DISKUSI

Kerangka pencegahan dan

penanganan Krisis Sistim keuangan
Pasca Terbitnya UUP2SK

Raden Pardede
 LIST KRISIS KEUANGAN

19th century
•Panic of 1819, a U.S. recession with bank failures; culmination
of U.S.'s first boom-to-bust economic cycle
•Panic of 1825, a pervasive British recession in which many
banks failed, nearly including the Bank of England
18th century
•Panic of 1837, a U.S. recession with bank failures, followed by
•Crisis of 1763, started in Amsterdam, begun by the collapse of
a 5-year depression
Johann Ernst Gotzkowsky and Leendert Pieter de Neufville's
•Panic of 1847, United Kingdom
bank, spread to Germany and Scandinavia
•Panic of 1857, a U.S. recession with bank failures
•British credit crisis of 1772-1773 in London and Amsterdam,
•Panic of 1866, Europe
begun by the collapse of the bankers Neal, James, Fordyce and
•Panic of 1873, a U.S. recession with bank failures, followed by
Down.
a 4-year depression
•Panic of 1792, New York
•Panic of 1884, United States and Europe
•Panic of 1796–1797, Britain and United States
•Panic of 1890, mainly affecting the United Kingdom and
Argentina
•Panic of 1893, a U.S. recession with bank failures
•Australian banking crisis of 1893
•Panic of 1896, acute U.S. recession

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20th century
•Panic of 1901, a U.S. economic recession that started a fight for
financial control of the Northern Pacific Railway
•Panic of 1907, a U.S. economic recession with bank failures
•Shōwa Financial Crisis, a 1927 Japanese financial panic that
resulted in mass bank failures across the Empire of Japan.
•Great Depression, the worst systemic banking crisis of the 20th
century
•Secondary banking crisis of 1973–1975 in the UK
•Japanese asset price bubble (1986–2003)
•Savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S.
•1988–1992 Norwegian banking crisis
•Finnish banking crisis of 1990s
•Sweden financial crisis 1990–1994
•Rhode Island banking crisis
•Peruvian banking crisis of 1992
•Venezuelan banking crisis of 1994
•1997 Asian financial crisis
• Enping financial crisis
•1998 collapse of Long-Term Capital Management
•1998 Russian financial crisis
•1998–2002 Argentine great depression
•1998–1999 Ecuador economic crisis RP
21st century
•2002 Uruguay banking crisis
•2003 Myanmar banking crisis
•Financial crisis of 2007–2008, including:
•Subprime mortgage crisis in the U.S. starting in 2007
•2008 United Kingdom bank rescue package
•2009 United Kingdom bank rescue package
•2008–2009 Belgian financial crisis
•2008–2011 Icelandic financial crisis
•Great Recession in Russia
•2008–2009 Ukrainian financial crisis
•2008–2014 Spanish financial crisis
•Post-2008 Irish banking crisis
•Venezuelan banking crisis of 2009–2010
•Ghana banking crisis of 2017–2018
•2023 US banking crisis + Swiss + German?
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Kenapa begitu banyak krisis Keuangan
(perbankan)?
The main conclusions of this part are the following:
• Although many banking crises have been initiated by financial
deregulation and globalization, these crises were amplified largely by
political interference.
• Public intervention in the banking sector faces a fundamental
commitment problem, analogous to the time consistency problem
confronted by monetary policy.
• The key to successful reform is independence and accountability of
banking supervisors

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One and a half year after the first rate hike, the Fed stands at policy
crossroads (POTENSI KRISIS PERBANKAN MASIH ADA)
On March 16, 2022, the Federal Open Market Committee enacted the first of what would be 10 interest rate increases.
Questions about what’s ahead as policymakers continue to grapple with a persistently high cost of living, on top of a
banking crisis.

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RP 6
RP 7
STANDAR PENCEGAHAN BANK RUNS :

• First, banks should keep enough capital to

absorb losses.
• Second, in the event of a bank run, central banks
should provide banks with emergency liquidity,
thereby ending the panic.
• Third, government deposit insurance should
calm depositors.
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UUP2SK
• Pengambilan keputusan KSSK
• KSSK melaksanakan fungsi koordinasi (normal dan Krisis)
• Koordinasi dalam kondisi krisis (Presiden putuskan kondisi krisis)
• KSSK memutuskan BI untuk membeli SBN Jk Panjang dalam kondisi
krisis (karus krisis Covid)
• Forum koordinasi : Mikro Prudensial, Makro Prudensial, Penanganan
permasalahan
• Pertukaran data dan Info
• Sekretariat KSSK

