question of law
- whether or not a justice of the peace court has the authority
to revive its own judgment.
In resolving the issue, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Judiciary Act of 1948 gave justice of the peace courts
jurisdiction over actions offorcible entry and unlawful detainer
"and also empowers them xx x to issue all processes necessary
to enforce their judgments and orders. Needless to say, the
revival of a judgment is a necessary step in its enforcement
XX x"
The reason for the decision is clear: since the court has
jurisdiction over an action for forcible entry, it also has the
power to revive its own judgment as a necessary step for its
execution. The rationale of Torrefranca in sustaining the power
of the court to revive its own judgment is clearly predicated on
the jurisdiction of the trial court over a case of forcible entry.
The pronouncements in Torrefranca obviously assumes that
the revived judgment is a continuation of the old judgment
and viewed the revival of the judgment as merely incidental
to or ancillary to the execution of the original judgment. The
decision did not consider the rule that the cause of action of
the original judgment is separate and distinct from that of
the cause of action to revive a judgment which, under the
decisions more recent than those in Torrefranca, is an entirely
new and independent action. In a nutshell, the rationale of the
decision in Torrefranca does not fall squarely with the more
recent pronouncements of the Court that an action to revive a
judgment is a new cause of action and not a mere continuation
of the original action.
The action to revive a judgment is unlike the remedy of
scire facias, which the Court declared is a mere incident of the
original suit and must be instituted in the court where said suit
718 CNIL PROCEDURE
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VOLUME I
was brought. Such remedy does not exist in the Philippines and
are not original actions but mere continuances of the former
suit. Thus, the owner of a judgment may use such judgment
as a cause of action and bring suit thereon in the same court
or any court of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute such
suit to final judgment (Aldeguer v. Gemelo, 68 Phil. 421, citing
Gould v. Hayden, 63 Ind., 443; Palmer v. Glover, 73 Ind., 529;
Campbel v. Martin, 87 Ind., 577 and Becknell v. Becknell,
110 Ind., 47; For further readings, see Compania General de
Tabacos v. Martinez and Nolan, 29 Phil. 515).
9. Where, however, the action filed is to revive
a judgment in a labor case, regular courts are bereft of
jurisdiction to entertain disputes involving employer-employee
relationships. Thus, in Maricalum Mining Corporation v.
NLRC, 298 SCRA 378, 387, the Court sustained the propriety
of the institution of the action for revival of a judgment in the
NLRC.
10. In a more recent case one issue sought to be resolved
by the Court was whether the RTC has original jurisdiction
over an action to revive a judgment. The Court held: As to
whether the RTC has jurisdiction, [the Court] rule[s] in the
affirmative. An action for revival of judgment may be filed
either "in the same court where said judgment was rendered
or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides or
in any other place designated by the statutes x x x In this
case, respondent filed the Petition for Revival of Judgment
in the same court which rendered the Decision xx x" (Heirs
of Miranda, Sr. v. Miranda, G.R. No. 179638, July 8, 2013;
Citations of the Court omitted).
Note: It is hoped that in a not too distant future, a case
would be brought before the Court with the appropriate issues
that would require an in-depth treatment of the full nature of
an action to revive a judgment in relation to jurisdiction.
Venue of an action to revive a judgment
What is the proper venue of an action for revival of
judgments? This question was answered in the case of Infante
v. Aran Builders, Inc., 531 SCRA 123, 129-130.
CHAPTERX 719
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
The court explained, thus:
"x xx the proper venue depends on the determination
of whether the present action for revival of judgment is
a real action or a personal action x x x if the action for
revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that
must be filed with the court of the place where the real
property is located. If such action does not fall under the
category of real actions, it is then a personal action that
may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff
or defendant resides x x x"
When the five-year period is interrupted (Bar 1993)
1. While the rule is that the execution of a judgment
can no longer be effected by mere motion after five years
from the date of entry of the judgment, the Court in certain
instances, allowed execution of the judgment by mere motion
despite the lapse of the five-year time line. In many instances,
the delays in the execution of the judgment were through
causes clearly attributable to the judgment debtor as when
he employs legal maneuvers to block the enforcement of the
judgment (See Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 611;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 344, 349~350). Delays
attributable to the defendant have the effect of suspending
the running of the prescriptive period for the enforcement of
the judgment (Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 611;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 344, 349-350).
2. There are instances where the Court allowed
execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon
meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common
denominator, and that is, the delay·is caused or occasioned
by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his
benefit or advantage (Republic v. Court of Appeals, ibid.;
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Serra, G.R. No.
203241, July 10, 2013). An example is when the writ could
not be implemented because the land subject of the action
had already been sold to another prompting the judgment
obligee to file an action for annulment of title against the new
720 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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registered owners (Spouses Larry and Flora Davis v. Spouses
Florencio and Lucresia Davis, G.R. No. 233489, March 7,
2018).
3. It has been held that in computing the time limit for
enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that the time
when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties
for a definite time, by injunction, or by the taking of an appeal
or writ of error shall not be included. Thus, the time during
which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said
time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor
as when the writ of execution cannot be enforced within
the five-year period because the debtor filed petitions in the
Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court challenging the
trial court's judgment as well as the writ of execution. Such
petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of
the writ (Yau v. Silverio, and Macapagal v. Gako, 543 SCRA
520,529).
4. The period may also be interrupted by the agreement
of the parties to suspend the enforcement of the judgment
(Macias v. Lim, 431 SCRA 20, 40).
When the five- and 10-year periods do not apply
1. The periods do not apply to (a) special proceedings,
such as land registration and cadastral cases, wherein the
right to ask for a writ of possession does not prescribe (Rodil
v. Benedicto, 95 SCRA 137, 144-145); (b) judgments for
support which do not become dormant and which can always
be executed by motion despite lapse of the five-year period
because the obligation is a continuing one and the court never
loses jurisdiction to enforce the same (Canonizado v. Benitez,
127 SCRA 610, 616).
2. Sec. 6, Rule 39 refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration
case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within
a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
CHAPTERX 721
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings
the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel
of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has
been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except
when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of
the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration
Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place
the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession.
The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse
or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any
further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting
an appeal (Ting v. Heirs of Diego Lirio, et al., G.R. No 168913,
March 14, 2007).
Stay of execution of a judgment; exceptions
As a rule, an appeal perfected in due time stays the
execution of a judgment. There are, however, judgments, the
execution of which is not stayed by a pending appeal. These
judgments may be· classified into two general categories,
namely:
(a) Those judgments which by express provision of
the rules are immediately executory and are not stayed
by an appeal (Sec. 4, Rule 39, Rules of Court); and
(b) Those judgments that have become the object of
discretionary execution (Sec. 2, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
Judgments not stayed by appeal
1. The following judgments by express prov1s1on
of the Rules are immediately executory, enforceable upon
their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken
therefrom:
(a) judgment for injunction;
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(b) judgment for receivership;
(c) judgment for accounting; and
(d) judgment for support (Sec. 4, Rule 39, Rules
of Court; Camino v. Pasagui, A.C. No. 11095, January
31, 2017; See also Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973,
August 8, 2017).
2. The rule, however, that the above judgments are
immediately executory and not stayed by an appeal, is not
absolute because the court is authorized to order otherwise.
Also on appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion
may make an order, suspending, modifying, restoring or
granting the injunction, receivership, accounting or award of
support (Sec. 4, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
The stay of the execution of the above judgments, if
ordered by the trial court, shall be upon such terms as to bond
or otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or
protection of the rights of the adverse party (Sec. 4, Rule 39,
Rules of Court).
3. Under Rule 70, a judgment rendered against the
defendant in an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
is, likewise, immediately executory upon motion. To stay
execution, the losing defendant has to perfect an appeal, file a
supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the
rents, damages, and costs that have accrued down to the time
of the judgment appealed from. He also has to deposit with the
appellate court the amount ofrent due from time to time under
the contract or the reasonable value of the use and occupation
of the property, in case there is no contract (Sec. 19, Rule
70, Rules of Court). Failure to comply with the requirements
to stay execution entitles the plaintiff to execution of the
judgment (See Sugni Holdings and Development Corporation
v. Paredes-Encinareal, A.M No. RTJ-08-2102, October 14,
2015).
CHAPTERX 723
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
Discretionary execution (Bar 1991; 1995)
1. The concept of discretionary execution constitutes
an exception to the general rule that a judgment cannot be
executed before the lapse of the period for appeal or during
the pendency of an appeal. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 39, execution
shall issue only as matter of right upon a judgment or final
order that finally disposes of the action or proceeding upon
the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal
has been duly perfected (For further readings, see Ocampo v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, August 8, 2017).
2. A discretionary execution is called "discretionary''
precisely because it is not a matter ofright. The execution of a
judgment under this concept is addressed to the discretionary
power of the court. Unlike judgments that are final and
executory, a judgment subject to discretionary execution
cannot be insisted upon but simply prayed and hoped for
because a discretionary execution is not a matter of right.
Jurisprudence considers this kind of execution not a
matter ofright, but of judicial discretion provided good reasons
therefor exist and the compelling grounds for the issuance of
the writ must be stated in a special order after due hearing
(Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited v. Lee, 479 SCRA
267, 273-27 4).
3. Be it noted that discretionary execution does not
require a final and executory judgment but simply a "final"
judgment or order (Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 341 SCRA 90, 105).
Requisites for discretionary execution
1. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 39, for the trial court to allow an
execution even before the expiration of the period for appeal
or pending appeal, there must be compliance of the following
requisites:
(a) there must be a motion filed by the prevailing
party with notice to the adverse party;
724 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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(b) there must be a hearing of the motion for
discretionary execution;
(c) the motion must be filed in the trial court while
it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of
either the original record or the record on appeal;
(d) there must be good reasons to justify the
discretionary execution; and
(e) the good reasons must be stated in a special
order (Sec. 2, Rule 39, Rules of Court; Mancenido v. Court
of Appeals, 330 SCRA 419, 427; Bangkok Bank Public
Company Limited v. Lee, G.R. No. 159806, January
20, 2006; Geolistics-Inc. v. Catewey Electronics, 582
SCRA 434, 445; See GSIS v. Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance, Inc., G.R. No. 165585, November 20, 2013).
2. In the exercise by the trial court of its discretionary
power to issue a writ of execution pending appeal, the
Court emphasizes the need for strict compliance with the
requirement that there be a statement of a good reason
supporting the execution because execution pending appeal is
the exception rather than the rule. The implementation of the
annulled writ does not render the issues of the case moot and
academic. In fact, Sec. 5 of Rule 39 even provides for a reversal
or annulment of an executed judgment as well as restitution
or reparation which justice and equity may require. A writ of
execution issued without complying with the requirement of
the rules is void. Where a writ of execution pending appeal is
void, all actions and proceedings conducted pursuant to it are
also void and of no legal effect. It is as if no writ was issued
at all (Carpio v. Court of Appeals, 692 SCRA 162, 171-174,
February 27, 2013).
3. The existence of good reasons is what confers
discretionary power on a court of first instance to issue a writ
of execution pending appeal. The reasons allowing execution
must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency
which will outweigh the injury or damage should the losing
party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal (Jaca and
Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company, et al., G.R. No. L-25771,
March 29, 1982)
CHAPTERX 725
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
Discretionary execution is to be strictly construed
1. A discretionary execution like an execution pending
appeal must be strictly construed because it is an exception
to the general rule. It is not meant to be availed of routinely
because it applies only in extraordinary circumstances (Corona
International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 512, 519).
It should be interpreted only insofar as the language thereof
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general rule (Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
317 SCRA 195,204).
2. It is not intended obviously that execution pending
appeal shall issue as a matter of course. "Good reasons," special,
important, pressing reasons must exist to justify it; otherwise,
instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, it may well
become a tool of oppression and inequity. But to consider the
mere posting of a bond a "good reason" would precisely make
immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal routinary,
the rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be
executed immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered, if
all that the prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond
to answer for damages that might result therefrom. This is a
situation, to repeat, neither contemplated nor intended by law
(Eudela, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 89265, July
17, 1992).
Good reasons
1. The existence of good reasons as justifications for
discretionary execution is essential. The good reasons are
what confer discretionary power upon the court to issue a writ
of execution pending appeal (Intramµ,ros Tennis Club, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 90, 107).
"Good reasons call for the attendance of compelling
circumstances warranting immediate execution for fear that
favorable judgment may yield to an empty victory. In this
regard, the Rules do not categorically and strictly define what
constitutes "good reasons"_ and hence, its presence or absence
must be determined in view of the peculiar circumstances of
726 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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each case. As a guide, jurisprudence dictates that the "good
reason" yardstick imports a superior circumstance that will
outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party. Corollarily,
the requirement of "good reason" does not necessarily entail
unassailable and flawless basis but at the very least, an
invocation thereof must be premised on solid footing" (GSIS v.
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., supra).
2. Certiorari will lie against an order granting
execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon
good reasons (International School, Inc. [Manila] v. Court of
Appeals, 309 SCRA 474, 482).
3. In Florendo v. Paramount Insurance Corp., 610
SCRA 377, G.R. No. 167976, January 20, 2010, the Supreme
Court held:
"x x x 'Good reasons,' it has been held, consist of
compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution
lest the judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances
must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that
might result should the losing party secure a reversal of
the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution
pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude
and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity."
4. "Good reason" as required by Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court does not necessarily mean unassailable and
flawless basis but at the very least, it must be on solid footing.
Dire financial conditions of the plaintiffs supported by mere
self-serving statements as "good reason" for the issuance of
a writ of execution pending appeal does not stand on solid
footing. It does not even stand on its own (National Power
Corporation v. Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2060, July 27, 2011).
5. Sec. 2 of Rule 39 does not cite examples of the good
reasons that would justify a discretionary execution. What
constitutes a good reason therefore, is left to the sound exercise
of judicial discretion. The following, among others, have been
given by jurisprudence as good reasons:
(a) The insolvency of the debtors may justify
discretionary execution as when it is proven that they had
CHAPTERX 727
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
been exhausting for their personal use all the monthly
installments being received by them from the sales of the
different lots of the subdivision in question, they have
not constructed therein the improvements required by
law like the construction of roads, gutters and that they
do not appear to have any other properties or assets to
answer not only for the aforementioned obligations but
more particularly the obligations imposed upon them by
the decision (Lao v. Mencias, 21 SCRA 1021, 1024).
(b) The purpose of preventing irreparable injury to
the consumers of an electric cooperative which needs the
amount of the judgment for its operations and the repair
of its transmission lines, electric posts, transformers,
accessories, towers, and fixtures within its coverage
area (Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 379 SCRA 7, 19-20).
(c) The fact that the goods subject of the judgment
will perish or deteriorate during the pendency of the
appeal, a fact which would render the judgment in favor
of the prevailing party ineffective (Federation of United
NAMARCO Distributors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 4
SCRA 867, 888; Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 341 SCRA 90, 107, citing Yasuda v. Court
of Appeals, 330 SCRA 385; Bell Carpets International
Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 35).
(d) The failure in an unlawful detainer case to
make the required periodic deposits to cover the amount
of rentals due under the contract or for payment of
the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the
premises, or the failure to post~ supersedeas bond may
be good reasons to allow execution pending appeal (Sec.
19, Rule 70, Rules of Court).
Frivolous appeal as reason for discretionary execution
Where the sole reason given by the trial court in allowing
execution is that the appeal is frivolous and dilatory, execution
pending appeal cannot be justified because the authority
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to disapprove an appeal pertains to the appellate court
(International School, Inc. [Manila] v. Court of Appeals, 309
SCRA 474, 483). Mere allegation that the appeal is dilatory is
not a good reason to merit discretionary execution (Intramuros
Tennis Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 90, 107).
Posting of bond as reason for discretionary execution (Bar
1991)
1. The rule is now settled that the mere filing of a bond
by the successful party is not in itself a good reason for ordering
execution pending appeal, because it is the combination of
circumstances which is the dominating reason that would
justify immediate execution, the bond being only an additional
factor (International School, Inc. [Manila] v. Court of Appeals,
309 SCRA 474, 485; Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, ibid.).
2. If the mere posting of a bond is sufficient to justify
immediate execution pending appeal, judgments would be
executed immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered,
if all that the prevailing party needed was to post a bond.
Immediate execution will then become the general rule rather
than the exception.
Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 370, 377-378,
elucidates:
"Good reasons, special, important, pressing
reasons must exist to justify it; otherwise, instead of an
instrument of solicitude and justice, it may well become
a tool of oppression and inequity. But to consider the
mere posting of a bond a "good reason" would precisely
make immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal
routinary, the rule rather than the exception. Judgments
would be executed immediately, as a matter of course,
once rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed to
do was to post a bond to answer for damages that might
result therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat, neither
contemplated nor intended by law."
_j.______
CHAPTERX 729
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
Another case likewise rules:
"We cannot, however, sanction the execution
pending appeal which was authorized in this case. The
order for advance execution must be struck down for lack
of the requisite good reasons therefor. It is already settled
that the mere filing of a bond does not warrant execution
pending appeal. To consider the mere filing of a bond a
good reason would precisely make immediate execution of
a judgment pending appeal routinary. the rule rather than
the exception" (Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 179 SCRA 117, 127; underscoring supplied).
Financial distress as reason for discretionary execution
The fact that the prevailing party is in financial distress
is also not in itself a good reason to justify execution pending
appeal (Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
supra).
Where to file an application for discretionary execution
The motion for discretionary execution shall be filed with
the trial court while (a) it has jurisdiction over the case and
while (b) it is in possession of either the original record or the
record on appeal. After the trial court has lost jurisdiction,
the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court (Sec. 2, Rule 39, Rules of Court; Bangkok Bank
Republic Company Limited v. Lee, G.R. No. 159806, January
20, 2006).
Remedy where the judgment subject to discretionary
execution is reversed or annulled
Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or
partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court
may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation
of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the
circumstances (Sec. 5, Rule 39, Rules of Court). There is
no need of specifying in the judgment that there should be
restitution because restitution is expressly provided for in the
------------------- --------------,.
730 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Rules. Said rule should apply in the absence of a disposition
to the contrary in the judgment of the appellate court (See the
related case of Salas v. Quinga, 13 SCRA 143, 145-146).
Execution in case the judgment obligee dies
The death of the judgment obligee will not prevent the
execution of the judgment. In case the judgment obligee dies,
execution may issue upon the application of his executor,
administrator or successor in interest (Sec. 7/a], Rule 39,
Rules of Court).
Execution in case the judgment obligor dies
The death of the judgment obligor will not, likewise,
prevent execution of the judgment. In case the judgment
obligor dies, execution shall still go on because under the Rules,
execution shall issue against his executor or administrator or
successor in interest, if the judgment be for the recovery of
real or personal property, or the enforcement of a lien thereon
(Sec. 7/b], Rule 39, Rules of Court). If the death occurs after
execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the same
may be sold for the satisfaction of the judgment obligation. If
there be any surplus after the sale, the officer making the sale
shall account to the corresponding executor or administrator
(Sec. 7/c], Rule 39, Rules of Court).
How to execute judgments for money; summary
1. In executing a judgment for money, the sheriff shall
follow the following steps:
(a) Demand from the judgment obligor the
immediate payment of the full amount stated in the
judgment including the lawful fees in cash, certified
check payable to the judgment obligee or any other form
of payment acceptable to him (Sec. 9/a], Rule 39, Rules of
Court).
(b) If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part
of the obligation in cash, certified check or other mode
...
-------------------------,
CHAPTERX 731
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
of payment, the officer shall levy upon the properties of
the judgment obligor. The judgment obligor shall have
the option to choose which property or part thereof may
be levied upon. If the judgment obligor does not exercise
the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal
properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the
personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
personal judgment but the sheriff shall sell only so much
of the property that is sufficient to satisfy the judgment
and lawful fees (Sec. 9/b], Rule 39, Rules of Court). Bar
2010
(c) The officer may levy on the debts due the
judgment debtor including bank deposits, financial
interests, royalties, commissions and other personal
property not capable of manual delivery in the possession
or control of third parties. The process of effecting this
form of levy is called garnishment.
2. Based on the foregoing rules, the sheriff is required
first to demand from the judgment obligor the immediate
payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution
before a levy can be made. The sheriff shall demand such
payment either in cash, certified bank check or any other mode
of payment that is acceptable to the judgment obligee. If the
judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods immediately
or at once, he can exercise his option to choose which among
his personal properties can be levied upon. If he does not
exercise this option, he waives such right and the sheriff can
now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to satisfy
the judgment (Villarin v. Munasque, 568 SCRA 483, 497).
It is evident from the current rules that the levy by the
sheriff may be done only if the judgment obligor cannot pay all
or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or through
other modes acceptable to the prevailing party. If payment
can be done, a levy is unnecessary. On the other hand, if the
judgment obligor makes a prior admission that he cannot pay
the amount stated in the writ of execution and that he agrees

