HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING vs KITAMURA

G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007

FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in
the infrastructure projects. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year.
Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the SouthernTagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR
project was nearcompletion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering &
construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the projectmanger in
the contract.
Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed
Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automaticallyrenewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the
company only up tothe substantial completion of the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted
that Kitamaru’s con
tract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaruthen filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City.Nippon
filed a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by &
between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction.The claim for improper pre-
termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be
heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles oflex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled that the principle of lexloci celebrationis was not applicable to the case,
because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in
applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE:
Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civi lcases for specific performance & damages involving contracts
executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles oflex loci celebra
tionis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens?
HELD:
NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition
and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c
will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state
constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction
and the choice of law will often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant
contacts” for the other.
The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of
that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however,has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must
have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case
and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation.In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction
herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed
by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff isentitled to all or some of
the claims asserted therein. In the instant case,Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by laww/
jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specificperformance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary
estimation & isproperly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as groundsto question subject matter
jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significantrelationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these
grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis
relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the
law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or
lex loci contractusmeans the “law of the place where a contract is executedor to be performed.” It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the
contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the partie
PHILIPPINE EXPORT v. V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION +
DECISION

Facts:
A service contract was entered into by respondent Vicente P. Eusebio Construction Inc. a filipino construction firm with the Iraqi
government for the construction of the Institute of physical therapy medical center in Baghdad, Iraq.
The Iraqi government required the contractors to submit performance bond and advance payment bond. To comply with this
requirements the respondents applied for the issuance of guarantee with the petitioner Phil guarantee, a government financial
entity.
Issues:
what law should be applied in determining whether the respondent contractor has defaulted in the performance of its obligations
under the service contract.
Ruling:
No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws.
The rule followed by most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by the lex
contractus or "proper law of the contract."
This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly (the lex loci intentionis).
The law selected may be implied from such factors as substantial connection with the... transaction, or the nationality or domicile
of the parties.
Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select
the law applicable to their contract, subject to the... limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the forum
and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction.
the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of the law that would govern it.
In the United States and Europe, the two rules that now seem to have emerged as "kings of the hill" are
(1) the parties may choose the governing... law; and
(2) in the absence of such a choice, the applicable law is that of the State that "has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties."
Another authority proposed that all matters relating to the time, place, and manner of... performance and valid excuses for non-
performance are determined by the law of the place of performance or lex loci solutionis, which is useful because it is
undoubtedly always connected to the contract in a significant way.
In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and
the place of performance is in Iraq.
Hence, the issue of whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be determined by the laws... of Iraq.
However, since that foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known
as the processual presumption, comes into play.
Our law, specifically Article 1169, last paragraph, of the Civil Code, provides: "In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in
delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him."
Default or mora on the part of the debtor is the delay in the fulfillment of the prestation by reason of a cause imputable to the
former.
It is the non-fulfillment of an obligation with respect to time.
It is undisputed that only 51.7% of the total work had been accomplished.
The 48.3% unfinished portion consisted in the purchase and installation of electro-mechanical equipment and materials, which
were available from foreign suppliers, thus requiring US Dollars for their... importation.
However, as explained by VPECI in its letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the payment by SOB purely in Dinars
adversely... affected the completion of the project
As found by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the delay or the non-completion of the Project was caused by factors
not imputable to the respondent contractor.
It was rather due mainly to the persistent violations by SOB of the terms and conditions of the... contract, particularly its failure to
pay 75% of the accomplished work in US Dollars.
Indeed, where one of the parties to a contract does not perform in a proper manner the prestation which he is bound to perform
under the contract, he is not entitled to... demand the performance of the other party. A party does not incur in delay if the other
party fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon him.
In order that the debtor may be in default it is necessary that the following requisites be present: (1) that the obligation be
demandable and already liquidated; (2) that the debtor delays performance; and (3) that the creditor requires the performance
because it must appear... that the tolerance or benevolence of the creditor must have ended.
SOB cannot yet demand complete performance from VPECI because it has not yet itself performed its obligation in a proper
manner, particularly the payment of the 75% of the cost of the Project in US Dollars.
The VPECI cannot yet be said to have incurred... in delay.
Besides, no demand has yet been made by SOB against the respondent contractor. Demand is generally necessary even if a
period has been fixed in the obligation.
And default generally begins from the moment the creditor demands judicially or... extra-judicially the performance of the
obligation. Without such demand, the effects of default will not arise.
Moreover, the petitioner as a guarantor is entitled to the benefit of excussion, that is, it cannot be compelled to pay the creditor
SOB unless the property of the debtor VPECI has been exhausted and all legal remedies against the said debtor have been
resorted to by the... creditor.

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES v. CA 241 SCRA 192

FACTS:Plaintiff Northwest Airlines and defendant C.F. Sharp & Co., through its Japan branch entered into an international
passenger sales agency agreement, whereby it authorized the latter to sell its airline tickets. Defendant was unable to remit the
proceeds of the ticket sales, hence plaintiff sued the defendant for the collection of the unremitted proceeds with a claim for
damages in a Tokyo court. A writ of summons were issued against defendant at its office in Yokohama but the bailiff failed twice
to serve the writs. The Tokyo court decided to have the writs of summons served at defendant’s head office in Manila, in which
the defendant accepted but failed to appear at the hearings. The Tokyo court decided in favor of the plaintiff. However the
judgment remained unsatisfied. Hence, petitioner fileda suit for the enforcement of judgment before RTC of Manila. Defendant
filed its answer, and averred that the judgment of the Japanese court was void having been rendered without due and proper
notice to them. The said case for enforcement was tried on the merits and defendant moved for demurrer of evidence on the
ground that the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is void for want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

ISSUE:Whether or not the foreign judgment can be recognized and enforced under Philippine courts.

HELD:Yes. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown.
It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings ang the giving of due notice therein. Alternatively, in the light of the
absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the processual presumption may be invoked. Apllying it, the Japanese law on the matter
is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private corporation doing business in the
Philippines. Sec. 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, the
service may be made: 1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose; 2) absence thereof, on the
government offcial designated by law to that effect or 98

G.R. No. L-104776, Dec. 5, 1994

o GENERAL RULE: A foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
o EXCEPTION: When the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute," the country of the forum will apply the foreign
statute of limitations.
o EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: The court of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public
policy.
o
CADALIN VS POEA238 SCRA 721
Facts:On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of
728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filingan "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII . BRII is a
foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic
corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilizeand deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of
its foreign principals.The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of
theemployment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest ofthe earnings of the
Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salarydifferential pay; fringe benefits; refund of
SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund ofwithholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing
prohibited practices; as well as thesuspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BIssue:Whether or not the
proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision that is the subjectof these appeals, conformed with the requirements
of due process.Whether or not what is the prevalent law to be applied in this case, Art. 291 of Labor Code or Art.1144 of Civil
Code.Ruling:Wherefore, all the three petitions are dismissed.The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court on the grounds thatNLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing
thequestioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.NLRC believed money claims-all money claims arising from
employer-employee relationsaccruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the
cause ofaction accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred. This is embodied in the Article 291 of Labor Codewhich the
petitioners failed to comply. It applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides forgreater benefits than those stipulated
in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of thebelief that "where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, then thelaws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment
contract."Its interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared formcontaining the
stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or leave it." Thepresumption is that there was an
imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signedthe contracts out of necessity that reduced their
bargaining power.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute

