Statutory Construction by Rolando Suarez

STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
ROLANDO A. SUAREZ
LL.B., SAN BEDA COLLEGE
Professor of Constitutional Law, Constitutional Law Review, and
Political Law Review
Former Professor of different law subjects in
several colleges (i.e., San Beda College of Law,
Adamson University, MLQU, Lyceum, University of Perpetual Help, PUP
and University of Manila); Lecturer; Powerhouse Law Review Center;
Center for Global Best Practices; IBP-MCLE; UM Review; Perpetual
Help, Las Piñas and Biñan, MLQ Pre-week,
Knowledge Providers Law Review Center,
Suarez, Zamora, Suarez and Suarez
Author: Political Law Reviewer, Constitutional Law Reviewer; Six Months
Before the Bar Outline/Reviewer; Three Months Before The Bar Outline
Reviewer Principles; Comments and Cases in Constitu
tional Law, Volume I, First Edition and Second Edition; Principles, Com ments
and Cases in Constitutional Law, Volume II, First Edition and Second Edition;
Agrarian Reform and Social Legislation; Comparative Study; Roman Law and
Philippine Law, First and Second Edition; Introduction to Law, First, Second,
Third and Fourth Editions; Notes and Comments, Proclamation No. 3 and
The Provisional Constitution of the Philippines;
Agrarian Reform, Cooperatives and Taxation;
A Mile to Go for Genuine Land Reform in the Philippines; Statutory
Constitution, First and Second Edition; Torts and Damages First and
Second Edition; Legal Forms;
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Made Easy
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DEDICATION
To my wife, Nora, and children, Revelyn, Rhonnel, Reinna Ricci,
and Rizza; to my beloved and .deceased parents, Marcelo A. Suarez and Elena
Arevalo Suarez, my first teachers, who taught me the rudiments of
writing and the value of hard work; to my thoughtful and loving aunt,
Cornelia Arevalo Vda. De Capul; to my kind and equally thoughtful
mother-in-law, Niflea Lautchang Vda. De Manalese, who just passed
away; to my deceased brothers and sisters, Buendegardo, Proserfina,
Elvira, Manolo, and Rodolfo with whom I have shared the blessings of a
modest home and hardwork
ing parents; to all my former teachers who cared to enlighten me with
their knowledge; to my town mates and friends who share my thoughts
and aspirations for a better society; and above all, to my dear God who is
always generous to help me in any of my endeavors, I dedicate this
humble work.
iu
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I acknowledge the assistance rendered by the members of my

present staff, Hanna Marie M. Manila, and Augusto C. Lusung, Jr., my
former student who found interest to learn how to write a law book and
even a non-law book.
I thank the proofreaders, including my children, Roland Rhon nel
M. Suarez, a lawyer, and Rhina Rizza M. Suarez, for encoding some
commentaries which I write from time to time.
I also wish to thank the whole Editorial Production Department of
Rex Book Store for helping me throughout the entire printing process.
Above all, I am immensely grateful to God for all the blessings,
guidance and fortune that I have received and those still to come.
V
PREFACE
I wrote the second edition of this book in 2007.

Last year, I was reminded by a concerned staff of REX Book Store
that I am not able to revise the second edition of Statutory Construction,
and I was requested to do so as soon as possible, in response to numerous
requests of students and professors.
I was about to start the revision last year, but I was saddled by
my busy schedule in bar review classes until the first week of August
2013. After the end of the bar examinations last year, I was all set to start
the revision, but again, and to my dismay, I suffered a stroke last October
2013, and I was advised to take a rest.
After my recovery, I started reading new cases and jurispru dence
about the subject. I gathered the important ones and they are now
included in this edition. They are the cases in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012,
and 2013.
Like what I have done in all the books I wrote in different sub jects, I have
tried to have a simplified presentation and discussion of the various
principles and cases covering the subject matter.
I hope that this new edition, like any other book or books I
wrote, will be of valuable help to all students and professors through out
the country.
December 18, 2014, Paranaque City
ROLANDO A. SUAREZ
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT,
PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
Statutory construction, defined ................................................ 1
Construction distinguished from interpretation .....................1 The
most basic rules to remember ........................................... 2
Decisions of the Supreme Court that clarify the rule on the issue of when
to apply and interpret the law 2 Three (3) cardinal rules when the
wordings of the
Constitution are subject to interpretation ......................3 Who
interprets the law? ............................................................ 3 Purpose of
interpretation and construction ............................. .4 When is it necessary
and not necessary to interpret and
construct? ...................................................................4
New Case
Cynthia S. Bolos v. Danilo T. Bolos
G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010 .................................5 Old
Case
Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second
25% grant of the special allowance for judges be
included in the computation of his retirement
benefits, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004 7
Ambiguitydefined ...................................................................... 9 The
present structure of government, and how this affects interpretation and
construction of statutes 9 Legislative
power ... . ................................................................... 10
Case
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v.
CA, et al., G.R. No. 125183, September 29, 1997...........10 ix
Judicial power, traditional concept of judicial power 13 What is the

traditional concept of judicial power? ......... 13 What is the new
definition of judicial power? ................13
New Case
Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo v. The Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010 ...............................14 Old
Case
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, Manila Hotel
Corporation, et al. G.R. No. 122156,
February3, 1997...............................................................18
The Court or the judicial arm of the government shall be governed by
rules..............................................................22 Executive
Department...............................................................23 The three (3)
principal branches of government.....................24
CHAPTER II
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND
CONSTRUCTION
Use intrinsic aids before resorting to extrinsic aids...............27 What
are the intrinsic aids? ......................................................27
New Case
Spouses Pascual, et al.,
Francisco A. Pascual, Margarita Corazon D. Mariano,
Edwin D. Mariano and Danny R. Mariano v.
Spouses Ballesteros, et al.,
G.R. No. 186269, February 15, 2012 ..............................29
Old Case
LandBank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 118745, July 5, 1996 .........................................31
New Case
South Pacific Sugar Corporation and
South East Asia Sugar Mill Corporation v.
Court Of Appeals and
x
Sugar Regulatory Administration
G.R. No. 180462, February 9, 2011 ................................. 32 Old
Case
Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation v.

Court of Appeals and Herminigildo Pascual,
G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997 ............................... 35
Tabao v. Judge Espina, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1348,

June 14, 1996 En Banc, Per Curiam............................... 39
New Case
Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy v.
Hon. Court Of Appeals and Asia United Bank
G.R. No. 187919, April 25, 2012......................................43
Old Cases
People v. Hon. A. Purisima, et al.,
G.R. Nos. L.420050-66, November 20, 1978 ................... 46
U.S. v. Hart, et al.,

26 Phil. 149........................................................................ 47
General Milling Corporation v. Torres,

G.R. No. 93666, April 22, 1991 ........................................ 48
Paras v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 123169, November 4,
1996 ............................................................. 50
ExtrinsicAids............................................................................. 53
1. Contemporaneous circumstances ..................................... 53 2 Policy .
.................................................................................. 53 3. Legislative history

of the statute ..................................... 54 4. Contemporaneous and practical
construction ................. .54 5. Executive construction
...................................................... 54 . 6 Legislative construction
.................................................... 54 7. Judicial construction
......................................................... 55 8. Construction by the bar and legal
commentators .......... 55
Simplifications of the rule regarding the use

of extrinsic aids ................................................................. 55
Cases
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 ............................. ............. . 55
Bonifacio v. Judge Dizon, G.R. No. 79416,
September5, 1989.................................................................. 57
Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,
106 Phil. 466 [1959] and Aguinaldo v. Santos,
212 SCRA 768 [1992].......................................................... 58
Garcia-Padilla v. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile,
Gen. Fabian C. Ver and General Fidel V. Ramos
& Lt. Col. Miguel Coronel G.R. No. 61388,
April20, 1983.................................................................... 61
Attendant circumstances considered ........................................ 63
Comments on this part of the decision ........................... ........... 64
Contemporaneous circumstances and what was actually
being experienced by the soldiers in the battlefield 64 The historical
basis of the President's Power to
suspend the privilege of habeas corpus ........................... 65 Reasons
and evils sought to be remedied by LOl 1211.......... 65 Opinions,
commentaries of legal luminaries and ruling of the U.S. Supreme
Court ............................................... 66
Cases
CelsO Halili and Arthur Haul v. C.A. and Helen
Meyers Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 113539,
March12, 1998.........................................................................73
Emilio M.R. Osmefla and Pablo Garcia v. Comelec, G.R. No.
132231, March 31, 1998.....................................78
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Merida Ruth Romero..............82
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban..........85
Cases
Joker Arroyo, et al. v. Jose de Venecia, et al.,
G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998........................................87
Joseph Estrada V. Aniàno Desierto,
in his capacity as Ombudsman, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 146710-15 March 2. 2001 .............. .................. .90 xli
New Case
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danio B. Faller and
Ferdinand N. Talabong v.
Commission On Elections and Wilfredo F. Asilo,
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009..............................99 Old
Case
Socrates v. COMELEC & Hagedorn,
G.R. Nos. 155083-84, October 16, 2002 ........................... 101
Background of rules and jurisprudence in case

of termination of employment 103 Cases
Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, et al.,
G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989 .................................... 105
Ruben Serrano v National Labor Relations
Commission and Isetann Department Store,
G R No 117040, January 27, 2000 107
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,
442 SCRA 573 (2004) 109
Presumptions in aids of construction ................ ........................ 110
Presumption of validity .................................................... 111
Presumption of constitutionality ............... ....................... 111
Presumption of good faith ......................... ....................... 112
Presumption agamst injustice 112 Presumption against
inconsistency 112 Presumption against absurdity 113 Presumption
against ineffectiveness 113 Presumption against irrepealable laws
113
Case
De Guia v. Guingona, et al.,
G R No 119525, April 18, 1995 114
Presumption against implied repeals 115 Presumption against
violation of public policy 115 Presumption of knowledge of
existing, laws 115 Presumption of acquiescence to judicial
construction 116
Presumption of jurisdiction . 116 Presumption of acting within the
scope of authority 116 Presumption against violation of
international law ....... 116
CHAPTER III
LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION
Definition of law......................................................................... 117 Classification of law
................................................................... 118 Sources of law ............................................................................ 119
Statutes ...................................................................................... 121 Kinds of
statutes........................................................................ 121
As to nature
Penal statutes ........................................................... 121
Remedial statutes ...................................................... ... 121 Substantive
statutes................................................. 121 Labor statutes
........................................................... 121 Tax statutes
.............................................................. 121 As to application
Mandatory ................................................................. 121 Directory
.................................................................... 121 As to performance
Permanent................................................................. 121 Temporary
................................................................. 121 As to scope
General...................................................................... 121 Special
....................................................................... 121 Local
.
.......................................................................... 121 Other

classifications
A statute could either be prospective
orretroactive ...................................................... 121 A statute could either
be a repealing act
or an amendatory act ......................................... 121 A statute could
either be a reference statute
or a declaratory statute ..................................... 121
Identification of statutes ........................................................... 122 How are statutes
identified? ............................................ 122 Partsof statutes .........................................................................
122 Seven parts of a statute ................................................... 122
Title...........................................................................122 Preamble
Enacting Clause ..... . ...................... ............................ .
................................................................... 124 125
xiv
125
Body
Proviso.......................................................................127
Interpretative clause ........... ...................................... 128
Repealing clause.......................................................128
Savingclause ............................................................129
Separability clause...................................................129
Otherlaws ................................................................. 130 1.
Presidential issuances........................................130
130
Background.........................................................
130
Examples............................................................. 2.
Ordinances..........................................................136
Effectivityof laws ...................................................................... 140 When
shall a law take effect? .......................................... 140 Scope of Tañada v.
Tuvera............................................... 140 Effectivity of presidential
140
issuances................................ Effectivity of
140
ordinance..................................................... Who are subject to
Philippine laws? ........................................ 141
CHAPTER IV
VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF STATUTES
Validity and constitutionality of statutes................................ 142 Actual
case or controversy ......................................................... 143
Properparty............................................................................... 143 Earliest
opportunity .................................................................. 143 Decision of the
constitutional question
is necessary to determine the case itself ......................... 144 Effect of
unconstitutional statute............................................. 144 If totally declared
unconstitutional.......................................... 144 If partially declared
unconstitutional ...................................... 144 What is the effect of a
statute which is declared
unconstitutional? ............................................................... 145 What
is the extent of judicial power to declare the
unconstitutionality of assailed legislative
and executive acts? ............................................................. 146
Requisites for declaration of partial unconstitutionality........ 147
CHAPTER V
GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
Statutes must be read and construed as a whole ................... 148 xv
Legislative intent must be ascertained from the