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to the levy of his properties so long as the auction sale would
not be set earlier than a certain set by the judgment obligor,
such admission provides a reasonable basis for the sheriff to
forego a prior demand to pay and to levy on the properties
right away (Villarin u. Munasque, ibid., at 499).
3. The rule that it is not proper for a sheriff to
immediately levy upon the property of the judgment debtor
was affirmed in one case. In Leachon u. Pascua, A.M No.
P-11-2972, September 28, 2011, it was ruled that the levy
upon the properties of the judgment obligor may be had by
the executing sheriff only if the judgment obligor cannot pay
all or part of the full amount stated in the writ of execution. If
the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation
in cash, certified bank check, or other mode acceptable to the
judgment obligee, the judgment obligor is given the option
to immedia~ely choose which of his property or part thereof,
not otherwise exempt from execution, may be levied upon
sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does
not exercise the option immediately, or when he is absent or
cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can
now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the
real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to
answer for the judgment. Therefore, the sheriff cannot and
should not be the one to determine which property to levy if
the judgment obligor cannot immediately pay because it is
the judgment obligor who is given the option to choose which
property or part thereof may be levied upon to satisfy the
judgment (Leachon u. Pascua, supra).
Money judgments are enforceable only against property of
judgment debtor
"It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are
enforceable only against property unquestionably belonging
to the ju~gment debtor. In the execution of a money judgment,
the sheriff must first make a demand on the obligor for
payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution.
Property belonging to third persons cannot be levied upon.
Moreover, the levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor
CHAPTERX 733
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
may be had by the executing sheriff if the judgment obligor
cannot pay all or part of the full amount stated in the writ
of execution. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part
of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode
acceptable to the judgment obligee, the judgment obligor is
given the option to immediately choose which of ~is property
or part thereof, not otherwise exempt from execut101_1, may be
levied upon sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the Judgment
obligor does not exercise the option immediately, or when
he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such right, and
the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any,
and then the real properties if the personal properties are
insufficient to answer for the judgment.
Therefore the sheriff cannot and should not be the one
to determine ~hich property to levy if the judgment obligor
cannot immediately pay because it is the judgment obligor
who is given the option to choose which property or part
thereof may be levied upon to satisfy the judgment. In a c~se
where the judgment obligor is not the owner of the subJect
vehicle that the sheriff levied on, it was improper for him to
have enforced the writ of execution on a property that did not
belong to the judgment debtor/obligor: Responden! .sheri~~
evidently failed to perform his duty with utmost diligence
(Sarmiento u. Mendiola, 638 SCRA, 345, 350, December 15,
2010).
Garnishment of debts and credits
Garnishment shall be made by: (a) serving notice upon the
third person having in possession or control of the cred~ts in
favor of the judgment obligor; (b) the third person or garmshee
shall make a written report to the c~:mrtwithin five days from
service of the notice of garnishment stating whether or not the
judgment obligor has sufficient funds to satisfy the judgment.
If sufficient, the garnishee shall deliver the amount in cash
or certified check directly to the judgment obligee within 10
working days from service of notice on said garnishee. The
lawful fees shall be directly paid to the court. If the amount
is insufficient, the garnishee shall make a report as to the
 734 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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amount he holds for the judgment obligor (Sec. 9, Rule 39,
Rules of Court).
Levy of encumbered property
"In determining properties to be levied upon, the Rules
require the sheriff to levy only on those "properties of the
judgment debtor" which are "not otherwise exempt from
execution." For purposes of the levy, a property is deemed to
belong to the judgment debtor if he holds a beneficial interest
in such property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of for
value. In a contract of mortgage, the debtor retains beneficial
interest over the property notwithstanding the encumbrance
since the mortgage only serves to secure the fulfillment of th~
principal obligation. Indeed, even if the debtor defaults, this
fact does not operate to vest in the creditor the ownership
of the property; the creditor must still resort to foreclosure
proceedings. Thus, a mortgaged property may still be levied
upon by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment debtor's obligations
x x x" (Golden Sun Finance Corporation v. Albano, A.M. No.
P-11-2888, July 27, 2011).
In Golden Sun Finance Corporation, the Court explained
that the encumbrance will not affect the right of the judgment
debtor over the property or exempt the property from the levy
if made prior to foreclosure of any mortgage constituted on the
property. Even the pendency of a proceeding for replevin would
not serve to prevent the sheriff from levying on the property
since the fact of default and the right to foreclose had to be
settled in the proceeding (Golden Sun Finance Corporation v.
Albano, supra).
Effect of levy and sale of property
It is settled that execution is enforced by the fact of levy
and sale. The result of such execution was that title over
the subject property is vested immediately in the purchaser
subject only to the right to redeem the property within the
period provided for by law. The right acquired by the purchaser
at an execution sale is inchoate and does not become absolute
CHAPTERX 735
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
until after the expiration of the redemption period without
the right of redemption having been exercised. But inchoate
though it be, it is, like any other right, entitled to protection
and must be respected until extinguished by redemption. If
there is a failure to redeem the subject property within the
period allowed by law, the redemptioner is divested of his
rights over the property (Ching v. Family Savings Bank, 634
SCRA 586, 601, November 15, 2010).
Execution of a judgment for the performance of a specific
act
1. If the judgment requires a person to perform a
specific act, said act must be performed but if the party fails
to comply within the specified time, the court may direct the
act to be done by someone at the cost of the disobedient party
and the act when so done shall have the effect as if done by the
party (Sec. 10{a], Rule 39, Rules of Court).
2. If the judgment directs a conveyance of real or
personal property, and said property is in the Philippines, the
court in lieu of directing the conveyance thereof, may by an
order divest the title of any party and vest it in others, which
shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due
form of law (Sec. 10[a], Rule 39, Rules of Court}
Execution for a judgment for the delivery or restitution of
real property {Bar 1995)
1. An example of this kind of judgment is one rendered
in an action for ejectment. In such a case, the officer shall
demand from the judgment obligor to vacate peaceably within
three working days, and restore possession of the property to
the judgment obligee (Sec. 10{c], Rule 39, Rules of Court).
The enforcement of the writ of execution in ejectment
cases is carried out by giving the defendant notice of such writ,
and making a demand that defendant comply therewith within
a reasonable period, normally from three to five days, and it is
only after such period that the sheriff is to enforce the writ by
the bodily removal of the defendant and his belongings. Note
......
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that in both the Rules and jurisprudence, the writ of execution
in ejectment cases cannot be enforced on the same date the
sheriff receives the writ. The three-day notice is required. In
one case, there was no notice given. Respondents only learned
of the issuance of the writ of execution at the time it was being
enforced by petitioner (Manuel v. Escalante, G.R. No. 134141,
August 13, 2002). A sheriff who enforces the writ without the
required notice runs afoul of the Rules of Court (Ma-fialac v.
Bidan, A.M. No. P-18-3875, October 3, 2018).
2. Immediacy of execution does not mean instant
execution. When a decision is immediately executory it does not
mean dispensing with the required three-day notice (Mendoza
v. Doroni, 481 SCRA 41, 52-53; Calaunan v. Madolaria, 642
SCRA 1, 9, February 8, 2011).
The requirement of a notice to vacate is based on the
rudiments of justice and fair play. The rule requires that
notice be served on the "person against whom the judgment for
the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all
persons claiming rights under him" (Calaunan v. Madolaria,
ibid.).
3. After the lapse of the period given and the judgment
obligor refuses to vacate, then the sheriff may enforce the
writ by ousting the judgment obligor and all the persons
claiming a right under him, with the assistance, if necessary,
of appropriate peace officers, and employing such means as
may be reasonably necessary to retake possession and place
the judgment obligee in possession of such property (Sec.
1O[c],Rule 39, Rules of Court). This provision authorizes the
bodily removal of the defendant and his belongings (Mendoza
v. Doroni, supra).
Contempt is not a remedy
The mere refusal or unwillingness of the judgment
debtor to vacate the property is not a sufficient ground to
hold him in contempt. The writ of possession was not directed
to the judgment debtor but to the sheriff who was directed
CHAPTERX 737
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
to deliver the property to the prevailing party. As the writ
did not command the judgment debtor to do anything, he
cannot be guilty of the acts described in Rule 71 which is
"disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment or command of any court." The proper procedure
is not for the court to cite the debtor in contempt. What the
officer should do is to dispossess him of the property and if
after the dispossession, the judgment debtor should execute
acts of ownership or possession or in any manner disturb
the possession of the judgment creditor, then and only then
may he be punished for contempt (Pascua v. Heirs of Segundo
Simeon, 161 SCRA 1, 5; Barrete v. Amila, 230 SCRA 219, 222-
223).
Removal of improvements on the property subject of
execution
When the property subject of execution contains
improvements constructed or planted thereon by the judgment
obligor or his agent, the officer shall not demolish, destroy or
remove them. These acts may only be done by the officer upon
a special order by the court which will be issued upon motion
by the judgment obligee and after hearing and only after the
judgment obligor fails to remove them within a reasonable
time fixed by the court (Sec. 10[d], Rule 39, Rules of Court).
Property exempt from execution (Bar 1981)
1. There are certain properties exempt from execution
enumerated under Sec. 13 of Rule 39, to wit:
(a) The judgment obligor's family home as provided
by law, or the homestead in which he resides, and the
land necessarily used in connection therewith;
(b) Ordinary tools and implements personally used
by him in his trade, employment, or livelihood;
(c) Three horses, or three cows, or three carabaos,
or other beasts of burden, such as the judgment obligor
may select necessarily used by him in his ordinary
occupation;
 738 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
(d) His necessary clothing and articles for ordinary
personal use, excluding jewelry;
(e) ~ousehold furniture and utensils necessary for
ho~sekeepm~, and used for that purpose by the judgment
obhgor and his family, such as the judgment obligor may
select, of a value not exceeding one hundred thousand
pesos; Bar 1981
(f) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient
for four months;
. (g) The professional libraries and equipment of
Judges, lawyers, physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engi-
n_eers, surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other profes-
s10nals, not exceeding three hundred thousand pesos in
value;
(h) One fishing boat and accessories not exceeding
the total value of one hundred thousand pesos owned by
a fisherman and by the lawful use of which he earns his
livelihood;
. (i) So much of the salaries, wages, or earnings of
the Judgment obligor for his personal services within the
four (4) months preceding the levy as are necessary for
the support of his family;
G) Lettered gravestones;
(k) Monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accru-
ing or in any manner growing out of any life insurance;
(1) The ri~ht to receive legal support, or money
or property obtamed as such support, or any pension or
gratuity from the government; and
(m) Properties specially exempted by law (Sec. 13,
Rule 39, Rules of Court).
2. T~e rule provides that no other property is exempt
from execut10n, except as otherwise provided by law (Sec. 13,
Rules of Court). The enumeration, therefore, is exclusive.
CHAPTERX 739
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
3. It is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to
the Sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from later
claiming the exception. In the case of Sps. Versola v. Court of
Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 164740, July 31, 2006), petitioners
simply alleged there that the property subject of the intended
auction sale was their family home. Instead of substantiating
their claim, petitioners languidly presupposed that the sheriff
had prior knowledge that the said property was constituted
by them as their family home. Lamentably, in the said
objection, petitioners did not set forth therein any evidence
to substantiate their claim that the property to be sold at the
execution sale was indeed exempt for having been constituted
as a family home.
When the property mentioned is not exempt from execution
If the property mentioned in Sec. 13 of Rule 39 is the
subject of execution because of a judgment for the recovery of
the price or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage upon
the property, the property is not exempt from execution (Sec.
13, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
Proceedings when property levied upon is claimed by third
persons; terceria (Bar 1982; 1984; 1993; 2011)
1. The power of a court in executing judgments extends
only to properties unquestionable belonging to the judgment
debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party
and not against one who did not have his day in court. The
duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment
debtor and not that of a third person (Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation [PSALM] v. Maunlad
Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 215933, February 8, 2017).
It is a basic rule that execution may issue only upon a
person who is a party to the action or proceeding, and not
against one who did not have his day in court (Philippine
Coconut Federation, Inc. [COCOFEDJ v. Republic, G.R. Nos.

740 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
177857-58, October 5, 2016). Sometimes, it happens that the
sheriff levies upon the property of one who was not a party to
the action. What remedy is available to such person?
Under the Rules, a person, not a party to the action,
claiming a property levied upon may execute an affidavit of
his title or right of possession over the property. Such affidavit
must state the grounds of such right or title. The affidavit
shall be served upon the officer making a levy and a copy
thereof must also be served upon the judgment obligee (Sec.
16, Rule 39, Rules of Court). This remedy of the claiming party
is also called "terceria. "
The officer served with the affidavit of the claiming third
person shall not be bound to keep the property subject of the
claim, unless the judgment obligee, on demand of the officer,
files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the claimant
in a sum not less than the value of the property levied
upon. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property may be enforced against the bond unless the action
therefor is filed within 120 days from the date of the filing of
the bond (Sec. 16, Rule 39, Rules of Court). The officer shall
not be liable to any third-party claimant for damages for the
taking or keeping of the property, if such bond is filed (Sec. 16,
Rule 39, Rules of Court; Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation [PSALM] u. Maunlad Homes, Inc.,
G.R. No. 215933, February 8, 2017).
2. Other remedies may also be availed of by the third-
party claimant because nothing contained in the Rules "shall
prevent the claiming third person from vindicating his claim
to the property in a separate action x x x" (Sec. 16, Rule 39,
Rules of Court; See Villasi u. Garcia, G.R. No. 190106, January
15, 2014). Bar 1982; 1983; 1984; 1993; 2011
635 SCRA 357, 365) similarly teaches:
One case holds:
"The second paragraph of Section 16, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court provides:
x x x Nothing herein contained shall prevent
such claimant or any third person from vindicating
CHAPTERX 741
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
his claim to the property in a separate action,
or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming
damages in the same or separate action against a
third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly
spurious claim.
Clearly, a third-party claimant or any third
person may vindicate his claim to his property
wrongfully levied by filing a proper action which
is distinct and separate from that in which the
judgment is being enforced. Such action would have
for its object the recovery of the possession of the
property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages
resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and
detention thereof despite the third-party claim; and
it may be brought against the sheriff, of course, and
such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded
with the sheriff in the supposedly wrongful execution
proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself.
The same paragraph also provides a remedy
to a judgment obligee when a frivolous and plainly
spurious claim was filed by a third-party claimant,
i.e., to file his claim for damages in the same court
where the third-party claimant filed his third-party
claim or to file a separate action. Thus, petitioners'
claim for damages must be filed in the trial court,
whether in the same case where a third-party claim
has been filed or in a separate action for damages
which petitioners may institute. This is so in order
to require the filing of proper pleadings and to hol_d
trial so as to give the parties the chance to submit
their respective evidence" (Capa v. Court of Appeals,
502 SCRA 406, 417-418; underscoring supplied).
One case (Imani u. Metropolitan· Bank & Trust Company,
"x xx A third-party claimant may also resort to an
independent "separate action," the object of which is
the recovery of ownership or possession of the property
seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arisin~ from
wrongful seizure and detention of the property despite the

742 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
third-party claim. If a "separate action" is the recourse,
the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of
competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate
from the action in which the judgment is being enforced,
even before or without need of filing a claim in the court
that issued the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and
may be availed of independently of or separately from the
other. Availment of the terceria is not a condition sine
qua non to the institution of a "separate action."
In another case (Ching and Ching v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004), the Court likewise held:
When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment
and seizes the property of a third person in which the said
defendant holds no right or interest, the superior authority
of the court which has authorized the execution may be
invoked by the aggrieved third person in the same case.
Upon application of the third person, the court shall order
a summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether
the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance
of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment, more
specifically if he has indeed levied on attachment and taken
hold of property not belonging to the plaintiff. If so, the court
may then order the sheriff to release the property from the
erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person.
In resolving the motion of the third party, the court does not
and cannot pass upon the question of the title to the property
with any character of finality. It can treat the matter only
insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted
correctly or not. If the claimant's proof does not persuade the
court of the validity of the title, or right of possession thereto,
the claim will be denied by the court. The aggrieved third
party may also avail himself of the remedy of "terceria" by
executing an affidavit of his title or right of possession over
the property levied on attachment and serving the same to the
office making the levy and the adverse party. Such party may
also file an action to nullify the levy with damages resulting
from the unlawful levy and seizure, which should be a totally
CHAPTERX 743
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
separate and distinct action from the former case. The above-
mentioned remedies are cumulative and any one of them may
be resorted to by one third-party claimant without availing of
the other remedies." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
2. Jurisprudence, however, cautioned that before the
court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release
of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof
to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably
establish his ownership or right of possession thereon (Villasi
v. Garcia, G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014).
Miscellaneous principles to be remembered in execution
sales
1. A notice of sale is required before the property levied
upon is sold on execution (Sec. 15, Rule 39, Rules of Court}-
All sales of property under execution must be made at pubhc
auction to the highest bidder (Sec. 19, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
but the execution sale must be preceded by a valid levy which
is indispensable for a valid execution sale (Tan v. Court of
Appeals, 162 SCRA 237, 244).
A levy is the act whereby the sheriff sets apart or
appropriates a part of the whole of the properties of the
judgment obligor to satisfy the command of the writ (Fiestan
v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 751, 757).
A levy is necessary only if the obligor cannot satisfy
the judgment in cash, certified check or any other mode of
payment acceptable to the judgment creditor (Sec. 9[b], Rule
39, Rules of Court).
A levy upon real property is _made by the officer by
performing two specific acts: (a) filing with the Register of
Deeds a copy of the order, description of the attached property
and notice of attachment; and (b) leaving with the occupant
of the property copy of the same order, description and
notice. Non-compliance with any of these requisites is fatal
because a special statutory provision respecting the manner
of carrying out levy of attachment must be strictly complied
with and departure therefrom shall invalidate the levy (Delta

744 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 206, 212;
Philippine Surety and Insurance Co. v. Zabal, 21 SCRA 682,
685).
2. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the
execution, no more shall be sold (Sec. 19, Rule 39, Rules of
Court);
3. Any excess property or proceeds of the sale shall be
delivered to the judgment obligor (Sec. 19, Rule 39, Rules of
Court);
4. If the purchaser at the auction refuses to pay the
amount bid by him, the officer may again sell the property to
the highest bidder and the court may require such purchaser
to pay unto the court the amount of whatever loss, with costs
occasioned by his refusal to pay and if he disobeys the order,
may punish him for contempt. Any subsequent bid by such
purchaser may be refused by the officer conducting the bidding
(Sec. 20, Rule 39, Rules of Court);
5. The judgment obligee may bid and if said party is
the purchaser and there is no third party claim, he need not
pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of
his judgment. If it does, he shall only pay the excess (Sec. 21,
Rule 39, Rules of Court);
6. If the purchaser of personal property capable of
manual delivery pays the purchase price, the officer making
the sale must deliver the property to the purchaser and, if
desired, shall execute a certificate of sale. The sale conveys to
the purchaser all the rights which the judgment obligor had
in such property as of the date of the levy on execution or
preliminary attachment (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court);
7. When the purchaser of any personal property not
capable of manual delivery pays the price, the officer making
the sale must execute and deliver to the purchaser a certificate
of sale. Such certificate conveys to the purchaser all the rights
which the judgment obligor had in such property as of the
date of the levy on execution or preliminary attachment (Sec.
24, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
CHAPTERX 745
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
Sale and redemption of real property (Bar 2009)
1. Upon a sale of real property, the officer must give
to the purchaser a certificate of sale. Such certificate must
be registered in the registry of deeds of the place where the
property is situated (Sec. 25, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
2. The real property sold may be redeemed from the
purchaser, at any time within one year from the date o~ the
registration of the certificate of sale. If there are other creditors
having a lien on the property, the property so redeemed ~ay
again be redeemed within 60 days from the last re~emp~10n.
The property may again, and as often as a redem~t10ner _is ~o
disposed, be redeemed from any previous redemptioner withm
60 days after the last redemption (Sec. 28, Rule 39, Rules of
Court).
3. The property may be redeemed by the judgment
obligor, or his successor in interest or by a creditor having a
lien by virtue of an attachment, judgment or mortgage on the
property sold, subsequent to the lien under which the pro~erty
was sold. Such redeeming creditor is called a redempt10ner
(Sec. 27, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
4. Note that the right of redemption under referred to
above has reference only to real, not personal property (Sec.
27, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
Effect if no redemption is made
1. If no redemption is made within one year from the
date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser
is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or
if so redeemed whenever 60 days have elapsed and no other
redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, th~ last
redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession of
the property (Sec. 33, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
2. Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the
purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire
all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor
to the property as of the time of the levy (Sec. 33, Rule 39,
Rules of Court).

746 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Under the same provision, the possession of the property
shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the
same officer unless a third party is actually holding the
property adverse to the judgment debtor. Thus, where a
parcel ofland levied upon on execution is occupied by a person
other than the judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court
to order a hearing to determine the nature of the possession
of the occupant. If the property is held by the occupant in a
manner adverse to the judgment debtor (like as a co-owner or
a usufructuary), the possession of the property cannot as yet
be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner. If, however,
the possession by the occupant is merely as a successor of or
transferee from the judgment obligor, the purchaser or last
redemptioner is entitled to possession of the property (See
AQA Global Construction, Inc. v. Planters Development Bank,
G.R. No. 211742, August 12, 2015).
Rents, income and earnings of the property pending the
redemption
The purchaser or redemptioner shall not be entitled to
receive the rents, earnings and income of the property sold
on execution, or the value of the use and occupation thereof
when such property is in the possession of a tenant. All rents,
earnings and income derived from the property pending
redemption shall belong to the judgment obligor until the
expiration of his period of redemption (Sec. 32, Rule 39, Rules
of Court).
Remedy when the judgment is unsatisfied (Bar 1983; 2002;
2008)
1. When the return of the writ of execution shows that
the judgment is unsatisfied, the judgment obligee is entitled
to an order from the court which rendered the judgment,
requiring the judgment obligor to appear and be examined
concerning his property and income before the court or a
commissioner appointed by the court. This remedy has a
limitation because the judgment obligor cannot be required
CHAPTERX 747
EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
to appear before a court or commissioner outside the province
or city in which such obligor resides or is found (Sec. 36, Rule
39, Rules of Court). Thus, if the court is RTC Bulacan and the
obligor is a resident of Quezon City, he cannot be required to
appear and be examined.
2. It is not only the judgment debtor who may be
examined. A person, corporation, or other juridical entity,
indebted to the judgment debtor may, by an order, be required
to appear before the court or a commissioner appointed by it,
at a time and place within the province or city where such
debtor resides or is found, and be examined concerning the
same (Sec. 37, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
3. Pursuant to the above rules, in the examination of
a person, corporation, or other juridical entity who has the
property of the judgment obligor or is indebted to him, the
court may only authorize the judgment obligee to institute an
action against such person or corporation for the recovery of
such interest or debt. Nothing in the Rules gives the court
the authority to order such person or corporation to pay the
judgment obligee and the court exceeds its jurisdiction if it
orders the person who denies the indebtedness to pay the
same. Execution of a judgment can only be issued against
one who is a party to the action, and not against one, who,
not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due
process demands that a court decision can only bind a party to
the litigation and not against innocent third parties (Esguerra
, v. Holcim Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 182571, September 2,
2013).
-oOo-

Chapter XI
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
A. Small Claims Cases
(Basic Features)
A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC (The Rules on Expedited Procedures in
the First Level Courts)
By virtue of A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, entitled before as "The
Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases" took effect on
October 1, 2008. On October 27, 2009, some amendments
were introduced to the Rule. The amendments took effect
on November 3, 2009 following their publication in two
newspapers of general circulation. On February 1, 2016 the
"Th e Revised Rules for Small Claims Cases" took effect. '
On August 7, 2018, further amendments were made to the
Rule. OCA Circular No. 165-2018 announced that an en bane
resolution of the Supreme Court on July 10, 2018 increased the
threshold amount of small claims from two hundred thousand
(P200,000.00) pesos to three hundred thousand (P300,000.00)
pesos.
On March 21, 2019, OCA Circular No. 45-2019 announced
that an en bane resolution of the Supreme Court on February
26, 2019 increased the threshold amount of small claims
cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs)
from Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) pesos to Four
Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos and for the Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities (MTCCs), Municipal Trial (MTCs) and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MTCTs) to remain at Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00). To reflect the new
748
CHAPTER XI 749
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
amount for small claims cases, Secs. 2 and 8 of the 2016
revised rules were amended. The amendment took effect on
April 1, 2019, following its publication in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation. The resolution was published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and Manila Bulletin on March 15,
2019.
The initiative was to streamline and harmonize the rules
of procedure for money claims filed before all first level courts.
As a result, money claims filed before the first level courts
outside Metro Manila are all covered by the Revised Rules of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases, whereas those filed before
the Metropolitan Trial Courts are considered either as small
claims cases for claims of up to P300,000.00, or proceeded
under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, for claims
above P300,000.00 to P400,000.00.
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court, during
its En Banc deliberation on March 1, 2022, approved the
procedural rules expediting criminal and civil actions filed
before the first level courts. This effectively amended the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and 2016 Revised Rules
on Small Claims Cases.
Entitled Rules on Expedited Procedures in First Level
Courts (AM. No. 08-8-7-SC), the same recalibrates, reconciles,
and harmonizes the coverage of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and Small Claims cases following the enactment
of R.A. 11576, which expanded the jurisdictional amount
cognizable by the first level courts to P2,000,000.00 for civil
actions monetary claims.
The Rules increase the threshold amount of small claims
cases to Pl,000,000.00 and no longer makes a distinction
whether the claim is filed before the first level courts within
or outside Metro Manila. The claim or demand may be for
money owed under contracts of lease, loan and other credit
accommodations, services, and sale of personal property. The
recovery of personal property is excluded, unless made subject
of a compromise agreement between the parties. Nevertheless,
the enforcement ofbarangay amicable settlement agreements
 750 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
and arbitration awards where the money claim does not exceed
Pl,000,000.00 is likewise covered.
Purpose/Objectives
1. The purpose of the rules for small claims is to provide
an inexpensive and expeditious means to settle disputes over
small amounts. The theory behind the small claims system is
that ordinary litigation fails to bring practical justice to the
parties, when the disputed claim is small, because the time
and expense required by the ordinary litigation process is so
disproportionate to the amount involved that it discourages a
just resolution of the dispute.
2. Specifically, the following are the. objectives of the
rules of procedure for small claims cases:
(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right
of persons to a speedy disposition of cases;
(b) To provide a simplified and inexpensive proce-
dure for the disposition of small claims cases;
(c) To introduce innovations and best practices for
the benefit of the underprivileged (Sec. 2, Rule N, A.M.
No. 08-8-7-SC).
Inapplicability of strict procedural rules
The small claims process is designed to function quickly
and informally. There are no attorneys allowed, unless he is
the plaintiff or defendant. There are no formal pleadings filed
and the strict legal rules on evidence do not apply. The small
claims court system is not a "typical inferior court." Parties
are encouraged to file small claims court actions to resolve
their minor disputes as opposed to resorting to self-help or
forcible means to seek their remedy (Explanatory note to A.M
No. 08-8-7-SC, citing Pace v. Hillcrest Motor Co., 161 Cal.
Rptr. 663, 664 Ct. App. 1980).
Jurisdiction
1. Small claims cases are cognizable by the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts in Cities
CHAPTER XI 751
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
(MTCCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts (MTCTs) where the value of the claim does
not exceed Pl,000,000.00, exclusive of interest and cost (Sec.
1[2], Rule I, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC). The claim must be purely
civil in nature and is solely for payment or reimbursement of
a sum of money (Sec. 1, Rule N, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
2. To be covered by the Revised Rules on Small Claims
Cases, the claim or demand should be for money owed under
any of the following: (a) contract of lease; (b) contract of loan
and other credit accommodations; (c) contract of services; (d)
contract of sale of personal property, excluding the recovery
of the personal property, unless it is made the subject of a
compromise agreement between the parties. The claim may
also be for the enforcement of barangay amicable settlement
agreements and arbitration awards, where the money claim
does not exceed 1 Million Pesos, provided that no execution
has been enforced by the barangay within six months from
the date of the settlement or date of receipt of the award or
from the date the obligation stipulated or adjudged in the
arbitration award becomes due and demandable, pursuant to
Section 417, Chapter VII of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as
The Local Government Code of 1991. (Sec. 1[2], A.M. No. 08-
8-7-SC). Bar 2014
The above enumeration is essentially the same under
the 2016 Revised Rules on Small Claims Cases except for the
deletion of contract of mortgage considering that the same
is deemed covered under contract of loan as mere accessory
contract thereto. The claim allowed by the rules is one solely
for the payment of money. Hence, a claim for the delivery of a
car, goods, or anything other than for the payment of money
falls outside the ambit of small claims cases. In the same vein,
a suit cannot be brought in a small claims court to compel a
defendant to fix or replace damaged goods.
A claim seeking for a judgment to compel the defendant
to perform specific acts, like the performance of services,
pursuant to a contract, is also not covered by the rules on
small claims since such claim is not solely for the recovery of
752 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
money. On the other hand, a claim for monetary compensation
for services rendered is covered by such rules. A claim for
the proceeds of an insurance contract, or the contract price
resulting from a sale can be brought in a small claims court.
The Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level
Courts added a catch all phrase "and other accredited
accommodations" to clarify that the Rules cover transactions
that may not technically be considered as loans but are
nonetheless part of the banking business such as credit card
debts.
For contracts of sale, the Rules limited the coverage
of small claims to personal property only. Contract of sale
of real property is deliberately excluded because of their
complex nature and would usually involve other legal issues
necessitating professional legal advice and trial for its
resolution. Hence, such contracts are removed from the ambit
of small claims where the parties are prohibited from being
represented or assisted by counsels.
The Rules removed liquidated damages arising from
contracts from the coverage of small claims since the same
usually involves other legal issues such as validity, breach and
enforceability of contracts wherein the parties are required to
be assisted by counsel. Instead, liquidated damages arising
from contracts may be covered under summary procedure
provided that the claim falls within the threshold amount.
Commencement of the claim; Statement of claims
1. A small claims case is not commenced by a complaint,
as the initiatory pleading is called in the Rules of Court.
Instead, it is commenced by filling up and filing a form called
a Statement of Claim/s with Verification and Certification
Against Forum Shopping, Splitting a Single Cause of Action,
and Multiplicity of Suits (Form I-SCC). No formal pleading,
other than the Statement of Claim/s described, is necessary
to initiate a small claims action. Instead of reserving the
evidence for presentation during the hearing, the plaintiff is
required to attach duly certified photocopies of the actionable
document/s subject of the claim, affidavits of witnesses, and
_L
CHAPTER XI 753
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
other evidence to support the claim, with as many copies
thereof as there are defendants.
2. Submitting every evidence together with the
Statement of Claim is a mandatory requirement. Evidence
not attached shall not be allowed during the hearing. The
only way for the plaintiff to submit additional evidence not
previously attached, is to show to the court that he has good
cause for the submission of additional evidence (Sec. 4, Rule
N, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC). In addition, the non-submission of
the required affidavits will cause the immediate dismissal of
the claim (Sec. 7, Rule N, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
3. The affidavits attached to the Statement of Claim
are required to state only facts of direct personal knowledge
of the affiant or facts based on authentic records. Failure to
follow this requirement will make the affidavits inadmissible
and result in their being expunged from the record (Sec. 7,
Rule N, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC). A violation of this requirement
shall subject the party and the person who assisted the party
in the preparation of the affidavits, to appropriate disciplinary
action (Sec. 7, Rule N, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC).
Note: All documents attached to the Statement of Claim
or Response that are required to be certified, shall be certified
by the signature of the plaintiff or defendan~ concern~d.
Certification by a party is not needed for pubhc or official
documents (Sec. 26, Rule N, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
4. The rules do not prohibit joinder of causes of action.
Separate claims arising from distinct causes of action may be
joined in a single statement of claim provided the total amount
claimed, exclusive of interest and ~osts, does not exceed Pl
million. (Sec. 6, Rule N, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
5. Upon the filing of the claim, the plaintiff shall pay
the docket and other legal fees prescribed under Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court. Exemption from the payment of filing fees
shall be granted only by the Supreme Court.
If a case is dismissed without prejudice under Sec. 12(£)
of this Rule, and is re-filed within one year from notice of