Plaintiff Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. opposes a suit by a passenger injured on one of their cruise ships, because the cruise tickets
contained an agreement that all matters relating to the cruise would be litigated before a Florida court.
Synopsis of Rule of Law.
Forum-selection clauses forcing individuals to agree to submit to jurisdiction in a particular place are enforceable so long as they
pass the test for judicial fairness.
Facts.
Defendant Shute purchased passage for a seven day cruise on the Tropicale, a ship owned by Plaintiff, through a Washington
travel agent. The face of each ticket contained terms and conditions of passage, which included an agreement that all matters
disputed or litigated subject to the travel agreement, would be before a Florida court. Defendant boarded the ship in California,
which then sailed to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico before returning to Los Angeles. While the ship was in international waters,
Defendant Eulala Shute was injured from slipping on a deck mat. Defendants filed suit in Federal District Court in Washington.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the clause in the tickets required Defendants to bring their suit in
Florida.
Issue.
Whether the court should enforce a forum-selection clause forcing individuals to submit to jurisdiction in a particular state.
Held.
Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to enforce the forum-selection
clause. Forum-selection clauses contained in form passage contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness, but
where they are not lacking in fairness, they will be enforced.

Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz

SCOTUS - 1985 (471 U.S. 462)
Facts:
 BK (P) is a FL corporation. Rudzewicz (D) is a MI resident.
 Rudzewicz applied for a franchise to BK. The franchise would be in MI.
 Before the final agreements were signed, the two sides began to disagree. During the disputes, Rudzewicz negotiated with
the BK offices in MI and in Miami, FL.
 Rudzewicz fell behind in his monthly payments to BK in Miami, engaged in negotiations with Miami office while trying to
work out issues.
 BK terminated the franchise, but Rudzewicz refused and continued to operate as a BK franchise.
 BK sued for $228,875 in damages.
Procedural History:
 District Court found for BK.
 Circuit Court reversed.
 SCOTUS reversed, found for BK.
Issues:
  To what extent can a contract constitute a contact for the purposes of due process analysis (through minimum contacts
analysis needed for personal jurisdiction)?
 How do you apply the minimum contacts test for a person who has never entered the forum state?
Holding/Rule:
 Alone, signing a contract with a party in the forum state is not sufficient to meet the minimum contacts requirement for
that forum state. However, if the contract in that state is an intermediate step to tie up prior negotiations and
contemplated future consequences, the party may be seen as having purposefully established minimum contacts in that
forum state, especially when the consequences arise proximately from the activities allowed by the contract. Purposeful
availment!

BURGER KING CORP. V. RUDZEWICZ, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)

Citation. 471 U.S. 462 (1985)
SHORT FACT SUMMARY
Two individuals purchase two franchises of Burger King Franchise and fail to pay. Burger King sues the men in Florida, and the
defendants object to personal jurisdiction.
A SYNOPSIS - RULE OF LAW
A court has to consider a defendant's actions aimed at the forum state when determining the minimum contact.
FACTS
The defendants can jointly purchase the Burger King franchise in Detroit, Michigan. They negotiated the deal together with the
Plaintiff's Michigan office and Miami headquarters and eventually were granted the franchise. The defendant MacShara went to
management training in Florida. In contrast, the defendant Rudzewicz purchased the equipment to run the business through his
Burger King office in Florida. The defendants were required to make royalty and franchise payments in royalty and franchise
payments to Burger King in Florida. The clause that governs the choice-of-law of the agreement for franchise specified that Florida
law was the one to govern. Defendants are in arrears with their payment, and Plaintiff Burger King sues.
ISSUE
Should the court consider the defendant's motives in determining the minimum contact to determine personal jurisdiction?
HELD
Yes. A court must consider a defendant's actions directed at the forum state when the determination of minimum contact. The
decision from the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to court for additional proceedings in line with the
ruling.
DISSENT
Justice Stevens with Justice White dissident Personal jurisdiction is based primarily on the choice of law clause, which does not
suffice to establish minimum contact. It is fundamentally unjust to permit the choice-of-law clause to hold this much power since
there is a substantial difference in bargaining between the franchisee in question and its franchisee.

Conflict of Laws: Cases on Jurisdiction

Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v. Shute

499 U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991)

Facts. Defendant Shute purchased passage for a seven day cruise on the Tropicale, a ship owned by Plaintiff, through a
Washington travel agent. The face of each ticket contained terms and conditions of passage, which included an agreement that all
matters disputed or litigated subject to the travel agreement, would be before a Florida court. Defendant boarded the ship in
California, which then sailed to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico before returning to Los Angeles. While the ship was in international
waters, Defendant Eulala Shute was injured from slipping on a deck mat. Defendants filed suit in Federal District Court in
Washington. Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the clause in the tickets required Defendants to bring
their suit in Florida.

Issue. Whether the court should enforce a forum-selection clause forcing individuals to submit to jurisdiction in a particular state.
Held. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to enforce the forum-selection
clause.
Forum-selection clauses contained in form passage contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness, but where
they are not lacking in fairness, they will be enforced.

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)

Facts. Rudzewicz and MacShara (Defendants), residents of Michigan, had a contract with Burger King (Plaintiff) as franchisees for
20 years. The contract said that the franchise relationship would be established in Miami (where Plaintiff’s principal offices
are) and that the relationship would be governed by Florida law. Defendants fell behind in monthly payments and Plaintiff
brought a diversity action in federal court in Florida. Defendants argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because Defendants
were residents of Michigan and the claim did not “arise” in Florida. The Court said the claims did arise under the Florida long-arm
statute and found for Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that exercising jurisdiction would offend the
“fundamental fairness of due process.”

Issue. : Whether the court of Florida may exercise personal jurisdiction on a franchisee, when the franchisee voluntarily accepts
the regulation by the franchisor’s headquarters, the franchisee had notice that he may be subject to suit in the forum state

Held. Yes. A forum may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where an alleged injury arises out of or relates to
actions by the defendant himself that are purposeful directed toward forum residents, and where jurisdiction would not otherwise
offend "fair play and substantial justice." Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the defendant did
not physically enter the forum.. The contract term stating that the franchise relationship would be governed by Florida law
constituted “purposeful availment” of the benefits and protections of Florida law by the defendants. When a contract calling for a
certain forum is not made under duress or misrepresentation then jurisdiction over the defendants is proper unless the defendants
would be inconvenienced to such an extent that having to litigate in the forum state would be unconstitutional.
Because Rudzewicz established a substantial and continuing relationship with Burger King’s Miami headquarters, received fair
notice from the contract documents and the course of dealing that he might be subject to suit in Florida, and has failed to
demonstrate how jurisdiction in that forum would otherwise be fundamentally unfair, we conclude that the District Court’s
exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Stat. 48.193(1)(g) (Supp. 1984) did not offend due process

SWEET LINES INC vs TEVES

GR No. 37750, May 19, 1978
SANTOS, J.