statute as a whole ............................................................. 148
New Case
Lorenzo T. Tangga-an v.
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 180636, March 13, 2013....................................149
Old Case
Meridian Assurance Corporation v. Dayrit
G.R. No. L-59154, April 3, 1990 ....................................... 152
Courts have the duty to reconcile or harmonize the
different provisions of the statute including the
conflicting provisions thereof ............................................ 153 As a rule, the
statute of later date prevails ............................ 153 Generalia specialibus non
derogant ......................................... 154 A special law prevails over a general law
............................... 154 Exceptions to this rule .............................................................. 155
Parimatenia rule ....................................................................... 155 In interpreting reenacted
statutes, the court will follow the
construction which such statute received when
previously in force ............................................................. 156 In the case of adopted
statute, the interpretation of the courts of the State from which it is
adopted should be considered ..................................................................... 157 In case of
conflict between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the
latter prevails ........................... 158 Implied repeals are not legally presumed in
the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such
intentions ........ ................................................................... 159
Case
Batangas CATV, Inc. v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
138810, September 29, 2004 ............................. 159
CHAPTER VI
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF
SPECIFIC STATUTES
Specific Statutes......................................................................... 161 Rules of construction of the
following statutes ........................ 161
xw
Construction of each statute..................................................... 162
PenalStatutes............................................................................ 162 How are
penal statutes interpreted? ............................... 162 .
RemedialStatutes ..................................................................... 162 How

are remedial statutes construed? ............................ 162 Substantive
Statutes ................................................................. 162
LaborStatutes ........................................................................... 163 How
are labor laws interpreted? ...................................... 163
TaxStatutes............................................................................... 164 How are
tax statutes interpreted? ................................... 164
MandatoryStatutes................................................................... 165
DirectoryStatutes ...................................................................... 165
PermanentStatute .................................................................... 168
TemporaryStatute .................................................................... 168
GeneralStatute.......................................................................... 168
SpecialStatute........................................................................... 168
LocalStatute.............................................................................. 168
OtherStatutes ........................................................................... 169 Statutes
in derogation of rights....................................... 169 Statutes granting
privileges............................................. 169 Naturalization
laws .......................................................... 169 Statutes imposing taxes and
custom duties ................... 169 Statute authorizing suits against the
government ........ 169 Statutes prescribing limitations on the taxing
power of local government units ............................. 170
Statute imposing penalties for non-payment of tax 170
Electionlaws ..................................................................... 170
Adoptionstatutes.............................................................. 170
Amnesty proclamations .................................................... 171
Veteran and pension laws................................................ 171 General
welfare legislations............................................. 171
Probationlaw .................................................................... 171 Laws
on attachment ......................................................... 171 Rulesof
court..................................................................... 171 Statutes
prescribing qualifications for an office ............. 171 Election laws on
qualification and disqualification........ 172
Other classifications .................................................................. 172 A
statute could either be prospective or retroactive............... 172 Prospective
statute............................................................ 172
Retroactivestatute............................................................ 173 A statute
could either be a repealing act or an
Amendatoryact................................................................. 173
Repealingact ..................................................................... 172
Repeal 174 The repeal of a statute is either total or partial.....................
174 Amendatoryact .......................................................................... 175 A
Statute could either be a reference statute, a
supplemental statute, a reenacted statute or an
adopted Statute ................................................................. 176
Reference statute .............................................................. 176
Supplemental statutes...................................................... 176
Reenacted statutes ................................................ . ............ 176
Adopted statutes ............................................................... 177
CHAPTER VII
LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING
AND IMPORTANCE
Importance of Latin Maxims .................................................... 178 Latin
maxims applicable to statutory construction ................ 179 On the .
principle that laws should be prospective,

not retroactive ........................................................... 179 On
the principle that when the law is clear, what
the courts should do is to apply it, not to
interpretit................................................................. 180 On the
principle that it is not the letter of the law
that killeth, it is the spirit of the law that
givethlife .................................................................. 181 On
the principle that what is not included in those enumerated are
deemed excluded........................... 182 On the principle that special
provisions prevail
over general provisions ............................................ 183 New
Case
Maria Virginia V. Remo v.
The Honorable Secretary Of Foreign Affairs
G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010......................................183
On the principle that while the law may be hard,
it is the law that will be followed ...........................186
New Case
Arnold James M. Ysidoro v. People Of The Philippines G.R. No.
192330, November 14, 2012..............................186
On the general principle that without intent, there
can be no crime ......................................................... 188 xvrn
On the principle that ignorance of the law excuses no one but

ignorance of fact may be an excuse .....188 On the principle that
when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish........................................189
Latin Maxims and phrases related to the subject
of statutory construction................................................... 189 Mens
legislatores............................................................... 189 Reddendo
singula singulis................................................ 190 Cassus omissus
pro omisso habbendus est...................... 190 Noscitur a
sociis ................................................................ 191 Ejusdem
generic ................................................................ 192
CHAPTER VIII
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
USED IN A STATUTE
How are words and phrases in a statute interpreted? ............ 194 Is the
statutory definition conclusive to the courts?............... 194 Rules that
govern the following situations.............................. 194 When the word
used in a statute has a general meaning 195 When the word used has a
technical meaning ........................ 195
Case
Macasaet v Commission On Audit
G.R. No. 83748, May 12, 1989 .........................................196
When the word used has no meaning in harmony with the legislative
intent ......................................................... 198 When the word or phrase is
repeatedly used in
astatute ............................................................................. 199 Particular
words and phrases................................................... 199 Theword
"OR"................................................................... 199 The word
"AND .................................................................. 201 The term
"AND/OR ............................................................ 201
New Case
Antonio D. Dayao, et al., v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 193643 and
Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. v.
COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 193704, January 29, 2013.................................201 kAm
Old Case
Civil Service Commission v. Saturnino Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004 ..................................205 The
words "SHALL" ..................................................................206 The word
"MAY " ........................................................................ 208 The word "ALL,"
"EVERY," and "ANY .................................... 208 The words "AND SO
FORTH,"
and "AND THE LIKE ........................................................ 208
Negative terms "CANNOT," "SHALL NOT,"
and"NO .............................................................................. 209
Due process of CHAPTER IX
law..............................................................
....... Requirements of due process RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
.................................................... OF CONTRACTS
Substantive due Can the contracting parties enter into any
process........................................................ kind of agreement and establish such
.... Procedural due terms and conditions that they may deem
process........................................................ proper? ............................................
....... Two aspects of procedural due Who are bound by the terms of the
process .................................... Court's contract 9 ......................... When is it
power to construe statutes arises only if necessary and not necessary to interpret
the the
statute is not 209 210 210 210 210
clear............................................................
In the process of construing a statute, what 212
are those that the court can do and what
are those that the court cannot
do...........................................................
What happens if the statute is not capable 212 213 213
of interpretation or
construction' ........................................
Can the supreme court abandon or 215
overrule its earlier
decision?.....................................................
............ If the decision of the supreme
court in a particular case is not correct,
should it be followed by the
inferior
courts? ........................................................
.......... 216 217
terms of the contract? ....................................................... 217 In case

of conflict between the words of the contract and evident intention of the
parties,
which prevails? ............................................. .....................219 How
to judge the intention of the parties? .............................. 219
xx
Rules governing the following:
Effect of the use of several terms.................................... 220 Effect
of stipulations that admit of several
meanings................................................................... 220 Effect
of words which may have different
significations ............................................................. 220
Effect of usage or custom of the place ............................. .220
Effect of obscure words or stipulation in a contract 220
Use of general terms ................................................................. 220
Stipulations that admit general meanings.............................. 220 Usage or
custom of the place .................................................... 220 Obscure words
or stipulation.................................................... 220 Rule in case of doubt
as to the principal object and as to
the incidental circumstances ............................................. 221 Other
rules of interpretation.................................................... 221
New Case
Salun-At Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz v.
Eloisa Espejo, et al.,
G.R. No. 168387, August 25, 2010 . ...................................223
CHAPTER X
OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
Cases
Emeteria Liwag v.
Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 189755, July 4, 2012 ........................................227
Philippine International Trading Corporation v.
Commission On Audit
G.R. No. 183517, June 22, 2010 .....................................227
Batangas Power Corporation v. Batangas City and
National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 152675;
and National Power Corporation v. Hon. Ricardo
R. Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 152771,
April28, 2004....................................................................228
Lucio Morigo v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004.................................231 Mel
United Harbor Pilots' Assn. of the Phils., Inc. v. Assn. of Int'l.

Shipping Lines, G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002
........................................................... 234
People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan

and Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., G.R. No. 101724,
SupremeCourt .................................................................... 235
Tupas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 89571,
February6, 1991 ............................................................... 238
Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor And
Employment Accreditation Committee For
Medical Clinics v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. 724, April Z, 1931 ...............................................
Maceda v. Macaraig G.R. No. 88291,
May31, 1991 ..................................................................... 240
Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililia, G.R
No. 90776, June 3, 1991 .......................... 241
Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69344, April 26, 1991 ........... 241 Basco v.
PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991 ......... 241
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court
of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 44007,
March 20, 1991 ................................................................... 242
De Villa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87416,
April8, 1991 ....................................................................... 242
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 83815, February 22, 1991 .................................. 242
People of the Philippines v. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, June5, 1991
244
.................................... ........ .. ........................
Board of Commissioners v. Judge de la Rosa,

G.R. No. 95122; Board of Commissioners v.
Judge Capulong, G.R. No. 95123;Gatchalian
v. Board of Commissioners, G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May31, 1991
............... ...... ........................... .................... ... 244
Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

G.R. No. 72138, January 22, 1990 245
..................................... xxil
Meridian Assurance Corporation v. Dayrit,
G.R. No. 59154, April 3, 1990 . ......................................... 245
Songco, et al. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. Nos. 50999-51000,
March 23, 1990 247
Fiestan v Court of Appeals, G R No 81552,
May28, 1990..................................................................... 247
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G R No 54470, May 8, 1990 248
Brent School, Inc., et al. v. Zamora, et al.,
G.R. No. 48494, February 5, 1990.................................... 248
Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development
Corporation v Court of Appeals, et al,
G R No 54305, February 14, 1990 249
Liamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850,
June 29, 1989 ..................................................................... 250
Jandusay, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 48714, April 18, 1989......................................... 252
Manila Resource Development v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 80586, May 3, 1989 ........................................... 252
Regidor v. Chiongbian, G.R. No. 85815,
May 19, 1989 253
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989 ............................................ 253
Francisco v. Permskul, G.R. No. 810061,
May12, 1989..................................................................... 253
Liamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850,
June 29, 1989 254
SM Agri/and General Machineries v NLRC,
G.R.No 748061, January 9 1989 254
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989 ........................................... 254
People of the Philippines v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. 45127, May 5, 1989
....................................................................... 255
xon
xxiv
CHAPTER I
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION,
ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, DEFINED
Statutory construction is the act or process of discovering and

expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided in the law.
II. CONSTRUCTION DISTINGUISHED FROM

INTERPRETATION
Construction and interpretation have the same purpose and that is to
ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. A distinc tion, however,
has been drawn between construction and interpreta tion. One who
interprets makes use of intrinsic aids or those found in the statute itself,
while one who constructs makes use of extrinsic aids or those found
outside of the written language of the law (Caltex [Philippines], Inc. v.
Palomar, L-19650, September 29, 1966).
Hence, when the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and
ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be
determined from the language employed, and when there is no ambiguity
in the words, there is no room for construction (Allarde v. Commission on
Audit, 218 SCRA 227).
When the language under consideration is plain, it is neither
necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids (People v. Amigo, 67
SCAD 28).
When the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no
alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language
(Security Bank and Trust Co. v. RTC of Manila, 75 SCAD 519).
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
III. IN A NUTSHELL THEREFORE, THE MOST BASIC