754 CNIL PROCEDURE
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dismissal, the plaintiff shall pay a fixed amount of P2,000 as
filing fee, inclusive of the Pl,000 fee for service of summons
and processes (Sec. 5, Rule rv, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC).
Venue
T?-e Statement of Claim shall be filed in the place
followmg the rules on venue in Rule 4, of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 5, Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC). This is because the
Rules of Civil Procedure apply suppletorily to small claims
cases but only insofar as they are not inconsistent with A.M.
No. 08-8-7-SC (Sec. 1, Rule II, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC). However
if the plaintiff is engaged in the business of lending, bankin~
and _similar activities, and has branch within the municipality
or city where the defendant resides or is holding business,
the Sta~e~en_t of Claim/s shall be filed in the court of the city
or ~umc1pahty where the defendant resides or is holding
?usmess. If there are two or more defendants, it shall be filed
m the court of the city or municipality where any of them
resides or is holding business, at the option of the plaintiff.
(Sec. 5, Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC as amended).
Action of the court; dismissal
1. Upon receiving the Statement of Claim, the court
shall determine first if the claim falls under the Rules
on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts more
particularly on small claims. If the court finds that the case
falls under a summary or regular procedure, or if the case is
filed under summary or regular procedure but falls under this
Rule, the case shall not be dismissed. Instead, the case shall
be re-docketed under the appropriate procedure, and returned
to th~ cour_t where it ~as assigned, subject to payment of any
deficiency m the applicable regular rate of filing fees. (Sec. 9,
Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC).
This rule presupposes that the case filed is within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. If the case filed is beyond its jurisdiction
because it is the RTC which should take cognizance over the
same, the case has to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
CHAPTER XI 755
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
After examining whether or not the case falls under a
small claims, the court shall examine the allegations in the
Statement of Claims and the attached evidence. If it finds a
ground for dismissal in the allegations and the evidence, it
shall do so outright on any of the following grounds:
(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(b) There is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause;
(c) The action is barred by prior judgment;
(d) The claim is barred by the statute oflimitations;
(e) The court has no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant;
(f) Venue is improperly laid;
(g) Plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(h) The statement of Claim/s states no cause of
action;
(i) That a condition precedent for filing the claim
has not been complied with; and
G) Plaintiff failed to submit the required affidavits,
as provided in Section 7 of the Rules on Expedited
Procedures in the First Level Courts.
No motion to dismiss is required prior to dismissal. The
court, however, is required to state if the dismissal is with or
without prejudice. This prerogative of the court to dismiss the
case, by itself, may be exercised during the hearing even if
the ground is not pleaded in the defendant's Response (Sec. 9,
Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC). .
Summons and Notice of Hearing
1. If the court finds no ground for dismissal, the court
shall now issue the summons (Form 2-SCC) within 24 hours
from receipt of the Statement of Claim/s. The summons shall
direct the defendant to submit a verified Response (Form
 756 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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3-SCC). In ordinary procedure, the Response is equivalent
to the answer to the complaint. The summons shall be
accompanied by the Statement of Claim/sand all the documents
submitted by the plaintiff. It shall also be accompanied by a
blank Response Form (Form 3-SCC), to be accomplished by
the defendant. (Sec. 10, Rule Iv, A.M No. 08-8- 7-SC).
The court shall issue a Notice of Hearing (Form 4-SCC)
to both parties, directing them to appear before it on a specific
date and time for hearing, with a warning that no unjustified
postponement shall be allowed. A blank Special Power of
Attorney (Form 7-SCC) shall be attached to the Notice of
Hearing.
The Notice of Hearing shall accompany the Summons and
shall contain: (a) the date of the hearing, which shall not be
more than 60 calendar days if one of the defendants resides or
holds business outside the judicial region; and (b) the express
prohibition against the filing of a motion to dismiss or other
prohibited motions (Sec. 10, Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC).
Electronic Filing and Service
The service of court issuances and filings by the plaintiff/s
and defendant/s may be made through email, facsimile, and
other electronic means. Notices may also be served through
mobile phone calls, short messaging services (SMS), or instant
messaging (IM) software applications. The consent to, and
chosen mode of, electronic service and notice shall be indicated
in the Statement of Claim/s or Response, as the case may be.
Response
1. Upon receiving the summons, may the defendant
file a motion to dismiss? The rule expressly prohibits the filing
of a motion to dismiss or any motion under Sec. 2, Rule II of
the Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts.
The Notice of Hearing, in fact, contains an express prohibition
against a motion to dismiss (Sec. 10, Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8-
7-SC; See also Sec. 2[a], Rule IL A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC). Even a
L
CHAPTER XI 757
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
motion for bill of particulars is prohibited (Sec. 2[c], Rule II,
A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC).
2. The defendant shall file with the court and serve
on the plaintiff a duly accomplished verified Response (Form
3-SCC) within 10 calendar days from receipt of summons. This
period is non-extendible. The Response shall be accompanied
by certified photocopies of documents, as well as affidavits of
witnesses and other evidence in support thereof. No evidence
shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached
to or submitted together with the Response, unless good
cause is shown for the admission of additional evidence (Sec.
13, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC). The Response may be accompanied
by a counterclaim, compulsory or permissive, as long as such
claim is within the coverage of the small claims cases. If the
counterclaim does not arise out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim (permissive),
the prescribed docket and other legal fees should first be
paid (Sec. 15, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC). Any amount pleaded in a
counterclaim in excess of Pl million, excluding interests and
costs, shall be deemed waived.
3. If the Response is not filed and served within the
required period, the plaintiff cannot file a motion to declare the
defendant in default. Such motion is prohibited under Sec. 2[i],
Rule II of the Rules. Hence, the defendant is not to be declared
in default. Instead, the court shall render judgment on the
day set for hearing if the defendant also fails to appear on the
day of the hearing. If the defendant does not file and serve his
Response, but he appears on the date set for hearing, the court
shall ascertain his defenses and proceed to hear the case on
the same day as if a Response has been filed and, thereafter,
render judgment within 24 hours from the termination of the
hearing. If the defendant relies on documentary evidence to
support his defense, the court shall order him/her to submit
original copies of such documents within three calendar days
from the termination of the hearing and upon receipt thereof
or expiration of the period to file, the court shall render
judgment within 24 hours. (Sec. 14, Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-
SC).
 758 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Hearing/Postponement
1. The parties are required to personally appear on
the designated date for hearing. Hence, as a rule, appearance
through a representative is not allowed. Appearance through
a representative must only be for a valid cause.
Not anyone can be a representative. A lawyer cannot
be designated by an individual-party as a representative.
Juridical entities are not also to be represented by a lawyer in
any capacity (Sec. 17, Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC). The basic
rule is that no attorney shall appear in behalf of or represent a
party at the hearing. The only exception is if the said attorney
is the plaintiff or defendant (Sec. 18, Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8-
7-SC).
The rules require a specific form for the appearance of a
representative. He must be authorized under a Special Power
of Attorney (Form 7-SCC), board resolution or secretary's
certificate, as the case may be, authorizing him to enter into
an amicable settlement, stipulations and admissions of fact
and of documentary exhibits (Sec. 17, Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8-
7-SC).
2. The plaintiff has an obligation to appear on the
date set for hearing. His failure to appear shall be a cause
for the dismissal of the Statement of Claim/s. The dismissal
shall be without prejudice. If the defendant appears in the
absence of the plaintiff, he shall be entitled to judgment on his
permissive counterclaim, not on his compulsory counterclaim
(Sec. 19, Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
The failure of the defendant to appear on the date set
for hearing shall have the same effect as the failure to file a
Response under Sec. 14 of the Rules. This effect shall not apply
where one of two or more defendants who are sued under a
common cause of action and have pleaded a common defense
appears at the hearing (Sec. 19, Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
Failure of both parties to appear shall cause the dismissal of
both the Statement of Claim/s and the counterclaim (Sec. 19,
Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC).
L
CHAPTER XI 759
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
3. At the beginning of the court session, the judge shall
read aloud a short statement explaining the nature, purpose
and the rule of procedure for small claims cases (Sec. 21, Rule
Iv, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
During the hearing, the judge shall first exert efforts
to bring the parties to an amicable settlement of their
dispute. Settlement discussions must be conducted in strict
confidentiality.
Any settlement or resolution of the dispute shall be
reduced into writing, signed by the parties, and immediately
submitted to the court for approval at the hearing (Form
9-SCC). The court shall render judgment based on the
compromise agreement within 24 hours, and furnish copies
thereof to the parties (Form 10-SCC).
If at any time before or at the hearing, a compromise
agreement is submitted, signed by both parties, but only one
or neither party appears to confirm it, the court shall issue
an order directing the non-appearing party/ies to confirm
the compromise agreement within three calendar days from
notice thereof; otherwise, it shall be deemed confirmed.
If efforts at settlement fail, the court shall immediately
proceed to hear the case in an informal and expeditious
manner and, thereafter, render judgment within 24 hours
from termination of the hearing. (Sec. 22, Rule IV, A.M. No.
08-8- 7-SC).
4. The only ground for postponement allowed is the
physical inability of a party to appear. A party may avail of
only one postponement (Sec. 20, Rule IV, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC).
Resort to alternative videoconferencing platform
Should the hearing be done through videoconferencing,
the court shall require the parties to participate through the use
of the Court-prescribed videoconferencing platform. However,
if any of the participants communicates his or her difficulty
in accessing or using the said videoconferencing platform,
 760 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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the court may allow the use of alternative videoconferencing
platforms or instant messaging (IM) applications with video
call features, provided that the following conditions are met:
(a) The court shall use either its official e-mail
address or cell phone number to access the alternative
videoconferencing platform or instant messaging (IM)
application;
(b) The parties shall use the e-mail address or
cell phone number they indicated in their Statement
of Claim/s or Response, as the case may be, to access
the alternative videoconferencing platform or instant
messaging (IM) application; and
(c) The court shall maintain record and transcrip-
tion of the proceedings.
Decision/Execution
1. After the hearing, the court shall render its
decision (Form 11-SCC) within 24 hours from termination
of the hearing. The decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable. Hence, the decision shall immediately be
entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases
and a copy thereof shall be served on the parties (Sec. 24, Rule
Iv, A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC). Despite the relative informality of
the procedure, judgments are based upon a strict application
of the substantive law and an objective judicial analysis of the
facts. The judge is duty-bound to give the legal basis for the
findings (Explanatory note to A.M. No. 08-8- 7-SC).
2. When the decision is rendered and proof of receipt
thereof is on record, execution shall issue (Forms 13-SCC,
13-A-SCC, or 13-B-SCC) upon ex parte motion (Form 12-SCC).
However, a decision based on compromise shall not be covered
by the requirement of proof of receipt (Sec. 25, Rule Iv, A.M
No. 08-8- 7-SC).
Appeal
The decision of the court shall be final, executory and
unappealable (Sec. 24, Rule Iv, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC). The
L_
CHAPTER XI 761
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
prohibition against appeals assures immediate justice. Sec.
36 of B.P. 129 allows the Supreme Court to adopt special
procedures to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases without regard to technical rules. This
authority necessarily includes disallowance of appeals in
special cases.
Reminders
1. There are certain motions and pleadings normally
allowed in ordinary civil actions which are prohibited in small
claims cases. The following are not allowed under Sec. 16 of
A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC:
(a) In civil cases, a motion to dismiss the complaint
or the statement of claim and in criminal cases, a motion
to quash the complaint or information, except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
or failure to comply with the requirement of barangay
conciliation, pursuant to Chapter VII, Title I, Book III of
Republic Act No. 7160;
(b) Motion to hear and/or resolve affirmative
defenses;
(c) Motion for bill of particulars;
(d) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a
judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(e) Petition for relief from judgment;
(f) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other paper;
(g) Memoranda;
(h) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(i) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
G) Dilatory motions for postponement. Any motion
for postponement shall be presumed dilatory unless
grounded on acts of God force majeure, or physical
762 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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inability of a counsel or witness to personally appear in
court, as supported by the requisite affidavit and medical
proof;
(k) Rejoinder;
(1) Third-party complaints;
(m) Motion for Complaint in Intervention;
(n) Motion to admit late judicial affidavit/s, position
papers, or other evidence, except on the ground of force
majeure or acts of God;
(o) Motion for judicial determination of probable
cause in criminal cases.
2. No attorney shall appear in behalf of or represent
a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff
or defendant. If the court determines that a party needs
assistance, the court may, allow another individual, who is
not an attorney, to assist such party with the latter's consent
(Sec. 18, Rule IV, A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC). Bar 2013
-oOo-
B. Basic Features of the Barangay
Conciliation Proceedings
Basic Principles
1. The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under
Secs. 399-422 of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, effective on January 1, 1992, and
which repealed P.D. 1508, introduced substantial changes not
only in t~e authority granted to the Lupong Tagapamayapa,
but also m the procedure to be observed in the settlement of
disputes within the authority of the lupon.
2. The primordial aim of the Katarungang Pamba-
rangay Law is to reduce the number of court litigations and
prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has
been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the
CHAPTER XI 763
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
courts (Zamora v. Heirs of Izquierdo, 443 SCRA 24, 31). Bar
1999
3. The barangay justice system was established
primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases in
the judicial courts. Originally embodied in P.D. 1508, it is now
incorporated in the Local Government Code of 1991 (Aquino v.
Aure, 546 SCRA 71, 79).
Proceedings before the barangay are notjudicial proceedings
1. The proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa,
or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay, are not
judicial proceedings. Legally, there is no barangay court. It is
not mentioned in B.P. 129, as amended, and other pertinent
laws on jurisdiction, as one of the courts created by law.
2. The lupon and the pangkat do not have inherent
adjudicatory powers. They resolve disputes or attempt to do
so through amicable settlement, conciliation, and arbitration
(See Secs. 410, 412, and 413, Local Government Code of 1991).
Any adjudicatory power exercised by any of these bodies
must be agreed upon by the parties in writing. Such agreement
may involve their willingness to abide by any arbitral award
given by the lupon or the pangkat (See Secs. 411 and 413,
Local Government Code of 1991).
Importance of barangay conciliation proceedings (Bar 2012)
1. "Where the case is covered by the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, the compulsory process of arbitration
required therein is a pre-condition for filing a complaint in
court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of
the excepted cases, or (b) it did not allege prior availment of
said conciliation process, or (c) did not have a certification
that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the
parties, the case should be dismissed x x x While the foregoing
doctrine is handed down in civil cases, it is submitted that the
same should apply to criminal cases xx x" (Agbayani v. Court
of Appeals, 674 SCRA 358,362, June 25, 2012).
 764 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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The pertinent provision of the law reads:
"No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding
involving any matter within the authority of the lupon
shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government officefor adjudication, unless there has been
a confrontation between the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon
or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been
repudiated" (Sec. 412, Local Government Code of 1991; See
also Zamora v. Heirs of Izquierdo, 443 SCRA 24, 31-32).
2. Under Sec. lG) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a
motion to dismiss a civil complaint may be filed if a condition
precedent for the filing of the claim has not been complied with.
Failure to undergo the barangay conciliation proceedings is
non-compliance with a condition precedent.
3. Administrative Circular No. 14-93 of the Supreme
Court (July 15, 1993) provides:
"A case filed in court without compliance with prior
Barangay conciliation, which is a pre-condition for formal
adjudication (Sec. 412 [a] of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law), may be dismissed upon motion of
defendant/s, not for lack of jurisdiction of the court but for
insufficiency of the cause of action or prematurity (Royales
v. IAC, 127 SCRA 470; Gonzales v. CA, 151 SCRA 289),
or the court may suspend proceedings upon petition of
any party x x x and refer the case motu proprio to the
appropriate Barangay authority applying by analogy
Sec. 408 [g], 2nd par., of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law which reads as follows:
"The court in which non-criminal cases not falling
within the authority of the Lupon under this Code are
filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the
case to the Lupon concerned for amicable settlement"
(Italics ours).
The above circular was issued prior to the amendments of
the Rules of Court and, so, the ground for dismissal used was
CHAPTER XI 765
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
"insufficiency of the cause of action." The proper ground to be
invoked since July 1, 1997, the date when the amendment to
the Rules took effect, should be: "That a condition precedent
for filing the claim has not been complied with" (Sec. l[j], Rule
16, Rules of Court).
No motu proprio dismissal
The court may not motu proprio dismiss a case on the
ground of failure to comply with the requirement of a barangay
conciliation, the ground not being among those mentioned for
the dismissal of a complaint on the initiative of the court. Sec.
1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides only the following
grounds for a motu proprio dismissal:
(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter;
(b) There is another cause of action pending
between the same parties for the same cause;
(c) The action is barred by a prior judgment; and
(d) The action is barred by the statute oflimitations
(Aquino u. Aure, 546 SCRA 71, 85).
Rule in relation to cases covered by summary procedure
1. Under the Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First
Level Courts, all cases requiring prior referral to barangay
conciliation must contain a statement of compliance pursuant
to Katarungang Pambarangay. Where there is no showing
of compliance with such requirement, the complaint shall be
dismissed without prejudice, on the court's own initiative or
upon motion by the defendant, and ~ay be re-filed only after
the requirement has been complied with (Sec. 2, Rule III, A.M.
No. 08-8-7-SC; For further readings, see Uy u. Javellana, 680
SCRA 13, September 5, 2012).
2. Under Sec. 2, Rule III of the same Rule, where the
case is dismissed for non-compliance with the conciliation
proceedings, the dismissed case may be revived only after
such requirement shall have been complied with.
766 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Non-compliance with conciliation proceedings is not
jurisdictional
1. It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for
barangay conciliation, when so required under the law, is not
jurisdictional in nature and may, therefore, be deemed waived
if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. Hence, a party
who does not raise the defect seasonably can no longer raise
the defense of non-compliance with the barangay conciliation
proceedings to seek the dismissal of the complaint (Spouses
Santos v. Spouses Lumbao, 519 SCRA 408, 422-423).
Note, however, that, under the Rules of Court, "[D]efenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived" (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Rules of
Court). Also, if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the
grounds for dismissal provided for in Rule 16 may be pleaded
as affirmative defenses in the answer (Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules
of Court).
2. The conciliation procedure is not a jurisdictional
requirement in the sense that failure to have prior recourse
to it does not deprive a court of its jurisdiction, either over
the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Non-
compliance with a condition precedent under said law does
not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising
its power of adjudication over a case where defendants fail
to object to such exercise of jurisdiction. But such objection
should be seasonably made before the court first taking
cognizance of the complaint (Junson v. Martinez, 405 SCRA
390,395).
3. It is true that the precise technical effect of failure
to comply with the requirement of Sec. 412 of the Local
Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously
contained in Sec. 5 of P.D. 1508) is much the same effect
produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-
maturity; and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for
judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable
to a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the conciliation process
CHAPTER XI 767
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that noncompliance
therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person
of the defendant (Librada M. Aquino v. Ernest Aure, G.R. No.
153567, February 18, 2008).
Subject matters for settlement (Bar 2009)
1. Sec. 408 of the Local Government Code of 1991
establishes the general rule that "The Lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes x x x" (For further readings, see
Torbela v. Rosarion, 661 SCRA 633, December 7, 2011).
2. Administrative Circular No. 14-93 of the Supreme
Court dated July 15, 1993, the provisions of which are
primarily based on Sec. 408 of the Local Government Code of
1991. The circular, in substance, provides:
All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant
to the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law and prior
recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint
in court or any government offices except in the following
disputes:
[1] Where one party is the government, or any sub-
division or inst_;rumentality thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee
and the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
[3] Where the dispute involves real properties
located in different cities or m:unicipalities, unless the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
[4] Any complaint by or against corporations,
partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals
shall be parties to barangay conciliation proceedings
either as complainants or respondents (Sec. 1, Rule VI,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);
768 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
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[5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside
in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;
[6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a
maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year or a fine of over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
[7] Offenses where there is no private offended
party;
[8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary
to prevent injustice from being committed or further
continued, specifically the following:
[a] Criminal cases where the accused is under
police custody or detention (See Sec. 412[b][l],
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law);
[b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person
illegally deprived of his rightful custody over another
or a person illegally deprived of or on acting in his
behalf;
[c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies
such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
delivery of personal property and support during the
pendency of the action; and
[d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute
of Limitations.
[9] Any class of disputes which the President
may determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice;
[10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehen-
sive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) (Secs. 46 and 47, R.A.
6657);
[11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from
employer-employee relations (Montoya v. Escayo, et al.,
CHAPTER XI 769
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
171 SCRA 442). Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, grants
original and exclusive jurisdiction over conciliation and
mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain
offices of the Department of Labor and Employment;
[12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise
which may be filed directly in court (See Sanchez v.
Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459; Underscoring supplied; See also
Sec. 408ofthe Local Government Code of 1991)."
3. Sec. 412[b] of the Local Government Code of 1991
also enumerates the instances where the parties may go
directly to court without the need for undergoing the barangay
conciliation proceedings, namely:
[a] Where the accused is under detention;
[b] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
[c] Where actions are coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite;
and
[d] Where the action may otherwise be barred by
the statute of limitations.
Note: The above instances have also been reiterated
in Administrative Circular No. 14-93 of the Supreme Court,
dated July 15, 1993.
4. In an early case, the petitioner argued that he is a
resident of the United States and since he, not his attorney-
in-fact, is the real party-in-interest,. the lupon would have
no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving the real
property. In dismissing the complaint for non-compliance
with the barangay conciliation requirement, the trial court
ruled that since the attorney-in-fact of the petitioner and the
respondent reside in the same place, the controversy is subject
to barangay conciliation, the attorney-in-fact being deemed to
be the real party in interest.
 770 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
The Court, however, did not agree with the trial court. It
ruled that the requirement of actual residence pertains to the
real party in interest and does not apply to the attorney-in-fact
as plaintiff. In sustaining the petitioner, the Court instructed:
"In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real
party in interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay
where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local
lupon has no jurisdiction over the dispute, hence, prior
referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its
filing in court" (Pascual v. Pascual, 475 SCRA 271, 275;
See also Abagatnan v. Spouses Clarito, G.R. No. 211966,
August 7, 2017).
5. The fact that the petitioner and private respondent
reside in the same municipality does not justify compulsory
conciliation where the other co-defendants reside in barangays
of different cities and municipalities (Candido v. Macapagal,
221 SCRA 328, 332). Thus, where one party resides in Roxas
City, the other in Laguna and another in Pasig City, the lupon
has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the
case for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its filing
in court (Abagatnan v. Spouses Clarita, G.R. No. 211966,
August 7, 2017). Bar 2018
6. In sum, parties who do not actually reside in the
same city or municipality or adjoining barangays are not
required to submit their dispute to the lupon as a precondition
to the filing of a complaint in court (Abagatnan v. Spouses
Clarita, G.R. No. 211966, August 7, 2017). Bar 2018
7. Under Sec. 4(a) of P.D. 1508, referral of a dispute
to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties
thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single
human being as contrasted with a social group or institution."
Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural
persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person
such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or
intestate, estate, etc.
The plaintiff in this case is a mere nominal party who
is suing on behalf of the estate. While it is true that Sec. 3,
CHAPTER XI 771
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an
estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose
benefit the action is presented or defended, it is indisputable
that the real party in interest is the intestate estate under
administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person
plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in
court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon
for arbitration (Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy, G.R. No. L-63277,
November 29, 1983).
Venue
Sec. 409 of R.A. 7160 provides for the following rules on
venue:
"(a) Disputes between persons actually residing
in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different
barangays within the same city or municipality shall be
brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of
the respondents actually resides, at the election of the
complainant. Bar 2018
(c) All disputes involving real property or any
interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where
the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the
contending parties are employed or at the institution
where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought
in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation
proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise,
the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question
which may confront the punong barangay in resolving
objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted
to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated
representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding."
772 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Initiation of proceedings
1. Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee, any indi-
vidual, who has a cause of action against another individual,
involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon may
complain, orally or in writing, to the chairman of the lupon
(Sec. 410/a], R.A. 7160). The chairman of the lupon is the Pu-
nong Barangay (Sec. 399, R.A. 7160). The fact that the com-
plaint was addressed to the barangay captain is of no moment
because he is the chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa
(Magno v. Velasco-Jacoba, 475 SCRA 584).
2. Upon receipt of the complaint, the chairman shall
summon the respondents within the next working day to
appear. If the chairman fails in his mediation efforts within
15 days from the first meeting, he shall set a date to constitute
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo (Sec. 41 0[b], R.A. 7160).
Personal appearance of parties
The parties must appear in person in all katarungang
pambarangay proceedings and without the assistance of
counsel or representatives, except for minors and incompetents
who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers
(Sec. 415, R.A. 7160; Magno v. Velasco-Jacoba, 475 SCRA 584,
589). Bar 1999
Parties to the proceedings
Only individuals shall be parties to the proceedings
either as complainants and respondents. Hence, no complaint
by or against corporations, partnerships or other juridical
entities shall be filed, received or acted upon (Sec. 1, Rule VI,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules; Administrative Circular
14-93, July 15, 1993).
Form of settlement
All amicable settlements shall be in writing, in a language
or dialect known to the parties, signed by them, and attested
CHAPTER XI 773
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
to by the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the
case may be. When the parties to the dispute do not use the
same language or dialect, the settlement shall be written in
the language or dialect known to them (Sec. 411, R.A. 7160).
Effect of amicable settlement and award; repudiation
1. The amicable settlement and arbitration award
shall have the effect of a final judgment of a court upon the
expiration of 10 days from the date thereof, unless repudiation
of the settlement has been made or a petition to nullify the
award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court
(Sec. 416, R.A. 7160).
Jurisprudence confirms that, "x xx [An] amicable settle-
ment reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the
force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated
or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the proper city
or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date" (Chavez
v. Court of Appeals, 453 SCRA 843, 849; See also Vidal v.
Escueta, 417 SCRA 617, 627).
2. The above provision shall not apply to court cases
settled by the lupon under the last paragraph of Sec. 408 of
this Code; in which case, the compromise settlement agreed
upon by the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat
chairman shall be submitted to the court and, upon approval
thereof, have the force and effect of a judgment of said court
(Sec. 416, Local Government Code of 1991).
The relevant provision of the last paragraph of Sec. 408
provides:
"The court in which non-criminal cases not falling
within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed
may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case
to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement."
3. The Court appears not to favor referral of cases
falling under summary procedure to the lupon for amicable
settlement because Sec. 10 of the Rules on Expedited
774 CNIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Procedures in the First Level Courts mandates a preliminary
conference which is precisely for the purpose of giving room
for a possible amicable settlement. In a case involving an
unlawful detainer case, the Court explained:
"x x x [W]hile the last paragraph of the aforecited
provision apparently gives the court the discretion to refer
the case to the lupon for amicable settlement although
it may not fall within the authority of the lupon, the
referral of said subject civil case to the lupon is saliently
an unsound exercise of discretion, considering that the
matter falls under the Rule[s] on Summary Procedure.
The reason is that the Rule[s] on Summary Procedure was
promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious
and inexpensive determination of cases." The fact that
unlawful detainer cases fall under summary procedure,
speedy resolution thereof is thus deemed a matter of
public policy. To do otherwise would ultimately defeat
the very essence of the creation of the Rules on Summary
Procedure" (Diaz v. Gestopa, Jr., 652 SCRA 434, 439,
June 22, 2011).
Repudiation of the settlement
1. Any party to the dispute may, within 10 days from
the date of the settlement, repudiate the same by filing with
the lupon chairman a statement to that effect, sworn to
before him, where the consent is vitiated by fraud, violence
or intimidation. Such repudiation shall be a sufficient basis
for the issuance of the certification for filing a complaint (Sec.
418, R.A. 7160; For further readings, see Vidal v. Escueta, 417
SCRA 617, 627). Failure to repudiate the settlement within
the 10-day period shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
challenge the settlement on said grounds (Sec. 14, Rule VI,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules).
2. "Generally, the rule is that where no repudiation
was made during the 10-day period, the amicable settlement
attains the status of finality and it becomes the ministerial
duty of the court to implement and enforce it. However, such
rule is not inflexible for it admits of certain exceptions x x x"
(Quiros v. Arjona, 425 SCRA 57, 63).
CHAPTER XI 775
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
In Quiros, the parties entered into two agreements for
the conveyance of a parcel of land, but on ocular inspection,
the Municipal Trial Court found that the land inspected was
different from the land intended to be conveyed because of the
disparity in the description of the property in the agreements.
While the Court conceded the validity of the written
agreements, subject, however, to its reformation, the Court
concluded that no writ of execution could be issued for failure
to determine the land intended to be delivered.
Execution of award or settlement (Bar 2012)
1. The amicable settlement or arbitration award may
be enforced by execution by the lupon within six months from
the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the
settlement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city
or municipal court (Sec. 417, R.A. 7160; Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, supra; Miguel v. Montanez, 664 SCRA 345, 350-351,
January 25, 2012).
2. The timeline of six months, according to the Court,
is for the benefit, not only of the complainant, but also of the
respondent. The plain words of the law mandate that the
period of six months should be computed from• the date of
settlement. This period, however, declared the Court, cannot
be strictly applied in certain cases.
The Court explained:
"x xx [I]f applied to a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstance, the computation of the time line
from the date of the settlement may be arbitrary and
unjust and contrary to the intent of the law. To illustrate:
Under an amicable settlement made·by the parties before
the Lupon dated January 15, 2003, the respondents
were obliged to vacate the subject property on or before
September 15, 2003. If the time line of six months under
Section 417 were to be strictly applied and literally
followed, the complainant may enforce the settlement
only up to July 15, 2003. But under the settlement, the
respondent was not obliged to vacate the property on or
776 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
before July 15, 2003; hence, the settlement cannot as yet
be enforced. The settlement could be enforced only after
September 15, 2003, when the respondent was obliged
to vacate the property. By then, the six months under
Section 417 shall have already elapsed. The complainant
can no longer enforce the settlement through the Lupon,
but had to enforce the same through an action in the
MTC, in derogation of the objective of Section 417 of the
LGC. The law should be construed and applied in such a
way as to reflect the will of the legislature x x x" (Vidal v.
Escueta, 417 SCRA 617, 630-631).
3. The enforcement by execution of the amicable
settlement provided for under Sec. 41 7 of the Local Government
Code, either under the first remedy (within six months from
settlement), or the second remedy (after six months from
settlement), is only applicable if the contracting parties have
not repudiated such settlement within 10 days from the date
thereof in accordance with Sec. 416 of the Local Government
Code. If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one party,
either expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options,
namely, to enforce the compromise in accordance with the
Local Government Code or the Rules of Court as the case may
be, or to consider it rescinded and insist upon his original
demand. This in accord with Art. 2041 of the Civil Code, viz.:
"If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by
the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon the
original demand " (Miguel v. Montanez, 664 SCRA 345,
352-353, January 25, 2012).
The Court further declared, in Miguel v. Montanez,
that the language of Art. 2041 of the Civil Code denotes
that no action for rescission is required, and that the party
aggrieved by the breach of the compromise agreement, may,
if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his
original demand, as if there had never been any compromise
agreement (Miguel v. Montanez, supra at 352).
-o0o-
CASE TITLE INDEX
7
7107 Islands Publishing, Inc. v. The House
Printers Corporation, G.R. No. 193420,
October 14, 2015, ........................................................... 332, 429
A
Abagatnan v. Spouses Clarita, G.R. No. 211966,
August 7, 2017 ................................................................ 504, 770
ABC Davao Auto Supply, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
284 SCRA 218, 222 ................................................................... 29
ABC Davao Auto Supply, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 113296, January 16, 1998 ......................................... 61
Abella v. People, G.R. No. 198400, October 2, 2013 ...................... 100
Abdulrahman v. The Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 175977, August 19, 2013 ......................................... 693
Ablaza v. People, G.R. No. 217722, September 26, 2018 .............. 645
Ablud Metal Recycling Corporation v. Ang,
G.R. No. 182157, August 17, 2015 ......................................... 244
Aboitiz International Forwarders, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 488 SCRA 492, 507-509 ..................................... .430
Abrenica v. The Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol
and Tibayan, 502 SCRA 614, 622 ........................................... 16
Abrigo v. Flores, G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013 ......................... 572
Acabal v. Acabal, 454 SCRA 555, 569 ............................................ 344
Acosta v. COMELEC, 293 SCRA 578,580 ............................ 552, 553
Acu:fia v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ....................................... 661
Adamos v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 25 SQRA 529, 534 ............... 219
Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 623,628 ......... 225
Adlawan v. People, G.R. No. 197645,
April 18, 2018 ......................................................... 639, 640, 645
Afdal v. Carlos, 636 SCRA 389, 395-396 ....................... 230, 672, 679
AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v.
Regional Trial Court, Marikina City,
Branch 193,642 SCRA 720, 727, February 14, 2011 ........... 673
777
778 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System v.
Republic, 694 SCRA 118, 123-124, March 20, 2013 ............ 484
Africa v. Insurance Savings and Investment
Agency, Inc. [ISIA], G.R. No. 206540, April 20, 2015 .......... 243
Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, 674 SCRA 358, 362,
June 25, 2012 .........................................................................
Agilent Technologies Singapore [PTE] Ltd. v.
Integrated Silicon Technology Philippines
Corporation, G.R. No. 154618, April 2004 ........................... 434
Ago v. Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 530, 534 Ago v.
Court of Appeals .................................................................... 558
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association v.
Nicolas, 567 SCRA 540, 552 ................................................. 191
Agro Conglomerates, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
348 SCRA 450, 460 ................................................................
Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 ....................................................... 262
Aguila v. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 246, 253-254 ........... 244,249
Aguila v. Court of First Instance of Batangas,
160 SCRA 579 ..........................................................................
Aguilar v. Lightbringers Credit Cooperative,
G.R. No. 209605, January 12, 2015 ...................................... 349
Aguinaldo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302,
November 29, 2016 .................................. 13, 246, 381, 700, 701
Agulto v. Tecson, 476 SCRA 395, 402 ........................................... 494
Agustin v. Cruz-Herrera, G.R. No. 174564,
February-2, 2014 ............................................................ 300-301
Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. v. Court
of Tax Appeals, En Banc, G.R. No. 193625,
August 30, 2017 .................................................................
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 ....................................... 212
Air Manila v. Court of Industrial Relations,
83 SCRA 579, 589 ....................................................................
Air Philippines Corporation v. Pennswell, Inc.,
540 SCRA 215 ........................................................................
Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 470 SCRA 697,
705-708 ........................................................... 225, 673, 681, 685
Alba v. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA 495,
505-506 ....................................................................... 87, 88, 416
Alba v. Malapajo, G.R. No. 198752,
January 13, 2016 .................................. 327, 362,364,367, 368
Albania v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017 .............................................. 666
CASE TITLE INDEX 779
Alberto v. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 756 .......... 191
Albor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 196598 ·······················
J anuary 17, 2018 ...........................................................
' 5 70 689
Alburo v. People, G.R. No. 196289, August 15, 2016 .................. : 639
Alcantara v. Belen, G.R. No. 200204, April 25, 2017 ................... 215
763 Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, 502 SCRA 518 .............................................. 66 8
Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, 533 Phil. 796 ................................................ 668
Alcazaren v. Univet Agricultural Products, Inc.,
475 SCRA 636, 650 ................................................................ 106
Aldeguer v. Gemelo, 68 Phil. 421 .......................................... 716 718
Alejo v. Cortez, G.R. No. 206114, June 19, 2017 ......................... : 621
Alicando v. People, G.R. No. 181119, July 31, 2013 ....................... 91
Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association,
Inc. v. The Quezon City Government,
260 G.R. No. 230651, September 18, 2018 .................................. 236
Allied Banking Corporation v. Madriaga,
G.R. No. 196670, October 12, 2016 ....................................... 493
Almagro v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 204803,
18 September 12, 2018 ....................................... 474,475,656, 689
Almario-Templonuevo v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 198583, June 28, 2017 .................... 662
Almendras v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 540, 544 ................... 258
Almendras v. South Davao Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 198209, March 22, 2017 ................... 627
Almuete v. People, 693 SCRA 167, 185, March 12, 2013 ............. 572
Alpine Lending Investors v. Corpuz, 508 SCRA 45, 48-49 .......... 390
Altavas v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 940, 943 ............................... 3
Altres v. Empleo, 573 SCRA 583 ................................................... 311
64, 69 Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 208426,
September 30, 2017 ....................................... 249, 348, 461, 4 71
Alvero v. De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 434 ............................................. 3
17 Amargo v. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 64, 68 .............................. 556
Ambassador Hotel, Inc. v. Social Security System,
529 G.R. No. 194137, June 21, 2017 .............................................. 76
Ambray v. Tsourous, G.R. No. 209264, July 5, 2016 .................... 647
Ampeloquio v. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 465 .......................... 357
Anchor Savings Bank v. Furigay, 693 SCRA 384, 395,
March 13, 2013 ...................................................................... 186
Anderson v. Ho, 688 SCRA 8, 17, January 7, 2013 ...................... 301
Ang v. Pacunio, G.R. No. 208928, July 8, 2015 ............................ 241
Ansaldo v. Fidelity & Surety Company, 88 Phil. 547,548, ........ 712
Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
632 SCRA 727, 760-763 ................................................... 12, 571
__l
780 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
647 SCRA 207 ................................................................ 236, 572
AQA Global Construction, Inc. v. Planters Development
Bank, G.R. No. 211742, August 12, 2015 .............................. 746
Aquino v. Aure, 546 SCRA 71, 79, 85 .................................... 763, 765
Aquino v. Tangkengko, G.R. No. 197356,
August 24, 2016 ............................................................. 679,680
Aquintey v. Tibong, 511 SCRA 414, 432 ............................... 339, 341
Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154096,
August 22, 2008 ..................................................................... 166
Arap v. Mustafa, 379 SCRA 1, 4-5 ................................................ 559
Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287,
July 1, 2014 .............................................................. 20, 698, 701
Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 617, 625-626 ................... 368
Argovan v. San Miguel Corporation,
702 SCRA 191, 197, July 24, 2013 ........................................ 668
Aron v. Realon, 450 SCRA 372, 388 .............................................. 250
Arranza v. B.F. Homes, Inc., 333 SCRA 799,812, ............. 64, 68, 69
Aruego, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 711, 719-720 .............. 76
Ascano-Cupino v. Pacific Rehouse Corporation,
G.R. No. 205113, August 26, 2015 ........................................ 399
Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank
[now Banco De Oro-EPCI, Inc.],
G.R. No. 190432, April 25, 2017 .................................... 190, 193
Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc.,
637 SCRA 691, 696 ................................................................ 295
Asian Terminals, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158458,
December 19, 2007 ................................................................ 616
Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc.,
692 SCRA 87, 96, February 27, 2013 ................................... 645
Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc. v. Commissioner
oflnternal Revenue, G.R. No. 201530, April 19, 2017 ........ 664
Asiatrust Development Bank v. First Aikka
Development, Inc. and Univac Development, Inc.,
650 SCRA 172, 184 .................................................................. 80
Asia vest Limited v. Court of Appeals,
296 SCRA 539, 552, 554 .......................... 88, 230, 235, 417, 457
Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v.
Department of Transportation and
Communications, G.R. No. 169914, March 24, 2008 ........... 385
Asmala v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 746, 752 .................................... 77
Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals,
300 SCRA 579, 614 ................................................................ 238
CASE TITLE INDEX 781
Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals,
324 SCRA 533, 546 ................................................................ 401
Association of Flood Victims v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 203775, August 5, 2014 ........................ 236
Atienza v. Board of Medicine, 642 SCRA 523,529,
February 9, 2011, ...................................................................... 6
Atlas Developer & Steel Industries, Inc. v. Sarmiento
Enterprises, Inc., 184 SCRA 153, 155, 69
Auction in Malinta, Inc. v. Luyaben, 515 SCRA 569,
575-576 ........................................................................... 177, 178
Austria v. Crystal Shipping, Inc., G.R. No. 206256,
February 24, 2016 ................................................................. 691
Avon Cosmetics, Inc. v. Luna, 511 SCRA 376, 388 ........................ 92
Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty, 346 SCRA 663 ............ 565
Ayala Land, Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 178110,
January 12, 2016 .................................................................... 613
Ayo v. Violago-Isnani, 308 SCRA 543, 551 ................................... 704
Azola Farms v. Court of Appeals, 442 SCRA 133, 141 ................ 394
B
BA Finance Corporation v. Co., 224 SCRA 163 (1993) ................ 374
Bacalso v. Aca-ac, G.R. No. 172919, January 13, 2016 .......... 99, 607
Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
296 SCRA 487, 495 ................................................................ 709
Baclaran Marketing Corporation v. Nieva and Sibulo,
Jr., G.R. No. 189881, April 19, 2017 ..................... 681,682,683
Bacolor v. VL Macabali Memorial Hospital, Inc.,
G.R. No. 204325, April 18, 2016 ........................................... 311
Balagtas v. Court of Appeals, 317 SCRA 69, 76-77 ...................... 249
Balao v. Ermita, G.R. No. 186050, June 21, 2016
and August 1, 2017 ................................................................. 449
Baldado v. Mejica, 693 SCRA 1, 12, March 11, 2013 ................... .4 71
Baleares v. Espanto, G.R. No. 229645, June 6, 2018 ............ 118, 608
Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. v. F~ith in
Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc.,
G.R. No. 191527, August 22, 2016 ............................. 64, 70, 189
Balayan Bay Rural Bank, Inc. v. National
Livelihood Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 194589, September 21, 2015 .................................. 250
Baltazar v. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74, 83 ................................... 248
Baluyo v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 197058, October 14, 2015 ............ 187
Banares v. Flordeliza, et al., 51 Phil. 786 .. ,.......................... 351, 352
782 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Banco de Brasil v. Court of Appeals,
333 SCRA 545, 557, 558 ...................... 94, 97, 447-448, 453, 454
Banco-Espanol Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921,
927-929, 930 ...................................................... 97, 234,417,456
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Legaspi,
G.R. No. 205966, March 2, 2016 ............................................ 132
Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited v. Lee,
479 SCRA 267, 273-274 ......................................................... 723
Bangkok Bank Public Company Limited v. Lee,
G.R. No. 159806, January 20, 2006 ............................... 724, 729
Bank of Commerce v. Spouses San Pablo, Jr.,
522 SCRA 713, 723-724 .......................................................... 125
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. ALS Management &
Development Corporation, 427 SCRA 564, 575 ...................... 68
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Co, G.R. No. 171172,
November 9, 2015 ..................................................................... 66
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,
569 SCRA 510, 523 ................................................................. 292
Bank of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 198799,
March 20, 2017 ....................................................................... 640
Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.,
403 SCRA 699, 703 ..................................................................... 6
Bantua v. Mercader, 350 SCRA 86, 96 ............................................ 76
Barangay Mayamot v. Antipolo City,
G.R. No. 187349, August 17, 2016 ............................... 60, 70, 80
Barangay Piapi v. Talip, 469 SCRA 409, 413 ............... 133, 149, 195
Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor,
334 SCRA 127, 132-133 .................................................. 150, 151
Barde v. Posiquit, 164 SCRA 304, 310 .......................................... .494
Barlin v. Ramirez, 7 Phil. 41 .......................................................... 239
Barrazona v. RTC of Baguio, 486 SCRA 555,
561-562 .............................................................. 71, 190, 283, 554
Barrete v. Amila, 230 SCRA 219, 222-223 .................................... 737
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014 ................ 156
Barroso v. Omelio, G.R. No. 194767, October 14, 2015 ................... 79
Basan v. Coca-Coca Bottlers Philippines,
G.R. Nos. 174365- 66, February 4, 2015 ............................... 305
Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 194247, June 19, 2013 ............................................. 628
Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Uy, 650
Basilio v. Dinio, 634 SCRA 516, 523 ............................................... 77
Basilonia v. Villaruz, G.R. Nos. 1911370-71,
August 10, 2015 ........... ,.......................................................... 712
CASE TITLE INDEX 783
Bastida v. Menzi & Co., Inc., 58 Phil. 188, 222 ............................ .400
Bausa v. Heirs of Juan Dino, 563 SCRA 533, 540-541 ................. 715
Bautista v. De Borja, 18 SCRA 474 .............................................. 177
Bautista v. Maya-Maya Cottages, Inc., 476 SCRA 416,419 ........ 390
Becknell v. Becknell, 110 Ind., 47 .................................................. 718
Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013 ............... 564
Bell v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530, 542 .................................. 18
Bell Carpets Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
185 SCRA 35 .......................................................................... 727
Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Santos, G.R. No. 185894,
August 30, 2017 .............................................................. 146, 295
Belongilot v. Cua, 636 SCRA 34, 41, 42 ......................................... 660
Beltran v. Balbuena, 53 Phil. 697, 701 .......................................... 365
Benedicto-Mufi.oz v. Cacho-Olivares, G.R. No. 179121,
November 9, 2015 ................................................................... 253
Benguet Corporation v. Cordillera Caraballo
Mission, Inc., 469 SCRA 381, 384 .......................................... 293
Ben Line Agencies Philippines, Inc. v. Madson,
G.R. No. 195887, January 10, 2018 ........................................ 16
Berbeso v. Cabral, G.R. No. 204617, July 10, 2017 ............... 639, 641
Bergonia v. Decano, 317 SCRA 660, 665 ....................................... 706
Bermejo v. Barrios, 31 SCRA 764, 776 ............................................. 3
Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473 ................................................ 274
Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank,
515 SCRA 106, 115-116, 118 ............................ 88, 227, 232, 417
Bilag v. Ay-Ay, G.R. No. 189950, April 24, 2017 ................ 60, 62, 64
Bintudan v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211937,
March 21, 2017 ............................................................... 654, 667
Birkenstock Orthopaedie GMBH and Co. KG v.
Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corporation,
G.R. No. 194307, November 20, 2013 ........................................ 7
Bitte v. Jonas, G.R. No. 212256, December 9, 2015 ...................... 356
Blay v. Bafia, G.R. No. 232189, March 7, 2018 ............................. 375
Blossoms & Co. v. Manila Gas Corporation, 55 Phil. 226,
240-241 ............................................... -.................................... 208
Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, 20 SCRA 987, 1000 .................... 267
Bobis v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 23, 30 ................................ 684
Bokingo v. Court of Appeals, 489 SCRA 521, 532-533 .................. 152
Bolisay v. Alcid, 85 SCRA 213, 220 ................................................ 158
Bongalan v. People, 694 SCRA 12, 18-19,
March 20, 2013 ....................................................................... 689
Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, 691 SCRA 269,
286-287, February 20, 2013 .......................................... 690, 692
784 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Borlasa v. Polistico, 4 7 Phil. 345, 348 .................................... 258, 271
Borlongan v. Banco De Oro [formerly Equitable
PCI Bank], G.R. No. 217617,
April 5, 2017 .......................... 413, 436, 437, 438, 440, 441, 449
Borromeo v. Family Care Hospital, Inc.,
G.R. No. 191018, January 25, 2016 ....................................... 647
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013 ............................................... 62
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Spouses Benedicto &
Yujuico, G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015 ............................... 164
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Yujuico,
G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015 ............................. 170, 218, 223
Breslin v. Luzon Stevedo- ring, 84 Phil. 618, 626-627 ................. 390
Briones v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 204444,
January 14, 2015 ............................................. 166, 167,168, 179
Briones-Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 450 SCRA 482, 491.. ........ 571
Brioso v. Rili-Mariano, 396 SCRA 549, 556-557 ........................... 264
Buan v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 424, 432 ............................. 708
Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 563, 567 ...................... 619
Buenaflor v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 201607, February 15, 2017 .......... 69
Bulalacao-Soriano v. Papina, G.R. No. 213187,
August 24, 2016 ...................................................................... 118
Buot v. Dujali, G.R. No. 199885, October 2, 2017 ......................... 599
Bureau of Customs v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253,
September 8, 2015 .................................................... 63, 311, 669
Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Acosta, G.R. No. 195320,
April 23, 2018 ......................................................................... 693
Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640, 653-654 ............................................. 2
Butuan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 197358, April 5, 2017 ....................... 192-193, 606,689
Butuan Development Corporation v. The Twenty
First Division of the Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 197358, April 5, 2017 ....................................... 192-193
C Canete v. Genuino Ice Company, 542 SCRA 206,217 .................. 285
Cabaero v. Cantos, 271 SCRA 391, 400 ......................................... 371
Cabigon v. Pepsi-Cola Products, Philippines, Inc.,
541 SCRA 149, 156-157 .......................................................... 562
Cabling v. Dangcalan, G.R. No. 187696,
June 15, 2016 ................................................... 70, 132, 136, 640
Cabrera v. Francisco, G.R. No. 172293,
August 28, 2013 ...................................................... lll, 150, 156
CASE TITLE INDEX 785
Cabrera v. Lapid, 510 SCRA 55, 64, 66, 65-66 ...................... 661, 662
Cadano v. Cadano, G.R. No. L-34998,
January 11, 1973 ................................................................... 578
Cagatao v. Almonte, G.R. No. 174004, October 9, 2013 ................ 254
Cagayan de Oro Coliseum v. Court of Appeals,
320 SCRA 731, 754 ................................................................ 704
Cagayan Economic Zone Authority v. Meridien
Vista Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 194962,
January 27, 2016 ........................................................... 671,683
Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 151413,
February 13, 2008 ................................................................. 302
Cahayag v. Commercial Credit Corporation,
G.R. No. 168078, January 13, 2016 ...................................... 613
Caifia v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 252, 262 ............................. 715
Calalas v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 356, 361 .................. 196, 316
Calaunan v. Madolaria, 642 SCRA 1, 9,
February 8, 2011 .................................................................... 736
Calilung v. Paramount Insurance Corporation,
G.R. No. 195641, February 3, 2016 ....................................... 705
Calimlim v. Ramirez, 118 SCRA 399, 406 ....................................... 79
Callo-Trinidad v. Esteban, 694 SCRA 185, 196,
March 20, 2013 ................................................................ 653-654
Calo v. Ajax International, Inc., 22 SCRA 996, 999 ...................... 365
Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 611 .............................. 719
Camaso v. TSM Shipping [Phils.], Inc.,
G.R. No. 223290, November 7, 2016 ...................................... 334
Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. v.
Chua, G.R. No. 191170, September 14, 2016 ........................ 268
Camino v. Pasagui, A.C. No. 11095, January 31, 2017 ............... 722
Camitan v. Court of Appeals, 511 SCRA 364, 373 ....................... 341
Campbel v. Martin, 87 Ind., 577 ................................................... 718
Campos Rueda Corporation v. Bautista, 6 SCRA 240, 244 .......... 398
Candido v. Macapagal, 221 SCRA 328, 332 .................................. 770
Canonizado v. Benitez, 127 SCRA 610,616 ................................. 730
Capa v. Court of Appeals, 502 SCRA 406, 417-418 ....................... 741
Capablanca v. heirs of Pedro Bas, G.R. No. 224144,
June 28, 2017 ......................................................................... 407
Caranto v. Bergesen D.Y. Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 170706,
August 26, 2015 ................................................................ 99, 100
Cardenas v. Heirs of Spouses Aguilar, G.R. No. 191079,
March 2, 2016 ......................................................................... 265
786 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 196890,
January 11, 2018 ...................................................... 15, 606, 691
Carpio v. Court of Appeals, 692 SCRA 162, 171-174,
February 27, 2013 .................................................................. 724
Carpio v. Sulu Resource Dev. Corp., 387 SCRA 128,
138-139 ............................................................................ 653, 697
Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals (6th Division),
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015 ................................ 9
Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015 ................................................... 80, 663, 693
Carson Realty & Management Corporation v. Red
Robbin Security Agency, G.R. No. 225035,
February 8, 2017 ............................................ 349, 350,422, 441
Casona v. People, G.R. No. 179757, September 13, 2017 ............. 648
Castro v. David, 100 Phil. 454, 458 ............................................... 382
Castro v. Malazo, 99 SCRA 164, 170 ............................................. 558
Castro v. Mendoza, Sr., G.R. No. 212778, April 26, 2017 ............. 386
Cathay Land, Inc. v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 210209,
August 9, 2017 ................................................................ 577, 578
Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 172204,
July 2, 2014 ............................................................................... 10
Cathay Pacific Airways v. Romillo, Jr., 141 SCRA 451 ................ 357
Catindig v. Vda. de Meneses, 641 SCRA 350, 359-360 ................. 135
Cawad v. Abad, G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015 ........................... 698
Cayetano v. Ceguerra, 13 SCRA 73, 79 ......................................... 674
CCC Insurance Corporation v. Kawasaki Steel
Corporation, G.R. No. 156162, June 22, 2015 ....................... 186
Cebu Women's Club v. De la Victoria, 327 SCRA 533, 538 .......... 650
Central Bank Board of Liquidators v. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 173399,
February 21, 2017 .................................. 211, 388, 389, 396, 402
CGR Corporation v. Treyes, G.R. No. 170916,
April 27, 2007 ......................................................................... 200
Chan v. Chan, 569 SCRA 106, 116-117 ........................................ .402
Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013 ............................. 528
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 453 SCRA 843, 849 .................. 773, 775
China Banking Corporation v. Padilla, 514 SCRA 35, 42 ............ 379
China Trust [Phils.] Commercial Bank v. Turner,
G.R. No. 191458, July 3, 2017 ............................................... 286
Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014 ...................... .483
CASE TITLE INDEX 787
Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110844,
April 27, 2000 ................................................................. 400, 401
Ching v. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 16 ................................ 33, 399
Ching v. Family Savings Bank, 634 SCRA 586, 601,
November 15, 2010 ................................................................. 735
Ching v. Subic Bay Golf and Country Club, Inc.,
G.R. No. 174353, September 10, 2014 .................................. 283
Ching and Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124642,
February 23, 2004 ................................................................. 7 42
Chingkoe v. Republic, G.R. No. 183608, July 31, 2013 ........ 496, 609
Chipongian v. Benitez-Lirio, G.R. No. 162692,
August 26, 2015 ..................................................... 381, 589, 608
Chiquita Brands, Inc. v. Omelio, G.R. No. 189102,
June 7, 2017 ........................................ 20, 22, 577, 579, 708, 711
Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corporation, 694 SCRA 302,
308, April 1, 2013 ................................................................... 436
Chua v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 236573,
August 14, 2018 ...................................................................... 664
Chua v. Torres, 468 SCRA 358, 367 ............................................... 259
Chua v. Total Office Products and Services [Topros], Inc.,
471 SCRA 500, 507 ................................................................ 221
Cindy and Lynsy Garment v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 38, 45 .................. 92
Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano, 504 SCRA 378, 412 ......................... 560
Citizens Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Melencio-Herrera,
38 SCRA 369, 371-372 .................................................... 234, 449
City Government of Baguio v. Masweng, G.R. No. 195905,
July 4, 2018 .................................................................... 296, 695
City Government of Makati v. Odefia, G.R. No. 191661,
August 13, 2013 ...................................................................... 612
City of Bacolod v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.,
29 SCRA 819, 827 .................................................................. 199
City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority,
G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011.. ....................................... 115
City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority,
G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014 .................... 162, 164, 165
City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723,
February 4, 2014 .................................................................... 651
City of Taguig v. City of Makati, G.R. No. 208393,
June 15, 2016 .......................................................................... 561
City State Savings Bank, Inc. v. Aguinaldo,
G.R. No. 200018, April 6, 2015 .............................................. 391
Civil Service Commission v. Magoyag, G.R. No. 197792,
December 9, 2015 ................................................................... 225
788 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Claudio v. Saraza, G.R. No. 213286, August 26, 2015 .................. 548
Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillo, 19 SCRA 379 (1967) ............. 167
Clemente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175483,
October 14, 2015 ..................................................................... 643
Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168406,
January 14, 2015 ............................................................ 186, 195
Co v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 705, 710 .................................. 703
Coca v. De Pangilinan, 171 Phil. 246 ............................................. 158
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Ilocos and
Technical Employees Union [IPTEU],
G.R. No. 193798, September 9, 2015 ....................................... 74
Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 526 (1916) ...... 167
Co It v. Co, G.R. No. 198127, October 5, 2016 .............................. 619
Colegio Medico-Farmaceutico De Filipinas, Inc. v. Lim,
G.R. No. 212034, July 2, 2018 ............................................... 303
Commercial Union Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company, 86 SCRA 79, 89 ................. 555
Commissioner of Customs v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, G.R. No. 205002, April 20, 2016 .............. 296, 297
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Apo Cement
Corporation, G.R. No. 193381, February 8, 2017 ......... 291, 292
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, G.R. Nos. 167274-75,
September 11, 2013 ......................................................... 576-577
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan
Corporation, G.R. No. 199422, June 20, 2016 ....................... 680
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation, 504 SCRA 484, 496 ............................................. ll
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation, G.R. No. 180434, January 20, 2016 ................... 79
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Nippon
Express [Phils.] Corporation, G.R. No. 212920,
September 16, 2015 ................................................................ 622
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Miguel
Corporation, G.R. No. 205045, January 25, 2017 ................. 499
Compania General de Tabacos v. Martinez and Nolan,
29 Phil. 515 ............................................................................. 718
Complaint of Arrienda Against Justices Puno, Kapunan,
Pardo, Ynares- Santiago, et al., 460 SCRA 1, 13-14 ............. 555
Concejero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 223262,
September 11, 2017 ............................................................... 655
Concerned Officials of the MWSS v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502 ...... 74
CASE TITLE INDEX 789
Concorde Condominium, Inc. v. Baculio, G.R. No. 203678,
February 17, 2016 .................................................................. 148
Concrete Aggregate Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
266 SCRA 88, 95 ..................................................................... 278
Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 144, 153 ....... 684
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 169457, October 19, 2015 ....................... 217
Consolidated Plywood v. Breva, 166 SCRA 589 ............................ 234
Continental Micronesia, Inc. v. Basco,
G.R. Nos. 178382-83, September 23, 2015 .............................. 60
Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308 .......................................... 234, 417
Cooperative Development Authority v.
Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Cooperative, 382 SCRA 552, 565 ........................................... 270
Cordova v. Tornilla, 246 SCRA 430,432 ............................... 262, 265
Corona International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
343 SCRA 512, 519 ................................................................. 725
Corpus v. Sandiganbayan, 442 SCRA 294, 309 ............................. 553
Cortal v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises,
G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017 ............ 16, 293, 605-606, 654
Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance
Company, G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012 .......................... 302
Co-Unjieng v. Hijos Mabalacat Sugar Company,
70 Phil. 380, 384 ..................................................................... 709
Cramer v. Aiken, 63 App. D.C. 16, 68 F. 2d 761, 762 ................... 341
Crisologo v. Daray, 562 SCRA 382, 391 ......................................... 624
Crisologo v. JEWN Agro- Industrial Corporation,
G.R. No. 196894, March 3, 2014 ............................ 255, 611, 690
Cristobal v. PAL and Tan, G.R. No. 201622,
October 4, 2017 ....................................................................... 598
Cruz v. Manila International Airport Authority,
G.R. No. 184732, September 9, 2013 ............................. 614, 615
Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 210266, June 7, 2017 ............................. 500
Cruz v. Tan, 87 Phil. 627, 629 ........................................................ 152
Cubero v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperatives,
Inc., 509 SCRA 410, 416 ........................................................... 27
Cuenca v. PCGG, 535 SCRA 102, 114 .............................................. 68
Cu v. Ventura, G.R. No. 224567, September 26, 2018 .................. 647
Cuizon v. Ramolete, 129 SCRA 495, 499 ....................................... 158
Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 .................................................. 158
Cunanan v. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 263, 264 ................ 708, 709
Custodio v. Corrado, 435 SCRA 500, 509 ..................................... 573
790 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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VOLUME I
Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals, 479 SCRA 594,
602, 604 ............................................................................. 16, 618
Cu-Unjieng v. Mabalacat Sugar Co., 70 Phil. 384 ........................ 576
D Department of Public Works and Highways v.
Dacanay v. Siapno, Jr., G.R. No. 185169, June 15, 2016 ............. 474
Danao v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 446, 448 ........................... 201
Dangwa Transportation Company v. Sarmiento,
G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 1977 .................................... 167
Dasco v. Philtranco Service Enteprises, Inc.,
G.R. No. 211141, June 29, 2016 .............................................. 99
Dator v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 2377 42, October 8, 2018 ....... 660
Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001 ........................ 167
David-Chan v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677, 687 ................... 18
Declarador v. Bansales, 499 SCRA 341, 348 .................................. 22
Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, G.R. No. 173148,
April 6, 2015 ................................................................... 473, 474
De Guzman v. Chico, G.R. No. 195445, December 2016 .............. 307
De Jesus v. Coloso, 1 SCRA 272, 273-274 ...................................... 220
De Jesus v. Garcia, 19 SCRA 554, 558 ........................................... 69
De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 520, 527 .................... 201
De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 103,
115 ........................................................................... 117, 188, 194
De la Cruz v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 219683,
January 23, 2018 ............................................................. 562
De la Rosa v. Roldan, 501 SCRA 34, 51.. ......................................... 69
De Leon v. Chu, G.R. No. 186522, September 2, 2015 ......... 307,471
De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 94 ................................... 134
De Leon v. People, G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016 ................ 553
De Lima v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528, February 19, 2013 ........... 217
De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781,
October 10, 2017 ............................................... 21, 292, 293, 642
De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330,
January 11, 2016 ............................................................ 668, 699
Delos Reyes v. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505, 578
Delos Santos v. Elizalde, 514 SCRA 14, 27 .......................... 321, 589
Del Rosario v. Ocampo-Ferrer, G.R. No. 215348, June 20, 2016, 79
Del Rosario v. Villegas, 49 Phil. 634, 644 ...................................... 709
Delta Motors v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 212, 223 ................ 564
Delta Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
168 SCRA206, 212 .......................................................... 743-744
CASE TITLE INDEX 791
De Mesa v. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 773, 781 ....................... 706
De Ocampo v. RPN-9/Radio Philippines Network, Inc.,
G.R. No. 192947, December 9, 2015 ...................................... 688
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Uy, 515 SCRA 376, 399 ........... 5
CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri Joint Venture,
G.R. No. 179732, September 13, 2017 ........................... 301, 339
De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 194751, November 26,
2014 ....................... 62, 63, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89,227,234,425, 438
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Carpio,
G.R. No. 195450, February 1, 2017 ....................................... 631
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Guarifia
Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 160759, January 15, 2014 ....................................... 574
De Vera v. Spouses Santiago, G.R. No. 179457,
June 22, 2015 .......................................................................... 133
Diamond Builders Conglomeration v. Country
Bankers Corp., 540 SCRA 194 .............................................. 577
Diaz v. Diaz, 331 SCRA 302, 316 .................................................. 191
Diaz v. Gestopa, Jr., 652 SCRA 434, 439, June 22, 2011.. ............ 774
Diaz v. Spouses Punzalan, G.R. No. 203075,
March 16, 2016 ....................................................................... 188
Diaz-Enriquez v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 168065,
September 6, 2017 .................................................................. 616
Digital Telecommunications Phils., Inc. v. Ayapana,
G.R. No. 195614, January 10, 20l8 ...................................... 616
Dinglasan-Delos Santos v. Abejon, G.R. No. 215820,
March 20, 2017 ....................................................................... 490
Dio v. Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc.,
G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014 ............................................. 374
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015 ......................................... 22
Diona v. Balangue, 688 SCRA 22, 34-35, ·
January 7, 2013 ...................................................... 571, 681,682
Dionisio v. Sison Puerto, 60 SCRA 471, 477 .................................... 72
Director of Lands v. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117 ......................................... 576
Distribution & Control Products, Inc. v. Santos,
G.R. No. 212616, July 10, 2017 ............................................. 645
Divinagracia v. Parilla, G.R. No. 196750,
March 11, 2015 ............................................................... 254, 257
792 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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VOLUME I
Divine Word College ofLaoag v. Mina,
G.R. No. 195155, April 13, 2016 .............................................. 99
Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. v. Security Bank
Corporation, 639 SCRA 39, 45 ............................................... 334
Docena v. Lapesura, 355 SCRA 658; Opinaldo v. Ravina,
G.R. No. 196573, October 16, 2013 ....................................... 692
Dolot v. Paje, G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013 .......................... 163
Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 163431, August 28, 2013 ......................................... 652
Dormitorio v. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 366,393 ................................ 709
Douglas Lu Ym v. Gertrudes Nabua, 452 SCRA 298,
305-306 ................................................................................... 478
DST Movers Corporation v. General Insurance
Corporation, G.R. No. 198627, January 13, 2016 ................... 99
Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
377 SCRA 353 .................................................................. 147-148
Dutch Movers, Inc. v. Lequin, G.R. No. 210032,
April 25, 2017 ......................................................................... 646
Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. [Phil.], Inc. v.
Presbitero, Jr., G.R. No. 174202, April 7, 2015 ................... 198
Dy v. NLRC, 145 SCRA 211, 213 ................................................... 616
Dy Chiao v. Bolivar, G.R. No. 192491, August 17, 2016 ............... 628
Dy v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 331 .......................................... 311
Dy Tehan Trading, Inc. v. Dy, G.R. No. 185647,
July 26, 2017 .......................................................... 145, 147, 149
E G.R. No. 192679, October 17, 2016 ................................ 627, 639
E.B. Villarosa & Partner, Ltd. v. Benito,
312 SCRA 65, 73-74 ....................................................... .428, 430
E. Ganzon, Inc. [EGI] v. Ando, Jr., G.R. No. 214183,
February 20, 2017 .......................................................... 656, 657
Eagleridge Development Corporation v. Cameron
Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.,
G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013 ............................................ 528
Eastern Shipping Lines v. BPI/MS Insurance
Corporation, G.R. No. 193986,
January 15, 2014 ............................................................ 639, 640
Echanes v. Spouses Hailar, G.R. No. 203880,
August 10, 2016 .............................................................. 118, 189
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,
301 SCRA 96, 106, 108, 112 .......................................... 8, 61, 77
CASE TITLE INDEX 793
Edron Construction Corporation v. Provincial
Government of Surigao Del Sur, G.R. No. 220211,
June 5, 2017 ............................................................................ 471
Ellice v. Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Young,
686 SCRA 51, 61, November 21, 2012 .......................... .415, 418
Emergency Loan Pawnshop, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
353 SCRA 89, 91, 93 ....................................................... 220, 223
Encarnacion v. Johnson, G.R. No. 192285,
July 11, 2018 ........................................................................... 686
Encarnacion Construction and Industrial Corporation
v. Phoenix Ready Mix Concrete Development &
Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 225402,
September 4, 2017 .................................................................. 642
Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, 419 SCRA 82,
90, 106 .................................................................................... 660
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan [Third Division],
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015 ........................................... 13
Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, 372 SCRA 372, 376 ....................... 715
Enriquez v. Padilla, 77 Phil. 373 .................................................... 578
Enriquez v. Vilar, G.R. No. 225309, March 6, 2018 ...................... 253
Enriquez Vda. de Santiago v. Suing, G.R. No. 194814,
October 21, 2015 ..................................................................... 383
Erorita v. Spouses Dumlao, G.R. No. 195477,
January 25, 2016 ...................................................................... 79
Escareal v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 455 SCRA 119, 133 ............ 671
Escoto v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,
Esguerra v. Holcim Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 182571,
September 2, 2013 .......................................................... 612, 747
Espere v. NFD International Manning Agents,
G.R. No. 212098, July 26, 2017 ..................................... 655, 656
Espineli v. Santiago, 107 Phil. 830, 833 ........................................ 221
Espiritu v. Tankiansee, 651 SCRA 706, 707 ................................. 298
Esquivel v. Alegre, 172 SCRA 315,325 ........................................ 597
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos v. Republic,
G.R. No. 213037, January 18, 2017 ....................................... 526
Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679,
August 15, 2017 ......................................................... 8, 9, 11, 15
Estolas v. Acena, 448 SCRA 233, 245 .............................................. 92
Eudela, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 89265, July 17, 1992 ............................................... 725
 794 CML PROCEDURE
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VOLUME I
Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation v. Republic,
G.R. No. 218628, September 6, 2017 ..................................... 641
Express Padala [Italia] S.P.A. v. Ocampo,
G.R. No. 202505, September 6, 2017 .................... .414, 438, 443
F Philippines [FASAP] v. Philippine Airlines,
F.A.T. Key Computer Systems v. Online Networks
International, Inc., 641 SCRA 390, 408,
February 2, 2011 .................................................................... 639
Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998 ............... 9
Fabian v. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470 ................................................. 660
Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,
297 SCRA 30, 53 ..................................................................... 301
Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v.
People, G.R. No. 170618, November 20, 2013 ...................... 627
Federation of United NAMARCO Distributors, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 4 SCRA 867, 888 .................................. 727
Felicilda v. Uy, G.R. No. 221241, September 14, 2016 ................. 646
Felipe v. MGM Motor Trading Corporation,
G.R. No. 191849, September 23, 2015 ................................... 548
Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, 458 SCRA 454, 465 ..................... 631
Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, 691 SCRA 167, 192-193,
February 19, 2013 .................................................................. 383
Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan
University of the Philippines, Inc.; G.R. No. 207970;
January 20, 2016 ................................... 279, 318, 338, 579, 580
Fernando v. Santamaria, 446 SCRA 136, 142 ............................... 575
Ferreria v. Vda. de Gonzales, G.R. No. L-11567,
July 17, 1958 ........................................................................... 264
FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking
Corporation, 386 SCRA 312, 320 .................................. 196, 316
Fideldia v. Songcuan, 465 SCRA 218, 226 ..................................... 708
Fiestan v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 751, 757 .......................... 743
Filipinas Palmoil Processing, Inc. v. Dejapa,
641 SCRA 572, 581, February 7, 2011 .......................... 571, 572
Film Development Council of the Philippines v.
SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 197937,
April 3, 2013 ........................................................................... 476
Financial Building Corporation v. Forbes Park
Association, 338 SCRA 346, 354 ............................................ 368
First Aqua Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, 514 SCRA 223, 226-227 .............................................. .4
CASE TITLE INDEX 795
First Gas Power Corporation v. Republic,
G.R. No. 169461, September 2, 2013 ..................................... 225
Five Star Marketing Corp. v. Booe, 535 SCRA 28,
41-43 ................................................................................ 627, 637
Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the
Inc., G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018 ................................. 617
Florendo v. Paramount Insurance Corp., 610 SCRA 377,
G.R. No. 167976, January 20, 2010 ....................................... 726
Florendo, Jr. v. Coloma, 129 SCRA 304,
309-311 ............................................................................ 265, 266
Flores v. Office of the Ombudsman, 389 SCRA 127, 132 .............. 194
Flores v. Sumaljag, 290 SCRA 568, 579-580 .................................. 77
Florete, Jr. v. Florete, Sr., G.R. No. 174909,
January 20, 2016 .................................................... 250, 256,258
Fong v. Duenas, G.R. No. 185592, June 15, 2015 ......................... 283
Fontana Development Corporation v. Vukasinovic,
G.R. No. 222424, September 21, 2016 ................................... 309
Fontanilla v. The Commission Proper, Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 209714, June 21, 2016 ............................ 666
Forest Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. v. Fil-Estate,
Inc., G.R. No. 206649, July 20, 2016 ............................. 142, 147
Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 624, 649 .................................... 22, 241
Fortune Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 108119,
January 19, 1994 .................................................................... 510
Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 7, 19-20 .................................... 727
Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 469 SCRA 424, 431 .............. 79
Francisco v. Loyola Plans Consolidated, Inc.,
G.R. No. 194134, February 1, 2016 ....................................... 688
Francisco v. Permskul, G.R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989 ................. 557
Francisco v. Puno, 108 SCRA 427, 432 .......................................... 672
Francisco, Jr., et al. v. Toll Regulatory Board, et al.,
G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010 ........................................ 702
French v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 220057,
July 12, 2017 ............................................................................. 70
Frias v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, February 28,
2018 ................................. 224, 226, 230, 414, 416, 420, 440, 680
Frondozo v. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 178379,
August 22, 2017 ...................................................................... 657
Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu,
G.R. Nos. 204944-45, December 3, 2014 .............. 292,311,655

