;
ELECTIONS
+ Why did U.S. voting turnout rise in 20047
+ What went wrong with the US. eleetoral system in 2000?
+ Should we view U.S. nonvoting with alarm?
+ How does party 1D help decide elections?
+ Why is there a "gender gap” in U.S. voting?
* Does income predict how a person votes?
+ Are we sccing electoral realignenent, dealignment, or neither?
+ How does the econom
‘more specific question about voting in the United States. Fist, we ask why peo-
ke vote, This leads us to the puzzle of why voting mmout in the United States
Is low. Second, we ask how people vote. This brings us to the question of whether
party loyalties in the United States are shifting, Finally, we ask what wins elec-
tions. This takes us to some of the strategies used in U.S. elections,
I: this chapter we ask three general questions about voting, each followed by a
@ Way Do Peorce Vote?
Although committed to democracy and participation, Americans vote less than cit-
izens of other democracies. in the 2004 U.S. election, 55.3 percent of those eligi-
ble voted, a major improvement {rom previous years. Likely reason: Bota parties
worked hard to turn out their potential supporters, Historically, voter tumout in
Percent of those eligible who vote.
aia— 23
he United Statés was never high; its peak in 1960 was 63 percent. Turnout in
Sweden, Germany, and Italy has reached 90 percemt. Black South Africans in 1994,
allowed to vote for the first tine, had a turnout of 86 percent, a measure of how
much they appreciated the right to cast a ballot
Im nonpresidential elections, U.S. twmout is perhaps quarter to a third. Why
do Americans vote so litile? Typically, more than half of U.S, nonvoters say they
are uninterested in or dissatisfied with candidates, Many feel their vate makes no
difference or that none of the candidates is really good. Another reason is the U.S.
party system. in which the twa large parties may not alfer an interesting or clear
cut choice: both ist positions. Television saturates vaters so lang in
advance—often with primitive, ditty political spots—that disgust many with beth,
parties by election day. Fewer than one adult American in twenty is involved
enough in politics to attend a political meeting, contribute money, or canvass a
neighborhood
U.S, nonvoting has brought major debate among politcal scientists, One school
views the decline with alarm, arguing that low electoral participation means that
many Americans are turning away from the political system, which loses legiti
macy. Another school ig unworried, arguing that the decline means Americans
mast of the time are basically satisfied with the system, or not sufficiently dissat
isfied to go to register and vote. Countries with very hi + tumauts may have
sort of political fever in which partisan polities has become too intense. The Unit
ed States experienced some of this imensity in 2004, when emotional issues and
a divided electorate brought aut more voters
‘Cs gh tro in 2005 saver ep erty or ara poling starion where there sus
ally no lin. (Michael Raskin)a4 veer
Is THE U.S. ELECTORAL System DEFECTIVE?
[is 200 8 seal ton was olen ek, and oth tin ree ere
‘waiting to happen: (1) An anachronistic Electoral College was eventually going io deny
slctory to the popular-vote winner: and (2) a defective balloting mechanism was eventually
going to really matter Gore, with s nontrivial half-million more votes (0.51 percent more).
Tost in electoral votes 10 Bush, 271-266, Siallar situations had happened three times in the
nineteenth eentury.