RULES TO REMEMBER ARE AS FOLLOWS:
Apply the Law Interpret the Law Construct the Law

When the law When there is When the intent speaks in clear and
ambiguity in the of the legislature categorical language language of the
cannot be statute, ascertain ascertained by
legislative intent merely making use
by making use of of intrinsic aids, the
intrinsic aids, or court should resort
those found in the to extrinsic aids, or
law itself, those found outside
the language of the
law.
lv. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT

CLARIFY THE RULE ON THE ISSUE OF WHEN TO
APPLY AND INTERPRET THE LAW
The decision of the Supreme Court on the issue of when to apply
and interpret the law has not changed.
1. In Songco, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
the
Supreme Court said: "When the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation or
construction. There is only room for application. A plain and
unambiguous statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make
it clearer is vain labor and tends only to obscurity." (G.R. Nos.
50999-5100, March 23, 1990)
2. In Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, September 30, 1986, Second
Division, Feria, J., the Supreme Court made the same ruling,
but explained further when an interpretation can be resorted to,
thus: "Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the law is applied according to it express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would either be impossible or absurd or would
lead to an injustice." (248 SCRA 590)
3. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no need, in the absence of legislative intent to the
CHAPTER I 3
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
contrary, for any interpretation (Domingo v. Commission on

Audit, 297 SCRA 168).
4. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199).
5. Statutory Construction applied in connection with RA No.
9227. - It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the
function of the courts is simple application, not inter pretation
or circumvention. With respect to the manner of computation
of the retirement benefits in light of the Special Allowance
granted under RA No. 9227, Section 5 thereof, could not be
any clearer. (Re: Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the
second 25% grant of the special allowance for judges be
included in the computation of his retirement benefits, A.M. No.
RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004; Callejo, Sr., J.)
V. THREE (3) CARDINAL RULES WHEN THE

WORDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE
SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION
FIRST: VERBA LEGIS, which means that whenever possible, the
words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.
SECOND: RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA, which means that in
case of ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted
in accordance with the intent of its framers.
THIRD: UTMAGIS VALEATOUAMPEREAT, which means that
the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, but if the plain
meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available. (Francisco v. HRET, G.R. No. 160261, November
10, 2003)
VI. WHO INTERPRETS THE LAW?

Anyone can interpret the law. Lawyers, policemen, arbiters,
administrative boards and agencies, government as well as private
executives are involved from time to time in the interpretation of laws.
Their interpretation, however, is not necessarily conclusive nor can they bind
the courts. Hence, in many occasions, the decisions of
regulatory boards and administrative agencies have been elevated and

appealed to the Supreme Court in cases where there is abuse of discretion
and authority or when there is a violation of due process or denial of
substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of the law
(MantradeFMMC Division Employee and Workers Union v. Bacungan,
G.R. No. L-48437, September 30, 1986, Second Division,
Feria, J.).
The judiciary has the delicate task of ascertaining the sign
ificance of a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a
procedural or a municipal ordinance. It discharges a role no crucial than the
roles played by the two other departments in maintaining the rules of
law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to
speak with one voice. Logically and rightly, it does so with finality
through the highest judicial organ, the Supreme Court. What it says is
definite and authoritative, binding on those who occupy the lower ranks
in the judicial hierarchy (Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
70443, September 15, 1986, Second Division, Gutierez, Jr., J.).
VII. PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION AND

CONSTRUCTION
Interpretation and construction have the same purpose and that is
to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.
VIII. WHEN IS IT NECESSARY

TO INTERPRET AND CONSTRUCT?
It is necessary to interpret or construct when any of the follow ing
reasons exists:
1. When the language of the statute is ambiguous, doubtful, or
obscure, when taken in relation to a set of facts;
2. When reasonable minds disagree as to the meaning of the
language used in the statute.
IX. WHEN IS IT NOT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET

AND CONSTRUCT?
It is not necessary to interpret or construct when the law speaks
in clear and categorical language. The duty of the court, in such a case, is to
APPLY THE LAW, NOT TO INTERPRET IT (Go Ka Toc & Sons v. Rice &
Corn Board, G.R. No. L-23607, May 23,
CHAPTER I 5
1967; People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967; Luzon
Security Co. v. De Garcia, G.R. No. L-25659, October 31, 1969).
New Case:
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS v. DANILO T. BOLOS

G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010
FACTS:
Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Danilo Bolos under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the
merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment.
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo and he timely filed
the Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for his
failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in
violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. His motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
The RTC issued the order declaring its decision final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by
Cynthia.
Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
seeking to annul the orders of the RTC and prayed that he be declared
psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to
Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family
home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the
assailed orders of the RTC and explained that a motion for recon
sideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did
not apply in this case as the marriage between the parties was solemnized
before the Family Code took effect.
Cynthia sought reconsideration by filing her Manifestation with
Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court's Decision dated
December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, denied the motion for extension
of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period is non-
extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
and the motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC entitled 'Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages" is applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity
of the Family Code.
HELD:
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its
scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for

declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no
room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the

law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is
no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room
for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or
"speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the
mmm verbs legis ,ion et recedendum, or "from the words of a
statute there should be no departure."
CHAPTER I 7
Old Case:
Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the
special allowance for judges be included in the computation of
his retirement benefits,
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004; Callejo, Sr., J.
Facts: Judge Tito G. Gustilo, then Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Iloilo City, Branch 23 requested that the second tranche of the Special
Allowance granted to judges under RA No. 9227 be included in the
computation of his retirement benefits. He claimed that pursuant to
OCA Circular No. 48-2004 dated March 3, 2004, the first tranche of the
Special Allowance equivalent to 25% was implemented starting on
November 11, 2003. The next 25% (second tranche) will be implemented
on November 11, 2004. In this connection, Judge Gustio appealed to the
Chief Justice that, in the computation of
his retirement benefits, the second tranche of the Special Allowance be
included since his retirement was only one (1) month and twelve (12)
days before its implementation on November 11, 2004.
The Office of the Court Administrator (0 CA) recommended that
the request be granted, citing Judge Gustio's service record in the
judiciary, which started on January 18, 1983, including his exemplary
record of disposing cases at an average of 2.25 cases each month.
Judge Gustio's letter and the 0 CA's memorandum were referred
to the Court's Chief Attorney, who recommended the denial of the
request for not being in accord with RA No. 9227 and the Guidelines
promulgated by the Court.
Held: (1) It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the function of
the courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention. -
With respect to the manner of computation of the retirement benefits in
light of the Special Allowance granted under HA No. 9227, Section 5
thereof, quoted anew below, could not be any clearer:
Section 5. Inclusion in the Computation of Retire
ment Benefits. - For purposes of retirement, only the
allowances actually received and tranche or tranches of the
special allowance already implemented and received pursuant
to this Act by the justices, judges and all other positions in the
Judiciary with the equivalent rank of jus
tices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional
Trial Court as authorized under existing laws shall, at the

date of their retirement, be included in the computa tion of
their respective retirement benefits.
A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of
retirement, only the allowances "actually received" and the tranche or
tranches "already received and implemented," upon the date of
retirement, shall be included in the computation of the retirement
benefits. Otherwise put, before the Special Allowance could be
considered in the computation of retirement benefits, it should have been
"actually received" and the tranche or tranches thereof should have been
"already implemented and received" at the date of retirement.
(2) Accrued; Meaning of. - The Guidelines promulgated by this
Court pursuant to RA No. 9227 is even more definite as it used the term
"accrued" in this wise: "only the special allowance actually received and
that which has accrued at the time of retirement shall
be included." As correctly reasoned by the Chief Attorney:
Notably, the phrase "has accrued at the time of retirement" is
used in the Guidelines instead of "the tranche or tranches of the special
allowance already implemented and received" which is used in Section 5
of IRA No. 9227. Nevertheless, the same meaning is con
veyed. The word "accrue" means "to come into existence as an en
forceable claim: vest as a right" or "to come by way of increase or
addition: arise as a growth or result" or "to be periodically accumu
lated in the process of time whether as an increase or a decrease." Hence,
a Special Allowance that has not yet come into existence as an
enforceable claim or has not yet vested on the recipient judge as a matter
of right cannot be considered in the computation of retire
ment benefits.
Indeed, "accrue" in its past tense is "in sense of due and de
mandable; vested." In the case of Judge Gustilo, on the date of his
retirement, the second tranche of the Special Allowance has not ac crued
as yet; hence, it cannot be said that the same is due and de mandable or
that it has vested insofar as he is concerned.
(3) Interpretation of retirement laws generally favors the retiree,
except when the law is clear and unambiguous. - The Chief Attorney,
likewise, correctly posits that the strict application of Section 5 of RA
No. 9227 is called for by the fact that, under Section
3 thereof, the source for the Special Allowance is the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) established under PD No. 1949, which
basically comes from the docket fees paid by litigants:
CHAPTER I 9
As such, the JDF as a fund source is not constant

or fixed in amount, as its amount depends on the amount
collected by the courts and the amount of increase in docket
fees that the Court would impose. The fact of the JDF
becoming insufficient has been foreseen by the Court and is
reflected in the second paragraph of 4.1 of the Guidelines
quoted above. It is worth noting that until now, the first tranche
of the Special Allowance has been received only for the months
of November 11, 2003 until February 2004. The delay in receipt
thereof may continue if courts nationwide do not timely transmit
the reports of collections to the OCA, as the JDF should be
disbursed only if the reports of collections and the deposits under
the JDF account for the Special Allowance tally in accordance
with accounting and auditing rules.
stance in
While th[eJ Court had, in certain cases, adopted a liberal
interpreting retirement laws in favor the retiree,
of it cannot do so in this
case because, as earlier stated. Sec tion 5 of RA No. 9227 is quite clear
and unambiguous. In other words, there is no room for interpretation
but only simple application of the law." (underlining and emphasis
supplied)
X. AMBIGUITY DEFINED
Ambiguity is doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning, indistinct ness or
strument.
uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written in
(Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, 105) It has been
p. held, however, that
ambiguity does not only arise from the meaning of the particular words but
also from the general scope and meaning of the statute when all its provisions
are examined. There is also an ambiguity when a literal interpretation of
the words would lead to unreasonable, unjust or absurd consequences, or
where a statute is in conflict with the Constitution, or where the statute
would defeat the policy of the legislation. (Tarlac Development
Corporation v. CA, L-41012, September 30, 1976)
M. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT, AND

HOW THIS AFFECTS INTERPRETATION
AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
The present government is a presidential form with the executive
power being vested in the President of the Philippines,
10 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
the legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines consisting of a

Senate and a House of Representatives, and the judicial power in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
This structure upholds the principle of separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances.
There is, however, a more precise and specific meaning attached to
each of the said powers.
XII. LEGISLATIVE POWER

It is the authority of Congress to make laws and to alter or repeal
them. There are two kinds of legislative powers namely:
1. Original Legislative Power— This is a power belonging to the
sovereign people and this is supreme.
-
2. Derivative Legislative Power This is delegated by the
sovereign people to the legislative bodies and it is subordinate to
the original power of the people.
EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT

RULED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION
NO. 164 WAS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER AND RULED THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 164
ISSUED BY PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO WAS
NULL AND VOID
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA v.