796 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 ...................... 568
Funa v. Agra, 691 SCRA 196, 208-209,
February 19, 2013 ................................................................. 247
G Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr., G.R. No. 201061,
G. Holdings, Inc. v. Cagayan Electric Power and
Light Company, Inc., G.R. No. 226213
September 27, 2017 .............................. '................................. 364
G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
.158 SCRA 466 ................................................................. 469, 429
Gabriel v. Petron Corporation, G.R. No. 194575,
April 11, 2018 ................................................................. 655 656
Gagui v. Dejero, G.R. No. 196036, October 23, 2013 ................... ~.595
Gal~rosa v. Valencia, 227 SCRA 726, ........................................... 255
Gal~do v. Magrare, G.R. No. 206584, January 11, 2016 ............... 257
Galmdo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788,
.January 10, 2017 .................................................................... 667
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 336 SCRA 4 75 ................................... 582
Garcia v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 153810, August 12, 2015 ................. 74
garrucho v. Court of Appeals, 448 SCRA 165, 172 ....................... 288
aspar v. Dorado, 15 SCRA 331, 334 ............................................ 399
Gatan v: Vinarao, G.R. No. 205912, October 18, 2017 .................... 99
Geme~tiza v. COMELEC, 353 SCRA 724, 730 ............................. 549
Genesis Investment, Inc. v. Ebarasabal, G.R. No. 181622,
November 20, 2013 ......................................................... 150, 151
Genpact Services, Inc. v. Santos-Falceso
.G ..R. No. 227695, July 31, 2017 ...... : .............. 689, 690,693,695
Geohsbcs-Inc. v. Catewey Electronics,
582 SCRA 434, 445 ................................................................. 724
Geonzon Vda. de Barrera v. Heirs of Vicente
Legaspi, 565 SCRA 192 .......................................................... 127
Georg v. Holy Trinity College, Inc., G.R. No. 190408,
Gero~= !~'c
2
a~~:;~~·,.. cii ·N~.··2·oi'1si·:······
................................. 512
December 10, 2014 ........................................................... 70,
Glob e Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo- Flores
. 390 ~CRA 201, 210 ........................ '.........................................
Gloria Bmlders Savings and Loan Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 202324, June 4, 2018 ...............................................
Gov. BPI Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 199354
June 26, 2013 ................................................ .'.........................
CASE TITLE INDEX 797
Gov. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corporation,
G.R. Nos. 206841- 42, January 19, 2018 .............................. 553
Gov. Rico, 488 SCRA 137, 145-146 ................................................ 301
Gov. Sunbanon, 642 SCRA 367, 383 ................................................. 3
July 3, 2013 ............................................................................. 540
Gochan v. Gochan, 372 SCRA 256, 263-264 .................. 170, 219, 283
Gochan v. Mancao, G.R. No. 182314,
November 13, 2013 ......................................................... 572, 683
Gochanco v. CFI of Negros Occidental, 157 SCRA 40 .................. .443
Gojo v. Goyala, 35 SCRA 557, 563 ................................................. 370
Golangco v. Fung, Office of the Ombudsman,
504 SCRA 321, 334 ................................................................. 660
Golden Arches Development Corporation v.
St. Francis Square Holdings, Inc., 640 SCRA 227, 230 ....... 163
Golden Sun Finance Corporation v. Albano,
AM. No. P-11-2888, July 27, 2011 ........................................ 734
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 420 SCRA 98, 104 ............................ .417
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 425 SCRA 98,
103-106 ........................................................ 88, 94, 228, 229, 231
Gomez v. Montalban, 548 SCRA 693, 702 ............................. 100, 112
Gonzales v. CA, 151 SCRA 289 ..................................................... 764
Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc., G.R. No. 202664,
November 10, 2015 ................................................. 142, 14 7, 148
Gonzales v. Rosas, 423 SCRA 488, 494 .......................................... 106
Gonzales and Mauricio v. Francisco, 49 Phil. 747 ........................ 351
Gonzales, et al. v. Bugaay, et al, G.R. No. 173008,
February 22, 2012 .................................................................. 548
Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. v. Alcaide,
G.R. No. 167952, October 19, 2016 .......................................... ll
Gould v. Hayden, 63 Ind., 443 ........................................................ 718
Government v. Echaus, 71 Phil. 318, 320 ...................................... 712
Gozon v. Vda. de Barrameda, 11 SCRA 376, 379 .......................... 201
Grace Park International Corporation v.
EastWest Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 210606,
254 July 27, 2016 .................................................................. 296, 476
Green Star Express, Inc. v. Nissin- Universal
704 Robina Corporation, G.R. No. 181517, July 6, 2015 ............ .432
GSIS v. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, 13-14 ........................... 371
305 GSIS v. NLRC, 635 SCRA 251,257 ............................................... 323
GSIS v. Oliza, 304 SCRA 421, 426 ................................................... 65
633