States and counties use whatever balloting system they wish, including defective ones. Some
still use paper Ballots, some hand-lever voting machines designed in 1892, and some light+
Scanned ballois. Counties are slow to upgrade to electronic and touch-sereen systems because
‘of cost, The worst typeof system was in Palm Beach County, Florida, wich had a widely nsed
and cheap forty-year-old technology: Voters put an IBM-type card into a metal frame and
Punched owt a rectangle by thelr choice. Some ofthe little “chads"—as high as 6 percem—were
not completely punched out, 30 counting machines read them as “no vote.” The system was
‘ong known to be delective and had spawned court cases in several staies; Massachusetts had
‘outlawed ft
Making things worse in Palm Beach was a two-page “butterfly ballor” that confused votes,
many of whom accidentally voted for rightwing populist Pat Buchanan instead of the intend-
ced Al Gore. Those wito tried to fix the error by making another punch invalidated their ballot
“This strongly Demacratc county lost some 20,000 votes for Gare, several times move than were
needed to win Florida snd to win in the Electoral College
The Electoral College was designed to overtepredent states with fewer voters, espectaly the
Souther states, where slave-owning elites rejected notions of “one person, one vee.” Ese
state gets as many electors as ifs senators and representatives, seven very smal sates get three
tlectors. A vote for president in a thinly populated state has several times the power of a vate
for president in a ppulous state, A vote In Wyoming is worth almost four times that of a vote
it California. And small states, a huge swath of the mnddle of America, tend 10 go Republics
States with big cities, clustered in the Northeast and on the Great Lakes and West Coast. tend
to go Democrat
‘The Electoral College is widely thought o be an anachronism but can't be seriously reformed
tecatne nineteen small states with three or fewer representatives like being overrepresented:
Why the difference between European and American turnout? One obvious
reason is that in Europe registration is automatic, upon reaching eighteen local au.
thorities register you, Americans must register personally, months before the elec
tion and before campaign excitement mounts, U.S. elections are held on Tuesdays,
in much of Europe on Sundays, The U.S. long ballot with many local, state, and
national candidates plus referendums baffles voters, European (and Canadian)
Electoral College U.S. system of welghting pop
3 presiiential vote 10 lavor smaller states
anachronism Something out of the pastUNTEL, Pierr
ight take a hin
imple, usually just a choice of party, and
» political advertising: some allow none. Ai
@ WHO Votes?
alse mare likely to idenDown’s THEORY OF VOTING
rutwoigh the costs, Tht is, the stakes seem important, ctzens will yo to the trouble
erty owners fearing 1 hikes are much more likely o vote than renters not immedi
ss (Not al have the energy ar intstest to follow political news or a
more than the less affluent, the well-educated more than
ese twa characteristics often come together (goad educa
‘on leads 10 good salaries) and reinforee each other. High income gives people a stake
in election outcomes, and educatian raises levels of interest and sophistication,
Faciory workers in small towns mnay sec little difference between candidates.
They pay 12 rules, make a living, and see little difference under Demo
cratic or Republican administrations. In contrast, executives and professionals fecl
ravolved and see a direct relationship between whe wins and their personal {or
tune. Bluc-collar workers aré also affected by a change in administratfon, but they
are less likely to know it
The difference between voters and nonvoters is feeling of efficacy. the feeling
that one has at least a little power. It tends to be low for workers and high far pro-
fessionals, Better-off and better-educated people have seen interest groups sue
sd in changing policy, Blue-collar workers likely see political life as a “siler
majority.” Friends, neighbors, and family rarely had much wealth and rarely or-
ganized to pressure the government.
‘well-educated people have broader interests In elections beyond personal eo
nomic stakes. The college-educated person—wealthy or not—is more interested.
better informed, and more likely 10 participate in elections. As we discussed in
Chapter 7, education provides a sense of participation and an abstract intellectual
sity, which makes people more likely to follow political news and feel involved.
Despite federal laws and black organizations, black voting rates are lower than
The gap may eventually close as black income and education levels rise.
Act overcame some of the barriers placed in the way of black
fly in the South. Many blacks have gone through palitical con
sciousness: 4 the value of participation and voting. Some previ
ously racist white politicians got the message and became respectful toward theirblack constituents. Latinos faced similar problems and also showed low turnouts.