COURT OF APPEALS, et al.,
G.R. No. 125183, September 29, 1997
FACTS:
On February 17, 1978, former President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government
Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain located
in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned
proclamation was occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San Juan
purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for
the said squatters. Only after resettling these squatters would the
municipality be able to develop and construct its municipal government
center on the subject land.
CHAPPER I 11
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the

Municipality of San Juan started to develop its government center by
constructing the INP Building, which now serves as the PNP
Headquarters, the Fire Station Headquarters, and the site to house the two
salas of the Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the Municipal
Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon are the Central Post Office
Building and the Municipal High School Annex Building.
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July
26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164,
amending Proclamation No. 1716.
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Associa tion,
Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a
petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining or der against
the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of
Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either remov ing or
demolishing the houses of the association members who were claiming
that the lots they occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation
No. 164.
On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the
petition, ruling that the property in question is being utilized by the
Municipality of San Juan for government purposes and thus, the
condition set forth in Proclamation No. 164 is absent.
The appeal before the CA was dismissed in a decision dated July
17, 1991. This decision became final and the said judgment was duly
entered on April 8, 1992.
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, pri vate
respondents hired a private surveyor to make consolidation subdivision
plans of the land in question, submitting the same to respondent
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in
connection with their application for a grant under Proc lamation No. 164.
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents,
petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
against respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Jesus
Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality,
enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the parcels of
land covered by Proclamation No. 164. The CA reversed the said

decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is Proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power?
More specifically, is Proclamation No. 164 a valid legislation?
HELD:
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation
—Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of legislative power
vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act
of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended by an equally
valid act of legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act
of legislation. After the so-called bloodless revolution on February 1986,
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3, promulgating
the Provisional Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the
Freedom Constitution. Under Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom
Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power
until a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution. Then
came the ratification of the draft constitution, to be known later as the
1987 Constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987,
President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716
was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely
vested in Congress.
The Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was
an invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation
is hereby declared NULL and VOID - There is a long standing
principle that every statute is presumed
to be valid (Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCR4 734 [1970]). However, this
rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by legislature.
This presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of
legislative power by the executive branch. For th[e] Court to allow such
disregard of the most basic of all constitutional principles by reason of the
doctrine of presumption of validity of a law would be to turn its back to
its sacred duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus, also, it is in
the discharge of this task that we take this exception from the Court's
usual practice of not entertaining constitutional questions unless they
are specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.
CHAPTER I 13
XIII. JUDICIAL POWER

TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL POWER
What is the traditional concept of judicial power?

The traditional concept of judicial power refers only to the
authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the court of justice or the
redress of wrongs for the violation of such rights (Philippine Legal
Encyclopedia, by Jose Agaton R. Sibal, citing Lopez v. Roxas, 17SCRA
756).
What is the new definition of judicial power?
The traditional concept of judicial power, as above-mentioned,
including now the duty of the courts of justice "to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on any part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government," constitutes the totality of the judicial power which is now
vested by our Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law." This is what is known and referred
to as the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The significance of the additional sentence "and to determine

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amount
ing to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government"? (Last paragraph Section 1,
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
This sentence has, in effect, expanded the power, authority, and
jurisdiction of our courts of justice, particularly the Supreme Court, to
determine whether any branch or instrumentality of our government has
committed "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." In fact, this power, authority and jurisdiction goes beyond
the mere legality of a questioned act, or transaction, whether it is
committed, or entered into by the highest official of the land, or of any
official or branch of our government.
The question of whether the said abuse of discretion is grave or not
is ultimately determined, not by the officials whose acts are in question,
but by our courts, particularly by the Supreme Court, and it is in this
sense that the new provision grants unto the Supreme Court "an expanded
jurisdiction and authority" to look into what it considers as a proper
subject of its final disposition. In so doing, the
Supreme Court, as the final arbiter, enjoys a wide latitude of power and
discretion using, as it may, its honest evaluation of facts, laws,
jurisprudence and any and all materials, books and points of refer ence
which may be valuable to support its analysis and conclusion.
The wisdom and propriety, for instance, which may be invoked by
the executive department, may not be considered so by the scrutinizing
minds of the justices. In the end, the Supreme Court may find itself
intervening in matters which should better be left to the wisdom of the
leaders of the nation who are directly responsible to the sovereign
electorate.
In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance
System, et al. (G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997), the Supreme Court
ruled that the sale of 51% of the shares of GSIS in Manila Hotel
Corporation, pursuant to the privatization program of the government,
cannot contravene the Filipino First Policy. In this case, the petitioner
invoked Article XII, Section 10(2) of the 1987 Constitution and submits
that Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument that reflects the vibrance of
Philippine heritage and culture. Since Manila Hotel is part of national
patrimony and part of the national economy, petitioner should be
preferred after it has matched the offer of Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm.

RULED THAT THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ISSUED BYTHE
PRESIDENT WAS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
INSOFAR AS IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
LOUIS "BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
and
REP. EDCEL C. bAGMAN,
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and
REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
v .
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY ELORENCIO B. ABAD
G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010
CHAPTER I 15
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both
of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010."
The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by
petitioner Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer.
Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the leg
islative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Consti tution
as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public
office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. bagman,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is viola tive
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. They contend that it
does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the
intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object
makes the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) an "ad venture in partisan
hostility."
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior
to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon
Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with
his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahi rap." The Filipino people,
convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aqui no
found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and
corruption allegedly committed during the previous ad ministration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30,
2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010.
Whether Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD:
Although the purpose of the PTC falls within the investigative
power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law, nor shall any persom be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is

violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not
apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of
singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the
PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded
with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and
corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former
President Arroyo.
One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimi nation
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in
a separate clause, however, to provide for a more spe cific guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed par takes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by
its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state ac tions,
not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
CHAPTERI 17
departments of the government including the political and execu tive

departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection
of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should
be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration" only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the
questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedi

cated solely to investigating and finding out the truth con
cerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration, and which will recom mend the
prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
Section 1. Creation of a Commission. - There is hereby
created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter
referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek
and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports
of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock
and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people,
committed by public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration; and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to
be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice
shall be served without fear or favor.
Section 2. Powers and Functions. - The Commis sion, which
shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Adminis trative Code of
1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thor ough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred
to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, ac complices and accessories from
the private sector, if any, during the previous administration
and thereafter
submit its finding and recommendations to the President,

Congress and the Ombudsman. (Emphases supplied)
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo ad
ministration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past ad
ministrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differ entiation
clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Executive Order No. 1 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME

COURT MADE REFERENCE TO THE FILIPINO
FIRST POLICY (THE POLICY OBSERVED AND
MADE POPULAR BY PAST PRESIDENT CARLOS P.
GARCIA), TO THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF MANILA HOTEL, AND TO THE
LATIN MAXIM OF UBI JUS IBI REMEDIUM
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No. 122156,
February 3, 1997
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, the
shares of GSIS, owner of 51% of the shares of Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC), was sold by GSIS through public bidding. Manila
Prince Hotel and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, participated in the
bidding, and both of them offered to buy 51% of MHC shares. Renong
Berhad offered a higher bid.
MHC sent a check to match the bid of the foreign firm. To prevent the
consummation of the bid of Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner's arguments are as follows:
1. Petitioner invokes Article XII, Section 10(2) of the Consti tution and
submits that Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation
and has practically become a historical monument that reflects the
vibrance of Philippine heritage and culture.
2. Manila Hotel has become a national patrimony.
CHAPTER I 19
3. Since Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony and part of the

national economy, petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the
offer of the Malaysian firm.
Respondents argued that Article XII, Section 10(2) is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing pro vision
and requires implementing legislation. Respondents added that even if
the provision is self-executing, the hotel does not fall under the term
"national patrimony."
ISSUE;
Does MHC fall under the term "national patrimony"? Is Section
10(2) of Article XII self-executing?
HELD:
Section 10, second paragraph, Article XII of the 1987 Cons titution,
is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words, the provision does not require any
legislation to put in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concession covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists
in certain specified circumstances, an action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; con sequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce
such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right, there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to
the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to
be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events, which have shaped
Philippine history. It was
called the Cultural Center of 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during
the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official
Guest House of the Philippine Government, it plays host to dignitaries and
official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.
The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by the Filipinos. This is very
clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the
higher bid, it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder
after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured
the required approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos, the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Reluctantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet,
nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder.
For in choosing the awardee, respondents are mandated to abide by the
dictates of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions of which are presumed
to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is
embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so it must be
enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will
never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding
the majesty of the Constitution which it is
tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this
Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of
foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes
more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for
Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution.
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its
business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character
of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values- A
commercial, nay enen a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the
expense of national pride and dignity. For the
Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values.
CHAPTER I 21
Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper
governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in
any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the
Constitution is involved.
In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS, Manila Hotel Corporation, et al., what particularly is the
effect of the Supreme Court's "expanded jurisdiction and authority?"
The power, authority and discretion to determine whether grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed
goes beyond the mere legality of a questioned act, or transaction, whether
it is committed, or entered into by the highest official of the land, or any
official or branch of our government.
The wisdom and propriety, which may be invoked by the
executive department, may not be considered so by the scrutinizing
minds of the justices.
Example: The privatization of business asset for

purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing
further losses, in pursuance of and to implement alleged
economic policy, did not meet the approval of the Supreme
Court which took the position that this argument should not take
precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay
even a budgetary objective, should not be pursued at the
expense of national will and dignity.
Respondents argued that Article XII, Section 10(2) is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
provision and that it requires an implementing legislation.
Respondents also argued that even if the said provision is self
executing, the hotel does not fall under the term "national patrimony."
In sum, the privatization of business asset for purposes of
enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, in
pursuance of and to implement alleged economic policy, did not meet the
approval of the Supreme Court which took the position that this argument
should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay
even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of
national pride and dignity.
Giving emphasis to what it considers to be more deserving of
preference, the Supreme Court added that there is nothing so
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial

review when the Constitution is involved.
XIV. IN THE EXERCISE OF THE SAID POWER AND

AUTHORITY HOWEVER, THE COURT OR THE JUDICIAL
ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY
THE FOLLOWING RULES
1. When the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to
interpret it; (Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326, 33 SCRA 105;
Quijano p. DBP, 35 SCRA 220, L-26419, October 16, 1970)
2. It is the duty of the judge to apply the law without fear or favor.
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of the
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail; (Article 10, New Civil Code)
3. When construction or interpretation is necessary, the court
should interpret the law according to the meaning the
legislature intended to give it;
4. If there are two possible interpretations of a law, that which
will achieve the ends desired by Congress should be adopted;
5. Laws of pleading, practice and procedure are liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive de
termination of every action and proceeding;
6. A judge cannot decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (Article 9,
New Civil Code) In other words, he must decide the case
assigned to him whether or not he knows what law shall be
applied. In case of silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
laws, a judge may still be guided by the following:
a. Customs which are not contrary to law, public order or
public policy;
b Court decisions, foreign or local, in similar cases, C. Legal
opinions of qualified writers and professors; d. General

principles of justice and equity; and
e. Rules of statutory construction.
CHAPTER I 23
In criminal cases, however, it is an established rule that there is no

crime when there is no law punishing it. NULLA POENA SINE
LEGE. If there is no law therefore which punishes an act complained
to Law, 4).
of, the judge must dismiss the case (Suarez, Introduction p.
XV. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Article VII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides as
follows:
"The executive power shall be vested in the President of

the Philippines."
Who shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices?
The President of the Republic of the Philippines shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices (Section 17,
Article VII) and shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces
of the Philippines. Under and by virtue of all the powers vested in him by
the Constitution, the President is regarded as the most powerful and the
most influential person in the country subject to no other restraint than to
comply with the law and the Constitution.
What does this mean?
This means that he is the "Chief Executive." More specifically, he
is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines and the heads of
the different executive departments who are popularly known and
called as Cabinet Members, are, in effect, merely his advisers, hence,
they are subject to his control and supervision.
Are the powers of the President limited only to those that are
expressly enumerated in the Constitution?
No. The President has residual power to protect the general welfare
of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President as steward of the
people (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 66811989]).
What is the so-called residual power of the President?

In the said case (Marcos v. Manglapus ibid.), the Supreme Court,
through Justice Irene R. Cortes, said that "it is a power borne by the
President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It may be
viewed also as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that
the laws are faithfully executed (see Hyman, the
American President, where the author advanced the view that an
allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and
is best lodged in the President).
Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, on the other hand, made this
explanation: "Failing in legal arguments for the allowance of the
Marcoses' return, appeal is being made to sympathy, compassion and
even Filipino tradition. The political and economic gains we have
achieved during the past three years are, however, too valuable and
precious to gamble away on purely compassionate considerations.
Neither could public peace, order, and safety be sacrificed for an
individual's wish to die in his own country. Verily, in the balancing of
interests, the scales tilt in favor of presidential prerogative, which we do
not find to have been gravely abused or arbitrarily exercised, to ban the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines."
What is the executive power of the President?