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BELAJAR DARI
ASIAN Financial Crisis
1998

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6 Causes of ASIAN Crisis
• Macroeconomic imbalances, including large current account deficits
• Many affected countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, had
large current account deficits, which occur when a country imports more
goods and services than it exports. These imbalances can lead to a loss of
confidence among foreign investors, which can, in turn, trigger a currency
crisis.
• Overvalued currencies, which made exports less competitive
• In the lead-up to the crisis, many affected countries had overvalued
currencies, making their exports more expensive and less competitive in
global markets. This reduced demand for their goods and services and
weakened their economies.

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• Unsustainable lending practices and lax regulation/supervision
• Particularly borrowing heavily from foreign lenders in the form of short-term
debt. Many affected countries have borrowed heavily from foreign lenders in
short-term debt, which is riskier and can lead to liquidity problems if foreign
investors suddenly withdraw their funds.
• Dependence on exports, particularly to the United States
• Many affected countries are heavily dependent on exports, particularly to the
United States. When demand for their exports declined, their economies
suffered.
• Withdrawal of foreign funds, leading to a shortage of liquidity
• As the crisis spread, foreign investors began withdrawing their funds from
affected countries, leading to a shortage of liquidity and difficulties for banks
and other financial institutions.

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• Sharp devaluation of currencies
• Leading to a surge in inflation, rise in interest rates, and collapse in asset
prices: As the crisis deepened, many affected countries were forced to
devalue their currencies to remain competitive. This led to a surge in inflation
and interest rates, making it more difficult for businesses and households to
repay their debts. The collapse in asset prices, particularly in real estate and
stock markets, further weakened the economies of affected countries.

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9 Impacts of the Crisis

• Sharp economic contraction and recession in affected countries

• The crisis led to a sharp contraction in many affected countries' economies, leading
to a recession that lasted for several years. This led to widespread job losses and
reduced economic activity.
• Currency devaluations and inflation
• The sharp devaluation of currencies in many affected countries led to a surge in
inflation, making it more difficult for businesses and households to afford basic
goods and services.
• Financial sector instability and banking crises
• The crisis led to a wave of financial sector instability and banking crises, as many
banks and financial institutions were exposed to the risks of the crisis. This led to the
collapse of many financial institutions and forced many others to be recapitalized or
bailed out by governments.

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• Corporate bankruptcies and job losses
• Many companies could not service their debts and went bankrupt, leading to
job losses and reduced economic activity. This had a major impact on many
industries, particularly those heavily reliant on exports.
• Social and political unrest
• The crisis led to social and political unrest in many affected countries, as
people became increasingly frustrated with the economic situation and the
perceived failure of their governments to address the crisis.
• Loss of investor confidence and capital flight
• The crisis led to a loss of investor confidence in many affected countries,
leading to capital flight and reduced investment in the affected economies.
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• Spillover effects on other emerging market economies
• The crisis had spillover effects on other emerging market economies, particularly
those with similar economic structures and vulnerabilities.
• Calls for reform of international financial institutions and policies
• The crisis led to calls for reform of international financial institutions and policies,
particularly in the areas of financial regulation, exchange rate policy, and debt
management.
• Increased awareness of the risks of globalization and financial
liberalization
• The crisis increased awareness of the risks of globalization and financial liberalization,
particularly in emerging market economies. This led to a reassessment of economic
policies and greater scrutiny of the risks associated with global economic integration.

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8 Responses to the Crisis (ASIAN CRISIS)
• Monetary and Exchange rate adjustments
• Adjusted interest rate (hike significantly)
• Many affected countries adjusted their exchange rates to restore competitiveness and
reduce the risk of currency crises.
• lent large amounts of money to banks with “good assets” (?)that could not borrow in
financial markets;
• Banking sector reforms
• Many affected countries implemented reforms to strengthen their banking sectors and
improve regulation and supervision.
• Fiscal consolidation and Guaranteed
• Many affected countries implemented measures to reduce their budget deficits and improve
their fiscal positions to restore investor confidence and reduce the risk of future crises.
• Guaranteed deposits and bank “bonds” to shore up confidence in Banks
• International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance
• The IMF provided financial assistance to many affected countries to stabilize their economies
and support reforms.