FACTS:
Atty. Tandog and Atty. Tiro bought tickets at the branch office of Sweet Lines Inc, which is engaged in the transportation of goods
and passengers, at Cagayan de Oro. Upon knowing that the vessel will not proceed to Bohol, but rather on Surigao, respondents
sought proper relocation to another vessel. However, since the vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree to
hide in the cargo section to avoid inspection. But respondents alleged that they were exposed to the scorching trip during the trip
and were not later on honored and was constrained to pay for other tickets. Respondents filed a case for damages in the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Oriental. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue since Condition 14
of the ticket stated that any action arising out of the conditions and provisions of the ticket shall be filed in the courts of Cebu. The
lower court denied the motion. Hence this petition.

Petitioner contend that the condition fixing the venue of actions in the City of Cebu is proper since venue may be validly waived.
In contrast respondent contend that while venue of actions may be transferred from one province to another, such arrangement
requires the “written agreement of the parties”, not to be imposed unilaterally.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition on venue is proper.

HELD:
No, the condition on venue is not proper. Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. For,
although venue may be changed or transferred from one province to another by agreement of the parties in writing pursuant to
Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such an agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the
claimants, such as the private respondents herein. The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the
convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice.
Public policy is “. . . that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public or against the public good. . .”. Under this principle “. . . freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted
by law for the good of the public.” Clearly, Condition No. 14, if enforced, will be subversive of the public good or interest, since it
will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions of passenger claimants outside of Cebu City, thus placing petitioner company at a
decided advantage over said persons, who may have perfectly legitimate claims against it.

HSBC v Jack Robert Sherman GR 72494

Facts: Eastern Book Supply, a company incorporated in Singapore, was granted by HSBC’s Singapore branch an overdraft facility
payable monthly with 3% interest. As a security, both private respondents and a certain Lowe, executed a Joint and Several
guarantee in favor of HSBC where it stipulates that all liabilities arising from it may be enforced in accordance with the laws of
Singapore and that the Courts of Singapore will have jurisdiction over it.
When Easter failed to pay its obligation, HSBC filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against respondents in RTC of
Quezon City. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction in the IAC in which The IAC rendered a
decision enjoining the RTC Quezon City from taking further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for filing with the
proper court of Singapore which is the proper forum.

Issue: Does Philippines have jurisdiction over the Case?

Ruling: YES.
While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a
choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates that the stipulation be liberally construed. One basic principle
underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis
for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam.
In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be disinclined to litigate before a foreign tribunal, with more reason as a
defendant. The defense of Sherman & Reloj that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality.
They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or
expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass Sherman & Reloj.
The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did
the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the
light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things w/in its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. A State is
competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of
cases brought before them.
However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum non conveniens depends
largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, the IAC should not
have relied on such principle (In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it is not authorized by law to
exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it may still refuse to entertain the case by applying the principle of forum non
conveniens.)

Paula Llorente vs CA
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the
US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he
discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the
father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together
for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second
marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. The trial granted the
letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the
judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired
during their 25 years of cohabitation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.
RULING:
Foreign law applies. The Civil Code provides that intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. In this case, Lorenzo was an American citizen long before and at
the time of: (1) divorce from first wife; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. Aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Imelda Marcos vs Comelec

Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. Comelec declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended COC as well as the original COCs.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But the Comelec suspended her proclamation.
Petitioner contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the Comelec which has jurisdiction
over the election of members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:
WON HRET has jurisdiction over petitioner’s qualification?

Held:
No. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House
of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al

G.R. No. 103493 June 19, 1997

Facts: Private respondent Ventura O. Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala and Philsec in the sum of
US$2,500,000.00, secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat with a market value of P14,088,995.00. In order to facilitate the
payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent Drago Daic, assumed Ducat’s
obligation under an Agreement, dated January 27, 1983, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien by
which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (hereafter called ATHONA) a parcel of land in Harris County, Texas, U.S.A., for
US$2,807,209.02, while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA in the amount of US$2,500,000.00 as initial payment of
the purchase price. The balance of US$307,209.02 was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of
1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the US$2,500,000.00 from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his
indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
• As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance of US$307,209.02, the entire amount covered by the note became due and
demandable.
• Private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance of
US$307,209.02 and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the
marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement. Originally instituted in the United States District
Court of Texas, 165th Judicial District, where it was docketed as Case No. 85-57746, the venue of the action was later transferred
to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where 1488, Inc. filed an amended complaint, reiterating its
allegations in the original complaint.
• While Civil Case No. H-86-440 was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint “For Sum of Money with Damages
and Writ of Preliminary Attachment” against private respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. 16563. The complaint reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in Civil Action No. H-
86-440 of the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a
price 400 percent more than its true value of US$800,000.00. Petitioners claimed that, as a result of private respondents’
fraudulent misrepresentations, ATHONA, PHILSEC, and AYALA were induced to enter into the Agreement and to purchase the
Houston property. Petitioners prayed that private respondents be ordered to return to ATHONA the excess payment of
US$1,700,000.00 and to pay damages. On April 20, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the real
and personal properties of private respondents.
Private respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 16563 on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis Civil Action No. H-
86-440 filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state
a cause of action. Ducat contended that the alleged overpricing of the property prejudiced only petitioner ATHONA, as buyer, but
not PHILSEC and BPI-IFL which were not parties to the sale and whose only participation was to extend financial accommodation
to ATHONA under a separate loan agreement.
The trial court granted Ducat’s motion to dismiss, stating that “the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more
suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non
conveniens,” even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
• A separate hearing was held with regard to 1488, Inc. and Daic’s motion to dismiss. On March 9, 1988, the trial court 3 granted
the motion to dismiss filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic on the ground plaintiff ATHONA is the subject matter of the pending case in the
United States District Court which, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is the better (if not exclusive) forum to litigate
matters needed to determine the assessment and/or fluctuations of the fair market value of real estate situated in Houston,
Texas, U.S.A.
The Court of Appeals also held that Civil Case No. 16563 was an action in personam for the recovery of a sum of money for alleged
tortious acts, so that service of summons by publication did not vest the trial court with jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Drago
Daic. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 16563 on the ground of forum non conveniens was likewise affirmed by the Court of Appeals
on the ground that the case can be better tried and decided by the U.S. court:
The U.S. case and the case at bar arose from only one main transaction, and involve foreign elements, to wit: 2) the seller, 1488
Inc. is a non-resident foreign corporation; 3) although the buyer, Athona Holdings, a foreign corporation which does not claim to
be doing business in the Philippines, is wholly owned by Philsec, a domestic corporation, Athona Holdings is also owned by BPI-IFL,
also a foreign corporation; 4) the Warranty Deed was executed in Texas, U.S.A.
• It is important to note in connection with the first point that while the present case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas rendered judgment 5 in the case before it. The judgment, which was
in favor of private respondents, was affirmed on appeal by the Circuit Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether Civil Case No. 16536 is barred by the judgment of the U.S. court.
HELD: Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. 16563 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
for consolidation with Civil Case No. 92-1070 and for further proceedings in accordance with this decision
Jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes
prima facie evidence of
the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. 9 Rule 39, §50 provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It was error therefore for the Court of Appeals to summarily rule that petitioners’ action is barred by the principle of res judicata.
Petitioners in fact questioned the jurisdiction of the U.S. court over their persons, but their claim was brushed aside by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals.
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the pleadings filed by private respondents in
connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one
of the defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the latter’s debt which was the object of the
transaction under litigation. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S.
case.
• It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold that jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic could not be
obtained because this is an action in personam and summons were served by extraterritorial service. Rule 14, §17 on
extraterritorial service provides that service of summons on a non-resident defendant may be effected out of the Philippines by
leave of Court where, among others, “the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.” 18 It is not
disputed that the properties, real and personal, of the private respondents had been attached prior to service of summons under
the Order of the trial court dated April 20, 1987.