798 CML PROCEDURE
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VOLUME I
GSIS v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.,
G.R. No. 165585, November 20, 2013 ................... 579, 724, 726
GSIS Family Bank-Thrift Bank, Inc. v.
BPI Family Bank, G.R. No. 175278,
September 23, 2015 ................................................................ 308
GSIS Family Bank-Thrift Bank [formerly Comsavings
Bank, Inc.] v. BPI Family Bank, G.R. No. 175278,
September 23, 2015 ................................................................ 614
Guanio v. Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc.,
641 SCRA 591, 596 ................................................................. 196
Guanzon v. Arradaza, 510 SCRA 309, 318 .................................... 443
Guerrero v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.,
G.R. No. 222523, October 3, 2018 .................................. 641, 645
Guevara v. BPI Securities Corporation, 498 SCRA 613 ............... 574
Gumabay v. Baralin, 77 SCRA 258 ................................................ 397
Guy v. Gacott, G.R. No. 206147,
January 13, 2016 .......................................... 83, 84, 87,419,424
Guzman v. Guzman, 693 SCRA 318, 325-327,
March 12, 2013 ............................................................... 632, 651
H
H.B. Zachry Company International v. Court of Appeals,
232 SCRA 329, 346 .................................................................
Hacbang v. Alo, G.R. No. 191031, October 5, 2015 ............... 241,
Hanover Insurance Company v. Port Service and
Manila Railroad Company, 19 SCRA 69, 73 .........................
Harold v. Aliba, 534 SCRA 478, 486 ..............................................
Heirs of Arrienda v. Kalaw, G.R. No. 204314,
April 6, 2016 ................................................................... 133,
Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232,
March 10, 2014 ....................................................... 154, 155,
Heirs of Benjamin Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,
565 SCRA 506, 512-513 ..........................................................
Heirs of Cabigas v. Limbaco, G.R. No. 175291,
July 27, 2011 ...........................................................................
Heirs of Cesar Marasigan v. Marasigan,
548 SCRA 409, 435 .................................................................
Heirs of Conahap v. Regafia, 458 SCRA 741, 748 .........................
Heirs of Dacanay v. Siapno, Jr., G.R. No. 185169,
June 15, 2016 ..........................................................................
Heirs of Donton v. Stier, G.R. No. 216491,
August 24, 2017 ......................................................................
CASE TITLE INDEX 799
Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, 449 SCRA 173 .............. 229
Heirs of Felicidad Canque v. Court of Appeals,
275 SCRA 741, 749 ................................................................. 561
Heirs of Francisco Retuya v. Court of Appeals,
647 SCRA 299, 309-310 .......................................................... 305
Heirs of Gilberto Roldan v. Heirs of Silvela Roldan,
G.R. No. 202578, September 27, 2017 .................................. 613
Heirs of Hinog v. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 ...................................... 101
Heirs of Jose Fernando v. De Belen, G.R. No. 186366,
July 3, 2013 ............................................................................... 81
Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. Cebrero, G.R. No. 222737,
November 12, 2018 ................................................... 84, 263, 556
Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro, 324 SCRA 591, 609 .................. 163, 164
Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v. Ricaforte,
G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013 ............................................... 215
Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio,
541 SCRA 479 ......................................................................... 615
Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, 542 SCRA 406,
417-418 .............................................................................. 66, 685
Heirs of Maximo Regoso v. Court of Appeals,
211 SCRA 348, 351 ................................................................. 262
Heirs of Miranda, Sr. v. Miranda, G.R. No. 179638,
July 8, 2013 ..................................................................... 715, 718
432 Heirs of Reinoso, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 654 SCRA 1,
242 9-10 .......................................................................................... 333
Heirs of Sebe v. Heirs of Sevilla, 603 SCRA 395,
315 402-405 .................................................................... 119, 123, 130
577 Heirs of Sotto v. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691,
June 13, 2013 .......................................................................... 567
138 Heirs of Spouses Maglasang v. Manila Banking
Corporation, G.R. No. 171206,
219 September 23, 2013 ................................................................ 267
Heirs of Spouses Reterta v. Spouses Mores, 655 SCRA
321 580, 585 ................................................................................... 125
Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha v. Spouse·s Lumocso,
643 540 SCRA 1, 120 .................................................................... 124
Heirs of Valientes v. Ramas, 638 SCRA 444, 451 ........................ .471
295 Heirs ofWenceslao Tabia v. Court of Appeals,
504 516 SCRA 431, 443 ................................................................. 475
Hemedez v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 347, 375 ...................... 260
473 Herarc Realty Corporation v. The Provincial Treasurer
ofBatangas, G.R. No. 210736, September 5, 2018 ............... 664
646