It is the power to enforce and administer the laws. (Sec tion 1 and
17, Article VII) The President shall ensure that laws are faithfully
executed (Section 17, Article VII).
Is he still required to determine the validity of a law?

No, this being a question that should be properly resolved by the
judicial department of government. Hence, the President has a duty to
execute it regardless of his doubts on its validity. Until and unless a law
is declared unconstitutional, it is not unlawful for the President to
perform his duty of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed.
XVI. THE THREE PRINCIPAL BRANCHES OF

GOVERNMENT HELP ONE ANOTHER IN THE
ENFORCEMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS
Each Department is Given Certain Powers by which each may
Restrain the others from Exceeding their Constitutional Authority.
Hence, A System of Checks and Balances Provides an Equilibrium
of Governmental Powers.
The following are actual examples:
FIRST: THE LAWS EMANATE FROM THE LEGISLATURE

The legislature enacts laws but these laws have to be presented to
the executive department for its approval. The latter may veto or
CHAPTER I 25
disapprove the acts of the legislative if in its judgment they are not in
conformity with the Constitution or if they will cause hardship to the
people.
Here, the judicial arm of the government has no role to play yet. It
is only called upon to interfere and to exercise its authority when an
action is brought to it for decision, and only upon reaching this stage
when the courts should apply, among others, these basic rules, to wit:
When the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to
interpret it.
In applying the law, the court should discover the real
intent and the purpose of the legislature. If that intent and
purpose can be discovered within the law, it is the duty of
the court to carry out that intention. If that intent and purpose
cannot be found within the law, the court should resort to
extrinsic aids.
3. When all other rules of statutory construction fail, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended, right and justice
to prevail.
When conflicting claims are brought to the court for determina tion,
it is authorized to determine the validity of the said legislative measures
or executive acts.
SECOND: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MAY

MODIFY OR SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The executive department, through the pardoning power, may also
modify or set aside the judgment of the courts.
The executive department is not in any way interpreting or
constructing the law in its favor. It is a plain exercise of pardoning power,
which is expressly granted by the Constitution to the Presi dent.
THIRD: THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY

AMEND OR REVOKE THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT
The legislature may amend or revoke decisions of the courts when
in its judgment the interpretation given to a law by the courts is not in
harmony with the general policy of the State. It may do this by
enacting a new law or by amending the old law, THEREBY
ATTAINING AN INTERPRETATION THAT WILL WIPE OUT

THE DECISIONS OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.
In this example, the legislature is not interpreting or construct ing
the law but attains the interpretation it desires by enacting a new law
or by amending the old law.
CHAPTER II
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION
AND CONSTRUCTION
L USE INTRINSIC AIDS BEFORE RESORTING TO

EXTRINSIC AIDS
In determining the intention of the legislature, the courts may use
any of the following:
1. INTRINSIC AIDS - Elements found in the law itself
2. EXTRINSIC AIDS - Facts or matters not found in the law
3. PRESUMPTIONS - Based on logic or established provision of
law
The established practice is to resort first to intrinsic aids before
resolving to extrinsic aids and before indulging in presumptions.
H. WHAT ARE THE INTRINSIC AIDS?

Intrinsic aids are any of the following: Title, preamble, words,
phrases and sentences; context; punctuation; headings and marginal notes;
legislative definition and interpretation clauses.
1. TITLE. - That which expresses the subject matter of the law. It can
help in the construction of statutes but it is not controlling and not
entitled to much weight.
2. PREAMBLE. - That part of the statute following the title and
preceding the enacting clause which states the reasons or the
objectives of the enactment. It cannot enlarge or confer powers,
or cure inherent defects in the statute.
3. WORDS, PHRASES AND SENTENCES, CONTEXT. - The

intention of the legislature must primarily be
27
determined from the language of the statute and such

language consists of the words, phrases and sentences used
therein. The meaning of the law should, however, be taken
from the general consideration of the act as a whole and not
from any single part, portion or section or from isolated
words and phrases, clauses or sentences used.
4. PUNCTUATION. - It is an aid of low degree in inter preting
the language of a statute and can never control against the
intelligible meaning of the written word. How ever, if the
punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning that is reasonable
and in apparent accord with the legis lative will, it may be used
as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of
the words thus punctu ated.
5. HEADINGS AND MARGINAL NOTES. - If the
meaning of the statute is clear or if the text of the statute is
clear, they will prevail as against the headings, especially if
the headings have been prepared by compilers and not by the
legislature.
6. LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION AND INTERPRETA
TION. - If the legislature has defined the words used in the
statute and has declared the construction to be placed
thereon, such definition or construction should be followed by
the courts. The rules are as follows:
(a) If a law provides that in case of doubt it should be
construed or interpreted in a certain manner, the
courts should follow such instruction;
(b) In case of conflict between the interpretation clauses and
the legislative meaning, as revealed by the statute
considered in its totality, the latter shall prevail;
(c) A term is used throughout the statute in the same sense
in which it is first defined;
(d)
Legislative definition of similar terms in other statute
may be resorted to except where a particular law
expressly declares that its definition therein is limited in
application to the statutes in which they appear.
CHAPTER II 29
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE LAW SPEAKS IN

CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE AND THERE IS
THEREFORE NO REASON FOR INTERPRETATION OR
CONSTRUCTION, BUT ONLY FOR APPLICATION
New Case:
SPOUSES PASCUAL, et al., FRANCISCO A. PASCUAL,

MARGARITA CORAZON D. MARIANO, EDWIN D.
MARIANO arid DANNY R. MARIANO
V.
SPOUSES BALLESTEROS, et al.,
G.R. No. 186269, February 15, 2012
PONENTE: JUSTICE REYES
FACTS:
The case involves a parcel of land situated in Laoag City which is co-
owned by the spouses Albino and Margarita Mariano, the spouses
Melecio and Victoria Melchor, and Angela Melchor.
Upon the death of the Spouses Melchor, their share was in herited
by their daughter Lorenza. Subsequently, Lorenza and her husband
Antonio Ballesteros acquired the share of Angela.
In 2000, Margarita, then already widowed, together with her
children, sold their share to Spouses Pascual and Francisco. The old TCT
was cancelled and a new one was issued in their names together with
Angela and Spouses Melchor.
Respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for legal redemp tion,
claiming that they did not receive any written notice of the said sale and
argued that they are entitled to redeem the portion sold as co-owners of
the same.
RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that they failed to sea sonably
exercise their right of redemption within the 30-day period pursuant to
Article 1623 of the Civil Code notwithstanding the lack of a written notice
since they had actual notice of the said sale.
CA granted the appeal of the respondents.
The petitioners sought for reconsideration, but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents could no longer exercise their right of
redemption having failed to exercise the same within 30 days from actual
knowledge of the said sale.
HELD:
Respondents can still exercise their right of redemption.
The Supreme Court held that no reversible error on the part of the CA
within which to
in ruling that the 30-day period given to the respondents
exercise their right of redemption has not commenced in view of the
absence of a written notice. Despite the respondents' actual knowledge
of the sale to the respondents, a written notice is still mandatory and
indispensable for purposes of
the commencement of the 30-day period within which to exercise the
right of redemption.
Article 1623 of the Civil Code succinctly provides that:
Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or re

demption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from
the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor,
as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompa nied by an affidavit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining

owners.
The indispensability of the "written notice requirement" for
purposes of the exercise of the right of redemption was explained in
Barcellano v. Bañas, thus:
The written notice of sale is mandatory. The Court has

long established the rule that notwithstanding actual
knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written
notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well
as its efficacy and status.
xxx
Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by
this Court that where the law speaks in clear and
CHAPTER II 31
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.

There is only room for application. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according
to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible
or absurd or would lead to an injustice. x x x (Citations
omitted)
Old Case:
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118745, July 5, 1996
"When the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. Thus, recourse to
any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts as a
mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 goes
beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore
impermissible."
FACTS:
Petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAB) and the Land
Bank of The Philippines (LBP), filed their respective motions for
reconsideration contending mainly that, contrary to the Court's
conclusion, the opening of trust accounts in favor of the rejecting
landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of R.A. No. 6657.
Moreover, it is argued that there is no legal basis for allowing the
withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting
landowners pending the determination of the final valuation of their
properties.
The Supreme Court denied their motions for reconsideration.
HELD:
The Court rejects the said contention. Sec. 16(e) of RA No. 6657
was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as
compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds," to wit:
Section 16(e) Procedure for Acquisition of Private
Lands -
xxx xxx xxx
"Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank des ignated
by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name
of the Republic of the Philip pines. xxx"
The said provision is very clear and unambiguous,
foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that
would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage
of the term "deposit."
When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there
is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application. Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening of
trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of RA No.
6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore
impermissible.
As [the Court] ha[s] previously declared, the rule-making power
must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry
into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend
or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with
the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two
will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE COURT APPLIED THE

LAW ACCORDING TO ITS PLAIN AND OBVIOUS MEANING
New Case:
SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR CORPORATION and SOUTH EAST
ASIA SUGAR MILL CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
and SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION G.R. No.
180462, February 9, 2011
FACTS:
In 1999, the government projected a shortage of some 500,000 metric
tons of sugar due to the effects of El Niño and La Nina
CHAPTER II 33
phenomena. To fill the expected shortage and to ensure stable sugar prices,
then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 87, Series of
1999, facilitating sugar importation by the private sector.
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 87 created a Committee on Sugar
Conversion/Auction (Committee) to determine procedures for sugar
importation as well as for collection and remittance of conversion fee.
Under Section 3, sugar conversion is by auction and is subject to
conversion fee to be remitted by Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) to
the Bureau of Treasury.
The Committee issued the Bidding Rules providing guidelines for
sugar importation. Under the rules, the importer pays 25% of the
conversion fee within three working days from receipt of notice of the bid
award and the 75% balance upon arrival of the imported sugar.
The rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the
importation or if the imported sugar fails to arrive on or before the set arrival
date, 25% of the conversion fee is forfeited in favor of the SRA, to wit:
G. Forfeiture of Conversion Fee

G.1 In case of failure of the importer to make the
importation or for the imported sugar to arrive in the
Philippines on or before the Arrival Date, the 25% of
Conversion Fee Bid already paid shall be forfeited in favor
of the SRA and the imported sugar shall not be classified as
"B" (domestic sugar) unless, upon application with the SRA
and without objection of the Committee, the SRA allows such
conversion after payment by the importer of 100% of the
Conversion Fee applicable to the shipment. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sugar Mill submitted the winning bid for 10,000 metric tons
while Pacific Sugar submitted the winning bid for 20,000 metric tons, for a
combined total volume of 30,000 metric tons of sugar. Pursuant to the
Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar paid 25% of the conversion
fees.
Aa it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar delivered only 10% of their
sugar import allocation, or a total of only 3,000 metric
tons of sugar. They requested the SRA to cancel the remaining 27,000
metric tons blaming sharp decline in sugar prices. They sought
immediate reimbursement of the corresponding 25% of the conversion
fee amounting to P38,637,000.00.
The SRA informed the sugar corporations that the conversion fee
would be forfeited pursuant to paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules
and notified them that the authority to reconsider their request for
reimbursement was vested with the Committee.
The sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach of contract and
damages in the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs and ordered the SRA to pay plaintiffs the amount of
P38,637,000 as reimbursement of 25% of the conversion fee they had
paid and held that paragraph G. 1 of the Bidding Rules contemplated
delay in the arrival of imported sugar, not cancellation of sugar
importation. It concluded that the forfeiture provision did not apply to
the sugar corporations which merely cancelled the sugar importation.
Aggrieved, the SRA filed in the CA a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 seeking to set aside the RTC's Orders as well as the Writ
of Execution and the Amended Writ of Execution. The CA ruled to annul
and set-aside all the orders of the RTC and remanded the case to the court
a quo for further proceedings.
Dissatisfied, the sugar corporations filed in this Court a petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the sugar corporations are entitled to reimbursement of
P38,637,000.00 in conversion fee.
HELD:
The RTC gravely erred in ordering the SRAto return the forfeited
conversion fee to the sugar corporations. Its strained interpretation of
paragraph G. 1 of the Bidding Rules contemplates cases of delay in the
arrival of imported sugar but not cases of cancellation of sugar
importation defies logic and the express provision of paragraph G. 1.
If delay in the arrival of imported sugar is subject to forfeiture of 25% of
the conversion fee, with more reason is outright failure to import sugar,
by cancelling the sugar importation altogether, subject to forfeiture of
the 25% of the conversion fee.
Plainly and expressly, paragraph G.1 identifies two situations
which would bring about the forfeiture of 25% of the conversion
CHAPTER II 35
fee: (1) when the importer fails to make the importation or (2)
when the imported sugar fails to arrive in the Philippines on or before the
set arrival date. It is wrong for the RTC to interpret the forfeiture
provision in a way departing from its plain and express language.
Where the language of a rule is clear, it is the duty of the court to
enforce it according to the plain meaning of the word. There is no
occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.
Old Case:
CECILLEVILLE REALTY AND SERVICE
CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL
G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997
FRANCISCO, J.
The Supreme Court applied the law, RA No.