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984)

Facts.
Kathy Keeton (Plaintiff), a resident of New York, sued Hustler Magazine, Inc. (Hustler) and others (Defendants) for libel in the
United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire under its diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff claims that Defendants
committed libel against her in five issues of its magazine published between 1975 and 1976. Plaintiff has no contacts with the
state of New Hampshire other than through a magazine she helps produce. Hustler is a corporation organized under the laws of
Ohio, and its principal place of business is in California. Hustler sells between 10,000 and 15,000 copies of its magazine in New
Hampshire per month. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed on
the ground that Plaintiff lacked sufficient contacts with New Hampshire to justify the state’s personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
Further, the court of appeals placed significant weight on the fact that New Hampshire’s six-year statute of limitations for libel
made it the only state in which Plaintiff’s suit could still be brought and that the “single publication rule” meant that, if successful,
Plaintiff would be able to recover for damages suffered in all fifty states. For these reasons, the court of appeals considered
personal jurisdiction over Defendants unfair. Plaintiff petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, which was
granted.
Issue.
Whether personal jurisdiction is proper in a libel action against a magazine in a state where its only contacts are magazine sales.
Held.
Yes. The court of appeals’ ruling is reversed and the case is remanded.
Due process forbids the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation unless the corporation has sufficient
minimum contacts with the state. Hustler’s “regular circulation” of its magazines within the state of New Hampshire constitutes
sufficient contacts to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over it for a libel claim related to statements made in the
magazine. Defendants purposefully sought to do business in the state of New Hampshire and regularly sells thousands of
magazines per month there. Further, New Hampshire has an interest in adjudicating harm that occurs inside its borders. This
includes a case involving libel committed in the state, even if committed against a nonresident. The court of appeals’ concern with
New Hampshire’s unusually long statute of limitations and the possibility of an unfair damage award was misplaced. Choice of law
matters have no bearing on a forum’s right to assert personal jurisdiction over a party. In addition, a plaintiff’s contacts with a
forum state have no relevance to whether personal jurisdiction exists over the defendant. It is Defendants’ contacts that are at
issue, and while they might not be sufficient to justify general personal jurisdiction over unrelated claims, Defendants’ continued
business justifies specific personal jurisdiction over claims related to that business. Moreover, the fact that a plaintiff resides
outside the state will not destroy personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Even though Plaintiff’s damages would likely be greater
in her home state, there is no prohibition on bringing libel actions elsewhere. Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the
privileges of doing business in New Hampshire, and should reasonably anticipated being haled into court for claims related to the
magazine it sells there. National publications may properly be sued for their content anywhere “a substantial number of copies
are regularly sold and distributed.”

RUSH v. SAVCHUK(1980)
Facts: On January 13, 1972, Jeffrey Savchuk the plaintiff was riding in a car operated by Randal Rush the defendant insured which
was involved in a single-car crash, as a result Savchuk suffered injuries. Savchuk a Minnesota resident, brought an action for
negligence in a Minnesota state court against defendant, an Indiana resident. Since defendant had no contacts with Minnesota
that would support in personam jurisdiction, plaintiff sought to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by garnishing the contractual
obligation of defendant’s insurer State Farm which is licensed to do business in Minnesota.

Issue: Whether a state have jurisdiction over a defendant with no connections in the state by attaching the contractual obligation
of an insurer licensed in the state?
Held: No. A State may exercise jurisdiction over an absent defendant only if the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the
forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Here, the only
affiliating circumstance offered to show a relationship among Rush, Minnesota, and this lawsuit is that Rush's insurance company
does business in the State. However, the fictional presence in Minnesota of State Farm's policy obligation to defend and indemnify
Rush - derived from combining the legal fiction that assigns a situs to a debt, for garnishment purposes, wherever the debtor is
found with the legal fiction that a corporation is "present," for jurisdictional purposes, wherever it does business - cannot be
deemed to give the State the power to determine Rush's liability for the out-of-state accident. The mere presence of property in a
State does not establish a sufficient relationship between the owner of the property and the State to support the exercise of
jurisdiction over an unrelated cause of action, and it cannot be said that the defendant engaged in any purposeful activity related
to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or reasonable merely because his insurer does business there.
Nor does the policy provide significant contacts between the litigation and the forum, for the policy obligations pertain only to the
conduct, not the substance, of the litigation.

Worldwide Volswagen vs Woodson

Facts :
New York residents purchased a car from a Volkswagen retailer in New York. On a drive to Arizona, the residents got in a car
accident while driving through Oklahoma. A defective gas tank in the car allegedly caused the accident. The residents sued the
retailer and its New York based wholesale distributor in Oklahoma state court. The retailer and distributor asserted that Oklahoma
could not properly have jurisdiction. The trial court rejected this claim. The retailer and distributor then sought a writ of
prohibition from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial court from exercising in personam jurisdiction. The court
denied the writ because jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma’s long-arm statute, which allowed jurisdiction over defendants
who caused tortuous injury within the state.
Issue:
May a state court exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a products liability action where the
defendant’s only connection to the state is the accident in question?