800 CIVIL PROCEDURE
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VOLUME I
Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 237721,
July 31, 2018 ........................................................................... 572
Hernandez v. Development Bank of the Philippines,
71 SCRA 290, 293 ........................................................... 220, 223
Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., 81 SCRA 75,
84 ............................................................................................ 220
Herrera v. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245, 256 ............................................ 68
Hibberd v. Rohde and Mcmillian, 32 Phil. 4 76,
478-479 ............................................................................ 319, 320
Hidalgo v. Velasco, G.R. No. 202217, April 25, 2018 ...................... 70
Highpoint Development Corporation v. Republic,
G.R. No. 224389, November 7, 2018 ................................ 14, 563
Hilario v. Miranda, G.R. No. 196499, November 28, 2018 .......... .472
Hilario v. Salvador, 457 SCRA 815, 826-827 ......................... 135, 136
Hoechst Philippines, Inc. v. Torres, 83 SCRA 297, 301 ................ 177
Home Guaranty Corporation v. R-11 Builders, Inc.,
652 SCRA 649, 657 ................................................................. 134
Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board,
G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015 ..................... 241, 246,248
Huibonhoa v. Concepcion, 497 SCRA 562, 569-570 ...... 296, 297,298
Hyatt Escalators Corporation v. Cathedral
Heights Building Complex Association, Inc.,
636 SCRA 401, 405 ................................................................
I International Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of
lbafi.es v. Roman Catholic Church, 12 Phil. 227, 241.. ................. 273
Ibanez v. Harper, G.R. No. 194272, February 17, 2017 ....... 264,265
lfurungv. Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018 .................... 699
Ignacio v. Hilarion, 76 Phil. 605 .................................................... 709
Ignacio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 213192, July 12, 2017 ................ 157, 566
Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa [IBM] Nestle
Philippines, Inc. Chapter [Ice Cream and Chilled
Products Division] v. Nestle Philippines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 198675, September 23, 2015 .......................... 706, 711
Iloilo Jar Corporation v. Comglasco Corporation/
Aguila Glass, G.R. No. 219509, January 18, 2017 ................ 583
Imani v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company,
635 SCRA 357, 365 ................................................................. 741
Imperial v. Armes, G.R. No. 178842, January 30, 2017 .............. 687
Imperial v. Hardy, La, 302 So.2d 5, 7 ............................................. 83
Imperial Textile Mills v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 584 .......... 320
Inchausti v. De Leon, 24 Phil. 224, 226 ............................................ 3
CASE TITLE INDEX 801
Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on
Higher Education, 356 SCRA 367 ........................................ 357
Indoyon, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 693 SCRA 201,
203, 208-209, March 12, 2013 ................................. 16, 651, 693
Industrial Finance Corporation v. Apostol,
177 SCRA 521, 524 ................................................................. 201
Industrial Timber Corporation v. Ababon, 480 SCRA 171,
181-182 .................................................................................... 572
Industrial Timber Corporation v. NLRC, 233 SCRA 597 ............. 572
Infante v. Aran Builders, Inc., 531 SCRA 123, 129-130 ............... 718
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139,
June 6, 2017 ............................................................................ 699
Interlining Corporation v. Philippine Trust Company,
378 SCRA 521, 525 ................................................................. 490
International Corporate Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
501 SCRA 20, 28-29 ................................................................ 651
International Hotel Corporation v. Joaquin, Jr.,
G.R. No. 158361, April 10, 2013 .............................................. 91
International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia [Philippines], G.R. No. 209271,
December 8, 2015 ....................................................... 73, 76, 544
644
International School, Inc. [Manila] v. Court of Appeals,
309 SCRA 474, 482-483, 485 .......................................... 726, 728
Appeals, 214 SCRA 456 (1992) ............................................. 374
Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Maghari III, A.C. No. 10525,
September 1, 2015 .................................................. 288, 293,294
Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 196795,
March 7, 2018 ......................................................................... 296
Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
341 SCRA 90 ................................................................... 105, 107
724,725,727,728,729
In the Matter for the Correction of Entry
[Change of Family Name in the Birth Certificate
of Felipe C. Almojuela as Appearing in the
Records of the National Statistics Office] v.
Republic, G.R. No. 211724, August 24, 2016 ........................ 254
In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court
Hon. Simeon Datumanong, 497 SCRA 626, 636-637 ............... 3
r 802 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
CASE TITLE INDEX 803

Islamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines v. L

Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 178, 186 ................................... 685
J Lajave Agricultural Management and Development
Jaca and Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company, et al.,
G.R. No. L-25771, March 29, 1982 ........................................ 724
Jalandoni v. PNB, 108 SCRA 102 .................................................. 712
Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014 ............... 700
Javier v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 186204,
September 2, 2015 .................................................................. 131
Javines v. Xlibris, G.R. No. 214301, June 7, 2017 ........................ 616
Jocson v. San Miguel, G.R. No. 206941,
March 9, 2016 ......................................................................... 595
Jose v. Boyon, 414 SCRA 216, 222-225 228, ........ .437, 438, 439, 452
Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435,
August 9, 2017 ................................................ 660, 662, 694, 695
Juaban v. Espina, 548 SCRA 588, 605-606 ................................... 308
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Fil-Estate Land, Inc., G.R. No. 152272,
March 5, 2012 ......................................................................... 273
Junson v. Martinez, 405 SCRA 390, 395 ....................................... 766
K G.R. No. 213863, January 27, 2016 ....................................... 564
Kawasaki Port Service Corporation v. Amores,
199 SCRA 230, 236-237 .......................................... 229, 454, 455
Kent v. Micarez, G.R. 185758, March 9, 2011.. ............................. 492
KEPCO Philippines Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
636 SCRA 166, l 74 ................................................................ 649
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, 562 ............................ 248
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino, G.R. No. 210761,
June 28, 2016 ......................................................................... 691
Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma,
542 SCRA 1, 16-17 .................................................................. 371
KT Construction Supply, Inc. v. Philippine Savings
Bank, G.R. No. 228435, June 21, 2017 .................................... 84
Ku v. RCBC Securities, G.R. No. 219491,
October 17, 2018 ................................ 68, 70, 142, 145, 146, 334
Kummer v. People, G.R. No. 174461,
September 11, 2013, .............................................................. 560
Lacson Hermanas, Inc. v. Heirs of Ignacio,
462 SCRA 290, 294 ................................................................. 101
Enterprises, Inc. v. Spouses Javellana,
G.R. No. 223785, November 7, 2018 .............. 205, 211,296,297
La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 739, 744-745 ............. 315
Lanao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
Provincial Government of Lanao del Norte,
G.R. No. 185420, August 29, 2017 ..................................... 21, 22
La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
236 SCRA 78 ............................................................................. 86
Landbank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
409 SCRA 455, 479, 480-481.. ........................................ 689, 690
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Belle Corporation,
G.R. No. 205271, September 2, 2015 .................................... 643
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Cacayuran,
G.R. No. 191667, April 22, 2015 .................................... 256, 257
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dalauta,
G.R. No. 190004, August 8, 2017 .................................... 73, 299
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Fastech Synergy
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 206150, August 9, 2017 ................ 19
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos,
Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United
Coconut Planters Bank, 34 7 SCRA 542, 555-556 ................. 177
Lanto v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 217189,
April 18, 2017 ................................................. 569, 570, 571, 572
Lao v. LGU of Cagayan de Oro City, G.R. No. 187869,
September 13, 2017 ............................................................... 640
Lao v. Mencias, 21 SCRA 1021, 1024 ............................................. 727
Lao v. Yao Bio Lim, G.R. No. 201306, August 9,2017 .................. 614
La'o v. Republic, 479 SCRA 439, 446 ....................................... 80, 165
Lapu- Lapu Development and Housing_
Corporation v. Group Management Corporation,
388 SCRA 493, 508 ................................................................... 23
Lara's Gift and Decors, Inc. v. PNB Insurers Co.,
Inc., G.R. Nos. 230429-30, January 24, 2018 ........................ 500
La Salette College v. Pilotin, 463 Phil. 785 (2003) ....................... 333
Lasala v. National Food Authority, G.R. No. 171582,
August 19, 2015 ...................................................................... 365
La Tondefi.a Distillers v: Ponferrada, 264 SCRA 540 .................... 219