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• Debt restructuring
• Many affected countries undertook debt restructuring efforts to reduce their debt
burdens and make their debt more sustainable.
• Trade liberalization
• Some affected countries implemented trade liberalization measures to improve their
competitiveness and promote economic growth.
• Calls for greater international cooperation and coordination
• The crisis called for greater international cooperation and coordination to better
manage financial risks and promote economic stability.
• Public protests and social movements
• The crisis also led to public protests and social movements in many affected
countries, as people demanded greater accountability and more equitable economic
policies.

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BELAJAR DARI
Global Financial Crisis
2008
RP 19
The Global Financial Crisis
• Main Causes of the GFC
1. Excessive risk-taking in a favourable (loose) macroeconomic environment
• In the years leading up to the GFC, economic conditions in the United States and other countries were
favourable. Economic growth was strong and stable, and rates of inflation, unemployment and interest were
relatively low. In this environment, house prices grew strongly. Expectations that house prices would
continue to rise led households, in the United States especially, to borrow imprudently to purchase and build
houses.
2. Increased borrowing by banks and investors (under-estimate risk)
• In the lead up to the GFC, banks and other investors in the United States and abroad borrowed increasing
amounts to expand their lending and purchase MBS products. Borrowing money to purchase an asset
(known as an increase in leverage) magnifies potential profits but also magnifies potential losses.As a result,
when house prices began to fall, banks and investors incurred large losses because they had borrowed so
much.
3. Regulation and policy errors (In adequate regulation and supervision)
• Regulation of subprime lending and MBS products was too lax. In particular, there was insufficient
regulation of the institutions that created and sold the complex and opaque MBS to investors

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How the GFC Unfolded
• US house prices fell, borrowers missed repayments
• Stresses in the financial system
• Some lenders and investors began to incur large losses because many of the houses they repossessed after the
borrowers missed repayments could only be sold at prices below the loan balance.

• Spillovers to other countries

• As noted above, foreign banks were active participants in the US housing market during the boom, including
purchasing MBS (with short-term US dollar funding)

• Failure of financial firms, panic in financial markets

• Financial stresses peaked following the failure of the US financial firm Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Together
with the failure or near failure of a range of other financial firms around that time, this triggered a panic in financial
markets globally.

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Policy Responses (GFC)
• Lower interest rate
• Central banks lowered interest rates rapidly to very ow levels (often near zero);
• Lent large amounts of money to banks and other institutions with good assets that could not borrow in financial
markets;
• and Purchased a substantial amount of financial securities to support dysfunctional markets
• and to stimulate economic activity once policy interest rates were near zero (known as ‘quantitative easing’)

• Increased government spending

• Governments increased their spending to stimulate demand and support employment throughout the economy;
• Guaranteed deposits and bank bonds to shore up confidence in financial firms;
• Purchased ownership stakes in some banks and other financial firms to prevent bankruptcies that could have
exacerbated the panic in financial markets

• Stronger oversight of financial firm

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BELAJAR DARI
Financial Crisis 2023

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RP 24
KEGAGALAN BANK DI AMERIKA TAHUN 2023
1. Exposure to Interest Rate and Liquidity Risks Not Properly Managed
• The banks’ investments and loans were particularly exposed to interest rate and liquidity risks and were not marked to
market. With the Fed raising interest rates, such risks should have been properly managed through various hedging
instruments.
2. Large Portion of Uninsured Deposits & Deposit Concentration Risk
• The three banks had a large share of customers with deposits that surpassed federal insurance limit of US$250,000. These
depositors are more likely to be cautious and ready to move their money at the first sign of trouble, because they
stand to lose much.
3. Fates of the Three Banks Were Interconnected
• The three banks’ fates were connected. The failure of SVB made Americans more concerned about the safety of
their deposits with the mid sized and smaller banks. When news and fear spread, depositors and investors sought
out banks with similar risk exposures and profiles as SVB. .
4. Less Stringent Regulatory Requirements
• Another reason for the failures was the less stringent regulatory requirements and supervision the mid size US banks
were subjected to compared with large US banks.
5. Investment Securities Not Marked to Market
• The mid size US banks should have been required to mark to market their AFS investment securities via Other
Comprehensive Income, just like the large US banks. In this way, impairments arising from valuation losses of their
investment securities would have been surfaced earlier for prompt corrective actions to be taken, and not left
undisclosed until the banks needed to dispose of the securities and had to realise the losses

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Classic bank runs

Assets Libilities
• Loans • Deposits (concentration ratio)
• T Bonds (price fall due to hike i) • Panic and Runs
• Other securities (price fall, hike i) • Securities
• Adjusted price drop, huge • Equity/capital
discount from Par-level • Adjusted capital falling down,
inline with asset price