Held: Consistently with the Due Process Clause, the Oklahoma trial court may not exercise in personamjurisdiction over
petitioners. Pp. 444 U. S. 291-299.
(a) A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist "minimum contacts"
between the defendant and the forum State. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310. The defendant's contacts with
the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, id. at 326 U. S. 316, and the relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is "reasonable . . . to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there," id. at 326 U. S. 317. The Due Process Clause
"does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations."
Id. at 326 U. S. 319. Pp. 444 U. S. 291-294.
(b) Here, there is a total absence in the record of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of
state court jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma; they close no sales and perform no services
there, avail
Page 444 U. S. 287
themselves of none of the benefits of Oklahoma law, and solicit no business there either through salespersons or through
advertising reasonably calculated to reach that State. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars to Oklahoma
residents, or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. Although it is foreseeable that
automobiles sold by petitioners would travel to Oklahoma and that the automobile here might cause injury in Oklahoma,
"foreseeability" alone is not a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. The foreseeability that
is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State, but rather is that
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there. Nor can jurisdiction be supported on the theory that petitioners earn substantial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.

COMPUSERV INC., vs PATTERSON

No. 95-3452, July 22, 1996

FACTS:
CompuServe, Inc., established in Ohio, provides an opportunity for subscribers to post and sell software in the form of
"shareware." CompuServe accepted payment for the shareware from purchasers and remitted that payment, less a commission,
to the authors of the software. Richard S. Patterson, a resident of Texas, subscribed to CompuServe for marketing his navigation
software. Before use of the shareware service, Patterson entered into a "Shareware Registration Agreement" ("SRA") that
provided that Ohio law governed the parties' relationship. Subsequent to the posting of Patterson's navigation software,
CompuServe itself began to market its own navigation software. Patterson believed that CompuServe's software was confusingly
similar to his own trademarked software and notified CompuServe.

CompuServe filed a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking a declaration that it
had not infringed Patterson's trademarks. Patterson filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court
granted Patterson's motion.

CompuServe filed an appeal arguing that Patterson's repeated availment of the shareware sales procedures constituted minimum
contacts with the forum state. CompuServe further argued that the existence of the Shareware Registration Agreement clearly
stipulating that Ohio law governed disputes regarding the agreement meant that the exercise of personal jurisdiction comported
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an Internet service provider's home state can exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state author of software who
had subscribed and received commissions by using the Internet service provider.

HELD:
Yes. A forum state can exercise jurisdiction over an author of software who sells his software via a Internet service provider based
in the forum state because 1) the author purposefully avails himself of the forum's laws by acting in the forum, 2) the cause of
action arises from that availment, and 3) the burden on the defendant author is less than that on the forum state's interests in
determining its laws concerning trademarks and trade names.

SANTOS VS NORTHWEST
ACTS: The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign
corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines.
On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San
Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified
for his return to San Francisco.
On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to
Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo
to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.
On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in the RTC of Makati. On April 13, 1987, NOA moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows:
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of
business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.
The private respondent contended that the Philippines was not its domicile nor was this its principal place of business. Neither
was the petitioner’s ticket issued in this country nor was his destination Manila but San Francisco in the United States.
Lower court granted the dismissal, CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the Philippines has jurisdiction over the case. (Issue raised by the party is WON the provision of the Warsaw
convention was constitutional)
HELD: No jurisdiction (the provision is constitutional)
The Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect
of law in this country. The petitioner’s allegations are not convincing enough to overcome this presumption. Apparently, the
Convention considered the four places designated in Article 28 the most convenient forums for the litigation of any claim that may
arise between the airline and its passenger, as distinguished from all other places.
NOTES:
WON Warsaw convention applies.
Convention applies to all international transportation of persons performed by aircraft for hire. Whether the transportation is
“international” is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of
carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals “within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties,” the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the
airline and its passenger.
WON MNL or SFO was the destination.
The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or,
specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner’s ticket shows that his
ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the
parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be
considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.
WON Northwest has domicile in the Philippines
Notably, the domicile of the carrier is only one of the places where the complaint is allowed to be filed under Article 28(1). By
specifying the three other places, to wit, the principal place of business of the carrier, its place of business where the contract was
made, and the place of destination, the article clearly meant that these three other places were not comprehended in the term
“domicile.”
COMMUNICATION MATERIALS VS. CA
FACTS: Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC) are both
domestic corporations.. Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are corporations duly organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, USA. There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines.
ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as “Representative Agreement”. Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged
ASPAC as its “exclusive representative” in the Philippines for the sale of ITEC’s products, in consideration of which, ASPAC was
paid a stipulated commission. Through a “License Agreement” entered into by the same parties later on, ASPAC was able to
incorporate and use the name “ITEC” in its own name. Thus , ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly known as
ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines).
One year into the second term of the parties’ Representative Agreement, ITEC decided to terminate the same, because petitioner
ASPAC allegedly violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners and another
Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL), the President of which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of
using knowledge and information of ITEC’s products specifications to develop their own line of equipment and product support,
which are similar, if not identical to ITEC’s own, and offering them to ITEC’s former customer.
The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC. Defendants filed a MTD the complaint on the following grounds: (1)
That plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the required BOI
authority and SEC license, and (2) that plaintiff is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application against it of the
principle of “forum non conveniens”. The MTD was denied.
Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised ROC.
It was dismissed as well. MR denied, hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:

2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience?

YES; Petitioner’s insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or non application, of the private international
law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the Philippine Court has no venue
to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is
misplaced because the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the original
complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question plaintiff’s standing to sue, having already
acceded to the same by virtue of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.
Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of the case, whether to give due course to
the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in
spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so;
provided, that the following requisites are met:
1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and,
3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the court’s disposition to give due course to the questioned action,
the matter of the present forum not being the “most convenient” as a ground for the suit’s dismissal, deserves scant
consideration.
First Philippine International Bank v. CA

Facts:
The bank had an agreement with Demetria to purchase the parcels of land. The said agreement was made by Demetria with the
bank’s manager, Rivera. Later, however, the bank through its conservator, Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement
as it alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such agreement. Hence, there was no valid contract of sale.
Subsequently, Demtria sued the bank. The RTC ruled in favor of Demetria. The bank filean appeal with the CA.
Meanwhile, Henry Co., who is a stockholder in the said bank, filed a motion for intervention with the trial court which was denied
since the trial has concluded already and the case is now pending appeal. Subsequently, Henry Co., filed a separate civil case
against Ejercito, the successor-in-interest of Demetria seeking to have the contract of sale be declared unenforceable against the
bank. Ejercito argued that the second case constitutes forum shopping since it was barred by litis pendentia by virtue of the case
then pending in the CA.

Issue:
whether or not a court may refuse to take cognizance of a case on the ground of forum shopping.

Held:
Yes. Forum-shopping originated as a concept in private international law.12 , where non-resident litigants are given the option to
choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to
annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat these less than
honorable excuses, the principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere.
THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ARBITER CEFERINA J. DIOSANA AND MARCELO G. SANTOS, respondents.