L
I 804 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
La Tondeiia Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
209 SCRA 553, 573-574 .......................................................... 371
Latorre v. Latorre, 617 SCRA 88, 97 ............................................. 169
Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde, G.R. No. 217456,
November 24, 2015 ................................................................. 244
Laurel v. Vardeleon, G.R. No. 202967, August 5, 2015 ................ 484
Laus v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 688 .............................. 357, 438
Lavina v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 691, 702 .......................... 262
Lawas v. Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 173, 176 ............................ 262
Laya, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 205813,
January 10, 2018 ............................................................ 656, 657
Leachon v. Pascua, AM. No. P-11-2972,
September 28, 2011 ................................................................ 732
Lefebre v. A Brown Company, Inc., G.R. No. 224973,
September 27, 2017 .................................................................. 17
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Lepanto
Capataz Union, 691 SCRA 11, 23-24,
February 18, 2013 .................................................................. 693
Leriou v. Longa, G.R. No. 203923, October 8, 2018 ...................... 301
Leung Ben v. O'Brien, 38 Phil. 182 ............................................... 268
Leviste Management System, Inc. v. Legaspi
Towers 200, Inc., G.R. No. 199353, April 4, 2018 ................. 609
Ley Construction and Development Corporation v.
Sedano, G.R. No. 222711, August 23, 2017 ................... 174, 175
Ley Construction and Development Corporation v.
Union Bank of the Philippines, 334 SCRA 443 .................... 581
Leynes v. Former Tenth Division of the Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011 ....................... 627
Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc.,
76 SCRA 197 ........................................................................... 614
Librada M. Aquino v. Ernest Aure, G.R. No. 153567,
February 18, 2008 .................................................................. 767
Liga ng mga Barangay National v. Atienza,
. 420 SCRA 562, 572 ................................................................ 101
Ligon v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 73, 84-85 ............................ 194
Ligtas v. People, G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015 ..................... 100
Lihaylihay v. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013 .................. 659
Lim v. Court of Appeals, 689 SCRA 705, 710,
. January 30, 2013 .................................................................... 478
Lim v. Gamosa, G.R. No. 193964, December 2, 2015 ................... 285
Lim v. Pacquing, 236 SCRA 211, 219 .............................................. 61
Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776 .................. 238
CASE TITLE INDEX 805
Limpin v. IAC, 147 SCRA 516, 522-523 ......................................... 710
Lim Teck Chuan v. Uy, G.R. No. 155701, March 11, 2015 ........... 374
Lina v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 637, 642 ............................... 356
Lisondra v. Megacraft International Corporation,
G.R. No. 204275, December 9, 2015 .............................. 327, 330
Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. v. Glodel
Brokerage Corporation, 639 SCRA 69, 86 ............................. 377
Local Water Utilities Administration Employees
Association for Progress v. Local Water Utilities
Administration, G.R. Nos. 206808- 09,
September 7, 2016 .................................................................. 637
Lopez v. City of Manila, 303 SCRA 448 ......................................... 311
Lopez v. Compania de Seguros, 16 SCRA 855, 859 ....................... 214
Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 716, 724 ........................... 358
Lou v. Siapno, 335 SCRA 181, 187 ................................................. 705
Lozano v. Balesteros, 195 SCRA 681, 690 ..................................... 255
Lu v. Chiong, G.R. No. 222070, April 16, 2018 ............................. 697
Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011.. ........................... 226
Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 148 ................................................... 400
Lui Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma Corporation,
G.R. No. 193494, March 12, 2014 .......................... 352, 356, 357
Luna v. Carandang, 26 SCRA 306, 309 ........................................... 69
Lupong Tagapamayapa (Magno v. Velasco-Jacoba,
475 SCRA 584 ......................................................................... 772
Luzon Development Bank v. Conquilla,
470 SCRA 533, 544-549 ........................................................... 573
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. IAC, G.R. No. 72645,
June 30, 1987 .......................................................................... 714
M
M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva,
441 SCRA 525, 530 ................................................................. 335
Macabingkil v. PHHC, 72 SCRA 326, 343 ..................................... 703
Macahilig v. Heirs of Gracia M. Magalit,
344 SCRA 838, 848 ....................... :......................................... 552
Macalanda, Jr. v. Acosta, G.R. No. 197718,
September 6, 2017 .......................................................... 641, 642
Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. No. 220598,
July 19, 2016 ..................................................................... 12, 701
Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013 ...................... 84, 453
Macias v. Lim, 431 SCRA 20, 40 .................................................... 720
 806 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs
of Mifioza, 641 SCRA 520, 529-533 .............. 381, 382, 383, 384
Madarang, et al. v. Sps. Morales, G.R. No. 199283,
June 9, 2014 ............................................................................ 675
Magat, et al. v. Tantrade, et al., G.R. No. 205483,
August 23, 2017 ...................................................................... 633
Magat, Sr. v. Tantrade Corporation, G.R. No. 205483,
August 23, 2017 ...................................................................... 627
Magdalena Estate v. Nieto, 125 SCRA 758 ................................... 234
Magno v. Magno, G.R. No. 206451, August 17, 2016 .................... 577
Magno v. Velasco-Jacoba, 4 75 SCRA 584, 589 ............................. 772
Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals,
180 SCRA 266 ......................................................................... 238
Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58168,
December 19, 1989 ................................................................. 385
Magsino v. De Ocampo, G.R. No. 166944, August 18, 2014 ........... 16
Majestic Plus Holding International, Inc. v.
Bullion Investment and Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 201017, December 5, 2016 ...................................... 148
Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, 561 SCRA 234,
245, 249 ............................................................................. 10, 609
Malana v. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009 ............. 127
Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phil., Inc. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013 ........................... 691
Mallari v. Arcega, 379 SCRA 537, 550 ........................................... 562
Mallion v., G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006 ............................. 207
Mallo v. Southeast Asian College, Inc., G.R. No. 212861,
October 14, 2015 ..................................................................... 646
Maltos v. Heirs of Borromeo, G.R. No. 172720,
September 14, 2015 ................................................................ 369
Mamba v. Bueno, G.R. No. 191416, February 7, 2017 .................. 589
Mafialac v. Bidan, A.M. No. P-18-3875, October 3, 2018 .............. 736
Mafialac v. Gellada, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2535
October 8, 2018 .................................... :................................... 23
Manalang v. Bacani, G.R. No. 156995,
January 12, 2015, 131 ............................................................ 625
Manalang, et al. v. Bacani, G.R. No. 156995,
January 12, 2015 .................................................................... 625
Manalo v. Ateneo de Naga University, G.R. No. 185058,
November 9, 2015 ................................................... 649, 655,690
Manaloto v. Veloso III, 632 SCRA 347, 362-363 ........................... 195
Mancenido v. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 419, 427 .................... 724
CASE TITLE INDEX 807
Manchester v. Court of Appeals, 233 Phil. 579 (1987) ................. 333
Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, 474 SCRA 153, 162 ...................... 81
Mangila v. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 162, 174-175 .................. l 76
The Manila Banking Corporation v. Bases Conversion
Development Authority, G.R. No. 230144,
January 22, 2018 ...................................................................... 15
Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo,
G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017 ............................................... 640
Manila Electric Company v. Philippine Consumers
Foundation, Inc., 37 4 SCRA 262, 277 ................................... 562
Manliclic v. Calaunan, 512 SCRA 642, 662-663 ............................ 197
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 499 SCRA 21,
33, 35-36 .......................................................... 418, 439, 442, 443
Manuel v. Escalante, G.R. No. 134141,
August 13, 2002 ...................................................................... 736
Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. v. Valbueco, Inc.,
G.R. No. 179594, September 11, 2013 .................................. .471
Marasigan v. Fuentes, G.R. No. 201310, January 11, 2016 ......... 649
Marchadesch v. Vda. de Yepes, 442 SCRA 254, 262 ..................... 561
Marcos v. Pamintuan, 639 SCRA 658, 665 .................................... 570
Maricalum Mining Corporation v. NLRC,
298 SCRA 378, 387 ................................................................. 718
Marikina Development Corporation v. Flojo,
251 SCRA 87, 93 ..................................................................... 590
Marilag v. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015 ................... 202
Marina Properties Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
294 SCRA 273 ......................................................................... 591
Mariscal v. Court of Appeals, 311 SCRA 51, 56 ............................ 199
Martinez v. Buen, G.R. No. 187342, April 5, 2017 ........ 286, 485, 690
Martires v. Chua, 694 SCRA 38, 52-53, March 20, 2013 .............. 615
Maslagv. Monzon, G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013 ..................... 135
Mason v. Court of Appeals, 413 SCRA 303, 310-311 ................... .431
Mathaeus v. Spouses Medequiso, G.R. No. 196651,
February 3, 2016 .................................................................... 308
Mathay v. Consolidated Bank & Trust Company,
58 SCRA 559, 571-572 .................... :....................... 271, 272, 274
Maturan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227155,
March 28, 2017 ....................................................................... 666
Maunlad Trans Inc. v. Isidro, G.R. No. 222699,
July 24, 2017 ................................................................... 641, 646
Maxicare PCIB Cigna Healthcare v. Contreras,
689 SCRA 763, 772, January 30, 2013 .................................... 81
 808 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Mayon Hotel and Restaurant v. Adana, 458 SCRA 609, 629 ........... 6
Mayor Rhustom Dagadag v. Michael C. Tongnawa,
450 SCRA 437, 443-444 .......................................................... 242
Meatworld International, Inc. v. Hechanova,
G .R. No. 208053, October 18, 201 7 ........................................ 302
Medical Plaza Makati Condominium v. Cullen,
G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013 .............................. 72, 145
Mejia- Espinoza v. Carino, G.R. No. 193397,
January 25, 2017 ...................................................................... 61
Melendres v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 194346,
June 18, 2018 .................................................................... 16, 606
Melgar v. Buenviaje, 179 SCRA 196, 201.. .................................... 267
Meliton v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 485, 493 .......................... 365
Mendez v. Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a District,
Cotabato City, G.R. No. 201614,
January 12, 2016 ............................................................. 60, 553
Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, 677 SCRA 27, 50-51 ..................... 164
Mendoza v. De los Santos, 694 SCRA 7 4, 82,
March 20, 2013 ....................................................................... 646
Mendoza v. Doroni, 481 SCRA 41, 52-53 ....................................... 736
Mercader v. DBP, 332 SCRA 82 ............................................. .488-490
Mercene v. Government Service Insurance System,
G.R. No. 192971, January 10, 2018 ....................................... 345
Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang, G.R. No. 197654,
August 30, 2017 ............................................. 569, 570, 571, 576
Mercury Group of Companies v. Home Development
Mutual Fund, 541 SCRA 211 ................................................. 574
Mesina v. Meer, 383 SCRA 625, 634 .............................................. 678
Metals Engineering Resources Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 203 SCRA 273, 285 ..................................... 371, 37 4
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. CPR
Promotions and Marketing, Inc.,
G.R. No. 200567, June 22, 2015 ..................................... 364, 367
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Fadcor, Inc., G.R. No. 197970,
January 25, 2016 ........................................... 495,496,501,647
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Ley Construction and Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 185590, December 3, 2014 ........ 187, 318
Miguel v. JCT Group, Inc., 453 SCRA 529, 541 ........................... 553
Miguel v. Montanez, 664 SCRA 345, 350-353,
January 25, 2012 ............................................................ 775, 776
CASE TITLE INDEX 809
Millare v. Montero, A.C. No. 3283, July 19, 1995 ......................... 298
Millennium Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes,
634 SCRA 708, 713-714 .............................................................. 7
Millennium Industrial Corporation v. Tan,
326 SCRA 563, 569-571.. ....................................................... .430
Miller v. Rowan, 25 Ill., 344 ............................................................. 68
Milwaukee Industries v. Court of Tax Appeals,
636 SCRA 70, 77 ..................................................................... 540
Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 278, 283 ....................... .437
Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 144760-61,
August 2, 2017 ............................................ 15, 66, 608, 689, 694
Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v. David,
468 SCRA 63, 71 ..................................................................... 469
Mitra v. Commission on Elections,
622 SCRA 744, 766-767 ......................................................... 666
Mitra v. Sablan-Gevarra, G.R. No. 213994, April 18, 2018 ............ 14
Modesto v. Urbina, 633 SCRA 383, 391.. ....................................... 135
Momarco Import Company, Inc. v. Villamena,
G.R. No. 192477, July 27, 2016 ............................................. 350
Monarch Insurance v. Court of Appeals,
333 SCRA 71, 93 ............................................................. 352, 353
Mondonedo v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 28, 30 ...................... 495
Montalban v. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070, 1078-1079,
444, 451 ......................................................................•........... 460
Montes v. Court of Appeals, 489 SCRA 432,440 ....... ,................. 298
Montoya v. Escayo, et al., 171 SCRA 442 .............................. 768-769
Monzon Spouses Relova v. Addio Properties, Inc.,
565 SCRA 514, 524 ................................................................. 349
Muller v. Muller, 235 Cal. App. 2d, 341,
45 c·aI. Rptr. 182, 184 ............................................................. 90
Multi-International Business Data System, Inc. v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 175378, November 11, 2015 ................... 99
Multinational Village Homeowners' Association v.
Gacutan, G.R. No. 188307, .
August 2, 2017 ............................................... 569, 570, 572, 654
Municipality of Cordova v. Pathfinder Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 205544, June 29, 2016 ...................... 690
The Municipality of Tangkal v. Balindong,
G.R. No. 193340, January 11, 2017 ...................................... 160
Mufi.oz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737 ...................................................... 221
Mufi.oz v. Yabut, Jr., 650 SCRA 344, 365-367 .............. 224,228,229
 810 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Mutia v. Pacariem, 494 SCRA 448, 453 ........................................ 195
N Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633,
Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 506 SCRA 542, 551 .................................. 651
Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
344 SCRA 781, 786-787 ......................................................... 583
Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation v.
Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation,
G.R. No. 202877, December 9, 2015 ....................................... 80
Nation Petroleum Gas, Incorporated v. Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 183370,
August 17, 2015 ............................. 413,419, 428,431,436, 438
National Association of Electricity Consumers for
Reforms v. Manila Electric Company,
G.R. No. 191150, October 10, 2016 ......................................... 91
National Housing Authority v. Laurito,
G.R. No. 191657, July 31, 2017 ............................ 381, 384, 386
National Power Corporation v. Adiong,
654 SCRA 391, 403-404 ......................................................... 491
National Power Corporation v. Adiong,
AM. No. RTJ-07-2060, July 27, 2011 .................................. 726
National Power Corporation v. The Provincial Treasurer
of Benguet, G.R. No. 209303, November 14, 2016 ............... 595
National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 123215, February 2, 1999 ...................................... 150
National Transmission Corporation v. Heirs of
Ebesa, G.R. No. 186102, February 24, 2016 ........................ 618
Natividad v. MTRCB, 540 SCRA 124, 135 ................................... 646
Nava v. National Bureau of Investigation,
455 SCRA 377, 389 ................................................................ 661
Navaja v. De Castro, G.R. No. 182296, June 22, 2015 ................. 163
Navarro v. Vda. de Taroma, 478 SCRA 336, 344-345 .................. 389
Nayong Pilipino Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 213200,
September 19, 2017 ............................................................... 667
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 637, 653 ...................... 238
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 378 SCRA 28, 34-35 ..................... 561
Neri v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 202243,
August 7, 2013 ............................................................... 545, 546
Neri v. Yu, G.R. No. 230831, September 5, 2018 ................. 643,647
Nepomuceno v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209251,
November 19, 2013 ................................................................ 564
J
CASE TITLE INDEX 811
Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
142 SCRA 171, 176-177 ......................................................... 274
643-644 ............................................................. 4, 9, 10, 594, 603
Nightowl Watchman & Security Agency, Inc. v.
Lumahan, G.R. No. 212096, October 14, 2015 ..................... 653
Nocum v. Tan, 470 SCRA 639 ............................................... 645, 164
North Cotabato Communications Corporation v.
Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 217575, June 15, 2016 ....................... 553
North Greenhills Association, Inc. v. Morales,
G.R. No. 222821, August 9, 2017 ............................................ 72
Northwest .Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
284 SCRA 408, 416 ................................................................ 549
Novino v. Court of Appeals, 8 SCRA 279, 280 .............................. 555
0
Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973,
August 8, 2017 ............................. 17, 18, 19, 245, 694, 722, 723
Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973,
November 8, 2016 ...................................................... 20, 21, 245
Ocean East Agency Corporation v. Lopez,
G.R. No. 194410, October 14, 2015 ....................................... 565
Office of the Ombudsman v. Dechavez,
G.R. No. 176702, November 13, 2013 ..................................... 77
Office of the Ombudsman v. Gutierrez,
G.R. No. 189100, June 21, 2017 ............................................ 381
Oil and Natural Gas Commission v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114323, July 23, 1998 ............... 558
Olav. People, G.R. No. 195547, December 2, 2015 ....................... 391
Oliveros v. Sison, 548 SCRA 265, 271.. ......................................... 309
Olympia-Geronilla v. Montemayor, Jr.,
A.M. No. P-17-3676, June 5, 2017 ........................................ 707
Ong v. Bogfi.albal, G.R. No. 149140, 501 SCRA 490 ..................... 650
Ong v. Co, G.R. No. 206653, February 2~, 2015 ........................... 440
Ong Chia v. Republic, 328 SCRA 749, 756 ....................................... 7
Ong Chia Kwan v. Court of Appeals,
345 SCRA 586, 589-590 ......................................................... 557
Ongco v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 190810, July 18, 2012 ....................... 384
Ong Peng v. Custodio, 1 SCRA 780, 784-785 ............................... 390
Onstott v. Upper Tagpos Neighborhood Association,
Inc., G.R. No. 221047, September 14, 2016 .................... 84, 420
Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792, 802-803 ................................. 275
 812 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v.
Cardline, Inc., G.R. No. 201417,
January 13, 2016 ........................................................... 613 705
Orlina v. Ventura, G.R. No. 227033, ' Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. v .
. December 3, 2018 .................................. 570,572,606,690, 691
Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Ruiz,
148 SCRA 326, 339 ................................................................ 274
Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v.
Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, January 21, io15 .......................296
Osmeiia III v. Abaya, G.R. No. 214756, January 13, 2016 ............ 20
Osmeiia III v. Abaya, G.R. No. 211737, January 13, 2016 .......... 245
Osmeiia III v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation, G.R. No. 212686,
September 26, 2015 ............................................................... 701
p PCI Bank v. Alejandro, 533 SCRA 738, 88 ................................... 417
Pabon v. NLRC, 296 SCRA 7, 14 ................................................... 429
Pace v. Hillcrest Motor Co., 161 Cal. Rptr. 663,
664 Ct. App. 1980 .................................................................. 750
Pacific Consultants v. Schonfeld, 516 SCRA 209, 229 ................. 175
Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v.
Schonfeld, 516 SCRA 209, 229 .............................................. 177
Pacioles, Jr. v. Chuatoco-Ching, 466 SCRA 90, 97-98 ................. 158
Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017 .................................... 245 247
Padilla v. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings
Corporation, G.R. No. 207376, August 6, 2014 .................... 362
Padlan v. Dinglasan, 694 SCRA 91, 98-101,
March 20, 2013 ......................................................... 76, 119 131
Paeste v. Jaurigue, 94 Phil. 179, 181.. ......................................... : 390
Page-Tenorio v. Tenorio, 443 SCRA 560, 569 ............................... 573
Paglaum Management & Development Corporation v.
Union Bank of the Philippines, 673 SCRA 506,
512-516 ............................................................................ l 78 221
Pajares v. Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning, ' People v. Dillatan, Sr., G.R. No. 212191, 'September 5, 2018 ....... 607
G.R. No. 212690, February 20, 2017 .................... 113, 133, 157
Paje v. Casiiio, G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015 ..................... 276
Pallada v. Regional Trial Court of Kalibo
Aklan, Br. I, 304 SCRA 440, 446 ..... '..................................... 705
Palmer v. Glover, 73 Ind., 529 ........................................................ 718
Paloma v. Mora, 470 SCRA 711 ...................................................... 74
CASE TITLE INDEX 813
Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank v. King,
G.R. No. 78252, April 12, 1989, 172 SCRA 60 ..................... 446
Pamintuan v. Tiglao, 53 Phil. 1, 4, .................................................. 77
NLRC, 272 SCRA 737,743,292
Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 51, 59 .......................... 79
Pantaleon v. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761, 765 ................................... 234
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Buncan,
453 SCRA 482, 489 ................................................................ 113
Panuncillo v. CAP Phils., Inc., 515 SCRA 323, 341 .......................... 6
Paramount Insurance Corp. v. A.C. Ordoiiez
Corporation, 561 SCRA 327, 333, 334 .......................... 355, 431
Pascua v. Heirs of Segundo Simeon, 161 SCRA 1, 5 .................... 737
Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561, 562 ............................................ 221
Pascual v. Pascual, 475 SCRA 271, 275 ........................................ 770
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Go Ko,
454 SCRA 586, 592 .................................................................... 3
PCIB v. Alejandro, 533 SCRA 738, 754 ........................................ 451
Pedrosa v. Hill, 327 Phil. 153, 158 (1996) .................................... 333
Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
270 SCRA 82, 92... ........................ .. ................. .................... .. 561
Pen Development Corporation v. Martinez Leyba,
Inc., G.R. No. 211845, August 9, 2017 .................................. 313
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 ................................. 83
' People v. Caballero, G.R. No. 210673, June 29, 2016 .................. 607
People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 543 .................................................. 28
People v. Castillo, Sr., G.R. No. 204419, November 7, 2016 ........ 691
People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267, 288 ......................................... 78
People v. Ceralde, G.R. No. 228894, August 7, 2017 ................... 618
People v. De la Victoria, G.R. No. 233325,
April 16, 2018 ......................................................................... 618
People v. Delector, October 4, 2017 ............................................... 607
People v. Diaz, 691 SCRA 139, 148, February 18, 2013 .............. 621
People v. Diputado, G.R. No. 213922, July 5, 2017 ...................... 618
People v. Ejercito, G.R. No. 229861, July 2, 2018 ........................ 618
People v. Escobar, G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017 ...................... 472
People v. Espinosa, 409 SCRA 256, 261 ....................................... 658
People ex rel. Herndon v. Opekl, 188 Ill 194, 58 NE 996 .............. 29
People v. Flores, 481 SCRA 451, 453 ............................................ 639
People v. Gabriel, 510 SCRA 197,202 .......................................... 321
814 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
People v. Go, G.R. No. 201644, September 24, 2014 ..................... 256
People v. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64, 78 ................................................ 214
People v. Hilario, G.R. No. 210610, January 11, 201.. .................. 606
People v. Ladra, G.R. No. 221443, July 17, 2017 ......................... 607
People v. Layag, G.R. No. 214875, October 17, 2016 ..................... 13
People v. Napoles, G.R. No. 215200, July 26, 2017 ...................... 607
People v. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 24, 2017 ............... 642
People v. Santos, G.R. No. 223142,
January 17, 2018 ........................................................... 618, 642
People v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08,
October 6, 1995 ......................................................................
People v. Tumaru, 319 SCRA 515,528, 560
People v. Woolcock, 244 SCRA 235 ................................................. 23
People ex rel. Herndon v. Opekl, 188 Ill 194, 58 NE 996 .............. 29
Periquet, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
238 SCRA 697 ................................................................ 713, 242
Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186, 189 ............................................... 456
Pesane Animas Mongao v. Pryce Properties Corp.,
467 SCRA 201, 214 ................................................................. 345
Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc.,
635 SCRA 140, 161 ................................................................
Philcontrust Resources, Inc. v. Santiago,
G.R. No. 174760, July 26, 2017 .............................................. 16
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 91332, July 16, 1993 .............................................. 433
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Philippine Airlines
Employees Savings and Loan Association,
Inc., G.R. No. 201073, February 10, 2016 .................... 286,287
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
[PAGCOR] v. Lopez, 474 SCRA 76, 92 ................................. 332
Philippine Association of Detective and Protective
Agency Operators [PADPAO], Region 7 Chapter, Inc.,
G.R. No. 223505, October 3, 2017 .................................. 665-666
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Go,
642 SCRA 693, 705-707, February 14, 2011 ................ 339, 583
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo,
500 SCRA 242, 247-248 ......................................................... 177
Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan,
230 SCRA 413, 420 ...............................................................
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v.
Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58,
G.R. No. 178193, October 5, 2016 ......................................... 237
CASE TITLE INDEX 815
Philippine Coconut Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] v.
Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, October 5, 2016 .......... 739-740
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation,
Inc. [COCOFED] v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 177857-58,
178193, October 5, 2016 ............................. 83-84, 237, 739-740
Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Alejandro, 533 SCRA 738, 752-754 ...................................... 460
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation v. Amalgamated
Management and Development
617 Corporation, 658 SCRA 273-282 ........................................... 504
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation v. Philippine Infrastructures, Inc.,
419 SCRA 6, 14-15 ................................................................. 392
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Our
Lady of Lourdes Hospital, G.R. No. 193158,
November 11, 2015 ......................................... 516, 522-523, 528
Philippine National Bank v. Arcobillas,
G.R. No. 179648, August 7, 2013 .......................................... 694
Philippine National Bank v. Bondoc, 14 SCRA 770,
309 770-772 ........................................................................... 714, 715
Philippine National Bank v. Dalmacio,
G.R. No. 202308, July 5, 2017 .............................................. 641
Philippine National Bank v. Gregorio,
G.R. No. 194944, September 18, 2017 .................. 655, 656, 693
Philippine National Bank v. Manalo,
G.R. No. 174433, February 24, 2014 .................................... 394
Philippine National Bank v. Paneda, 515 SCRA 639, 649 .......... 591
Philippine National Bank v. Pasimio,
G.R. No. 205590, September 2, 2015 ............................ 107, 628
Philippine National Bank v. Sps Manalo,
G.R. No. 174433, February 24, 2014 .................................... 394
Philippine Numismatic and Antiquarian Society v.
Aquino, G.R. No. 206617, January ?O,2017 ................ 242,249
Philippine Reconstruction Corporation, Inc. v.
Aparente, 45 SCRA 217,222 ................................................ 716
Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Cagayan Electric
Power and Light Co., Inc., 381 SCRA 582, 591 ..................... 23
174
Philippine Steel Coating Corporation v. Quinones,
G.R. No. 194533, April 17, 2017 ........................................... 497
Philippine Surety and Insurance Co. v. Zabal,
21 SCRA 682, 685 .................................................................. 744
816 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Aligway,
G.R. No. 201793, September 16, 2015 .................................. 641
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Cristino,
G.R. No. 188638, December 9, 2015 ..................................... 647
Philippine Trust Company v. Court of Appeals,
320 SCRA 719, 729 ................................................................ 244
Philippine Trust Company v. Roxas,
G.R. No. 171897, October 14, 2015 ....................................... 705
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 78 SCRA 645 ............................................. 709
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Spouses Sabado,
G.R. No. 224204, August 30, 2017 ................................ 253,254
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Cual,
G.R. No. 207684, July 17, 2017 ............................................ 574
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Paras,
G.R. No. 161909. April 25, 2012 ........................................... 379
Pia v. Gervacio, G.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013 ........................... 660
Pilapil v. Heirs of Briones, 514 SCRA 197, 201.. ............................ 16
Pilipinas Makro, Inc. v. Coco Charcoal Phils., Inc.,
G.R. No. 196419, October 4, 2017 ........................................... 15
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner
of Customs, G.R. No. 195876, June 19, 2017 ....................... 562
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner
of Custqms, G.R. No. 195876, December 5, 2016 ................. 581
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Royal Ferry
Services, Inc., G.R. No. 188146, February 1, 2017 ...... 164, 621
PILTEL v. NTC, 410 SCRA 82, 88 ........................................ 195, 689
Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, 494 SCRA 393, 398, 413 ............. 11, 37 4
Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v.
Hontanosas, 78 SCRA 447, 461 ............................................ 493
Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development
Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 279 SCRA 312, 322 ......................................... 429
Planters Development Bank v. Ramos, G.R. No. 228617,
September 20, 2017 ................................................................ 174
Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
317 SCRA 195,204, 725
Plasabas v. Court of Appeals, 582 SCRA 686, 692-693 ................ 257
Plata v. Torres, 570 SCRA 12, 17-18 ............................................. 559
PNB v. Deloso, 32 SCRA 266 ......................................................... 714
Polomolok Water District v. Polomolok
General Consumers Association, Inc.,
636 SCRA 647, 652-653 ......................................................... 151
CASE TITLE INDEX 817
Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, 30 SCRA 187, 191 ................... 175
Ponciano v. Parentela, 331 SCRA 605, 611 .................................. 370
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 198146, August 8, 2017 ............................................ 75
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation [PSALM] v. Maunlad Homes, Inc.,
G.R. No. 215933, February 8, 2017 .............................. 739, 740
Presidential Commission on Good Government [PCGG]
v. Dumayas, G.R. No. 209447, August 11, 2015 .......... 292,307
Prieto v. Alpadi Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 191025, July 31, 2013 ............................................... 16
Prieto v. Court of Appeals, 673 SCRA 371 ................................... 179
Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446, 452 ............................................ 2
Primo v. Mendoza Vda. de Erederos, G.R. Nos. 172532
and 172544-45, November 20, 2013 .......................................... 7
Prince Transport, Inc. v. Garcia, 639 SCRA 312, 330 .................. 287
Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 301 SCRA 637,647 ......................................... 199, 650
Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Banque National de
Paris, 460 SCRA 260, 276 ...................................................... 332
The Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and
Development Corporation, G.R. Nos. 197592
and 202623, November 27, 2013 .................................. 73-74, 76
Pulgar v. RTC, G.R. No. 157583, September 20, 2014 ................. 382
Pulumbarit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 153745-46,
October 14, 2015 .................................................................... 297
Puncia v. Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc., G.R. No. 214399,
June 28, 2016 ................................................................. 545, 546
Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People, G.R. No. 194214,
January 10, 2018 ................................................... 606, 690, 691
Purcon v. MRM Philippines, Inc.,
566 SCRA 645, 651-653 .......................................................... 677
Q
Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, 470 SCRA 73, 80 ........................... 675
Querubin v. Commission on Elections En Banc,
G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015 ..................................... 665
Quezon City v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,
567 SCRA 496, 508-509 .................................................. 627, 636
Quillopa v. Quality Guards Services and Investigation
Agency, G.R. No. 213814, December 2, 2015 ........................ 691

818 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Quilo v. Bajao, G.R. No. 186199, September 7, 2016 ................... 628
Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,
531 SCRA 104 ................................................. 112-114, 131, 136
Quiros v. Arjona, 425 SCRA 57, 63 ................................................ 774
R G.R. No. 203039, September 11, 2013 .......................... 325, 331
R. Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
241 SCRA 77, 83 .................................................................... 429
Raboca v. Velez, 341 SCRA 543 .................................................... 581
Racpan v. Barroga-Haigh, G.R. No. 234499,
June 6, 2018 ................................................................... 166, 169
Radiowealth Finance Corporation v. Del Rosario,
G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000 .............................................. 550
Rama v. Moises, G.R. No. 197146, August 8, 2017 .................. 22, 23
Ramiscal, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213716,
October 10, 2017 .................................................................... 187
Ramos v. Alvendia, 568 SCRA 239, 249 ......................................... 16
Ram's Studio and Photographic Equipment, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 691, 697 .................................. 571
Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation v.
Villa, G.R. No. 184197, February 11, 2010 .......................... .420
Raut-Raut v. Gaputan, A.M. No. P-14-3214,
September 14, 2015 ............................................................... 707
Rayo v. Metrobank, 539 SCRA 571, 579 ....................................... 241
RCPI v. Court of Appeals, 488 SCRA 306 ...................................... 574
Real Bank, Inc. V; Samsung Mabuhay Corporation,
633 SCRA 124, 134 ................................................................. 495
Reblora v. Armed Forces of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 195842, June 18, 2013 ............................................ 666
Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800, 809-810 ............... 429
Rebultan v. Spouses Daganta, G.R. No. 197908,
July 4, 2018 .................................................................... 641, 645
Reburiano v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 342, 349 ..................... 710
Redeiia v. Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA 389, 400 ......................... 672
Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 162 ......................................... 224
Regalado v. Go, 514 SCRA 616, 634 ....................................... 335, 618
Regulus Development, Inc. v. De la Cruz,
G.R. No. 198172, January 25, 2016 ................... 15, 80, 292, 706
Reicon Realty Builders Corporation v. Diamond Dragon
Realty and Management, Inc.,
G.R. No. 204796, February 4, 2015 ...................................... .420
CASE TITLE INDEX 819
Remington Industrial Sales v. Court of Appeals,
382 SCRA 499, 506 ................................................................. 390
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit of RTC Brs. 29 and 59,
Toledo City, 292 SCRA 8, 21-22 ............................................. 559
Republic v. Atlas Farms, 345 SCRA 296, 300 ................................. 77
Republic v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,
Republic v. Bolante, G.R. No. 190357, April 17, 2017 .................. 297
Republic v. Caguioa, 691 SCRA 306, 316-317,
February 20, 2013 ............................................................ 22, 322
Republic v. Cortez, G.R. No. 197472, September 7, 2015 ............ 246
Republic v. Cortez, G.R. No. 187527, February 7, 2017 ............... 627
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 344, 349-350 ................. 719
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 600, 606 ........................ 228
Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187488,
January 9, 2017 .............................................................. 547, 548
Republic v. Diaz- Enriquez, 694 SCRA 102, 112,
March 20, 2013 ....................................................................... 484
Republic v. Estipular, 336 SCRA 333, 340 ...................................... 69
Republic v "G" Holdings, Inc., 475 SCRA 608,
617-6.19 ...................................................................... 61, 682, 684
Republic v Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673,
Janu;ry 11, 2016 .................................................................... 339
Republic v. Glasgow Credit and Collection
Services, Inc., 542 SCRA 95, 112 ............................................. 88
Republic v. Heirs of Oribello, Jr., 692 SCRA 645,
647 645 March 6 2013 ......................................... 545, 546, 566
Republic ' v. Herbieto,
' ' SCRA 183, 196 ....................................... ~O
459 7
Republic v. Ilao, 4 SCRA 106, 112 ................ _............................. ···· 3
Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,
498 SCRA 220, 229-230 .................................................. 288, 290
Republic v. Ker & Company, Ltd., 18 SCRA 207,
213-214 ...................................................................................... 85
Republic v. Ker & Co. Ltd., G.R. L-21609,
September 29, 1966 ...................... :......................................... 420
Republic v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 170966, June 22, 2016 ........... 99, 644
Republic v. Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338, 344 ......................... 627, 6!!
Republic v. Nolasco, 457 SCRA 400, 408 ....................................... 5
Republic v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 189590,
April 23, 2018 ........................................................................ 658
Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Corporation,
G.R. No. 209234, December 9, 2015 ..................................... 640
 CASE TITLE INDEX 821
820 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I