1199, as amended by RA No. 2263, according to its plain
and obvious meaning, according to its express terms. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the word, only a tenant
is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to
construct or maintain a house thereon.
It is a fundamental principle that once the
policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect
should be given to it by the judiciary. This Court should
not deviate therefrom.
FACTS:
In 1976, Sotero Pascual became a tenant of Jose A. Resurrec cion, the
President of petitioner Cecileville Realty and Service Cor poration, in the
latter's land at Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. When Sotero died, his wife
Ana Pascual, succeeded him in tenancy by op eration of law. As such
tenant she had a home lot and a house on the landholding. She was
assisted in the cultivation of the land by her son, private respondent
Hermigildo Pascual, who also occupies a portion of the landholding
distinct from that occupied by his mother.
Petitioner Cecifieville sought to eject Hermigildo from the
portion occupied by his house but the latter, insisting that he is entitled
to occupancy since he is helping his mother in the cultivation of the land, refused
to vacate. Petitioner instituted an ejectment suit
against Hermigildo before MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Finding no

tenancy relationship between petitioner and Hermigildo, the MTC
ordered the latter to vacate the land and pay attorney's fees and the sum of
P500.00 monthly from the filing of the complaint.
On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC and ordered that
the case be remanded to the DARAB for further adjudication. The court
was of the opinion that Ana Pascual was entitled to the help of her son in the
cultivation, consequently, her son cannot be simply ejected without
circumventing the law. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the RTC's decision on the basis of Section 5, RA No.
1199, as amended by RA No. 2263, governing the relations of landlords
and tenants, which provides that a tenant is entitled to the aid and
assistance of the immediate members of his family and other persons
who, though not tenants themselves, are afforded the protection of the
law and the security of tenure accorded the tenant. Thus, the Court of
Appeals concluded that Hermigildo's having a house on the landholding
is but an incident of the tenancy.
In this petition for review on certiorari Cecileville contends that
the appellate court erred in not finding that while private respondent is
entitled to work on the agricultural land of petitioner in his capacity as
member of the family of tenant Ana Pascual, nonetheless he cannot
occupy a substantial portion thereof and utilize the same for residential
purposes.
HELD:
As clearly provided by Section 22, paragraph 3, RA No. 1199, as
amended by RA No. 2263, only a tenant is granted the right to a home lot
and the right to construct and maintain a house thereon. Private
respondent is not entitled to a home lot. As the Court sees it, the issue lies
on the interpretation of Sec. 22, paragraph 3, of RA No. 1199, as
amended by RA No. 2263. This section provides in full as follows:
"Section 22.x x x (3) The tenant shall have the right

to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an area of
not more than 3 per cent, of the area of his landholding
provided that it does not exceed one thousand square meters
and that it shall be located at a convenient and suitable place
within the land of the landholder to be designated by the latter
where the tenant shall construct his dwelling and may raise
vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals and engage in
minor industries, the
37
CHAPTER II
products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively. The

tenant's dwelling shall not be removed from the lot already
assigned to him by the landholder, except as provided in
Section 26 unless there is a severance of the tenancy
relationship between them as provided under Section 9, or
unless the tenant is ejected for cause, and only after the
expiration of forty-five (45) days following such severance of
relationship or dismissal for cause."
The law is unambiguous and clear. Consequently, it must be
according to its
applied according to its plaini arid ob-vious meaning,
express terms. Verba legis non est receden dum, or from the word,
only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right
to construct or maintain a house thereon. And here, private
respondent does not dis pute that he is a mere member of Ana
Pascual's immediate farm household. Under the law, therefore, we
find private re spondent not entitled to a home lot. Neither is he
entitled to construct a house of his own or to continue maintaining
the same within the very small landholding of petitioner. To rule
otherwise is to make a mockery of the purpose of the tenan cy
relations between a bona fide tenant and the landholder as
envisioned by the very law, i.e., RA No. 1199, as amended, upon
which private respondent relies, to wit:
Section 2. Purpose. - It is the purpose of this Act to
establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders
and tenants upon the principles of social justice; to afford
adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and
landholders: to issue the equitable division of the produce
and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-
farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient
agricultural production, to bolster their economic position
and to encourage their participation in the development of
peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if the Court were to follow private respondent's argu ment and
allow all the members of the tenant's immediate farm household to
construct and maintain their houses and to be entitled to not more than
one thousand (1,000) square meters each of home lot, as what private
respondent wanted th[e] Court to dole-out, then farms will be virtually
converted into rows, if not colonies, of houses. How then can there be
"equitable division of the produce and
income derived from the land" and "more efficient agricul tural
production" if the land's productivity and use for growing crops is
lessened or, more appropriately, obliterated by its uncer
emonious conversion into residential use? It is a fundamental
principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been
ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Th[e]
Court should not deviate therefrom.
The landholder is also entitled to the protection of the law.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged.
Further, it is undisputed that Ana Pascual, the tenant and
private respondent's mother, has an existing home lot and a
house on the subject property in which private respondent may
take refuge while attending to his work. Curiously, despite its
availability, private respondent chose to construct, without
petitioner's permission, a concrete house of his own thereby
saving him the trouble of paying appropriate rents. If the courts
were to abide by the respondent court's inordinate
pronouncement that private respondent is entitled to maintain his
own house then we will be condoning the deprivation of a
landholder's property without even a fraction of compensation.
It taxes the credulity of the Court, therefore, to insist that
private respondent's having a house of his own on the property is
merely incidental to the "tenancy" and to afford him the
convenience of attending to the cultivation of the land for, in the
first place, he is not the tenant as he himself admits.
Besides, the "incidental" use of his own house can very
well be provided by the existing house of his mother, who with her
"old and infirm" condition, surely needs the attention and care of
her children, one of whom is herein private respondent.
Be it emphasized that like the tenant the landholder is also
entitled to the protection of the law, as one of the purposes of the
"Act" is "to afford adequate protection to the rights of BOTH
tenants and landholders."
The policy of social justice, the Court reiterates, is not intended
to countenance wrongdoing simply because
CHAPTER II 39
it is committed by the underprivileged. "Compassion for the

poor," as [the Court] said in Galay, et al. v. CA,, et al., is an
imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is
not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege."
REJECTED RESPONDENT'S PLEA THAT THERE WAS
ROOM FOR ANOTHER INTERPRETATION. INSTEAD,
THECOURTFIRMLYRULEDTHATRESPONDENTJUDGE
MISERABLY FAILED TO EXHIBIT THE OBJECTIVITY
REQUIRED OF MEMBERS OF THE BENCH WHICH IS
NECESSARY, EVEN INDISPENSABLE, TO MAINTAIN
PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE COURT.
TABAO v. JUDGE ESPINA

A.M. No. RTJ-96-1348, 14 June 1996
EN BANG, PER CURIAM
The respondent Judge should be sanctioned for
digressing from the regular course and procedure of
rendering judgment, which must be done only after both
the prosecution and the defense have rested their
respective cases; that a hearing is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can determine whether or
not to grant bail; and that the ruling in Simon did not
alter, much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to
oppose bail and neither did it cure the defect of lack of a
bail hearing in this case.
FACTS:
First Assistant City Prosecutor for Tacloban City, Leo C. Tabao,
accused Judge Pedro S. Espina of: (a) Gross Irregularity, (b) Abuse of
Authority, and (c) Bias in favor of the accused.
In another sworn complaint, Regional State Prosecutor Fran cisco Q.
Aurillo, Jr. manifested that he had earlier assailed before the CA an order
issued by respondent granting bail to the accused without giving the
prosecution a chance to present evidence to op pose the grant of bail. The
Court of Appeals annulled respondent's orders, granting bail to the
accused and denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the
order that granted bail. Respon dent failed to comment on this aspect of
the complaint against him.
The records show that respondent Judge had set the promulga tion of
judgment in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197 entitled "People of the Phils. v.
Salvador Padernal, "a case for violation of RA No. 6425 for drug pushing
and had promulgated his decision thereon despite the defense's
manifestation for time to allow it to submit other docu mentary evidence,
make its formal offer of exhibits, and to rest its case. Judgment was
promulgated and the prosecution was not given a chance to adduce
rebuttal evidence.
Respondent filed his comments on the separate complaints, arguing
that he proceeded to decide the case without the documentary evidence of the
defense because they were not submitted on time; that the evidence to be
submitted, consisting of business licenses and permits, was immaterial to
the innocence or guilt of the accused; that official duty is presumed to
have been regularly performed unless the contrary is shown; that his
grant of bail to the accused is now allowed in view of the ruling in
People v. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555).
HELD:
The Office of the Court Administrator held that respondent's acts
constituted an exercise of judicial prerogative.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Judge should be
sanctioned for digressing from the regular course and procedure of
rendering judgment, which must be done only after both the
prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases; that
a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can determine
whether or not to grant bail; and that the ruling in Simon did not alter,
much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose bail and
neither did it cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case.
The Supreme Court dismissed respondent from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Court has repeatedly stressed the ruling in People v. Dacudao (170
SCRA 489), that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong
on the issue of whether or not to grant bail to an accused charged with a
heinous crime where the imposable
CHAPTER II 41
penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Hence, a denial