FACTS: During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press in the Sultanate of Oman, respondent Santos received a letter from
Mr. Gerhard R. Shmidt, General Manager, Palace Hotel, Beijing, China. Mr. Schmidt informed respondent Santos that he was
recommended by one Nestor Buenio, a friend of his. On November 5, 1988, respondent Santos left for Beijing, China. He started
to work at the Palace Hotel. Subsequently, respondent Santos signed an amended "employment agreement" with the Palace
Hotel, effective November 5, 1988. In the contract, Mr. Shmidt represented the Palace Hotel. The Vice President (Operations and
Development) of petitioner MHICL Miguel D. Cergueda signed the employment agreement under the word "noted". On August
10, 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent Santos by letter signed by Mr. Shmidt that his employment at the Palace Hotel
print shop would be terminated due to business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in China. On September 5, 1989,
the Palace Hotel terminated the employment of respondent Santos and paid all benefits due him, including his plane fare back to
the Philippines. On October 24, 1989, respondent Santos, through his lawyer, Atty. Ednave wrote Mr. Shmidt, demanding full
compensation pursuant to the employment agreement. On February 20, 1990, respondent Santos filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Palace Hotel and
Mr. Shmidt were not served with summons and neither participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. On June 27,
1991, Labor Arbiter decided the case against petitioners. On July 23, 1991, petitioners appealed to the NLRC, arguing that the
POEA, not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC was the proper forum for the instant case.

DECISION: The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum. Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency
may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.37 The conditions are unavailing in the case at
bar.
FACTS:
The Respondent’s decedents died in an aircraft in the Scottish Highlands. All the decedents were Scottish residents, as were their
heirs. As the decedents' personal representative, respondent filed suit against petitioner in the United States because petitioner
manufactured the aircraft in Pennsylvania and the law was more favorable to their case. Petitioner wanted to litigate the tort
action in Scotland.

ISSUE:
Whether the possibility of an unfavorable change of the law in plaintiff’s home forum bar dismissal under forum non convenient
(Transfer to a More Convenient Forum)?
ANSWER:
No, the possibility of an unfavorable change in the law should not, by itself, bar dismissal.
The possibility of an unfavorable change in the law in Scotland should not, by itself, bar dismissal. The court held that plaintiffs
may not defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that
would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the chosen forum, since the possibility of a
change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens
inquiry. In this case the proper forum was Scotland given that fewer evidentiary problems would be posed if the trial were held in
Scotland; the inability to implead potential third party defendants clearly supported holding the trial in Scotland; and public
interest favored trial in Scotland, the accident having occurred in its air space, all the decedents being Scottish, and apart from the
manufacturers, all potential plaintiffs and defendants being either Scottish or English.