Republic v. Principalia Management and Personnel Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental
Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 198426, Wood Processing Corporation, G.R. No. 152228,
September 2, 2015 .................................................................. 152 September 23, 2005 ................................................................ 432
Republic v. Resins, Inc., 639 SCRA 390, 401-402, Riosa v. Tabaco La Suerte Corporation, G.R. No. 203786,
January 12, 2011 .................................................................... 328 October 23, 2013 ..................................................................... 642
Republic v. Roque, G.R. No. 204603, September 24, 2013 ........... 691 Rivera v. Del Rosario, 419 SCRA 626, 635 .................................... 332
Republic v. Rosario, G.R. No. 186635, January 27, 2016 ............ 562 Rivera-Calingasan v. Rivera, G.R. No. 171555,
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 301 SCRA 237,245, 540 April 17, 2013 ......................................................................... 266
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 540 SCRA 431, 444-445, Riviera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings, B.V.,
G.R. No. 173783, June 17, 2015 ..................................... 198, 199
448-449, .................................................................. 356, 359 464
Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 ..... 296, 300: 385 Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Serra,
G.R. No. 203241, July 10, 2013 ............................................ 719
Republic v. Spouses Luriz, 513 SCRA 140, 151 ........................... 619
Rizal Surety & Insurance Company v. Manila Railroad
Republic v. Tuvera, 516 SCRA 113, 130-131, 136 ................ 549, 550
Corporation, 70 SCRA 187 .................................................... 261
Republic of the Philippines v. Domingo,
Roasters Philippines, Inc. v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 191874,
657 SCRA 621, 632 ........................ ,........................ 636, 418, 435
September 2, 2015 ......................................................... 484, 598
Republic of the Philippines v. Ortigas Company
Robert Development Corporation v. Quitain,
Limited Partnership, G.R. No. 171496, 315 SCRA 150, 160 ................................................................. 296
March 3, 2014 ......................................................................... 592 Robinson v. Miralles, 510 SCRA 678, 683-684 ...................... 445, 446
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Tafion Rodil v. Benedicto, 95 SCRA 137, 144-145 .................................... 720
Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises,
Roldan v. Barrios, G.R. No. 214803,
and other Cetacean Species, Joined in and April 23, 2018 ............................................... 21, 22, 23, 138, 157
Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Sta.
Estenzo Ramos and Rose- Liza Eisma-Osorio Teresa, G.R. No. 179181, November 18, 2013 ..................... 641
In Their Capacity as Legal Guardians of the Lesser '
Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, 401 SCRA 762,
Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of God's v. 765, 770 ................................................................ 93, 94, 224, 228
Reyes, in his capacity as Secretary of the Romullo v. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng
Department of Energy, G.R. No. 180771, Bayanihan Compound Homeowner's
April 21, 2015 ........................................................................ 253 Association, G.R. No. 180687, October 6, 2010 ..................... 637
Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan [First Division], Rosales v. Energy Regulatory Commission,
July 24, 2018, ......................................................... 563, 607, 691 G.R. No. 2001852, April 5, 2016 ............................................ 703
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 38 SCRA 138, 151, ............................. 365 Rosario v. Carandang, 96 Phil. 845, 851.. ...................................... 398
Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 370, 377-378 ..................... 728
June 25, 2013 .............................................................................. 6 Roxas v. Dinglasan, 28 SCRA 430, 433 ......................................... 384
Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 487 ...................................................... 90 Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Reyes v. Lim, 408 SCRA 560, 566 .................................................... 19 Philippines, Inc.-Cebu Plant, G.R. No. 198783,
Reyes v. Mauricio, 636 SCRA 79, 85 .............................................. 644 April 15, 2013 .:...................................................................... 658
Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 193034, July 20, 2015 .......................... 335 Royales v. IAC, 127 SCRA 4 70 ....................................................... 764
Rigor v. Consolidated Orix Leasing and Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development
Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 136423, Corporation v. Formaran III, 578 SCRA 283, 305 ................ 156
August 20, 2002 ...................................................................... 181 Rudecon Management Corporation v. Singson,
Riguer v. Mateo, G.R. No. 222538, June 21, 2017 ......................... 325 454 SCRA 612, 627-629, ........................................ 556, 557, 565
 822 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Russel v. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738-739,
744-746 ............................................. 137, 150-151, 153, 154, 157
s Sanico v. Colipano, G.R. No. 209969, September 27, 2017 .......... 245
Sabellina v. Buray, G.R. No. 187727, September 2, 2015 ............. 100
Sablas v. Sablas, 526 SCRA 292,
296-299, 398 ............................. 350, 351,354, 355, 356, 357, 358
Saguid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611,
June 10, 2003, ........................................................................ 501
Salas v. Quinga, 13 SCRA 143, 145-146, ...................................... 730
Salazar v. Felias, G.R. No. 213972, February 5, 2018 ................. 709
Saligumba v. Palanog, 573 SCRA 8,
15-16 ............................................................................... 266, 712
Salting v. Velez, 639 SCRA 124, 131; See also
Multinational Village Homeowners' Association v.
Gacutan, G.R. No. 188307, August 2, 2017 .......................... 571
Saludo v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 193138,
August 20, 2018 ..................................................................... 239
Salvador v. Mapa, 539 SCRA 34, 44 ............................................. 661
Salvador v. Ortoll, 343 SCRA 658, 668 .......................................... 578
Salvador v. Patricia, Inc.,
G.R. No. 195834, November 9,
2016 ....................... 60, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 127, 164, 211, 214
Salvador v. Rabaja, G.R. No. 199990,
February 4, 2015 .................................................................... 349
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan [SPARK] v.
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017 .............. 20, 702
Samartino v. Raon, 383 SCRA 664, 673 ........................................ 358
Samson v. Cabanas, 461 SCRA 545, 574
Samson v. Court of Appeals, 105 SCRA 781, 787 ........................ .494
Samson v. Spouses Gabor, G.R. No. 182970,
July 23, 2014 .......................................................................... 170
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 540 ................................... 13
Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014 .................. .
282-283
Sanchez v. Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459 .................................................. 769
Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. and Rimport Industries, Inc. v.
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy [PMMA],
G.R. No. 188633, April 10, 2013 ........................................... 560
Sang-an v. Equator Knights Detective and Security
Agency, Inc., 690 SCRA 534, 541,
February 13, 2013 ................................................................. 688
CASE TITLE INDEX 823
Sangguniang Barangay of Pangasugan, Baybay,
Leyte v. Exploration Permit Application of Philippine
National Oil Company, September 2, 2013 ......................... 570
San Juan v. Cruz, 497 SCRA 410, 425-426 .................................. 263
San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group, Inc. v.
Bayang, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015 .............................. 595
San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
288 SCRA 115, 126 ................................................................. 192
San Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan,
340 SCRA 289, 321 ................................................................... 76
San Pedro v. Asdala, 593 SCRA 397 .............................................. 124
San Pedro Cineplex Properties, Inc. v. Heirs of Manuel
Humada Enafio, 635 SCRA 421, 424-425 ............................ 355
Santamaria v. Cleary, G.R. No. 197122, June 15, 2016 ............... 512
Sante v. Claravall, G.R. No. 173195, February 22, 2010 ............. 112
Santiago v. Delos Santos, 61 SCRA 146, 149-150 ............... 277,278
Santiago Land Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 267 SCRA 79, 87 ................................................ 254
Santo Tomas University v. Surla, 294 SCRA 382,
392-393 ........................................................................... 306, 370
Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 235058,
September 4, 2018, 708
Santos v. PNOC Exploration Corporation,
566 SCRA 272, 278, 280 ........................................ 235, 419, 448
Santos Yllana Realty Corporation v. Deang,
G.R. No. 190043, June 21, 2017 ............................................ 554
Sarmiento v. Juan, 120 SCRA 403, 408 ................................ 370, 493
Sarmiento v. Mendiola, 638 SCRA, 345, 350,
December 15, 2010 ................................................................ 733
Sarmiento v. Zaratan, 514 SCRA 246, 257, 260 ..................... 13, 292
Saw v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 740, 745-746 ........ 238, 381-382
Saw v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90580, April 8, 1991 .............. 385
Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 260 Iowa 556,
149 N.W.2d 789, 792 ...................... -............................................ 1
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
327 SCRA 135, 140 ................................................................. 191
Sebastian v. Cruz, G.R. No. 220940, March 20, 2017 ................... 684
Seno v. Mangubat, 156 SCRA 113, 119 ......................................... 259
Senarlo v. Judge Paderanga, 617 SCRA 247, 253-254 ................. 495
Serna v. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 527, 533 ............................ 560
Serrano v. Delica, 465 SCRA 82, 88-89 ......................................... 134
Serrano v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-16153, December 29, 1960 ............ 578
824 CML PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Shioji v. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333, 342 .................................................... 3
Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 186, 196 .......................... 219
Sibal v. Buquel, G.R. No. 197825, January 11, 2016 .... 680, 683,684
Sibayan v. Costales, G.R. No. 191492, July 4, 2016 ...................... 621
Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton, 252
Silverio, Jr. v. Filipino Business Consultants, Inc.,
466 SCRA 584, 594, 595 ................................................. 556, 557
Sime Darby Employees Association v. NLRC,
510 SCRA 204, 217, 222 .................................................... 6, 609
Smart Communications, Inc. v. Aldecoa, G.R. No. 166330,
September 11, 2013 ............................................................... 583
Smith Bell Co. v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530, 542 ............... 17
SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and
Development Authority, G.R, No. 203655,
September 7, 2015 .................................................................. 380
SM Systems Corporation (formerly Springsun
Management Systems Corporation v. Camerino,
G.R. No. G.R. No. 178591, March 29, 2017 .......................... 577
So v. Court of Appeals, 388 SCRA 107, 111.. ................................ 709
Social Justice Society v. Atienza, 545 SCRA 92, 114 .................... 552
Social Justice Society v. Drilon, G.R. No. 208493,
November 15, 2013 ................................................................ 564
Societe Des Produits, Nestle, S.A. v. Puregold Price
Club, Inc., G.R. No. 217194, September 6, 2017 .......... 295,302
Soledad v. Mamangun, 8 SCRA 110 .............................................. 397
Solidbank Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 166581, December 7, 2015 ...................................... 569
Solidbank Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
379 SCRA 159, 166 ................................................................. 708
South Cotabato Communications Corporation v.
Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 173326, December 15, 2010 ................ 303
South Cotabato Communications Corporation v.
Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 217575, June 15, 2016 ............... 554, 683
Specified Contractors & Development, Inc. v.
Pobocan, G.R. No. 212472, January 11, 2018 ...................... 154
Spouses Agbada v. Inter-Urban Developers,
389 SCRA 430, 432 ................................................................. 582
Spouses Butiong v. Plazo, G.R. No. 187524,
August 5, 2015 ....................................................................... 198
Spouses Carpio v. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, 489 SCRA 492, 497 .............................................. 306
Spouses de los Santos v. Carpio, 501 SCRA 390, 399-400 ............ 350
CASE TITLE INDEX 825
Spouses Erorita v. Spouses Dumlao, G.R. No. 195477,
January 25, 2016 ........................................................ 71, 81, 613
Spouses Gaditano v. San Miguel Corporation,
G.R. No. 188767, July 24, 2013 ............................................. 668
Spouses Lam v. Kodak Philippines, Ltd.,
G.R. No. 167615, January 11, 2016 ....................................... 641
Spouses Lantin v. Lantion, 499 SCRA 718, 722-723 ............ 175, 178
Spouses Larry and Flora Davis v. Spouses
Florencio and Lucresia Davis, G.R. No. 196795,
March 7, 2018 ......................................................... 694, 711, 730
Spouses Latoja v. Lim, G.R. No. 198925, July 13, 2016 ............... 695
Spouses Laus v. Optimum Security Services, Inc.,
G.R. No. 208343, February 3, 2016 .............................. 241, 257
Spouses Lee v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 218867, February 17, 2016 ..................................... 607
Spouses Nice v. Equitable PCI-Bank,
516 SCRA 231, 251-252 .......................................................... 695
Spouses Nicolas and Sarigumba v. Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Association, G.R. No. 179566,
October 19, 2016 ..................................................................... 654
Spouses Reyes v. Spouses Chung, G.R. No. 228112,
September 13, 2017 ........................................................ 296, 299
Spouses Rosario v. Alvar, G.R. No. 212731,
September 6, 2017 .................................................................. 475
Spouses Sabitsana v. Muertegui, G.R. No. 181359,
August 5, 2013 ...................................................... ;................. 125
Spouses Sanchez v. Vda. de Aguilar, G.R. No. 228680,
September 17, 2018 ............................. 60, 68, 70, 680, 685, 686
Spouses Santos v. Court of Appeals, 337 SCRA 67, 74 .................. 91
Spouses Santos v. Spouses Lumbao, 519 SCRA 408,
422-423 .................................................................................... 766
Spouses Saraza v. Francisco, G.R. No. 198718,
November 27, 2013 ................................................. 154, 170, 219
Spouses Sibay v. Spouses Bermudez,
G.R. No. 198196, July 17, 2017 ............................................. 540
Spouses Tatlonghari v. Bangko Kabayan-Ibaan
Rural Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 219783, August 3, 2016 ............. 389
Spouses Tea:fio v. The Municipality of Navotas,
G.R. No. 205814, February 15, 2016 ............................ 679, 681
Spouses Trayvilla v. Sejas, G.R. No. 204970,
February 1, 2016 .................................................................... 156
Springfield Development Corporation v. RTC of
Misamis Oriental, 514 SCRA 326, 340 .................................. 687
 I
: !

826 CML PROCEDURE CASE TITLE INDEX 827

THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I

Sps. Manila v. Sps. Manzo, G.R. No. 163602,
September 7, 2011 .................................................................. 685
Sps. Versola v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 164740, July 31, 2006 ............................................. 739
Star Electric Corporation v. R & G Construction
Development and Trading, Inc., G.R. No. 212058,
December 7, 2015· .................................................................. 644
Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association
[Bermuda] v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 196072,
September 20, 2017 ......................................................... 304-305
Stonehill v. Diokno; 20 SCRA 383 .................................................. 237
St. Luke's College of Medicine v. Spouses Perez,
G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016 ........................... 253, 254
St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494,
508-509 .................................................................... 101, 105, 655
Strait Times v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 714, 723 .................. 684
Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
179 SCRA 117, 127 ................................................................. 729
Sugni Holdings and Development Corporation
v. Paredes-Encinareal, AM. No. RTJ-08-2102,
October 14, 2015 ..................................................................... 722
Suico Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
301 SCRA 212, 213 ................................................................... 23
Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. v. Araneta, 72 SCRA 347,
356-377 ............................................................................ 271, 273
Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corporation,
G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015 ............................................... 12
Summit Trading and Development Corporation v.
Avendano, 135 SCRA 397 .............................................. 400, 429
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,
170 SCRA 27 4, 285 ................................................................. 332
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,
252 Phil. 280 (1989) ............................................................... 333
Sunrise Garden Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 158836, September 30, 2015 .................................. .415
Suntay v. Gocolay, 470 SCRA 627, 638 ........................................... 68
Supapo v. Spouses de Jesus, G.R. No. 198356,
April 20, 2015 ................................................................ 131, 136
Supena v. De la Rosa, 267 SCRA 1, 11, 14 ........................... 174, 178
Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 455 SCRA 175 ............................................ 395, 396
Swedish Match Philippines v. The Treasurer of the
City of Manila, G.R. No. 181277, July 3, 2013 ..................... 304
Sweet Lines, Inc. v. Teves, 83 SCRA 361, 372 .............................. 180
Swire Realty Development Corporation v.
Specialty Contracts General and Construction
Services, Inc., G.R. No. 188027, August 9, 2017 ................... 64 7
Systems and Plan Integrator and Development
Corporation v. Municipal Government of Murcia,
G.R. No. 217121, March 16, 2016 ................................. .485, 611
Systems Factors Corporation v. NLRC,
346 SCRA 149, 152 ................................................................. 650
Sy-Vargas v. The Estate of Ogsos, Jr., G.R. No. 221062,
October 5, 2016 ............................... 334, 362, 363, 364, 369, 372
T
Tadeja v. People, 691 SCRA 252, 267, February 20, 2013 ........... 563
Tagalog v. Lim Vda. de Gonzalez, G.R. No. 201286,
July 18, 2014 ...................................................................... 63, 64
Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco
Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 181369,
June 22, 2016 ......................................................................... 472
Talsan v. Baliwag Transit, Inc., 310 SCRA 156, 163-164 ............ 429
Talusan v. Tayag, 356 SCRA 263, 276 .......................................... 229
Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584, 588 ................................... 219, 228
Tamblot Security & General Services, Inc. v. Item,
G.R. No. 199314, December 7, 2015 ..................................... 644
Tan v. Cinco, G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016 ............................... 79
Tan v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 237, 244 ............................... 743
Tan v. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 524, 537 ................................... 5
Tan v. Jangas, G.R. No. 200285, March 20, 2017 ........................ 643
Tan v. Matsuura, G.R. No. 179003, January 9, 2013 .................. 668
Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 216756, August 8, 2018 ...................... 266
Tan v. Republic, 523 SCRA 203, 211-212 .............................. 619, 620
Tanchuling v. Cantela, G.R. No. 209284,
November 10, 2015 ................................................................ 644
Tanhueco v. Aguilar, 33 SCRA 2;33, 237 ....................................... 266
Tankiko v. Cezar, 302 SCRA 559, 570 .. .-.................................... 17-18
Tapay v. Bancolo, 694 SCRA 1, 9-10, March 20, 2013 ................. 290
Te v. Breva, G.R. No. 164974, August 5, 2015 ............................. 691
Techno Development & Chemical Corporation v.
Viking Metal Industries, Incorporated,
G.R. No. 203179, July 4, 2016 .............................................. 647
Tecson v. Gutierrez, 452 SCRA 781, 787 ....................................... 201
Teng v. Ting, G.R. No. 184237, September 21, 2016 .................... .472
 CASE TITLE INDEX 829
828 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I

Terelay Investment and Development Corporation v.
T Yulo, G.R. No. 160924, August 5, 2015 ................................... 99
T~rry v. P~ople, 314 SCRA 669, 673 ............................................. 711
~Jam v. S1bonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35 ..................................... 80 81
T~ng v. Heirs of Diego Lirio, 518 SCRA 334, 338 ......................... 225
Tmg v. Heirs of Diego Lirio, et al., G.R. No 168913
.. March 14, 2007 ................................................. '...................... 721
T~mo ~· Man~ano, 307 SCRA 460, 467 ........................................... 489
T10ros10-Espmosa v. Hofileiia-Europa, G.R. No. 185746,
. Ja~uary 20, 2016 ............................................................ 694, 696
Tm v. Middleton, 310 SCRA 580, 586 ........................................... .490
Todd v. United States, 158 US 278, 39 L Ed 982,
15 S ct. 889 ................................................................................ 29
Toledo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167838,
August 5, 2015 ........................................................................ 156
Tolentino v. Social Security Commission,
138 SCRA 428, 434 .................................................................. 69
Tomas v. Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
[CIDG], G:R. No. 208090, November 9, 2016 ................. 11, 296
Tongonan Holdmg and Development Corporation v.
Escano, Jr., G.R. No. 190994, September 7, 2011 ............... 588
Torbela v. Rosarion, 661 SCRA 633, December 7, 2011 ............... 767
Torrefranca, et al. v. Albiso, 102 Phil. 732 .................................... 717
Torres v. Aruego, G.R. No. 201271, September 20, 2017 ................ 82
Torres v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 24, 35 ................................ 399
Torres v. De Leon, G.R. No. 199440, January 18, 2016 ................ 306
Trajano v. Cruz, 80 SCRA 712 ....................................................... 356
Travel & Tours Advisers, Incorporated v. Cruz, Sr.,
. G .R. No. 199282, March 14, 2016 .................................. 197, 644
Tr11lanes IV v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451,
. ~arch 14, 2018 ................................. 21, 190, 191, 193,194,470
Tr1m1ca v. Polaris Marketing Corp., G.R. No. L-29887,
.. October 28, 1974 .................................................................... 415
Trm1dad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415
423-424 .................................................................. '.................. 4 76
Trocio v. Labayo, 53 SCRA 97, 100 ................................................ 535
Trust International Paper Corporation v. Pelaez,
G.R. No. 164871, August 22, 2006 ......................................... 610
Trust International Paper Corporation v. Pelaez,
499 SCRA 552, 561 ................................................................ 672
Tujan-Militante v. Nustad, G.R. No. 209518,
June 19, 2017 ................................................................. 418, 420
Tumagan v. Kairuz, G.R. No. 198124,
September 12, 2018 ....................................... 145, 253, 254, 255
Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, 340 SCRA 765, 774 ....................... 552
Tung Ho Steel Enterprises Corporation v.
Ting Guan Trading Corporation,
G.R. No. 182153, April 7, 2014 ...................................... 351, 478
Turner v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, 636 SCRA 13, 30,
November 24, 2010 ......................................................... 186, 187
Typoco, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 221857, August 16, 2017 ............. 659
u
Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 167246, July 20, 2011 .............................. 199-200, 204
Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corporation,
654 SCRA 155, 161-163 .......................................................... 299
Umali v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 228628,
July 25, 2017 ........................................................... 246, 247, 563
Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284,
April 18, 2017 ............................................................... 20, 25, 73
Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284,
October 20, 2015 ....................................................................... 72
Ungria v. Court of Appeals, 654 SCRA 314, 324-325 .................... 150
Unicapital, Inc. v. Consing, Jr., G.R. No. 192073,
September 11, 2013 ................................................................ 209
Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan, G.R. No. 179367,
January 29, 2014 ................................................. .................. 668
Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
267 SCRA 759, 776, 777 ......................................................... 176
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Maunlad Homes,
Inc., 678 SCRA 539, 550, August 15, 2012 ............................ 173
Union Bank of the Philippines v. People,
667 SCRA 113, 122 ................................................................. 163
United Alloy Philippines Corporation v. United
Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 179257,
November 23, 2015 ........................ :........................................ 167
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc.,
674 SCRA 92, 104, 114, June 20, 2012 ............................ 81, 248
United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. v. Valmores,
G.R. No. 201018, July 12, 2017 ............................................ 555
United Coconut Planters Bank v. Spouses Uy,
G.R. No. 204039, January 10, 2018 ....................................... 563

830 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
United Overseas Bank v. Ros (G.R. No. 171532,
August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 334, 353 ...................................... 333
United Tourist Promotions v. Kemplin,
G.R. No. 205463, February 5, 2014 ....................................... 641
Universal Robina Corporation v. Lim, 535 SCRA 95, 99 ............. 173
University of the East v. Masangkay,
G.R. No. 226727, April 15, 2018 ............................................ 563
University of the East v. Pepanio, G.R. No. 193897,
January 23, 2013 .................................................................... 304
University of the Immaculate Conception v. Office of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment,
G.R. Nos. 178085-178086, September 14, 2015 ...................... 78
Uy v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 69, 77 ..................................... 243
Uy v. Court of Appeals, 494 SCRA 535, 545 .................................. 256
Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173186,
September 16, 2015 ................................................ 295, 301, 308
Uy v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 223610, July 24, 2017 .............. 418, 419
Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation,
503 SCRA 704, 712- 713 ................................................. 602, 603
Uy v. Javellana, 680 SCRA 13, September 5, 2012 ...................... 765
U.S. v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321, 327 .............................................. 17
V Villalon v. Lirio, G.R. No. 183869, August 3, 2015 ...................... 314
Valdevieso v. Damalerio, 451 SCRA 638, 671 .............................. 417
Valdez v. Dabon, Jr., A.C. No. 7353,
November 16, 2015 ........................................................ 341, 342
Valentin v. Sta. Maria, 55 SCRA 40 ............................................. 561
Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 92,
99-101-102 ······································································227, 451
Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy, G.R. No. L-63277,
November 29, 1983 ................................................................. 771
Vda. de Formoso v. Philippine National Bank,
G.R. No. 154704, June 1, 2011.. ............................................. 643
Vda. de Formoso v. Philippine National Bank,
650 SCRA 35, 44-45, G.R. No. 154704,
Junel,2011,291,292,305,311
Vda. de Haberer v. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 534 .................. 264
Vda. de Herrera v. Bernardo, 650 SCRA 87, 97-98 ......................... 81
Vda. de Herrera v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 170251,
June 1, 2011 ........................................................................... 119
Vda. de Quiambao v. Manila Motor Co., 3 SCRA 444, 450 ........... 712
CASE TITLE INDEX 831
Vda. de Rojales v. Dime, G.R. No. 194548,
February 10, 2016 ................................................................. 242
Vda. de Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 305,
308-309, 311 ........................................................... 264,265,266
Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 329 SCRA 392 ................................. 582
Velasquez v. Cruz, G.R. No. 191479,
September 21, 2015 ................................................................ 135
Velayo-Fong v. Spouses Velayo, 510 SCRA 320,
329-332 ............................................................. 91, 415, 447, 454
Velez v. Demetrio, 387 SCRA 232, 238 ........................................... 18
Verginesa-Suarez v. Dilag, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014,
August 16, 2011 ..................................................................... 599
Versoza v. Fernandez, 49 Phil. 627, 633-634 ................................ 239
Vette Industrial Sales Company, Inc. v. Cheng,
509 SCRA 532, 543 ..................................................... ····... · 65-66
V-Gent, Inc. v. Morning Star Travel and Tours,
G.R. No. 186305, July 22, 2015 ............................................ 243
Viacrusis v. Estenzo, G.R. L-18457, June 30, 1962 ....................... 357
Victory Liner v. Belosillo, 425 SCRA 79, 89 .................................... 77
Vidal v. Escueta, 417 SCRA 617,627, 630-631 ............ 773, 774, 776
Viewmaster Construction Corporation v. Roxas,
335 SCRA 540, 546 ................................................................ 191
Villamar-Sandoval v. Cailipan, 692 SCRA 339, 344,
March 4, 2013 ....................................................... _................. 651
Villamor v. Court of Appeals, 434 SCRA 565, 571-572 ................ 335
Villamor v. Salas, 203 SCRA 540, 543 ............................................ 23
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 463,
463-469 ............................................................... ·... ····.. ···.. ····· 565
Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833,
April 7, 2015 ........................................................................... 700
Villanueva v. Nite, 496 SCRA 459 ................................................ 685
Villanueva v. Ople, 475 SCRA 539, 550 ........................................ 661
Villareal v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 511, 529 ....................... 356
Villarin v. Munasque, 568 SCRA 483, 497 ............................ 731, 732
Villasi v. Garcia, G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014 .......... 740, 743
Villongco v. Yabut, G.R. No. 225022,
February 5, 2018 ........................................................... 353, 422
Virata v. Ng Wee, G.R. No. 221135, July 5, 2017 ................ 194, 574
Virata v. Ng Wee, G.R. No. 221135, July 6, 2017 ......................... 241
 832 CIVIL PROCEDURE
THE BAR LECTURES SERIES
VOLUME I
Virginia S. Dio and H.S. Equities, Ltd. v.
Subic Bay Maribe Exploratorium, Inc.
(G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014 .......................................... 373
Vlason Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 121662-64, July 6, 1999 ......................................... 348
Vlason Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
310 SCRA 26, 55-58, 64 ......................................... 352, 400, 429
w Yap-Co v. Uy, G.R. No. 209295, February 11, 2015 ...................... 194
W.M. Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dalag, G.R. No. 209418,
December 7, 2015 .................................................................. 693
Wacnang v. COMELEC, 569 SCRA 799, 809 ............................... 307
Wagenhorst v. Philadelphia Life Insurance Co.,
358 Pa. 55, 55 A2d 762 ............................................................ 28
Wang Laboratories v. Mendoza, 156 SCRA 44, 54 ......................... 85
Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. v. Reyes,
103 Phil. 662, 665 .......................................................... 340, 341
Watercraft Venture Corporation v. Wolfe,
G.R. No. 181721, September 2015 ......................................... 314
Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. v.
Ledesma, G.R. No. 197556, Mach 25, 2015 ................... 292, 321
Wenceslao v. Makati Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 230696, August 30, 2017 ......................................... 696
Westmont Bank [now United Overseas Bank
Phils.] v. Funai Philippines Corporation,
G.R. No. 175733, July 8, 2015 ............................................... 187
Westmont Bank v. Shugo Noda & Co. Ltd.,
307 SCRA 381, 391 ................................................................. 242
West Tower Condominium on behalf of the Residents of
West Tower Condominium and in representation
of Barangay Bangkal, and others, including
minors and generations yet unborn v. First
Philippine Industrial Condominium,
G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015 ...................................... 244-245
William Go Que Construction v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 191699, April 19, 2016 ............................................ 291
CASE TITLE INDEX 833
y
Yalong v. People, G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013 .................... 633
Yamauchi v. Suniga, G.R. No. 199513,
April 18, 2018 ................................................................. 642, 643
Yap v. Lagtapon, G.R. No. 196347, January 23, 2017 .................. 705
Yap v. People, G.R. No. 234217, November 14, 2018 .................... 618
Yap v. Siao, G.R. No. 212493,
June 1, 2016 ............................................ 303, 305, 574, 581, 583
Yasuda v. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 385 .......................... 650, 727
Yau v. Manila Banking Corporation, 384 SCRA 340, 352 ............ 386
Yau v. Silverio, and Macapagal v. Gako,
543 SCRA 520, 529 ................................................................. 720"
Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925,
June 1, 2011 ................................................................... 599, 602
Young v. Spouses Sy, 503 SCRA 151, 166 ............................. 296, 298
Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979,
February 9, 2011 .................................................................... 595
Yu v. SR Metals, Inc., G.R. No. 214249,
September 25, 2017 ................................................................ 696
Yu v. Yu, G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016 .................... .455, 681, 683
z
Zaldivar v. People, G.R. No. 197056, March 2, 2016 .................... .490
Zamora v. Heirs of Izquierdo, 443 SCRA 24, 31-32 ............... 763, 764
Zaragoza v. Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc.,
G.R. No. 224022, June 28, 2017 ............................................. 135
Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation,
504 SCRA 126, 131-132, 134 .................................. 190, 191, 534
Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran, G.R. No. 197380,
October 8, 2014 ................................................................ 391, 551