Race, accordingly, i still a factor in U.S, election tumnout
hey vote less. About half of U.S, citizens eighteen to twenty-five are current
ot registered 10- vate. You
economically uninvolved with election outcomes, When they start paying taxcs,
they become more interested, Focused on the concerns of youth. many have no
lime or interest in political questions, which seem abstract and distan
g people, with litte income and property, also fee
In 1971 the Twenty-sixth Amendment lowered the U.S. voting age from twen
ty-one to eighteen at the same time t
s were similar: The newly enfranchised young pec not vate as much
2s their elders, and when they did, theit votes were little different. Middle-aged and
older people are more likely to vote than the young, probably because tle middle
person is at peak earning pawer, and the oki person is concerned bout So
al Security and Medicare. In recent U.S. elections, those over seventy at
franchised women only in 1971.) Since 1920, when suffrage ted
franchise
suffrage Rilaus E
_ Ens ae
‘Tue PuzeLe OF EDUCATION AND VoTIN
studies agrce that education makes people more perticipetory. But dec
appened precisely as U.S. educational levels grew. America has s percentage al both
lelucated citizens. That should make us very participatory and
ning US, tarout
numbers of
[No one has cracked this puzzle, Edusation may not mean what it used to, The sh
US. college
nowadays, is 1
shave diluted its former elite status. A college degree, in terms of geting a job
igh-school diploma before World War I. Many majors are vocational or
not awaken curlosty or knowledge of the nation and world
ureer-related and
Joes net mean Whatil sed to, Even well-educate
1 be turned off by negative campaigning
ans are dirty. (In 2004, however, negative ads seemed to have boosted
ine in politcal participation,
tal theory, in all he indus.
ice between parties and candidates, Potential voters
1 all poli
Postmaterialism offers another «x
ti jons the economy has moved away from manufacturing and inta knowledge a
mation inclustries. With this has come a shift of values, away from society and toward sell. Only
diet, outdoor activities, and music. So.
materialism theory is accurate, we might
and conelu
ed
personal things matter in the New Age: relationships, car
he United States, the
wed and then even reversed: in recent U.S. elections women have voted more
ap between men’s and women's voier turnout nar
PLACE OF RESIDENCE
City dwellers are more likely to vote than rural re
People who have lived in the same place fc
volved in local affairs and are more likely to participate in groups and activities
n the community
‘Yoter turnout in the U.S. South is somewha an in the North and
West, a reflection of lower living standards and.a lack of party competition. But the
South and its politics have changed, and ne
that of o 5, Other nations are also characterized by regional difle
{the Loire River bave a
tumout inthe South is approaching
postmatertalism Theory t= How Do Peopte Vote?
The re scan be di
vided int
‘erm influence and can affect a person’s votes for his or her lifetime, Shott-teer
varlables may cause a person to Vote ane way for one eleetian but not four years
Later. Margaret Thatcher shrewdly called British elections in L983 tw cateh the glow
of military victory in the Falklands and a
and disarray in Labour's t fer Conservatives wan both times, Sim
1976 in the United States, Jimmy Carter benefited [rom a “morality factor” awak:
ened by the Watergate scandal. Economic conditions matter; the 1992 downturn
hurt incumbent P rarely rma
sident Bush. Such short-term variables
loyally
Party identification— any fee
J one pariy ever many years. Strong party identifiers hab
party: weak identifiers can be swayed to vote for another party. Peop|
ID are up for grabs
is something that people carry
iy vote or that
fh no party
y Ie
that par.
4 may shift theit votes every election. Remeniber,
party identification Long-term voter attachment to a given partyarty ID Is heavily influer arly in life. Some children proclaim
they are Democrats or Republicans and may never change what they learned from
their parents, like the early learning of a religion. It is also easier 10 vore along
party lines, especially important with complicated U.S. ballots. Party ID is a ‘stand
ng decision” on how to wore. Strong identifiers feel good about their party's can=
didates and view other candidates with suspicion.
Party ID is important wo electoral stability. People who stick largely to one party
allow politicians to anticipate what people want and to try to deliver it. We
ID produces great volatility In voting. as citizens shiit their votes to easily, often
in response to clever TV ads. Political scientists worry that declining party 1D in
the United States bodes ill for democracy
Party identification in much of Europe and Japan used to be stronger thar
in the United States, but the difference may be fading, Britain, Germany, Swe
den, Japan, and other countries were long characterized by consistent splits be=
tween their two biggest parties. Typically, the swing fram one major party to
another ranged feom only about | percent to 5 percent, ax most voters stuck
with the same party. The reason: Strong party ID anchored voters to parties
‘with the decline in ¢lass voting (sec below) and rise of postmaterialism, p.