GOLF OIL CORP. vs GILBERT

330 US 501, 1947

United States Supreme Court

GULF OIL CORPORATION v. GILBERT(1947)
No. 93
Argued: Decided: March 10, 1947
[330 U.S. 501, 502] Messrs. Bernard A. Golding and Archie D. Gray, both of Houston, Tex., for petitioner.
Mr. Max J. Gwertzman, of New York City, for respondent.
Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions are whether the United States District Court has inherent power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the doctrine of forum
non conveniens and, if so, whether that power was abused in this case.
The respondent-plaintiff brought this action in the Southern District of New York, but resides at Lynchburg, Virginia, where he
operated a public warehouse. He alleges that the petitioner-defendant, in violation of the ordinances of Lynchburg, so carelessly
handled a delivery of gasoline to his warehouse tanks and pumps as to cause [330 U.S. 501, 503] an explosion and fire which
consumed the warehouse building to his damage of $41,889.10, destroyed merchandise and fixtures to his damage of $3,602. 40,
caused injury to his business and profits of $20,038.27, and burned the property of customers in his custody under warehousing
agreements to the extent of $300,000. He asks judgment of $365,529.77 with costs and disbursements, and interest from the date
of fire. The action clearly is one in tort.
The petitioner-defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, qualified to do business in both Virginia and
New York, and it has designated officials of each state as agents to receive service of process. When sued in New York, the
defendant, invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claimed that the appropriate place for trial is Virginia where the
plaintiff lives and defendant does business, where all events in litigation took place, where most of the witnesses reside, and
where both state and federal courts are available to plaintiff and are able to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant.
The case, on its merits, involves no federal question and was brought in the United States District Court solely because of diversity
in citizenship of the parties. Because of the charact r of its jurisdiction and the holdings of and under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 , 58 S.Ct. 817, 114 A.L.R. 1487, the District Court considered that the law of New York as to forum non conveniens
applied and that it required the case to be left to Virginia courts. 1 It therefore dismissed.
The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed as to the applicability of New York law, took a restrictive view of the application of the
entire doctrine in federal courts and, one judge dissenting, reversed. 2 The case is here on certiorari. 328 U.S. 830 , 66 S.Ct. 1123
[330 U.S. 501, 504] I.
It is conceded that the venue statutes of the United States permitted the plaintiff to commence his action in the Southern District
of New York and empower that court to entertain it. 3 But that does not settle the question whether it must do so. Indeed the
doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue.
This Court, in one form of words or another, has repeatedly recognized the existence of the power to decline jurisdiction in
exceptional circumstances. As formulated by Mr. Justice Brandeis the rule is: 'Obviously, the proposition that a court having
jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true; else the admiralty court could never decline jurisdiction on the ground that the
litigation is between foreigners. Nor is it true of courts administering other systems of our law. Courts of equity and of law also
occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the suit is between aliens or nonresidents, or where
for kindred reasons the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal.' Canada Malting Co., Ltd., v. Paterson
Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 422, 423, 52 S.Ct. 413, 415.
We later expressly said that a state court 'may in appropriate cases apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens.' Broderick v.
Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 , 55 S.Ct. 589, 592, 79 l.Ed. 1100, 100 A.L.R. 1133; Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 , 294,
n. 5, 63 S.Ct. 207, 143 A.L.R. 1273. Even where federal rights binding on state courts under the Constitution are sought to be
adjudged, this Court has sustained state courts in a refusal to entertain a litigation between a nonresident and a foreign
corporation or between two foreign corporations. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 , 49 S.Ct. 355; Anglo-
American Provision Co. v. [330 U.S. 501, 505] Davis Provision Co. No. 1, 191 U.S. 373 , 24 S.Ct. 92. It has held the use of an
inappropriate forum in one case an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Equity Co.,
262 U.S. 312 , 43 S.Ct. 556. On substantially forum non conveniens grounds we have required federal courts to relinquish decision
of cases within their jurisdiction where the court would have to participate in the administrative policy of a state. Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 , 61 S.Ct. 343; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 , 63 S.Ct. 1098;
but cf. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 , 64 S.Ct. 7. And most recently we decided Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co.,
326 U.S. 549 , 66 S.Ct. 284, in which the Court, without questioning the validity of the doctrine held it had been applied in that
case without justification. 4
It is true that in cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. 51 et seq., we have held that plaintiff's choice of a
forum cannot be defeated on the basis of forum non conveniens. But this was because the special venue act under which those
cases are brought was believed to require it. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 , 62 S.Ct. 6, 136 A.L.R. 1222; Miles v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 , 62 S.Ct. 827, 146 A.L.R. 1104. Those decisions do not purport to modify the doctrine as to
other cases governed by the general venue statutes. [330 U.S. 501, 506] But the court below says that 'The Kepner case ...
warned against refusal of jurisdiction in a particular case controlled by congressional act; here the only difference is that
congressional act, plus judicial interpretation (under the Neirbo case), spells out the result.' 153 F.2d at page 885. The Federal
Employers' Liability Act, however, which controlled decision in the Kepner case, specifically provides where venue may be had in
any suit on a cause of action arising under that statute. What the court below refers to as 'congressional act, plus judicial
interpretation,' is the general statute of venue in diversity suits, plus our decision that it gives the defendant 'a personal privilege
respecting the venue, or place of suit, which he may assert, or may waive, at his election,' Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., Ltd., 308 U.S. 165, 168 , 60 S.Ct. 153, 154, 128 A.L.R. 1437. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, as interpreted by Kepner,
increases the number of places where the defendant may be sued and makes him accept the plaintiff's choice. The Neirbo case is
only a declaration that if the defendant, by filing consent to be sued, waives its privilege to be sued at its place of residence, it may
be sued in the federal courts at the place where it has consented to be sued. But the general venue statute plus the Neirbo
interpretation do not add up to a declaration that the court must respect the choice of the plaintiff, no matter what the type of
suit or issues involved. The two taken together mean only that the defendant may consent to be sued, and it is proper for the
federal court to take jurisdiction, not that the plaintiff's choice cannot be questioned. The defendant's consent to be sued extends
only to give the court jurisdiction of the person; it assumes that the court, having the parties before it, will apply all the applicable
law, including, in those cases where it is appropriate, its discretionary judgment as to whether the suit should be entertained. In
all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into [330 U.S. 501, 507] play, it presupposes at least two forums
in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them.
II.
The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is
authorized by the letter of a general venue statute. These statutes are drawn with a necessary generality and usually give a
plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy. But the open door may
admit those who seek not simply justice but perhaps justice blended with some harassment. A plaintiff sometimes is under
temptation to resort to a strategy of f rcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to
himself.
Many of the states have met misuse of venue by investing courts with a discretion to change the place of trial on various grounds,
such as the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice. 5 The federal law contains no such express criteria to guide the
district court in exercising its power. But the problem is a very old one affecting the administration of the courts as well as the
rights of litigants, and both in England and in this country the common law worked out techniques and criteria for dealing with
it. 6 [330 U.S. 501, 508] Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or require either
grant or denial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts, and experience has
not shown a judicial tendency to renounce one's own jurisdiction so strong as to result in many abuses. 7
If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to forecast or state, those to be considered are not
difficult to name. An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant.
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate
to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be
questions as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair
trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by
inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. 8 But unless the balance is strongly in
favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is
piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the
people of a community [330 U.S. 501, 509] which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many
persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can
learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness,
too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than
having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.
The law of New York as to the discretion of a court to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and as to the standards that
guide discretion is, so far as here involved, the same as the federal rule. Murnan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 246 N.Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508, 54
A.L.R. 1522; Wedemann v. United States Trus Co. of New York, 258 N.Y. 315, 179 N.E. 712, 79 A.L.R. 1320; see Gregonis v.
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co ., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223, 32 A.L.R. 1. It would not be profitable, therefore, to pursue
inquiry as to the source from which our rule must flow.
III.
Turning to the question whether this is one of those rather rare cases where the doctrine should be applied, we look first to the
interests of the litigants.
The plaintiff himself is not a resident of New York, nor did any event connected with the case take place there, nor does any
witness with the possible exception of experts live there. No one connected with that side of the case save counsel for the plaintiff
resides there, and he has candidly told us that he was retained by insurance companies interested presumably because of
subrogation. His affidavits and argument are devoted to controvering claims as to defendant's inconvenience rather than to
showing that the present forum serves any convenience [330 U.S. 501, 510] of his own, with one exception. The only justification
for trial in New York advanced here is one rejected by the district court and is set forth in the brief as follows: 'This Court can
readily realize that an action of this type, involving as it does a claim for damages in an amount close to $ 400,000, is one which
may stagger the imagination of a local jury which is surely unaccustomed to dealing with amounts of such a nature. Furthermore,
removed from Lynchburg, the respondent will have an opportunity to try this case free from local influences and preconceived
notions which make it difficult to procure a jury which has no previous knowledge of any of the facts herein.'
This unproven premise that jurors of New York live on terms of intimacy with $400,000 transactions is not an assumption we
easily make. Nor can we assume that a jury from Lynchburg and vicinity would be 'staggered' by contemplating the value of a
warehouse building that stood in their region, or of merchandise and fixtures such as were used there, nor are they likely to be
staggered by the value of chattels which the people of that neighborhood put in storage. It is a strange argument on behalf of a
Virginia plaintiff that the community which gave him patronage to make his business valuable is not capable of furnishing jurors
who know the value of the goods they store, the building they are stored in, or the business their patronage creates. And there is
no specification of any local influence, other than accurate knowledge of local conditiions, that would make a fair trial improbable.
The net of this is that we cannot say the District Court was bound to entertain a provincial fear of the provincialism of a Virginia
jury. That leaves the Virginia plaintiff without even a suggested reason for transporting this suit to New York. [330 U.S. 501,
511] Defendant points out that not only the plaintiff, but every person who participated in the acts charged to be negligent,
resides in or near Lynchburg. It also claims a need to interplead an alleged independent contractor which made the delivery of the
gasoline and which is a Virginia corporation domiciled in Lynchburg, that it cannot interplead in New York. There also are
approximately 350 persons residing in and around Lynchburg who stored with plaintiff the goods for the damage to which he
seeks to recover. The extent to which they have left the community since the fire and the number of them who will actually be
needed is in dispute. The complaint alleges that defendant's conduct violated Lynchburg ordinances. Conditions are said to
require proof by firemen and by many others. The learned and experienced trial judge was not unaware that litigants generally
manage to try their cases with fewer witnesses than they predict in such motions as this. But he was justified in concluding that
this trial is likely to be long and to involve calling many witnesses, and that Lynchburg, some 400 miles from New York, is the
source of all proofs for either side with possible exception of e perts. Certainly to fix the place of trial at a point where litigants
cannot compel personal attendance and may be forced to try their cases on deposition, is to create a condition not satisfactory to
court, jury or most litigants. Nor is it necessarily cured by the statement of plaintiff's counsel that he will see to getting many of
the witnesses to the trial and that some of them 'would be delighted to come to New York to testify.' There may be circumstances
where such a proposal should be given weight. In others the offer may not turn out to be as generous as defendant or court might
suppose it to be. Such matters are for the District Court to decide in exercise of a sound discretion.
The court likewise could well have concluded that the task of the trial court would be simplified by trial in Vir- [330 U.S. 501,
512] ginia. If trial was in a state court, it could apply its own law to events occurring there. If in federal court by reason of
diversity of citizenship, the court would apply the law of its own state in which it is likely to be experienced. The course of
adjudication in New York federal court might be beset with conflict of laws problems all avoided if the case is litigated in Virginia
where it arose.
We are convinced that the District Court did not exceed its powers or the bounds of its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's
complaint and remitting him to the courts of his own community. The Circuit Court of Appeals took too restrictive a view of the
doctrine as approved by this Court. Its judgment is reversed.