of the prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural
due process, a right to which it is entitled equally as the defense. A
hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the
existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114,
Section 6, Rules of Court in granting or rejecting a plea for bail. The
hearing for bail though summary in nature is necessary to afford both the
prosecution and the defense an opportunity to prove their respective
contentions on the matter of bail for the accused.
The Court has never hesitated to impose sanctions on judges who had
granted bail to an accused charged with a heinous crime punishable with
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without the required
hearing. In Santos v. Ofilada (245 SCRA 56), the Court expressing almost
exasperation over repeated violations by judges in this regard stated that
"it is indeed lamentable that despite the series of its pronouncements on
the same administrative
office, th[e] Court still has to contend with the same problem all over
again and to impose once more the same sanction.
It is gross misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court, for
respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolution requiring him to
comment on the accusations in the complaints thoroughly and
substantially.
Respondent cannot rely on the ruling in People v. Simon (234
SCRA 555), since the issue in the present complaints is his having
granted bail to an accused charged with an offense then punishable
with life imprisonment; without giving the prosecution the opportunity to
show that evidence of guilt is strong and that as a consequence, the
accused is not entitled to bail. Under the Rules of Court, a hearing for bail
is mandatory to afford the State its right to oppose the granting of bail.
The ruling in Simon did not alter much less set aside the State's right to a
hearing to oppose bail. Neither did the ruling in Simon cure the defect of
lack of a bail hearing in this case.
On the issue regarding the manner of promulgating the decision
in a criminal case, respondent judge digressed from the regular course
and procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after the
prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases. In the
subject criminal case, the defense has rested their respective cases. In
the subject criminal case, the defense had yet to rest its case when
respondent rendered the judgment of acquittal. It is not difficult to
imagine the grave injustice which
would have resulted had respondent judge convicted the accused before
the defense had rested its case. Of course, respondent judge acquitted the
accused. But the questions now are: why the deliberate haste to acquit
the accused, the same accused to whom bail had been granted by
respondent judge without hearing the prosecution's evidence? And why
was the prosecution denied the right to present rebuttal evidence when it
manifested its intention to present rebuttal evidence when informed of
the promulgation of judgment?
Judges should be reminded that in each step in the trial of criminal
cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favorof an accused
requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his
defense; so, with the prosecution as to its evidence.
Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always
take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether
in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges
are sworn not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just.
The judicial gavel should not be yielded by one who has an unsound and
distorted sense of justice and fairness. Respondent judge's conduct in the
disposition of the criminal case subject of the present complaints leaves
much to be desired. He miserably failed to exhibit the objectivity
required of members of the bench that is necessary, even indispensable,
to maintain the public's trust and confidence in the courts.
In sum, respondent judge should be penalized for gross
ignorance of the law in granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case No.
93-04-197, where the imposable penalty was life imprisonment, without
hearing. He should also be accordingly sanctioned for having
promulgated the decision in the same criminal case before the defense
had rested and without according the prosecution an opportunity to
present rebuttal evidence.
NOTE: In the above-cited case, the Supreme Court made

reference to and answered the respondent's contention and
citation of the 1946 case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons
(76 Phil. 756) to support his theory that where the prosecution
recommends bail, it is to be understood as being equivalent to an
admission that evidence of guilt is not strong or a non opposition
or a virtual agreement to the bail application which in effect does
away with the need for a bail hearing. Unfortunately, nowhere in
said case may such conclusion be inferred. Besides, in Ocampo v.
Bernabe (77
Phil. 55), the Court said: [The Court] ha[s] held in Herras
CHAPTER II 43
Teehankee v. Director of Prisons that all persons shall before

conviction be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense
and the evidence of guilt is strong. The general rule therefore is
that all persons, whether charged or not yet charged are before
their conviction entitled to provisional release on bail, the only
exception being where the charge is a capital offense and the evidence
of guilt is found to be strong. The determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion. This
discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing.
RESPONDENT. THUS, CANNOT PLEAD THAT THERE

WAS ROOM FOR ANOTHER POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION
AND THAT THEREFORE HIS ACT TO GRANTING BAIL
WITHOUT HEARING IS BUT A CASE OF INNOCENT ERROR
OR MISTAKE NOT TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW. ABD USUKUR M. TANv. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS.
G.R. NO. 119892, FEBRUARY 13, 1996, EN BANC, MINUTE
RESOLUTION. (Underscoring and Emphasis Supplied)

MADE REFERENCE TO THE PREAMBLE AND TO THE
WHEREAS CLAUSES TO DISCOVER THE SPIRIT AND
INTENT OF A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
New Case:
RAFAEL H. GALVEZ and KATHERINE L. GUY v. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and ASIA UNITED BANK G.R. No.
187919
ASIA UNITED BANK v. GILBERT G. GUY, PHILIP
LEUNG, KATHERINE L. GUY, RAFAEL H. GALVEZ
and EUGENIO H. GALVEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 187979
GILBERT G. GUY, PHILIP LEUNG and EUGENIO H.
GALVEZ, JR. v. ASIA UNITED BANK
G.R. No. 188030
April 25, 2012
In this case, the Court holds that AUB, being a commercial
bank, is not beyond the coverage of PD No. 1689. The Court asserts
that a bank is a corporation whose fund comes from
the general public and PD No. 1689 does not distinguish the
nature of the corporation. It requires, rather, that the funds of
such corporation should come from the general public. This was
highlighted by the third "whereas clause" of the quoted law which
states that the same also applies to other "corporations/associations
operating on funds solicited from the general public."
FACTS:
In 1999, Radio Marine Network (Smartnet) Inc. (RMSI) claim ing
to do business under the name Smartnet Philippines and/or Smartnet
Philippines, Inc. (SPI), applied for an Omnibus Credit Line for various
credit facilities with Asia United Bank (AUB). To induce AUB to extend
the Omnibus Credit Line, RMSI, through its directors and officers,
presented its Articles of Incorporation with its 400-peso million
capitalization and its congressional telecom fran chise.
Satisfied with the credit worthiness of RMSI, AUB granted a P250
million Omnibus Credit Line, under the name of Smartnet Philippines,
RMSI's Division. Later, it was increased to P452 minion after a third-
party real estate mortgage by an affiliate of Guy Group of Companies, in
favor of Smartnet Philippines, was offered to the bank. Simultaneous
to the increase, RMSI submitted a proof of authority to open the
Omnibus Credit Line and peso and dollar accounts in the name of
Smartnet Philippines, Inc., which Gilbert Guy, et al., represented as a
division of RMSI, as evidenced by the letterhead used in its formal
correspondences with the bank and the financial audit made by SGV & Co.
Attached to this authority was the Amended Articles of Incorporation of
RMSI, doing business under the name of Smartnet Philippines, and the
Secretary's Certificate of SPI authorizing its directors, Gilbert Guy and
Philip Leung to transact with AUB. Prior to this major transaction,
however, and, unknown to AUB, Gilbert Guy, et al. formed a subsidiary
corporation, the SPI with a paid-up capital of only P62,500.00.
Believing that SPI is the same as Smartnet Philippines AUB granted it,
among others, an Irrevocable Letter of Credit in the total sum of
$29,300.00 in favor of Rohde & Schwarz Support Centre Asia Ptd. Ltd.,
which is the subject of these consolidated petitions. To cover this liability
Gilbert Guy executed Promissory Note (PN) in behalf of SPI in favor of
AUB. This PN was renewed twice, once, in the name of SPI, and last, in
the name of Smartnet Philippines, bolstering
CHAPTER II 45
AUB's belief that RMSI's directors and officers consistently treated this
letter of credit, among others, as obligations of RMSI.
When RMSI's obligations remained unpaid, AUB sent demand
letters. RMSI denied liability contending that the transaction was
incurred solely by SPI, a corporation which belongs to the Guy Group
of Companies, which has a separate and distinct personality from RMSI.
It further claimed that while Smartnet Philippines is an RMSI division,
SPI, is a subsidiary of RMSI, and hence, is a separate entity.
Aggrieved, AUB filed a case of syndicated estafa under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689
against the interlocking directors of RMSI and SPI, namely, Gilbert G.
Guy, Rafael H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy, and Eugenio H.
Galvez, Jr., before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City.
Accordingly, an Information was filed against Gilbert Guy, et al., with the
RTC of Pasig City.
Both parties filed their respective Petitions for Review with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) assailing the Resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig City.
The DOJ reversed the City Prosecutor's Resolution and ordered the
dismissal of the estafa charges against Gilbert Guy, et al. for insufficiency
of evidence. The AUB's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
AUB then assailed the DOd Resolution before the CA. The CA
partially granted AUB's petition.
Hence, these consolidated petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether there is probable cause to prosecute Gilbert Guy, et al.,
for the crime of syndicated estafa under PD No. 1689.
HELD:
Anent the issue as to whether or not Gilbert Guy, et al., should be
charged for syndicated estafa in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689,
which states that:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or

other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be
punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa)

is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or
illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme,
and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers
associations, or of funds solicited by corporationsl asso
ciations from the general public.
The Court holds that the afore-quoted law applies to the case at bar.
Gilbert Guy et al. want the Court to believe that AUB, being a
commercial bank, is beyond the coverage of PD No. 1689. The Court
holds, however, that a bank is a corporation whose fund comes from the
general public. PD No. 189 does not distinguish the nature of the
corporation. It requires, rather, that the funds of such corporation should
come from the general public. This is bolstered by the third "whereas
clause" of the quoted law which states that the same also applies to other
"corporations/associations operating on funds solicited from the general
public." This is precisely the very same scheme that PD No. 1689
contemplates to "be checked or at least be minimized by imposing capital
punishment involving funds solicited by corporations/associations from
the general public" because "this erodes the confidence of the public in
the banking and cooperative system, contravenes public interest and
constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the stability of the nation."
Old Cases:
PEOPLE v. HON. A. PURISIMA, et al.,

G.R. Nos. 1-420050-66, November 20, 1978
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the
intent and spirit of Presidential Decree No. 9 can be
found in the preamble or "whereas" clauses, which
enumerate the facts, or events that justify the
promulgation of the decrees and the stiff sanctions stated
therein.
FACTS:
Information for violation of PD No. 9 was ordered quashed by
Judge Purisima. The latter reasoned out that the information failed to
allege an essential element of the offense; thus: That the carrying outside
of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt
CHAPTER II 47
weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related

to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, organized lawlessness or public
disorder.
On appeal, the Solicitor General raised the argument that the
prohibited acts need not be related to subversion activities and that the
preamble of the statute or that expressed in the "whereas" clauses is not
an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure
inherent defects in the statute. It was also argued that the explanatory
note merely explains the reasons for issuing the decree and this cannot
prevail over the text itself.
HELD:
The Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor General.
Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview
of PD No. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of
the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or
"whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanction stated therein.
U.S. v. HART, et al., 26 PHIL. 149

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that
construction should be based upon something more
substantial than mere punctuation found in the printed
act. Argument based upon punctuation is not conclusive,
and the courts will not hesitate to
change the punctuation when necessary, to give the act the
effect intended by the legislature.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were charged with vagrancy under Section 1
of RA No. 519. This section enumerates certain classes of persons who
are to be considered as vagrants such as those "found loitering about
saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying
through the country without visible means of support."
Accused-appellants were prosecuted and convicted for "loitering about
saloons or dram shops or gambling houses" the first part of Section 1.
The second part, it will be noticed is worded as follows: "or tramping or
straying through the country without visible means of support."
It turned out, as shown by the evidence, that accused-appellants had

visible means of support.
The Attorney General argued that "without visible means of
support" as used in the second part, does not apply to "every person
found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses," but
only to tramping or straying through the country." It was contended that
if "without visible means of support" is intended for the first part, either
the comma after gambling houses would have been omitted, or else the
comma after country would have been inserted.
HELD:
When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the
duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention,
and adopt that construction of the statute which will give it effect.
The construction should be based upon something more
substantial that the mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the
punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in
apparent accord with legislative will, it may be used as an additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as
thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation is not
conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation
when necessary, to give to the Act the effect intended by the legislature,
disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting
others where necessary.
The accused-appellants were acquitted.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION v. TORRES

G.R. No. 93666, April 22, 1991
Private Parties cannot Constitutionally con
tract away the Applicable Provision of Law.
FACTS:
An alien employment permit was issued by DOLE to Earl
Timothy Cone, as sports consultant and coach of General Milling
Corporation. The change of admission of status of said Earl Timothy
Cone was approved to a pre-arranged employee. Months later, CMC
requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full pledged coach. The
request was granted.
CHAPTER II 49
The Secretary of labor cancelled Cone's permit because General

Milling Corporation failed to submit evidence that there is no person in the
Philippines that is competent and willing to do the services that could be
rendered by Cone, and likewise, there is no proof that Cone's employment
will redound to national interest.
ISSUE:
Was there a grave abuse of discretion in revoking the alien
employment permit of Cone? Is the contention of General Milling
Corporation (that it is an employer's prerogative to hire a foreign coach)
valid and tenable?
HELD:
There was no grave abuse of discretion. It is not true that the hiring
of foreign coach is an employer's prerogative. The law is clear on this point.
Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of
an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of
Labor. General Milling Corporation's right to choose who to employ is
limited by the statutory requirement of an employment permit.
GMC will not find solace in the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. No comparison can be made between Cone and Norman
Black as the latter is "a long-time resident" of the country and thus, not
subject to Article 40 of the Labor Code which applies only to "non-resident
aliens."
Neither will obligation of contract be impaired by the imple
mentation of the Secretary's decision. The Labor Code and its imple menting
Rules and Regulations requiring alien employment permits were in existence
long before GMC and Cone entered into their con tract of employment.
Provisions of applicable laws especially those relating to matters affected
with public policy, are deemed written into contracts. Private parties
cannot constitutionally con tract away the applicable provision of
law.
GMC's contention that the Labor Secretary should have deferred
to the Immigration Commission's finding as for the need to employ Cone is
again bereft of legal basis.
EXAMPLE OFACASE WHERE THE SUPREME COURT