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RP 27
 DAMPAK KENAIKAN SUKU BUNGA AGRESSIF DI US
HARGA BOND JATUH, LOAN FIX RATE TETAP,  NILAI TOTAL ASSET JATUH ( > 1500 B USD
DEPOSIT RATE (BIAYA) NAIK, PANIK/RUNS  EQUITAS (MODAL) JATUH

T Bond Panic/Runs
MBS

Variable
Fix (rate)

Q1 2022
KONTRAKSI BALANCE SHEET, KONTRAKSI KREDIT  KONTRAKSI EKONOMI
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PEMERINTAH RUMAH TANGGA
Interkoneksi
Aset Liability A L
balancesheet
Fix aset Hutang/bonds Fix aset Hutang bank, pemerintah, bank
Piutang Piutang KPR,Credit card sentral, rumah tangga
Kas Modal Kas Modal dan perusahaan,
PERUSAHAAN Serta negara lain
THE FED
A L
A L
T bond Kas… Fix aset Hutang bank,
Bonds Piutang Hutang lain
KPR.. (Bonds)
NEGARA LAIN (REST OF
Repo Kas Modal
THE WORLD)
BANK/FIN Perusahaan
Aset Liability Rumah tangga
Kredit DPK Bank Sentral
T bond Bonds Perusahaan
KPR
Fix Equitas
Lain lain (modal)
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Surat hutang yang dikeluarkan pemerintah US tidak hanya dipegang investor dalam negeri

Transmisi
penularan
Perubahan
suku bunga

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Responses
• FDIC (insurance) and receivership
• Bank term funding program
• Group interbank line
• Blanket guarantee
• Selling bank

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Policy Responses: The Fed and FDIC Fast Policy Coordination
The Fed considers tougher rules for mid-sized banks after SVB’s collapse
• The US Federal Reserve and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are
considering establishing a fund that will
allow regulators to support more deposits
in troubled banks.
• The Fed also assess the stress tests which
evaluate lenders’ ability to withstand
adverse economic and financial scenarios,
among a host of other rules.
• Removing the “penalty” rate for banks
borrowing at the Fed’s discount window.
• The US central bank is reviewing the
capital an d l i qui di t y r e qu i r e m e nt s i t
imposes on banks, especially those with
between USD100 bn and USD250 bn in
assets.
Source: Various sources
Federal Regulators Actions to help Depositors
• The Fed introduced a new special emergency
lending facility that would offer up to one-year
loans at relaxed rates to other banks, savings
associations, credit unions and depository
institutions in exchange for government-backed
assets as collateral. Notably, the Fed would
accept those assets at the original value, so
banks don’t have to sell those assets at a loss.
The Fed and FDIC Policies Coordination
• The Fed will also hold an emergency meeting as
a response to the collapse of the SVB with an
agenda to review and determine the discount
rate or loan interest charged to commercial
banks by the Fed in each region.
RP
• The FDIC said it would make a l l
depositors who banked with SVB
and Signature Bank “whole,”
meaning no customer would lose
access to their money.
• The Fed said it was creating a new
bank term funding program to
protect institutions affected by
market volatility from SVB failures.
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RP 33
E xecutive S ummary C redit S uis s e
Weakened By a S tring of S c andals
C edi S i e T o ble in he L a
The numerous scandals
suffered by Credit Suisse
Fe Yea
over the years have
seriously damaged the
bank’s reputation and
severely eroded the
confidence of investors
and depositors.

Source: Morningstar Direct

Wounded By a Surge in Customer Deposit Withdrawals

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Swiss Forceful Actions Stopped Contagion But Led to Lawsuits
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 BAHAN EVALUASI KITA BERSAMA
• Apakah Kita sudah siap menghadapi krisis finansial YAD
• Kenapa KSSK harus intervensi (kapan KSSK harus intervensi)
• Apakah cukup oleh Sebagian anggota saja (OJK, Atau LPS, atau OJK + LPS)
• Pastikan Punya Alasan/Argumen yang kuat : payung hukum ada (bila belum ada
dibuatkan segera)
• UU P2SK, PP, KMK, PBI, POJK, PLPS
• Dari pengalaman krisis baru baru ini di perbankan US, apakah kita bisa
mengatasinya dengan UU P2SK dan aturan turunannya.
• Bagaimana kita mengantisipasi kedepan, sumber penyebab ketidak-stabilan dan
krisis di perbankan dan sektor keuangan

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