GLYNNA FORONDA-CRYSTAL,
Petitioner
,
v.
ANIANA LAWAS SON,
Respondent
.
G.R. No.
221815, 29 November 2017
FACTS
The Respondent Aniana Lawas Son filed an action for reconveyance and
damages against the petitioner Glynna Foronda-Crystal alleging that, for twelve and a
half years, she has been the lawful owner and possessor of a parcel of land located inBarrio Magay, Municipality of
Compostela, Province of Cebu. She alleged that on August 4, 1986, she purchased the same from a certain
Eleno T. Arias for a sum of P200,000.00, and since her acquisition, she has been paying real property taxes
thereon as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 16408A, which was issued under her name. In her contention, the issued Free
Patent to petitioner's father was "due to gross error or any other cause" because "there is no tax declaration in the name of
patentee Eddie Foronda" and that this "goes to show that Eddie Foronda is not the owner of lot 1280 and neither has payment of
real estate taxes been made by him when he was still alive or by his heirs." On April 13, 1999, the petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction asserting that the "market value of
the subject property per Tax Declaration No. 16408 is P2,830.00" and thus, jurisdiction over the case lies with the MCTC. However,
RTC reconsidered and set aside its earlier ruling based on the Complaint stated that the property was worth
P200,000.00, and that under the BIR zonal valuation, the property located at Magay, Compostela, Cebu carries the value that may
be summed up to more than P20,000.00.CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUES
1. Whether the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether the RTC decision was void ab initio.
RULING
1. No, the RTC cannot validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.
The law provides that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00.
For those below the
foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the MeTC, MTC, MCTC, or
MTCC. Moreover, it required the allegation of the real property's assessed value in the
complaint.
In this case, the respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value
of the subject property. Rather, what she included therein was an allegation of its
market value amounting to P200,000.00.
In the course of the trial, the petitioner
asserted that the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration was
merely P1,030.00. Thus, the RTC lacked jurisdiction.
2. Yes, the RTC decision was void ab initio
In the case of
Diona v. Balangue
,
the Court ruled that void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of
any obligation. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
Here, it is
clear that it is the MCTC, and not the RTC that has jurisdiction over the
case. The RTC should have upheld its earlier Order which dismissed the same.
Consequently, the decision that it rendered is null and void

CaseDig: El Banco Espanol vs. Palanca

G.R. No. L-11390; March 26, 1918
Posted by: Rianne Fernandez
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt which amounted to 218, 294. 10
Php while his property was worth 75, 000 Php more than what he owed. Due to his failure to pay, El Banco executed an
instrument to mortgage the former's property. However, Engracio left for Amoy, China and eventually died there. The mortgagor
then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The
Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant's last known address but it was not shown
whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause
proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was
held with the bank as the highest bidder and the same was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the
confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein
he requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto.
On the ground that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter or the action.
HELD:
Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives outside of the country and refuses to appear or otherwise submit himself to
the authority of the court, the jurisdiction of the latter is limited to the mortgaged property, with respect to which jurisdiction of
the court is based upon the fact that the property is located within the district and that the court, under the provisions of law
applicable in such cases is vested with the power to subject property to the obligation created by the mortgage. In such case
personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant is non-essential and in fact cannot be acquired.
among themselves. The trial court ordered Eugene Perkins to include in his complaint
as parties defendants, Idonah Perkins and George Engelhard. The complaint was
accordingly amended and in addition to the relief prayed for inthe original complaint,
Eugene Perkins prayed that Idonah Perkins and George Engelhard be adjudged without
interest in the shares of stock. Thereafter, summons by publication were served upon
the non-resident defendants. Idonah Perkins and George Engelhard, pursuant to the
Order of the trial court, filed an answer to the amended complaint. Idonah Perkins filed
her pleading entitled “Objection to Venue, Motion to Quash, and Demurrer to
Jurisdiction”, wherein she challenged the jurisdiction of the lower court over her person.
The trial court rejected/overruled Idonah Perkin’s objection, motion and
demurrer,and her motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, Idonah Perkins
brought the instant Petition for Certiorari, praying that the summons of publication
issued against her be declared null and void, and respondent Judge be permanently
prohibited from taking any action on the case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Idonah Perkins
as a non-resident defendant.
2. Notwithstanding the want of jurisdiction, whether the court may validly try the case.
RULING:
The Court noticed that the pleas made by Idonah Perkins over the subject-matter
is not an independent grounds for relief, but merely an additional arguments to support
her contention that the lower court has no jurisdiction over her person because (1) she
is a non-resident, (2) the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (3) the
issues had already been decided by the New York court, and are being re litigated in
California court. The court believed that Idonah Perkins has not submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Voluntary appearance cannot be implied from a mistaken
reasoning but from the nature of the relief prayed for.
The amended complaint brought by Eugene Perkins against Idonah Perkins
seeks to exclude her from any interest in a property located in the Philippines.
That property consists of shares of stock in Benguet Consolidate Mining
Company which is organized in the Philippines under the provisions of Spanish
Code of Commerce, with principal office in Manila, and which conducts mining
activities in the Philippines. The situs of the shares is in the jurisdiction where the
corporation is created, whether the certificate of ownership of shares is within or
without that jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, the Court held that the action
brought is QUASI IN REM. The action being a quasi in rem, RTC Manila has
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident. In order to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of due process, summons has been served upon her
by publication. The action being a quasi in rem, the relief that may be granted by
the Philippine court must be confined to the res; it having no jurisdiction to render
a personal judgment against the non-resident. In the amended complaint file by
Eugene Perkins, no money judgment or other relief in personam is prayed for
against Idonah Perkins. The only relief sought is that she be declared to be
without any interest/claim or be excluded in the shares in controversy.

Grounds to disinherit children, descendants

The following are the grounds to disinherit children and descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate: (Article 919, Civil Code of
the Philippines)
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
descendants, or ascendants
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or
more, if the accusation has been found groundless
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change
one already made
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction

Read more: https://business.inquirer.net/383579/grounds-for-disinheriting-an-heir#ixzz8DeJVYqdw

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