RULED, AMONG OTHERS, THAT EVERY PART
OF THE STATUTE MUST BE INTERPRETED WITH
REFERENCE TO THE CONTEXT, i.e., THAT EVERY

PART OF THE STATUTE MUST BE CONSIDERED
TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PARTS, AND KEPT
SUBSERVIENT TO THE GENERAL INTENT OF THE
WHOLE ENACTMENT.
THE COURTALSO RULED THAT THE SPIRIT RATHER
THAN THE LETTER OF A LAW DETERMINES ITS
CONSTRUCTION; HENCE, A STATUTE, AS IN THIS
CASE, MUST BE READ ACCORDING TO ITS SPIRIT
AND INTENT.
PARAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996
It is a rule in statutory construction that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.
An interpretation should, ifpossible, be avoided
under which a statute or provision being construed is
defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away,
or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or
nugatory.
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory con
struction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution.
FACTS:
Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City,
who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for
his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay. COMELEC scheduled the petition signing on October 14,
1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1996. At least 29.30%
of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25%
requirement provided by law. Due to Paras' opposition, the COMELEC
set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent
the holding of the recall election, Paras filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City a
CHAPTER II 51
petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a temporary

restraining order.
The petition was later on dismissed and the TRO was lifted. In a
resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-
scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996. Hence, the instant
petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction
was filed.
HELD:
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
"Section 74. Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local
official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his
term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election."
•It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. (Aisporna v.
Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 464)
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b)
construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when
such election shall take place.
Thus, subscribing to Paras' interpretation of the phrase regu lar local
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel
provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if
the SK election which is set by RA No. 7808 to be held every three years
from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase
"regular local election," as erroneously insisted by Paras, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the
Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with
the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective
law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing
in the enactment of a statute. (Asturias
Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617) An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as other wise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained
away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, in
formative or nugatory. (PLDT v. Collector of International
Revenue, 90 Phil. 674)
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a
statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus,
the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code,
specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with
the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution to "enact a local gov
ernment code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum x x
Moreover, Paras' too literal interpretation of the law leads to
absurdity, which we cannot countenance.
The spirit rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to
its spirit and intent.
1. Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal
working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses,
hence, the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year
immediately preceding the regular election for the office of the local
elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's
replacement in the said election that certainly has a longer tenure in
office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would,
therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the
Code to construe regular local election referring to an election where the
office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the
limitation stated under Section 74(b) of the Code considering that the
next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely
seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. (Paras v.
Commission on Election,, G.R. 123169, November 4, 1996, En Banc,
Francisco, J. [Resolution])
CHAPTER II 53
III. EXTRINSIC AIDS

Extrinsic aids are any of the following: Contemporaneous cir
cumstances, policy, legislative history of the statute, contempora neous or
practical construction, executive construction, legislative construction,
judicial construction, and construction by the bar and legal
commentators.
Extrinsic aids can be resorted to only after the intrinsic aids have
been used and exhausted.
1. CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. - These are
the conditions existing at the time the law was enacted such as the
following:
(a) History of the times and conditions existing at the time the law
was enacted;
(b) Previous state of the law;
(c) The evils sought to be remedied or corrected by the law; and
(d) The customs usages of the people.
The above-mentioned circumstances constitute the reasons why
the law was enacted. Hence, the one interpreting the law should place
himself in the position and circumstances of those who used the words in
question and be able to feel the atmosphere, the conditions, and the
reasons why the law was enacted.
2. POLICY. - The general policy of the law or the settled policy
of the State may enlighten the interpreter of the law as to the intention of
the legislature in enacting the same. Hence, if a new agrarian law is
enacted today and few years from now, there will arise the need to find
out why such a law is enacted, the conditions, the prevailing sentiment of
the people, the policy of the State, and the executive order issued by the
Office of the President preceding the legislative enactment will throw
light upon the intention of the legislature in enacting said law. The same
thing is true if death sentence is imposed for drug pushers and for
those currently involved in the so-called "satanismo" offenses. The
conditions of
the times and the very destructive and heinous crimes committed even in
broad daylight, whether in the city or in the provinces, will convince
future interpreters of the law that such a penalty is needed to protect
society.
3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE. - Such

history may be found in reports of legislative committees, in the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during a hearing, legislative
investigation, or legislative debates.
Are personal opinions of some legislators appropriate aids of
construction?
As a general rule, they are not appropriate aids of construction.
However, if there is unanimity among the supporters and oppositors to a
bill with respect to the objective sought to be accomplished, the debates may
then be used as evidence of the purpose of the act.
4. CONTEMPORANEOUS AND PRACTICAL CON
STRUCTION. - Those who lived at or near the time when the law was
passed were more acquainted of the conditions and the reasons why that
law was enacted Their understandmg and application of the law,
especially if the same has been continued and acquiesced by the judicial
tribunals and the legal profession, deserve to be consid
ered by the courts.
5. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION. - The construction given
by the executive department deserves great weight and should be
respected if said construction has been formed and observed for a long
period of time. The rules to remember are as follow:
(a) Congress is deemed to have been aware of the contempo raneous
and practical construction made by the officers charged with
the administration and enforcement of the law;
(b) The courts should respect that contemporaneous
construction except if it is clearly erroneous;
(c) Executive construction has more weight if it is rendered by the
Chief Legal adviser of the government who can issue opinions
to assist various departments of the government charged with
the duty to administer the law;
(d) The opinion, however, of the Chief Legal adviser is sub servient
to the ruling of the judiciary, which is in charge of applying
and mterpretmg laws
6 LEGISLATIVE CONSTRUCTION - Legislative
construction is entitled to consideration and great weight but it cannot
control as against the court's prerogative to decide on what is the right or
wrong interpretation.
CHAPTER II 55
7. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION. - It is presumed that the

legislature was acquainted with and had in mind the judicial
construction of former statutes on the subject. It is also presumed that the
statute was enacted in the light of the judicial construction
that the prior enactment had received. With respect to a statute
adopted from another state, it is presumed that it was adopted with the
construction placed upon it by the courts of that State.
Should this construction be followed?
It should be followed only if it is reasonable, in harmony with
justice and public policy and consistent with the local law.
8. CONSTRUCTION BY THE BAR AND LEGAL COM
MENTATORS. - It is presumed that the meaning publicly given in a
statute by the members of the legal profession is a true one and regarded
as one that should not be lightly changed. The opinion and commentaries
of text writers and legal commentators, whether they are Filipinos or
foreigners, may also be consulted as, in fact, they are oftentimes cited or
made as references in court decisions.
SIMPLIFICATIONS OF THE RULE REGARDING THE

USE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS
Extrinsic aids, such as those mentioned above, are entitled to
respect, consideration and weight, but the courts are at liberty to decide
whether they are applicable or not to the case brought to it for decision.
EXAMPLE OFA CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT

EXPLAINED THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW AS WELL
AS THE POLICY AND OBJECTIVE SOUGHT TO BE
ACCOMPLISHED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE

PHILIPPINES v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989
FACTS:
PD No. 27, EO Nos. 228 and 229, and RA No. 6657 (Compre hensive
Agrarian Reform Program) were assailed as violative of due process and
therefore unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Is RA No. 6657 constitutional?
HELD:
The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of
the land. What is required is the surrender of the land and the physical
possession of the land in excess of the retention limit and all the
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the for
mer beneficiary. This is within the power of the State to take and regulate
private property for which payment of just compensation is provided.
Although the proceedings in Section 16 of CARL are described as
summary, the landowners and other interested parties are never theless
allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the
property.
DAR's determination of just compensation is not by any means
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any interested party. DAR's
determination is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties
concerned. Otherwise, the court of justice will still have the right to
review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.
Regarding Section 18 thereof which requires the owners of
expropriated properties to accept just compensation in less than
money, the Supreme Court said: "This is not an ordinary
expropriation where only a specific property is sought to be taken
by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose. WHAT WE DEAL WITH HERE IS A REVOLUTIONARY
KIND OF EXPROPRIATION."
Such program will involve not merely millions but billions of
pesos. "[The Court] assume[s] that the framers of the Constitution
were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform
as a top project of the government. There can be no doubt that
they were aware of the financial
limitation of the government and had no illusions that there
would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands
they wanted to be distributed among the farmers."
"[The Court] may assume their intention was to allow such
manner of payment as provided by the CARP Law conditions the transfer
of possession and ownership of the land to the government upon receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAB of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Until then, the title remains with the landowner. No outright change of
ownership is contemplated."
CHAPTER II 57
EXAMPLE OF CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT

DELVED INTO THE INTENTION OF THE LAW AND
WHY THE RIGHT OF CULTIVATION WAS EXTENDED
TO THE LANDOWNER'S IMMEDIATE FAMILY
MEMBERS
BONIFACIO v. JUDGE DIZON

G.R. No. 79416, September 5, 1989
The question (involving the interpretation of Section 36(1) of BA
No. 3844 is this:
Is the ejectment of the agricultural lessee valid when the
landowner-lessor desires to cultivate the landholding?
Section 36 (1) of RA No. 3844 provides as follows:
"Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future

surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in
the enjoyment and possession of his landhold ing except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment
that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that;
The agricultural lessor-own
er or a member of the immediate family will personally
cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school
site or other useful non-agricultural purposes."
Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was

authorized not only when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the
landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so desired.
In so providing, the law did not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly
and personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of such right to
the members of his immediate family. The right of cultivation as a ground
for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-
lessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation
likewise conferred upon the landowner's immediate family members.
The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's
immediate family members to place the landowner-lessor in
parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to
cultivate the land with the aid of farm household. In this regard, it
must be observed that an agricultural

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STATUTORY

* Published & Distributed by

REX Book Store

I acknowledge the assistance rendered by the members of my

I wrote the second edition of this book in 2007.

Judicial power, traditional concept of judicial power 13 What is the

Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation v.

Tabao v. Judge Espina, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1348,

U.S. v. Hart, et al.,

General Milling Corporation v. Torres,

.................................................................................. 53 3. Legislative history

Simplifications of the rule regarding the use

Background of rules and jurisprudence in case

.......................................................................... 121 Other

Legislative intent must be ascertained from the

RemedialStatutes ..................................................................... 162 How

principle that laws should be prospective,

On the principle that ignorance of the law excuses no one but

terms of the contract? ....................................................... 217 In case

United Harbor Pilots' Assn. of the Phils., Inc. v. Assn. of Int'l.

People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan

Board of Commissioners v. Judge de la Rosa,

Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, DEFINED

Statutory construction is the act or process of discovering and

II. CONSTRUCTION DISTINGUISHED FROM

III. IN A NUTSHELL THEREFORE, THE MOST BASIC

Apply the Law Interpret the Law Construct the Law

lv. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT

contrary, for any interpretation (Domingo v. Commission on

V. THREE (3) CARDINAL RULES WHEN THE

VI. WHO INTERPRETS THE LAW?

regulatory boards and administrative agencies have been elevated and

VII. PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION AND

VIII. WHEN IS IT NECESSARY

IX. WHEN IS IT NOT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS v. DANILO T. BOLOS

Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the

Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the

Trial Court as authorized under existing laws shall, at the

As such, the JDF as a fund source is not constant

M. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT, AND

the legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines consisting of a

XII. LEGISLATIVE POWER

EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA v.

After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the

land covered by Proclamation No. 164. The CA reversed the said

XIII. JUDICIAL POWER

What is the traditional concept of judicial power?

The significance of the additional sentence "and to determine

EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and

Whether Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is