ID has been fading and volatility increasing, sometimes to U.S. levels. French,
voters, on the other hand, were even less likely than Americans to party
1D, partly the result of the splitting, merging, and renaming that French parties
engage in. Such changes do not give party IDs time to-take roat, Result; French,
voting is and always has been volatile
® Wuo Votes How?
Using the social categories discussed in Chapter 8 (on public opinion) and earlier
in this chapter (on voting turnout), political scientists can generally describe what
Kinds of people tend to identify with the variaus parties. No social category votes
100: percent for a given pany; people often disregard group norms, This fact ac
counts for poor Republicans and rich Democrats. [f mare than hall of a given so-
al category votes for ane party, there is prabably a significant relationship between
the social category and the party: {three-quarters votes for a party, there is a strong
relationship. We are making statements here that indicate a tendency, not an ab
solute relationshi
Practicing politicians and political scientists call a tendency in a group to iden:
tify with a certain party a voting blac, The candidates’ strategy Is then to secure
‘enough blocs to deliver a plurality of the electorate, and they tailor their campaign
to win over the blocs most likely to vote for them. The concept of voting blocs is
an oversimplification: there is no such thing as a solid bloc
swing. Percentage of voters swite
class voting Tendency of a given sacal class 10 vote for sent its Interests
voting bloc Group with a marked tendency221
TENDENCY STATEMENTS |
[Lithasstoghowthat one thing causes anor, expecially nthe scl sence. hen te bet we
do is show how one thing correlates or covaries with another, For example, we have noted
how rich countries are democracies and poor no, but ths is only approximately true. There are
many exceptions, so instead of saying “f.” we sty “tends 0” Further, which causes which? Does being
| rich: make countries democratic? Or does being democratic make counties ri
} Most social sciemtists are cutious about causal staements—X causes Y—andd say that awa
Indirect and complex. X might give ese to Q. which in {umn influences Z ta mave in the direction of
¥. In our example, wealth creates. large middle class, which likes education and acticulates ite in
terests, which in tum undermines authoritarian rate. Simple it ain't
ve study is multicausal: & Q, and R workts
| more—percapita GDF, education, or interest-group formation—o the foundi
all matter and are hard disentangle. They tend 10 come as a package. Instes
then statements, where we find X ss also
that this connection is rarely one-to-one: Where ove find X, two-thirds ofthe time we find ¥. Thiss
uch of ih ther lead 4o Z, Which matters
‘of democracy? They
{making causal state
called a tendency statement, the standard fare-of the social sciences, For example: “Poor countiles
tend to not be democracies, butseveral are." And remember, individuals often defy the tendency of
their group: “African Americans vate Republican,
strongly t0 9
Social class is one determinant of party identification and voting behavier. Even tr
the United States, where class distinctions are blurred, blue-collar warkers tend t
register and vote Democratic, especially in families in which breadwinners arc
anion members, Notice in Table 12.1 on page 222 how vot
under $30,000 tended to go to Kerry in the 2004 election; higher brackets went t
Bush, [n most Eurapean countries, this te
connected to social-democratic or labor parties, The
Swedish and German
anions, respectively the LO and DGB, persuade most of their members 19 vate S0-
cial Democrat. Better ns, French, German, and Swedes
ikély to sup.
consider themselves middle class, have a family tradition, or have individuc
victions—vote for conservative parties. Sometimes majority of the U.S. and British
working elass vote, respectively, Republican and Conservative. Conversely, some
middie» and even upper-class peopie—be King: class origins,
have a family tradition, or picked up liberal views in college—vote for parties an
3 making something bap
HMothen statement Says that two things ave linked: Where this happens so does that.
tendency Finding that twa things are linked. but not perfem2
Bush Kerry
“4 1s
4 0
“7 “o
19
0
8
31
u 51
4 34
0 05
High school graduate “4
‘es than high schoo! 38 35
ily income
575,000-100,000 56 a
530,000-49,999
$$20,000-29,999 8as
he left. Such people are especially important in providing working-class parties with
educated leadership y erossover—working class g ns
nd middle class going left—dilutes